ML14251A554

SECY-14-0144: Request by Southern California Edison for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements

ML14251A554
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	12/17/2014
From:	Satorius M NRC/EDO
To:	NRC/OCM
Norris M
References
SECY-14-0144
Download: ML14251A554 (27)

Text

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POLICY ISSUE (Notation Vote)

December 17, 2014 SECY-14-0144 FOR: The Commissioners FROM: Mark A. Satorius Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

REQUEST BY SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON FOR EXEMPTIONS FROM CERTAIN EMERGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS PURPOSE:

The purpose of this paper is to seek Commission approval for the staff to grant Southern California Edisons (SCEs) request for exemptions from certain emergency planning (EP) requirements of Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, of Title 10, Energy, of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). SCEs proposed exemptions would result in elimination of the requirements placed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on the licensee for formal offsite radiological emergency plans at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) site, but would require the maintenance of certain onsite capabilities to communicate and coordinate with offsite response authorities. This paper does not address any new commitments or resource implications.

SUMMARY

The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans, and Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, to 10 CFR Part 50 continue to apply to a nuclear power reactor after permanent cessation of operations and removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that has been shut down from those for an operating power reactor.

CONTACTS: Michael Norris, NSIR/DPR 301-287-3754

The Commissioners To modify their emergency plans to reflect the risk commensurate with power reactors that have been permanently shut down, power reactor licensees transitioning to decommissioning must seek exemptions from certain EP regulatory requirements before amending these plans.

The staff has reviewed the technical basis for SCEs requested exemptions and is recommending that the Commission approve the staffs proposal to grant the requested EP exemptions, as detailed in the enclosure.

BACKGROUND:

The regulations in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) provide that the NRC may, on application by a licensee or on its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in circumstances in which application of the regulation would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.1 The risk of an offsite radiological release is significantly lower and the types of possible accidents are significantly fewer, at a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel than at an operating power reactor. On this basis, the NRC has previously granted similar exemptions from EP requirements for permanently shut down and defueled power reactor licensees. The staff provided an evaluation of an exemption request for the Kewaunee Power Station to the Commission in SECY-14-0066 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14072A257), which the Commission approved in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to SECY-14-0066 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14219A366).

Before the Kewaunee Power Station, the last approved exemption that eliminated the requirements for formal offsite radiological EP was for the Zion facility in 1999 (ADAMS Legacy Accession No. 9908260192). The underlying technical basis for the approval of the Zion facilitys exemption was based on demonstrating that the radiological consequences of design-basis-accidents (DBAs) would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agencys (EPAs) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary and that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) would not reach the zirconium ignition temperature in fewer than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> based on analysis that assumes no water or air cooling of the fuel. The staff concluded that if 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> were available to initiate mitigative actions or, if needed, to implement offsite protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP),2 formal offsite radiological emergency plans are not necessary for permanently defueled nuclear power reactor licensees. In addition to SONGS, Crystal River Unit 3 and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station have also applied for exemptions from certain 1

Notwithstanding the special circumstances of the exemption request, 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1) requires that the exemption must be authorized by law, not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and be consistent with the common defense and security.

2 A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in the Federal Emergency Management Agencys (FEMAs) Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans. CPG 101 is the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and decisionmaking and helps planners at all levels of government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for all hazards planning.

The Commissioners EP requirements. The exemption requests by SONGS, as described in this paper, are consistent with those approved by the Commission for the Kewaunee Power Station in the SRM to SECY-14-0066.

The NRC requires a level of licensee EP commensurate with the potential consequences to public health and safety and common defense and security at the licensees site. Under the current safety analysis in NUREG-1738, Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), the event sequences important to risk at a decommissioning power reactor are limited to a large earthquake and cask-drop events. This is an important difference from an operating power reactor where typically a large number of different initiating events make significant contributions to risk. Additionally, physical security for special nuclear material at fixed sites, including decommissioning power reactors, is required by 10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials. Decommissioning power reactor licensees are required by 10 CFR 73.55(f) to develop target sets for use in the development and implementation of security strategies that protect against spent fuel sabotage. While both operating and decommissioning power reactors are required to develop target sets, the number of target sets at a decommissioning reactor is significantly reduced. Implementation of the protective strategy at a decommissioning reactor takes into account this reduction in target sets. With the significant reduction in radiological risk for a power reactor undergoing decommissioning, the NRC has historically approved exemptions from EP and security requirements based on site-specific evaluations and the objectives of the regulations.

