NLS2015007, Supplemental Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic

Supplemental Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic

ML15035A067
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	01/22/2015
From:	Limpias O Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NLS2015007
Download: ML15035A067 (58)

Text

H Nebraska Public Power District Always there when you need us NLS2015007 January 22, 2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

Supplemental Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic Cooper Nuclear Station, Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46

References:

1. NRC Letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012

2. NPPD letter to NRC, Seismic Walkdown Report - Nebraska Public Power District's Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,) dated November 27, 2012 (NLS2012125)

Dear Sir or Madam:

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued Reference I to all power reactor licensees. Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 contains specific requested actions, requested information, and required responses associated with Recommendation 2.3 for seismic walkdowns. Reference 2 provided Nebraska Public Power District's (NPPD) seismic walkdown report for Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). In Reference 2, NPPD noted that some equipment was inaccessible for inspection during the initial seismic walkdowns. As a result, NPPD committed to perform walkdowns for the equipment that could not be inspected and provide an updated seismic walkdown report for CNS.

The enclosure to this letter provides the results for the seismic walkdowns of inaccessible equipment. This supplemental report has been formatted to provide a direct update by section to the original seismic walkdown report submitted by Reference 2. There were no issues identified to be a potentially adverse seismic condition during the supplemental seismic walkdowns.

There are no new commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions, please contact Jim Shaw, Licensing Manager, at (402) 825-2788.

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION P0. Box 98 / Brownville, NE 68321-0098 Telephone: (402) 825-3811 / Fax: (402) 825-5211 /7 www.nppd.com VL---

NLS2015007 Page 2 of 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed On 0_1_/__.____/__5 (Date)

Since el A. Limpias( 2 Vice President - Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer

/bk

Enclosure:

Cooper Nuclear Station Supplemental Seismic Walkdown Report cc: Regional Administrator w/enclosure USNRC - Region IV Director w/enclosure USNRC - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Cooper Project Manager w/enclosure USNRC - NRR Project Directorate IV-1 Senior Resident Inspector w/enclosure USNRC - CNS NPG Distribution w/enclosure CNS Records w/enclosure

NLS2015007 Enclosure Enclosure Cooper Nuclear Station Supplemental Seismic Walkdown Report

Engineering Report No. KR 2014-O2O Rev 0 Page - of 55 Engineering Report Cover Sheet Engineering Report

Title:

COOPER NUCLEAR STA-nON 50.54(f) SEC.ON 2.3 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Engineering Report Type:

New Revision Cacelled [ Superseded Superseded by, EC No. N/A Report Origin: [ CNS En Vendor Vendor Document No.: N/A Quality-Related: El Yes [ No Prepared by: Derek Helmick

• 4 **Date: IZ-149 Responsible E-ngine6 (Print NAe/Sign)

Design Verified: N/A Date:

Design Verifier ured)42nt Name/Sign)

Reviewedby: Peter Bregio U- . Date: 12__1 Reviewer (Print Namc/S*)

Approved by; _17 L?/ P6~L 112 Date: / /q Supervisor / Manager (Print Na-ne/Sign)

COPPER NUCLEAR STATION 50.54(f) SECTION 2.3 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Engineering Report ER 2014-020 2 of 55

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 P UR P O S E ................................................................................................... . . . .. 5 2 B A C K G RO UND .................................................................................................. .6 3 SEISM IC LIC ENSING BASIS ............................................................................. 7 4 PERSO NNEL Q UALIFICATIO N ........................................................................ 8 4 .1 O ve rv ie w ................................................................................................... .. 8 4.2 Walkdown & Peer Review Personnel ......................................................... 8 5 S E LEC T IO N O F S SC s ..................................................................................... 10 5 .1 Ove rv ie w ................................................................................................. . . 10 5.2 Selection of Alternate Com ponents ........................................................... 10 6 S EISM IC W A LKD O W NS ................................................................................... 11 6 .1 Ove rv iew ................................................................................................. . . 11 6.2 Seism ic W alkdow ns ................................................................................. 11 7 LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS .................................................................. 13 8 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES RESOLUTION REPORT ........................................ 14 9 P E E R R E VIE W ............................................................................................... .. 15 9.1 Peer R eview Introduction ........................................................................... 15 9.2 Review of Supplemental Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) .............. 15 9.3 Review of Supplemental Licensing Basis Evaluations and Findings ...... 15 9.4 Peer Review of CNS Engineering Report and Sign-off .............................. 15 10 R E F E R E NC E S ................................................................................................ .. 16 Note:

The format of this ER has been modified from the general standard outlined in CNS procedure 3-EN-DC-147, Attachment 9.2 to reflect the same sectional format as presented in the original CNS 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report [Ref. 10.3]

ATTACHMENT A - Personnel Qualifications of the Seismic Walkdown Engineers ATTACHMENT B - Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs)

ATTACHMENT C - Condition Report Disposition Matrix ATTACHMENT D - PEER REVIEW Comment / Disposition Matrix and Sign-off ATTACHMENT E - Personnel Qualifications of the Peer Review Team Engineering Report ER 2014-020 3 of 55

Revision Summary Rev. No. Date Description/Reason for Change 0 Original Issue.

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I PURPOSE The purpose of this Engineering Report is to document the additional follow-up Seismic Walkdowns at Copper Nuclear Station (CNS) performed during the RE28 Refueling Outage. This supplemental report documents completion of the three equipment items inspected during RE28 due to plant conditions requiring these components to remain energized previous to the start of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown effort. All Seismic Walk-bys were completed during the original walkdowns and are documented in the previously submitted CNS 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report [Ref. 10.3].

This Supplemental Report has been formatted to provide a direct update by Section to the original submitted CNS 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report [Ref. 10.3].

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 5 of 55

2 BACKGROUND In response to the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 Seismic and Reference 10.1, seismic walkdowns were performed at CNS in accordance with the guidance provided in EPRI Technical Report 1025286 [Ref. 10.2]. Results of the walkdowns are documented in the original Seismic 2.3 Walkdown Report [Ref.10.3]. The walkdown team was unable to inspect some equipment at that time due to the plant configuration (risk window(s) and accessibility by unit buss outage(s)).

The following three items were originally identified and deferred for completion during the RE28 outage.

• SWEL Item #11 - EE-SWGR-480F

• SWEL Item #12- EE-SWGR-4160G

• SWEL Item #66 - EE-PNL-CDP1B CNS was unable to perform walkdown inspections on 4160 Switchgear G, 480 Switchgear F, and Critical Distribution Panel 1 B (CDP1 B) due to plant conditions requiring these components to remain energized. These components cannot be de-energized with the plant in operation, and must be done during a unit outage. CNS performs buss outages for inspections on a rotational basis, and during RE27 (previous outage) no critical busses were scheduled for removal from service for inspection. Critical Buss G was scheduled for inspection during RE28 and therefore identified for equipment walkdown accessibility.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 6 of 55

3 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS The CNS Seismic Licensing Basis including; Design Response Spectra, Design Criteria for Class I Structures and Equipment, Piping and Applicable Codes is established and presented within the submitted Cooper Nuclear Station Seismic Walk Down Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic [Ref. 10.3].

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 7 of 55

4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION 4.1 Overview This section of the report identifies the personnel that participated in the supplemental inspections for the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdown effort. Note that for this report, the only roles required were for the walkdown team, licensing basis reviewer, and peer reviewer.

4.2 Walkdown & Peer Review Personnel Table 4-1 summarizes the names and corresponding roles of personnel who participated in the NTTF 2.3 Supplemental Seismic Walkdown effort.

Name Seismic Walkdown Licensing Basis Peer Name Engineer Engineer Reviewer Reviewer Peter Breglio X X Matthew Nienaber X X Michael Pettini(Team Leader) X Evan Silberquit X Table 4-1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS The following is a short synopsis of each individual's qualifications:

Peter Breqilio, P.E.(SWE)

Mr. Breglio has over 30 years of experience encompassing the design, analysis, evaluation and modification of various nuclear power plant systems including program assessments.

Mr. Breglio has a graduate degree (MS) in Mechanical Engineering from Rennselaer Polytechnic Institute and holds professional licensure in various states. Mr. Breglio attended the original SQUG qualification training and has completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown training course.

Matthew Nienaber (SWE)

Mr. Nienaber is an engineer in the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Design Engineering Department (DED), working in the civil structural group. Mr. Nienaber has a BS in Civil Engineering from the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, and has completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown training course.

