RS-16-176, County, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ic

County, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ich

ML16336A810
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	12/01/2016
From:	Kaegi G Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RS-16-176
Download: ML16336A810 (95)

Text

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ExeLon Generation.

RS-16-176

10 CFR 50.54(f)

December 1, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Subject:

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12053A340)

2. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," As An Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331)

3. NEI Letter, Final Draft of Industry Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic (EPRI 1025287), dated November 27, 2012 (ML12333A168 and ML12333A170)

4. NRC Letter, Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 1025287, Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, dated February 15, 2013 (ML12319A074)

5. Exelon Generation Company, LLC letter to NRC, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 -

Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 31, 2014 (RS-14-068) (ML14091A013)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement December 1, 2016 Page 2

6. NRC Letter, Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated May 9, 2014 (ML14111A147)

7. NRC Memorandum, Support Document for Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluation for Operating Reactors in the Central and Eastern United States, dated May 21, 2014 (ML14136A126)

8. NEI Letter, Request for NRC Endorsement of High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396),

dated July 30, 2015 (M L 1 5223A 100 / M L 1 5223A 102)

9. NRC Letter to NEI: Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396: "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility' dated September 17, 2015 (ML15218A569)

10. NRC Letter, Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated October 27, 2015 (ML15194A015)

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Request for Information per 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Reference 1) to all power reactor licensees. The required response section of Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 indicated that licensees should provide a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of the letter for Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) nuclear power plants. By NRC letter dated May 7, 2013 (Reference 2), the date to submit the report was extended to March 31, 2014.

By letter dated May 9, 2014 (Reference 6), the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation report for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 submitted on March 31, 2014 (Reference 5). In accordance with the screening, prioritization, and implementation details report (SPID) (References 3 and 4), and Augmented Approach guidance (Reference 2), the reevaluated seismic hazard is used to determine if additional seismic risk evaluations are warranted for a plant. Specifically, the reevaluated horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) at the control point elevation is compared to the existing safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) or Individual Plant Examination for External Events (I PEEE) High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Spectrum (I HS) to determine if a plant is required to perform a high frequency confirmation evaluation. As noted in the May 9, 2014 letter from the NRC (Reference 6) on page 2 of Enclosure 2, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 is to conduct a limited scope High Frequency Evaluation (Confirmation).

Within the May 9, 2014 letter (Reference 6), the NRC acknowledged that these limited scope evaluations will require additional development of the assessment process. By Reference 8, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report entitled, High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396) for NRC review and endorsement. NRC endorsement was provided by Reference 9. Reference 10 provided the NRC final seismic hazard evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement December 1, 2016 Page 3 screening determination results and the associated schedules for submittal of the remaining seismic hazard evaluation activities.

The High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, provided in the enclosure to this letter, shows that all high frequency susceptible equipment evaluated within the scoping requirements and using evaluation criteria of Reference 8 for seismic demands and capacities, are acceptable.

Therefore, no additional modifications or evaluations are necessary.

This transmittal completes the scope of work described in Section 4.2 of Reference 5, for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2.

This letter closes the associated regulatory Commitment No. 1 contained in Enclosure 2 of Reference 5 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Ronald Gaston at 630-657-3359.

1 declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 1't day of December 2016.

Respectfully submitted, Glen T. Kaegi U Director - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Enclosure:

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 - Seismic High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report cc:

NRC Regional Administrator - Region III NRC Project Manager, NRR LaSalle Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector LaSalle Station Mr. Brett A. Titus, NRR/JLD/JCBB, NRC Mr. Stephen M. Wyman, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Mr. Frankie G. Vega, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Illinois Emergency Management Agency Division of Nuclear Safety

Enclosure LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Seismic High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report (91 pages)

HIGH FREQUENCY CONFIRMATION REPORT IN RESPONSE TO NEAR TERM TASK FORCE (NTTF) 2.1 RECOMMENDATION for the LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 1 AND 2 2601 N 21st Rd, Marseilles, IL 61341 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos.60-373 and 50-374 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176

-~ Exeton..

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon)

PO Box 805398 Chicago, IL 60680-5398 Prepared by:

Stevenson & Associates 1661 Feehanville Drive, Suite 150 Mount Prospect, IL 60056 Report Number..15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Printed Name

Sinnature

Date Preparer.

F. Ganatra 0

G-4c-

10/21/2016 Reviewer:

M. Delaney 't`' '- (

10/21/2016 Approver:

M. Delaney t. its

10/21/2016 Lead Responsible Engineer.

Branch Manager:

~~rdc~~.

%hike:

Senior Manager _

Design Engineering:

M Corporate Acceptance:

e~~c~y S. C1A,r-k

'W Ito 6 It 11 1

Document ID: 15CO348-RPT-002

Title:

High Frequency Confirmation Report for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 in Response to Near Term Task Force NTTF 2.1 Recommendation Document Type:

Criteria K

Interface K

Report Specification K

Other K

Drawing K Project Name:

LaSalle, Unit 1 and 2 High Frequency Confirmation Job No.: 15C0348 Client:

ExeLon.

This document has been prepared under the guidance of the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 18 and project requirements:

Initial Issue (Rev. 0)

Originated by: F. Ganatra

W4'"

Date: 10/21/2016 Checked by: M. Delaney

Date: 10/21/2016 Approved by: M. Delaney-

/L(A-4-a Date: 10/21/2016 Revision Record:

Revision Originated by/

Checked by/

Approved by/

Description of Revision No.

Date Date Date DOCUMENT PROJECT NO.

APPROVAL SHEET 15CO348 Figure 2.8 Stevenson & Associates

l5[O34M-RPT-OO2, Rev. O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176

.xecutive Summary The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March I2,2OI2 letter [l].

Folloxvlngtheaccidenta1theFukushlmaDailchlnudeorpovverplantresultlngfrorntheK4arohI1, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations [15] intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees' perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRl 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation 0atolls (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic" [6]

provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details tothe U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Eva/uation,"[8] and was endorsed by the NRClna letter dated September 17,2O15[3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided byNRCina letter dated October 27,2O15[2].

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for LaSalle County Station, Unit 1and 2 (LA5). The objective ofthis report lsto provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made asa result of the evaluations.

EPRI 3002004396 [8] is used for the LAS engineering evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference [8], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this w

Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation 0

Estimation of a vertical ground motion response spectrum (GMRS)

Page oofV1

l5CO34O-RPT-OO2, Rev. O Correspondence N R316-176 Estimation of in-cabinet seismic demand for subject components Estimation of in-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components 0

Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations Page 4ofe1

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the NRC in its March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

1.2 BACKGROUND

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees' perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic" [6] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 30020043961 "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2].

On March 31, 2014, LAS submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. By letter dated October 27, 2015 [2], the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for LAS using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Page 5 of 91

Correspondence N RS-I6-176 Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17,2Ol5[3].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the conclusions made as a result nf the evaluations.

1~3 APPROACH EPRl3UO2OO439G[8]ls used for the LAS engineering evaluations described ln this report. Section 4.1 of Reference [8] provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation. Accordingly, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

LAS SSE and GIVIRSInformation

• Selection of components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation Estimation of seismic demand for subject components Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

~

Summary ofResults 1.4

PLANT SCREENING LAS submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GIVIRS and seismic hazard information to the NRCon March 31,2Ol4[4].lna letter dated April 2l,2O1S, the NRCstaff concluded that the submitted GIVIRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the LAS site for 11Seismic [14].

The NRC final screening determination letter concluded [2] that the LAS GIVIRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria ln the SPlO[5].

1.5

REPORT Docuy0ENlATDON Section 2 describes the selection of devices. The identified devices are evaluated in Reference

[17] for the seismic demand specified in Section 3 using the evaluation criteria discussed in Section 4. The overall conclusion is discussed ln Section 5.

Table B-1 lists the devices identified in Section 2 and provides the results of the evaluations performed in accordance with Section 3 and Section 4.

Page morm1

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Selection of Components for High-Frequency Screening The fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited FLEX/mitigating strategies equipment to fail to perform as necessary. An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference [8], this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (AC/DC power support systems).

Within the applicable functions, the components that would need a high frequency confirmation are contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal-in or lockout (SILO) circuits. Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2.1 of Reference [8] is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions.

2.1

REACTOR TRIP/SCRAM The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference [8] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "the design requirements preclude the application of SILO circuits that prevent reactor trip/SCRAM functions" and that "No high-frequency review of the reactor trip/SCRAM systems is necessary."

2.2

REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY CONTROL The reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control systems were reviewed for contact control devices in SILO circuits that would create a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The focus of the review was contact control devices that could lead to a significant leak path. Check valves in series with active valves would prevent significant leaks due to misoperation of the active valve; therefore, SILO circuit reviews were not required for those active valves.

The process/criteria for assessing potential reactor coolant leak path valves is to review all P&ID's attached to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and include all active isolation valves and any active second valve upstream or downstream that is assumed to be required to be closed during normal operation or close upon an initiating event (LOCA or Seismic). A table with the valves and associated P&ID is included in Table B-2 of this report.

Manual valves that are normally closed are assumed to remain closed and a second simple check valve is assumed to function and not be a Multiple Spurious Failure.

Page 7 of 91

I5CO348-RPT'OO2, Rev. O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 On BVVR'sthe instrument lines that are 1" or less, in general, are assumed to have restricting orifices that are designed to mitigate any leakage due to make up.

Table 8-2 only lists the Unit 2valves. Unit 1 has equivalent valves. For example, Unit 2 valve 282l-FOI3Cls equivalent to Unit 1 valve 1B2I-FO13C.

Active Function: Afunctlon that requires mechanical motion or change of state (e.g, the closing ofe valve or relay or the change }n state ofotranslstor).

Simple Check Valve: Axalve which doses upon reverse fluid flow only.

Table B-2 contains a list of valves analyzed and the resultant devices selected which are also identified below. Devices controlling the valves listed in Table B-1 were selected based on the analysis detailed below.

Main Steam System Valves Automatic Depressurization Valves IB21-FOl3C/D/E/R/5/U/\\,ZB2I-FOI8C/D/E/R/S/U/V; Safety Relief Valves 1B2l-FOl3F/H/K/L/M/P,Z821'FO13F/H/K/L/W1/P.

Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via relays controlled by the Auto Depressurization Logic /A/B Solenoids ofl/2821-FO13C/D/E/R/3/U/V>, the Low-Low Setpolnt Relief Logic (8/C Solenoids of1/2B22'FOI3C/D/E/K/P/S/U),or reactor pressure (C Solenoids uf l/2B21-FO13F/H/L/M/R/V)[32, pp. 7.3'7].

The Auto Depressurization Logic can seal in via contacts onI/2B2lC-K4A/B,I/2B21[-KOA/8[93, 34,35,36]. The input logic to 1/2821C-K4A/B and l/2B22C-KOA/8ls via several diverse contacts. It is unlikely that coincident chatter would occur simultaneously in each of these input contacts in a way that would cause 1/2B21C-K4A/B and 1/2B21C-K8A/B to both seal in, and for this reason these input devices are not included in the analysis. Relays 1/2B2IC-K7A/Band l/2B2IC-K6A/B are slaves toI/2B21C'K4A/8 and 1/2B2IC'K0A/8 and do not seal-in ontheir own, thus do not meet selection criteria.

Any chatter which could energize the coil of the Low-Low 3etpolnt Relief auxiliary relay associated with the B/C Solenoid-operated pilot valve, and also seal ln the Low-Low Setpo}nt Relief Logic, could cause the valve to open and remain open [37,38,39,4D]. This could happen if a combination of two of the following relays chatter simultaneously: 1/2B21C'K54A/8, 1/2B21C-K55A/B,I/2B31C-K56A/B,1/2B2IC'K57A/8,1/2B21C-K66A/B,1/2B21C-K68A/B, 1/2B21C-K69A/B, 1/2B21C-K70A/8,1/2B21C-K71A/B,1/2821C'K72A/B,1/2B21C'K75A/B, l/282lC-K7GA/8;or the pressure switches PS-l/2BN2l-NO39C/CC,PS-1/2BN21-NO39O/DD,PS' 1/2BN22-NO39E/EE,PS-1/2BN21-NO39K/KK,PS-1/2131\\12I'1\\103913/1313,PS-1/2BN21-NO395/BS,PS' 1/28N2I'NO39U/UU,orPS-1/2BN21-NO60U/UU[41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48](U2),[49,50,51, 52,53,54,55,56](U2).

Chatter in the pressure switch of the pressure-controlled C Solenoids may cause the valve to momentarily open, however there is no seal-in of this pressure signal and the valves would redoae after the period of strong shaking [42,43,44`45,5O,5I,52,53]. Thus none ofthese pressure switches meet the selection criteria.

Main Steam Isolation Valves l821'F02%A/8/C/D,1821'FD28A/8/[/D,2821-FO22A/B/C/D, 2B21-FO28A/8/C/D.

The solenoid-operated pilot valves of these normally-open valves are energized to keep the valves open. Chatter in the auxiliary relays controlling these valves [57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, Page oo,m1

Rev O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 64](Ul),[65,66 67 88,69,70 7l,72](U2),orln the Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Logic [73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, BO] could cause the valves to dose, vvhloh is e beneficial effect. If an isolation signal is generated, no relay chatter would cause these valves to remain open after the period of strong shaking. For this reason, no devices controlling these valves meet the selection criteria.

Main Steam Drain Valves I132I-FOI6,I8J1-FO19,IQ2l-FOG7A/B/C/C\\2B22-FOl6,2B21-FOI9,2B21-FOG7A/8/C/O.

These motor-operated valves are normally open and chatter in the opening control circuit is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches [8l,82,83,84]. Chatter ln the closing contactor auxiliary contacts or the isolate signal relay contacts could cause valve closure, however this effect ls beneficial as far as leak-path lsconcerned. All other contact devices lnthe closing circuit are rugged.

Feedumatermnd Zinc System Valves Valves ]821-FOl1A/B,2821-FO1IA/8.

Based on the P&lD [05, 86], these are normally open manual valves without electrical controls. This removes these valves from consideration as a potential RCS leak path resulting from high-frequency seismic effects.

Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculation Valves Reactor Recirculation Pump Discharge Valves lB33-FO67A/B,2833-FOB7A/B.

These valves are normally open and chatter in the opening control circuit is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches [O7,88]. Chatter ln the closing contactor auxiliary contacts could cause valve closure, however this effect is beneficial as far as leak-path is concerned.

Chatter of other devices in the close circuit would only have a temporary effect on valve closure and thus does not meet the selection criteria [89,9O,9l,92].

Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valves IB33-F080//B,2B33-FD60A/B.

These valves are controlled by hand switches via a solid-state positioning system [93, 94, 95, 96].

There are no vulnerable SILO contact devices which may hold these valves in the open position.

Reactor Recirculation Pump Suction Valves lB39-FO23A/B,2B33-FUZ3A/B.

These motor-operated valves are normally open and chatter in the opening control circuit is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches [97,98,99,I00]. Chatter ln the closing contactor auxiliary contacts could cause valve closure, however this effect is beneficial as far as leak-path lsconcerned. All other contact devices ln the closing circuit are rugged.

Residual Heat Removal System Valves Containment Spray Valves 1EI2'FO16A/B,lE12-FOl7A/B,2El2'FO16A/8,3E12-FOl7A/B.

These motor-operated valves are normally closed and controlled by hand switches with permissive contacts ln the opening circuit [lO1,1O2,lO3,1O4,IO5,1O6]. Chatter /n the auxiliary contact of the 42-0 opening contactor could bypass the permissive and control switch and seal-in the contactor, which would open the valve. Chatter in the opening permissive contacts are blocked bya rugged control switch. Chatter ln the closing circuit is blocked by open and rugged limit and torque switches.

Page mofsn

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Residual Heat Removal Suction Cooling Isolation Valves 1E12-F008, 1E12-F009, 2E12-F008, 2E12-F009.

These motor-operated valves are normally closed and controlled by hand switches with an isolate signal permissive contact in the opening circuit [107, 108, 109, 110]. In the absence of an isolation signal, chatter in the auxiliary contact of the 42-0 opening contactor could bypass the control switch and seal-in the contactor, which would open the valve. The inboard isolation valve, 1/2E12-F009, also has an interposing auxiliary relay CR1. Chatter in the contact of this relay could also lead to seal-in of the opening contactor. Chatter in the closing circuit is blocked by open and rugged limit and torque switches.

Reactor Water Clean-Up System Valves Reactor Water Clean-Up System Isolation Valves 1G33-F001, 2G33-F001; Reactor Water Clean-Up Vessel Drain Line Recirculation Valves 1034101, 2G33-F101.

Per the MID these motor-operated valves are normally open [111, 112]. Chatter in the opening control circuit is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches [113, 114, 115, 116]. Chatter in the closing contactor auxiliary contacts could cause valve closure, however this effect is beneficial as far as leak-path is concerned. All other contact devices in the closing circuit are rugged.

Reactor Water Clean-Up Line Suction Inside Containment Valves 1G33-F102, 2G33-F102.

These are normally-open motor operated valves controlled by rugged hand switches [113, 115]. There is no seal-in associated with the control of these valves.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Valves Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Isolation Valves 1E51-F063, 1E51-F008, 2E51-F063, 2E51-F008.

These normally-open motor-operated valves are required to remain open to supply steam to the RCIC Turbine, which powers the AC-Independent Core Cooling System credited in Section 2.4 below, and for the Phase 1 FLEX Response. There is no seal-in in the opening circuit, and closure, if needed, is not blocked by SILO [117, 118, 119, 120]. Inadvertent closure of these valves is covered in the RCIC chatter analysis in Section 5.3.7 of Ref. [18].

Page 10 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002 Rev.O Correspondence N 115-16-176 2.3

REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE CONTROL The reactor vessel pressure control function b identified asa key function lnReference [8]hobe considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "required post eventpressuneoontnollatypicailyprovldedbvpassNedevlces"andthat"nospecUDchlgh frequency component chatter review is required for this function."

2.4

CORE COOLING The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning. LaSalle credits their steam turbine-driven Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RClC) Pump to provide core decay-heat cooling.

The selection of contact devices for the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) overlaps with the RCS/Reactor Vessel Inventory Control Category. Refer to Section 2.2 for more information on the analysis of contact devices for these valves.

The selection of contact devices for RCIC was based on the premise that RCIC operation is desired, thus any SILO which would lead to RCIC operation is beneficial and thus does not meet the criteria for selection. Only contact devices which could render the RClC system inoperable were considered.

The largest vulnerability to RClC operation following e seismic event is contact chatter leading to a false RCl[ Isolation Signal or false Turbine Trip. Afalse steam line break trip has the potential to delay RClCoperatlon while confirmatory inspections are being made. Chatter lnthe contacts oftheRClClsoladonSlgnolRelayl/ZMA-K15,theStearnL/neHlghDlfferentialPressureTlrne DelayRelayl/2E51A-K47,theLeakDeteotionRelay1/2E3lArK2A^ortheTurbineExheusL Diaphragm High Pressure Relay 1/2E51A-K29; or coincident chatter in the Reactor Pressure Relays 1/2E5IA-K54 and 1/2ESlA-K55; may lead toaROC Isolation Signal and seal-in of I/2E51A,K15 [19, 20]. This would cause the RClC Isolation Valves to dose and the RClCTrlp and Throttle Valve totrip. Similar chatter ln the devices that drive those relays could also lead to seal-ln:l/2E3l-NO22/,I/2E31'NO22C,I/2E51-NO12/,l/2E51-NO12C and 1/2E32'ROOlC[l9, 21,20,22,23, 24]. (The four-second time delay associated with 1/2E51A-K47 will block chatter on differential pressure switch l/2E3l-NOI3AA,soitlsexduded.) The same rationale applies to the identical Division 3 devices: I/2E51A-K33, 1/2E51A-K48,1/2E5lArK33,l/3E3IA-K2B, 1/2E51A-K99,1/2E51A-K57,I/2E51A-K58,1/2E3I-NO228,1/2E31-NO22D,I/2E51-NOI28, I/2ES1-NO12O and 2/2E31-ROO2C[25,26,27,28].

