ML14288A363
| ML14288A363 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna |
| Issue date: | 05/28/2014 |
| From: | Operations Branch I |
| To: | Susquehanna |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14079A115 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC U01896 | |
| Download: ML14288A363 (43) | |
Text
ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Facility: SSES Units 1 and 2 Date of Exam:
08/22/14 (LOC26)
RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K
K K
K K
K A
A A
A G
1 2
3 4
5 6
1 2
3 4
Total A2 G*
Total
- 1.
1 4
3 4
3 3
3 20 3
4 7
Emergency 2
1 1
1 1
2 1
7 2
1 3
Plant Tier Evolutions Totals 5
4 5
4 5
4 27 5
5 10 1
3 3
2 3
3 2
2 2
2 2
2 26 2
3 5
- 2.
Plant 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
2 12 0
1 2
3 Systems Tier Totals 4
4 3
4 4
3 3
3 3
3 4
38 3
5 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge & Abilities 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 10 7
Categories 3
2 3
2 1
2 2
2 Note:
- 1.
Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each KIA category shall not be less than two).
- 2.
The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3.
Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to section D.1.b of ES-401, for guidance regarding elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.
- 4.
Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5.
Absent a plant specific priority, only those KAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6.
Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.
7.*
The generic (G) KIAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KIA's
- 8.
On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9.
For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, and enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals(#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to KIAs that are linked to 1 OCFR55.43
ES-401 2
Form ES-401-1 BWR Examination Outline Emer enc and Abnormal Plant Evolutions-Tier 1 Grou EAPE #I Name Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G
KIA Topic(s)
IR Q#
AA2.04-Ability to determine and interpret the following as they 600000 Plant Fire On-site I 8 X
apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: The 3.1 76 fire's extent of potential operational damage to plant equipment AA2.01 -Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to 700000 Generator Voltage and X
GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND 3.6 77 Electric Grid Disturbances ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES:
Operating point on the generator capability curve.
AA2.02-Ability to determine and/or 295005 Main Turbine Generator X
interpret the following as they apply to 2.7 78 Trip /3 MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP :
Turbine vibration 295030 Low Suppression Pool 2.4.41 - Emergency Procedures I Plan:
X Knowledge of the emergency action 4.6 79 Water Level/ 5 level thresholds and classifications.
295037 SCRAM Conditions 2.4.35 - Emergency Procedures I Plan:
Present and Reactor Power X
Knowledge of local auxiliary operator 4.0 80 Above APRM Downscale or tasks during emergency and the Unknown /1 resultant operational effects.
2.4.4-Emergency Procedures I Plan:
Ability to recognize abnormal 295021 Loss of Shutdown X
indications for system operating 4.7 81 Cooling /4 parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
295019 Partial or Total Loss of 2.1.19 - Conduct of Operations: Ability lnst. Air /8 X
to use plant computers to evaluate 3.8 82 system or component status.
EK1.01 -Knowledge of the operational 295028 High Drywell implications of the following concepts as X
they apply to HIGH DRYWELL 3.5 39 Temperature I 5 TEMPERATURE : Reactor water level measurement AK1.01 - Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as 700000 Generator Voltage and they apply to GENERA TOR VOLTAGE X
AND ELECTRIC GRID 3.3 40 Electric Grid Disturbances DISTURBANCES and the following:
Definition of terms: volts, watts, amps, VARs, power factor.
AK1.04 - Knowledge of the operational 295021 Loss of Shutdown X
implications of the following concepts as 3.6 41 Cooling /4 they apply to LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING : Natural circulation AK2.01 - Knowledge of the 600000 Plant Fire On-site I 8 X
interrelations between PLANT FIRE 2.6 42 ON SITE and the following: Sensors, detectors and valves AK2.02-Knowledge of the 295005 Main Turbine X
interrelations between MAIN TURBINE 2.9 43 Generator Trip I 3 GENERATOR TRIP and the following:
Feedwater temperature EK2.15 - Knowledge of the 295031 Reactor Low Water X
interrelations between REACTOR LOW 3.2 44 Level/2 WATER LEVEL and the following: A. C.
distribution: Plant-Specific AK3.03-Knowledge of the reasons for 295016 Control Room X
the following responses as they apply to 3.5 45 Abandonment I 7 CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT :
Disabling control room controls
ES-401 3
Form ES-401-1 BWR Examination Outline Emer enc and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier 1 Grou EAPE #I Name Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G
KJA Topic(s)
IR Q#
EK3.01 - Knowledge of the reasons for 295037 SCRAM Conditions the following responses as they apply to Present and Reactor Power X
SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND 4.1 46 Above APRM Downscale or REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM Unknown /1 DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN :
Recirculation pump trip/runback EK3.03 - Knowledge of the reasons for 295038 High Off-site Release X
the following responses as they apply to 3.7 47 Rate /9 HIGH OFF-SITE RELEASE RATE:
Control room ventilation isolation EA 1.03-Ability to operate and/or 295026 Suppression Pool High monitor the following as they apply to X
SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER 3.9 48 Water Temp. I 5 TEMPERATURE: Temperature monitoring AA 1.01 -Ability to operate and/or 295004 Partial or Total Loss of monitor the following as they apply to DC Pwr/6 X
PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF 3.3 49 D.C. POWER : D.C. electrical distribution systems AA 1.01 - Ability to operate and/or 295018 Partial or Total Loss of monitor the following as they apply to CCW/8 X
PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF 3.3 50 COMPONENT COOLING WATER :
Backup systems EA2.03-Ability to determine and/or 295030 Low Suppression Pool X
interpret the following as they apply to 3.9 51 Water Level/ 5 LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: Reactor pressure AA2.05-Ability to determine and/or 295001 Partial or Complete interpret the following as they apply to Loss of Forced Core Flow X
PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF 3.1 52 Circulation I 1 & 4 FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION
- Jet pump operability: Not-BWR-1 &2 EA2.06-Ability to determine and/or 295024 High Drywell Pressure X
interpret the following as they apply to 4.1 53
/5 HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE:
Suppression pool temperature 295023 Refueling Accidents I 8 X
2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases 3.3 54 for EOPs.
2.4.49-Emergency Procedures I Plan:
295003 Partial or Complete Ability to perform without reference to Loss of AC /6 X
procedures those actions that require 4.6 55 immediate operation of system components and controls.
2.4.9 - Emergency Procedures I Plan:
295019 Partial or Total Loss of Knowledge of low power I shutdown lnst. Air /8 X
implications in accident (e.g., loss of 3.8 56 coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.
EK1.03-Knowledge of the operational 295025 High Reactor Pressure X
implications of the following concepts as 3.9 57
/3 they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE : Decay heat generation AK3.06-Knowledge of the reasons for 295006 SCRAM I 1 X
the following responses as they apply to 3.2 58 SCRAM : Recirculation pump speed reduction: Plant-Specific KJA Category Totals:
4 3
4 3
3/3 3/4 Group Point Total:
I 20/7
ES-401 4
Form ES-401-1 BWR Examination Outline Emer enc and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier 1 Grou EAPE # I Name Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G
KIA Topic(s)
IR Q#
AA2.03-Ability to determine and/or 295020 Inadvertent Cont.
X interpret the following as they apply to 3.7 83 Isolation I 5 & 7 INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION : Reactor power 2.4.21 - Emergency Procedures I Plan:
Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety 295002 Loss of Main X
functions, such as reactivity control, core 4.6 84 Condenser Vac I 3 cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.
AA2.03 -Ability to determine and/or 295022 Loss of CRD Pumps /1 X
interpret the following as they apply to 3.2 85 LOSS OF CRD PUMPS : CRD mechanism temperatures AK1.04-Knowledge of the operational 295002 Loss of Main implications of the following concepts as Condenser Vacuum X
they apply to LOSS OF MAIN 3.0 59 CONDENSER VACUUM : Increased offgas flow.