The seismic walkdown training certificates and resumes for these individuals are provided in Attachment A of this report.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 8 of 55

PEER REVIEW TEAM The following is a short synopsis of each individual's qualifications:

Michael Pettini, P.E. (Peer Review Team Leader)

Mr. Pettini is a Professional Engineer with over 25 years of structural design experience and is a qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineer; trained to EPRI NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown requirements. Mr. Pettini has a degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Rhode Island and holds professional licensure in various states. He is a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) and American Concrete Institute (ACI).

Evan Siberquit (Peer Reviewer)

Mr. Silberquit has a BS in Civil Engineering from the University of Connecticut. He has been involved in both the structural assessment and design modification of various nuclear plant systems and in supporting the Fukushima NTTF recommendations at CNS. Mr.

Silberquit is a member of the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC).

Qualifications and resumes for the PEER Review Team members are provided in Attachment E of this report.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 9 of 55

5 SELECTION OF SSCS 5.1 Overview Section 5.0 of the Seismic Walkdown Report [Ref. 10.3] details the selection methodology utilized for this report and SWEL development.

5.2 Selection of Alternate Components As mentioned in Section 2 of this report, three items were originally identified and deferred for completion during the RE28 outage which included:

• SWEL Item #11 - EE-SWGR-480F

• SWEL Item #12- EE-SWGR-4160G

• SWEL Item #66- EE-PNL-CDP1B Due to the rotational buss outages, original SWEL Item #11, EE-SWGR-480F was not able to be inspected during the RE28 outage as Critical Buss F was not scheduled to be de-energized. Therefore, SWEL Item #11 was changed to EE-SWGR-480G, as documented in the original CNS Seismic 2.3 Walkdown Report. This allowed inspection of all of the deferred items during the RE28 refueling outage. This substitution was addressed by the project team during the preparation of Section 5.0 of Reference 10.3. Table 5-1 below provides an evaluation of the original component against the determined alternate component.

Original Evaluation Equipment SWEL 1 Alternate Basis for Class Component Component Change Critical Buss F Deemed acceptable based not scheduled to on EE-SWGR-480G having Item #11, EE- EE-SWGR- be de-energized. the same equipment Class 2 SWGR-480F 480G Critical Buss G and Safety Functions (1, 2, having a planned 3, 4, & 5) as the originally Buss outage selected item EE-SWGR-during RE28 480F.

Table 5-1 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 10 of 55

6 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS 6.1 Overview Seismic Walkdowns of three remaining plant components (discussed in Section 5) were conducted in October 2014 during the CNS RE28 refueling outage. The inspections were performed by a two-person team of trained Seismic Walkdown Engineers in accordance with the guidance provided in Reference 10.2.

6.2 Seismic Walkdowns The subject components identified for the seismic walkdowns are presented on the SWEL 1 in Attachment B of Reference 10.3. A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) established in accordance with Appendix C of Reference 10.2 was completed for each item on the SWEL.

In addition, photos are included with the SWCs to provide a visual record of the walkdowns.

The SWCs associated with the seismic walkdowns addressed by this report supplement are included as Attachment B. The equipment was internally inspected through access to cabinets with doors or panels that could readily be opened during normal maintenance activities.

6.2.1 Anchorage Design Configuration The items on the SWELs in Attachment B of Reference 10.3 were reviewed to identify those that included anchorage (i.e., items that were not line mounted equipment such as valves). A total of 56 items were identified with anchorage. Of those, 66% (37 items) were selected for confirmation that the as-installed equipment anchorage was consistent with plant documentation of the anchorage design. This is greater than the 50% required by the EPRI Guidance document [Ref. 10.2]. The selected items were indicated on the SWELs.

This report documents completion of the remaining 3 anchorage configuration design confirmations required by the SWC for these three components.

6.2.2 Issues Identified During Seismic Walkdowns A PASC (potentially adverse seismic condition) as addressed in Reference 10.2 is a condition in which a SSC cannot be shown to meet its seismic licensing basis. This condition may apply due to several criteria which include:

Anchorage - The evaluation for adverse anchorage conditions consisted of visual inspections of the anchorage and verification of anchorage configurations.

Based on the results of the visual inspections, the SWEs (Seismic Walkdown Engineer) judged whether the anchorage was potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed. Examples of documents used for verifying that the anchorage installation configurations were consistent with the plant documentation included design drawings, seismic qualification reports and IPEEE or USI A-46 program documentation.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 11 of 55

• Seismic Interaction - The evaluation for adverse seismic spatial interactions addressed the potential for physical contact between the SWEL items and other plant components or SSCs caused by relative motion between the two during an earthquake. The three types of seismic spatial interaction effects considered were proximity, failure and falling of SSCs, and flexibility of attached lines and cables.

• Other Conditions - The evaluation of other adverse seismic conditions addressed degraded conditions, and unusual mounting of heavy objects on cabinets not typically included by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). Additionally, electrical cabinets were opened and a visual inspection was performed, without breaking the plane of the cabinet, for loose or missing fasteners on component brackets, as well as electrical connections and/or relays that appeared to not be seated properly.

Any non-conforming items were entered into the CNS Corrective Action Program (CAP) for further evaluation and disposition. A total of four (4) Condition Reports were created as a result of the Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns. The issues identified were related to SWEL Item #11 - EE-SWGR-480 1G and SWEL Item

1. 12 - EE-SWGR-4160G. All issues are documented and summarized in the Attachment C, Condition Report Disposition Matrix of this report.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 12 of 55

7 LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS There were no issues identified during the supplemental seismic walkdowns determined to be a "Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition" and potentially challenging the current CNS licensing basis.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 13 of 55

8 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES RESOLUTION REPORT Appendix H of the NRC endorsed Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document [Ref. 10.2]

requires a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce plant-specific vulnerabilities identified by the IPEEE program [Ref. 10.5]. Based on the CNS IPEEE program submittal to the NRC one (1) of the six (6) items identified as a vulnerability (seismically weak equipment) was the 4160V Critical Switchgear 1G, EE-SWGR-4160G SWEL Item #12, (1 of the 3 components included in the supplemental walkdown).

All of the vulnerabilities (seismically weak item(s)) related to EE-SWGR-4160G, were addressed and resolved by the USI A-46 (GL 87-02) [Ref. 10.5] program. This information has all been confirmed and contained in NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) dated April 27, 2001

[Ref. 10.6], Subject "Cooper Nuclear Station - Review of Individual Plant Examination of External Events (TAC No. 83611)". The NRC staff contracted with Brookhaven National Laboratory to perform a screening review of the CNS IPEEE submittal for "completeness and reasonableness". Based on the NRC SE [Ref. 10.6], which stated that "On the basis that no vulnerabilities associated with the external events aspects of these issues were identified at the CNS, the NRC staff considers these issues resolved for the CNS."

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 14 of 55

9 PEER REVIEW 9.1 Peer Review Introduction The Peer Review Team was made up of two (2) engineers from an independent contractor (NPE Consultants, LLC) with various backgrounds and expertise in; seismic, licensing/regulatory, and systems dsign and analysis. The peer review was performed in accordance with Reference 10.2. The scope of the Peer Review was limited to the following activities, as the SWEL development process has already been peer reviewed by the original peer review team:

• Review of all the SWCs completed for the Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns

• Review of the final submittal Supplemental Report

• Development of a summary of the peer review process provided in this engineering report 9.2 Review of Supplemental Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) 9.2.1 Supplemental Walkdown Review and Review of Checklists The peer review team performed a review of all SWC's completed by the SWE walkdown team. The Peer Review Team concludes that the Supplemental SWEs were qualified to perform the walkdowns and that the walkdowns were performed in accordance with the EPRI guidance. There was sufficient walkdown documentation detail provided to conclude that an adequate review of the subject equipment appears to have been completed.

9.3 Review of Supplemental Licensing Basis Evaluations and Findings Several CRs (Condition Reports) were generated as a result of the Supplemental Walkdowns, which identified potential; insufficient anchorages, damage due to proximity of sub-components within cabinets during seismic events, and plant documentation inconsistencies. These issues have been addressed by proposed resolutions which deal with each type of as-found condition through various CAs (Corrective Actions) documented in Attachment C of this report.

9.4 Peer Review of CNS Engineering Report and Sign-off See Attachment D.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 15 of 55

10 REFERENCES 10.1 Eric J. Leeds and Michael R. Johnson letter to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012.

10.2 EPRI Technical Report 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," dated June 2012.

10.3 Zachry Nuclear, Inc., Engineering Evaluation 12-E18, Rev. 0, Cooper Nuclear Station Seismic Walk Down Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic.