Any chatter that may lead to the energization of the Trip and Throttle Valve Remote Trip Circuit is considered as SILO as it will close the valve and require a manual reset prior to restoration of the ROCsystem. Chatter in Turbine Trip Auxiliary Relay 1/2E51A-K8, or in the devices which control this relay; the Turbine Exhaust High Pressure Relay 1/2E51A-K6, the Pump Suction Low Pressure Relay 1/2E51A-K7, and the Isolation Signal Relays 1/2E5lA-K15, and 1/JE51A,K6O[15];

could cause seal-in ofK8 resulting lna turbine trip. Similar chatter in the contact devices that drive those relays (and not already covered in the RCIC Isolation Signal analysis) could also lead toa turbine trip: 1/2E51-NOO9A\\1/2E51-NOO98, and 1/2E5l-NOOG[29,3O].

LoSolle'sE5EL development ls documented lnMLI4353AO85[3l]. The contact devices selected as part of that effort appear ln Table B-2. For more information on the E3EL selection process and the complete ESEL refer to Ref. [31].

Page 11 of 91

Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 The /Cand DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in SlU]

circuits that prevent the availability ofDCand AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

° Emergency Diesel Generators,

° Battery Chargers,

°

Unlnterruptable Power Supplies,

=

EDG Ancillary Systems, and

°

3vvltchgeor, Load Centers, and W4CCs.

Electrical povver, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability ofAC power torecharge the batteries. The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators and their ancillary support systems. EPRl3OO2OO4396[Q] requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power ls not challenged bya SILO device. The tripping nf lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine if the trip was spurious due to contact chatter orln response toan actual system fault. The actions taken to diagnose the fault condition could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power.

In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary for Power Supply from EDGs to Battery Chargers and EDG Ancillary Systems. General information on the arrangement ofsafety-related AC and DC systems, as well as operation of the EDGs, was obtained from La3alle's UFSAR

[32]. LaSalle has five (5)EDGo which provide emergency power to their Class 1E loads ontheir two (2) units. The overall emergency power distribution is shown on the station One-Line Diagrams [12l,132,I23,124,125,128].

The analysis necessary to identify contact devices in this category relies on conservative worse-case initial conditions and presumptions regarding event progression. The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event.

The Emergency Diesel Generators are not operating but are available. The seismic event ls presumed to cause a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM.

In response to bus undervoltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class 1E control systems must automatically shed loads, start the EDGs, and sequentially load the diesel generators as designed. Ancillary systems required for EDG operation as well as Class 1E battery chargers and inverters must function asnecessary. The goal nf this analysis lsto identify any vulnerable contact devices which could chatter during the seismic event, seal-in or lock-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP.

The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to both divisions. The contact devices selected aa part of that effort appear ln Table B-1.

Page 1oorm1

l5CO348'RPT'DO2, Rev. O Correspondence N RS-16-176 Emerc jency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generatons,DGO OG1A,OG1B,DGJA, and DG28,lsdivided into two sections, generator protective relaying and diesel engine control. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear ln the UFSAR[32].

Generator Protective Relaying The DG 0 Circuit Breaker ACB1413 (ACB2413) is tripped by DG Lockout Relay 86DGO. If this lockout relay is tripped the circuit breaker will not close automatically during the LOOP [127, 128]. The Diesel Generator Lockout Relay 86DGO may be tripped by chatter in both engine and generator-related fault circuits. Chatter in engine-related fault circuits are covered below.

Chatter in the following generator protective and auxiliary relays may trip the lockout relay:

Differential Overcurrent 87, 87X; Neutral Ground 59, K59X1; Frequency 81, 81X; Overcurrent with Voltage Restraint 5IV,5IVX; Reverse Power 3Z,K32X; and Field Excitation 4O,K25[129, 130]. The lockout relays for the DG1A and DG 2A circuit breakers have identical control logic as DGO and are susceptible to chatter ln the same devices [l31,132,133,134,185,136].

The DG 1B Circuit Breaker ACB1433 and DG 2B Circuit Breaker ACB2433 are tripped by the Engine Lockout Relay K15, the Generator Lockout Relay K1, and the 86-N Normal Power Feed Lockout Relay [187,l38]. The engine lockout relay is covered below. The generator lockout relay may be tripped by chatter in the following protective relays: Differential Overcurrent K30A/B/C; Reverse Power K32; and Overcurrent with Voltage Restraint K35A/B/C coincident with Time Delay Relay K5[l39,14O]. The normal feed lockout relay may be tripped by chatter ln the uvercurrent relays 5l(A/8/C)[l4l,142].

Diesel Engine Control Tripping of the DG 0 Lockout Relay trips the generator breaker and energizes the engine shutdown solenoid [143, 144]. The engine fault devices that may trip the lockout relays are:

Failure to Start K39,K9; Engine OverspeedS8,K1O; Oil Pressure K11; and Oil Temperature Sl1, K12 [130]. The oil pressure switch changes state during engine start. Time delay relay K33 blocks the oil pressure fault during engine start. Chatter lnK33 may cause engine shutdown due toan erroneous oil pressure fault. Other than devices which could trip the lockout breaker, there are no SILO devices which would prevent diesel start after the period of strong shaking ends. The control logic for DG 1A and DG 2A is identical to DG 0 and is sensitive to chatter in the same devices [145,132,133,148,135,l33].

Tripping of either the generator or engine lockout relays onDG1BorDG2B will energize the engine shutdown relay. The engine fault devices which could trip the engine lockout relay on DG 1B or DG 2B are identical in design and nomenclature as the other three diesel generators

[147,14O].

Battery Chargers The Control Circuits for Battery Chargers contain a high voltage shutdown circuit [149] which is intended to protect the batteries and DC loads from output overvoltage due to charger failure

[150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157]. Chatter ln the contacts of these output relays may disable the battery chargers, and for this reason meet the selection criteria.

Page 1nofm

I5CO948-RPT-O02, Rev. O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Analysis of schematics for the Unlnterruptable Power Supplies [I58,159,l60,I61, 162,]63]did not indicate any SILO contact devices.

In order to start and operate the Emergency Diesel Generators, a number of components and systems are required. For the purpose of identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed. Information in the UFSAR [32] was used as appropriate for this analysis.

Starting A~

Based on Diesel Generator availability as an initial condition the passive air reservoirs are presumed pressurized and the only active components in this system required to operate are the air start solenoids [l64,l8S,l66,32, pp. 9.5-37], which are covered under the EDGengine control analysis ln Section above.

Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust The combustion air intake and exhaust for the Diesel Generators are passive systems [164, 165, 166 32, pp. 9.5-42] which do not rely on electrical control.

1ube Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps [I67,32, pp. 9.5-4O] which do not rely on electrical control.

Fuel Oil The Diesel Generators utilize self-driven pumps to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks; and the system requires no electrical power to supply fuel to the diesel engine during starting and initial operation []3, pp. 9.5'32]. The day tanks are re-supplied using AC-powered Diesel 0l Transfer Pumps [168, I69]. Chatter analysis of the control circuits for the fuel oil transfer pumps [l7O,I71,I72] concluded they do not include SILO devices.

Cooling Wate The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System consists of two loops, engine water and cooling water [32, pp. 9.5'34]. Engine driven pumps are credited for engine water when the engine ls operating. Those mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control. Cooling water flow is provided bv the Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pumps [I73,I74,17S,I76,175,277]. These pumps are controlled by the DG start circuit via the speed switch auxiliary relay K18. This control circuit ls covered in Section above.

Ventilation Ventilation for each [OG room /s achieved via a vent fan [32, pp. 9.4-S4]. These components are controlled by room temperature [178,179,I8O]. Strong shaking may temporarily prevent fan operation however there is no SILO associated with this circuit and fan operation would occur normally after the period of strong shaking.

Switch-gear, Load Centers, and MCCs Power distribution from the EOGs to the necessary electrical loads (Battery Chargers, Uninterruptable Power Supplies, Cooling Water Pumps, Fuel Oil Pumps, and EDG Ventilation Page 14mu1

15

Rev. O Correspondence N R3-16-178 Fans) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a circuit breaker trip and interruption lnpower. This effort excluded the EOG output circuit breakers, which are covered 1n Section above, as well as com pone nt-specifi c contactors and their control devices, which are covered ln the analysis for each component above.

The medium-and low-voltage circuit breakers ln4l6OV Busses and 4MOVAC Load Centers which are supplying power to loads identified ln this section (battery chargers, EDG ancillary systems, eto.) have been identified for evaluation. These were breakers ln the following awltchgear cubldea/connportnnents:l4lY Cubicle 9;135X Compartments 1O2B,IO3A,IO3C and 1O3O;l35Y Compartments 2O28 and 204B;l42Y Cubicle 9;l36X Compartments 3O28,3O3A, and 3O4D; I38Y Compartments 4O28 and 4O48;14S Cubicle 5;24lY Cubicle 4; 235X Compartments IO2/\\

lO2C,lO2D, and lO3B; 235Y Compartments 2O1C and 2O3B;242Y Cubicle 5;230K Compartments 3O1B,3O2C, and 3O313;236Y Compartments 4OIC and 4O3B; and 243 Cubicle 5

[I8I,I82,I83,184,185,I86,187](Ul),[188,189,190,191,192,193,194]/U2>. DC Distribution uses vulnerable Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers in the following compartments:

lDC08E Compartment 313, lDC15E Compartment 313, lDCO2E Compartment 2B, and lE22-P301A CB'G and C8-9(2DCO8E'38,2DC1SE-38,2DCO2E-2B, and 2E22-P3OlAC8-6 and CB-9); for the Distribution Panel and MCC Feeds [l95,196,I97,l98,199,2OO,2Ol,2O2]. The circuit breakers that feed the battery charger outputs to the DC Buses (1DC08E-2A, 1DC15E-2A, 1DC15E-2D, IDCO2E-lA,2OCOOE-2A,2OCI5E-2A,2DCl5E-2C\\2O[O2E-1A) use rugged Molded-Case Circuit Breakers per the walkdown described in Attachment 9.2, and thus are not selected for seismic evaluation. WqC[8s in low voltage Motor Control Center Buckets were considered rugged as The only circuit breakers affected bv protective relaying (not already covered) were those that distribute power from the 4160V Busses to the 4160/480V step-down transformers. An analysis of the control circuits for these circuit breakers indicates that chatter in the 51 Phase Overcurrent Relays or the 51G Ground Overcurrent Relay or 51N Neutral Overcurrent Relays in the trip circuits of these breakers could cause circuit breaker tripping [203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 2.6

SUMMARY

OF SELECTED COMPONENTS The investigation of high-frequency contactdevicasasdeacrbedebovevvasperfonnedinRef

[l8].A list of the contact devices requiring a high frequency confirmation ls provided /n Appendix 8, Table B-1. The identified devices are evaluated in Ref. [17] per the methodology/description of Section 3 and 4. Results are presented in Section 5 and Table B-1.

Page 1unrm1

15C0348-RPT-002 Rev.O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Per Reference [8], Sect. 4.3, the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand onthe subject components in the horizontal direction is the LAS horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GIVIRS), which was generated es part of the LAS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report

[4] submitted to the NRCon March 31~ 2O14` and accepted bv the NRCon April 21,2O15[l4].

It is noted in Reference [8] that o Foundation Input Response Spectrum (FIRS) may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. However, for sites founded on rock, per Ref. [8], "The Control Point GMRS developed for these rock sites are typically appropriate for all rock-founded structures and addltlonalFlRSeetlrnatesorenotdeemnadnecessaryfor1hehlQhfrequencyconfirnnatloneffort."

The applicable buildings at LAS are founded on rock; therefore, the Control Point GIVIRS is representative of the input at the building foundation.

The horizontal GIVIRS values are provided in Table 3-2.

3.2

VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND As described in Section 3.2 of Reference. [8], the horizontal GIVIRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GIVIRS (VGW1RS), which ls the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

The site's soil mean shear wave velocity vs. depth profile is provided in Reference. [4], Table 2.3.2-1 and reproduced below in Table 3-1.

Page 1oorm1

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity Vs. Depth Profile Layer Depth (ft)

Depth (m)

Thickness, d, (ft)

Vs, (ft/sec) d,/Vs, E [d,/Vs,]

Vs30 (ft/s) 1 5.5 1.7 5.5 663 8.30E-03 8.30E-03 815 2

11 3.4 5.5 663 8.30E-03 1.66E-02 3

16.5 5.0 5.5 663 8.30E-03 2.49E-02 4

22 6.7 5.5 663 8.30E-03 3.32E-02 5

27.6 8.4 5.5 663 8.30E-03 4.15E-02 6

33.1 10.1 5.5 663 8.30E-03 4.98E-02 7

38.6 11.8 5.5 663 8.30E-03 5.81E-02 8

44.1 13.4 5.5 663 8.30E-03 6.64E-02 9

49.6 15.1 5.5 663 8.30E-03 7.47E-02 10 55.1 16.8 5.5 663 8.30E-03 8.30E-02 11 60.6 18.5 5.500 663 8.30E-03 9.13E-02 12 66.1 20.1 5.500 663 8.30E-03 9.95E-02 13 72.1 22.0 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.03E-01 14 78.1 23.8 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.07E-01 15 84.2 25.7 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.10E-01 16 90.2 27.5 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.14E-01 17 96.2 29.3 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.17E-01 18 102.0 31.1 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.21E-01 Using the shear wave velocity vs. depth profile, the velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m (98.43ft) to the surface of the site (Vs30) is calculated per the methodology of Reference [8], Section 3.5.

The time for a shear wave to travel through each soil layer is calculated by dividing the layer depth (d,) by the shear wave velocity of the layer (Vs,).

The total time for a wave to travel from a depth of 30m to the surface is calculated by adding the travel time through each layer from depths of Om to 30m (F[di/Vs,]).

The velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface is therefore the total distance (30m) divided by the total time; i.e., Vs30 = (30m)/F[d,/Vs,].

Note: The shear wave velocity is calculated based on time it takes for the shear wave to travel 31.1m (102.Oft) instead of 30m (98.43ft). This small change in travel distance will have no impact on identifying soil class type.

The site's soil class is determined by using the site's shear wave velocity (Vs30) and the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the GMRS and comparing them to the values within Reference [8],

Table 3-1. Based on the PGA of 0.317g and the shear wave velocity of 815ft/s, the site soil class is C-Soft.

Page 17 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002 Rev.O Correspondence N R3-16-176 Once a site soil class is determined, the mean vertical vs. horizontal GIVIRS ratios (WH) at each frequency are determined by using the site soil class and its associated V/H values in Reference

[8], Table 3-2.

The vertical GIVIRS is then calculated by multiplying the mean V/H ratio at each frequency bvthe horizontal GK4RS acceleration at the corresponding frequency. It is noted that Reference [8O, Table 3-2values are constant between O.2Hz and 15Hz.

The V/H ratios and VGIVIRS values are provided ln Table 3-2of this report.

Figure 3-1 below provides a plot of the horizontal GIVIRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GIVIRS for LAS.

Page 1uorm1

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra Frequency (Hz)

HGMRS (g)

WH Ratio VGMRS (g) 100 0.317 0.94 0.298 90 0.324 1.01 0.327 80 0.331 1.09 0.361 70 0.341 1.18 0.402 60 0.354 1.24 0.439 50 0.373 1.28 0.477 45 0.389 1.3 0.505 40 0.404 1.23 0.497 35 0.426 1.13 0.481 30 0.454 1.03 0.468 25 0.486 0.91 0.442 20 0.507 0.79 0.401 15 0.574 0.7 0.402 12.5 0.635 0.7 0.445 10 0.695 0.7 0.487 9

0.686 0.7 0.480 8

0.664 0.7 0.465 7

0.627 0.7 0.439 6

0.572 0.7 0.400 5

0.517 0.7 0.362 4

0.491 0.7 0.344 3.5 0.480 0.7 0.336 3

0.461 0.7 0.323 2.5 0.428 0.7 0.300 2

0.403 0.7 0.282 1.5 0.330 0.7 0.231 1.25 0.284 0.7 0.199 1

0.232 0.7 0.162 0.9 0.214 0.7 0.150 0.8 0.193 0.7 0.135 0.7 0.169 0.7 0.118 0.6 0.143 0.7 0.100 0.5 0.118 0.7 0.083 0.4 0.094 0.7 0.066 0.35 0.082 0.7 0.058 0.3 0.071 0.7 0.049 0.25 0.059 0.7 0.041 0.2 0.047 0.7 0.033 0.15 0.035 0.7 0.025 0.125 0.029 0.7 0.021 0.1 0.024 0.7 0.016 Page 19 of 91

0.80

---

1.40 0.70

1.30 HGMRS V/H Ratio (C-Soft)

N 1.20 0.60 1.10 p 0.50 u

p

1.00 c~

0.40 a)

0.90 v

Q 0.30 0.80 0.20 0.70 0.10

0.60 0.00

0.50 0.1

1

10

100 Frequency [Hzj VGMRS 1

I

~

1

~

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Figure 3-1 Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V/H Ratios Page 20 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 3.3

COMPONENT VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND The component vertical demand is determined using the peak acceleration of the VGMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz and amplifying it using the following two factors:

Vertical in-structure amplification factor AFsv to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor AFC to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsv is derived from Figure 4-4 in Reference [8]. The in-cabinet vertical amplification factor, AFC is derived in Reference [8] and is 4.7 for all cabinet types.

3.4

COMPONENT HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND Per Reference [8] the peak horizontal acceleration is amplified using the following two factors to determine the horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum:

Horizontal in-structure amplification factor AFsH to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation.

Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFC to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.).

The in-structure amplification factor AFsH is derived from Figure 4-3 in Reference [8]. The in-cabinet horizontal amplification factor, AFC is associated with a given type of cabinet construction. The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference [8] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148-SL [13] assuming 5% in-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRI NP-7148-SL [13]

classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room benchboard panels and low amplification structures such as motor control centers.

All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table B-1 in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in-cabinet amplification categories in Reference [8] as follows:

LAS Motor Control Centers are typical motor control center cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections. Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the front-to-back direction. This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response. In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications. These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

LAS Switchgear cabinets are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category. Each section is a wide box-type structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less damping which increases the enclosure response. Components can be mounted on the wide panels, which results in the higher in-cabinet amplification factors.

Page 21 of 91

15

Rev. O Correspondence No RS-18-176 LAS Control cabinets are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width. Each section consists of structures with height-to-depth ratios of about 3 which results in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

Page 22 of 91

Rev O Correspondence N R5-16'I76 Per Reference [8], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(I) If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [7],

then the component seismic capacity from this program is used.

(2) lfa contact device was not tested as part of[7], then one or more ofthe following means to determine the component capacity were used:

(a) Device-specific seismic test reports (either from the station or from the SQURTS testing program.