AK2.14 - Knowledge of the 295017 High Off-site Release X
interrelations between HIGH OFF-SITE 4.0 60 Rate /9 RELEASE RATE and the following:
PCIS/NSSSS EK3.07 - Knowledge of the reasons for 500000 High CTMT Hydrogen the following responses as they apply to X
HIGH PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3.1 61 Conc. /5 HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIONS:
Operation of drywell vent AA 1.07 -Ability to operate and/or 295008 High Reactor Water X
monitor the following as they apply to 3.4 62 Level/2 HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL: Main turbine: Plant-Specific AA2.02-Ability to determine and/or 295022 Loss of CRD Pumps I X
interpret the following as they apply to 3.3 63 1
LOSS OF CRD PUMPS : CRD system status 295007 High Reactor Pressure X
2.4.6 - Emergency Procedures I Plan:
3.7 64
/3 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.
EA2.03-Ability to determine and/or 295029 High Suppression Pool X
interpret the following as they apply to 3.4 65 Water Level/ 5 HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL : Drywell/containment water level KIA Category Totals:
1 1
1 1
2/2 1/1 Group Point Total:
I 7/3
ES-401 5
Form ES-401-1 BWR Examination Outline Emer enc and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier 2 Grou System # I Name K
K K
K K
K A
A A
A G
KIA Topic(s)
IR Q#
1 2
3 4
5 6
1 2
3 4
A2.02 -Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the D.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION ; and (b) based 263000 DC Electrical X
on those predictions, use 2.9 86 Distribution procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Loss of ventilation during charging A2.01 -Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM ; and (b) based on 209001 LPCS X
those predictions, use procedures 3.4 87 to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Pump trips 262001 AC Electrical 2.1.32 - Conduct of Operations:
Distribution X
Ability to explain and apply all 4.0 88 system limits and precautions.
223002 PCIS/Nuclear Steam 2.2.40 - Equipment Control: Ability Supply Shutoff X
to apply technical specifications 4.7 89 for a system.
400000 Component Cooling X
2.1.20 -Ability to interpret and 4.6 90 Water execute procedure steps.
K1.02-Knowledge of the physical connections and/or 215004 Source Range cause-effect relationships X
between SOURCE RANGE 3.4 1
Monitor MONITOR (SRM) SYSTEM and the following: Reactor manual control K1.08-Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect 205000 Shutdown Cooling X
relationships between 3.9 2
SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE) and the following: LPCI K2.02 - Knowledge of electrical 212000 RPS X
power supplies to the following :
2.7 3
Analog trip system logic cabinets K2.01 - Knowledge of electrical 239002 SRVs X
power supplies to the following:
2.8 4
SRV solenoids K3.07-Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 259002 Reactor Water Level X
REACTOR WATER LEVEL 3.4 5
Control CONTROL SYSTEM will have on following: Reactor water level indication K3.01 - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 211000 SLC X
STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL 4.3 6
SYSTEM will have on following:
Ability to shutdown the reactor in certain conditions
ES-401 6
Form ES-401-1 BWR Examination Outline Emer enc and Abnormal Plant Evolutions Tier 2 Grou K
K K
K K
K A
A A
A G
KIA Topic(s)
IR Q#
System # I Name 1
2 3
4 5
6 1
2 3
4 K4.02 -Knowledge of D.C.
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION design feature(s) and/or interlocks 263000 DC Electrical X
which provide for the following:
3.1 7
Distribution Breaker interlocks, permissives, bypasses and cross ties: Plant-Specific K4.02 - Knowledge of AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM 218000 ADS X
design feature(s) and/or interlocks 3.8 8
which provide for the following:
Allows manual initiation of ADS logic K5.01 - Knowledge of the operational implications of the X
following concepts as they apply 2.6 9
2150031RM to INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR (IRM) SYSTEM :
Detector operation K5.02 -Knowledge of the operational implications of the X
following concepts as they apply 2.8 10 206000 HPCI to HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM : Turbine shaft sealino: BWR-2,3,4 K6.02 - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 262002 UPS (AC/DC)
X following will have on the 2.8 11 UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.) : D.C.
electrical power K6.04-Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the 217000 RCIC X
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION 3.5 12 COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC):
Condensate storage and transfer system A 1.01 -Ability to predict and I or 400000 Component Cooling monitor changes in parameters X
associated with operating the 2.8 13 Water CCWS controls including: CCW flow rate A 1.09 -Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the 203000 RHRILPCI: Injection X
RHRILPCI : INJECTION MODE 2.9 14 Mode (PLANT SPECIFIC) controls including: Component cooling water systems A2.05 -Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF ;
223002 PC IS/Nuclear Steam X
and (b) based on those 3.3 15 Supply Shutoff predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abn cond or ops. Nuclear boiler instrumentation failures
ES-401 7
Form ES-401-1 BWR Examination Outline Emer enc and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier 2 Grou System #I Name K
K K
K K
K A
A A
A G
KIA Topic(s)
IR Q#
1 2
3 4
5 6
1 2
3 4
A2.02-Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM ;
and (b) based on those 3.6 16 predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions : Upscale or downscale trips A3.04-Ability to monitor automatic operations of the EMERGENCY GENERATORS 264000 EDGs X
(DIESEUJET) including:
3.1 17 Operation of the governor control system on frequency and voltage control A3.02 - Ability to monitor 262001 AC Electrical X
automatic operations of the A. C.
3.2 18 Distribution ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION including: Automatic bus transfer A4.01 -Ability to manually 300000 Instrument Air X
operate and/or monitor in the 2.6 19 control room: Pressure qauqes A4.04 -Ability to manually 261000 SGTS X
operate and/or monitor in the 3.3 20 control room: Primary containment pressure 2.4.46-Emergency Procedures I 209001 LPCS X
Plan: Ability to verify that the 4.2 21 alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.
2.4.2 - Emergency Procedures I Plan: Knowledge of system set 217000 RCIC X
points, interlocks and automatic 4.5 22 actions associated with EOP entry conditions.
K2.02-Knowledge of electrical 206000 HPCI X
power supplies to the following:
2.8 23 System pumps: BWR-2,3,4 K5.02 - Knowledge of the 262001 AC Electrical operational implications of the Distribution X
following concepts as they apply 2.6 24 to A. C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION: Breaker control K1.01 - Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect 261000 SGTS X
relationships between STANDBY 3.4 25 GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM and the following: Reactor building ventilation svstem K4.01 - Knowledge of CCWS 400000 Component Cooling X
design feature(s) and or interlocks 3.4 26 Water which provide for the following:
Automatic start of standbv pump KIA Category Totals:
3 3
2 3
3 2
2 2/2 2
2 213 Group Point Total:
I 26/5
ES-401 8
Form ES-401-1 BWR Examination Outline Emer enc and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 2 Grou System #I Name K
K K
K K
K A
A A
A G
KIA Topic(s)
IR Q#
1 2
3 4
5 6
1 2
3 4
A2.11 -Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RHRILPCI: CONTAINMENT 226001 RHRILPCI:
SPRAY SYSTEM MODE ; and Containment Spray System X
(b) based on those predictions, 3.0 91 use procedures to correct, Mode control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Motor operated valve failures 2.4.34-Emergency Procedures I Plan: Knowledge of RO tasks 241000 Reactor/Turbine X
performed outside the main 4.1 92 Pressure Regulator control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.
234000 Fuel Handling 2.2.12 - Equipment Control:
X Knowledge of surveillance 4.1 93 Equipment procedures.