10.4 NPPD / CNS Procedure 0-EN-L-1i 02, Rev. 20C7, "Corrective Action Process" 10.5 James G. Partlow letter to Licensees Holding Operating Licenses and Construction Permits for Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10CFR50.54(f)

(Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4)," dated June 28,1991.

10.6 Mohan C. Thadani letter to J. H. Swailes, "Cooper Nuclear Station - Review of Individual Plant Examination of External Events (TAC No. 83611)," dated April 27, 2001.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 16 of 55

ATTACHMENT A Personnel Qualifications of Seismic Walkdown Engineers and Peer Review Team Engineering Report ER 2014-020 17 of 55

SQUG j

CertificateofAchiievement This is to Certify that Matthew Nienaber has Completedthe SQUJG Wafkdown Screening andSeismic Evaluation Training Course 6SQUýý June 11-15, 2012 Glen Allen, Virý inia Paul D. Baughman..ARES Corporation Divakar Bhargava, Dominion Generation SQUG Instructor SQUG Chairman

'-ngineering -eport r-K euq-uzu 18 of 55

Cooper Nuclear Station, PO BOX 98, Brownville, NE 68321 e402-825-5639embniena@nppd.com Matthew Nienaber Professional Summary Matthew Nienaber has been employed in the Nuclear Industry since January of 2012. His skills and specialties include, but are not limited to, the design and analysis of structural members, seismic design and analysis of structural members, overseeing projects relating to analysis, creating and overseeing rigging plans, and licensing basis evaluations.

Matthew has attended (June 2012) the SQUG 5 day walkdown training course and is fully up to date with regards to the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance as it relates to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Section 2.3.

Experience Jan. 2012 to Present Nebraska Public Power District - Cooper Brownville, NE Nuclear Station Design Engineer

• Project Management

• Seismic Design and Analysis

• Structural Inspections and Deficiency Evaluation May 2009 to June 2012 University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, NE Research Assistant

• Lab Management

• Experimental Design

• Experimental Testing May 2008 to May 2009 Chief Buildings Grand Island, NE Structural Engineer Intern

• Building Design

• Upgrade Design Tools to Latest AISC / AISI Code

• Building Retrofit Design

• Research and Development Testing of New Components May 2007 to Aug. 2007 Olsson Associates Grand Island, NE Civil Engineering Intern

• Roadway/Pavement Design

• AutoCAD Drawing Education May 2004 to Dec. 2011 University of Nebraska Lincoln Lincoln, NE BS in Civil Engineering m Structural Emphasis

+ 21 Additional Hours of Masters Classes in Engineering Mechanics Engineering Report ER 2014-020 19 of 55

H

.Nebraska Public Power District U2WcdU."

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",\ uA Certificateof Completion Peter M. Breglio Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns September 19, 2014 Date Mitchell M. Marotz DED Project Engineer NPPD/Cooper Nuclear Station Engineering Report ER 2014-020 20 of 55

== --- RESUME of PETER BREGLIO Peter M. Breglio, P.E.

Principal EDUCATION Masters of Science Mechanical Engineering (MSME) Rennselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)

Bachelor of Science Mechanical Engineering (BSME) University of Hartford PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION Professional Engineer: Connecticut, Nebraska, New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Mexico and Wisconsin Records on file with National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (NCEES)

QUALIFICATIONS

SUMMARY

Mr. Breglio has over 30 years of experience encompassing the design, analysis, and evaluation of various power plant, industrial process and facilities systems. Mr. Breglio has been responsible for both management and direct technical involvement of projects which have included providing engineering services in the areas of systems design & analysis, technical calculations, evaluations, and initial feasibility assessments.

DISTINGUISHING QUALIFICATIONS

> Design, analysis, evaluation and modification of various power plant and industrial systems including technical assessments

> Design and analysis of power & process piping systems used for the transfer of various fluids and gases, in accordance with ASME, ANSI, ASTM, and API codes and standards.

> Development of technical design and performance specifications for the procurement of sub-vendor supplied components including pumps, valves, pressure retaining devices, etc.

> Development of computer modeling codes and related hydraulic pressure drop calculations for various plant liquid fluid and gaseous systems

> Development of engineering evaluations for assessment and assurance that various nuclear electric generating system modifications meet the requirements as intended by the Federal Code of Regulation 10CFR Part5O

> Development of various nuclear plant design modifications including; 10CFR 5o.59 evaluations/screens, plant specific system and programs reviews, design basis review and reconstitution, design input record development, plant procedural reviews, other site specific procedural considerations, etc.

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), member grade American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), member grade Northeast Professional Engineering Consultants, LLC Page 1 of 6 108 New Park Avenue, Unit 3, Franklin, CT 06254 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 21 of 55

RESUME of PETER BREGLIO CURRENT AND RECENTLY COMPLETED PROJECTS

> Development of a Facility Modification for NPPD's Cooper Nuclear Station in response to the Fukushima Daiichi event and NRC Letter 50.54(0, resulting in the design and construction of two new building enclosures to house FLEX (Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies) equipment used in the event of loss of offsite power (ELAP). The design was developed in accordance with the guidance provided in NEI 12-06 "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide".

> Development of a 30% Change Evaluation Document (CED) for NPPD's Cooper Nuclear Station addressing installation of a new FLEX Makeup Water Well to provide an alternate clean raw water source for use in Phase II Mitigation Activities in response to ELAP event.

> Condenser Re-Tub Project for Entergy's J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Generating Station including various rigging, staging/scaffolding, temporary condenser spray water re-circulation system design.

> Development of a Change Evaluation Document (CED) for NPPD's Cooper Nuclear Station addressing modification to the stations Fire-Pump House to increase its level of protection from external flooding events.

>' Complete redevelopment of NPPD's Cooper Nuclear Station Calculation NEDC 11-072 for the analysis of Diesel Generator Starting Air (DGSA) Air Receiver sizing basis. The calculation evaluated the air receiver sizing basis with regard to available starting air capabilities at minimum initial pressure and single receiver operation. The calculation utilized a Microsoft ExceITM spreadsheet computer model developed and baselined using data obtained by the execution of Special Procedure SP12-003 performed on 11/19/2012.

> Recently supported NPPD's Cooper Nuclear Station with response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3, Flooding, Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident. These activities included:

• Development of a Flooding Walkdown Scoping Report which quantified the criteria and scope (number of penetrations, barriers, functional requirements, etc.) required for estimating the amount of manpower effort associated with the walkdown activities and evaluations.

• Preparation of Walkdown Packages which included development of Walkdown Packages specific to various areas of the plant considering; building area and elevation, accessibility during plant operation, radiological conditions, procedure or barrier/feature, active versus passive, and permanent versus temporary.

• . Inspection of Flood Protection and Mitigation Features including; performing inspections in accordance with the NEI 12-07 Guidance Document Development of the Final Walkdown Report in strict conformance with NEI 12-07, Rev. O-A, Appendix D

> Development of a major revision to the radiological analyses for the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) for transition to a 24 month fuel cycle using AST methodology in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 for NPPD's Cooper Nuclear Station.

Northeast Professional Engineering Consultants, LLC Page 2 of 6 108 New Park Avenue, Unit 3. Franklin. CT 06254 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 22 of 55

RESUME of PETER BREGLIO

> Development of a major revision to the radiological analyses for the Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA) for transition to a 24 month fuel cycle for NPPD's Cooper Nuclear Station.

> Development of an Engineering Evaluation (EA) to raise the current reactor coolant inlet temperature (Tcold) based on the installation of replacement steam generator units for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Generating Station. The analysis included the identification and review of all affected plant documents associated with proposed change to verify their current design basis and acceptability to the proposed increased operating limit. Development of the EA included; review of licensing documents and communication, design documents, operations documents/procedures and administrative procedures and controls documents. Several thermal and radiological analyses using first principles were also performed and included as part of the EA.

> Development of a Boron Dilution calculation which analyzes the rate of dilution of the Fort Calhoun Station Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) based on various postulated events including failure of water storage tanks, flooding, fire suppression systems, various plant operations procedures, etc.

SELECTED PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Nuclear Programs Mr. Breglio has been responsible for both management and technical development of various nuclear program assessment efforts which have included providing services in the areas of USI A-46 Response, GL 89-10, MOV/AOVs Operability, GL 89-13 and Plant System Reliability Programs. Mr. Breglio has been formally trained on the original SQUG (Seismic Qualification Utility Group) methodology in supporting utilities in response to USI A-46. This methodology was based on the rules and methods as presented in the GIP (Generic Implementation Procedure) for the original 20 SQUG equipment classes.