(b) Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per [9], [10], [11], and (d Assembly (e~~ electrical cabinet) tests where the component functional performance was monitored.

(3) The existing station procedure is used for contact devices where operator action can resolve any inadvertent actuation of the essential components.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated with the component mounting point demand from Section 3 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Reference [8].

A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provided in Table B-1 in Appendix B of this report.

Page 23 of 91

Correspondence N RS-I6-176 5.1

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS LAS has performed a High Frequency Confirmation evaluation in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [l] using the methods lnEPRl report 3OO2OO4396[8].

The evaluation identified a total of 363 components that required seismic high frequency evaluation. As summarized in Table B-1 in Appendix B, 360 of the devices have adequate seismic capacity. The remaining 3 devices are adequate despite their seismic capacities' being less than seismic demand because any chatter in these 3 devices can be resolved by LAS operator actions.

5.2

IDENTIFICATION OF FOLLOW-Up ACTIONS No follow-up actions were identified.

Page 24 of 91

Correspondence N RS-16-176 NRC(E Leeds and M. Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.l,Z.S and 9.Suf the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession Number MLI2053A340 NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List. "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the FukuyhlrnaDaAchlAouldent." October 27,2Ol5, ADAMS Accession Number MLI5194AOI5 8

NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute (A. Mauer). "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, "High Frequency Program:

AppllcatlonGuldonoeforFunctlonalConOrrnatlonondFraQUlty.'"Septenmber17,2O15, ADAMS Accession Number ML1521MA5G9 4

Seismic Hazard and Screening Report ln Response tothe 5O.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2 and 2 dated March 3I,ZOl4, ADAMS Accession Number 5

EPRlIOl5lO9, "Program on Technology Innovation: Seismic Screening ofComponents Sensitive to High-Frequency Vibratory K4otions." October 2OO7 G

EPRl1OJ52B7, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic." February 2013 7

EPRl3OO2O02997, "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing 5umnmnary."

September 2014 8

EPRI 3002004396, "'High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2Ol5 9

EPRlNP-7l47-SL, -Seismic Ruggedness ofReloys." August 1992 lD

EPRlNP'7l47'SLV2, Addendum I,"Selsmnic Ruggedness ofRe/ays", September 1993 Il

EPRlNP-7147-6LV2, Addendum 2, "Seismic Ruggedness ofRelays", April l995 12

EPRlNP-7147S[lUG Advisory 2OO4'O2."RelayGERSCorreotlons." September 1O,ZOO4 13

EPRI NP-7148-SL, "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functlonallty",199O 14

NRC (F. Vega) Letter to LaSalle County Station (B. Hanson), "LaSalle County Station, Units I and 2 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 5[\\ Section 5O.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the FukushlnmoOai-lchi Accident (TAC NOS. MF3881 and W1F38M2)" April 21,2O15,ADAMS Accession Number MLl5Ol3A132 Page 25ofm

25CO34B-RPT-OO2, Rev. O Correspondence N R3-16-178 15

Recommendations For Enhancing Reactor Safety inthe 21't Century, "The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the FukushimaDaAchl Accident" July ~2011, ADAMS Accession Number MLLIl8818O7 16

NB I2-06, Rev. 2, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide" 17

15CO348-CAL-001, Rev. 0, "'High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation ofRelays."

18

15CO348-RPT-OO1, Rev. 1, "Selection uf Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluatlon" 19

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4226AD Rev. AA, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 4 ZO

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4226AD Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 4 21

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4226AE Rev. AE, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 5 22

LaSalle Drawing lE-2-4226AE Rev. AD, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl (E51) Part 23

LaSalle Drawing lE-1-4224AC Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Leak Detection System LD(E31)

Part 34

LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4224AC Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Leak Detection System LD (E31)

Part 25

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4226AF Rev. AK, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 6 26

LaSalle Drawing 2E-2'4226AF Rev. AA, Schematic Olograrn Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 6 27

LaSalle DravvlnglE-l-4224AD Rev. O, Schematic Diagram Leak Detection System LD(E3l)

Part 28

LaSalle UrovvlngIE-2-4224AO Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Leak Detection System LD(E3l)

Part 29

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4226AC Rev. Z, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E5I) Part 3 30

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4226AC Rev. AA, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 3 31

LaSalle County Station, Unit I and 2, "Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report" December 19,2O24,ADAMS Accession Number ML14353AO85 32

LaSalle Report, "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UF3AR)," Revision 22, April 2O15.

33

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4201AB Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB (1321C) Part 34

LaSalle Drawing IE 2'4202AH Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82lC) Part O 35

LoSollc Oravvlng2E-2-42O2AB Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(821C) Part 2 36

LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4201AH Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B2lC) Part 8 Page 26oym

Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 37

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4201AN Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8/82IC1 Part 13 38

LaSalle Drawing 1 E-1-420IAP Rev. D, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B2IC) Part l4 89

LaSalle Dnavvlng1E-2-42O1AN Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B21C) Part I3 40

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4201AP Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B2lC) Part l4 41

LaSalle Drawing lE-l-42OlAC Rev. AC, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82IC) Part 42

LaSalle Dravvlng1E-l-42O1AD Rev. AG, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82lC) Part 4 43

LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4201AE Rev. Z, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB (B21C) Part 44

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4201AF Rev. AD, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82lC) Part 6 45

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4201AG Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB (B21C) Part 46

LaSalle Dravvlng1E-l-42OlAJ Rev. l, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B22C) Part 9 47

LaSalle Drawing IE-I-42O1AKRev. H, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B21C) Part 1O 48

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4201AR Rev. 1, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82l[) Part lG 49

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4201AC Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B2lC) Part 3 SO

LaSalle DravvlnglE-2-42OlAO Rev. X, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B21C) Part 4 51

LaSalle Drawing IE'2-4201AE Rev. l[Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B21C) Part S SZ

LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4201AF Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B2IC) Part 6 53

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4201AG Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B21C) Part 54

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4201AJ Rev. E, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B21C) Part 9 55

LaSalle Drawing lE-2-42O1AKRev. E, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(BJ1C) Part lO 56

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-420IAR Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82IC) Part 1§ 57

LaSalle Drawing lE-l-42O3AB Rev. \\, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB B21 Part 50

LaSalle Drawing 1E-l-42O3AC Rev. X, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NBB2l Part 3 Page 27 of 91

lSCO34Q-RPT-OO2, Rev. O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 59

LaSalle Drawing lE-I-42O3AD Rev. \\, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N882l Part 4 50

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-42O3AE Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NBB21 Part S 61

LaSalle Onavvlng 1E-I-4203AF Rev. X, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8 B21 Part 62

LaSalle DrovvlngIE-1-42O3AG Rev. X, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8B2l Part 7 63

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4209AH Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Main 5teonn Nuclear Boiler System NB82l Part 8 64

LaSalle Dravvlng1E-l-42D3AJ Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Main Stearn Nuclear Boiler System NBB21 Part 9 65

LaSalle Drawing IE-2-42O3AB Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NBB2I Part 2 66

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4203AC Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NBB2l Part 3 87

LaSalle Drawing IE'2-4203AO Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8B22 Part 4 68

LaSalle Oravving1E-2-42O3AE Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB821 Part 5 89

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-42O3AF Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8B2l Part 5 70

LaSalle Drawing lE-2-42O3AG Rev. T, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8B2l Part 7 71

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-42O3AH Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB821 Part 8 72

LaSalle DrevvlnglE-2'42O3AJ Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB82I Part 9 73

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4232AB Rev. AA, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PC821H Part 2 74

LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4232AC Rev. AF, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PCB21H Part 3 75

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4232AD Rev. AG, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PC821H Part 4 76

LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4232AE Rev. AD, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PCB22H Part 5 77

LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4232AB Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PC82lH Part 2 78

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4232AC Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PC8J1H Part 3 79

LaSalle Drawing lE-2-4232AD Rev. \\, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PCB21H Part 4 80

LaSalleDravvlng1E-2'4232AERev.S,DchernaticDiagramnPrimaryContalnmentand Reactor Vessel Isolation System PCB2lH Part 5 Page 28 of 91

I5CO34M-RPT-OO2, Rev. O Correspondence N R3I8-176 81

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4203A Rev. L Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB(B2l) Part 1I 82

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4203AM Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB(B2l) Part 1Z 83

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4203AL Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8(B2l) Part 1l 84

LaSalle Drawing lE-2-42O3AM Rev. ], Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB (B21) Part 12 85

LaSalle Drawing M-57 Sheet 1 Rev. T,PbklDFeedvvater and Zinc QG

LaSalle DnavvlnQ M-118 Sheet l Rev. O, P/&lD Feedvvater and Zinc 87

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4205BC Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part 27 88

LaSalle OnavvlnQ 1E-2-4205BC Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part 27 89

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4205AK Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part lO 90

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4205AV Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part 2O 91

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4205AK Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part IO 92

LaSa)leDrovvinglE-2-42O5AVRev.H,SchennadcDiagrannReactorRocirculatlonSystennRN (B33) Part 2O 93

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4205BR Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part 4O 94

La5alleOravvlnO1E-1'42O5CARev.F,3ohennatlcDlagrarnReaotorReolrculation3ysternRR (833) Part 49 95

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-42O58R Rev. G, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RQ (833) Part 4O 96

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4205CA Rev. E, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part 49 97

LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4205AJ Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B38) Part 9 98

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4205AU Rev. 1, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (833) Part I9 99

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4205AJ Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B39) Part 9 100 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4205AU Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (833) Part 19 101 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4220BE Rev. O, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(E1Z) Part 29 102 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-422OBG Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(EI2) Part 31 103 LaSalle Drawing 1E'l'422UBH Rev. Q, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(E1Z) Part 32 Page 29 of 91

Correspondence N R5-16-176 104 LaSalle Drawing lE-2-422O8E Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(El2) Part 29 IOS LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4220BG Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(El2) Part 3l 106 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-422OBH Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(E12) Part 32 107 LaSalle Drawing IE-1-422OBC Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH (E12) Part 27 I08 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4220BD Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(El3) Part 2B 109 LaSalle Dnavvlng1E-2-422OBC Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(E12) Part 27 110 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-422OBD Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(EI2) Part 28 111

LaSalle Drawing M-97 Sheet 1 Rev. AO, MID Reactor Water Clean-Up 112

LaSalle Drawing M-143 Sheet I Rev. A[L MID Reactor Water Clean-Up 113

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4228AO Rev. O, Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System RT(G33) Part 4 114

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4228AK Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System RT(B33) Part l0 115

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4228AD Rev. E, Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System RT(G3S) Part 4 116

