ML16341E828
| ML16341E828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1988 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341E827 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-88-18, 50-323-88-17, NUDOCS 8810170245 | |
| Download: ML16341E828 (92) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1988018
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
BOARD REPORT
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT
OF
LICENSEE
PERPORMANCE
FOR
PACIFIC GAS
AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT
REPORT
NOS. 50-275/88-18
AND 50-323/88-17
EVALUATION PERIOD:
08/01/87 - 07/31/88
BOARD ASSESSMENT
CONDUCTED
SEPTEMBER 8,
1988
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TABLE OF
CONTENTS
Pacae
I.
Introduction
A.
Licensee Activities
B.
Direct Inspection
and Review Activities
II.
Summary of Results
A.
Overview
B.
Results of Board Assessment
C.
Changes
in SALP Ratings
from Previous
III. Criteria
IV.
Performance
Analysis
A.
Pl ant Operati ons
B.
Radiological Controls
C.
Maintenance/Surveillance
D.
Emergency
Preparedness
E.
Security
F.
Engineering/Technical
Support
G.
Safety Assessment/quality
Verification
H.
Fire Protection
5
8
11
15
16
19
22
26
V.
Supporting
Data and Summaries
A.
Enforcement Activity
B.
Confirmation of Action Letters
28
28
TABLES
Table
1
Table
2
Table
3
Table
4
Table
5
Table
6
Table
7
Table
8
Inspection Activities and Enforcement
Summary, Unit 1
Inspection Activities and Enforcement
Summary, Unit 2
Enforcement
Items, Unit 1
Enforcement
Items, Unit 2
Synopsis of Licensee
Event Reports,
Unit 1
Synopsis of Licensee
Event Reports,
Unit 2
Licensee
Event Reports,
Unit 1
Licensee
Event Reports,
Unit 2
'b
DETAILS
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Systematic
Assessment
of Licensee
Performance
(SALP) program is an
integrated
NRC staff effort to collect available observations
and data
on
a periodic basis
and evaluate
the licensee's
performance
based
on this
information.
The program is supplemental
to normal regulatory processes
used to ensure
compliance with NRC rules
and regulations.
It is intended
to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide
a rational basis for allocating
NRC resources
and to provide meaningful
feedback to the licensee's
management
regarding the NRC's assessment
of their facility's performance
in each functional area.
An NRC SALP Board,
composed of the members listed below,
met in the
Region
V office on September
8, 1988, to review the observations
and data
on performance
in accordance
with NRC Chapter
0516,
dated
June
6, 1988,
"Systematic
Assessment
of Licensee
Performance."
The Board's findings
and recommendations
were forwarded to the
NRC Regional Administrator for
approval
and issuance.
This report is the NRC's assessment
of the licensee's
safety performance
at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,
Units 1 and,2, for the period
August 1,
1987 through July 31,
1988.
The
SALP Board for Diablo Canyon
was
composed of:
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E. Chaffee,
Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects,
Region
V (Board Chairman)
W. Knighton, Director, Project Directorate
V,
Rood,
NRR Project Manager
P.
Zimmerman, Chief, Reactor Projects
Branch
J.
Pate,
Chief, Reactor Safety Branch
L. Montgomery, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety
and Safeguards
Branch
M. Mendonca,
Chief, Reactor
Projects
Section
1
P.
Yuhas, Chief,
Emergency
Preparedness
and Radiological Protection
Branch
D. Schuster,
Chief, Safeguards
Section
F. Fish, Chief,
Emergency
Preparedness
Section
P. Narbut, Senior Resident
Inspector
B. Pereira,
Project Inspector
S. North, Senior Radiation Specialist
W. Schaefer,
Physical Security Specialist
P. O'rien, Project Inspector
Ramsey,
Reactor Inspector,
Engineering Section
"Denotes voting member in functional area of cognizance.
""Denotes voting member in all functional areas.
A.
Licensee Activities
Unit 1 started
the
SALP period at lOOX power and operated thru March
6,
1988 and then
commenced
the second refueling outage.
The second
refueling outage
was completed
on July 13,
1988, with a return to
power operations
which continued thru the end of this
SALP period.
The refueling outage
included refueling the core,
eddy current
testing of steam generators,
testing of 213 snubbers,
an integrated
leak rate test of containment
and significant unplanned work, such
as,
repair of leaking
CROM canopy welds,
replacement
of cracked
lube oil assemblies
and reversal
of 48 inch containment
purge
isolation valves.
Unit 1 experienced
four automatic reactor trips
during the
SALP period.
Unit 2 commenced
the
SALP period at 100X power and operated
continuously throughout the
SALP period.
Unit 2 experienced
one
automatic
and two manual reactor trips during the
SALP period.
B.
Direct Ins ection and Review Activities
Approximately 5416 on-site inspection
hours"were
spent in performing
a total of 59 inspections
by resident,
region-based,
headquarters,
and contract personnel.
Inspection activity for each unit in a
functional area are
summarized
in Tables
1 and 2, for Units
1 and 2,
respectively.
Three
NRC resident
inspectors
were on-site through
mid-May 1988, with two inspectors
onsite for the remainder of the
SALP period.
II.
Summar
of Results
A.
Overview
The
SALP Board found that the single most prevalent
commonality
noted in the various functional areas
assessed
was that the licensee
was defining and taking actions to improve performance
but that
progress
was being
made slowly.
This situation
was almost to the
point where the slowness
of the actions
became
a dominant negative
perception
as
opposed to a positive perception of the actions
themselves.
Notwithstanding the above
comments,
licensee
improvements
were
observed
during this
SALP period, including progress
made in the
areas of concern discussed
in the 1987
SALP.
Specifically, the
licensee
has
improved programs for root cause evaluation,
procedural
compliance,
and formality of communications.
A number of key issues
were developed
during this assessment
period.
Specifically, the
NRC found that minimal design basis
information
was available for use related to plant operations
and maintenance
~ activities.
Findings in this area
demonstrate
that communication
deficiencies
between corporate
engineering
and the site
have
resulted in an incomplete understanding
of the design basis
by the
site engineering staff.
To address this concern,
the licensee
has
undertaken
the development of a configuration management
program
including design basis definition and
a site system engineering
program.
The licensee
expects this program to be of the scope
necessary
to address
these
concerns,
however the program appears
to
have
been
slow in developing.
Another area for improvement identified during this assessment
has
been the
need for fully successful
implementation of
managements'olicy
and objectives.
Although corporate
management
established
a
presence
and set the tone in response
to significant events,
management
has not established
effective feedback or performance
monitoring methods to ensure that initiatives and expectations
are
implemented
as expected.
As a result,
management
has not been
completely aware that
some initiatives had not been carried out to
the extent expected.
Notable examples of this lack of feedback
and
monitoring were in the areas
of maintenance
backlog and in the
follow through of upper management's
guidance for event
investigation actions.
Contributing to these
problems
was the fact that the quality
organizations
appeared
to be insufficiently involved in the initial
review of events
and plant problems,
and were not providing
independent verification that management's
policies were being
successfully effected.
In some specific post event cases,
the
NRC
found it necessary
to supply the impetus for the licensee's
review
and verification of planned actions which had not been fully carried
through.
The functional areas
descriptions
provide additional specific
recommendations
for management
consideration.
B.
Results of Board Assessment
Overall, the
SALP Board concluded that PG8E's
management
has
continued to be involved and concerned with nuclear safety,
and that
licensee
resources
were ample
and reasonably effective in assuring
operational
safety.
The results of the Board's
assessment
of the
licensee's
performance
in each functional area,
including the
previous
assessments,
are
as follows:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
H.
Functional
Area
Plant Operations
Radiological Controls
Maintenance/Surveillance
Emergency
Preparedness
Secur ity
Engineering/Technical
Support
Safety Assessment/
guality Verification
Fire Protection
Rating
Last
Period'
2
1
2
1
2
Rating
Thi,s
Period
2
1
2
1
2
2
Trend~
Improving
Improving
The trend indicates
the
SALP Board's appraisal
of the licensee's
direction of performance
in a functional area
near the close of the
assessment
period such that continuation of this trend
may result in
a change in performance level.
Determination of the performance
trend is made selectively
and is reserved for those
instances
when
it is necessary
to focus
NRC and licensee attention
on an area with
a declining performance trend, or to acknowledge
an improving trend
in licensee
performance.
It is not necessarily
a comparison of
performance
during the current period with that in the previous
period.
C.
Chan
es in SALP Ratin
s from the Previous
The
NRC had administratively changed,
to some degree,
the groupings
of activities included in SALP functional areas
during this
period.
Engirieering/Technical
was not a functional area last
period and therefore
was not rated.
Maintenance
and Surveillance
were separate
functional areas last
SALP period.
However,
both
areas
received
a rating of 2 during the last 'assessment.
Safety
Assessment/guality
Verification is
a
new functional area this
period.
It is similar to,
and more comprehensive
than,
the guality
Programs
and Administrative Controls Affecting Safety functional
area that also received
a 2 rating last
SALP.
Other functional
areas
rated last
SALP period are discussed,
as appropriate,
in the
functional area analyses
for this
SALP period,
such
as training
support
and facilities are discussed
in the Engineering
and
Technical
Support functional area.
Finally, the area of fire
protection
was included in this
SALP because
of the licensee's
extensive efforts in this area which resulted in an improved
performance rating and trend.
Recognizing these facts, there
has
been essentially
no numerical rating changes
in the various
categories
from the last
SALP evaluation.
III. CRITERIA
Licensee
performance is assessed
in selected
functional areas,
depending
on whether the facility is in a construction
or operational
phase.
Functional
areas
normally represent
areas significant to nuclear safety
and the environment.
Some functional areas
may not be assessed
because
of little or no licensee activities or lack of meaningful observations.
Special
areas
may be added to highlight significant observations.
The following evaluation criteria were used,
as applicable,
to assess
each functional area:
l.
Assurance of quality, including management
involvement and control.
2.
Approach to resolution of technical
issues
from a safety standpoint.
3.
Responsiveness
to
NRC initiatives.
4.
Enforcement history.
5.
Operational
events (including response
to, analysis of, reporting
of, and corrective actions for).
6.
Staffing (including management).
7.
Effectiveness
of training and qualifications program.