Mr. Breglio served as the Vice-Chairman and was instrumental in the development of the recently published EPRI "HVAC Testing, Adjusting, and Balancing Guideline 1003092". He has been heavily involved in the analysis of various HVAC related issues associated with the nuclear power industry including; Station Black Out (SBO) loss of ventilation evaluations and plant area heat removal capability as a function of Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) temperature changes.

Nuclear Plant Power Uprate Projects Mr. Breglio has been involved in the analysis, design, and implementation support of various power uprate projects for both PWR and BWR nuclear power generating stations including the following:

Mr. Breglio supported an assessment of the Margin Uncertainty Recapture (MUR) Power Uprate License Amendment Request (LAR) for Entergy Nuclear's Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant. Mr.

Breglio provided additional input to Palisades regarding various elements that should be included in the subject LAR based on industry experience gained through previous submittal applications.

Mr. Breglio supported American Electric Power Company's D.C. Cook Unit 1 & 2 Nuclear Generating Stations in development of the Margin Uncertainty Recapture (MUR) power uprate license amendment study/submittal and feasibility analysis of extended power uprate for both units. Mr.

Breglio's responsibilities included review and analysis of various BOP and NSSS interface systems for power level (MWth) increases of between 1.7% to 12%. For the MUR project Mr. Breglio was instrumental in developing an analysis and review summary document which satisfies the key attributes and sections as required by Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) document 2002-03.

Northeast Professional Engineering Consultants, LLC Page 3 of 6 108 New Park Avenue, Unit 3, Franklin, CT 062.54 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 23 of 55

RESUME of PETER BREGLIO Previously, Mr. Breglio supported the analysis and implementation of a "Stretch" power uprate for Entergy Nuclear's James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Generating Plant and is intimately familiar with the GE BWR/4, Mark I Reactor designs. Mr. Breglio was also directly responsible for the development of a modification package implementing the 4.1% (MWth) increase in the licensed power level for JAF. Specific tasks supported by Mr. Breglio included the development of a nuclear safety evaluation summary document, FSAR mark-ups, recommended Tech. Spec. changes, calculation and vendor drawing reviews, and radiological and environmental effects summary descriptions.

Plant Systems Analysis Mr. Breglio has been involved in the analysis of various plant systems and components for both PWR and BWR nuclear power generating stations. While employed at Proto-Power Corporation, Mr.

Breglio was manager of the System Analysis Group which was directly responsible for the development and application of the Proto-FloTNI software. Several of the major analysis projects Mr.

Breglio both managed and/or technically supported included the following:

> Evaluation of American Electric Power's D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 boiler feed water pump, condensate pump and condensate booster pump's hydraulic capabilities to meet proposed power uprate operating conditions.

> Re-evaluation of First Energy Nuclear Operating Companies' Davis-Besse Generating Station's Essential and Non-Essential Service Water Systems in support of plant re-start. This analysis included development of pressure loss calculations using Proto-FloTM software to determine current baseline and proposed off system design operating conditions.

> Evaluation of Northeast Utilities Millstone Unit 3 Control Room Ventilation System which included development of pressure loss calculations using Proto-HVACTm software to determine various air flow capacities based on system modifications and branch distribution changes in order to ensure adequate system flow margin.

' Evaluation of American Electric Power's D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 Containment Hydrogen Skimmer System and Ice Condenser Re-circulation System based on degraded flow concerns. This project included the formulation of an HVAC flow model using Proto-HVACTm software to determine various damper position changes necessary to re-establish an acceptable system flow capacity.

Generic Safety Issue GSI- 19 1 "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors" Mr. Breglio was involved in the evaluation and analysis of various aspects of the GSI-191 issue. His responsibilities have included the following:

> Development of various Design Input Reports for use in supporting analysis using the guidance provided in NEI 04-07.

>- Development of Debris Generation (DG) and Debris Transport (DT) analysis in accordance with NEI 04-07; including base scope debris generation, transport logic tree and headloss analysis.

>' Development of Debris Headloss (DH) analysis in accordance with NEI 04-07 and Regulatory Guide 1.82. Preliminary Strainer Feasibility Studies and the integration of Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) were also utilized as part of this analysis.

Mr. Breglio was involved in supporting various utilities including the STARS consortium, SCE&G, and PG&E while working within the Westinghouse, ENERCON, and ALION design and analysis team.

Plant Systems Design and Modification Projects Northeast Professional Engineering Consultants, LLC Page 4 of 6 108 New Park Avenue, Unit 3, Franklin, CT 06254 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 24 of 55

RESUME of PETER BREGLIO Mr. Breglio has been involved in the development of major design modifications for various nuclear power plants. He has been responsible for developing all the major components required by the nuclear design change process including the Design Basis/Design Input identification and review, Design Calculations, IOCFR 50.59 reviews/screens, and implementing design documents and drawings. Several of the major design projects both managed and technically supported by Mr.

Breglio include the following:

>, Implementation of CVCS Boric Acid Reduction Program for the Salem Unit 1 & 2 NGS. This modification supported all mechanical aspects for the design implementation including; addressing regulatory requirements within the loCFR 50.59 Evaluation, flow confirmation of CVCS capability, analysis of existing piping for higher flows, sizing of new control valve trim, and development of installation and testing procedures.

> Equipment performance and room heat-up evaluation of the diesel generating rooms at Salem Station following a fire and loss of HVAC. For this work, Mr. Breglio determined the design requirements and function of the HVAC system and performed transient room heat-up calculations considering temporary interruptions in the HVAC system. This work also required Mr. Breglio to assist PSEG personnel in accomplishing performance testing of the diesel generator room HVAC system and to correlate actual test data with analysis results.

> Replacement of the HPCI out board containment isolation valve for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This project included development of a valve technical procurement specification, valve torque/thriust re-analysis, HPCI Steam Supply line hydraulic analysis, and development of a nuclear change package and ioCFR 50.59 screen.

> Evaluation of the Control Room and Relay Room HVAC systems for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to ensure isolation of the Control Room and proper venting of C02 upon actuation of the Relay Room Fire Suppression Systems. This project also included quantification of in-leakage using both component and tracer gas methods to quantify and identify leakage paths for subsequent sealing.

)o Upgrade of the Air Cooled Condensing Units and Air Heating Units for the primary chemistry lab area at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Mr. Breglio was responsible for the engineering evaluation and design modification required to improve air distribution and cooling within the administrative and laboratory areas of the facility.

> Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase Implementation Project for the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) NGS - This project involved the formulation of a modification package that implemented all design analysis required to justify increasing the design basis maximum lake temperature value (Ultimate Heat Sink) from 82 oF to 85 oF.

Radiological Consequence Analysis Mr. Breglio has performed various radiological analyses for both BWR and PWR nuclear plant applications. The analysis was performed by the use of the RADTRAD computer code which is currently recognized by the NRC as the code of choice in performing Radiological Consequence Analysis. Projects included the following:

Initial AST feasibility analysis including DBA LOCA, MSLB, and FHA for FENOC's Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station

>" Development of the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) using AST methodology in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1. 183 for NPPD's Cooper Nuclear Station.

Design Review of the DBA LOCA using AST methodology in accordance with Regulatory Guide i.183 for NPPD's Cooper Nuclear Station.

Northeast Professional Engineering Consultants, LLC Page 5 of 6 108 New Park Avenue, Unit 3, Franklin, CT 06254 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 25 of 55

RESUME of PETER BREGLIO HVAC and Control Room Habitability Projects Mr. Breglio supported Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Cooper Nuclear Station, Ft. Calhoun Station, and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Generating Stations with the assessment/development of their Control Room Habitability Programs. Tasks have included; design bases documentation reviews, plant walk-downs to establish actual configuration and material condition of the affected HVAC systems, review of radiological dose assessment and accident analyses, development of a qualitative smoke assessment, development of a toxic gas analysis, integration of the tracer gas test vendor's procedure to meet specific plant procedural requirements for test execution, and development of a boundary control program.

TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

• "2007 ASHRAE HANDBOOK, HVAC Applications Chapter 58" author of various sections related to Chemical and Biological Incidents and as they relate to HVAC design.

0 "Fundamentals of Heating, Ventilation, & Air Conditioning" training course presentation provided to Dominion Generation's Millstone Nuclear Facility, December

18. 2002.

. "EPRI Testing, Adjusting, and Balancing Guideline", (developed various sections and appendixes) Final Report, October 2001.

. "Room Transient Temperature Analysis", presented NHUG Winter Meeting 2002, San Antonio, TX.