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4228AK Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System RT(G33) Part 1O 1I7 LaSalleDravving1E'I'422GANRev.S,SchernatlcDlagnammReaotorCorelsolatinnCoollng System Rl(E51) Part 13 118 LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4226AX Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl (E5I) Part 22 119 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4226AN Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 23 120 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4226AX Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl (E51) Part 22 122 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4000B Rev. N, Single Line Diagram Part 2 Standby Generators and

~~~AR0M" 122

LaSalle Drawing 1E-l-4OOOD Rev. /, Single Line Diagram 48OV Substations on3xvhzhgear 14lX and 141Y Part 4 123 LaSaUeOnavvlng1E'1'4OOOERev.A^ 3lngleUneOlaQrann4QOVSubstatlonoon5vvhzhgear l42X,142Y and l43 Part 5 124 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4000B Rev. N, Single Line Diagram Stand-By Generators and 4160V Buses Part 2 125 LaSalle Drawing 1E-Z-4OODD Rev. /\\ Single Line Diagram 48OV Substation onSvvltchgear 241X and 24IY Part 4 126 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4000E Rev. A, Single Line Diagram 480V Substations on Switchgear 242X, 242Y and 243 Part 5 Page 30 of 91

Correspondence N RS-I5'176 127 LaSalle Drawing lE-O-4412AA Rev. AE, Schematic Diagram 416OVSxvbchgear141YDiesel Generator O Feed ACBI413 System DG Part l I28 LaSalle Drawing 1E-O-4412A8 Rev. AD, Schematic Diagram 418OV3vvhzhgear24lY2AP04E 0ead Generator Feed AC8 2413 System DG Pert 2 129

LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4412AG Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 0 Generator Engine Control System DG Part 130

LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4412AH Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 0 Generator Engine Control System DB Part 8 131 LaSalle Drawing 1E-l-4OO9AA Rev. AB, Schematic Diagram 4I6OVSwbchgaar142YDiesel Generator lA Feed ACBI428 System DG Part l 132 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4009AG Rev. Q, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A Generator Engine Control System DG Part 133 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4009AH Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A Generator Engine Control System DG Part 134 LaSalle Drawing lE-2-4OO9AA Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram 41GOVSvvltohgeor242Y2APO6E Diesel Generator 2A Feed ACB2423 System DG Part l 135 LaSalleDravvlng1E-2-4OO9AGRev.[,SchennaticDlagrarnOlesalGenerator2AGenarator Engine Control System DG Part 7 136 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4009AH Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Generator Engine Control System DG Part 137 LaSalle Drawing 1E-l-4223AD Rev. T, Schematic Diagram 416OVSvvltchgearI43 Feed from Diesel Generator 1B System DG (E228) Part 138

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4223AD Rev. T, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 243 Feed from Diesel Generator 3B System HPE22B Part 4 193 LaSalle DravvnQlE-l'4223AG Rev. L Schematic Diagram H.P.[.S. Diesel Generator 1B Protective Relaying System HP (E22B) Part 140 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4223AG Rev. L 3ohernatlo Diagram H.P.C.5. Diesel Generator 2B Protective Relaying System HPE228 Part 7 141 LaSalle Drawing lE'I~4223A8 Rev. X, Schematic Diagram 416OV5vvitchgear143lAPO7E Normal Feed AC8l432 System HPE328 Part 2 142

LaSalle Drawing 1E-24223AB Rev. R, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 243 2AP07E Normal Feed ACB2432 System HPE228 Part 2 143

LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4412AE Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 0 Generator Engine Control System DG Part 144 LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4412AF Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 0 Generator Engine Control System DG Part 145 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4009AE Rev. T, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A Generator Engine Control System DG Part 146 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4009AE Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Engine Control System DG Part 5 147 LaSalle Drawing lE-l-4223AL Rev. R, Schematic Diagram HPCSOg-lB Generator Engine Control System HP(E2JB) Part 12 148

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4223AL Rev. U, Schematic Diagram HPCS Diesel Generator 2B Generator Engine Control System HP(E228) Part ll Page murm1

15

Rev.O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 149 LaSalle Drawing lD-1575 Rev. 7,DSL, DSH(HVS) Voltage Alarm 150 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4008AA Rev. 1, Schematic Diagram 250V DC Battery Charger I 1DO03E5ystenm DC Part 2 151 LaSalle Drawing 1E-l-4OO8AB Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Division lI25VDC Battery Main Charger lAA(1DCO9E) System DC Part 2 152 LaSalle Drawing 1E-I-4008AK Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Division 2 125V DC Battery Main Charger lBA1OCI7E System OC 153 LaSalle Drawing lE-l-4223AS Rev. G, Schematic Diagram H.P.C.3.l25VDC Battery Charger lE22-SDO1 System HP(E22B) Part l7 154 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4008AA Rev. J, Schematic Diagram 250V DC Battery Charger 2 2DCO3E System DC Part 1 155 LaSalle DravvlngIE-2-4000AB Rev. J,Schematic Diagram Division 1 I25VDC Battery Main Charger 2AA(2DCO9E) System UC Part 2 156 LaSalle Drawing 2E-2-4OO8AKRev. F, Schematic Diagram Division 2 125V DC Battery Main Charger ZBA2DCl7E System OC Part 9 157 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4223AS Rev. G, Schematic Diagram H.P.C.S.125VOC Battery Charger 2E22-SOO1 System HPE228 Part I7 158 LaSalle Drawing lE-l-4OO7AB Rev. A^ Schematic Diagram lnverterUnlnterruptible Power Supply System lP Part l 159 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4OO7AC Rev. O, Schematic Diagram SCR Battery Charger Unlnterruptlb/e Power Supply System lP Part 2 I60 LaSalle Drawing 1E-l'4453AB Rev. D, Wiring Diagram Unlnterruptlb(e Power Supply Panel llPOlE Part 2 lGI LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4007AB Rev. A, Schematic Diagram Inverter Uninterruptible Power Supply System lP Part 1 I62 LaSa/leDraxvlnglE'2-4OO7ACRev.B,Schemmat/cDiagrannSCRBatteryCherQer Uninterruptible Power Supply System lP Part 2 I63

LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4453AB Rev. C, Wiring Diagram Uninterruptible Power Supply Panel 2lPOlE Part 2 164

LaSalle Drawing M-83 Sheet 1 Rev. AV, P&ID Diesel Generator Auxiliary System 165

LaSalle Drawing M-83 Sheet 2 Rev. AF, P&D Diesel Generator Auxiliary System 166

LaSalle Drawing M-83 Sheet 3 Rev. BB, P&D Diesel Generator Auxiliary System 167

LaSalle Drawing M-83 Sheet Rev. G, P&D Diesel Generator Auxiliary System 168 LaSalle Drawing M-85 Sheet 1 Rev. AE, P&lD Diesel Oil System I69 LaSalle Drawing M-132 Rev. AC, P&lO Diesel Oil System 170 LaSalle Drawing 1E'O-4428AA Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Diesel Fuel Oil System DO Part 1 171 LaSalle Drawing lE'1-4O28AA Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Fuel Oil System DO Part 1 172 LaSolleDravving2E-Z'4O26AARev.R,Schennat/cDlagrarnDieselFuelOil3ystemDOPart1 173

LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4412AC Rev. X, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator System DG Part 3

174 LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4009AB Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator System DG Part 175 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4223AR Rev. R, Schematic Diagram HPCS DG 113 Generator Engine Control System HP E22BPart 16 Page 32 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002 Rex.O Correspondence N RS15-178 176

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4OO9AB Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator System DGPart 2

177 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4223AR Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram High Pressure Core Spray 0S28 Generator Engine Control System HP(E228) Part l6 178 LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4433AA Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System VD Part I 179 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4072AA Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System VD Part l 180 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4O72AA Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System VD Part I 181

LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-400OAK Rev. F, Key Diagram 4160V Switchgear 141Y IAP04E 282 LaSalle Drawing 1E-I-4OOO8N Rev. C\\ Key Diagram 4OOVSvvitchgear 183 LaSalle Drawing IE-l-4O0J8P Rev. G, Key Diagram 4MOVSvvltchgearI35Y 184 LaSalle Drawing lE-I-4OOOAM Rev. E, Key Diagram 41GOVSvvltohOear 185

LaSalle Drawing 2E-l-4UOO8[l Rev. F, Key Diagram 48OVSxvltchgear 186 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4OOOBR Rev. H, Key Diagram 4MOVSvvitchQear 187 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4DOOAN Rev. C, Key Diagram 42GOVACSvvitchgear143 I88 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2~4OOOAK Rev. D, Key Diagram 415OVSvvltchgmar 289 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4DOOBN Rev. M, Key Diagram 48OV5wltchgeor 190 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4OOO8P Rev. G, Key Diagram 4OOVSvvltchgear2S5Y(2AP2OE) 191 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4OOOAW9 Rev. E, Key Diagram 41OOVSvvltchgear 192 LaSalle Drawing 2E-2-4OOOB[l Rev. O, Key Diagram 48OV3vvltchgear236X(2AP2lE) 193 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4OOOBR Rev. M, Key Diagram 48OV3vvi1chgear236Y(2AP22E) 194 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4OOOAN Rev. C, Key Diagram 4l50VSvvitchgear243 195 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4000FB Rev. T, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division 1 196 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4000FC Rev. 0, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division 2

197 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4000EB Rev. J, Key Diagram 250V DC Bus NOI IDCO2E and MCC I2lX1DCOSE 198 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4000FD Rev. M, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division 199 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4000FB Rev. 0, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division 1

200 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4000FC Rev. P, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division 2 201 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4000EB Rev. M, Key Diagram 250V DC Bus NO. 1 2DCO2E and MCC 221X2DCO5E 202 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4000FD Rev. N, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division g

203 LaSelleOravvingIE'1-4OO5BCRev.H,SchernatloDiaQrann416OV3vvltchgear14IYFeedto Transformer 13SX and 136Y System AP Part 27 304 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4005BD Rev. H, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 142Y Feed to Transformer l3GX and l3GY System AP Part 38 205 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4223AF Rev. G, Schematic Diagram 41GOV3vvltchgoar143 Feed to Transformer 143-1 System HP(E22B) Part G Page 33 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 206 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4005BC Rev. G, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 241Y Feed to Transformers 235X and 235Y System AP Part 27 207

LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4005BD Rev. J, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 242Y Feed to Transformers 236X and 236Y System AP Part 28 208 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4223AF Rev. E, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 243 Feed to Transformer 2E22-S003 System HP (E2213) Part 6 Page 34 of 91

15C0948-RPT-002 Rev.O Correspondence No RS-16'176 Representative Sample Component Evaluations The following sample calculation isextracted from Reference [171.

Notes:

I.

Reference citations within the sample calculation are per the Ref. [17] reference section shown on the following page.

2.

This sample calculation contains evaluations of sample high-frequency-sensitive components per the methodologies of both the EPRl high-frequency guidance [8] and the Page 35 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 42 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and By: AB 10/17/2016 Fragility Evaluation of Relays se~rmn&Assodaccs

Check: FG 10/17/2016 6 REFERENCES

1. Codes, Guidance, and Standards 1.1. EPRI 3002004396. "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2015.

1.2. EPRI 3002002997. "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary."

September 2014.

1.3. EPRI Report No.: NP-7147-SL, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", August 1991.

1.4. NEI 12-06, Appendix H, Rev. 2, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide."

1.5. GE Instruction Manual GEK-34166A, Instantaneous Auxiliary Relay Type HMA24A.

1.6. SQUG Advisory Memorandum, September 7, 2004, "SQUG Advisory 2004-02: Relay GERS Correction."

1.7. EPRI Report No.: NP-7147-SL, V2, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays Volume 2: Addendum 2" April 1995.

1.8. IEEE 344-1975 "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

1.9. SQUG GIP 3A, "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment", December 2001 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents 2.1. LaSalle Seismic Hazard and Screening Report Rev. 1, NRC Docket No. 50-373 and 50-374, Correspondence No. RS-14-068.

2.2. NRC Part 21 Report, Access No. ML010230240, "Seismic Qualification of electrically operated AK-15/25 circuit breakers."

3.

Station Documents 3.1. LSCS-UFSAR, Rev. 21.

3.2. Calculation 028996 Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification of RCIC Instrumentation Panel 'A' H22-P017."

3.3. Calculation 262A7433 Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Summary."

3.4. Calculation 262A7434 Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Summary."

3.5. SOR Letter to KCI, dated January 12, 1996 "List of Obsolete Pressure and Vacuum Switch Models and Corresponding Replacement Models" (See Attachment F).

3.6. Binder EQ-LS105, Rev. 8, "SOR Pressure and Vacuum Switch Models 5N6, 6N6, 9N6, 121\\16, 29N6, and 541\\16".

3.7. Design Analysis No. L-002738, Rev. 1(inc. Minor Rev. 1A), "Seismic Qualification of SOR model 6N6-B5-U8-CIA-JJTTNQ and 54N6-8118-M9-CIA-JJTT-NQ pressure switches for application 1E51-N020,1(2)E51-N006, and 1(2)B21-N056A/B/C/D".

3.8. Calculation 262A7436 Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Summary."

3.9. Calculation 262A7438 Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Summary."

3.10. Document DC-SE-02-1-S, Rev. 3, "Seismic Response Spectra Design Criteria."

3.11. Calculation L-003846, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification of Westinghouse Supplied Replacement Buckets, Motor Circuit Protector and Terminal Blocks For Safety Related MCCS."

3.12. Calculation L-003944, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification of EDG Speed Switch P/N ES150213W and Power Supply Assembly."

3.13. Calculation L-003775, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification of an Engine System Inc (ESI) Temperature Switch."

Page 36 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 43 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and sreve~<<,&a~dac~ Fragility Evaluation of Relays

By: AB 10/17/2016 Check: FG 10/17/2016 3.14. Calculation CQD-000831, Dated 11/05/1982, "Review of Safety-Related Equipment Qualification Report."

3.15. Calculation CQD-003648, Dated 09/03/1982, "Review of Seismic Qualification Reports for ITE Switchgear Units 1,2 AP01E, 02E, 04E, 06E, 08E, and 09E."

3.16. Calculation CQD-013254, Dated 03/28/1984, "Seismic Qualification of Battery Charger Model 3SD-260-200 (Tag Nos. 1,2DC03E)."

3.17. Calculation CQD-012383, Dated 02/14/1984, "Seismic Qualification of Battery Charger Tag

1. 1,2DC09E Model #3SD-130-200."

3.18. Calculation CQD-028932, Dated 12/10/1990, "Seismic Qualification of Diesel Generator Control Panels E22-P301A&B."

3.19. Calculation L-003904, Rev. 1, "Seismic Evaluation for Yokogawa DX Advanced Series Recorders and Seismic Mounting Evaluation in Control Room Panels."

3.20. Calculation EMD-033330, Dated 05/01/1981, "Seismic Qualification of HPCS Switchgear -

Metal Clad E22-S004."

3.21. Calculation EMD-006881, Dated 01/12/1977, "Seismic Certification - 480 V Unit Substation Transformer."

3.22. Calculation EMD-028572, Dated 02/24/1981, "Seismic Qualification of Division I Leak Detection Vertical Board (H13-P632)."

3.23. Calculation EMD-028565, Dated 02/24/1981, "Seismic Qualification of Low Low Set/Safety Relief Valve Division II Vertical Board (1-113-13645)."

3.24. Calculation CQD-000821, Dated 02/12/1982, "Seismic Qualification of HPCS Diesel Generator Protection Logic Vertical Board, Eq. #1,2H22-P028."

3.25. Calculation EMD-011085, Dated 11/23/1977, "Review of Seismic Qualification Report for D.C.

Distribution Equipment."

3.26. LOR-ODG03J-5-1, Rev. 3, "Diesel Generator 0 Loss of Field (Forty)."

3.27. LOR-1DG03J-5-1, Rev. 3, "Diesel Generator 1A Loss of Field (Forty)."

3.28. LOR-2DG03J-5-1, Rev. 3, "Diesel Generator 2A Loss of Field (Forty)."

4.

Station Drawings 4.1. Drawing 1E-1-4201AC, Rev AC, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C) Part 3."

4.2. Drawing 1E-1-4201AN, Rev C, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 13."

4.3. Drawing 1E-1-4201AJ, Rev I, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 9."

4.4. Drawing 1E-1-4201AP, Rev D, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 14."

4.5. Drawing 1E-1-4201AD, Rev AG, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C) Part 4.-

4.6. Drawing 1E-1-4201AE, Rev Z, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 5."

4.7. Drawing 1E-1-4201AR, Rev I, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 16."

4.8. Drawing 1E-1-4201AF, Rev AD, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C) Part 16."

4.9. Drawing 1E-1-4201AG, Rev W, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 7."

Page 37 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 44 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays

By: AB 10/17/2016 su,,&assodates

Check: FG 10/17/2016 4.10. Drawing 1E-1-4201AK, Rev H, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 10."

4.11. Drawing 1E-2-4201AC, Rev U, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 3."

4.12. Drawing 1E-2-4201AN, Rev C, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 13."

4.13. Drawing 1E-2-4201AJ, Rev E, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 9."

4.14. Drawing 1E-2-4201AP, Rev C, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 14."

4.15. Drawing 1E-2-4201AD, Rev X, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 4."

4.16. Drawing 1E-2-4201AE, Rev T, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (1321C)

Part 5."

4.17. DrawinglE-2-4201AR, Rev F, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 16."

4.18. Drawing 1E-2-4201AF, Rev Y, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 6."

4.19. Drawing 1E-2-4201AG, Rev R, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 7."

4.20. Drawing 1E-2-4201AK, Rev E, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 10."

4.21. Drawing NB-081, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT."

4.22. Drawing N13-132, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.23. Drawing N13-133, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.24. Drawing NB-134, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.25. Drawing N13-135, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.26. Drawing NB-136, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.27. Drawing NB-137, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.28. Drawing NB-138, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.29. Drawing NB-083, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT."

4.30. Drawing 1E-1-3445, Rev AW, "Electrical Installation Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Equipment Room Plan El 731-0 Col 12-15 And J-N."

4.31. Drawing 1E-2-3445, Rev. AF, "Electrical Installation Auxiliary Equipment Room Plan Elevation 731-0 Columns 15-18 And J-N."

4.32. Drawing M-Index, Rev. AK, "General Arrangement Index."

4.33. Drawing M-7, Rev. AD, "General Arrangement Main Floor Plan."

4.34. Drawing M-8, Rev. U, "General Arrangement Main Floor Plan."

4.35. Drawing M-9, Rev. T, "General Arrangement Main Floor Plan."

4.36. Drawing 1E-1-4220BE, Rev. 0, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 29 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.37. Drawing 1E-1-4220BG, Rev. L, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 31 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.38. Drawing 1E-1-4220BH, Rev. Q, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 32 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.39. Drawing 1E-1-422061), Rev. O, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 28 Critical Control Room Drawing."

Page 38 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 45 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays

By: AB 10/17/2016 stwewn&A%oaatm

Check: FG 10/17/2016 4.40. Drawing 1E-1-4220BC, Rev. N, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 27 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.41. Drawing 1E-1-4228AD, Rev. D, "Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Clean-Up System "RT" (G33) Part 4.-

4.42. Drawing 1E-1-4228AK, Rev. M, "Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System "RT" (G33)

Part 10."

4.43. Drawing 1E-2-4220BE, Rev. K, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 29 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.44. Drawing 1E-2-4220BG, Rev. M, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 31 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.45. Drawing 1E-2-4220BH, Rev. N, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 32 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.46. Drawing 1E-2-4220BD, Rev. O, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 28 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.47. Drawing 1E-2-4220BC, Rev. N, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 27 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.48. Drawing 1E-2-4228AD, Rev. E, "Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System RT (G33)

Part 4."

4.49. Drawing 1E-2-4228AK, Rev. M, "Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System "RT" (G33)

Part 10."

4.50. Drawing 1E-0-4412AH, Rev. R, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "0" Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 8."

4.51. Drawing 1E-0-4412AG, Rev. Y, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "0" Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 7."

4.52. Drawing 1E-0-4401S, Rev. V, "Relaying and Metering Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "0"."

4.53. Drawing 1E-1-4005BC, Rev. H, "Schematic Diagram 141Y Feed to Transformer 135X & 135Y System "AP" Part 27."

4.54. Drawing 1E-1-4009AH, Rev. R, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 8."

4.55. Drawing 1E-1-4009AG, Rev. Q "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "1A" Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 7."

4.56. Drawing 1E-1-4000QB, Rev. T, "Relaying & Metering Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "1A"."

4.57. Drawing 1E-1-4005BD, Rev. H, "Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 142Y Feed to Transformer 136X & 136Y System "AP" Part 28."

4.58. Drawing 1E-1-4223AL, Rev. R, "Schematic Diagram HPCS DG-1B Generator/Engine Control System "HP" (E22B) Part 11."

4.59. Drawing 1E-1-4223AG, Rev. L, "Schematic Diagram H.P.C.S Diesel Generator 1B Protective Relaying System HP (E22B) PT. 7."

4.60. Drawing 1E-1-4000PK, Rev. P, "Relaying & Metering Diagram 4160V SWGR. 143."

4.61. Drawing 1E-1-4223AF, Rev. G, "Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 143 Feed to Transformer 143-1 System "HP" (E22B) Part 6."

4.62. Drawing 1E-2-4005BC, Rev. G, "Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 241Y Feed to Transformer 235X & 235Y System "AP" Part 27."

4.63. Drawing 1E-2-4009AH, Rev. P, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "2A" Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 8."

4.64. Drawing 1E-2-4009AG, Rev. Q "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "2A" Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 7."

4.65. Drawing 1E-2-4000QB, Rev. U, "Relaying and Metering Diagram Standby Diesel Generator 2A."