However, the
NRC is not limited to these criteria and others
may be used
where appropriate.
On the basis of the
NRC assessment,
each functional area evaluated is
rated according to three performance
categories.
The definitions of
these
performance
categories
are
as follows:
~Cate or
1:
Licensee
management
attention
and involvement are readily
evident
and place
emphasis
on superior performance of nuclear safety or
safeguards
activities, with the resulting performance substantially
exceeding
regulatory requirements.
Licensee
resources
are
ample
and
effectively used
so that
a high level of plant and personnel
performance
is being achieved.
Reduced
NRC attention
may be appropriate.
r
~Cate
or
2:
Licensee
management
attention to and involvement in the
performance of nuclear
safety or safeguards
activities are
good.
The
licensee
has attained
a level of performance
above that needed
to meet
regulatory requirements.
Licensee
resources
are adequate
and reasonably
allocated
so that good plant and personnel
performance
is being achieved.
NRC attention
may be maintained at normal levels.
~Cate or
3:
Licensee
management
attention to and involvement in the
performance of nuclear safety or safeguards
activities are not
sufficient.
The licensee's
performance
does
not significantly exceed
that needed to meet minimal regulatory requirements.
Licensee
resources
appear to be strained
or not effectively used.
NRC attention
should
be
increased
above
normal levels.
IVA
Performance
Anal ses
A.
Plant
0 erations
1.
~Anal sis
During the assessment
period; the licensee's
plant operations
activities were observed routinely by both the resident
and the
regional inspection staff.
Over 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> of inspection
effort were devoted to this functional area.
The licensee
was
noted to have
had several
accomplishments
in the operations
area during this
SALP period,
such
as
improvements
in the
formality of communications,
in attitudes
towards procedure
compliance,
and in timeliness of reporting, all of which were
concerns
from the previous
SALP.
Another improving trend in
the licensee's
performance
has
been
an improvement in the
formal review of operational
events
and the formalization of
the consequent
action plans.
However, events did continue to
occur due to a lack of procedural
compliance
and the failure to
stop activities in the face of uncertainty.
These
problems
and
others
appear to have
been exacerbated
by some middle
management's
(site
and corporate)
missed opportunities
on a
day-to-day basis to provide feedback
and to interact with plant
staff.
In the plant operations
area,
high-level corporate
management
has frequently been involved in site activities.
As an
example,
Vice President
Nuclear
made
a weekly trip to the site
to discuss plant performance.
In addition, in response
to
plant events
management
established
a presence
and set the tone
for collecting information, establishing
root cause
and taking
corrective actions,
as evidenced
in the July 17,
1988 natural
circulation cooldown event at Unit 2 due to ground faulting.
However,
management
has not been totally effective in
establishing
feedback or performance monitoring methods to
ensure that initiatives and expectations
are
implemented
as
expected.
Examples of this are the relatively high number of
illuminated control
room annunciators,
the failure of some
plant supervision to satisfy their requirements
for plant
surveillance tours
and interaction with plant staff as noted
during the April 26 management
meeting,
and the absence
of
gA/gC overview of post event action plan implementation.
The licensee's
approach to the technical resolution of plant
problems resulting from operational
events
has generally
improved over the inspection period.
As late
as about half way
through the period
some restart
reviews were not thorough in
that they lacked indepth root cause
analysis
and did not probe
ancillary problems
experienced
during events.
For example,
following the December
13 Unit 1 reactor trip due to a main
pump trip, the licensee
did not thoroughly address
problems
noted during the event with the condenser
steam
dumps,
resulting in a subsequent
turbine trip at low power.
Towards
the end of the period,
the licensee
had improved the'estart
review process
by implementing detailed action plans which
address
both the root cause of the event
and ancillary problems
experienced.
The licensee
was in the process
of incorporating
these
changes
in the restart
procedure at the end of the
period.
However, the licensee
has
been
slow in establishing
formal root cause
reviews for less significant operational
events
which warrant 'changes
to plant procedures
or programs.
For example, guality Evaluations,
the lowest level of root
cause evaluations,
were not initiated for the March 10
pressurizer
pressure
transient at Unit 1 or the June
1
Auxiliary Feedwater spill at Unit 1.., Both of these
events
warranted
changes
to plant procedures.
The licensee's
responsiveness
to
NRC initiatives in the
operations
area
has
been generally adequate.
The licensee
has
made progress
in priority issues
addressed
in the previous
such
as procedural
compliance,
formality of communications
and
sensitivity to seismic
issues.
As an example,
in the area of
seismic sensitivity, the licensee identified in this period
a
number of operability concerns
when seismic
supports
were
identified to be missing
on equipment.
However,
as discussed
below, events
during the assessment
period indicate that
continued attention is warranted in the areas
of communications
and procedural
compliance.
Three enforcement
items were assigned to'this functional area
for two occurrences
dealing with attention to procedures.
First,.the overpressurization
of the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant
Drain Tank on March ll, resulted
from operations
personnel
going beyond the scope of their procedure.
Second,
the lack of
meaningful
acceptance
criteria for the containment
fan cooler
unit operation
was not noted by operators
in either unit.
Other operational
events during the period also resulted
from
plant personnel
proceeding
beyond the scope of their procedures
and authority,
such
as the January
31 turbine runback at Unit 2
which resulted
from an operator incorrectly using
a multimeter
he was not qualified to use.
The issue of plant personnel
proceeding in the face of uncertainty
was discussed
with
licensee
management
during the April 26 management
meeting,
and
war rants continued attention.
Examples of proceeding in the
face of uncertainty included the Unit 1 containment ventilation
isolation early in the
SALP period on February 17,
1988 (in
which the shift Foreman
concurred to the "functionality" of a
miswired flow transmitter)
and the September
1, 1988 Unit 1
reactor trip, soon after the
end of the
SALP period (in which a
shift foreman did not take action to open
an instrument root
valve which ultimately caused
the trip).
These .examples of
communication
breakdowns
indicate that management
attention to
revising the "culture" in operations
has not yet been fully
effective and that an overall operational attitude which
aggressively identifies, elevates
to management
attention,
and
resolves
problems is required in the operations
functional
area.
As shown by the synopsis of licensee
event reports
(LERs) in
Tables
5 and 6,
a large portion of the events
in the operations
area during the period fall into established
problem areas,
such
as procedural
inadequacy
or non-compliance.
In addition
to procedural
problems,
the most predominant
source of events
due to human error were in the category of'rong unit, wrong
train.
This category of events
was addressed
by the licensee's
Human Performance
Evaluation
System group resulting in changes
. to operating procedures
and t'raining to avoid this type of
error.
Another source of events in this area
were
a number of
containment
and fuel handling buil,ding ventilation mode changes
due to instrumentation sensitivity to electronic noise.
Although the licensee
has
a program to eliminate these types of
problems, its implementation
has
been
slow.
In general,
events
were reported in a timely fashion
and information and analysis
was complete.
The licensee's
qualified and licensed operational staffing,
on
shift and otherwise available,
continued to be ample
and well
qualified.
Overall, operations
personnel
appeared
to be
knowledgeable
of plant systems
and performance,
and responded
to significant and complicated
events effectively and
professionally.
For example,
operators
responded
quickly and
prudently to the impending failure of an isophase
bus motor
operated
disconnect
on November
7 at Unit 2,
as well as, to
ground indications
on vital buses at Unit 2 of July 17.
During the reporting period one replacement
examination
was
conducted in December
1987 by the
NRC.
A total of twelve
reactor operator candidates
and three senior operator
candidates
were administered written and operating tests
during
the replacement
examination.
All twelve reactor operator
candidates
and all three senior reactor operator
candidates
passed
these
examinations.
No generic weaknesses
were observed
during these
examinations.
The facility has
used the
NRC
Examiner Standards
for their own requalification examination
format and content.
They have also
been responsive
to
NRC
initiatives for developing
a facility question
bank for
facility and
NRC use.
2.
Performance
Ratin
Category
2, Improving trend.
3.
Board Recommendations
Licensee
management
should continue to develop sensitivity in
the maturing period of operations
towards the development of
proper attitudes with respect to thorough communications,
work
practices
related to procedural detail
and compliance,
and not
proceeding in the face uncertainty or freelancing.
In
addition,
management
should assure that there is an acceptable
degree of management
and supervisory
involvement in the
day-to-day operations
of the plant, including plant visibility,
and first hand assessments
of the implementation of initiatives
and expectations.
The licensee
should continue to improve its
root cause analysis of events
and lower the threshold of the
use of quality evaluations
to include less significant events.
Radiolo ical Controls
1.
~Anal sis
Five inspections
were performed in the radiological controls
area during this appraisal
period.
More than 312 hours0.00361 days <br />0.0867 hours <br />5.15873e-4 weeks <br />1.18716e-4 months <br /> were
expended
in the areas of occupational
radiation protection,
radioactive waste
management,
and radiochemical
confirmatory
measurements.
In addition, the resident inspectors
provided
continuing observations
in this area.
The licensee
demonstrated
excellent performance
in keeping
exposures
ALARA during the early part of the appraisal
period.
Specifically in 1987, which included
a Unit 2 refueling outage
and
a major portion of underwater fuel pool reracking for Unit
1,
DCPP only expended
335.6 person-rem for both Units.
The
1987 average for
PWR plants
was
372 person-rem
per Unit.
However, during the latter part of the appraisal
period, the
licensee
experienced
problems that challenged their ALARA goal
for 1988.
Specifically, the licensee
established
a goal of 600
person-rem for 1988, that included exposures
for a Unit 1 and
Unit 2 refueling outage
and underwater
spent fuel pool
reracking for both Units.
As of June
30, 1988,
about 442
person-rem
had been
expended with the fuel pool reracking
completed for Unit 1 and about two weeks remaining
on the Unit
1 refueling outage.
The Unit 1 outage
was extended in excess
of 45 days
due to unexpected
and unplanned
tasks that evolved
during the outage.
The licensee
also experienced
exposure
levels that were 10-20K higher than expected for the Unit 1
outage.
Although the Radiation Protection
Department
had done
an excellent job in ALARA planning,
they observed
excessive
time and dose
expended
in radiation areas
due to inefficient
preparation
and planning by various work groups,
which were
brought to management's
attention
and acted
upon
on
a case
by
case
basis.