The NRC prepared NUREG-1738 to provide a technical basis for SECY-00-0145, Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning (ADAMS Accession No. ML003721626). The proposed rulemaking was later deferred in light of higher priority work after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, NUREG-1738 provides insights that the staff continues to find helpful for the evaluation of exemption requests regarding EP requirements. Specifically, NUREG-1738 identified a zirconium fire resulting from a substantial loss-of-water inventory in the SFP as the only postulated scenario at a decommissioning power reactor that, while highly unlikely, might result in a significant offsite release.

Previously granted exemptions from EP regulations reduced EP requirements for decommissioning power reactors to those consistent with these standards: (1) 10 CFR 50.47(d), which states the requirements for a license authorizing fuel loading and low power testing only; and (2) 10 CFR 72.32(a), which establishes the information required in an emergency plan for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). Examples of previously granted exemptions from EP regulations for decommissioning power reactors include: setting the highest emergency plan classification as an Alert; extending the timing requirements for notification of offsite authorities; requiring only onsite exercises with the opportunity for offsite response organization participation; and only maintaining arrangements for offsite response organizations (i.e., law enforcement, fire and medical services) that might respond to onsite emergencies. The existence of formal offsite radiological emergency plans is no longer a binding requirement on the licensee.

While the staff considers the exemptions from certain EP requirements, as requested by SCE and described above, to be reasonable for a power reactor that has been permanently shut down and defueled, the resulting set of EP requirements could be viewed as a reduction in effectiveness when compared to the operating reactor emergency plan currently in effect at

The Commissioners SONGS. In the SRM to SECY-08-0024, Delegation of Commission Authority to Staff to Approve or Deny Emergency Plan Changes That Represent a Decrease in Effectiveness, dated May 19, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081400510), the Commission directed that the staff should request Commission approval for any reduction in effectiveness of a licensees emergency plan that requires an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. In a manner consistent with the SRMs direction, this paper seeks Commission approval for the staff to process and grant, as appropriate, SCEs requested exemptions from the EP requirements as detailed in the enclosure, which provides a summary of SCEs exemption request and a brief description of the staffs basis for recommending approval.

DISCUSSION:

SCE is the holder of Renewed Facility Operating Licenses No. NFP-10 (for SONGS Unit 2) and NFP-15 (for SONGS Unit 3), issued under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR Part 50, which authorizes the licensee to possess and store spent nuclear fuel and greater-than-Class C radioactive waste at the SONGS facility. SONGS Unit 1 was permanently shut down on November 30, 1992, all fuel assemblies were removed from the reactor on March 6, 1993, and the unit is in the decommissioning phase. SONGS Units 2 and 3 have been permanently shut down since January 2012. After the reactors were shut down, all fuel assemblies were removed from the reactor vessels and placed in the SFP (on October 15, 2012, at Unit 3 and on July 18, 2013, at Unit 2). Spent fuel is currently stored on site in an SFP and in an ISFSI dry-cask storage facility.

By letter dated June 12, 2013, Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML131640201), SCE submitted a certification to the NRC indicating its intention to permanently cease power operations at SONGS under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i). By letter dated June 28, 2013, Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13183A391), SCE submitted a certification of permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel for SONGS Unit 3. By letter dated July 22, 2013, Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13204A304), SCE submitted a certification of permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel for SONGS Unit 2, under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii). Upon the docketing of these certifications, the 10 CFR Part 50 licenses for SONGS no longer authorized operation of the reactors, or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessels, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2).

By letter dated March 31, 2014, Emergency Planning Exemption Request (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A332), SCE requested exemptions from specific EP requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 for SONGS. The staff issued a request for additional information (RAI) in a letter dated August 27, 2014, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 -

Request for Additional Information Re: Emergency Planning Exemption Request (ADAMS Accession No. ML14209A005). In a letter dated September 9, 2014, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency Planning Exemption Request San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, 3 and ISFSI (ADAMS Accession No. ML14258A003), SCE provided responses to the RAI.

The Commissioners The staff issued a supplemental RAI to the licensee in an e-mail dated September 10, 2014, Draft RAI RE: Emergency Planning Exemption Request (TAC Nos. MF 3835, MF 3836, and MF 3837) (ADAMS Accession No. ML14274A210). In a letter dated October 2, 2014, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency Planning Exemption Request (ADAMS Accession No. ML14280A265), SCE provided responses to the RAI, which contained information applicable to the radiological dose consequences of potential DBAs and beyond DBAs.