K1.05-Knowledge of the physical connections and/or 215002 RBM X
cause-effect relationships 3.0 27 between ROD BLOCK MONITOR SYSTEM and the following: Four rod display: BWR-3,4,5 K2.02-Knowledge of electrical 201001 CRD Hydraulic X
power supplies to the following:
3.6 28 Scram valve solenoids K3.15-Knowledge of the effect 239001 Main and Reheat that a loss or malfunction of the X
MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM 3.5 29 Steam SYSTEM will have on following:
Reactor water level control K4.03 - Knowledge of FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM design 286000 Fire Protection X
feature(s) and/or interlocks which 3.3 30 provide for the following:
Maintenance of fire header pressure K5.05 - Knowledge of the operational implications of the 201003 Control Rod and X
following concepts as they apply 3.0 31 Drive Mechanism to CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM : Reverse power effect K6.05 - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 204000 RWCU X
following will have on the 2.6 32 REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM : A. C. power A 1.01 -Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters 230000 RHRILPCI:
associated with operating the Torus/Pool Spray Mode X
RHRILPCI:
3.8 33 TORUS/SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY MODE controls including:
Suppression chamber pressure
ES-401 9
Form ES-401-1 BWR Examination Outline Emer enc and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 2 Grou System #I Name K
K K
K K
K A
A A
A G
KIA Topic(s)
IR Q#
1 2
3 4
5 6
1 2
3 4
A2.06 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RHRILPCI: CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM MODE ; and 226001 RHRILPCI: CTMT X
(b) based on those predictions, 2.8 34 Spray Mode use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: D.C.
electrical failures A3.01 -Ability to monitor 271000 Off-gas X
automatic operations of the 3.3 35 OFFGAS SYSTEM including:
Automatic system isolations A4.07 - Ability to manually 241 000 Reactor/Turbine X
operate and/or monitor in the 3.5 36 Pressure Regulator control room: Main stop/throttle valves (operation) 2.2.42-Equipment Control::
Ability to recognize system 201006 RWM X
parameters that are entry-level 3.9 37 conditions for Technical Specifications.
290002 Reactor Vessel 2.2.40- Equipment Control:
Internals X
Ability to apply technical 3.4 38 specifications for a system.
KIA Category Totals:
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1/1 1 1 212 Group Point Total:
I 12/3
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
Form ES-401-3 Facility: SSES Units 1 and 2 Date of Exam:
08/22/14 (LOC26)
RO SRO-Only Category KIA#
Topic IR Q#
IR Q#
2.1.34 Knowledge of primary and secondary plant 3.5 94 chemistry limits.
Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or 2.1.37 limitations associated with reactivity 4.3 66
- 1.
management.
Conduct Ability to interpret reference materials, such of Operations 2.1.25 as graphs, curves, tables, etc.
3.9 67 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of 4.1 75 major system components and controls.
Subtotal 3
1 2.2.23 Ability to track Technical Specification limiting 4.6 95 conditions for operations.
2.2.19 Knowledge of maintenance work order 3.4 98 requirements.
- 2.
2.2.39 Knowledge of less than one hour technical 3.9 68 Equipment specification action statements for systems.
Control Ability to determine the expected plant 2.2.15 configuration using design and configuration 3.9 69 control documentation, such as drawings, line-ups, tag-outs, etc.
Subtotal 2
2 Knowledge of radiation or containment 2.3.14 hazards that may arise during normal, 3.8 96 abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.
2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.
3.8 100 Knowledge of Radiological Safety
- 3.
Procedures pertaining to licensed operator Radiation 2.3.13 duties, such as response to radiation monitor 3.4 70 Control alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under 3.2 71 normal or emergency conditions.
2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases.
3.8 74 Subtotal 3
2 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing 2.4.23 emergency procedure implementation during 4.4 97 emergency operations.
2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all 4.0 99
- 4.
Emergency Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in Procedures I 2.4.47 an accurate and timely manner utilizing the 4.2 72 Plan appropriate control room reference material.
Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety 2.4.22 functions during abnormal/emergency 3.6 73 operations.
Subtotal 2
2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 7
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier I Group Randomly Reason for Rejection Selected Kl A Question 91 Originally selected KIA Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Failure to retract during accident conditions: Mark-1&11 (Not-BWR1)
SRO 215001 A2.07 Unable to write a discriminating question at the SRO level 2/2 Traversing for this KIA. Randomly re-sampled system due to low In-core Probe discriminatory potential for TIPs and randomly sampled A2 KIA.
226001 RHRILPCI: Containment Spray System Mode A2.11 -Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RHRILPCI: CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM MODE; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Motor operated valve failures (3.0)
Question 76 Originally selected K/A Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: Whether malfunction is SRO 600000 AA2.07 due to common-mode electrical failures 1/1 Plant Fire on Site Unable to write a psychometrically sound question related to the KIA at the SRO level. Replaced with randomly sampled KIA within original E/APE.
AA2.04 -Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: The fire's extent of potential operational damage to plant equipment (3.1)
Question 90 Originally selected KIA Emergency Procedures I Plan: Knowledge of the specific SRO 400000 2.4.12 bases for EOPs 2/1 Component Cooling Water Lack of information related to the CCW systems precluded writing a psychometrically sound question on this K/A.
Replaced with randomly sampled K/A within original system.
2.1.20 -Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
(4.6)
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier I Group Randomly Reason for Rejection Selected KIA Question 57 Originally selected K/A Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to HIGH REACTOR RO 295025 EK1.01 PRESSURE : Pressure effects on reactor power 1 /1 High Reactor Pressure Rejected due to KIA sampled on 2013 LOC25 NRC exam, unable to develop a significantly modified question.
Replaced with randomly sample KIA within EK1.
EK1.03 - Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE : Decay heat generation Question 6 Originally selected KIA Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM will have on following: Core plate differential pressure indication RO 211000 K3.03 2/1 SLC Rejected due to overlap on 2013 LOC25 NRC exam, unable to develop a significantly modified question. Replaced with randomly sample KIA within K3.
K3.01 - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM will have on following: Ability to shutdown the reactor in certain conditions Question 16 Originally selected K/A Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal RO 215005 A2.07 conditions: Recirculation flow channels flow mismatch 2/1 APRM I LPRM Rejected due to overlap with operating test scenario LOC26-NRC-1, Event 5. Replaced with randomly sample KIA within A2.
A2.02 -Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions: Upscale or downscale trips
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier I Group Randomly Reason for Rejection Selected KIA Question 51 Originally selected K/A Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they 295030 EA2.02 apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL:
RO Low Suppression Suppression pool temperature 1 /1 Pool Water Level Rejected due to overlap with Question 48. Replaced with randomly sample KIA within EA2.
EA2.03 -Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: Reactor pressure Question 54 Originally selected K/A RO 295023 2.4.41 Emergency Procedures I Plan: Knowledge of the 1 /1 Refueling emergency action level thresholds and classifications.
Accidents Rejected due to SRO-Ievel knowledge and abilities required for this KIA. Replaced with randomly-sampled generic KIA.
2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.
Question 59 Originally selected K/A Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to HIGH SUPPRESSION 295013 AK1.01 POOL TEMPERATURE: Pool stratification.
RO High Suppression 1/2 Rejected due to overlap with RO questions 48 and 53, and Pool Temperature SRO question 82. Randomly sampled Tier 1 Group 2 APE 295002, Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum, to replace 295013.
Randomly sampled AK1 under 295013 to obtain new KIA.
AK1.04 - Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM: Increased offgas flow.
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier I Group Randomly Reason for Rejection Selected Kl A Question 2 Originally selected K/A Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between SHUTDOWN COOLING 205000 K1.05 SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE) and the RO Shutdown following: Component cooling water systems 2/1 Cooling Rejected due to overlap with RO question 13, 14, and SRO question 90. Replaced with randomly sample KIA within K1.
K1.08 - Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE) and the following: LPCI Question 24 Originally selected KIA Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM: Air compressors RO 300000 K5.01 Rejected due to overlap on 2013 LOC25 NRC exam. Due to 2/1 Instrument Air small number of K5 topics in 300000, randomly resampled for new Tier 2 Group 1 system and obtained 262001 A.C.