During an
NRC outage
inspection,
similar
observations
were also brought to management's
attention.
The
poor ALARA practices
observed
represented
a need for
improvement in management
oversight from all
DCPP Departments.
The licensee attributed most of the inefficiencies to the large
force of contract workers
who lacked nuclear plant experience.
To prevent similar problems during the upcoming Unit 2
refueling outage,
DCPP's
management
has decided to establish
an
inplant central control work center that will be manned
24
hours per day and
7 days per week by key decision making plant
staff (foreman
and above).
These individuals will have the
responsibility to observe
work in progress
and target the
identification and response
to inefficient work practices.
In
addition, onsite
and corporate
higher level management
plan to
spend
more time inplant during the Unit 2 outage.
During an
NRC maintenance
team inspection,
which occurred late in the
SALP evaluation period,
a clear
understanding
of the concept,
individual and organizational
responsibilities
of ALARA by
maintenance
and I8C foreman
and craftsmen/technicians
was
identified.
The inspection
included
an examination of the work
order generation
process
as it applied to ALARA.
The process
was
such that reviews were performed using historical
and
current data with appropriate
levels of supervisory
and
management
review.
Post
ALARA reviews were performed which
were factored into the historical data base.
With the Unit 2
refueling outage
remaining for 1988,
DCPP still expects
to meet
or be below the
PWR average.
The licensee
continued to
experience.
good fuel performance for both Units.
During this appraisal
period, the licensee
continued to
demonstrate
managements'nvolvement
in ensuring quality.
The
licensee
met the challenge of an extended
Unit 1 refueling
outage
and underwater fuel pool reracking for both Units with
no significant radiological
problems.
In one example,
10
immediately after
an event
on December
9=, 1987, involving a hot
particle incident during the Unit 1 underwater fuel pool
reracking task,
DCPP's
management
took immediate steps
to
determine
the root cause
and implement corrective actions to
prevent recurrence.
Another example of program quality was
noted in the licensee's
conservative
approach to ensure that
all safety precautions
were taken
and minimal exposure
expended
when
a Unit 1 incore detector
was stuck out of the five path
position.
Corporate
support
and involvement with onsite
activities appeared
to be excellent throughout the appraisal
period.
The licensee's
program for radiochemical
measurements
was excellent.
Radiochemical
procedures
and measurement
quality control practices
were well-considered
and consistently
implemented.
Accuracy of radiological
measurements
was good
when compared
by the
NRC Mobile Laboratory.
The licensee
continued to resolve technical
issues with
appropriate
conservatism,
technical
expertise
and supporting
documentation.
The issues
addressed
included clarification of
the reporting requirements. for process
monitor alarms,
deficiencies
in the radioactive
laundry cleaning facility's
ventilation
system,
and exposure
evaluations
due to hot
particle contaminations.
The licensee
has
been responsive
to
NRC initiatives with
conservatism
routinely exhibited.
One example concerning
an
inspector's
observations
of poor operating conditions involving
the licensee's
clean waste sorting operations
was immediately
acted
on by licensee
management.
This operation
was
immediately halted
and did not resume until work practices
were
brought
up to industry standards'he
last
SALP Board
Recommendation
addressed
the reduction of liquid radioactive
effluents.
Annual discharge
beginning in 1986 totaled
approximately
11 and
5 curies respectively with approximately
1
curie in the first half of 1988.
Two Severity Level IV violations and
one associated
deviation
were identified during this appraisal
period.
The violations
involved the failure to maintain access
controls to very high
radiation areas
in accordance
with Technical Specifications
requirements
and adherence
to radiological
access
control
procedure.
The deviation,
assessed
in the engineering
and
technical
support
area involved radiation monitor data that
were not being recorded in the control
room rack as described
in the licensee's
FSAR.
The violations were not representative
of a programmatic
breakdown,
however they did indicate
a need
to improve management
oversight
and attention to detail.
Four
LERs were submitted in this functional area during this
appraisal
period.
Two of the
LERs were for failure to maintain
access
controls to very high radiation areas
in accordance
with
Technical Specification requirements.
One of these
LERs
involved two separate
incidents.
The
NRC inspection of these
events identified one violation described
above.
In addition,
11
although the licensee
had informed the Region
V Office of the
incidents,
the licensee
did not have
a clear
command of the
reporting requirements
based
on their interpretation of 10 CFR Part 50.73
and
NUREG. 1022,
Supplement
1.
To their credit the
licensee
aggressively
pursued
understanding
and reported these
events after consultation with the NRC's
AEOD/TPAB Branch.
The
other two LERs involved the failure to perform a plant vent air
sample flow estimate
and high radiation levels from a hot
particle that caused
the Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building
Ventilation System to shift to the iodine removal'ode.
With
respect to these
two LERs, corrective actions
were timely and
effectively implemented.
Staff positions
are identified and authorities
and
responsibilities
are well defined.
Expertise
was available in
both the plant and corporate staffs
and the
use of outside
consultants
continued to be minimal.
Experience
levels for
management
and technician staff's continue to meet and/or
exceed
commitments
made
by the licensee.
Corporate
management
oversight
and technical
support
was observed
during
inspections,
especially during refueling outages
and other
major onsite tasks.
2.
Performance
Ratin
Category
1.
3.
Board Recommendations
Licensee
management
of all departments
should continue to focus
their attention
on ensuring that all personnel,
with emphasis
on an inexperienced
contractor
or
new employees,
are
knowledgeable
of and practice
ALARA concepts
and improve work
efficiencies in radiation areas.
Mid-level management
should
increase
oversight to improve the level of attention to detail
and to ensure that procedural
requirements
are adhered
to by
all levels of their staffs'.
C.
Maintenance/Surveillance
1.
~Anal ala
This functional area
was observed routinely during the
assessment
period by both the -resident
and regional inspection
staff.
Approximately 1269 hours0.0147 days <br />0.353 hours <br />0.0021 weeks <br />4.828545e-4 months <br /> of inspection effort were
devoted to this functional area.
In addition,
a team
inspection in October
1987 focused
on plant chemistry and
another
team inspection in July 1988.focused
on maintenance
activities.
The licensee
has
shown improvement in the area of
formality of communications
between operations
and
maintenance/surveillance
personnel,
which was raised
as
a
concern in the last
SALP.
Another identified strength
was
improved mechanical
and electrical
maintenance
procedures.
Also, the licensee
consolidated
the maintenance
organizations
12
(electrical
and mechanical
maintenance,
I&C, procurement,
and
work planning)
under
one Maintenance
Manager which holds the
potential for improved coordination of maintenance activities.
Problems
from the previous
SALP, which the licensee
has not
dealt with in an effective manner,
were (1) the tracking and
control of maintenance
backlog, particularly in the
I&C area,
and (2) the continuing relatively large
number of personnel
'errors reported.
Other weaknesses
identified during this
period included
I&C procedures,
engineering
involvement,
and
occasionally
slow implementation of industry and site specific
experience
lessons
learned.
Management
was usually involved in site activities and there
was consistent
evidence of prior planning
and assignment
of
priorities.
For example,
the licensee's
programs for
procurement
and storage of materials
were examined
and found to
be well executed
and supported
by management.
However,
as
noted in the cover letter to the May 5,
1988 inspection report,
in some
cases
specific management
expectations
were repeatedly
not implemented
such
as those dealing with foreign material
exclusion.
Additionally, the maintenance
backlog problems
and
the excessive
number of illuminated control
room annunciators
as discussed
in the April 26 manag'ement
meeting
and identified
during the maintenance
team inspection is indicative that
management
has not been completely effective in controlling and
supporting maintenance activities.
A significant improvement,
which was indicative of management
involvement,
was
made in the area of mechanical
and electrical
maintenance
procedures
that were revised during this period.
These
procedures
included
good detail
and quantitative data,
and provided specific instructions
and guidance to the craft.
In contrast,
some
segments
of I&C procedures
were found to be
marginal.
Examples of weakness
included the instrumentation
loop tests
and calibration procedures
for measuring
and test
equipment,
which appeared
to provide inadequate
guidance.
Additionally, at the end of the
SALP period it was determined
that important procedure
changes,
some necessary
to avoid plant
trips,
had been
requested
by ICC technicians
but had not been
implemented over a long period of time.
The licensee,
towards
the
end of the assessment
period had applied additional
resources
to revise
I&C procedures.
"Further, in the evaluation of management
involvement,
the
maintenance
inspection
team in July 1988 found that (1)
licensee
management
had not proper ly assessed
the safety
significance of current. maintenance-related
problems,
(2)
programs for measuring
and improving maintenance
performance
were weak, (3) performance
standards f'r maintenance
personnel
were not well defined,
and (4) the quality program
organizations
had missed opportunities to improve the
maintenance
program.
II
13
In the area of resolution of technical
issues for the
maintenance
and surveillance
area,
the licensee
generally
established
a clear understanding
of issues.
The licensee
properly acted
upon
a number of potentially generic
issues
discovered
as
a result of maintenance
and surveillance
activities.
For example,
the 48 inch containment
purge valves
were determined to have
a preferential direction for leak tight
operability during testing.
The licensee
took a conservative
and technically sound approach of reversing the valve through
a
design
change.
However, the licensee
was slow and in some
cases
not thorough in incorporating industry experience
into
maintenance activities
as identified by the maintenance
team
inspection for the plant air systems.
In addition, in some
cases
the licensee
was slow in learning from their own
experience
as with the December
17 turbine trip due to steam
dump problems despite
a history of similar problems which
dictated the
need to perform thorough electrical
and mechanical
grooming of the valves prior to startups.
The licensee's
efforts to learn from their own'and industries
experience
deserves
continued attention.
Also, during the
SALP period, plant engineering
had
occasionally
shown
a lack of understanding
and critical
assessment,
of technical
issues
in the maintenance
and
surveillance
areas.
As an example,
engineering did not propose
any corrective maintenance
action
on the component cooling
water surge tank isolation valve when its stroke time increased
dramatically.
Although, the stroke time remained within the
"Action" limit, the increased
stroke time indicated
impending
problems.
Following the issuance
of a notice of violation in
this area,
the valve exceeded
the "Action" limit and was
declared
In addition, engineering
has failed twice
in the last year to perform administrative functions necessary
to update recurring task schedules
resulting in missed
surveillances
in the Inservice Test (IST) area.