The staff also transmitted a supplemental RAI to the licensee in an e-mail dated September 22, 2014, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, Draft Request for Additional Information (ADAMS Accession No. ML14274A213). In a letter dated October 6, 2014, Response to Request for Additional Information Proposed Exemptions from Certain Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E (ADAMS Accession No. ML14282A021),

SCE provided responses to the RAI, which contained information applicable to the SFP inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the loss-of-water inventory. The information provided by SCE included justifications for each requested exemption. Note that this document is withheld from public release as it contains security-related information.

By letter dated October 7, 2014, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency Planning Exemption Request (ADAMS Accession No. ML14287A228), the licensee corrected a factual error in its October 2, 2014, RAI response. The licensee stated that the error did not change the conclusions stated in the relevant paragraph of the October 2, 2014, RAI response.

In an e-mail dated October 8, 2014, Request for Clarification of October 6, 2014 RAI Response Concerning Proposed Exemption from Certain EP Requirements (TAC Nos. MF 3835, MF 3836, and MF 3837) (ADAMS Accession No. ML14296A469), the staff requested a clarification of the two items in the licensees October 6, 2014, RAI response. By letter dated October 27, 2014, Response to Request for Clarification of October 6, 2014 RAI Responses Concerning Emergency Planning Exemption Request San Onofre Generating Station, Units 1, 2, 3 and ISFSI (ADAMS Accession No. ML14303A257), SCE provided a response, which contained additional information applicable to their SFP makeup and spray strategies.

In Enclosure 1 to the March 31, 2014, letter, SCE provided the accident analyses associated with DBAs and beyond DBAs as a basis for justifying the request for approval of the SONGS Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan. SCEs exemption request included radiological analyses to show that the radiological consequences of DBAs will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Additionally, SCE performed analyses for loss of SFP inventory events, including an event that has uncovered spent fuel with no cooling. In the unlikely event that no cooling of the spent fuel is possible, the analysis showed that more than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> would be available from the time the fuel is uncovered until it reaches a temperature of 900 degrees Celsius (C) to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions and, if necessary, for offsite authorities to employ their CEMP to take protective actions.

The Commissioners The staff requested further clarification for the adiabatic heatup time in its September 22, 2014, RAI request, specifically for SCE to provide the actual time to heat up to 900 degrees C relative to a specific date after the reactors were shut down. In its October 6, 2014, RAI response, SCE provided the following further analysis of uncovered spent fuel with no cooling through 2016:

DATE Decay Time Heat-up Time to Heat-up Time to (months) 565°C (hours) 900°C (hours)

October 12, 2014 33 10.7 17.8 February 12, 2015 37 12.0 20.0 June 12, 2015 41 13.4 22.3 December 12, 2015 47 15.4 25.6 June 12, 2016 53 17.3 28.7 December 12, 2016 59 19.0 31.6 These results show the time to reach 565 degrees C, which is the lowest temperature at which incipient cladding failure may occur and is below the temperature at which exothermic cladding oxidation may begin adding significant heat, is already also greater than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Therefore, the results also demonstrate that, in the event ample air is available for cladding oxidation, the extra heat produced by cladding oxidation could not result in heat up times to 900 degrees C of less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

In addition, the significant decay of short-lived radionuclides that has occurred since the January 2012 shutdown provides assurance in other ways. As indicated by the results of research conducted for NUREG-1738 and more recently, for NUREG-2161, Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite early fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements were relaxed.

As noted above, SCE furnished information concerning its SFP inventory makeup strategies to supplement its exemption request. The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on installed fire water pumps (two motor-driven and one diesel-driven) and service and firewater storage tanks; or an external strategy that uses portable pumps to initiate makeup flow into the SFPs through a seismic standpipe and standard fire hoses routed either over the SFPs edge or to a spray nozzle. The portable pumps consist of a skid-mounted pump that is capable of delivering 500 gallons per minute (GPM) and a trailer-mounted pump capable of delivering 2,500 GPM. SCE further provides that designated on-shift personnel are trained to implement such strategies and that they have plans in place to mitigate the consequences of an event involving a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory concurrently from the SFPs of both Units 2 and 3. SCE estimates that it would take approximately 55 minutes to deliver flow to one pool, with an additional 35 minutes to provide water to the second pool without relocation of the trailer-mounted pump. Relocation of the trailer-mounted pump, if required, would take approximately 30 additional minutes.