Electrical Distribution. Randomly sampled K5 and obtained KIA K5.02 - Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION: Breaker control Question 47 Originally selected K/A Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 295038 EK3.01 they apply to HIGH OFF-SITE RELEASE RATE:
RO High Off-site Implementation of site emergency plan 1 /1 Release Rate Rejected due to SRO-Ievel knowledge and abilities required for this KIA. Replaced with randomly-sampled K/A from EK3:
EK3.03 - Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH OFF-SITE RELEASE RATE: Control room ventilation isolation
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier I Group Randomly Reason for Rejection Selected KJA Question 30 Originally selected K/A K4.07 - Knowledge of FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the RO 286000 K4.07 following: Diesel engine protection 2/2 Fire Protection Rejected due to could not develop a question with reliable discrimination validity. Replaced with randomly-sampled KIA from K4:
K4.03 - Knowledge of FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following:
Maintenance of fire header pressure Question 9 Originally selected K/A K5.06 - Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM : Turbine speed RO 206000 K5.06 measurement 2/1 HPCI Rejected due to could not develop a question with reliable discrimination validity. Replaced with randomly-sampled KIA from KS:
K5.02 - Knowledge of FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following: Turbine shaft sealing
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:
SSES Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination:
August 11-22, 2014 Exam Level: RO
- SRO 0 Administrative Topic (see Note)
Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Equipment Control Radiation Control Emergency Procedures/Plan Type Code*
R,M S,D R,M S,N Operating Test No.:
LOC26 Describe activity to be performed Implement Reactor Coolant System Temperature Monitoring, HUR Exceeded (OO.S0.1178.152)
Implement On-Site Class 1 E Operability Test for Inoperable Diesel Generator (24.S0.1475.202)
Review and Verify Blocking Required per NDAP-QA-0322 (OO.AD.3274.206)
Perform Control Room Actions in Response to Fuel Handling Accident (81.0N.2356.001)
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank(:::; 3 for ROs; :::; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (~ 1)
(P)revious 2 exams (:::; 1; randomly selected)
JPM Description JPM C001. The applicant will use provided plant process computer data to record and calculate reactor heatup rate. The heatup rate will have violated TS 3.4.1 0 limits. The SRO applicants will be required to identify the TS 3.4.1 0 Conditions entered with the corresponding Required Actions and Completion Times.
JPM C002. The applicant will perform S0-024-013, Offsite Power Source and Onsite Class 1 E Operability Test, in response to the failure of a Diesel Generator to satisfy TS 3.8.1 Required Action 8.2. The test will identify that redundant required equipment is inoperable. The SRO applicants will be required to identify the applicable LCO not met and the Conditions to be entered, with the corresponding Required Actions and Completion Times.
JPM EC. The applicant will be required to evaluate the proposed blocking for maintenance on a loop of Core Spray. The proposed equipment clearance will include three deficiencies requiring correction or additional blocking to address.
JPM RC-RO. The applicant will be required to perform the Control Room actions in response to a fuel handling accident on the Refuel Floor per ON-081 -001, Fuel Handling Accident. The applicant will perform a limited evacuation of the plant and initiate actions to secure plant personnel with Security and HP.
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:
SSES Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination:
August 11-22, 2014 Exam Level: ROD SRO.
Operating Test No.:
LOC26 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note)
Code*
Conduct of Operations R,M Implement Reactor Coolant System Temperature Monitoring, HUR Exceeded (OO.S0.1178.152)
Conduct of Operations S,D Implement On-Site Class 1 E Operability Test for Inoperable Diesel Generator (24.S0.1475.202)
Equipment Control R,M Review and Verify Blocking Required per NDAP-QA-0322 (OO.AD.3274.206)
Radiation Control R,D Respond to SGTS Exhaust High Radiation While Purging Primary Containment (OO.AD.1 018.101)
Emergency Procedures/Plan S,N Classify an Emergency Condition (scenario-specific)
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank(~ 3 for ROs; ~ 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (<:: 1)
(P)revious 2 exams(~ 1; randomly selected)
JPM Description JPM C001. The applicant will use provided plant process computer data to record and calculate reactor heatup rate. The heatup rate will have violated TS 3.4.1 0 limits. The SRO applicants will be required to identify the TS 3.4.1 0 Conditions entered with the corresponding Required Actions and Completion Times.
JPM C002. The applicant will perform S0-024-013, Offsite Power Source and Onsite Class 1 E Operability Test, in response to the failure of a Diesel Generator to satisfy TS 3.8.1 Required Action 8.2. The test will identify that redundant required equipment is inoperable. The SRO applicants will be required to identify the applicable LCO not met and the Conditions to be entered, with the corresponding Required Actions and Completion Times.
JPM EC. The applicant will be required to evaluate the proposed blocking for maintenance on a loop of Core Spray. The proposed equipment clearance will include three deficiencies requiring correction or additional blocking to address.
JPM RC-SRO. A purge of the Suppression Chamber is in progress. The SRO applicant will be provided with the status of radiation monitoring equipment associated with the Standby Gas Treatment system. The applicant will be required to recognize a failure of the automatic actions associated with a high radiation condition and formulate a response, including TS evaluation, manual actions required in response to the automatic action failure, and actions to assure personnel safety.
JPM EP. Each SRO applicant will be required to classify the events of the scenario in which they are evaluated as the Unit Supervisor. One JPM will be prepared, incorporating the events and correct classification for all of the simulator scenarios.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility:
SSES Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination:
August 11-22, 2014 Exam Level: RO.
SR0-1 D SRO-UD Operating Test No.:
LOC26 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SR0-1); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System I JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function
- a.
Respond to Control Rod Drift In During Performance of A,D,S 1
Rod Exercise Test (55.0N.1998.151)
Speed Oscillates (45.0P.1671.151)
C. Start HPCI in Pressure Control Mode (52.0P.1950.101)
EN,M,S 4
- d.
Place Shell Warming in Service, Warming Demand A,N,L,S 3
Fails High (93.0P.2440.151)
- e. Vent the Drywell (73.0P.2287.101)
D,P,S 5
- f.
Energize ESS Transformer 211, Re-Energize ESS Bus A,EN,N,S 6
2D after Transformer Lockout (04.0P.2529.151)
- g. Restore Bypassed Control Rod Position in RWM L,N,S 7
(31.0P.1552.101)
- h.
Perform RBCCW System Flush, RBCCW Pump Trips A,N,S 8
(14.0N.1335.151)
In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SR0-1); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i.
Manual Emergency Shutdown of Diesel Generator A A,D,EN 6
from Panel OC521A (24.0P.1443.051)
- j.
Venting Suppression Chamber without Radiological D,E,EN,R 9
Release Limitations (73.E0.2282.1 01)
- k.
Perform Operator Actions Outside the Control Room in D,E 7
Accordance With ON-1 00-009 (OO.ON.1153.1 02)
All RO and SR0-1 control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO I SR0-11 SRO-U (A)Iternate path 4-614-612-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank
- 591:581:54 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant
~11~11~1 (EN)gineered safety feature
- I -
I
~1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown
~11~11~1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A)
~21~21~1 (P)revious 2 exams
- 3 I
- :; 31::; 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA
~11~11~1 (S)imulator
JPM Description JPM A. The monthly control rod exercise is performed. The first 2 control rods are tested with no incident. The 3rd control rod drifts to an intermediate position when an insert signal is applied.
The off-normal procedure for control rod problems is used to insert the control rod to the full-in position.
JPM B. RFP B has just been placed in-service as the second RFP in Flow Control Mode. Speed control is transferred to the Backup Woodward Governor due to concerns with control valve position feedback to the Primary. After control is transferred RFPT B speed begins oscillating, requiring the RFPT Backup Woodward Governor to be shutdown to stop the oscillations.