Similarly,
weaknesses
identified in the maintenance
team inspection
were
primarily attributable to inadequate
engineering
involvement
and lapses of management
oversight.
The licensee
received ten notices of violation in this area.
The violations highlighted weaknesses
described
in this
functional area.
The violations included three instances
where
plant configuration did not meet design or design drawings,
two
~ . instances
of procedural
non-compliance,
and two for failure to
maintain cleanliness
controls around the reactor coolant system
during the refueling outage.
The licensee
reported twenty-nine events with causes
attributable to this area.
Of these,
eighteen
were attributed
to personnel
error or procedural
deficiency, of which one led
to a reactor trip.
The reactor trip was
due to an attempt to
perform maintenance
on
a shared 'leg of the three, reactor
coolant flow transmitters
of one loop.
Due to an overly
permissive
I8C surveillance
procedure
and what appeared
to .be
a
14
lapse of management
attention to this critical plant activity,
a technician
was allowed to go beyond the scope of the written
methods
based
on a verbal
concurrence
from supervision.
The
other eleven events
resulted
from design,
manufacturing or
installation errors
or component failures.
Generally,
the
licensee
performed
a thorough assessment
of the causes
of these
problems
and identified reasonable
corrective actions.
The licensee
s response
to
NRC initiatives,
such
as the problem
associated
with counterfeit material,
was found to be
comprehensive
and timely.
The licensee's
efforts in the areas
of Inservice Inspection (ISI) and the containment
integrated
leak rate test (ILRT) were examined
and found to be properly
implemented
and technically "state-of-the-art".
In regards to
the conduct of the
ILRT on Unit 1, licensee
engineering
personnel
demonstrated
a proper inquisitiveness
and
consequently identified a potentially generic problem regarding
a preferred seating direction for large butterfly valves
as
was
discussed
above.
However, there were
a number of instances
discovered
by the licensee
during this period where plant
maintenance activities in the past
have adversely affected
equipment seismic qualification.
This points to a need for
more detailed
design basis
documentation
and implementation in
procedures
and training which was also reinforced by the
maintenance
team inspection.
A special
chemistry
team inspection
was conducted
during the
SALP evaluation
pet iod.
A total of 218 hours0.00252 days <br />0.0606 hours <br />3.604497e-4 weeks <br />8.2949e-5 months <br /> of inspection
effort was expended
in this area excluding the confirmatory
measurement
of radioactive
species
inspection which was
conducted concurrently.
,The confirmatory measurement
program
is addressed
in the Radiological
Control portion of the report.
It appeared
that plant and corporate
management
provided
appropriate
levels of support
and supervision to chemistry
related activities.
The licensee's facilities were found to be
"state-of-the-art" for both primary and secondary
analyses.
In
the area of systems affecting plant chemistry,
the team found
the licensee
to be aware of the advantages
of improved chemical
control
and active in pursuing
improved control.
The
licensee's
efforts in erosion/corrosion
control were found to
be above industry standards.
With respect to the Post Accident
Sampling System
(PASS), it was found that the systems
met the
intent of NUREG-0737, that technician training and retraining
programs
were acceptable
and that appropriate administrative
control measures
had been
implemented.
'n July 1988, the maintenance
area
was reorganized
by the
licensee,
as previously mentioned, to include mechanical,
electrical,
I&C, work planning,
and procurement.
This area
was
generally well staffed
and
had
key positions identified and
responsibilities
defined.
In the mechanical
and electrical
area,
expertise
was available within the staff and staffing
appeared
to be ample to control backlog.
In the
IKC area,
15
staffing appeared
strained with overtime necessary
to control
backlog
and the
use of consultants
to revise procedures.
Training of maintenance
personnel
continued to be
a strength.
It appeared
from the
SALP Board analysis that the training
program
and personnel
knowledge
has prevented
a greater
number
of plant events related to I&C activities.
However, in
mechanical
maintenance
one enforcement
item dealt with
refueling outage contract personnel
inadequately
prepared to
change
a gasket in the safety injection system.
The lack of
training contributed to the failure to follow procedural
requirements.
2.
Performance
Ratin
Category
2
3.
Board Recommendations
In the maintenance/surveillance
area,
licensee
management
should take steps to:
1) integrate,
in a timely and thorough
manner, configuration control measures
including design basis
information; 2) assess
and incorporate
lessons
learned
from
plant experience
and industry experience;
3) increase attention
in the
I&C area particularly with regard to adequacy of
staffing,
and procedure quality; 4) encourage
integration of
engineering into the program
and problem resolution processes;
5) enhance
programs for measuring
and improving maintenance
performance
and 6) instill the attitude that activities are to
be stopped
whenever there is any uncertainty.
Emer enc
Pre aredness
1.
~Anal sis
Inspections
performed during this
SALP period included
one
routine inspection
and the observation of the annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise.
Approximately 151 hours0.00175 days <br />0.0419 hours <br />2.496693e-4 weeks <br />5.74555e-5 months <br /> of direct
inspection
was devoted to the assessment
of emergency
preparedness
at Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Plant.
Licensee
performance
during this assessment
period demonstrated
management
was actively involved in achieving quality. Decision
making regarding
changes
to the emergency
preparedness
program
appeared
to be at a level that assures
adequate
management
review.
Management
review of items affecting emergency
preparedness
have
been thorough
and technically sound.
Corporate
management
was actively involved in matters affecting
site emergency
preparedness
and supports
the site's efforts
regarding
emergency
preparedness.
This was most recently
exemplified by the Vice President,
Nuclear
Power Generation
serving
as
an observer of the Emergency Operations Facility
activities during the August 1988 emergency
preparedness
I
16
exercise.
Records
and documents
related to emergency
preparedness
are well maintained
and available.
The licensee's
approach to the resolution of technical
issues
from a safety standpoint
has always
been conservative
and
technically sound.
An examination of some of the licensee's
declared
emergency
events
demonstrated
conservative
classifications
and actions.
The licensee
has evaluated
technical
issues affecting safety thoroughly and resolutions of
the issues
regarding
emergency
preparedness
have
been
conservative
and timely.
One recent
example in this area
was
improvements to the licensee's
classification procedure
EP-G-1 was significantly revised to be conservative
and to
remove
some of the "grey areas"
or judgement calls that
may
lead to a non-conservative
classification of an emergency
event.
Other
improvements
included
an increased
emphasis
on
event reportabi lity and classification
noted in the simulator
training and the introduction of more specialized
courses for
managers
and decision
makers in emergency
response.
Licensee
management
has
been very responsive
to concerns
identified by the
NRC.
Timely and thorough corrective actions
have
been initiated when concerns
were brought to their
attention.
There were
no violations identified during this assessment
period,
and
no licensee
event reports.
The staffing and training in the functional area of emergency
preparedness
continues to exceed
the industry norm.
This is
evidenced
by the improvements to emergency training mentioned
above
and the capabilities of the emergency
response
organization
demonstrated
during the annual
exercise.
Emergency
response
training records
were current
and well maintained.
Performance
Ratin
Category l.
3.
Board Recommendations
The licensee
should continue'o maintain management
attention
to ensure
a continued high level of emergency
preparedness
at
Diablo Canyon.
E.
~Securi t
~Aaa1 sis
During this assessment
period of August 1,
1987 through July
31,
1988,
Region
V conducted
two physical security inspections
at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
A total of
approximately
260 hours0.00301 days <br />0.0722 hours <br />4.298942e-4 weeks <br />9.893e-5 months <br /> of direct inspection effort were
conducted
by regional
inspectors.
In addition, the resident
17
inspectors
provided continuing observations
in this area.
There were
no material control
and accounting inspections
conducted during this assessment
period.
With regard to management's
involvement in assuring quality,
corporate
and plant management
continued to review the
operation of the overall security program.
They have generally
implemented
remedial
measures
to correct deficiencies
identified in the course of both internal
and
NRC security
inspections.
In May 1988, the licensee
moved to a temporary
access facility and began to upgrade their permanent security
access
control building.
This remodeling is scheduled
to be
completed
by April 1989.
Additionally, during this assessment
period,
the licensee
replaced their security card readers
with
more reliable units.
Since August 1986,
each security inspection report has
identified deficiencies with installed closed circuit
television
(CCTV) cameras.
Some deficiencies
were minor,
however,
some deficiencies
rendered
many cameras
ineffective.
During this assessment
period, plant management
indicated that
actions
would be accelerated
to resolve continuing maintenance
and
image clarity problems with the
CCTV cameras.
The previous
SALP report
recommended
that Security,
Maintenance
and Operations
Departments
improve their internal coordination
to resolve
concerns
regarding plant work crews
removing
portions of vital area barriers without considering the
secur ity impact of their actions.
During this
SALP period,
improved coordinations
have resolved this previous
concern.
Additionally, security
management
demonstrated
a coordinated
effort with other plant staff in preventing safety/security
problems at Diablo Canyon.
The previous
SALP report
recommended that the licensee
resolve
the safety/security
issue involving radio communication
frequencies
for security
and operations
personnel.
During this
assessment
period,
the security
management
began modifying
their radio communication
equipment to avoid possible
interference with the radio communication
equipment assigned
to
the Units
1 and
2 operations staff.
These modifications are
approximately
70K complete.
During the assessment
period, four information notices related
to security were issued.
These related to criminal prosecution
by the
US Department of Justice resulting in the conviction of
two individuals for falsification of security training records;
the discovery of falsified pre-employment
screening
records;
potential
problems resulting from security weaknesses
identified during safeguards
Regulatory Effectiveness
Reviews;
and weaknesses
in the
use
and protection of Safeguards
Information.
The lice'nsee's
actions,
as reviewed to date,
were
found to be appropriate,
however,
the last three information
18
notices
were issued after the most recent of the two security
inspections.
In response
to the August 1986,
NRC policy statement
on Fitness
for Duty of nuclear
power plant personnel,
corporate
and plant
management
continued to support their established
Fitness for
Duty Program.
As designed,
this program requires that all
applicants
seeking on-site
employment
must satisfactorily
complete
a pre-employment
drug and alcohol urinalysis test.
Current on-site
employees
were grandfathered
into the program
and were not required to pass
a urinalysis test.