In a letter dated October 1, 2014, Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Supplement I to Amendment Applications 266 and 251 Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14280A264), SCE withdrew the proposed changes to the Mitigating Strategies License Condition for Units 2 and 3 (2.C(26) for

The Commissioners Unit 2 and 2.C(27) for Unit 3). This license condition requires SONGS to maintain its SFP inventory-makeup strategies as discussed above. SCE states that these diverse strategies provide for defense-in-depth and can be used to provide sufficient makeup or spray to the SFPs before the onset of zirconium cladding ignition. In the unlikely situation that a radiological release is expected, elements of the revised emergency plan would make it easier for offsite authorities to take protective actions under a CEMP. The licensee must still maintain an ability to determine whether a radiological release is occurring and if a release is occurring or expected to occur, promptly communicate that information to offsite authorities. SONGS uses commercial telephone lines or mobile communications devices, including cell and satellite phones, to notify the State and County agencies of a declared emergency. Section E, Notification Methods and Procedures, of the proposed SONGS Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML14354A338) states that SONGS, in cooperation with State and local authorities, has established mutually agreeable methods and procedures for notification of offsite response organizations. These procedures include the specific content and format of the initial notification message to be transmitted during an emergency, along with methods of transmission. The following offsite agencies, at a minimum, will receive the initial notification messages:

• the State of California,

• Orange County,

• San Diego County, and

• Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton.

The staff found the exemption application complete and found that the licensees associated technical justification provides a basis for the Commissions consideration of the requested exemption. Chapter 15 of the SONGS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ADAMS Accession No. ML13182A288), revised May 2013, described the DBAs that were applicable to SONGS during power operation. Many of the UFSAR accident scenarios involved failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the reactor core. By letter dated September 17, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14265A144), SCE submitted the revised UFSAR Chapter 15 analysis, which summarizes the evaluation of the current DBAs that remain applicable to the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of SONGS.

The staff reviewed SCEs exemption request against the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 72.32, Emergency Plan. The review considered the status of the facility, which is permanently shut down and defueled, and the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures.

The staff based its evaluation of the SCE request for exemptions from EP requirements on the site-specific analyses provided by SCE. The staff verified SCEs analyses and its calculations.

The analysis provides reasonable assurance that in granting the requested exemption to SCE:

(1) an offsite radiological release will not exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary for a DBA; and; (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond DBA resulting in a loss of all SFP cooling, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions and, if a release is projected to occur, there is sufficient time for offsite agencies to take protective actions using a CEMP to protect the health and safety of the public.

Consistent with the June 17, 1993, memorandum of understanding between the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), contained in Appendix A, Memorandum of

The Commissioners Understanding Between Federal Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to 44 CFR Part 353, Fee for Services in Support, Review and Approval of State and Local Government or Licensee Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness, the staff has discussed and coordinated its review of requests for exemptions from EP regulations with FEMA. As part of the staffs evaluation of the recent EP exemption request for the Kewaunee Power Station, the staff provided FEMA with a copy of SECY-14-0066 and the opportunity to ask questions, obtain clarification, and comment on the paper before the Commission received it for review. FEMA provided the following comments in response to the EP exemption proposed in SECY-14-0066:

FEMA is not taking a position on the technical arguments presented by the licensee or the NRCs assessments. FEMA recognizes the NRCs role to analyze the possibility of incidents that could result in offsite dose impacts. FEMA acknowledges that individual states and local governments have the primary authority and responsibility to protect their citizens and respond to disasters and emergencies. The exemption, if issued, could create a transitional environment for off-site emergency planners in how they consider radiological hazards. FEMA will continue to support offsite organizations as they adjust their plans, capabilities, and resources to the changing radiological threat.

Among the resources available to support FEMA stakeholders during the transition process include, but are not limited to, the National Preparedness System guidance materials, the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, and assistance from FEMA Headquarters and Regional Staff.

The NRC staff considered FEMAs comments as part of SECY-14-0066 and believes that the technical and safety basis for the exemption demonstrates reasonable assurance in the two areas mentioned above.

FEMA was offered the opportunity to comment on this draft SONGS SECY paper. In response, FEMA indicated that it had no further comments other than the inclusion of the statement above from SECY-14-0066.