0 "ACFM vs. SCFM Measurement & Analysis Considerations", presented NHUG Winter Meeting 2001, Las Vegas, NV.

. "Simple Refrigerant Chiller Computer Model", Presented NHUG Winter Meeting 1998, New Orleans, La.

Northeast Professional Engineering Consultants, LLC Page 6 of 6 108 New Park Avenue, Unit 3, Franklin, CT 06254 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 26 of 55

ATTACHMENT B Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs)

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 27 of 55

Sheet I of 3 Status: YE N-] U--

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. EE-SWGR-480G Equip. Class, 2 Low Voltage Switchgear Equipment Description 480V Critical Switchgear IG (SWC# WD-SWEL-011 &AWC# WB-022)

Location: Bldg. Rx Floor El. 932 Room, Area R-932-G-SWGR Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) Westinghouse Electric Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YO NEl of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

Selected from originalSWEL list for anchorage

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YO NEI UiI N/AI-Anchorage verified per drwg. CNS-EE-158. Back anchorgeson transformer section are partically bent/angled (see attachedmarked-up drawing &photos)

Reference - CR-CNS-2014-06602

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YI NEI UI- N/AE]

oxidation?

No corrosion found.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YO NEI U[1 N/AE1 No cracks found or identified in slab

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YO NEI UE] N/AEl (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

PerDrwg. CNS-EE-158

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YN NEl U-potentially adverse seismic conditions?

No adverse condions found (referto Item 2 above)

IEnter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 28 of 55

Sheet 2 of 3 Status: YM ND U0-Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. EE-SWGR-480G Equip. Class' 2 Low Voltage Switch-gear Equipment Description 480V Critical Switchqear IG (SWC# WD-SWEL-011 &AWC# WB-022)

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YN ND U- N/AD Soft Targets (front switches &meters) are free from overhead objects falling. No overhead objects within pathway.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yo NDI UD N/AD]

and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

All overhead equipment appearsseismically mounted.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YZ NDI UD- N/AD Overhead conduit adequately supported by seismic hangers, etc.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YZ NEI U-of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes, no apparentadverse conditions from seismic interactionpotential.

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YL51 ND UDI adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Yes, no apparent adverse conditions.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Screw was found missing from EE-REL-CRDPB. Reference CR-CNS-2014-06603.

Evaluated by:. Date: 10/8/2014 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 29 of 55

Sheet 3 of 3 Status: YN N[-] UD--

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. EE-SWGR-480G Equip. Class' 2 Low Voltage Switch-gear Equipment Description 480V CriticalSwitchgear 1G (SWC# WD-SWEL-01 1 &AWC# WB-022)

INote: Fartially bent anchor (type -i) Note:

Note: Screw was found missing from EE-REL- Note:

CRDPB Engineering Report ER 2014-020 30 of 55

r 'D POOR WELDS

'CIL 2/a"E4"1IO" A .-.. I

. / ,SHIS S -f)G-cD P P---Dý5 B 11x17-12x18 PLAN 480 V. SWGR CRITICAL BUS "IG" CABINET FRAMF CABINET FRAME SHIM PLATE S I.