The current
Fitness
for Duty Program
does
not follow the industrial
standards
published
by Edison Electric Institute (EEI) i.e.,
the requirement for random or regular periodic chemical testing
is not included.
The enforcement history for the period of August 1,
1987
through July 31,
1988 included two Severity Level IV violations
related to the licensee's
failure to properly escort
a visitor
inside the protected
area,
and their failure to provide
an
adequate
clear zone for surveillance
around
a portion of the
protected
area perimeter.
During this
SALP period, Diablo Canyon reported
eleven
-safeguards
events.
Seven
(64K) of these
events
were caused
by
personnel
error.
Nine of these
events
occurred after
a change
in the requirements
of 10 CFR 73.71(c),
and thus were reported
in the Licensee
Event Report
(LER) format.
These
eleven events
related to:
failed security compensatory
measures(4);
degraded
barriers(3);
drug-related
events(2);
and miscellaneous
events(2).
During the past four years,
the perimeter security alarms at
the Intake Structure
have
been inoperative
and the licensee
has'ontinued
to provide long term compensatory
measures
at this
area.
The licensee
needs to finalize their changes
to the
design of both the security barriers,
and the associated
perimeter security alarm system at the Intake Structure.
Three
of the four safeguards
events
concerning the failed
compensatory
measures
involved security officers being found
inattentive at their security posts at the Intake Structure.
These security officers had been posted at the perimeter
of
this separated
protected
area to compensate
for the inoperative
perimeter alarms.
With respect
to staffing,
key positions
were identified and
responsibilities
were generally well defined.
The security
training staff appears
capable of performing its assigned
missions.
2.
Performance
Ratin
Category
2.
19
3.
Board Recommendations
Licensee
management
is encouraged
to finalize their
modifications to the protected
area barrier and the perimeter
alarms at the Intake Structure.
Additionally, the licensee
is
encouraged
to minimize the deficiencies
and to improve the
image clarity of their
CCTV cameras.
Further,
the licensee
is encouraged
to reexamine their current
Fitness for Duty Program with respect to the
EEI guidance
pertaining to chemical testing of body fluids;
En ineerin
and Technical
Su
ort
1.
~Anal sis
During the assessment
period, the licensee's
engineering
and
technical
support activities were observed routinely by both
the resident
and the regional
inspection staff.
Approximately
208 hours0.00241 days <br />0.0578 hours <br />3.439153e-4 weeks <br />7.9144e-5 months <br /> of inspection effort were devoted to this functional
area in addition to extensive
management
review.
The
engineering
department
has initiated a number of programs
to
deal with identified weaknesses
such
as the configuration
management
process
and the system engineering
program.
However, these
programs
have progressed
slowly and
as
a result,
design
and plant configuration information is not readily
available to the site for implementation.
In addition,
engineering analysis of operations
and maintenance activities
has
been limited by a slow implementation of the system
engineering
program.
In the engineering functional area,
there
was evidence of prior
planning and assignments
of priorities.
The licensee's
efforts
in the seismic re-evaluation
program demonstrated
a high level
of management
involvement and control of the quality and
timeliness of this engineering effort in that the license
condition was met on schedule.
In other instances,
implementation of engineering
improvement
items
was sometimes
slow and incomplete.
The issue of greatest
concern in the
engineering
and technical
support area
has
been the
implementation of the design basis into plant operations
and
maintenance.
In addition to'ndustry-wide findings ot
inadequate
design
and configuration management,
at Diablo
Canyon
a number of events
and findings pointed to a need for
emphasis
by the licensee in this area.
Events in this area
included
a number of instances
where components
had.seismic
bracing inadvertently
removed,
including a main steam line
'estraint
disassembled
at power,
and the auxiliary saltwater
system performance limits were challenged
by, what appeared
to
be,
an improperly thought out change to an operating procedure
setpoint.
The licensee
recognized
the
need for enhancing configuration
management
and initiated a task force to evaluate
what
20
improvements
were
needed
and
how to implement them.
The
licensee
has considered
such aspects
as what should
and'houldn't
be contained
in a design basis
document
and what
organization is to be responsible
for it.
At the
end of the
period few recommendations
had been
implemented.
Although the
licensee's
planned efforts appear
to be comprehensive,
the
implementation
schedule
was not defined at the end of -the
evaluation period.
At the start of the assessment
period, the licensee
recognized
the
need for independent
engineering oversite of the operation
and maintenance
of plant systems
and established
the system
engineering
program.
The maintenance
team inspection,
conducted at the
end of the period identified that the system
engineering
program
had not been fully developed.
The issues
raised
by the team included inadequate
training and
requirements
for system engineers
in addition to a poorly
defined job scope.
As an example,
the team found that the
system engineer
responsible
for air systems
did not have
a
thorough understanding
of the plant air system.
Further,
the
maintenance
team was unable to obtain from the licensee
a clear
definition of safety significance of certain air system
check
valves although the questions
were posed early in the
inspection.
In their approach
to the resolution of technical
issues
and in
response
to
NRC initiatives, the licensee
often performed
thorough detailed technical
reviews,
such
as the analyses
of
pressurizer
surge line movement
and main steam line noise.
Also, the licensee's
analyses
and proposed
Technical
Specification
changes
to reduce
the potential for reactor trips
was considered
a conservative,
well-thought-out effort.
However, in other cases
inspectors
found that both corporate
and plant engineering
did not take the initiative on potential
safety problems, with the result that
NRC inspectors
supplied
the impetus.
An example of this was the discussion
on the
design of the auxiliary salt water system which began in April
1988,
was only, recently responded
to by the licensee,
and
has
not yet been resolved.
In addition, engineering
was slow and
'not completely accurate
in establishing definitive
acceptance'riteria
for equating
RCS leakage to the containment
fan cooler
condensate
system collection rate, after the subject
was raised
as
an
NRC concern.
As discussed
in the maintenance
and
surveillance
area,
engineering
performance
in the surveillance
testing area
was noted to have weaknesses
regarding engineering
judgement
and follow through (the failure to identify valve
RCV-16 for maintenance after testing
showed erratic stroke
.
times)
and engineering administrative actions (failures to
update test schedules
led to missed surveillances)
and failure
to have
an administrative procedure for changing
IST acceptance
parameters.
One strength
and
key improvement over the
assessment
period has
been the increased direct involvement in
plant operations
and operational
events
by the Onsite Project
Engineering
Group
(OPEG).
This group
was instrumental
in
21
identifying a missing main steam line pipe restraint
as
an
operability concern
and in another
instance identifying a poor
maintenance
practice of not blocking pipe support spring cans
when draining water filled lines.
An additional
concern regarding the timeliness of important
engineering actions
was identified soon after the
end of the
SALP period.
On September
1, 1988 Unit 2 experienced
a reactor
trip due to planned testing of the seismic trips.
The reactor
trip would not have occurred if appropriate
design
change
actions, identified after
a precedent trip on March 5, 1988,
had been
implemented.
Also, on September
1, 1988, Unit 1
experienced
a reactor trip during an attempted
startup
due to a
turbine antimotoring device being inadvertently valved out.
The closure of the valve had been
noted
and documented
on
August 6,
1988 by an engineer
and
made
known to the shift
foreman.
The lack of action in the ensuing
weeks directly
caused
the unnecessary
In the area of engineer ing, five enforcement
items were issued.
One violation concerned
erroneous
dimensions
used in a
calculation regarding available reactor
head vent area.
This
particular notice of violation highlighted
a lack of
understanding
of a fundamental
practice
such
as
independent
verification of design inputs
by an engineering
group.
A
violation for a lack of cleanliness
controls
assessed
in the
maintenance
area
on the
same job highlighted
a lack of
understanding
of fundamental
cleanliness
controls
by the
involved field engineering
group as well as the maintenance
personnel,
who were ultimately responsible.
In addition two devi.ations applicable to both units were
assessed
in the engineering
area.
The deviations
were
departures
from FSAR committments to have control
room
recorders for radiation monitors
and to have redundant
power
supplies for certain
level instrumentation.
These deviations
demonstrated
a lack of follow through in the
area of committments.
The licensee's
engineering organizations
included
a plant
engineering
group reporting to the plant manager,
the Nuclear
.
Engineering
and Construction
Group located in San Francisco
with a group onsite,
and the Nuclear Operations
Support group
also in San Francisco.
The licensee's
engineering
groups
were
generally.. well staffed with considerable
resources.
However,
there
appeared
to be
a need to f'ully implement the licensee
committment to a system engineer
program at the plant to assure
appropriate
maintenance
of the plant de'sign basis in the
operation of the units.
The facility's training programs for both licensed
and
non-licensed
personnel
have
been accredited
by INPO.
The
facility simulator has generally performed well and properly
models almost all scenarios
used to date
by the
NRC.
In
22
addition, the facility continued,
as discussed
in previous
SALP's, to have outstanding
technical training facilities.
These facilities appear to have the capability to simulate
and
provide training for a substantial
number of potential
evolutions encountered
by plant personnel.
In summary,
the
technical
support provided by the plants training staff was
found to be well executed
and included adequate staff and
outstanding training facilities.
2.
Performance
Ratin
Category
2
The
SALP Board deliberated
at length
as to whether
a declining
trend in engineering
and technical
support
was clearly evident.
The Board ultimately decided that
no trend
was apparent.
3.
Board Recommendations
The licensee
is encouraged
to increase
emphasis
on documenting
the design basis
and ensuring its implementation in plant
activities.
The licensee
should ensure that basic design
criteria are
known and available to appropriate plant
personnel.
In addition the licensee
is encouraged
to fully implement the.
system engineering
program,
and ensure that adequate
configuration control is maintained.
The licensee
should
provide increased
attention to improve the communications
and
interaction
between plant and engineering
groups.
These
efforts should assure
that
a proper culture
and sense
of
responsibility is instilled in the plant and engineering
groups
to assure that problems
are dealt with and resolved in a timely
manner,.
Finally, the licensee
management
should assure that the
fundamentals
of nuclear plant operation, e.g.,
independent
verification and cleanliness
controls,
are understood
by
engineering
personnel.
Safet
Assessment/ ualit
Verification
~Anal sis
This functional area
was observed routinely during the
assessment
period by both the resident
and regional inspection
staffs
and includes
assessments
made
by NRR
HQ staff in the
area of reviews of responses
to generic letters
and other
regulatory initiatives.