The SONGS decommissioning facility, at the time the exemption is granted, would pose significantly less of a radiological risk to public health and safety than an operating power reactor, which should result in a straightforward transition to a more streamlined CEMP.

Aspects of existing offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans may remain in place, at the States discretion, before completion of any adjustments to State and local CEMPs that are appropriate for the reduced radiological risk and can be adopted to minimize burden on the State and local governments. SCE will still be required to maintain an onsite emergency plan, which would provide for the notification of, and coordination with, offsite organizations, to an extent commensurate with the approved exemptions.

The staffs exemption recommendation, if approved by the Commission, would not affect the authority that FEMA has under its regulations in 44 CFR Chapter I, Federal Emergency Management Agency, for overall emergency management and assistance to State and local response organizations, nor would it affect the responsibilities of State and local governments to establish and maintain CEMPs. The NRC would base its finding of reasonable assurance on its review of licensee onsite emergency preparedness and would not require a finding from FEMA on the adequacy of State and local CEMPs. Under its role as described in the National Response Framework, the NRC remains ready to support FEMA by providing it and State and

The Commissioners local governments with technical advice related to the safety and security of operations at the plant.

Though not considered as part of the staffs reasonable assurance determination, the staff is informing the Commission of ongoing efforts between SCE and the SONGS Interjurisdictional Planning Committee (IPC)3:

• In a letter dated June 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14282A021), SCE stated that it intended to fully comply with the nuclear power plant funding provisions of California Government Code Section 8610.5, that it would continue to provide funding for EP, until that section expires in July 2019, and that it will not seek changes to funding levels without prior consultation with the IPC.

• In accordance with an email dated October 22, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14297A489), the members of the SONGS IPC have committed to maintaining emergency response capabilities related to nuclear preparedness throughout the SONGS decommissioning process and to continuing a multi-agency partnership to accomplish this goal. As a part of ongoing EP efforts, the IPC will retain the ability to receive information, independently monitor and assess conditions, and take actions to protect residents, visitors, and emergency workers. Although plans will vary by agency, these public safety capabilities include law enforcement, fire and medical services, radiological monitoring, multi-agency coordination, and public information. While most of these capabilities are applicable to a variety of hazards, the IPC will preserve a specific focus on nuclear power plants as a part of their continuing preparedness efforts for as long as necessary.

In separate letters dated March 31, 2014, Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Respectively, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A314) and Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level Scheme, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Respectively, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ADAMS Accession No. ML14029A249), SCE also requested license amendments to approve its emergency plan, implementing changes that reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled status of SONGS.

The revised emergency plan also includes changes consistent with the proposed exemptions discussed in this paper. The staff is awaiting a decision on this paper before issuing a decision on the amendment requests.

CONCLUSION:

The NRC staff concludes that granting the exemption request, as provided in the enclosure, would provide: (1) an adequate basis for an acceptable state of emergency preparedness; and (2) in conjunction with arrangements made with offsite response agencies, reasonable 3

The IPC was formed in 1982 to address the EP requirements within the emergency planning zone for SONGS. The IPC is composed of representatives from: City of San Clemente, City of Dana Point, City of San Juan Capistrano, Orange County, San Diego County, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California State Parks, and Southern California Edison. The mission of this group is to integrate emergency plans, coordinate decisionmaking for SONGS-related activities and educate the public. (Source: http://www.songscommunity.com/partnerships.asp, accessed November 3, 2014.)

The Commissioners assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at SONGS.

The NRC staff has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, Specific Exemptions, the exemptions described in the enclosure are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and will be consistent with the common defense and security, and special circumstances are present.

RECOMMENDATION:

The exemption request is consistent with previously granted exemptions and SECY-14-0066 for the Kewaunee Power Station, and is commensurate with the risk associated with the facility.

The changes in regulatory requirements are appropriate because the traditional accident sequences that dominate operating reactor risk are no longer applicable. Continued application of the regulations to the licensee, to maintain its current level of EP, is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the regulation. Therefore, the staff recommends that the Commission:

Approve: The staffs proposal to grant SCEs requested EP exemptions from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 consistent with the discussion above.

COORDINATION:

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper and has no legal objection.

/RA/

Mark A. Satorius Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

Exemptions to Rule Language

The Commissioners assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at SONGS.

The NRC staff has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, Specific Exemptions, the exemptions described in the enclosure are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and will be consistent with the common defense and security, and special circumstances are present.