JPM C. A manual startup of the HPCI system is performed for pressure control. HPCI system flow and discharge pressure are to be maximized to initiate a reactor cooldown with MSIVs closed.
JPM D. Unit startup is in progress. Shell warming is returned to service following a planned turbine trip. As HP turbine pressurization begins, the warming demand fails high. Shell warming must be secured or the turbine tripped before a reactor scram on Main Turbine TSVITCV closure is generated as HP first stage pressure exceeds the RPS scram bypass setpoint.
JPM E. Drywell pressure is elevated with the plant operating at nominal rated power conditions.
SGTS is started and a vent path created to lower Drywell pressure. Once Drywell pressure begins lowering, the vent path is secured.
JPM F. ESS Transformer 201 is to be returned to service following maintenance, with ESS Bus 2D returned to the normal supply. The transformer will be re-energized, but when ESS Bus 2D is transferred the transformer experiences a lockout. ESS Bus 2D is then re-energized from Diesel Generator D.
JPM G. A reactor startup is in progress at less than 5 percent power. A substitute control rod position has been entered for a partially withdrawn control rod with a bad position indication at a specific notch. The control rod has been withdrawn past the position with the bad indication and the substituted position is deleted.
JPM H. A flush of the RBCCW system per G0-100-014 for hot weather operation is to be performed. The in-service RBCCW pump trips when the flush is initiated. The standby pump fails to automatically start and must be manually started. The standby pump is air-bound and fails to develop flow, requiring the pump to be vented per the off-normal position.
JPM I. A local emergency stop of Diesel Generator A(B) is to be performed due to loss of cooling water. The emergency stop PB fails to trip the DG. The DG must be stopped by isolating the fuel oil supply.
JPM J. A Station Blackout and LOCA has occurred with Drywell pressure approaching design limits. A vent path from the Suppression Chamber to the Unit 1 Reactor Building is manually established by removal of a ductwork access panel to serve as a vent and manual opening of vent isolation dampers.
JPM K. The Control Room was evacuated due to a fire. Operators failed to scram the Unit 1 reactor before leaving the Control Room. Local actions to scram the reactor and ensure MSIVs remain closed are performed.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301 -2 Facility:
SSES Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination:
August 11-22, 2014 Exam Level: RO 0 SR0-1
- SRO-U 0 Operating Test No.:
Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SR0-1); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System I JPM Title
- a. Respond to Control Rod Drift In During Performance of Rod Exercise Test (55.0N.1998.151)
- c.
Start HPCI in Pressure Control Mode (52.0P.1950.101)
- d. Place Shell Warming in Service, Warming Demand Fails High (93.0P.2440.151)
- e. Ventthe Drywell (73.0P.2287.101)
- f.
Energize ESS Transformer 211, Re-Energize ESS Bus 2D after Transformer Lockout (04.0P.2529.151)
In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SR0-1); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i.
Manual Emergency Shutdown of Diesel Generator A from Panel OC521A (24.0P.1443.051)
- j.
Venting Suppression Chamber without Radiological Release Limitations (73.E0.2282.1 01)
- k. Perform Operator Actions Outside the Control Room in Accordance With ON-1 00-009 (OO.ON.1153.1 02)
Type Code*
A,D,S A,N,S EN,M,S A,N,L,S D,P,S A,EN,N,S A,N,S A,D,EN D,E,EN,R D,E LOC26 Safety Function 1
2 4
3 5
6 8
6 9
7 All RO and SR0-1 control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO I SR0-11 SRO-U (A)Iternate path 4-614-612-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank
- 591:581:54 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant
<:11<:11<:1 (EN)gineered safety feature
- I -
I <:1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown
<:11<:11<:1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A)
<:21<:21<:1 (P)revious 2 exams
- 5 3 I :5 31 :5 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA
<:11<:11<:1 (S)imulator
JPM Description JPM A. The monthly control rod exercise is performed. The first 2 control rods are tested with no incident. The 3rd control rod drifts to an intermediate position when an insert signal is applied.
The off-normal procedure for control rod problems is used to insert the control rod to the full-in position.
JPM B. RFP B has just been placed in-service as the second RFP in Flow Control Mode. Speed control is transferred to the Backup Woodward Governor due to concerns with control valve position feedback to the Primary. After control is transferred RFPT B speed begins oscillating, requiring the RFPT Backup Woodward Governor to be shutdown to stop the oscillations.
JPM C. A manual startup of the HPCI system is performed for pressure control. HPCI system flow and discharge pressure are to be maximized to initiate a reactor cooldown with MSIVs closed.
JPM D. Unit startup is in progress. Shell warming is returned to service following a planned turbine trip. As HP turbine pressurization begins, the warming demand fails high. Shell warming must be secured or the turbine tripped before a reactor scram on Main Turbine TSV/TCV closure is generated as HP first stage pressure exceeds the RPS scram bypass setpoint.
JPM E. Drywell pressure is elevated with the plant operating at nominal rated power conditions.
SGTS is started and a vent path created to lower Drywell pressure. Once Drywell pressure begins lowering, the vent path is secured.
JPM F. ESS Transformer 201 is to be returned to service following maintenance, with ESS Bus 2D returned to the normal supply. The transformer will be re-energized, but when ESS Bus 2D is transferred the transformer experiences a lockout. ESS Bus 2D is then re-energized from Diesel Generator D.
JPM H. A flush of the RBCCW system per G0-100-014 for hot weather operation is to be performed. The in-service RBCCW pump trips when the flush is initiated. The standby pump fails to automatically start and must be manually started. The standby pump is air-bound and fails to develop flow, requiring the pump to be vented per the off-normal position.
JPM I. A local emergency stop of Diesel Generator A(B) is to be performed due to loss of cooling water. The emergency stop PB fails to trip the DG. The DG must be stopped by isolating the fuel oil supply.
JPM J. A Station Blackout and LOCA has occurred with Drywell pressure approaching design limits. A vent path from the Suppression Chamber to the Unit 1 Reactor Building is manually established by removal of a ductwork access panel to serve as a vent and manual opening of vent isolation dampers.
JPM K. The Control Room was evacuated due to a fire. Operators failed to scram the Unit 1 reactor before leaving the Control Room. Local actions to scram the reactor and ensure MSIVs remain closed are performed.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility:
SSES Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination:
August 11-22, 2014 Exam Level: RO 0 SR0-1 0 SRO-U
- Operating Test No.:
Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SR0-1); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System I JPM Title
- j.
Venting Suppression Chamber without Radiological Release Limitations (73.E0.2282.1 01)
- k.
Perform Operator Actions Outside the Control Room in Accordance With ON-100-009 (OO.ON.1153.102)
Type Code*
D,E,EN,R D,E LOC26 Safety Function 9
7 All RO and SR0-1 control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO I SR0-11 SRO-U (A)Iternate path 4-614-612-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank
~91~81~4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant
~11:2:11~1 (EN)gineered safety feature
- I - I
~1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown
~11~11~1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A)
- 2:21:2:21~ 1 (P)revious 2 exams
~ 3 I ~ 3 I ~ 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA
- 2:11:2:11:2:1 (S)imulator
JPM Description JPM B. RFP B has just been placed in-service as the second RFP in Flow Control Mode. Speed control is transferred to the Backup Woodward Governor due to concerns with control valve position feedback to the Primary. After control is transferred RFPT B speed begins oscillating, requiring the RFPT Backup Woodward Governor to be shutdown to stop the oscillations.
JPM D. Unit startup is in progress. Shell warming is returned to service following a planned turbine trip. As HP turbine pressurization begins, the warming demand fails high. Shell warming must be secured or the turbine tripped before a reactor scram on Main Turbine TSV/TCV closure is generated as HP first stage pressure exceeds the RPS scram bypass setpoint.