Approximately 1620 hours0.0188 days <br />0.45 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.1641e-4 months <br /> of inspection
effort were devoted to this function'al area.
The performance
of Quality Assurance,
Quality Support,
onsite Quality Control,
the Onsite Safety
Review Group,
and the Plant Staff Review
Committee were included in this assessment
as well as the
licensee
organizations
involved in the review of regulatory
and
23
industry initiatives.
The previous
SALP assessment
had
identified a need for the licensee
to improve the timeliness
and quality of root cause
analyses
and to: improve management
focus
on the identification and correction of problem areas
including those identified through industry'xperience.
During
this
SALP period the licensee
has
moved forward in these
areas
with improvements
in areas
such
as the performance of technical
audits
by Quality Assurance,
improved formality and tracking of
action plans for reactor trips and other events,
and specific
root cause training for involved managers
and supervision.
Further improvements
are clearly indicated to be required
as
identified in the body of this analysis
in the areas of
lowering the licensee's
threshold for root cause
analysis
and
in the area of effective management
followup and assessment
of
event action plans.
Licensee
management
has
been involved in site activities in the
quality verification area
and
has taken corrective actions to
improve these
programs
as
needed.
For example,
the licensee
has
a number of levels of root cause/corrective
action
evaluations
procedures
and to some extent all levels
have
seen
some
improvement.
A significant improvement
was the
establishment
of a formalized licensee
Event Investigation
Team
(EIT), a team lead by a member of corporate
management
to
evaluate
some of the more significant or technically
complicated events.
This concept,
a fallout of the April 1987
RHR event investigation includes
a detailed action plan.
The
first EIT initiated by the licensee
reviewed the failure of the
motor operated
disconnect
on November 11,
1987.
The review was
found by the inspectors
to be indepth
and thorough.
An apparent
weakness
in the EIT process
was identified
fol.lowing a more recent event.
Specifically, it appeared
that
neither
the
QA nor
QC departments
were actively involved in an
independent verification of the scope
and completeness
of
action taken in accordance
with the action plan.
For example
subsequent
to the July 17,
1988 reactor trip, the resident
inspector
sampling of actions identified areas
of oversight in
scope or ommissions
in actions; specifically a lack of
inspection for failed-welds
on fuse holder cabinets
and
a
failure to fully perform high voltage testing of affected
circuit breakers.
QA and
QC also appear to have
a lack of
significent involvement and input in the initial analysis of
operational
events
and in decisions for restart.
Their
involvement appears
to be concentrated
in after the fact
Technical
Review Group
(TRG) meetings
on'on-Conformance
Reports
(NCR) related to the event.
An innovative approach
in the quality verification program
has
been the development
by QA of audits
based
on the safety system
functional inspections
performed
by the
NRC.
These audits
concentrate
on one activity or system
from design to
implementation
and operation.
Although these
inspections
24
started with limited findings, the audits
and findings have
increased
in depth
and scope during the
SALP period.
The
SALP Board analyzed
the 26 completed licensing actions for
this assessment
period.
The Board concluded that the licensee
should strive to continue to improve the quality of licensing
submittals.
The major objective should
be to improve the
safety basis for requested
license
amendments.
As a minimum,
the submittal
should discuss
the basis for the original
requirement,
and why the proposed
change
continues to meet the
applicable safety criteria and maintains
an adequate
margin of
safety.
Also, greater
emphasis
should
be placed
on the prompt
resolution of long-standing safety issues.
In the licensee's
approach to the resolution of technical
issues
from a safety standpoint,
an understanding
of issues
is
generally apparent.
Early'n the
SALP period there
was
a lack
of a structured
formalized indepth review of root cause
and
ancillary problems for reactor trips or other events.
These
problems
were most evident following the December
13,
1987
reactor trip and the subsequent
turbine trip due to poor steam
dump performance.
Later in the
SALP period the licensee
had
improved the scope of the restart
reviews
and intends to issue
a revised restart
procedure
to reflect those
improvements.
The licensee's
response
to major regulatory initiatives such
as
Bulletins and Gener ic Letters
has
been generally comprehensive
and timely.
However the licensee's
attention to and followup
of committments to inspection findings has occasionally
been
found to be slow and/or
incomplete
as
was the case with
findings in the
IST area with engineering,
with the engineering
corrective actions associated
with a lack of acceptance
criteria for containment
fan cooler collection rates
and with
the resolution of design criteria for the
ASW system with
engineering.
These technical
areas
were discussed
in
engineering
but are highlighted here. as well from the
~
standpoint that licensee
management
did not consistently
ensure
thorough
and timely closeout of regulatory safety initiatives
identified by inspection findings.
Also, on occasion
the
quality organizations
have
been ineffective in dealing with a
problem in a timely way.
An example
was the ineffective action
taken during the Unit 1 outage in resolving the cleanliness
condition for reactor vessel
head work previously discussed.
The onsite
and offsite safety committees
were assessed
on a
routine basis
by the resident
inspectors
through attendance
at
selected
meetings
and review of the committees
minutes,
."
findings and recommendations.
No significant issues
were
developed
from this limited review.
gA and
gC involvement was
encouraging
in this area,
but continued
development of these
organizations
as active participants is warranted.
A major issue in the previous
assessment
period,
NCR review,
has
improved over this assessment
period.
TRG chairmen
have
25
received training in root cause identification and
as
a result
NCR reviews appear to be more indepth.
In addition, the format
of the
NCR has
improved including a more thorough description
and analysis of the events.
Although assessments
are generally
good, there
have
been
inadequate
root cause
analyses
and
untimely corrective actions
as discussed,
for example,
in the
cover letter of the February 17,
1988 inspection report.
In addition, at times the inspectors
found that the lowest
level of root cause evaluation,
the guality Evaluation,
was not
being implemented for less significant eventsthat
warranted
a
change to procedure
or program.
Two examples of such events
were described
in the operations
functional area regarding
a
pressurizer
pressure
and an auxiliary feedwater
This is another indication of the lack of adequate
gC
oversite of plant operations.
This issue related to high
thresholds for initiating root cause
assessment
of plant
problems
was also
an issue
discussed
in the cover letter to the
maintenance
team inspection.
In general,
the licensee's
LERs adequately
described
the major
aspects
of each event,
including component
or system failures
that contributed to the event
and the significant corrective
actions
taken or planned to prevent recurrence.
The reports
were reasonably
complete,
generally well written and easy to
understand.
The root causes
were identified as appropriate.
Previous similar occur rences
were properly referenced
in the
LERs as applicable.
One aspect of LERs identified for
potential
improvement
was related to water
hammer events.
The
first event
was related to repairing
RHR check valves at Unit 1
on June
25,
1988,
and the second
event
was related to the Unit
2 natural circulation cooldown event
on July 17,
1988.
The
descriptions of the water
hammer aspects
of the events
were
minimal given the serious potential of such events.
There were four violations attributed to this area.
None of
the violations were considered repetitive nor indicated
a
programatic
breakdown.
The quality verification organizations
appeared
to be
adequately
staffed
and evaluated
a substantial
percentage
of
site activities,
such
as maintenance
and procurement.
Some
significant problems identified by the gA/gC organizations
. included
N&TE instruments
fou'nd out of calibration and not
receiving timely review,
and the adequacy of the sealing of a
temporary containment penetration, used during the outage for
pass
through of a temporary
system.
Performance
Ratin
Category
2
26
Board Recommendations
The licensee
should continue to focus
management
attention
towards the thorough evaluation of plant problems
and the
development
and implementation of well thought-out corrective
action/investigation
plans with overall
management
responsibility defined.
This should include the involvement of
quality verification organizations
in the review of events
and
the independent verification of actions.
Also, licensee
management
should assure that the quality organizations
are
effectively used for routine conditions,
such
as the onsite
and
offsite review committees.
The licensee
should strive to continue to improve the quality
of licensing submittals.
The major objective should
be to
improve the safety basis for requested
license
amendments.
Finally, the approach for handling regulatory safety
initiatives identified by inspection findings should
be
assessed
programmatically,
to ensure that thorough
and timely
consideration
is provided.
H.
Fire Protection
~Anal ala
During this assessment
period,
40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> were expended
by one
NRC inspector conducting
an inspection in the fire protection
area.
In addition, the resident
inspectors
provided continuing
observation
in this area.
Improvements
were
made in this area.
In the last Salp assessment,
the
NRC expressed
concern that the
licensee's
capability to detect fires in the earliest possible
stage,
make timely responses
and accomplish
manual fire
suppression
was questionably
adequate
due to the geographical
responsibilities
delegated
to the site fire brigade.
The licensee
demonstrated
management's
involvement in assuring
quality in the fire protection area
by initiating a program for
improvements
in this area
and allocating required
funds for the
program goals which extend
beyond the scope of concerns
expressed
by the
NRC.
The program goals
have objectives that
address
the optimum performance of fire protection features
rather than satisfying regulatory requirements
as
a minimum.
The licensee's
response
to
NRC initiatives included upgrading
the fire alarm system in safety related
areas
to a system with
improved technology
and reliability to provide the earliest
possible detection of fires; developing
a Plant Information
Management
System
(PIMS) for fire barrier and fire protection
feature configuration management;
clarification of agreements
with offsite fire departments
so that the minimum five-man fire
brigade will be available on-site at all times to respond to
fires in safety related areas;
and implementing
a wildland fire
fuel management
program.
27
The licensee
demonstrated
timely and effective resolution to
technical
issues
from a safety standpoint
by responding
to the
NRC concern for the geographical
responsibilities
delegated
to
site fire brigade.
The licensee's
resolution to this concern
included limiting the site fire brigade geographical
responsibilities
to safety related
areas
and non-safety related
areas within the immediate vicinity of safety related
areas.
Responsibility for firefighting in remote areas within and
outside of the site area
boundary
was delegated
to a separate
maintenance fire brigade
and offsite fire departments.
There
was
no enforcement history and
no LER's submitted during
this assessment
period.
In response
to operational
events,
the licensee
implemented
a
wildland fuel management
program to reduce
the potential
impact
of external wildland fires on plant operations
such
as those
that occurred during a 1982 wildland fire.