Page 39 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 46 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and sDevawn&Azodat"

Fragility Evaluation of Relays

By: AB 10/17/2016 Check: FG 10/17/2016 4.66. Drawing 1E-2-4005BD, Rev. J, "Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear Feed to Transformer 236X & 236Y System "AP" Part 28."

4.67. Drawing 1E-2-4223AG, Rev. L, "Schematic Diagram H.P.C.S Diesel Generator 2B Protective Relaying System HP (E22B) PT.7."

4.68. Drawing 1E-2-4000PK, Rev. K, "Relaying and Metering 4160V Switchgear 243."

4.69. Drawing 1E-2-4223AF, Rev. E, "Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 243 Feed to Transformer 2E22-S003 System "HP" (E22B) Part 6."

5.

S&A Documents 5.1. 14Q4238-CAL-005, Rev. 1, "ESEP HCLPFs for Relays."

5.2. 14Q4238-RPT-005, Rev. 1, "LaSalle ESEP SEWS."

5.3. 15C0348-RPT-001, Rev. 1, "Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation."

Miscellaneous Documents 6.1. TE Connectivity Qualification Test Report, Rev E, "Nuclear Environmental Qualification Test Report On Agastat EGP, EML, and ETR Control Relays By Control Products Division Amerace Corporation." (See Attachment H for select pages) 6.2. Barksdale Control Products Information Sheet, 2013, "Series B1S, 1325, BIT, 62T." (See Attachment M for select pages) 6.3. Report 60891, Rev. 1, "Seismic Qualification Report for Barksdale Pressure Switch P/N B2T-M12SS." (See Attachment N for select pages) 6.4. General Electric GEH-2058L, "Instruction Auxiliary Relays Hand Reset with Target Types HEA61 and HEA62."

6.5. General Electric GEK-28008D, "Instruction Auxiliary Relays HMAIIA-B-C-D-E-F."

6.6. Report No. 50090.1, Rev. 2, "Seismic Test Report for a GE Overvoltage Relay and ABB Overcurrent Relay." (See Attachment 0 for select pages) 6.7. Report No. 50093.1, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Report for G.E. Power Directional Relay."

(See Attachment P for select pages) 6.8. General Electric GEK-45484B, "Instructions Multi-Contact Auxiliary Relay Type HFA151" 6.9. Report No. 50084.7, Rev. 3, "Seismic Qualification Report for an Airpax Tachometer, LIE Pressure Switch, Ashcroft Pressure Gauge, McDonnel & Miller Liquid Level Switch, Fumas Relay, Struthers-Dunn Relays, Agastat Time Delay Relays and a GE Relay." (See Attachment Q for select pages)

Page 40 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 49 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and

~

Fragility Evaluation of Relay

By: AB 10/17/2016 Relays s&n4oaac~

Check: FG 10/17/2016 8

ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2

High-Frequency Seismic Demand Calculate the high-frequency seismic demand on the relays per the methodology from Ref. 1.1.

Sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1E51A K32 and 1E51A-K33 is presented below. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic demand for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

8.2.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand The horizontal site-specific GMRS for LaSalle County Generating Station (LAS) is per Ref. 2.1. GMRS data can be found in Attachment B of this calculation. A plot of GMRS can be found in Attachment C of this calculation.

Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz.

Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS

SAGMRS 0.5748 (at 15 Hz) between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (Ref. 2.1; see Attachment B of this calculation):

Calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the plant foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

Grade Elevation (Ref. 3.1, Sect. 2.4.2.3):

ELgrade

710ft Reactor Building Embedment Depth (Ref. 3. 1, Section 3.7.1.4)

Auxiliary Building Embedment Depth (Ref. 3. 1, Section 3.7.1.4)

Foundation Elevation (Reactor Building):

Foundation Elevation (Auxiliary Building):

Relay floor elevation (Table 1.1):

embedrb := 44ft embedab := 54ft Elfound.rb

ELgrade embedrb = 666.00-ft Elfound.ab

ELgrade embedab = 656.00-ft ELrelay

731ft Relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are both located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 731'-0".

Distance between relay floor and foundation: hrelay

ELrelay Elfound.ab = 75.00-ft Page 41 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 50 of 57 16%

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and By: AB 10/17/2016 Fragility Evaluation of Relays stmruon@~assoclates

Check: FG 10/17/2016 8

ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2

High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.1

Horizontal Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Work the distance between the relay floor and foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-3 to calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor.

2.1 1.2 1 Slope of amplification factor line,

mh : 40ft Oft = 0.0225.

ft Oft < hrelay < 40fr Intercept of amplification factor line:

bh := 1.2 Horizontal in-structure amplification factor:

AFSH(hrelay)

(mh' hrelay + bh) if hrelay < 40ft 2.1 otherwise AFSH(hrelay) = 2.10 Calculate the horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor based on the type of cabinet that contains the subject relay.

Type of cabinet (per Ref. 4.1)

cab := "Rigid" (enter "MCC", "Switchgear", "Control Cabinet", or "Rigid"):

Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-13):

AFc h(cab) := 3.6 if cab= "MCC" 7.2 if cab = "Switchgear" 4.5 if cab = "Control Cabinet" 1.0 if cab= "Rigid" AFc h(cab) = 1.0 Note: Per Ref. 3.3 and 3.4, the relay enclosures 1H13-13618, 1H13-13621, 21-113-P618, and 2H13-P621 are rigid in the 1Hz to 35Hz range. The sample relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are mounted within host 1H13-13618. Therefore, the in-cabinet amplification factor for the sample relay components is 1.0.

Multiply the peak horizontal GMRS acceleration by the horizontal in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relays.

Horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-1a and p. 4-15, Eq. 4-4):

ICRSc.h

AFSH(hrelay).AFc.h (cab)

• SAGMRS = 1.205*g Note that the horizontal seismic demand is same for both relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33.

Page 42 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 51 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and seevenn &~Assoclares Fragility Evaluation of Relays

By: AB so 10/17/2016 Check: FG 10/17/2016 8

ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2

High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz.

Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS

SAGMRS = 0.574.g (at 15 Hz) between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (see Sect. 8.2.1 of this calculation)

Obtain the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the horizontal GMRS from Ref. 2.1 (see Attachment B of this calculation).

PGAGMRS 0.3179 Calculate the shear wave velocity traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface of the site (Vs30) from Ref. 1.1, p. 3-5 and Attachment D.

Shear Wave Velocity:

Vs30

(30m)

Vi d

E si

where, di: Thickness of the layer (ft)

Vsi: Shear wave velocity of the layer (ft/s)

Per Attachment D, the sum of thickness of the layer over shear wave velocity of the layer is 0.1208 sec.

Shear Wave Velocity:

30m ft Vs30 0.1208sec 815--

sec Page 43 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 1500348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 52 of 57 5ft

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and By: AB 10/17/2016 Fragility Evaluation of Relays sreverwn&aaodac~

Check: FG 10/17/2016 8

ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2

High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Work the PGA and shear wave velocity with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-1 to determine the soil class of the site. Based on the PGA of 0.3178 and shear wave velocity of 815ft/sec at LaSalle County Generating Station (LAS), the site soil class is C-Soft.

Work the site soil class with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-2 to determine the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each spectral frequency. Multiply the V/H ratio at each frequency between 15Hz and 40Hz by the corresponding horizontal GMRS acceleration at each frequency between 15Hz and 40Hz to calculate the vertical GMRS.

See Attachment B for a table that calculates the vertical GMRS (equal to (V/H) x horizontal GMRS) between 15Hz and 40Hz.

Determine the peak acceleration of the vertical GMRS (SAVCMRs) between frequencies of 15Hz and 40Hz. (By inspection of Attachment B, the SAVGMRs occurs at 40Hz.)

V/H ratio at 40Hz (See Attachment B of this calculation):

Horizontal GMRS at frequency of peak vertical GMRS (at 40Hz)

(See Attachment B of this calculation):

Peak acceleration of vertical GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz:

VH := 1.23 HGMRS := 0.404g SAVGMRS VH-HGMRS = 0.497*g (at 40 Hz)

A plot of horizontal and vertical GMRS is provided in Attachment C of this calculation.

Page 44 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 53 of 57 sit

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and By: AB 10/17/2016 Fragility Evaluation of Relays 5tntrmw `

g

Check: FG 10/17/2016 8

ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2

High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the plant fioundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

Distance between relay floor and foundation

hrelay = 75.00-ft (see Sect. 8.2.1 of this calculation):

Work the distance between the relay floor a nd foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-4 to calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor.

Slope of amplification factor line:

2.7-1.0 1 my

100ft Oft 0.017 ft Intercept of amplification factor line:

by = 1.0 Vertical in-structure amplification factor:

AFSV := mv' hrelay + by = 2.275 Per Ref. 3.2, the host component 1H13-13618 is rigid in the 1Hz to 35Hz range. The sample relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are mounted within host 1H13-13618. Therefore, the vertical in-cabinet amplification for sample relay components is 1.0.

Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor:

AFC.v := 1.0 Multiplythe peakvertical GMRS acceleration between bythe vertical in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relay.

Vertical in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-1b and p. 4-15, Eq. 4-4):

ICRSc.v := AFSV*AFc.v.SAVGMRS = 1.13*g Note that the vertical seismic demand is same for both relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33.

Page 45 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 54 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and

& ftodatm Fragility Evaluation of Relays

By: AB 10/17/2016 Stversw

Check: FG 10/17/2016 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3

High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic capacity of 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 relaycomponents are presented here. A table that calculates the high frequency seismic capacities for all of the Ref. 1.1 subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this ca Iculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

8.3.1 Seismic Test Capacity The high frequency seismic capacity of a relay can be determined from the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program or other broad banded low frequency capacity data such as the Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS). Per Ref. 1. 1, Sect. 4.5.2, a conservative estimate of the high-frequency (i.e., 20Hz to 40Hz) capacity can be made by extending the low frequency GERS capacity into the high frequency range to a roll off frequency of about 40Hz. Therefore, if the high frequency capacity was not available for a component, a SAT value equal to the GERS spectral acceleration from 4 to 16 Hz could be used.

For the relay component 1E51A-K32, this model of relay was not tested as part of the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program; therefore, GERS spectral acceleration from Ref. 1.6, Table 3-1 is used as the seismic test capacity.

For the relay component 1E51A-K33, this model of relay was tested as part of the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program; therefore, test result from Ref. 1.2 is used as the seismic test capacity.

Seismic test capacity (SA*):

SA' :=

5.10 g

1E51A-K32 (Ref. 1.6, Table 3-1) 15.80 1E51A-K33 (Ref. 1.2, Table 5-12) 8.3.2

Effective Spectral Test Capacity Relay 1E51A K33 was tested as part of Ref. 1.2 and tested to the relay's fragility threshold. Per Ref. 1.1, p. 4-16, add half of the test level increment of 1.258 to the seismic test capacity to calculate the effective spectral test capacity.

GERS spectral acceleration for the relay component 1E51A-K32 is used as the seismic test capacity. Therefore for the relay component 1E51A-K32 there is no spectral acceleration increase.

Effective spectral test capacity

SAT :=

SA' 1 1.25

= 5.10 )

.g

(IE51A-K32)

(Ref. 1.1, p. 4-16):

SA'2 +

2 g

(16.43 1E51A-K33 Page 46 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 55 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays

By: AB 10/17/2016 sue°"&Awodets

Check: FG 10/17/2016 8

ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3

High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays (cont'd) 8.3.3 Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor Determine the seismic capacity knockdown factor for the subject relay based on the type of testing used to determine the seismic capacity of the relay.

The knockdown factor for relay 1E51A-K32 is obtained per Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2. Relay 1E51A-K33 was tested to the EPRI High Frequency Test Program (Ref. 1.2) and tested to its fragility threshold. Work this information with Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2 to obtain the knockdown factor.

Seismic capacity knockdown factor:

Fk :_ 1.50 (lE51A-K32 (Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2)

(1.56

1E51A-K33 (Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2) 8.3.4 Seismic Testing Single-Axis Correction Factor Determine the seismic testing single-axis correction factor of the subject relay, which is based on whether the equipment housing to which the relay is mounted has well-separated horizontal and vertical motion or not.

Per Ref. 1.1, pp. 4-17 to 4-18, relays mounted within cabinets that are braced, bolted together in a row, mounted to both floor and wall, etc. will have a correction factor of 1.00. Relays mounted within cabinets that are bolted only to the floor or otherwise not well-braced will have a correction factor of 1.2.

The sample relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are mounted within host 1H13-P618. Per Ref. 1.1, pp.

4-18, conservatively take the FMS value as 1.0.

Single-axis correction factor

FMS := 1.0 (Ref. 1. 1, pp. 4-17 to 4-18):

Page 47 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 56 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and By: AB 10/17/2016 Fragility Evaluation of Relays so~ermn&nssodaces

Check: FG 10/17/2016 8

ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3

High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays (cont'd) 8.3.5 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Calculate the effective wide-band component capacity acceleration of relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-5.

Effective wide-band component capacity

SAT 3.400 (IE51A K32 acceleration (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-5)

TRS := Fk FMS 10.529 g

1E51A-K33 8.4

High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.4, Appendix H Relays 8.4.1 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Per a review of the capacity generation methodologies of Ref. 1.1 and Ref. 1.4, App. H, Section H.5, the capacity of a Ref. 1.4 relay is equal to the Ref. 1.1 effective wide-band component capacity multiplied by a factor accounting for the difference between a 1% probabdityof failure (Cl%, Ref. 1.1) and a 10% probability of failure (C10%, Ref. 1.4).

Per Ref. 1.4, App. H, Table H.1, use the C10% vs. Cl% ratio from the Realistic Lower Bound Case for relays.

Clo% vs. C1% ratio

C10 := 1.36 Effective wide-band component capacity

4.624 (1E51A_K32 acceleration (Ref. 1.4, App. H, Sect. H.5) TRS14 := TRS C10 = (

14.319 g

1E51A-K33 Page 48 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0

Sheet 57 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and By: AB 10/17/2016 Fragility Evaluation of Relays stmww,&agodam

Check: FG 10/17/2016 8

ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.5

Relay (Ref. L1)High-Frequency Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for Ref. 1.1 relays per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

Horizontal seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6):

TRS

= 2.821

> 1.0, 0. K.

1E51A-K32 ICRSc h

8.735

> 1. 0, 0. K.

(IE51A-K33)

Vertical seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6):

TRS

3.008

> 1.0, O.K.

1E51A-K32

> 1.0, O.K.

ICRSc v

9,313

(1E51A-K33)

Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for the relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are greater than 1.00. The sample relays are adequate for high frequency seismic spectral ground motion fur their Ref. 1.1 functions.

8.6

Relay (Ref. L4)Hgh-Frequency Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for Ref. 1.4 relays per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1E51A K32 and 1E51A-K33 is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

Horizontal seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6):

TRS1.4 _ 3.836

> 1. 0, 0. K.

(IE51A-K32

> 1.0, O.K.

ICRSc h

11.879

1E51A-K33 Vertical seismic margin (Ref. 1. 1, Eq. 4-6):

TRS1.4

4.090

> 1. 0, 0. K.

1E51A-K32

> 1.0, O.K.

ICRSc v

12.666

1E51A-03 Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for the relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are greater than 1.00. The sample relays are adequate for high frequency seismic spectral ground motion for their Ref. 1.4 functions.

Page 49 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 B Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function tNanuf.

Model No.

!D Type (ft)

Capacity Result 1

1 1E5 2

Timing Control Core Cooling Steam Line High Differential Agastat ETR14D3BC200 1H13-P618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap > Dem K032 Relay Pressure Relay 4002 Building 2

2 2

32 Timing Control Core Cooling Steam Line High Differential Agastat ETR14D3BC200 2H13-P618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap > Dem K0032 Relay Pressure Relay 4002 Building 3

1 1

48 Timing Control Core Cooling Steam Line High Differential Agastat ETR14D3BC200 1H 13-13618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap > Dem K0048 Relay Pressure Relay 4002 Building 4

2 2

48 Timing Control Core Cooling Steam Line High Differential Agastat ETR14D3BC200 2H13-P618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap> Dem K0048 Relay Pressure Relay 4002 Building 5

1 1E5 7

Timing Control Core Cooling Steam Line High Differential Agastat ETR14D3BC200 1H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap > Dem K047 Relay Pressure Relay 4002 Building 6

2 2

47 Timing Control Core Cooling Steam Line High Differential Agastat ETR14D3BC200 2H13-13621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap > Dem K0047 Relay Pressure Relay 4002 Building 7

1 1E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling RCIC Isolation GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-13618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap > Dem K033 Relay Relay Building Test 8

2 2E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling RCIC Isolation GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-13618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap> Dem K033 Relay Relay Building Test 9

1 1E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling Reactor Low GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-13618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap' Dem K057 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test 10 2

2E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling Reactor Low GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-13618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF CaP> Dem K057 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test 11 1

1E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling Reactor Low GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-13618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap> Dem K058 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test Page 50 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result 12 2

2E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling Reactor Low GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap> Dem K058 Relay pressure Relay Building Test 13 1

1E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling RCIC Isolation GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-P618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap >Dem K060 Relay Relay Building Test 14 2

2E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling RCIC Isolation GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap > Dem K060 Relay Relay Building Test 15 1

1E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling RCIC Isolation GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap > Dem K015 Relay Relay Building Test 16 2

2E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling RCIC Isolation GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap > Dem K015 Relay Relay Building Test 17 1

1E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling Reactor Low GE 12HFA151A2F iH13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap > Dem K054 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test 18 2

2E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling Reactor Low GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Test Cap > Dem K054 Relay Pressure Relay Building 19 1

1E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling Reactor Low GE 12HFA151A2F iH13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap > Dem K055 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test 20 2

2E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling Reactor Low GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap > Dem K055 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test RCS/Reactor High Drywell 21 1

11321C-Auxiliary Vessel Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-P628 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap> Dem K004A Relay Inventory Low Level Relay Building Test Control RCS/Reactor High Drywell 22 2

2B21C-Auxiliary Vessel Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P628 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap> Dem K004A Relay Inventory Low Level Relay Building Test Control RCS/Reactor High Drywell 23 1

iB21C-Auxiliary Vessel Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-P628 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF CaP> Dem K008A Relay Inventory Low Level Relay Building Test Control RCS/Reactor High Drywell 24 2

2B21C-Auxiliary Vessel Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P628 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap> Dem K008A Relay Inventory Low Level Relay Building Test Control Page 51 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

!D Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result RCS/Reactor 25 1

11321C-1 Auxiliary Vessel Pressure/RPV GE High Drywell 12HFA151A2F 1H13-P631 Rigid Axi Auxiliary iliar 731 EPRI HF Cap >Dem K0046 Relay Inventory Low Level Relay Control Building Test RCS/Reactor High Drywell 26 2

2621C-Auxiliary Vessel Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P631 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap> Dem K004B Relay Inventory Low Level Relay Building Test Control RCS/Reactor 27 1

1621C-Auxiliary Vessel High Drywell Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 11-113-P631 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap> Dem K008B Relay Inventory Low Level Relay Building Test Control RCS/Reactor High Drywell 28 2

2B21C-21C Auxiliary Vessel Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P631 Rigid Auxiliary 731 EPRI HF Cap> Dem Relay Inventory Low Level Relay Building Test Control 1

Auxiliary Turbine Exhaust Auxiliary 29 1

K0039 39 Relay Core Cooling Diaphragm High GE 12HMA24A2F 1H 13-P618 Rigid Building 731 GERS Cap > Dem Pressure Relay 30 2

2 K

039 Auxiliary Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm High GE 12HMA24A2F 2H 13-15618 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap> Dem K039 Relay Pressure Relay Building 31 1

1 K0005 06 Auxiliary Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust High Pressure GE 12HMA24A2F 1H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay Building 32 2