JPM F. ESS Transformer 201 is to be returned to service following maintenance, with ESS Bus 2D returned to the normal supply. The transformer will be re-energized, but when ESS Bus 2D is transferred the transformer experiences a lockout. ESS Bus 2D is then re-energized from Diesel Generator D.
JPM J. A Station Blackout and LOCA has occurred with Drywell pressure approaching design limits. A vent path from the Suppression Chamber to the Unit 1 Reactor Building is manually established by removal of a ductwork access panel to serve as a vent and manual opening of vent isolation dampers.
JPM K. The Control Room was evacuated due to a fire. Operators failed to scram the Unit 1 reactor before leaving the Control Room. Local actions to scram the reactor and ensure MSIVs remain closed are performed.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.:
1 Op-Test No.:
LOC26 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions Unit 1 95 percent power for control rod pattern adjustment, EOL HPCI OOSVC, DG E substituted for DG A (IC-380)
Turnover RFP lube oil conditioner swa~~ed from A to B last shift Control rods 42-15 and 46-19 declared slow last scram time test Severe thunderstorm watch in effect Event Malf.
Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
N/A R
Withdraw control rods to raise reactor power 3 percent SRO,ATC (OP-AD-338, G0-1 00-012) 2 N/A N
Place CRD Pump B in-service, secure CRD Pump A SRO,BOP (OP-155-001) 3 mfFW145 c
RFPT B vibration rises, reduce RFPT speed to lower 0078 SRO,ATC vibration (AR-101-A16) 4 mfFW145 c
RFPT B trips on high vibration, Recirc LIM2 runback 0078 All (ON-164-002) cmfTR03 -
I APRM 2 and 3 Recirc Loop A drive flows fail high during 5
FT831 1N014C SRO,ATC Recirc LIM2 runback (TS 3.3.1.1) cmfAV04_
c RBCCW TCV fails, ESW placed in-service to restore 6
TV11028 SRO,BOP RBCCW cooling (ON-114-001 ), ESW loop declared inoperable when aligned to RBCCW (TS 3.7.2) rfCU161001 RWCU fails to automatically isolate on high temperature, 7
rfCU161009 I
cmfMVOS SRO,ATC manual isolation successful (AR-1 01-A01)
HV144F004 8
mfRD155 M
Hydraulic-block A TWS (E0-1 00-113, OP-145-005, 017 ALL ES-158-002) cmfPM03 -
SLC pump trips after start, standby SLC pump 9
1P208A c
cmfPM03 -
SRO,BOP successfully injects boron (OP-153-001) 1P2088 10 cmfTR01 I
Wide Range level instrument fails, RFP flow must be LT14201A SRO,ATC raised to maintain reactor level in ATWS band 11 mfFW148 c
In-service RFPT trips after first scram, RCIC restored to 002 ALL maintain RPV level while standby RFPT placed in-service
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
Scenario Actual Events Attributes
- 1.
Total malfunctions (5-8) 3,6,7,9,10,11 6
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 9,10,11 3
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4,6 2
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 8 1
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)
E0-100-102 1
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)
E0-100-113 1
CT -2 Lowers RPV level to < -60" but > -161".
CT -3 Inserts control rods lAW E0-1 00-113 Sht. 2.
SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 95 percent power, 500 days into the operating cycle.
Preparations are set for performing a control rod pattern adjustment. HPCI is in day 2 of a planned 4-day system outage window. Diesel Generator E is substituted for DG A for a system outage window. The RFP lube oil conditioner was swapped from the RFP A reservoir to the B reservoir last shift. Control rods 42-15 and 46-19 were declared slow during the last scram time test. A severe thunderstorm watch is in effect for northeast Pennsylvania for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The first task for the crew is to withdraw control rods in accordance with the Reactivity Maneuver Request provided by Reactor Engineering. The pattern adjustment will raise reactor power approximately 3 percent. When the pattern adjustment is complete, the crew will commence rotating CRD Pumps per OP-155-001 in support of scheduled maintenance on the next shift. WCC personnel will hang a clearance on CRD Pump 1A when it has been removed from service.
When the reactivity maneuver has been completed and CRD pump rotation is complete, RFP B will experience a rising vibration trend. Vibration will quickly rise to the alarm setpoint, then continue to rise at a slower rate toward the RFP trip setpoint. The crew should initiate action to first reduce the speed of the RFP per the associated alarm response procedure, then remove the pump from service. The vibration will rise to the trip setpoint when the crew takes manual control of RFP B speed or adjusts the speed bias. The crew will respond per off-normal procedures to the RFP trip and recirc LIM2 runback. Control rod insertion may be performed due to margin to the MELLA rod-line, but is not required. The Recirc loop A drive flow inputs to APRM flow channels C and 0 (APRMs 2 and 3) will drift high during the runback, resulting in a RBM flow compare control rod withdrawal block. The inoperable flow-biased scram and rod-block functions of the two APRMs will require entry into TS 3.3.1.1 and TRO 3.1.3.
When the crew has lowered power below the MELLA rod-line, the RBCCW TCV will malfunction resulting in a loss of cooling to RBCCW. RBCCW temperature will quickly rise. RWCU will fail to trip on high motor temperature or isolate on high F/0 inlet temperature and must be manually tripped and isolated (F004). The RBCCW TCV bypass valve will be stuck closed. The crew will be required to place RBCCW on ESW which bypasses the RBCCW TCVs and will restore cooling to RBCCW loads. Entry into TS 3.7.2 will be required for the loop of ESW made inoperable when aligned to the RBCCW HX.
Once the crew has placed ESW in-service to RBCCW the supply valve HV11 024A 1 will fail closed after approximately 5 minutes, due to its solenoid failing, resulting in a total loss of RBCCW cooling. Recirc Pump A lower motor bearing temperature will rise rapidly on the second loss of cooling, requiring a reactor scram and tripping of the Recirc Pump. If the reactor is not scrammed before the recirc pump is tripped, Region 1 of the power-flow map will be entered and the reactor will automatically scram on OPRMs.
The reactor scram will result in a hydraulic-block A TWS. The crew will trip both Recirc Pumps and reduce level to the A TWS band to lower power. The crew will perform the ES to bypass RPS trips, allowing the scram to be reset to drain the SDV and scram again. The crew will be able to insert control rods using RMCS. The first SLC pump started will trip shortly after starting, requiring the second pump to be started. As reactor level is lowered one channel of Wide Range reactor level will fail, requiring the crew to diagnose the failure and raise FW flow to maintain reactor level within the A TWS band.
The first attempt at draining the SDV and re-inserting a scram will result in limited control rod motion. The crew should reset the scram and allow the SDV to drain again while continuing control rod insertion. The in-service RFP will trip after the scram is reset. RCIC can be used to maintain reactor level as the standby RFP is placed in service. The scenario may be terminated when level is stable in the A TWS band and the standby RFP has been placed in service.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.:
2 Op-Test No.:
LOC26 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions Unit 1 80 percent power starting up from forced outage, 80L HPCIOOSVC Turnover Swap RFP A main lube oil pumps RFP lube oil conditioner being swapped from A to 8 Control rods 42-15 and 46-19 declared slow last scram time test Severe thunderstorm watch in effect
~uont Malf.