The program is
comprehensive
and is based
on examination of alternate
methods
for wildland fuel reduction/modification that are consistent
with other land uses objectives for short and long terms.
In
addition to potential disruption of safety related operations,
the licensee
determined that wildland fires pose significant
risk to the uninterrupted
power output of the plant.
Therefore,
the wildland fuel management
program objectives
implemented
by the licensee
extend
beyond the scope of
regulatory requirements
with the incorporation of practical
measures
for wildland fire prevention
by the reduction of fuel
volumes.
These
measures
include controlled burning to create
"fuel mosiacs",
mechanical
removal of vegetation,
chemically
fire retarding vegetation
and annual
evaluation of fuel growth
and age classes.
This is an extensive effort that involve
10,000 acres of wildland vegetation
on various slopes
and
elevations within and outside the site boundary.
This effort
is expected to reduce the potential of wildland fire
occurrences
by 30 to 50 percent.
The licensee's
management
and technical staff, responsible for
implementing fire protection requirements,
appeared
to be
appropriately
knowledgeable
in fire protection
and nuclear
engineering,
and they appeared
to be maintaining
a balanced
approach
toward implementing
a program aimed at obtaining
prudent objectives.
To enhance
the effectiveness
of the licensee's
training and
qualifications program,
as part of a joint venture with offsite
fire departments
and California Polytechnical Institute, the
licensee is in the process
of upgrading existing fire brigade
training facilities to a certified internal structural
firefighting burn facility.
The
new facility is expected
to be
completed in the fall of 1989.
Finally, as
a measure
of the
licensee's
training effectiveness,
the licensee's fire watches
have detected
and reported fires and unusual
events
(such as,
28
the Motor Operated
Disconnect arcing) in their early stages
and
avoided
more serious
consequences.
2.
Performance
Ratin
Category 1, Improving Trend
3.
Board Recommendations
Licensee
management
should continue its efforts to be sensitive
to practical fire protection
and nuclear engineering
concerns
through the development
and implementation of program goals
that are not aimed at mere regulatory compliance but are
intended to achieve effective, reliable
and safe plant
operations.
Management is strongly encouraged
to continue
active involvement in the day-to-day fire protection aspects
of
plant operations
and provide leadership, visibility and first
hand assessments
of the implementation of initiatives and
expectations
in this area.
SUPPORTING
DATA AND SUMMARIES
A.
Enforcement Activit
A summary of inspection activities for Units 1 and
2 are provided in
Tables
1 and
2 respectively
along with a summary of enforcement
items from these
inspections.
A description of the enforcement
items for Units 1 and
2 are provided in Tables
3 and 4,
respectively.
During this
SALP period,
no escalated
enforcement
items were identified.
B.
Confirmation of Action Letters
None
29
TABLE 1
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND ENFORCEMENT
SUMMARY 8/1/87 - 7/31/88
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1
Functional
Area
Ins ections
Conducted
Enforcement
Items
Inspection"
Percent
Severit
Level
Hours
of Effort I II III
IV
V
Dev
Plant Operations
994
30'1
2
2.
Radiological Controls
198
6. 04
1
3.
Maintenance/
Surveillance
654
19. 94
3
1
4.
Emergency
Preparedness
73
2. 23
5.
6.
Security
Engineering/
Technical
Support
171
160
5. 22
4. 88
7.
Safety Assessment/
equality Verification
1009
30. 77
3
1
8.
Fire Protection
20
.61
TOTAL
3279
100
15
2
2
Allocations of inspection
hours to each functional area are
approximations
based
upon
NRC Form 766 data.
Severity levels are in accordance
with NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C).
Data reflects Inspection
Reports
87-31 through 88-17.
30
TABLE 2
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY 8/1/87 - 7/31/88
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2
Functi onal
Ar ea
1.
Plant Operations
606
27. 71
Ins ections
Conducted
Enforcement
Items
Inspect)on
Percent
Severest
Leve
Hours
of Effort I II III
V
V
Dev
2.
Radiological Controls
114
3.
Maintenance/
Surveillance
615
4.
Emergency
Preparedness
78
5. 21
28. 12
3. 57
5.
Security
6.
Engineering/
Technical
Support
95
48
4. 34
2. 19
7.
Safety Assessment/
quality Verification
611
27.93
8.
Fire Protection
20
.93
TOTAL
2187
100
Allocations of inspection
hours to each functional area
are
approximations
based
upon
NRC Form 766 data.
8
1
2
~*
Severity levels are in accordance
with NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C).
Data reflects Inspection
Reports
87-31 through 88-16.
31
TABLE 3
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1
ENFORCEMENT ITEMS
(08/01/87 - 07/31/88
Inspection
~Re ort Ro.
87-38
87-38
~Sub 'ect
Failure to include acceptance
criteria for the operation of the
'containment
fan cooler collection
monitoring system.
Deviation:
Radiation Monitors
RE-58 and RE-59, installed in April
1985,
were not recorded in the
control
room radiation monitoring
racks.
Severity
Functional
Level
Area
IV
Deviation
87-44
On January
7, 1988,
a visitor inside
the protected
area,
in the adminis-
tration building cafeteria,
became
separated
from, and was not under
the control of, his assigned
escort.
Condition existed for approximately
3 minutes.
IV
88-02
At time of the inspection,
several.
Reg.
Guide 1.97 instruments
were not
calibrated within the established
interval.
IV
88-02
88-03
Deviation:
At time of the inspection,
the wide range
level
instrumentation
did not meet the
redundancy criteria in that all four
of the wide range
instruments
were powered
from one
power supply.
On February 24, 1988,
a equality
Control Inspector
stamped
and
initialed his acceptance
of clean-
liness
on the inspection plan without
visually inspecting inside the body
of valve No.
8484B for cleanliness.
Deviation
IV
88-04
During the performance
of the routine
surveillance test of containment
spray
pump
No. 1-1 (STP P-48)
on February 10,
1988, the reference
f'low rate of 300 +
5
GPM was not established.
IV
32
TABLE 3 (continued)
Licensee failed to provide
a clear
zone for surveillance at the protected
area perimeter.
IV
On April 14, 1988,
a Zone
3 house-
keeping area,
established
for the
Unit 1 reactor vessel
head cable tray
area,
was found to contain loose tools
which were not entered
on the provided
log.
On March 11,
1988, draining of safety
1-2 and 1-4 was initiated
prior to venting the accumulators,
causing relief valve actuation
on the
RCDT inventory to the reactor cavity
sump.
IV
On March 11,
1988, Calculation
No.
880311-0
had been
signed
as prepared
verified, but was not identified as
preliminary even though design input-
data requiring verification was
used
and
had not been verified.
The
calculation's result was in error
due to dimensional
input data being
in error.
IV
Two licensee action requests
reported
that two very high radiation
area
doors were found to be shut but
not locked.
IV
Corrective actions
taken by licensee
did not preclude repetition of lack
of required cleanliness
controls.
IV
On April 27, 1988, while replacing
spiral
wound gaskets,
on a Unit 1
safety injection relief valve header
mechanics
used
an unauthorized
lubricant instead of the prescribed
Felpro N-5000 and not complete the
data
sheets
prescribed
by MP M-54.4.
IV
Since licensing of'nit 1 on November 2,
IV
1984,
a test program
has not been
'stablished
and implemented to assure
required surveillance testing of plant
33
TABLE 3 (continued)
On July 21,
1988 the applicable test
procedures
did not pr ovide for testing the
10K atmospheric
dump valves actuating
systems
to demonstrate
operational
readiness
for loss of normal air supply
and nitrogen backup supply.
IV
As of July 21, 1988, revisions to the
V
have not been submitted to the
NRC
reflecting changes
to the compressed air-
system.
Failure to properly implement
ASME code
IV
requirements
for inservice testing of
safety rel'ated auxiliary feedwater
pumps.
Failure to implement required
measures
to
IV
ensure
proper review of changes
to plant
procedures
for performance of inservice
testing.
A
34
TABLE 4
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2
ENFORCEMENT ITEMS
(08/01/87 - 07/31/88
Inspection
~Re or t No.
87-38
87-38
87-39
~Sob 'ect
Failure to include acceptance
criteria for the operation of the
containment
fan cooler collection
monitoring system.
Deviation:
Radiation Monitors
RE-58 and RE-59, were not recorded
in the control
room radiation
monitoring racks.
On May 5,
1987 maintenance
personnel
torch heated to 1200 degrees'F
and
mechanically pulled S.S.
RHR piping
adjacent
to flow element
without prior approval
by the
appropriate
engineering
organizations.
Severity
Functional
Level
Area
IV
Deviation
IV
87-39
Work order C0011616 Activity 02 of
May 5, 1987,
was issued in lieu of an
approved
procedure
and directed
heating of a
RHR pipe to 1200 degrees
F.
The pipe was subsequently
heated
which
likely caused sensitization
of the
stainless
steel
pipe.
IV
87-43
In April 1985,
two differential pressure
IV
were installed across
the Unit 2
RHR pumps without implementing Adminis-
trative Procedure
Procedure C-lSl,
Revision 3, or any other form of
procedural
control.
As a result, the
remained in place until
November 1987 following identification
by the inspector.
87-43
On November 13, 1987, the Unit 2 Shift
Foreman did not complete
step 8. 13 to
Surveillance Test Procedure
P-3B
which states:
"Remove
tempo-
rarily installed for this test" prior
to signing that the procedure
had been
completed.
were not removed
until November
18,
1987 following
identification by the inspector.
V
35
TABLE 4 (continued)
At time of the inspection,
several
Reg.
Guide 1.97 instruments
were not
calibrated within the established
interval.
IV
Deviation:
At time of the inspection,
the wide range
level
instrumentation
did not meet the
criteria in that al.l four of the
wide range
level
instruments
were powered
from one
power supply.
Deviation
Records
for Unit 2 indicated that
valve
RCV-16 stroke time increased
143% on November 29,
1986 and the
test frequency
was increased
to once
each
month.
The original
92 days
valve stroke time test frequency
was
resumed after May 4, 1987, without
the performance of valve corrective
action in the form of repair,
replacement
or detailed engineering
analysis.
IV
On February
19,
1988,
a licensee
employee entered
the radiological
controls area
by stepping over
a
posted
boundary at a point not
established
as
a normal personnel
access
control point.