2ES K0066 Auxiliary Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust High Pressure GE 12HMA24A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Building Relay 33 1

1E5 K0077 Auxiliary Core Cooling Pump Suction Low Pressure GE 12HMA24A2F 1H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap > Dem Relay Relay Building 34 2

2 K0007 07 Auxiliary Core Cooling Pump Suction Low Pressure GE 12HMA24A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap > Dem Relay Relay Building 35 1

1ES1A-Auxiliary Core Cooling Turbine Trip GE 12HMA24A2F 1H13-15621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap > Dem K008 Relay Auxiliary Relay Building Page 52 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result 36 2

2E51A-Auxiliary Core Cooling Turbine Trip GE 12HMA24A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap > Dem K008 Relay Auxiliary Relay Building Turbine Exhaust 37 1

1 K0029 29 Auxiliary Core Cooling Diaphragm High GE 12HMA24A2F 1H13-P621 Rigid Auxiliary 731 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Building Pressure Relay 2ES2 Auxiliary Turbine Exhaust Auxiliary 38 2

K0299 Core Cooling Diaphragm High GE 12HMA24A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem Relay Building Pressure Relay 39 1

1E31-Pressure Core Cooling Reactor Pressure SOR 6N6-BS-NX-1H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap>Dem N022A Switch Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 40 2

2E31-Pressure Core Cooling Reactor Pressure SOR 6N6-B5-NX-2H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N022A Switch Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 41 1

1E31-Pressure Core Cooling Reactor Pressure SOR 6N6-B5-NX-ClA JJTTX7 1H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N022C Switch Switch Cabinet Building Report 42 2

2E31-Pressure Core Cooling Reactor Pressure SOR 6N6-BS-NX-2H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N022C Switch Switch C1A-11TTX7 Cabinet Building Report 43 1

1E51-Pressure Core Cooling Pump Suction SOR 54N6-B118-M9-CIA JJTTNQ 1H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N006 Switch Pressure Switch Cabinet Building 2

2E51-Pressure Core Cooling Pump Suction Report 44 SOR 54N6-8118-NX-2H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N006 Switch Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 45 1

1E51-Pressure Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust SOR 6N6-B45-NX-1H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N009A Switch Pressure Switch C1A-1JTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 46 2

2E51-Pressure Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust SOR 4N6-E45-NX-2H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N009A Switch Pressure Switch CIA-TTX6 Cabinet Building Report 47 1

1E51-Pressure Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust SOR 6N6-B3-U8-IH22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N009B Switch Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTNQ Cabinet Building Report 48 2

2E51-Pressure Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust SOR 6N6-B3-U8-2H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap> Dem N009B Switch Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTNQ Cabinet Building Report 49 1

1E51-Pressure Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm SOR 6N6-B2-NX-1H22-P017 Control Reactor LAS Cap > Dem N012A Switch Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building 673 Report 50 2

2E51-Pressure Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm SOR 4N6-E45-NX-2H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N012A Switch Pressure Switch C1A-TTX6 Cabinet Building Report Page 53 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

1D Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result 51 1

1E51-Pressure Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm SOR 6N6-62-NX-1H22-13017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N012C Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch 52 2

2E51-Pressure Core Cooling Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm SOR 4N6-E45-NX-2H22-P017 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N012C Switch C1A-TTX6 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch 53 1

1E31-Pressure Core Cooing Reactor Pressure SOR 6N6-BS-NX-1H22-13029 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N022B Switch Switch ClA JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 54 2

2E31-Pressure Core Cooling Reactor Pressure SOR 6N6-BS-NX-2H22-P029 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N022B Switch Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 55 1

1E31-Pressure Core Cooling Reactor Pressure SOR 6N6-B5-NX-1H22-P029 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N022D Switch Switch CIA-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 56 2

2E31-Pressure Core Cooling Reactor Pressure SOR 6N6-B5-NX-2H22 13029 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N022D Switch Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 1E51-Pressure Turbine Exhaust 6N6-62-NX-Control Reactor LAS 57 1

Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 1H22-P029 673 Cap > Dem N012B Switch ClA JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch 2E51-Pressure Turbine Exhaust 4N6-E45-NX-Control Reactor LAS 58 2

Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 2H22 P029 673 Cap > Dem N012B Switch CIA-TTX6 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch Turbine Exhaust 59 1

1E51-Pressure Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 6N6-62-NX-1H22-P029 Control Reactor 673 LAS Cap > Dem N012D Switch CIA-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch 2E51-Pressure Turbine Exhaust 4N6-E45-NX-Control Reactor LAS 60 2

Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 21-122-13029 673 Cap> Dem N012D Switch C1A-TTX6 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch RCS/Reactor 61 1

PS 1BN2 Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-1H22-13026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem N039C Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control RCS/Reactor 62 2

PS 26N2 Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-2H22-13026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap>Dem N039C Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control Page 54 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result RCS/Reactor 63 1

PS i6N21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-1H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap> Dem N039D Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-1JTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control PS_

RCS/Reactor 64 2

2BN21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-2H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem N039D Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control RCS/Reactor 65 1

PS iBN21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-1H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem N039E Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control PS_

RCS/Reactor 66 2

2BN21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-2H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem N039E Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control RCS/Reactor 67 1

PS iBN21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-1H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap> Dem N039K Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control PS RCS/Reactor 9N6-B45-NX-68 2

2BN21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR CIA,IJTTX6 /

2H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap >Dem N039K Switch Inventory Pressure Switch 29N6-B45-U1-Cabinet Building Report Control C1A-JJTTNQ RCS/Reactor 69 1

PS 1BN21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-1H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem N039P Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control PS_

RCS/Reactor 70 2

2BN21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-2H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem N039P Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control Page 55 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capaci Result RCS/Reactor 71 1

PS 1BN2 Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-1H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem N039S Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control RCS/Reactor 72 2

PS 2BN2 Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-2H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap>Dem NQ39S Switch Inventory Pressure Switch CIA-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control RCS/Reactor 73 1

PS 1BN2 Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-C1A-JJTTX6 1H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS

~p>Dem N039U Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Report Control RCS/Reactor 74 2

PS 2B Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-2H22-P026 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem N039U 9U Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control RCS/Reactor 9N6-B45-NX-75 1

PS IBN21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR C1A JJTTX6 /

1H22-P075 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch 29N6-B45-U1-Cabinet Building Report N060U Control C1A-JJTTNQ RCS/Reactor 76 1

PS Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-1H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem N039CC 39CC Switch Inventory Pressure Switch CIA-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control RCS/Reactor 77 1

PS 16N21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-C1A-JJTTX6 1H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Report N039DD Control RCS/Reactor 78 1

PS 1

Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-1H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap> Dem N039EE 039 Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report Control Page 56 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result RCS/Reactor 79 1

PS 1BN21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-1H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch CIA-1JTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039KK Control RCS/Reactor 80 1

PS 1BN21 Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-C1A-JJTTX6 1H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem N039PP Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Report Control RCS/Reactor 81 1

PS 16321-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-C1A-JJTTX6 1H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Report N039SS Control RCS/Reactor 82 1

PS 16321-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR 9N6-B45-NX-C1A-JJTTX6 1H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Report N039UU Control PS RCS/Reactor 9N6-B45-NX-83 1

1BN21-Pressure Vessel RPV High SOR CIA JJTTX6 /

1H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 LAS Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch 29N6-B45-U1-Cabinet Building Report N06000 Control C1A-JJTTNQ RCS/Reactor 84 1

1621C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K054A Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor 85 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K054A Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor 86 1

16 21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Quali fiq Cap > Dem K055A Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control Page 57 of 91

15C0348-RPT-0021, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result RCS/Reactor

$7 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K055A Relay Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 88 1

11321C-Vessel Timing Control ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K056A Relay Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 89 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qual~ca Cap > Dem K056A Relay Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 90 1

1621C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qual~ra Cap > Dem K057A Relay Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 91 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qual~p Cap > Dem K057A Relay Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 92 1

1B21C-Timing Control Vessel Valve 1621-F013D Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K066A Relay Inventory "C" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 93 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel Valve 2821-F013D Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qual~ca Cap > Dem K066A Relay Inventory "C" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 94 1

1B21C-Timing Control Vessel Valve 1621-F013S Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-P644 731 Control Auxiliary Qualifip Cap > Dem K068A Relay Inventory "C" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control Page 58 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

1D Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result RCS/Reactor 95 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel Valve 2621-F013S Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K068A Relay Inventory "C" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 96 1

1B21C-Timing Control Vessel Valve 11321-F013C Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-P644 Control Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K069A Relay Inventory "C" Open Relay Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 97 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel Valve 2B21-F013C Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K069A Relay Inventory "C" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control Timing RCS/Reactor Valve 11321-98 1

1B21C-K070A Control Vessel F013E Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-15644 731 Control Auxiliary Qualifica Cap > Dem Relay Inventory "C" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control Timing RCS/Reactor Valve 21321-99 2

2B21C-Control Vessel F013E Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K070A Relay Inventory "C" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 1621C-Timing Vessel Valve 1621-Control Auxiliary Qualifica 100 1

K071A Control Inventory F013K Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 Cabinet Building 731 tion Test Cap > Dem Relay Control "C" Open Relay RCS/Reactor 101 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel Valve 2621-F013K Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K071A Relay Inventory "C" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 102 1

1621C-Timing Control Vessel Valve 1621-F013P Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K072A Relay Inventory "C" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control Page 59 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result 2B21C-Timing RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 2621-Control Auxiliary Qualifica 103 2

K072A Control Inventory F013P Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Cabinet Building 731 tion Test Cap > Dem Relay "C" Open Relay Control 1621C-Timing RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 11321-Qualifica 104 Control Auxiliary 1

K075A Control Inventory F013U Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 Cabinet Building 731 tion Test Cap > Dem Relay Control "C" Open Relay 2B21C-Timing RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 21321-Control Auxiliary Qualifica 105 2

K075A Control Inventory F013U Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Cabinet Building 731 tion Test Cap> Dem Relay Control "C" Open Relay RCS/Reactor 106 1

1B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 11-113-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K076A Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor 107 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap>Dem K076A Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor 108 1

1B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP iH13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K054B Relay Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Qualifica 109 Type GP 2H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Cap > Dem K054B Relay Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 110 1

1B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP Control 1H13-Qualifica Cabinet Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K055B Inventory Seal-In Relay Building tion Test Relay Control Page 60 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

1D Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result RCS/Reactor 111 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap> Dem K055B Relay Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 112 1

11321C-Vessel Timing Control ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 1H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K056B Relay Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 113 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K056B Relay Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 114 1

1621C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 11-113-P645 Control Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K057B Relay Inventory Seal-In Relay Building tion Test Control Timing RCS/Reactor 115 2

2B21C-Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap>Dem K057B Relay Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control Timing RCS/Reactor Valve 1821-116 1

1621C-Control Vessel F013D Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K066B Relay Inventory "B Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel Valve 21321-F013D Solenoid Agastat Qualifica 117 Type GP 2H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Cap> Dem K066B Relay Inventory "B" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 1

iB21C-Timing Control Vessel Valve 11321-F013S Solenoid Agastat Qualifica 118 Type GP 11-113-P645 731 Control Auxiliary Cap > Dem K068B Relay Inventory "B" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control Page 61 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result Timing RCS/Reactor Valve 21321-119 2

2B21C-Control Vessel F013S Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K068B Relay Inventory "B" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control Timing RCS/Reactor Valve 1621-120 1

1B21C-Control Vessel F013C Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-15645 731 Control Auxiliary Qualifica Cap > Dem K069B Relay Inventory "B" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control 2B21C-Timing RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 21321-Control Auxiliary Qualfca 121 2

K069B Control Inventory F013C Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 Cabinet Building 731 tion Test Cap > Dem Relay Control "B" Open Relay 1621C-Timing RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 11321-Control Control Auxiliary Qualifica 122 1

K070B Control Inventory F013E Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-P645 Building 731 tion Test Cap > Dem Relay "B" Open Relay Control Timing RCS/Reactor Valve 21321-123 2

2B21C-Control Vessel F013E Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Qualifica Cap > Dem K070B Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control "B" Open Relay 1B21C-Timing RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 1621-Qualifica 124 Control Control Auxiliary 1

K071B Control Inventory F013K Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-13645 Building 731 tion Test Cap > Dem Relay Control "B" Open Relay Timing RCS/Reactor Valve 2621-2 2B21C-Control Vessel F013K Solenoid Agastat Qualifica 125 Type GP 2H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Cap > Dem K071B Relay Inventory "B" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 1B21C-Timing Vessel Valve 11321-Control Auxiliary Qualifica 126 1

K0726 Control Inventory F013P Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P645 Cabinet Building 731 tion Test Cap> Dem Relay Control "B" Open Relay Page 62 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 6-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result 2B21C-Timing RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 21321-Qualifica 127 Control Auxiliary 2

K072B Control Inventory F013P Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 Cabinet Building 731 tion Test Cap > Dem Relay Control "B" Open Relay 1B21C-Timing RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 11321-Qualifica 128 Control Auxiliary 1

K075B Control Inventory F013U Solenoid Agastat Type GP iH13-P645 Cabinet Building 731 tion Test Cap> Dem Relay Control "B" Open Relay 2B21C-Timing RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 2621-Control Auxiliary Qualifica 129 2

K075B Control Inventory F013U Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 Cabinet Building 731 tion Test Cap > Dem Relay Control "B" Open Relay RCS/Reactor 1

11321C-Vessel Timing Control ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Qualifica 130 Type GP iH13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Cap > Dem K076B Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor 2

2B21C-Timing Control Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Agastat Qualifica 131 Type GP 2H13-P645 Control Auxiliary 731 Cap > Dem K076B Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control 132 1

1E31A-Relay Core Cooling Steam Leak Agastat Type GP 1H13-P632 Control Auxiliary 768 Qualifica Cap > Dem K002A Detection Relay Cabinet Building tion Test 133 2

2E31A-Relay Core Cooling Steam Leak Agastat Type GP 2H13-P632 Control Auxiliary 768 Qualifica Cap > Dem K002-A Detection Relay Cabinet Building tion Test 134 1

1E31A-Relay Core Cooling Steam Leak Agastat Type GP 1H13-P642 Control Auxiliary 768 Qualifica Cap > Dem K002B Detection Relay Cabinet Building tion Test RCS/Reactor 135 2

2E31A-Relay Vessel Steam Leak Agastat Type GP 2H13-P642 Control Auxiliary 768 Qualifica Cap > Dem K002B Inventory Detection Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor 136 2

PS 26 Pressure Vessel RPV High Barksdale BiT-M12SS-GE 2H22-P075 Control Reactor 761 SQURTS Cap>Dem N06OU 0U Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test Control Page 63 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result RCS/Reactor 137 2

PS 26321-Pressure Vessel RPV High Barksdale B1T-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 SQURTS Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039CC Control RCS/Reactor 138 2

PS 26321-Pressure Vessel RPV High Barksdale BiT-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 SQURTS Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039DD Control RCS/Reactor 139 2

PS 26321-Pressure Vessel RPV High Barksdale BiT-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 SQURTS Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039EE Control RCS/Reactor 140 2

PS 26321-Pressure Vessel RPV High Barksdale 61T-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 SQURTS Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039KK Control RCS/Reactor 141 2

PS 20321-Pressure Vessel RPV High Barksdale B1T-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 SQURTS Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039PP Control RCS/Reactor 142 2

PS 26321-Pressure Vessel RPV High Barksdale BiT-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 SQURTS Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039SS Control RCS/Reactor 143 2

PS 20321-Pressure Vessel RPV High Barksdale B1T-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 SQURTS Cap >Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039UU Control RCS/Reactor 144 2

PS 20321-Pressure Vessel RPV High Barksdale BiT-M12S5-GE 2H22-P076 Control Reactor 761 SQURTS

~P> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test 306000 Control Page 64 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result 42 RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 1E12-135Y-2 Motor Reactor LAS 145 1

0/1E12-Contactor Inventory F016A Opening N/A N/A (1AP76E)

Control Building 710 Report Cap > Dem F016A Control Contactor Center 42 RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 1E12-135Y-2 Motor Reactor LAS 146 1

O/1E12-Contactor Inventory F017A Opening N/A N/A (1AP76E)

Control Building 710 Report Cap > Dem F017A Contactor Center Control 42 RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 1E12-136Y-1 Motor Reactor LAS 147 1

O/1E12-Contactor Inventory F016B Opening N/A N/A (1AP82E)

Control Building 710 Report Cap > Dem F016B Control Contactor Center 42 RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 1E12-136Y-1 Motor Reactor LAS 148 1

O/1E12-Contactor Inventory F017B Opening N/A N/A (1AP82E)

Control Building 710 Report Cap> Dem F017B Control Contactor Center 42_

RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 1E12-F009 136Y-1 Motor Reactor LAS 149 1