Event Event II No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
N/A N
Swap RFP A main lube oil pumps (OP-145-003)
rfDB105106 c
18227 feeder trips (AR-016-804) and is inoperable All (TS 3.8. 7), re-energize RPS 8 from alternate (ON-158-001) 3 cmfPM02 c
RFP A main lube oil pump trips due to FME 1P124A(B)
SRO,ATC (AR-120-A03), RFP A manually secured (OP-145-001) 4 N/A R
Reduce power to < 65 percent using recirc flow and SRO,ATC control rods to secure RFP A (OP-AD-338) 5 cmfRL01 I
MSL flow transmitter fails high causing MSIV half-B211K3B SRO isolation (TS 3.6.1.3) cmfRL02 Insert manual scram on loss of Feedwater (only 1 RFP 6
in-service), RPS low-level auto-scram is failed (OP-AD-cmfPM02_
SRO,ATC 1P124C-D 004) 7 rfDS0010xx M
Loss of offsite power on reactor scram (ON-1 04-001) crfAB03_xx ALL 8
mfDG024 I
Diesel Generator 8 fails to automatically start, manual 001B SRO,BOP start from Control Room successful (ON-1 04-001) mfRR164 9
010 M
Drywell LOCA (E0-1 02, E0-1 03) mfRR164 ALL 011A cmfRV02_
I ADS auto-initiation fails, perform Rapid Depressurization 10 PSV141 F13G-N ALL (E0-112)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Event Malt.
No.
No.
11 12 cmfMVOG_
HV152 FOOSA cmfRL01_
E111Kxxx cmfMVOG_
HV151 F015B ALL ALL Division 1 Core Spray injection valve fails to automatically open, can be manually opened from Control Room Division 2 RHR LPCI initiation logic fails to initiate, manual alignment to LPCI required
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
Scenario Actual
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8)
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4)
- 4. Major transients (1-2)
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3)
CT-1 Rapid Depressurization at TAF CT-2 Manually align Division 1 Core Spray and Division 2 RHR for reactor vessel injection Events Attributes 2,3,6,8,10,11, 7
12 8,10,11,12 4
2,6 2
7,9 2
E0-100-102 2
E0-100-103 E0-100-102 (ALC) 2 E0-100-112
SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 80 percent power starting up from a forced outage, 50 days into the operating cycle. HPCI is inoperable with the steam supply isolated to repair a small steam leak in the steam supply piping in the HPCI room. The RFP lube oil conditioner is being placed on the RFP B reservoir after being removed from the RFP A reservoir last shift in preparation for a RFP A main lube oil pump test. Control rods 42-15 and 46-19 were declared slow during the last scram time test. A severe thunderstorm watch is in effect for northeast Pennsylvania for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The first task for the crew is to test the RFP A main lube oil pumps, and perform a pump swap in the process, per OP-145-003. NPOs will report the RFP lube oil conditioner is in-service on the RFP B reservoir once the lube oil pump swap is complete.
When the RFP lube oil pump swap is complete, the 1 B227 feeder breaker 1 B220-013 will trip, de energizing the MCC and RPS B. The MCC will not be recovered during the scenario. The crew will respond per ON-158-001 to re-energize RPS Band reset the half-scram, reset NSSSS logic, and restore cooling to the Recirc Pumps. The crew should reference ON 104-202 to identify other significant loads affected by the loss of the MCC, which include Division 2 Core Spray and Division 2 RHR Drywell spray. TS 3.8.7 should be entered for the inoperable ESS MCC.
Once activities associated with recovery from the loss of 1 B227 are complete, RFP A main lube oil pump B (1 P124B) will trip. Investigation will show significant quantities of foreign material in the reservoir with failure of the remaining RFP A main lube oil pump (1 P124A) expected. The crew should reduce power per GO 100-012 and remove RFP A from service per OP-145-001.
During the power reduction a MSL B flow transmitter will fail high, resulting in a MSIV half-isolation signal. The inoperable transmitter will require entry into TS 3.3.6.1.
Once RFP A has been secured and the MSL flow transmitter failure evaluated, the RFP B in-service main lube oil pump (1P124C) will trip. The standby pump (1P124D) will automatically start, but trip almost immediately, resulting in a trip of RFP B. With only 1 RFP in-service reactor level will fall rapidly. The scram on low RPV level will fail, requiring a manual scram.
The Unit 1 reactor scram will initiate a grid disturbance which will result in a total loss of offsite power. Diesel Generator B will fail to start, but can be automatically started from the Control Room to re-energize ESS Buses 1 B and 2B. The crew will respond to the Scram and LOOP per E0-102 and ON-104-001. RPV level and pressure control will be with RCIC and SRVs.
Once RPV level and pressure are stabilized after the LOOP, a small RCS leak will develop in the Drywell. The leak will be within the capability of RCIC and CRD to maintain RPV level above TAF. The crew response to the LOCA will be to align RHR for containment cooling. Once RHR is aligned for containment cooling, the leak will degrade resulting in level slowly falling below TAF. ADS will fail to initiate. Rapid Depressurization will be performed per E0-112 once level falls below T AF.
Low-pressure ECCS systems will fail to respond automatically to the LPCI initiation signal, requiring operator action to initiate ECCS flow to recover RPV level above TAF. The Division 1 Core Spray (HV 152-F005A) and RHR (HV-1 51-F015A) injection valves will fail to automatically open when the low RPV pressure permissive is reached. Operator action to manually open the Division 1 Core Spray valve will be successful. The Division 1 RHR LPCI valve will trip its breaker when it is manually opened. The Division 2 RHR LPCI initiation logic will fail, requiring
manual isolation of any in service containment cooling flow paths, the second RHR pump to be manually started, and the LPCI injection valves to be manually opened. The scenario may be terminated when level has been restored to the normal band by low-pressure ECCS and RHR is being aligned to containment cooling.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.:
3 Op-Test No.:
LOC26 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions Unit 1 33 percent power shutting down for DW RCS leak, MOL HPCIOOSVC Turnover Insert control rods, then test Turbine B~pass valve #3 RFP lube oil conditioner being swapped from A to 8 Control rods 42-15 and 46-19 declared slow last scram time test Event Malf.
Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
N/A R
Insert control rods (OP-156-001, OP-AD-338)
N/A N
Test turbine bypass valve #3 (S0-182-001)
c FW heater 2C tube leak (AR-120-C10,D10), isolate FW 3
1E102C SRO,BOP heater extraction steam (ON-147-002), TS MCPR limits not applicable (TS 3.2.2) 4 cmfPM04_
I Diesel Generator C spurious start without cooling, OP504C SRO,BOP manual ESW initiation required cmfEB01 -
ESS Bus 1 C lockout, DW leak severity rises, reactor 5
1A203 I
mfRR164 SRO, ATC scram required (ON-1 04-203, TS 3.8. 7) 010 6
mfRP158 M
Electrical ATWS (E0-100-113), ARI inserts control rods 003 ALL 7
mfRR179 c
Fuel failure with high MSL radiation, MSIV isolation 003 ALL required (AR-1 03-001, AR-1 04-001) 8 cmfMV06 I
RCIC injection valve fails to open on initiation HV149F013 SRO,ATC (OP-150-001) 9 mfRC150 M
Unisolable RCS leak into Secondary Containment, 2 004 ALL areas above Max Safe radiation (E0-100-104) cmfMV01 RCIC steam isolation valves fail to automatically close 10 HV149F007 I
(AR-1 08-F04,F05), manual isolation successful after cmfMV09_
SRO,BOP HV149F008 reactor pressure reduced
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity,
{l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8)
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4)
- 4. Major transients (1-2)
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3)
CT-2 Rapidly depressurize the reactor when two Secondary Containment Areas exceed Max Safe Rad levels.
Scenario Actual Events Attributes 3,4,5,7,8,10 6
7,8,10 3
3,5 2
6,9 2
E0-100-102 3
E0-100-104 E0-100-113 2
E0-100-112 2
SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The scenario begins with Unit 1 shutting down for an unplanned maintenance outage to identify and repair a small RCS leak in the Drywell, 300 days into the operating cycle. Unidentified OW leakage is steady at approximately 0.5 gpm. Reactor power is 33 percent with RFP A in-service in Flow Control Mode. HPCI is in day 2 of a 4-day unplanned maintenance window. The RFP lube oil conditioner is being placed on the RFP B reservoir after being removed from the RFP A reservoir last shift in preparation for a RFP A main lube oil pump test. Control rods 42-15 and 46-19 were declared slow during the last scram time test.