In addition,
the individual did not have written
authorization to enter
the area.
IV
Failure to properly perform quality
evaluations
of plant deficiencies
as required
by plant procedures.
IV
c'
3)
36
TABLE 5
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1
SYNOPSIS
OF
LICENSEE
EVENT REPORTSA"
5.
Emergency
Preparedness
Security
Functional
Area
1.
Plant Operations
2.
Radiological
Controls
3.
Maintenance/Surveillance
SALP Cause
Code"
A
B
C
D
E
X
3
0
4
3
3
0
3
0
0
1
0
0
10
3
1
2
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
1
0
0
0
3
Total s
13
19
6.
7.
8.
Engineering/Technical
Support
Safety Assessment/
equality Verification
Fire Protection
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
24
4
5
6
6
3
48
Cause
Codes:
A - Personnel
Error
B - Design,
Manufacturing or Installation Error
.
C - External
Cause
D - Defective Procedures
E - Component Failure
X - Other
Synopsis
includes
LER Nos.
87-12 through 88-22
(LERs 88-4,
17,
18
presently not issued)
and
upon 'Safeguai d
LERs 87-S03 through 88-S11.
37
TABLE 6
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2
SYNOPSIS
OF
LICENSEE
EVENT REPORTS**
Functional
Area
1.
Plant Operations
2.
Radiological
Controls
3.
Maintenance/Surveillance
4.
Emergency
Preparedness
5.
Security
6 ~
Engineering/Technical
Support
7.
Safety Assessment/
qua 1 ity Ver ificati on
8.
Fire Protection
SALP Cause
Code"
A
B
C
D-
E
X
1
1
2
0
-
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Totals
10
Cause
Codes:
4
4
2
3
2
0
15
A - Personnel
Error
B - Design, Manufacturing or Installation Error
C - External
Cause
D - Defective Procedures
E - Component Failure
X - Other
- "
Synopsis
includes
LER Nos.
87-18 through 88-07
t
l,
38
TABLE 7
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1
LICENSEE
EVENT REPORTS
(08/01/87 - 07/31/88)
LER
Title
~Sal
Area
Cause
Code
87-12
Containment fan cooler Unit 1-3 Cooling Mater
flow rate out of Tech Spec limit due to
out-of-tolerance
flow instrument.
3/E
87-13
Containment Ventilation Isolation Initiation
due to personnel
error.
1/A
87-14
87-15
87-16
Inadvertent start of diesel
generator
1-3
due to personnel
error.
Failure to satisfy Tech Specs
6. 12, high
radiation area
due to personnel
error.
Entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 four shutdown
bank control rods not fully withdrawn due
to fuse failure from poor solder joint
between the top end cap
and the metal
fuse
link of the fuse.
3/A
2/A
1/E
87-17
87-18
87-19
U
87-20
Cont. Ventilation Isolation Initiation due
to Voltage Spike during troubleshooting.
Fuel Handling Building ventilation system
shifted to iodine removal
mode
due to
personnel
error.
Failure to satisfy Tech.
Specs.
4. 1. 3. 1. 1 &
4. 1.3.2 for inoperable
rod position
deviation monitor due to personnel
error.
Failure to meet Tech.
Spec.
4.2.4: 1 for
quadrant
power tilt ratio
alarm due to personnel
error.
3/B
3/A
1/A
1/A
87-21
87-22
Actuation of engineered
safety features
due to inadvertent
grounding of
electrical
component.
Reactor Coolant System Control
Room .
Temperature
Recorders
declared
due to inadvertent failure
to reinstall seismic restraints.
3/A
3/A
39
TABLE 7 (continued)
Reactor Trip following Main Feed
Water
Pump Trip during surveillance
test
due to failed "Push to Test"
lamp socket.
Reactor trip when Source
Range
Channel
N-32 detector voltage failed high due
to a capacitor failure.
3/E
1/E
High Steam Generator
Water Level Main
Turbine Trip and Main Feedwater Isolation
during startup
due to lack of Guidance
for operators.
1/D
Mode 1 Entry while in Action Statement
in Violation of T.S. 3.0.4
due to lack of Procedural
Guidance.
1/D
Radiation Monitor Alarm and Hot Particle
caused
Fuel Handling Ventilation System
Change
due to failure to perform survey.
2/D
Entry into T.S.
3..0.3
when both trains
of Auxiliary Building Ventilation were
due to a procedural
deficiency.
3/A
when the
ESF Time
Response
Test Frequency
was not followed
due to misinterpretation of T.S.
3/A
Failure to Perform Plant Vent Air Sampler
Flow Estimate
Required
by T. S.
3. 3. 3 ~ 10
due to personnel
error.
2/A
Low Flow Signal
Reactor Trip Due to inadequate
procedural
guidance.
Spurious Actuation of Containment Ventilation
Isolation
Due to Noise
on Radiation Monitoring
channels'ower
source.
3/D
1/C
Reactor Trip Breakers
Missing Seismic Clips.
(Voluntary) to .be issued.
Containment Ventilation Isolation due to
Electronic Noise and late issuance
of
10 CFR 50.72 Required
Report
Due to
Inadequate
Procedural
Guidance.
1/C
~1
40
TABLE 7 (continued)
88-06
Fuel Handling Building Ventilation
System
and Control
Room Ventilation
System
Mode Changes
due to Inverter
Failure.
1/E
88-07
Actuation of Engineered
Safety Features
caused
by Electrical
Component Grounding
due to personnel
error.
6/A
88"08
Violation of T.S.
6. 12 when two very high
radiation area
doors were left unlocked
due to personnel
error.
2/A
88-09
Mestinghouse
ARD Relays experience
degradation
due to granules
of coil
potting compound lodging between
the
Relay Armature and Coil Spool (voluntary).
3/B
88-10
88-11
Containment Ventilation Isolations
due
to Electronic Noise.
4
Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System
Shift to Iodine Removal
Mode when Radiation
Monitor 1-RM-58 exceeded
the High Alarm Set
Point due to Background Radiation
Fluctuations.
1/C
1/C
88-12
88-13
88-14
88-15
Violation of T.S.
4. 11.2 when
18C technicians
secured
the continuous particulate
and iodine
plant vent sample,
due to personnel
error.
Main steam line isolation due to inadequate
communications
between
I&C technicians
and
the control
room operators.
Contamination of the diesel
generator
day
tank fuel oil due to biofouling (voluntary).
Pump Motor Upper Oil Reservoir
Assemblies
Degradation attributed to metal
fatigue (voluntary).
3/A
3/A
3/C
3/E
88-16
due to lack of Procedural
guidance.
.3/0
88-17
88-18
ECCS check valves (to be issued)
(voluntary).
Safety valve setpoint drift (to be issued)
(voluntary).
~g
41
TABLE 7 (continued)
Mispositioned capstan
spring tangs
on
Pacific Scientific Company snubbers
(voluntary).
3/B
Reactor trip from overtemperature-delta
temperture protection logic due to
personnel
error.
3/A
Reactor trip from high-high steam generator
level protection logic due to inadeuate
operating procedure.
1/0
of plant ventilation
system flow rate monitor
FR-12 due to
personnel
error.
3/A
42
TABLE 7
LER
TITLE
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1
SECURITY LICENSEE
EVENT REPORTS
(08/01/87 " 07/31/88)
SALP AREA
CAUSE
CODE
87-S03
87-S04
87-S05
87-SOG
88-S01
88-S03
88-S05
88-S06
88-S09
88-S10
88-S11
Failure of Security Compensatory
Measure
Inadequate Vital Area Barrier
Loss of Emergency (Security)
Power
Report of Capsule
(non drug)
Found Inside Protected
Area
Adverse
Media Interest - Plant Employee
Degraded
Protected
Area Barrier
Degraded Vital Area Barrier
Failure of Security Compensatory
Measure
Failure of Security Compensatory
Measure
Involvement of Reactor
Operator with Drugs
Failure of Security Compensatory
Measure
5/A
5/B
5/X
5/X
5/X
5/A
5/A
5/A
5/A
5/A
5/A
Og
43
TABLE 8
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2
Licensee
Event Reports
(08/01/87 - 07/31/88)
LER
87-18
87-19
87-20
87-21
Title
T.S. Violation 3.0.3
due to Both Trains of Auxiliary
building ventilation unavailable to start
on
Automatic Start Signal.
Auto Start of Diesel Generator
2-2 due to a
broken wire during reinstallation of a 4KV breaker.
Redundant
Trains of Aux. Building
Ventilation inoperable.
Failure to meet T. S.
Rod
Position Deviation Monitor Due to
Personnel
Error.
SALP Area
Cause
Code
3/D
3/B
1/B
1/A
87-22
87-23,
87-24
87-25
88-01
88-02
88-03
Fuel Handling Building Ventilation,
System shifted to Iodine Removal
Mode
due to unknown cause.
Accumulator Cracking
due to Intergranular
Stress
Corrosion (voluntary).
Manual Trip of Reactor
from 98K arcing at
contacts
on Isophase
Bus Motor-Operated
Disconnect Switch
Potential
loss of containment integrity
when FCV-661 failed
LLRT due to dust
on
valve seat while FCV-660 was potentially
due to personnel
error.
=
Spurious Actuation of the Fuel Hahdling
Building Ventilation System Iodine Removal
Mode due to Electronic Noise
.Reactor trip due to an undetected failed
Relay during Seismic Trip Channel Calibration
CVI & FHB Ventilation Mode Change
due to a
Power Supply Transient
& Second
CVI & FHB
Ventilation Mode Change
& Control
Room
Ventilation System
Mode Change
due to
personnel
error.
1/C
3/B
3/D
3/B
1/C
3/E
3/A
~ <
~ 'l
~'ABLE
8 (continued)
88-04
88-05
CVI due to Power Supply Transient
and
failure of CVI Protection Train A valves to
close
due to Installation error and
procedural
deficiency.
CVI initiation due to Electronic Noise
Caused
by Mechanical
Wear on the Check
Source
Latch.
3/0
1/E
88-06
88-07
due to Personnel
error.
Autostart of. diesel
generato~
2-1 due to
inadvertent
removal of vital bus potential
fuse block during preventive
maintenance
(personnel
error).
3/A
3/A
V
C