I

~~~

.a r

1W I I .

SEE DETAIL I *",,.--EMBEDDED (TYP) STEEL EMBWELD SECTION 'A-A' SECTION 'B-B' DETAIL I Manufacturer Westinghouse Location. Reactor Bldg. Critical Swgr. Room NOTES- Floor Elevation. 931'-6" I. MOST FRONT CABINET FILLET WELDS AS BUILT ARE OF POOR WELD QUALITY O TRANSITION SECTION BOLTED TO TRANSFORMER AND SWOR WITH 2 BOLTS D)I (MIN) PER SIDE. SECTION NOT ATTACHED I TO FLOOR.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 31 of 55

Sheet 1of 3 Status: YD NM U-]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. EE-SWGR-4160G Equip. Class' 3 Medium Voltage Switchgear Equipment Description 4160 Voltage Switchgear G (SWC# WD-SWEL-012 & AWC# WB-020)

Location: Bldg. Rx Floor El. 932 Room, Area R-932-G-SWGR (NE)

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) GE, Model MC4.76-250 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchoraye I. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YO NEI of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

Required as within 50% SWEL Equipment Item

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YZ NEI UI N/A[-U All anchorbolting/fastenersappeartight to floor enbedment plates.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YN NO Ur N/AO oxidation?

No corrosionapparenton anchors or frame

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YZ NEI UE- N/AO No cracks found. Bed plate continousdown concrete slab

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YZ NEI U- N/A-(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage consistent with drawing CNS-EE-156. Jog in the middle Bay not a part of the current drawing doc. error. CR-CNS-2014-06600

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YI NO UO potentially adverse seismic conditions?

No adverse conditions found.

' Enter the cquipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 32 of 55

Sheet 2 of 3 Status: YEI NE U-]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. EE-SWGR-4160G Equip. Class' 3 Medium Voltage Switch-gear Equipment Description 4160 Voltage Switch gear G (SWC# WD-SWEL-012 &AWC# WB-020)

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YEA NEI UL-I N/AZ Significant soft targets on top section of switchgear (i.e., meters, switches, indicators)have adequate separationfrom overhead lighting, lamps. All other overhead components seismically rigid.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YO N[-] Ur- N/AZ and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

All overhead systems, conduit. piping seismally mounted and appears adequate.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YO NE] Ur1 N/AL]

Attached conduit seismically supported and rigid.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YO NE'I Ul of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

No apparentinteractionpotential.

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YEr NO Ur-I adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Cabinets are bolted together Relay (EE-REL-86-1GB) drags on shelf Rubbing apparenton outside of housing. Reference CR-CNS-2014-06601.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Final bay on south side could not be accessed (still energized)

Evaluated by: Peter M. Breglio Matthew Nienaber Date: 1017/2014 frVI'lrV -1/

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 33 of 55

Sheet 3 of 3 Status: YE NO U[-]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. EE-SWGR-4160G Equip. Class, 3 Medium Voltage Switch-gear Equipment Description 4160 Voltage Switchaear G (SWC# WD-SWEL-012 &AWC# WB-020)

Photographs B) Note:

I iNore: uaomner bump-our (Jog) Note:

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 34 of 55

,4.5121P800i CD 0

qAA kfeý PLAN PLA DIR: 451213800 VER: AA REV: 00 SIZE: B 11x 17-12 x 18 4160 V. W"R CRITICAL BUS""ITATUS: 07/17/2013 Release NOTES" Manufacturer- General Electric 3/8"- 15/8' PLUG WELD Location. Reactor Bldg. Critical Swgr. Room PARTIAL 3/"x I / PLUG WELD DUE TO Floor Elevation. 931'-6" GROUT HOLE THE ANCHOR BOLTS IN CABINETS 4142,43,46,47, 49, AND 51 HAVE NO TORQUE TEST MARKINGS.

(D NO ANCMOR BOLTS OR *ELDS EXIST AT CENTER BOLT HOLES INSIDE EACH CABINET AS BUILT o_'

(.n

Sheet I of 3 Status: YZ NT- U-I Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. EE-PNL-CDPIB Equip. Class, 14 Distribution Panels Equipment Description CriticalDistribution Panel CDPIB (SWC# WD-SWEL-066 & AWC# WB-039)

Location: Bldg. C Floor El. 903 Room, Area RPS Room B Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) GE GO800 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage I. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YO NEl of tile 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

Identified for inspection.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YE NEI UEI N/AI-All hardwareappearsas original

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YM NEI UO N/AO oxidation?

No corrosion apparent

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YO NOI UO N/AO No cracks found

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YE NEI UO N/AO (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Very limited documentation available.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YO NE UI-potentially adverse seismic conditions?

No adverse conditions found Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 36 of 55

Sheet 2 of 3 Status: Y] NI-- U--

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment 1D No. EE-PNL-CDPIB Equip. Class' 14 DistributionPanels Equipment Description CriticalDistribution PanelCDPIB (SWC# WD-SWEL-066 &AWC# WB-039)

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YM NDi UE] N/AD-I Switch levers are not within plain of potential falling objects (i.e. broken light bulb lamps)

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YE NDI UED N/AD and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Lighting has adequate stand-off distance to not threaten subject equipment

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y[ NDl UD] N/AD Attached rigid conduit is adequately mounted to reinforced concrete wall.r

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YE NEI UDI of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

No adverse conditions found Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YIZ NDI UD-adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

No other seismic conditions found Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Evaluated by: Peter M. Breqlio Matthew Nienaber Date: 10/07/2014 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 37 of 55

Sheet 3 of 3 Status: Y[ NE] ULI Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. EE-PNL-CDPIB Equip. Class1 14 DistributionPanels Equipment Description CriticalDistributionPanel CDPIB (SWC# WD-SWEL-066 &AWC# WB-039)

Note:

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 38 of 55

ATTACHMENT C Condition Report Disposition Matrix Engineering ReDort ER 2014-020 39 of 55

ATTACHMENT C

.... * ... . w ... .... ......... .... ... ..........

CR-CNS-2014- WDI-12 N of Fuiwhim* NTTF. it wea noted that drawing CNS-EE-156 doev NIA N D-Trend Closed (10-18-14) 110431 not incorporate the longer length for cubicle 46. This is a WT 2014-0024-116- Plant drawings should reflect the plent condicons. Drawing wll be updated, 04600 documentat*lon error. Requirement not met Plant drawings should reflect the plant conditions.

This type of GE relay his extensive testing experience to levels as high as IOg's(without impact to During walkdowns In support of recommendation 2.3 for seismic surrounding objactts) per EPRI NP-7147-SL "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays" end the 8OURT8 of Fukuohima NTTF, several components inthe 0 critical database. However, the impact to the surface below the relay must be considered for the current switchgear were discovered to be in contact with the bottom of configuration. In order for reley chatter to occur on the switch, there must be deflection in the Contact.

the cabinet. EE-REL-86-108 was the primary component on For deflection to occur in this member, there must bea significant amount of additional horizontal force CR-CN 2 WDoNOTIF which this wee noted. Requirement not mat: To completely (beyond that expected with a horizontal SE load). The force must be horizontal based on the 2 D85014 WD12 NIA N D-CROAT Closed (10-18-14) 110N3792 exclude the possibility of relay chatter during e seismlc event, as configuration. The configuration in the field could potentially present an impact force in the vertical well as maintain the component in the as-quailfied configuration, direction (the surface is balow the switch). However,this will nottranslate to dditonal horizontal forces.

separation distance is maintained between components in Additonally, an inspection wee completed on em siolar model of relay. Itwas observed that the relay is cabinets that contain essential relays. In this case, contact very rugged. SSE forces with impact forces would not be expected to cause enough deflotion in the between the relay end the cabinet may induce banging and Contact to develop relay chatter. In conclusion, based on the mechanics of the relay and the direction chatter. of potential Impact force, no relay chatter is expected in this component. The component is acceptable as-is During walkidownsin support of recommendation 2.3 for seismic of Futushima NTTF, 3 of 4 boiOsthat anchor the 4000 critical switchigear are bent or askew. Tightoess wee not checked Requirement not met: Floor anchora like those in the 480 critical switchigleartransfor vertical tension forces end horizontal shear Although the condition has been evaluated to be acceptable by qualified individuals, CNS Calculafton forces into the floor. Anchor bont are installed perpendicular to NEDC 91-034 needs to be revised to document the current bent configuration of the anchors. Also.

3 RCN0R20RN11-13-14) NOTIF the floor as this provides the most robust connection to the floor revision of the applicable CNS drawings to reflect the current bent condition of the 480VAC G Critcal CRCN W(-I) 1NClosedWhile the subject anchorage is not ideal, floor connections are as SwitchgeoarTransformer anchors. Drawings:4074, 4092. 4221, CNS6E158 and OLVC02M3. These noted in drawing CNSEE158. While fut rigidity may not be actions are due for completion by 211112015.

achieved, the anchorage strength should be enough to provide basic seismic restraint. Per engineering judgment of walkdown engineers qualified per EPRI guldance. this condition is acceptable.

During weltidowns in support of recommendation 2.3 for seismic NOTIF of Fukushima NTTF, a restraining screwwee found missing from In the case of this component, as the component Is non-essential seismic qualification testing has not 4 CRCO31-EE-REL-CRDPB)TDR).

NRIA-2 W-Work Iteem0-8-4

-WokNIA Clse (101y14 and382 copnnsqlie 1 063825 Requirement yllmifa nnot r met:

etin relaysandother es*pacific n4CS0 been performed and three fasteners am adequate to maintain control of the component during a seismic WOCloe W 0-18-1) components qualified by seismic test ae tested event Also, SAP stFted that this component is In the "F SWGR" when hie located in"0. A document 11063689 configuration. Deviations between the installed and test hangs request has been generated to correct this error not c contiguration, such as number and size of fasteners, are enveloped by the original test configuration.

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 40 of 55

ATTACHMENT D PEER REVIEW Comment / Disposition Matrix Sign-off Engineering Report ER 2014-020 41 of 55

i"AN - a_ FORM NPE 2.6 MDWVA NPE Consultants. LLC COMMENT/RESOLUTION RECORD Rev. 0 REVIEWER COMMENT/RESOLUTION RECORD

[1] IDR Review [ ] V IDV Review [X ] , Technical Document: CALC REVIEWER REVIEWER PREPARER PREPARER ACCEPT NUMBER COMMENTS INIT/DATE RESPONSE INIT/DATE INIT/DATE 1 Walkdown qualifications for SWE Matt MDP Information added to Report DH Nienaber not found within attachment A 12/3/2014 t d o riz, 128t2014 2 SEWS for item EE-SWGR-480G states a Current CNS documentation Westinghouse XFRM, however ABB reflects new ABB XFRM installed (OLV-C-0293) MDP Replacement Transformer DH 12/3/2014 (Replaced after SEWS 12/8/2014 development in yr.1999 period) 3 ABB XFRM drawing shows 4-1" bolting A field walkdown verified that holes, however BR DWG 4245 shows /" the floor anchorage was anchor bolts. Additionally, the washer MDP actually /" bolts having a DH M show appears to be small, could possibly 12/3/2014 nomnalwasher diameter of 1- 2/8/2014 pull through during a seismic event. 15 / 32 nd inches which provides adequate capacity for the application.