O/1E12-Contactor Inventory Opening N/A N/A (136Y-1 Control Building 710'-6" Report Cap > De F009 Control Contactor Center RCS/Reactor Motor 150 1

CR1/1E12 Relay Vessel Valve 1E12-F009 N/A N/A 136Y-1 Control Reactor 710 -6 LAS Cap > Dem

-F009 Inventory Opening Relay (1AP82E)

Center Building Report Control 42 RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 1E12-F008 135X-1 Motor Reactor LAS 151 1

O/1E12-Contactor Inventory Opening N/A N/A (1AP71E)

Control Building 761 Report Cap> Dem F008 Control Contactor Center 42-RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 2E12-Motor Reactor 710'-6 LAS 152 2

0/2E12-Contactor Inventory F016A Opening N/A N/A 2AP76E Control Building Report Cap > Dem F016A Control Contactor Center Page 65 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

1D Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result 42-RCS/Reactor Valve 2E12-Motor 153 2

O/2E12-Contactor Vessel F017A Opening N/A N/A 2AP76E Control Reactor Building 710'-6" LAS Report Cap > Dem F017A Inventory Contactor Center Control 42 RCS/Reactor Valve 2E12-Motor 154 2

O/2E12-Contactor Vessel F016B Opening N/A N/A 2AP82E Control Reactor Building 710'-6" LAS Report Cap > Dem F016B Inventory Contactor Center Control 42_

RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 2E12-Motor Reactor LAS 155 2

O/2E12-Contactor Inventory F017B Opening N/A N/A 2AP82E Control Building 710'-6" Report Cap > Dem F017B Control Contactor Center 42 RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 2E12-F009 Motor Reactor LAS 156 2

O/2E12-Contactor Inventory Opening N/A N/A 2AP82E Control Building 710'-6" Report Cap> Dem F009 Control Contactor Center RCS/Reactor Motor 157 2

CR1/2E12 Relay Vessel Valve 2E12-F009 N/A N/A 2AP82E Control Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem

-F009 Inventory Opening Relay Center Building Report Control 42 RCS/Reactor Vessel Valve 2E12-F008 Motor Reactor LAS 158 2

O/2E12-Contactor Inventory Opening N/A N/A 2AP71E Control Building 761 Report Cap > Dem F008 Contactor Center Control 159 0

86DGO /

OHS-Auxiliary AC/DC Power DG 0 Lockout GE Type HEA ODG02JB Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem DGS003A Relay Support Relay panel Building Test Systems 160 1

86DGIA /

1HS-Auxiliary AC/DC Power DG 1A Lockout GE Type HEA 1DG02JB Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem DGS003A Relay Support Relay Panel Building Test Systems 161 1

1E22-Auxiliary AC/DC Power DG 1B Engine Fault Lockout GE Type HEA 1E22-Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem K015 Relay Support Relay p301B Panel Building Test Systems Page 66 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

knit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result 1E22-Auxiliary AC/DC Power DG 1B Generator 1E22-P028 Vertical Diesel EPRI HF 162 1

K001 Relay Support Fault Lockout GE Type HEA (1H22-Board Generator 710'-6'"

Test Cap> Dem Relay P028)

Building Systems 86DG2A /

Auxiliary AC/DC Power DG 2A Lockout SBM-Control Diesel EPRI HF 163 2

2HS-Relay Support Relay GE 12HEA61C236X 2

2DG021B Panel Generator 710'-6" Test Cap> Dem DGS003A Building Systems 164 2

2E22-Lockout AC/DC Power DG 2B Engine Fault Lockout GE 12HEA62B234X 2E22-Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem K015 Relay Support Relay 2

P301B Panel Building Test Systems 2E22-Lockout AC/DC Power DG 2B Generator 2E22-PO28 Vertical Diesel EPRI HF 165 2

K001 Relay Support Fault Lockout GE Type HEA (21-122-Generator Board 710'-6" Test Cap> Dem Relay P028)

Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 166 0

K10 /

Rotary Power DG 0 Overspeed P & B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Control Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem 0DGK010 Relay Support Relay panel Building Test Systems AC/DC DG 0 Differential Diesel 167 0

87X /

Auxiliary Power Overcurrent P & B MDR-137-8 ODG021B Control Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem ODG087 Relay Support Auxiliary Relay panel Building Test Systems AC/DC 168 0

81X /

Auxiliary Power DG 0 Frequency P & B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem ODG081X Relay Support Relay Panel Building Test Systems AC/DC K9 /

Auxiliary Power DG 0 Failure to Control Diesel EPRI HF 169 0

ODGKO09 Relay Support Start Relay P & B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Panel Generator 710'-6" Test Cap > Dem Building Systems AC/DC 170 0

K11 /

Auxiliary Power DG 0 Low Oil P & B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem ODGK011 Relay Support Pressure Relay Panel Test Building Systems AC/DC K12/

Auxiliary Power DG 0 Oil Control Diesel EPRI HF 171 0

ODGK012 Relay Support Temperature P & B MDR-137-8 ODG03J panel Generator 710'-6" Test Cap> Dem Relay Building Systems Page 67 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result AC/DC 172 0

K25 /

Auxiliary Power DG 0 Field Excitation Failure P & B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem ODGK025 Relay Support Relay Panel Building Test Systems AC/DC 173 1

K10/

Rotary Power DG 1A P & B MDR-137-8 iDG03J Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem lDGK010 Relay Support Overspeed Relay panel Building Test Systems AC/DC DG 1A Diesel 174 1

87X /

Auxiliary Power Differential P & B MDR-137-8 iDG02J6 Control Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem lDG087 Relay Support Overcurrent panel Building Test Systems Auxiliary Relay AC/DC 175 1

81X /

Auxiliary Power DG 1A Frequency P & B MDR-137-8 1DG03J Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem 1DG081X Relay Support Relay panel Building Test Systems AC/DC 176 1

K9 /

Auxiliary Power DG 1A Failure to P & B MDR-137-8 1DG03J Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem lDGK009 Relay Support Start Relay panel Building Test Systems AC/DC Diesel 177 1

K11 /

Auxiliary Power DG 1A Low Oil P & B MDR-137-8 iDG03J Control Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem 1DGK011 Relay Support Pressure Relay panel Building Test Systems AC/DC K12 /

Auxiliary Power DG lA Low Oil Control Diesel EPRI HF 178 1

1DGK012 Relay Support Temperature P & B MDR-137-8 1DG03J panel Generator 710'-6" Test Cap > Dem Relay Building Systems K25 /

Auxiliary AC/DC Power DG 1A Field Control Diesel EPRI HF 179 1

lDGK025 Relay Support Excitation Failure P & B MDR-137-8 iDG03J Panel Generator 710'-6" Test Cap> Dem Auxiliary Relay Building Systems K10 /

AC/DC Diesel 180 1

1E22-Overspee Power DG 16 P & B MDR-131-1 1E22-Control Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem K010 d Relay Support Overspeed Relay P301B Panel Building Test Systems AC/DC Diesel 181 1

K9 / 1E22-Auxiliary Power DG 1B Failure to P & B MDR-131-1 1E22-Control Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem K009 Relay Support Start Relay P301B Panel Building Test Systems Page 68 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

!D Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result K11 /

AC/DC Diesel 182 1

1E22-Auxiliary Power DG 1B Low Oil P & B MDR-131-1 1E22-Control Generator 710'-6 "

EPRI HF Cap > Dem K011 Relay Support Pressure Relay p301B Panel Building Test Systems K12 /

AC/DC DG 1B Low Oil Diesel 183 1

1E22-Auxiliary Power Temperature P & B MDR-131-1 1E22-Control Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem K012 Relay Support Relay P301B Panel Building Test Systems AC/DC Diesel 184 2

K10 /

Rotary Power DG 2A P & B MDR-137-8 2DG03J Control Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem 2DGKO10 Relay Support Overspeed Relay panel Building Test Systems AC/DC DG 2A Diesel 185 2

87X /

Auxiliary Power Differential P & B MDR-137-8 2DG02JB Control Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem 2DG087 Relay Support Overcurrent panel Building Test Systems Auxiliary Relay AC/DC 186 2

81X /

Auxiliary Power DG 2A Frequency P & B MDR-137-8 2DG03J Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem 2DG081X Relay Support Relay panel Building Test Systems AC/DC 187 2

K9/

Auxiliary Power DG 2A Failure to P & B MDR-137-8 2DG03J Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI t F Cap > Dem 2DGK009 Relay Support Start Relay panel Building Systems AC/DC 188 2

K11/

Auxiliary Power DG 2A Low Oil P & B MDR-137-8 2DG03J Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem 2DGK011 Relay Support Pressure Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC K12/

Auxiliary Power DG 2A Low Oil Control Diesel EPRI HF 189 2

2DGK012 Relay Support Temperature P & B MDR-137-8 2DG03J panel Generator 710'-6" Test Cap > Dem Relay Building Systems AC/DC K25/

Auxiliary Power DG 2A Field Control Diesel EPRI HF 190 2

2DGK025 Relay Support Excitation Failure P & B MDR-137-8 2DG03J panel Generator 710'-6" Test Cap> Dem Systems Relay Building AC/DC 191 0

S8 / OSTS-Speed Power DG 0 Overspeed Stewart &

81381-D-STC-ODG02J6 Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem DG076 Switch Support Switch Stevenson 4240 Panel Report Systems Building Page 69 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

1D Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result AC/DC 192 1

S8 / 1STS-Speed Power DG 1A Diesel Control

Diesel LAS DG076 Switch Support Overspeed Start ESSB-4AT 1DGO2JB Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap> Dem Systems Switch Building AC/DC 193 1

S8/ 1E22-Overspee Power DG 1B Overspeed Stewart &

81381-D-STC-1E22-Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem J901 d Switch Support Switch Stevenson 4240 P301B Panel Building Report Systems AC/DC 194 2

S8/ 2STS-Speed Power DG 81381-D-STC-Control Diesel LAS DG076 Switch Support Overspeed GE 4240 2DG02JB Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap > Dem Systems Switch Building AC/DC 195 2

S8 /2E22-Overspee Power DG 2B Overspeed Stewart &

81381-D-STC-2E22-Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem J901 d Switch Support Switch Stevenson 4240 P301B Panel Building Report Systems AC/DC 87/

Auxiliary Power DG 0 Differential Control Diesel 196 0

ODG008 Relay Support Overcurrent ABB SA-1 ODG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem Systems Relay Building AC/DC DG 1A 197 1

87/

Auxiliary Power Differential Control Diesel 1DG008 Relay Support Overcurrent ABB SA-1 1DG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem Systems Relay Building AC/DC DG 2A 198 2

87/

Auxiliary Power Differential ABB SA-1 2DG02JA Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem 2DG008 Relay Support Overcurrent Panel Systems Relay Building K59X1 /

Auxiliary AC/DC Power DG 0 Neutral Control Diesel Qualifica 199 0

ODGK059 X

Relay Support Ground Auxiliary GE 12HMA1166 ODG021A Panel Generator 710'-6" tion Test Cap > Dem Systems Relay Building K32X /

AC/DC DG 1A Reverse Diesel 200 0

ODGK032 Auxiliary Relay Power Support Power Auxiliary GE 12HMA11B6 ODG02JA Control Panel Generator 710'-6" Qual~ca Test tion Cap> Dem X

Relay Building Systems K59X1 /

Auxiliary AC/DC Power DG 1A Neutral Control Diesel Qualifica 201 1

1DGK059 Relay Support Ground Auxiliary GE 12HMA1166 iDG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" tion Test Cap > Dem X

Systems Relay Building Page 70 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result AC/DC K32X /

Auxiliary Power DG 1A Reverse Control Diesel Qualifica 202 1

1DG032 Relay Support Power Auxiliary GE 12HMA11B6 iDG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" tion Test Cap > Dem Systems Relay Building AC/DC K32X /

Auxiliary Power DG 2A Reverse Control Diesel Qualifica 203 2

2DGK32X Relay Support Power Auxiliary GE 12HMA11B6 2DG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" tion Test Cap> Dem Relay Building Systems AC/DC 59/

Overvolta Power DG 0 Neutral Control Diesel LAS 204 0

ODG005 ge Relay Support Ground Relay GE 121AV51D1A ODG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap> Dem Building Systems AC/DC 205 1

59/

Overvolta Power DG 1A Neutral GE 121AV51D1A lDG02JA Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem 1DG012 ge Relay Support Ground Relay Panel Report Systems Building AC/DC 59/

Overvolta Power DG 2A Neutral Control Diesel LAS 206 2

2DG012 ge Relay Support Ground Relay GE IAV51D 2DG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap > Dem Systems Building 51VX /

AC/DC DG 0 Diesel 207 0

ODG051V Time Power Overcurrent Agastat /

7012PB ODG03J Control Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem X

Relay Support Auxiliary Relay Amerace Panel Building Systems AC/DC K39 /

Time Power DG 0 Failure to Control Diesel 208 0

ODGK039 Relay Support Start Time Delay Agastat E7012PD002 ODG03J Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem Relay Building Systems AC/DC K33 /

Time Power DG 0 Engine Start Agastat /

Control Diesel 209 0

ODGK033 Relay Support Time Delay Relay Amerace 7012PE ODG03J Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Systems Building S1VX /

AC/DC DG 1A Diesel 210 1

lDG051V Time Power Overcurrent Agastat /

7012P4 lDG03J Control Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem X

Relay Support Relay Amerace Panel Building Systems AC/DC K39 /

Time Power DG 1A Failure to Control Diesel 211 1

1DGK039 Relay Support Start Time Delay Agastat E7012PD002 1DG03J Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem Systems Relay Building Page 71 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result 212 1

K33 /

Time AC/DC Power DG 1A Engine Start Time Delay Agastat /

7012PE 1DG03J Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem lDGK033 Relay Support Relay Amerace Panel Building Systems K39 /

Time AC/DC power DG 16 Failure to 1E22-Control Diesel 213 1

1E22-Delay Support Start Time Delay Agastat E7012PDO02 P301B Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem K039 Relay Relay Building Systems K33 /

Time AC/DC power DG 1B Engine 1E22-Control Diesel 214 1

1E22-Delay Support Start Time Delay Agastat E7012PD P301B Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem K033 Relay Relay Building Systems K6/

Time AC/DC 1E22-P028 Diesel 215 1

1E22B-Delay Power DG 1B Time Agastat Model 7012 (11-122-Vertical Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem K006 Relay Support Delay Relay P028)

Board Building Systems 51VX /

AC/DC DG 2A Diesel 216 2

2DG051V Time Power Overcurrent Agastat /

Model 7012 2DG03J Control Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem X

Relay Support Relay Amerace Panel Building Systems AC/DC K39/

Time Power DG 2A Failure to Amerace Control Diesel 217 2

2DGKO39 Relay Support Start Time Delay

/ Agastat E7012PDO02 2DG03J Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem Relay Building Systems AC/DC K33 /

Time Power DG 2A Engine Control Diesel 218 2

Delay Start Time Delay Agastat 7012PE 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem 2DGKO33 Relay Support Relay Panel Building Systems K39 /

Time AC/DC power DG 2B Failure to Diesel 219 2

2E22-Delay Start Time Delay Amerace E7012PDO02 2E22-Control Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem K039 Relay Support Relay

/ Agastat P301B Panel Building Systems K33/

Time AC/DC DG 2B Engine Diesel 220 2

2E22-Delay Power Start Time Delay Amerace 7012PD 2E22-Control Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem K033 Relay Support Relay

/ Agastat P301B Panel Building Systems AC/DC K6/

Time Power DG 2B Time Amerace 2E22-P028 Vertical Diesel 221 2

2E22B-Delay Model 7012 (21122-Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem K006 Relay Support Delay Relay

/ Agastat P028)

Board Building Systems Page 72 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result S11/

AC/DC DG 2A Oil Diesel 222 1

1E22-Temperat Power Temperature Square D 9025-BGW-1E22-Control Generator 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem N517 ure Switch Support Switch 2259 Series P301B Panel Building Report Systems 511 /

AC/DC DG 2B Oil Diesel 2

2E22-Temperat Power Temperature Square D LAS 223 9025 Model 2E22-Control Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem N517 ure Switch Support Switch P301B Panel Building Report Systems AC/DC 32/

Power Power DG 0 Reverse Control Diesel LAS 224 0

ODG002 Relay Support Power Relay GE 121CW51A2A ODG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap> Dem Building Systems AC/DC 225 1

32/

Power Power DG 1A Reverse GE 121CW51A2A 1DG02JA Control Diesel Generator 71O'-6" LAS Cap > Dem 1DG009 Relay Support Power Relay Panel Report Building Systems AC/DC 226 2

32/

Power Power DG 2A Reverse GE 121CW51A2A 2DG02JA Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem 2DG009 Relay Support Power Relay Panel Building Report Systems AC/DC 227 O

40(1440-Protective Power DG 0 Field GE Type CEH ODG02JA Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" N/A Operator DG003)

Relay Support Excitation Panel Building Action Systems AC/DC 228 1

40(1440-Protective Power DG 1A Field Type CEH 1DG021A Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" N/A Operator DG010 Support Relay GE Excitation Panel Building Action Systems AC/DC 229 2

40(2440-Protective Power DG 2A Field GE Type CEH 2DG02JA Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" N/A Operator DG010)

Relay Support Excitation Panel Building Action Systems K30A Differenti AC/DC DG 16 1E22-P028 Diesel 230 1

(1487-al Power Differential GE 12PVD21B1A (1H22-Vertical Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem DG1B)

Overcurre Support Overcurrent P028)

Board Building Test nt Relay I

Systems Relay Differenti AC/DC DG 16 K30B al Power Differential 1E22-P028 Vertical Diesel EPRI HF 231 1

(1487-Overcurre Support Overcurrent GE 12PVD21B1A (11-122-Generator Board 710'-6" Test Cap> Dem DG1B)

P028)

Building nt Relay Systems Relay Page 73 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

Basis for Evaluation 1D Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

10 Type (ft)

Capacity Result Differenti AC/DC DG 16 K30C al Power Differential 1E22-P028 Vertical Diesel EPRI HF 232 1

( 1487-Overcurre Support Overcurrent GE 12PVD21BIA

{1H22-Board Generator 710'-6" Test Ca > Dem p

DG1B) nt Relay Systems Relay P028)

Building Differenti AC/DC DG 2B K30A al Power Differential 2E22-PO28 Vertical Diesel EPRI HF 233 2

(2487-Overcurre Support Overcurrent GE 12PVD21B1A (2H22-Board Generator 710`-6" Test Cap> Dem DG26) nt Relay Systems Relay P028)

Building K306 Differenti AC/DC DG 26 2E22-P028 Diesel 234 2

{2487-al Power Differential GE 12PVD21B1A

{2H22-Vertical Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem DG26)

Overcurre Support Overcurrent P028)

Board Building Test nt Relay Systems Relay K30C Differenti AC/DC DG 26 2E22-P028 Diesel 235 2

(2487-al Power Differential GE 12PVD21B1A (21-122-Vertical Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem DG26)

Overcurre Support Overcurrent P028)

Board Building Test nt Relay Systems Relay AC/DC 236 0

S11 / OTS-Temperat Power DG 0 Oil Control Diesel LAS DG041 ure Switch Support Temperature Square D 9025-BCW-32 ODGOIK Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap> Dem Systems Switch Building AC/DC 237 1

511 / 1TS-Temperat Power DG lA Oil Control Diesel LAS DG041 ure Switch Support Temperature Square D 9025-BCW-32 iDG01K Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap> Dem Systems Switch Building AC/DC 238 2

S11 / 2TS-Temperat Power DG 1B Oil Control Diesel LAS DG041 ure Switch Support Temperature Square D 9025-BCW-32 2DGO1K Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap > Dem Systems Switch Building 51V AC/DC DG 0 Diesel 239 0

(1451-Overcurre Power Support Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B ODG02JA Control Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem DG015A) nt Relay Relay Phase A Building Systems Siv AC/DC DG 0 Diesel 240 0

(1451-Overcurre Power Support Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B ODG02JA Control Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem DG015B) nt Relay Systems Relay Phase B Panel Building 51V AC/DC DG 0 Diesel 241 0

(1451-Overcurre Power Support Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B ODG02JA Control Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem DG015C) nt Relay Relay Phase C Panel Building Systems Page 74 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result AC/DC 51V Power DG 1A Control Diesel 242 1

(1451-Overcurre Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 1DG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem DG016A) nt Relay Supems Relay Phase A Building AC/DC 51V Power DG 1A Control Diesel 243 1

(1451-Overcurre Support Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 1DG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap >Dem DG016B) nt Relay Relay Phase B Building Systems 51V AC/DC DG 1A Diesel 244 1

(1451-Overcurre Power Support Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 1DG02JA Control Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem DG016C) nt Relay Relay Phase C Building Systems K35A AC/DC Power DG 1B 1E22-PO28 Vertical Diesel 245 1

(1451V-Overcurre Support Overcurrent GE 121JCV51B21A (11122-Board Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem DG1B) nt Relay Systems Relay P028)

Building K35B AC/DC Power DG 1B 1E22-P028 Vertical Diesel 246 1

(1451V-Overcurre Support Overcurrent GE 1211CV51B21A (11122-Board Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem DG1B) nt Relay Systems Relay P028)

Building AC/DC K35C Power DG 1B 1E22-P028 Vertical Diesel 247 1

(1451V-Overcurre Support Overcurrent GE 121JCV51B21A (1H22-Board Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem DG1B) nt Relay Systems Relay P028)

Building AC/DC 51V Overcurre Power DG 2A Control Diesel 248 2

(2451-nt Relay Support Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 2DG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem DG016A)

Relay Phase A Building Systems AC/DC 51V Overcurre Power DG 2A Control Diesel 249 2

(2451-nt Relay Support Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 2DG02JA Panel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem DG016B)

Systems Relay Phase B Building 51V AC/DC DG 2A Diesel 250 2

(2451-Overcurre Power Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 2DG02JA Control Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem DG016C) nt Relay Support Relay Phase C Panel Building Systems AC/DC K35A Overcurre Power DG 2B 2E22-P028 Vertical Diesel 251 2

(2451V-nt Relay Support Overcurrent GE 12JCV51B21A (21122-Board Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem DG2B)

Systems Relay P028)

Building Page 75 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result K35B Overcurre AC/DC Power DG 2B 2E22-P028 Vertical Diesel 252 2

( 2451V-nt Relay Support Overcurrent GE 12JCV51B21A (2H22-Board Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem DG2B)

Systems Relay P028)

Building K35C Overcurre AC/DC Power DG 2B 2E22-P028 Vertical Diesel 253 2

(2451V-nt Relay Support Overcurrent GE 12JCV51621A (2H22-Board Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem DG2B)

Systems Relay P028)

Building 51G Ground AC/DC 141Y Feed to 254 1

(1451-Fault Power 135X Ground ABB 202D6141UL 141Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP055)

Relay Support Fault Type GR-5 (1AP04E)

Building Report Systems AC/DC 255 1

51N (1351-Overcurre Power 141Y Feed to 135X Neutral GE IAC-60B 135X Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem AP082) nt Relay Support Overcurrent (1AP19E)

Building Report Systems SiG Ground AC/DC 141Y Feed to 256 1

(1451-Fault Power 135Y Ground ABB GR-5 141Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP057)

Relay Support Fault (1AP04E)

Building Report Systems 51N AC/DC 141Y Feed to 257 1

(1351-Overcurre nt Relay Power Support 135Y Neutral GE IAC-60B 135Y (1AP20E)

Switchgear Reactor Building 710'-6" LAS Report Cap> Dem AP083)

Systems Overcurrent 51G Ground AC/DC 142Y Feed to 258 1

(1451-Fault Power 136X Ground ABB Type GR-5 1406E)

Switchgear Reactor 731 1po Cap > Dem AP071)

Relay Support Fault (1AP Building Repo rt Systems 51N AC/DC 142Y Feed to 259 1

(1351-Overcurre nt Relay Power Support 136X Neutral GE IAC-60B 136X (1AP21E)

Switchgear Reactor Building 731 LAS Report Cap> Dem AP090)

Systems Overcurrent SiG Ground AC/DC 142Y Feed to 260 1

(1451-Fault Power Support 136Y Ground ABB Type GR-5 142Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap > Dem AP073)

Relay Fault (1AP06E)

Building Report Systems 51N AC/DC 142Y Feed to 261 1

(1351-Overcurre nt Relay Power Support 136Y Neutral GE IAC-60B 136Y (1AP22E)

Switchgear Reactor Building 731 LAS Report Cap> Dem AP091)

Systems Overcurrent Page 76 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result AC/DC 262 1

86N/1432 Lockout Power 143 Switchgear N/A N/A 143 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap> Dem Relay Support Lockout Relay (1AP07E)

Building Report Systems AC/DC 51(1451-Overcurre Power Normal Feed to 143 Reactor LAS 263 1

AP034A) nt Relay Support GE IAC-51A (1AP07E)

Switchgear Building 687 Report Cap > Dem Systems Overcurrent ent AC/DC 51(1451-Overcurre Power Normal Feed to 143 Reactor LAS 264 1