The first task for the crew is to insert control rods to lower power to approximately 30 percent.
The crew will then cycle Main Turbine Bypass valve #3 per S0-182-001 to demonstrate functionality of the valve prior to scram.
When the reactivity maneuver has been completed, a tube leak will develop on the 2C Feedwater heater. The leak will initially be within the capability of the dump valve, but will continue to degrade until a heater isolation on high-high level occurs. The crew will respond to the isolation by isolating the extraction steam supplies to the 3C, 4C and 5C heaters and other inputs in accordance with off-normal procedures, and verify the high FW heater levels clear within 15 minutes or trip the main turbine.
Once the crew has completed off-normal procedures for the Feedwater heater isolation, Diesel Generator C will spuriously start. ESW Pump C will fail to automatically start and must be manually started to provide cooling to the DG. When the breaker for ESW Pump C closes, a fault in the breaker will result in an ESS Bus 1 C lockout. The crew will align Instrument Air to Containment Instrument Gas to maintain AOVs in the Drywell functional. The leak in the Drywell will degrade coincident with the bus lockout, resulting in a more rapid rise in Drywell temperature and pressure. The crew should complete activities associated with the loss of ESS Bus 1 C and insert a manual scram before an automatic scram on high Drywell pressure is received.
When the reactor is scrammed RPS will fail to de-energize, resulting in an electrical A TWS.
When ARI is initiated, control rods will slowly drift in when ARI is initiated, resulting in significant fuel cladding failure. The Scram Discharge Volume drains will be failed open, allowing the spread of highly radioactive coolant into the CRD HCU area. This will result in radiation levels rapidly exceeding the EO 104 maximum safe values. The magnitude of the fuel failure will also result in MSL high radiation signals that will require the MSIVs to be closed.
RPV level and pressure control will be with RCIC and SRVs. The RCIC injection valve will fail to automatically open and must be manually opened. Reactor pressure may be lowered to 500-600 psig to allow Condensate to be used for reactor level control.
Once RCIC has been initiated and the CRD HCU area radiation levels have exceeded the max safe value a steam leak will develop in the RCIC room. The isolation logic will fail and both isolation valves will fail to close automatically or manually. RCIC room radiation levels will quickly rise to maximum safe levels. With radiation levels in two areas above max safe, and an unisolable primary system leak outside the primary containment, E0-104 requires Rapid Depressurization. As reactor pressure lowers, the RCIC outboard isolation valve will stroke fully closed. The scenario may be terminated when reactor level has been stabilized in the normal band with Condensate and actions to place RHR in Suppression Pool cooling have been initiated.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.:
5 Op-Test No.:
LOC26 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions Unit 1 Mode 2, 3 percent eower, 500 psig Turnover Place RFP in-service in DPM in AUTO per OP-145-001 Control rods 42-15 and 46-19 declared slow last scram time test Severe thunderstorm watch in effect Event Malt.
Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
N/A N
Place RFP in-service in Discharge Pressure Mode SRO,BOP (OP-145-001) 2 N/A R
Withdraw control rods to raise reactor power SRO,ATC (OP-AD-338, G0-1 00-002) 3 mfLS155 I
Inoperable control rod position indication (TS 3.1.3) 0145435 SRO,ATC setfx10 I
Startup level control bypass valve HV-10640 controller 4
SULC_B9.
fails to maximum demand, take manual control OUT=100 SRO,ATC (ON-145-001)
IMF c
Aux Bus 11 B lockout, Start Condensate Pump C to 5
cmfRL02 maintain 2-pump Condensate alignment with RFP 86A1102 SRO,BOP in-service (ON-103-003. OP 144-001) 6 cmfFU01 I
RCIC Division 2 initiation logic power loss (TS 3.3.5.1) 1C618FU21 SRO 7
cmfRL01 c
Spurious MSIV closure, insert a manual scram due to B211K7x ALL loss of the normal heat sink (ON-1 00-101) 8 mfMS183 c
Drywell LOCA, place Suppression Chamber spray in-007 ALL service to cool Primary Containment (OP-149-004) cmfMV01 -
c RHR Suppression Chamber cooling isolation valve 9
HV151 breaker trips, place other division of RHR in Suppression F028x SRO,BOP Chamber spray (OP-149-004) 10 mfRH149 M
Unisolable Suppression Pool leak (E0-1 00-103, 112) 004x ALL
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8)
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4)
- 4. Major transients (1-2)
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3)
CT-1 Isolate HPCI when Suppression Pool level cannot be maintained above 17 feet.
CT-2 Rapidly Depressurize the reactor when Suppression Pool level cannot be maintained above 12 feet.
Scenario Actual Events Attributes 4,5,7,8,9 5
8,9 2
4,5 2
10 1
E0-100-102 2
E0-100-103 E0-100-112 1
2
SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The scenario begins with Unit 1 starting up from a refueling outage in Mode 2 at 500 psig, approximately 3 percent power. Control rods 42-15 and 46-19 were declared slow during the last scram time test. A severe thunderstorm watch is in effect for northeast Pennsylvania for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
RFP A is in standby with RFP B in Idle. The first task for the crew is to place RFP A in-service in Discharge Pressure Mode per OP-145-001. Once the RFP is in DPM the crew will pull the next step of control rods to raise power slightly. As the crew withdraws the third control rod the PIP probe will fail, causing a loss of indication for the control rod, requiring the crew to declare it inoperable and entering TS 3.1.3.
When activities associated with TS for the inoperable PIP probe are complete, the controller for the HV 10640 will be set to 100 percent demand. The crew will respond by manually closing the HV-1 0640 with the controller, or controlling level with RFP A speed. If the crew elects to control speed, Maintenance will be able to take to control of the HV-1 0640 and ramp the valve closed to restore auto level control.
Once reactor level has been stabilized, Aux Bus 11 B will experience a lockout. The crew will enter ON 103-001 for loss of the Aux Bus and ensure the unit remains stable. The crew will place Condensate Pump C in service per OP-144-001 to maintain a two Condensate Pumps in-service with a RFP in-service.
Once the crew has placed a second Condensate Pump in-service, the power to Division 2 of the RCIC initiation logic will be lost. The crew will TS 3.3.5.2 for RCIC instrumentation inoperable.
Once activities associated with Condensate Pump C and the RCIC logic power supply are complete, a spurious Group 1 MSIV and MSL drain isolation will occur. Reactor pressure will slowly begin to rise, with pressure soon exceeding the shutoff head of the Condensate Pumps.
All automatic scrams are disabled. The crew should elect to conservatively insert a manual scram due to the main steam isolation. When the MSIVs stroke closed a small steam leak will develop on one of the inboard MSIVs, resulting in Drywell pressure quickly rising to the scram setpoint.
The crew will enter E0-1 03 for Primary Containment control and place Suppression Chamber spray in service. The first SC spray valve to be operated will fail to open and trip its breaker. The crew must shift to the other division of RHR to place in SC spray. When the 2nd RHR pump is placed in SC spray, the RHR pump motor will experience a catastrophic fault, The pump breaker will fail to open, however, resulting in a lockout of the associated ESS bus. The motor fault will result in major Suppression Pool leakage from the pump, which will be unisolable.
The Suppression Pool leakage will result in re-entry into E0-103. SP level will slowly fall until HPCI is required to be isolated. Once HPCI is isolated, the severity of the leak will rise due to flooding spreading into an adjacent compartment. Once the second room flooded alarm is in the crew should recognize that SP level cannot be maintained above 12 feet and perform a Rapid Depressurization. Low-pressure ECCS will have to be overridden when Rapid Depressurization is initiated due to the LOCA signal and the availability of Condensate to maintain reactor water level.
The scenario may be terminated when Rapid Depressurization is complete and reactor level is stable in the normal band.