4 Marked up drawings as mentioned under MDP DH SWC EE-SWGR-480G item #2 is not 12/3/2014 Information added to Report 12/8/2014 attached.

5 SWC EE-PNL-CDP1B states the GE Anchorage was deemed G0800 has limited information available, adequate by both SWE was anchorage evaluated? If not was CR MDP members based on visual DH generated to ensure adequate anchorage? 12/3/2014 inspection of CDP anchorage 12/8/2014 1z -/

and seismic adequacy inspection of all attached major conduits.

NPE FORM 2.6 REVIEWER CALC COMMENT/RESOLUTION RECORD REV. 0 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 42 of 55

En--_-- FORM NPE 2.6 NPE Consultants, LLC COMMENT/RESOLUTION RECORD Rev. 0 REVIEWER COMMENTIRESOLUTION RECORD

[ ] " IDR Review [ ] vI IDV Review X ] - Technical Document: CALC REVIEWER REVIEWER PREPARER PREPARER ACCEPT NUMBER COMMENTS INIT/DATE RESPONSE INIT/DATE INIT/DATE 6 SWEL item #11 within section 6.2.2 is U__j>

incorrectly identified as EE-SWGR-480F, EJS Information corrected in DH item should be identified as EE-SWGR- 12/4/2014 Report 12/8/2014 (i.Z ý2.x, 480G 7 EE-SWGR-4160G is incorrectly identified EJS Information corrected in DH &6'5 as 480V switchgear, item should be 12/4/2014 Report 12/8/2014 identified as 4160V switchgear 12/4/2014 Report_12/8/2014 1..i\

8 Check report for font type and size EJS Information corrected in DH differences, page numbering 12/4/2014 Report 12/8/2014 _0t9

_Z--0 NPE FORM 2.6 REVIEWER CALC COMMENT/RESOLUTION RECORD REV. 0 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 43 of 55

Based on the critera set forth in Section 6, "Peer Review' and Section 8, "Submittal Report" of the Guidance (Ref. 10.2), the Peer Review Team concludes that CNS has met the requirements regarding this Supplemental Report.

Reviewed by: '920-Date:

Reviewed by: Date: j2hj&-

Engineering Report ER 2014-020 44of 55

ATTACHMENT E Personnel Qualifications of Peer Review Team Engineering Report ER 2014-020 45 of 55

--. 2 1 ELECTRICPOWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE Certificate of Completion Michael Pettini Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3

- Plant Seismic Walkdowns July 27, 2012 /f, 0 .0 4400ýý Date Robert K. Kassawara EPRI Manager, Structural Reliability & Integrity 46 of 55 Engineering ER 2014-020 Report ER Engineering Report 2014-020 46 of 55

___ mRESUME of MICHAEL PETTINI Michael D. Pettini, P.E.

Principal EDUCATION Bachelor of Science Civil Engineering (BSCE) University of Rhode Island PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION Professional Engineer: Connecticut (PE# 17461), Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Vermont Records on file with National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (NCEES)

QUALIFICATIONS

SUMMARY

Mr. Pettini is an engineering professional with a broad background in civil/structural engineering and project management having experience in all phases from preliminary research to the detailed design of new and modified structures. Mr. Pettini is well versed in the design and analysis of heavy construction and complex structures for various design applications, having experience in the areas of; structural design &

analysis of steel & concrete structures utilizing the latest FEA and computer aided design software. Mr. Pettini has spent a significant amount of his career focused on performing seismic analysis of systems, structures and components within both the industrial and power generating industries. He has specialized experience in performing inspection and evaluation of concrete and steel structures subjected to catastrophic failures due to environmental conditions including wind damage, flooding and thermal shock. Mr. Pettini also has extensive experience in the design of hydraulic retaining walls, berms and barriers/structures in accordance with ASCE 7 and ASCE 24-05 (combination load calculations) to withstand the hydrodynamic and wind forces resulting from a storm event.

DISTINGUISHING QUALIFICATIONS Project management skills: Detail oriented, capable to assume full responsibility and leadership role when responding to emergent field problems, able to diplomatically interact with the customers support staff and various levels of management, received extensive training in root cause analysis, and has testified as an expert witness.

Structural Analysis & Design Skills: Comprehensive design background able to produce structural repair drawings as needed to facilitate structural repairs of damaged/deteriorated facilities ensuring the safe and reliable operation of distribution structures and equipment. Development of structural Northeast Professional Engineering Consultants, LLC Page 1 of 5 108 New Park Avenue, Unit 3, Franklin, CT 06254 Engineering Report ER 2014-020 47 of 55

RESUME of MICHAEL PETTINI evaluations/calculations using extensive knowledge and understanding of engineering standards and codes including ACI, AISC, ANSI, ASCE, IBC, IEEE, NESC and NUREG, utilizing the latest MathCAD, STAAD/Pro, & AutoCAD Software.

Construction Support Engineering: Structural design of complex fixtures &

temporary shielding support structures.

Lifting & Handling Engineering: Heavy Load Rigging, Single/Multi Crane lift layout design & arrangements, and technical guidance for maintenance & repair of overhead/mobile cranes.

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP American Society of Civil Engineers (Member Grade)

American Institute of Steel Construction (Member Grade)

American Concrete Institute (Member Grade)

SELECTED PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Nuclear Power Plant & DOE Projects Mr. Pettini has been involved in the analysis, design, and implementation of various projects for both PWR and BWR nuclear power generating stations including the following:

Mr. Pettini supported the following projects at Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS).

• License Renewal Buried Piping Excavation - Shoring Design: developed design documents (calculations and sketches) necessary to complete Excavation Permits that will allow an inspection of selected buried safety-related piping in support of the CNS License Renewal Project. The backfill is Class 1 (essential).

The classification of the backfill requires that supporting calculations and drawings be performed in accordance with an approved Appendix B Quality Program. In addition a portable missile shield was designed to protect the exposed safety-related piping during extreme environmental wind conditions (e.g., potential tornado generated missiles). Prepared S.SSAFE and 50.59 forms for the Special Procedure addressing missile protection.

" Fire Pump House Modification: developed a complete minor modification package to flood proof the Fire Pump House at CNS to a flood elevation of 907.0 feet MSL, the design scope included the following:

o Address the addition of engineered flood barriers at the Fire Pump House external doorways. The engineered flood barriers will be modular allowing for rapid deployment, allowing unimpeded egress/access to all exterior doors.

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RESUME of MICHAEL PETTINI o Complete a stand-alone calculation of the structural adequacy of the Fire Pump House to determine if it can resist the static load applied from the external flood waters up to the proposed flood barrier elevation.

o Develop modifications necessary to waterproof the Fire Pump House, maintaining the building's integrity. This included sealing electrical conduits which communicate to other structures (manholes, terminal boxes, etc.) which are prone to external flooding, adding valve(s) to isolate existing drain lines from external flood source(s), installation of backflow preventers, sealing masonry walls and concrete floor slabs, or any other opening or penetration that could provide a leakage path into the building.

NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Flooding: Provided the following Engineering Services to Support - NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)

Recommendation 2.3, Flooding, Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident.

o Phase 1: Developed a Flooding Walkdown Scoping Report which quantified the criteria and scope (number of penetrations, barriers, functional requirements, etc.) required for estimating the amount of manpower effort associated with the Phase II walkdown activities and evaluations.

o Phase II:

" Preparation of Walkdown Packages: Developed Walkdown Packages specific to various areas of the plant considering; building area and elevation, accessibility during plant operation, radiological conditions, procedure or barrier/feature, active versus passive, and permanent versus temporary.

" Inspection of Flood Protection and Mitigation Features:

performed inspections in accordance with the NEI 12-07 Guidance Document

" Development of Final Walkdown Report: Provided input into the development of the final Walkdown Report for inclusion in the NPPD response to NRC Letter, dated March 12, 2012, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1. The report will be developed in strict conformance with NEI 12-07, Rev. o-A, Appendix D Temporary Shielding Requests (TSR's): in support of Turbine Sky Shine Temporary Shielding projects at various locations within/or on the Reactor, Turbine & Water Treatment Buildings. Mr. Pettini was directly responsible for the structural design, seismic analysis, and structural evaluation of custom shielding structures along the walls and roofs of the I&C Shop, BRE#7, and BRE#9.

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RESUME of MICHAEL PETTINI Mr. Pettini supported the analysis and implementation of Core Flood Nozzle Overlay project for First Energy Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Station. Mr.

Pettini's tasks required seismic analysis and structural design of a custom scaffolding/shielding structure, installed through a temporarily penetration in the bio-shield containment wall. Due to restrictive access to the work area, the shielding structure assembly was a portable design, and erected in place.

) Mr. Pettini supported the Containment Building Discharge Ductwork Refurbishment project for Entergy Nuclear's Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC)

Unit 2 & S. Mr. Pettini was directly responsible for the structural design and seismic analysis of various temporary and permanent scaffolding/platforms, required to access ductwork attached to the exterior of containment structure.

This project also included the structural design of a temporary structure/missile barrier for the Fuel Storage Building roof, due to postulated falling debris.

Mr. Pettini supported the analysis of Reactor Vessel Shipping Container for DTE Energy Enrico Fermi I Nuclear Generating Station. Mr. Pettini was directly responsible for the structural analysis and design of the shipping containers lifting padeyes using FEA computer code STAAD/Pro in accordance with the design requirements of 49CFR Part 173 regulations.

Mr. Pettini supported the analysis of Definitive Investigation Facility (DIF) for Los Alamos National Lab (LANL). Mr. Pettini was directly responsible for the seismic analysis and structural engineering design of main effluent discharge stack for the DIF building including detailed seismic analysis of complete air distribution system

) Mr. Pettini supported the evaluation of F-Canyon Truckwell Modifications Project for Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Mr. Pettini was directly responsible for the structural evaluation of the proposed gantry crane rail end stops.

Antarctic Ice Drilling Design and Operations Mr. Pettini supported the analysis and design of WISSARD hot water drill system (HWDS) shipping containers. Tradition ISO containers were evaluated for concentrated loads from unique WISSARD drill equipment. Due to weight restrictions, iterative finite element analyses were required providing the most cost effective and efficient design.

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RESUME of MICHAEL PETTINI Industrial & Utility Projects Mr. Pettini provided technical support for the New York Power Authority (NYPA) St. Lawrence /FDR Power Project Plattsburgh Substation Storm Water Assessment Report. The report provided several drainage improvement recommendations in conjunction with station service upgrades at the St.