AP034B) nt Relay Support GE IAC-51A (1AP07E)

Switchgear Building 687 Report Cap > Dem Systems Overcurrent ent AC/DC 265 1

51(1451-Overcurre Power Normal Feed to 143 Reactor LAS AP035) nt Relay Support GE IAC-53A (1AP07E)

Switchgear Building 687 Report Cap > Dem Systems Overcurrent ent AC/DC 266 1

51(1451-Overcurre Power 143 Feed to 143-GE IAC-51 143 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap > Dem AP074A }

nt Relay Support 10vercurrent (1AP07E)

Building Report Systems AC/DC 267 1

51(1451-Overcurre Power 143 Feed to 143-GE IAC-51 143 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap> Dem AP074B }

nt Relay Y

Support pp 1 Overcurrent (1AP07E)

Building Report Systems AC/DC 51G Ground 241Y Feed to 268 2

(2451-Fault Power 235X Ground ABB 202D6141UL 241Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP055)

Relay Support Fault Type GR-5 (2AP04E)

Building Report Systems 51N Ground AC/DC power 241Y Feed to 235X Reactor LAS 269 2

(2351-Fault Support 235X Neutral GE IAC-60B (2AP19E)

Switchgear Building 710'-6" Report Cap> Dem AP082)

Relay Overcurrent Systems 51G Ground AC/DC Power 241Y Feed to 270 2

(2451-Fault 235Y Ground ABB Type GR-5 241Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP057)

Relay Support Fault (2AP04E)

Building Report Systems 51N Ground AC/DC power 241Y Feed to 271 2

(2351-Fault 235Y Neutral GE IAC-606 235Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP083)

Relay Support Overcurrent (2AP20E)

Building Report Systems Page 77 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result AC/DC 51G Ground 242Y Feed to 272 2

(2451-Fault Power 236X Ground ABB Type GR-5 242Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap > Dem AP071)

Relay Support Fault (2AP06E)

Building Report Systems AC/DC 273 2

51N (2351-Overcurre Power 242Y Feed to 236X Neutral GE IAC-60B 236X Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap> Dem AP090) nt Relay Support Overcurrent (2AP21E)

Building Report Systems 51G Ground AC/DC power 242Y Feed to 274 2

(2451-Fault 236Y Ground ABB Type GR-5 242Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap > Dem AP073)

Relay Support Fault (2AP06E)

Building Report Systems SiN Ground AC/DC 242Y Feed to 275 2

(2351-Fault Power 236Y Neutral GE IAC-60B 236Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap> Dem AP091)

Relay Support Overcurrent (2AP22E)

Building Report Systems AC/DC 276 2

86N/2432 Lockout Power 243 Switchgear N/A N/A 243 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap > Dem Relay Support Lockout Relay (2AP07E)

Building Report Systems AC/DC 277 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power Normal Feed to SG 243 GE IAC-51B 243 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap > Dem AP034A) nt Relay Support (2AP07E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 278 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power Normal Feed to 243 Reactor LAS AP034B) nt Relay Support GE IAC-51B (2AP07E)

Switchgear Building 687 Report Cap> Dem Systems Overcurrent ent AC/DC 279 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power Normal Feed to 243 Reactor LAS AP035) nt Relay Support SG 243 GE IAC-53A (2AP07E)

Switchgear Building 687 Report Cap> Dem Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 280 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power 243 Feed to 243-GE IAC-516 243 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap> Dem AP074A nt RelaySu Support 10vercurrent (2AP07E)

Building Report Systems AC/DC 281 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power 243 Feed to 243-GE IAC-516 243 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap > Dem AP074B nt RelaySu Support 10vercurrent (2AP07E)

Building Report Systems Page 78 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

!D Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

!D Type (ft)

Capacity Result 282 1

K32 (1432-Power AC/DC Power DG 1B Reverse GE 12GGP53B1A 1E22-P028 (1H22-Vertical Diesel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem DG16)

Relay Support Power Relay P028)

Board Building Systems 283 2

K32 (2432-Power AC/DC Power DG 2B Reverse GE 12GGP53B1A 2E22-P028 (2H22-Vertical Diesel Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem DG2B)

Relay Support Power Relay P028)

Board Building Systems 284 1

K2 Overvolta AC/DC Power 250V Battery Charger Power Conv.

3SD-260-200 1DC03E Battery Auxiliary 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem ge Relay Support Overvoltage Prod.

Charger Building Report Systems AC/DC 1AA Battery 285 1

59K1 Overvolta Power Charger Overvoltage Power Conv.

3SD-130-200 1DC09E Battery Auxiliary 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem ge Relay Support Fault Module F-Prod.

Charger Building Report Systems 55-2285 AC/DC 1BA Battery 286 1

59K1 Overvolta Power Charger Overvoltage Power Conv.

3S-130-200D 1DC17E Battery Auxiliary 731 LAS Cap> Dem ge Relay Support Fault Module F-Prod.

Charger Building Report Systems 55-2285 AC/DC 1C Battery Power 287 1

K4 Overvolta Power Charger Conv.

3SD-1306-SOD 1DC19E Battery Auxiliary 687 LAS Cap > Dem ge Relay Support Overvoltage Prod.

Charger Building Report Systems Fault AC/DC 288 2

K2 Overvolta Power 250V Battery Charger Power Conv.

3SD-260-200 2DC03E Battery Auxiliary 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem ge Relay Support Overvoltage Prod.

Charger Building Report Systems AC/DC 2AA Battery 289 2

59K1 Overvolta Power Charger Overvoltage Power Conv.

3SD-130-200 2DC09E Battery Auxiliary 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem ge Relay Support Fault Module F-Prod.

Charger Building Report Systems 55-2285 AC/DC 2BA Battery 290 2

59K1 Overvolta Power Charger Overvoltage Power Conv.

3S-130-200D 2DC17E Battery Auxiliary 731 LAS Cap > Dem ge Relay Support Fault Module F-Prod.

Charger Building Report Systems 55-2285 Page 79 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

1D Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result AC/DC 2C Battery 291 2

K4 Overvolta Power Charger Power Conv.

3SD-130B-SOD 2DC19E Battery Auxiliary 687 LAS Cap> Dem ge Relay Support Overvoltage Prod.

Charger Building Report Systems Fault AC/DC 292 2

K10 Overspee Power DG 2B N/A N/A 2E22-Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem d Relay Support Overspeed Relay P301B Panel Report Systems Building AC/DC 293 2

K9 Start Power DG 2B Failure to N/A N/A 2E22-Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem Relay Support Start Relay P301B Panel Report Systems Building AC/DC 294 2

K11 Pressure Power DG 2B Low Oil N/A N/A 2E22-Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem Relay Support Pressure Relay P301B Panel Report Systems Building AC/DC Temperat Power DG 2B Low Oil 2E22-Control Diesel LAS 295 2

K12 ure Relay Support Temperature N/A N/A P301B Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap > Dem Systems Relay Building CB-6 /

AC/DC 296 1

1E22-Circuit Power Feeder Breaker GE TEB122100 1E22-Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem P301A-Breaker Support from 1C Battery P301A Panel Report CB6 Systems Building CB-9 /

AC/DC 1E22-Circuit Power Feeder Breaker 1E22-Control Diesel LAS 297 1

P301A-Breaker Support from 1C Battery GE TEB122100 P301A Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap> Dem CB9 Systems Charger Building CB-6 /

AC/DC 298 2

2E22-Circuit Power Feeder Breaker 2E22-Control Diesel LAS P301A-Breaker Support from 2C Battery GE TEB122100 P301A Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap> Dem CB6 Systems Building CB-9 /

AC/DC 2E22-Circuit Power Feeder Breaker 2E22-Control Diesel LAS 299 2

P301A-Breaker Support from 2C Battery GE TEB122100 P301A Panel Generator 710'-6" Report Cap> Dem CB9 Systems Charger Building AC/DC 300 1

51(1451-Overcurre Power 141Y Feed to 141Y Reactor LAS AP054A) nt Relay Support 1

cur ABB CO-4 (1AP04E)

Switchgear Building 710'-6" Report Cap > Dem Systems Overur rent Page 80 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

!D Type (ft)

Capacity Result AC/DC 301 1

51(1451-Overcurre Power 141Y Feed to 135X ABB CO-4 141Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP054B) nt Relay Support (1AP04E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 302 1

51(1451-Overcurre Power 141Y Feed to 135Y ABB CO-4 141Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP056A) nt Relay Support Overcurrent (1AP04E)

Building Report Systems 303 1

51(1451-Overcurre AC/DC Power 141Y Feed to 135Y ABB CO-4 141Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP056B) nt Relay Support (1AP04E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 142Y Feed to 304 1

51(1451-Overcurre Power 136X ABB CO-4 142Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap> Dem AP070A) nt Relay Support (1AP06E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 305 1

51(1451-Overcurre Power 142Y Feed to 136X ABB CO-4 142Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap> Dem AP070B) nt Relay Support (1AP06E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 306 1

51(1451-Overcurre Power 142Y Feed to 136Y ABB CO-4 142Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap> Dem AP072A) nt Relay Support (1AP06E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 307 1

51(1451-Overcurre Power 142Y Feed to 136Y ABB CO-4 142Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap > Dem AP072B) nt Relay Support (1AP06E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 308 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power 241Y Feed to 235X ABB CO-4 241Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP054A) nt Relay Support (2AP04E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 241Y Feed to 309 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power 235X ABB CO-4 241Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem AP054B) nt Relay Support (2AP04E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 310 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power 241Y Feed to 235Y ABB CO-4 241Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP056A) nt Relay Support (2AP04E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent Page 81 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft}

Capacity Result AC/DC 311 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power 241Y Feed to 235Y ABB CO-4 241Y Switchgear Reactor 710,-6" LAS Cap > Dem AP05613) nt Relay Support (2AP04E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 312 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power 242Y Feed to 236X ABB CO-4 242Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap > Dem AP070A) nt Relay Support Overcurrent (2AP06E)

Building Report Systems AC/DC 242Y Feed to 313 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power 236X ABB CO-4 242Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap> Dem AP07013) nt Relay Support (2AP06E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 314 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power 242Y Feed to 236Y ABB CO-4 242Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap > Dem AP072A) nt Relay Support (2AP06E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent AC/DC 242Y Feed to 315 2

51(2451-Overcurre Power 236Y ABB CO-4 242Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap> Dem AP0726) nt Relay Support (2AP06E)

Building Report Systems Overcurrent 316 1

1E31-Switch Core Cooling Steam Leak Yokogawa DX-112 11-113-P632 Control Auxiliary 768 LAS Cap > Dem R001C Detection Switch 2/A3/C3/S-S Cabinet Building Report RCS/Reactor 317 2

2E31-Switch Vessel Steam Leak Yokogawa DX-112 2H13-P632 Control Auxiliary 768 LAS Cap > Dem R001C Inventory Detection Switch 2/A3/C3/S_S Cabinet Building Report Control 318 1

1E31-Switch Core Cooling Steam Leak Yokogawa DX-112 11-113-13642 Control Auxiliary 768 LAS Cap> Dem R002C Detection Switch 2/A3/C3/S-S Cabinet Building Report RCS/Reactor 319 2

2E31-Switch Vessel Steam Leak Yokogawa DX-112 21-113-P642 Control Auxiliary 768 LAS Cap> Dem R002C Inventory Detection Switch 2/A3/C3/S-S Cabinet Building Report Control AC/DC Diesel 320 0

81/

Auxiliary Power DG 0 Frequency ABB Type ITE-81 ODG021A Control Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem ODG007 Relay Support Relay Panel Building Test Systems Page 82 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result AC/DC 321 1

81/

Auxiliary Power DG 1A Frequency ABB Type ITE-81 iDG021A Control Diesel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap> Dem 1DG014 Relay Support Relay panel Test Systems Building AC/DC 322 2

81/

Auxiliary Power DG 2A Frequency Control Diesel EPRI HF 2DG014 Relay Support Relay ABB Type ITE-81 2DG02JA panel Generator 710'-6" Test Cap> Dem Systems Building AC61413 AC/DC ITE Circuit 323 1

/ 1AP04E-Circuit Power DG 0 Circuit Breaker 5HK350 141Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem 3

Breaker Support pp Breaker LTD.

(1AP04E)

Building Test Systems AC/DC 52/

Circuit Power Feeder Circuit ITE Circuit 141Y Reactor EPRI HF 324 1

1AP04E-9 Breaker Su Support Breaker to 135X Breaker 5HK350 (1AP04E)

Switchgear Building 710'-6" Test Cap>Dem Systems

& 135Y LTD.

AC/DC 325 1

AC61423

/ 1AP06E-Circuit Power DG 1A Circuit ITE Circuit Breaker 5HK350 142Y Switchgear Reactor 731 EPRI HF Cap > Dem 3

Breaker Support Breaker (1AP06E)

Building Test Systems LTD.

AC/DC 326 1

52/

Circuit Power Feeder Circuit ITE Circuit 142Y Reactor EPRI HF 1AP06E-9 Breaker Support pp Breaker to 136X Breaker 5HK350 (1AP06E)

Switchgear Building 731 Test Cap>Dem Systems

& 136Y LTD.

AC/DC 327 2

ACB2413

/ 2AP04E-Circuit Power DG 0 Circuit ITE Circuit Breaker 5HK350 241Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" EPRI HF Cap > Dem 10 Breaker Support pp Breaker LTD.

(2AP04E)

Building Test Systems AC/DC 328 2

52/

Circuit Power Feeder Circuit ITE Circuit 241Y Reactor EPRI HF 2AP04E-4 Breaker Support Breaker to 235X Breaker 5HK350 (2AP04E)

Switchgear Building 710'-6" Test Cap > Dem Systems

& 235Y LTD.

ACB2423 AC/DC ITE Circuit 329 2

/ 2AP06E-Circuit Power DG 2A Circuit Breaker 5HK350 242Y Switchgear Reactor 731 EPRI HF Cap > Dem 11 Breaker Support Breaker LTD.

(2AP06E)

Building Test Systems AC/DC 330 2

52 /

/

2A52 Circuit Power Feeder Circuit Breaker to 236X ITE Circuit Breaker 5HK350 242Y Switchgear Reactor 731 EPRI HF Cap > Dem Breaker Support Su

& 236Y LTD.

(2AP06E)

Building Test Systems Page 83 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type (ft)

Capacity Result 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 331 1

1AP19E-Circuit Power Breaker from GE AK-50 135X Switchgear Reactor 710,-6" LAS Cap >Dem 102B Breaker Support 141Y (1AP19E)

Building Report Systems 52 /

AC/DC DG 0 Cooling 332 1

1AP19E-Circuit Power Water Pump GE AK-25 13SX Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem 103A Breaker Support Circuit Breaker (1AP19E)

Building Report Systems 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 333 1

1AP19E-Circuit Power Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 135X Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem Breaker Support (1AP19E)

Building Report 103C Systems 135X-2 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 334 1

1AP19E-Circuit Power Support er Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 135X Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem Breaker (1AP19E)

Building Report 103D Systems 135X-3 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 335 1

1AP20E-Circuit Power Breaker from GE AK-50 135Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap >Dem 202B Breaker Support 141Y (1AP20E)

Building Report Systems 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 336 1

1AP20E-Circuit Power Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 135Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem 204B Breaker Support 135Y-2 (1AP20E)

Building Report Systems 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 337 1

1AP21E-Circuit Power Breaker from GE AK-50 136X (1136X Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap > Dem Breaker Support Building Report 3028 Systems 142Y 52 /

AC/DC DG 1A Cooling 338 1

1AP21E-Circuit Power Water Pump GE AK-25 136X Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap > Dem Breaker Support (1AP21E)

Building Report 303A Systems Circuit Breaker 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 339 1

1AP21E-Circuit Power Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 136X Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap > Dem Breaker Support (1AP21E)

Building Report 304D Systems 136X-3 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 340 1

1AP22E-Circuit Power Breaker from GE AK-50 Y

136Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap >Dem Breaker Support Systems (1AP Building Report 4026 142Y Page 84 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result 52 J AC/DC Feeder Circuit 341 1

1AP22E-Circuit Power Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 136Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap> Dem 404B Breaker Support 136Y-1 (1AP22E)

Building Report Systems 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 342 2

2AP19E-Circuit Circus Breaker Power Breaker from GE AK-50 235X Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem 1038 Su Support 241Y (2AP19E)

Building Report Systems 52 /

AC/DC DG 0 Cooling 343 2

2AP19E-Circuit Power Water Pump GE AK-25 235X Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem 102A Breaker Support Circuit Breaker (2AP19E)

Building Report Systems 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 344 2

2AP19E-Circuit Power Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 235X Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem 102C Breaker Support pp 235X-2 (2AP19E)

Building Report Systems 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 345 2

2AP19E-Circuit Power Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 235X Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem 102D Breaker Support 235X-3 (2AP19E)

Building Report Systems 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 346 2

2AP20E-Circuit Power Breaker from GE AK-50 235Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap >Dem 2038 Breaker Su Support 241Y (2AP20E)

Building Report Systems 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 347 2

2AP20E-Circuit Power Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 235Y Switchgear Reactor 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem 201C Breaker Support 235Y-2 (2AP20E)

Building Report Systems 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 348 2

2AP21E-Circuit Breaker Power Support Breaker from GE AK-50 236X (2AP21E)

Switchgear Reactor Building 731 LAS Report Cap > Dem 303B Systems 242Y 52 /

AC/DC DG 2A Cooling 349 2

2AP21E-Circuit Breaker Power Support Water Pump GE AK-25 236X (2AP21E)

Switchgear Reactor Building 731 LAS Report Cap> Dem 302C Systems Circuit Breaker 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 350 2

2AP21E-Circuit Breaker Power Support Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 236X (2AP21E)

Switchgear Reactor Building 731 LAS Report Cap> Dem 3018 Systems 236X-3 Page 85 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 351 2

2AP22E-Circuit Power Breaker from GE AK-50 236Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap >Dem 403B Breaker Support 242Y (2AP22E)

Building Report Systems 52 /

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 352 2

2AP22E-Circuit Power Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 236Y Switchgear Reactor 731 LAS Cap> Dem 401C Breaker Support pp 136Y-1 (2AP22E)

Building Report Systems ACB1433 AC/DC 353 1

/ 1 Circuit Power DG 1B Circuit GE AM-4.16-350 143 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap > Dem 003 003 Breaker Support Breaker (1AP07E)

Building Report Systems 52/

AC/DC 354 1

1AP07E-Circuit Power Feeder Circuit GE AM-4.16-350 143 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap > Dem 005 Breaker Support Breaker to 143-1 (1AP07E)

Building Report Systems ACB2433 AC/DC 355 2

/ 2AP07E-Circuit Power DG 2B Circuit GE AM-4.16-350 243 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap > Dem 003 Breaker Support Breaker (2AP07E)

Building Report Systems 52/

AC/DC 356 2

2AP07E-Circuit Power Feeder Circuit GE AM-4.16-350 243 Switchgear Reactor 687 LAS Cap >Dem 005 Breaker Support Breaker to 243-1 (2AP07E)

Building Report Systems 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 357 1

1DCO2E-Circuit Power Breaker to GE AK-25 1DCO2E Distribution Auxiliary 710'-6" LAS Cap > Dem 2B Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report Systems Panel 121Y 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 358 1

1DC08E-Circuit Power Breaker to GE AK-25 iDCOBE Distribution Auxiliary 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem 3B Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report Systems Panel 111Y 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 359 1

1DC15E-Circuit Power Breaker to GE AK-25 lDC15E Distribution Auxiliary 731 LAS Cap > Dem 3B Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report Systems Panel 112Y 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 360 2

2DCO2E-Circuit Power Breaker to GE AK-25 2DCO2E Distribution Auxiliary 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem 2B Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report Systems Pane1221Y Page 86 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 6-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No.

Unit Building Elev.

!D Type System Function Manuf.

Model No.

ID Type Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 361 2

2DC08E-Circuit Power Breakerto GE AK-25 2DC08E Distribution Auxiliary 710'-6" LAS Cap> Dem 3B Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report Systems Pane1211Y 52/

AC/DC Feeder Circuit 362 2

2D Circuit Power Breaker to GE AK-25 2DCi5E Distribution Auxiliary 731 LAS Cap > Dem 36 3B Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report Systems Pane1212Y K59X1 /

AC/DC DG 2A Neutral Diesel 363 2

2DGK059 Auxiliary Relay Power Support Ground Auxiliary GE 12HFA151A2H 2DG03J Control Panel Generator 710'-6" EPRI HF Test Cap> Dem X

Relay Building Systems Page 87 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE*

PAID SHEET UNIT NOTE 2821-F013C M1 16 1 2

SRV 21321-17013D M116 1

2 SRV 21321-17013E M116 1

2 SRV 21321-17013F M116 1

2 SRV 2821-F013H M116 1

2 SRV 2821-F013 K M1 16 1 2

SRV 2821-F013L M116 1

2 SRV 21321-F013M M1 16 1 2

SRV 2821-F013P M116 1

2 SRV 2821-F013R M116 1

2 SRV 2821-F013S M116 1

2 SRV 21321-170M M116 1

2 SRV 2821-F013V M1 16 1 2

SRV 2821-F022C M116 2

2 MSIV Inboard 2821-F028C M116 2

2 MSIV Outboard 2821-F022D M116 2

2 MSIV Inboard 2821-F028D M116 2

2 MSIV Outboard 21321-F022A M116 2

2 MSIV Inboard Page 88 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE*

MID SHEET UNIT NOTE 21321-F028A M116 2

2 MSIV Outboard 21321-F022B M116 2

2 MSIV Inboard 2821-F028B M116 2

2 MSIV Outboard 21321-F011 B M118 1

2 21321-F01013 M118 1

2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2621-F011 A M1 18 1 2

2821-F010A M1 18 1 2

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 21333-F067A M139 1

2 2833-F060A M139 1

2 21333-F023A M139 1

2 2833-F067B M139 2

2 21333-F06013 M139 2

2 2B33-F023B M139 2

2 2E21-F005 M140 1

2 Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E21-F006 M140 1

2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E22-F005 M141 1

2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E22-F004 M141 1

2 Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-F017A M142 1

2 Page 89 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE*

PAID SHEET UNIT NOTE 2E12-F016A M142 1

2 2E12-F041A M142 1

2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-F042A M142 1

2 Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-17050A M142 1

2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-F053A M142 1

2 Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-F017B M142 2

2 2E12-F016B M142 2

2 2E12-FO41 B M142 2

2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-F042B M142 2

2 Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-F050B M142 2

2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-F053B M142 2

2 Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-F009 M142 3

2 2E12-F008 M142 3

2 2E12-F041C M142 3

2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-FO42C M142 3

2 Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2G33-F101 M143 1

2 Page 90 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE*

P&ID SHEET UNIT NOTE 2G33-F001 M143 1

2 2G33-F102 M143 1

2 2E51-F063 M147 1

2 2E51-F008 M147 1

2 21321-F016 M-116 7

2 21321-F019 M-116 7

2 2821-F067C M-116 7

2 21321-F0671D M-116 7

2 21321-F067A M-116 7

2 2821-F067B M-116 7

2

• Note that the evaluation of these valves and Unit 1 valves are discussed in Section 2.2 of this report as well as in report 15C0348-RPT-001(Ref. 18).

Page 91 of 91