Lawrence/FDR Power Project Plattsburgh Substation.

Mr. Pettini supported the analysis and design of NYPA St. Lawrence /FDR Power Project Plattsburgh Substation Storm Water Drainage Improvements. Performed hydraulic analysis and developed site design improvements necessary to mitigate substation equipment/control house flooding.

Mr. Pettini supported the evaluation of Thames River Bridge Rehabilitation Project located in New London CT for National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). Mr. Pettini's tasks included structural evaluation of the proposed building structure for the following load conditions: environmental (wind), flood, and seismic.

Mr. Pettini supported the analysis and implementation of 50 in 5 Power Generation Project for Connecticut Municipal Electrical Energy Cooperative (CMEEC). Mr. Pettini assisted in the development of design packages for the installation of twenty 2.5mW diesel generators at eight municipal sites. The generators would be used by the Utility for peak shaving and island mode as necessary. Several sites were located in flood hazard zones requiring that the diesel generators be installed on elevated structures. Mr. Pettini's tasks included structural analysis and design of the proposed elevated support structure for the following load conditions: environmental (wind), flood, and seismic.

Mr. Pettini supported the analysis and implementation of West 59th Street Station Transformer Replacement Project for Con Edison of New York. Electrical equipment (transformers, switchgear, disconnect switches) for the Station's Package Boilers were being upgraded. This project required the removal of a 13.5 ton transformer and lowering it from an elevation of 59 feet down to grade by use of a monorail trolley system, and then the lifting and installation of an 18.5 ton replacement transformer along with associated switchgear/disconnect switches.

Mr. Pettini assisted in the structural design of an underhung crane or monorail located in the open floor space directly above the truck ramp. The underhung crane was supported by a steel frame/work platform, which in turn was temporarily attached to the existing building structure. The platform provided the electrical contractor and ConEdison Plant Maintenance personnel safe access and rigging points during removal and installation of all electrical equipment. In addition Mr. Pettini was responsible for the preparation of design documents which included: drawings, specifications, and supporting calculations for the construction of the new monorail, trolley system and associated steel support structures.

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RESUME of MICHAEL PETTINI Mr. Pettini supported the analysis and implementation of 1 th Street Tunnel/Brooklyn Shaft Elevator Base Support Frame Replacement Project for Con Edison of New York. ConEdison Tunnel Maintenance noted during an annual inspection that the existing industrial lift (elevator) base support frame had significant deterioration requiring immediate replacement. Tunnel Maintenance required that the lift remain in service during the repair/replacement. Mr. Pettini was tasked with:

Providing immediate engineering and design services to temporarily support the guide rails allowing the existing steel base framing to be removed, plus the engineering and design for the permanent base support repairs.

Preparation of the repair documents consisting of drawings, instructions, specifications and supporting calculations.

Mr. Pettini supported the analysis and implementation of One World Trade Center Slurry Wall & Building Foundation Project for Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ). In accordance with The Port Authority requirements Mr. Pettini prepared calculations, details plans, and specifications for fixtures and shoring used by the general contractor for the installation of the replacement slurry wall and new concrete footings within the post 9-11 main site re-development area.

- Mr. Pettini supported the assessment/evaluation of various Electric Substations for United Illuminating Holdings. United Illuminating (UI) selected NPE to audit the design adequacy of all (Qty 24) of UI Distribution Substations. Many of UI's substations were built in the 1960s and 1970s. Preliminary engineering analysis of a number of substations and rising fault current levels throughout the system triggering a need to audit the design adequacy of the entire UI Substations. Mr.

Pettini managed the structural engineering evaluation for the following areas:

• Short-circuit adequacy of certain equipment and bus structures

• Structural Frame and Bracing Analysis: Each substation's frame and bracing analysis was performed utilizing loads and load combinations determined in accordance with applicable industry standards, state and local codes and UI design standards.

Short Circuit/Fault Force Analysis: NPE performed a short circuit/fault force analysis of the various substation system components including; the rigid bus, insulators, cable terminators, supporting structures, and disconnect switches within the substation.

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RESUME of MICHAEL PETTINI Mr. Pettini supported the analysis and implementation of Structural Repairs to Pier 15 Project for U.S. Naval Submarine Base New London. Mr. Pettini structural engineering tasks required analysis and design for the following:

Replacement anchorages for the existing US Navy Floating Dry-dock "SHIPPINGPORT" ramp. The existing anchor bolts were damaged due to hydrodynamic lateral loads caused by tidal and wave action.

Personnel Access Brow: designed replacement aluminum personnel access brow from the Pier to the dry-dock ramp. Prepared the construction documents which consisted of drawings, instructions, specifications and supporting calculations.

ARDM Mooring Shoe: The existing mooring shoes & supports were severely deteriorated requiring replacement or refurbishment. Prepared the repair documents which consisted of drawings, instructions, specifications and supporting calculations.

Mr. Pettini supported the analysis and implementation of Pier 17 North Modifications for US Naval Submarine Base New London. The modification design provided a new submarine berth on the north side of Pier 17. Mr. Pettini structural engineering tasks required analysis and design for the following:

Jib Crane: designed new jib cranes for placement of shore power cables to the submarine. Prepared the construction documents which consisted of drawings, instructions, specifications and supporting calculations.

Fender Pile: designed new reinforced plastic fender pile for the SSN688 &

Seawolf Class submarines. Prepared the construction documents which consisted of drawings, instructions, specifications and supporting calculations.

Moorings: designed new moorings and foundations for the SSN688 & Seawolf Class submarines. Prepared the construction documents which consisted of drawings, instructions, specifications and supporting calculations.

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AN- -m __

Evan J. Silberquit, E.I.T.

Project Engineer EDUCATION Bachelor of Science Civil Engineering (BSCE) University of Connecticut PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION Engineer in Training (EIT): Successful completion of the Fundamentals of Engineering (FE) Examination QUALIFICATIONS

SUMMARY

Project Engineer responsible for assignments based in the civil, structural, mechanical, electrical, and nuclear industries. Experience with all aspects ofjob completion including: detailed estimation, initial concept development, technical analysis & design, client interaction, project management and production of project deliverables.

DISTINGUISHING QUALIFICATIONS

> Substantial experience with the development & review of design drawings and project deliverables encompassing multiple engineering disciplines.

> Experience in the design and analysis of steel, concrete, aluminum, and timber structures.

> Evaluation of structural design including the use of finite element analysis and aided by STAAD.Pro analysis software.

> Design and analysis of industrial piping systems.

> Application and understanding ofAISC, ASCE, ACI, AWC, IBC & NFPA codes and standards.

> Experience with both engineering and construction based project scheduling and estimation.

SELECTED PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Dry Dock Fire Protection System Acting as overall project manager, provided design services for a new 1800gpm fire protection system located at Electric Boat's submarine fabrication facility. The system would utilize a main header line and multiple branch lines terminating in individual hose stations satisfying the US Military Design Standards (MIL-STD-16,25D).

Primary responsibilities included bid estimation, conceptual design, flow requirement calculation, operational and environmental pipe stress analysis, and development of submittal drawings.

5kV Switchgear Replacement Performed engineering associated with the design of an elevated outdoor 5kV switchgear arrangement and associated support structure. Project difficulties included developing a design that maintained continuous functionality of existing equipment while constructing within the existing site footprint. Final design utilized a composite steel & concrete elevated platform subject to conservative equipment and environmental loading values.

Responsibilities included initial site inspection and client interaction, development of appropriate site specific design, associated structural design calculations, and development of design drawings and client deliverables.

2.5 MW Generator Installations Supported the installation of twenty 2.5MW generators as part of the Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative's '50 in 5" Power Generation Project. Provided engineering design services and construction phase site support. Responsible for design modifications, as built site condition documentation, and client interaction.

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ANA- mI SiW mmW lw NTTF Recommendation 2.s Flooding Provided engineering services for Cooper Nuclear Station in response to the NRC's 10CFR50.54(f), request for information, associated with the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3: Flood, resulting from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident. Primary project tasks involved identification of all avenues for flood water to enter the plant and possibly compromise the critical Structures, Systems or Components (SSC's) required for safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant, hands on inspection of each feature identified as such, and the development of any repairs associated with findings classified as deficient.

High Pressure Gas Piping Modification Provided engineering services for the modification and abandonment of multiple sections of high pressure natural gas piping for the Consolidated Edison Company of New York. These modifications were performed on transmission pressure, high pressure, and low pressure systems, all located at the Astoria Head House. Work completed included the design of structural pipe supports, pipe route modification, and valve replacement on an active 16" supply line. This piping route modification preceded the analysis and abandonment of approximately 200 vertical feet of suspended 26" supply piping. In addition, a supply line "valve tree" was provided with structural support/strengthening to prevent adverse effects firom adjacent piping modifications.

Condenser Tube Replacement Supported Williams Plant Services in performing a complete condenser tube replacement at the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Provided engineering and design services associated with the transportation and temporary storage of condenser tubes, utilizing a unique rack system comprised of traditional scaffold materials in order to limit outage duration. Interacted with Entergy engineering and management personnel throughout the development of storage rack system and technical calculation submittal. Provided document revisions, onsite support, and field modifications as required throughout project duration.

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