RECOMMENDATION:

The exemption request is consistent with previously granted exemptions and SECY-14-0066 for the Kewaunee Power Station, and is commensurate with the risk associated with the facility.

The changes in regulatory requirements are appropriate because the traditional accident sequences that dominate operating reactor risk are no longer applicable. Continued application of the regulations to the licensee, to maintain its current level of EP, is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the regulation. Therefore, the staff recommends that the Commission:

Approve: The staffs proposal to grant SCEs requested EP exemptions from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 consistent with the discussion above.

COORDINATION:

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper and has no legal objection.

/RA/

Mark A. Satorius Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

Exemptions to Rule Language ADAMS ACCESSION No.: ML14251A554

• via email l OFFICE: NSIR/DPR BC:NSIR/DPR DD/NSIR/DPR NRR NAME: MNorris JAnderson RLewis JUhle*

DATE: 10/09/2014 10/09/2014 10/14/2014 11/7/2014 OFFICE: RES NMSS RIV Tech Editor NAME: SCoffin* KJones* MDapas* CHsu*

DATE: 10/25/2014 10/23/2014 10/30/2014 11/6/2014 OFFICE: OGC NSIR FO EDO NAME: HBenowitz* JWiggins MSatorius DATE: 11/25/2014 12/3/14 12/17/14 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Exemptions to Rule Language Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language.

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification (b) The onsite and, except as provided in In the Statement of Considerations (SOC) for the paragraph (d) of this section, offsite final rule for emergency planning (EP) emergency response plans for nuclear requirements for independent spent fuel storage power reactors must meet the following installations (ISFSIs) and for monitor retrievable standards: storage (MRS) facilities (60 FR [Federal Register]

32430; June 22, 1995), the Commission responded to comments concerning offsite EP for ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded that, the offsite consequences of potential accidents at an ISFSI or an MRS would not warrant establishing Emergency Planning Zones.

In a nuclear power reactors permanently defueled state, the accident risks are more similar to an ISFSI or an MRS than an operating nuclear power plant. The EP program would be similar to that required for an ISFSI under Section 72.32(a) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) when fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) has more than 5 years of decay time and would not change substantially when all the fuel is transferred from the SFP to an onsite ISFSI.

Exemptions from offsite EP requirements have previously been approved when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is available from a partial drain-down event where cooling of the spent fuel is not effective until the hottest fuel assembly reaches 900°C. The technical basis that underlied the approval of the exemption request is based partly on the analysis of a time period that spent fuel stored in the SFP is unlikely to reach the zirconium ignition temperature in less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. This time period is based on a heat-up calculation which uses several simplifying assumptions. Some of these assumptions are conservative (adiabatic conditions), while others are non-conservative (no oxidation below 900°C).

Weighing the conservatisms and non-conservatisms, the staff judges that this calculation reasonably represents conditions that may occur in the event of an SFP accident.

Enclosure

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification The staff concluded that if 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> were available to initiate mitigative actions, or if needed, offsite protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP), formal offsite radiological emergency plans are not necessary for these permanently defueled nuclear power reactor licensees.

As supported by the licensees SFP analysis, the staff believes an exemption to the requirements for formal offsite radiological emergency plans is justified for a zirconium fire scenario considering the low likelihood of this event together with time available to take mitigative or protective actions between the initiating event and before the onset of a postulated fire.

The Southern California Edison (SCE) analysis has demonstrated that the radiological consequences of design-basis-accidents (DBAs) will not exceed the limits of the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agencys (EPAs)

Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. These analyses also show that as of October 12, 2014, in the unlikely event of a beyond DBA where the hottest fuel assembly adiabatic heat up occurs, 17.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is available to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective actions using a CEMP from the time the fuel is uncovered until it reaches the auto-ignition temperature of 900°C.

SCE furnished information to supplement its exemption request concerning its SFP inventory makeup strategies. The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on installed fire water pumps (two motor-driven and one diesel-driven) and service and firewater storage tanks; or an external strategy that uses portable pumps to initiate make-up flow into the pools through a seismic standpipe and standard fire water hoses routed either over the pools edges or to spray nozzles. SCE further provides that designated on-shift staff is trained to implement such 2

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification strategies and they have plans in-place to mitigate the consequences of an event involving a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory concurrently from both Units 2 and 3 SFPs. It is estimated that it would take approximately 55 minutes to deliver flow to one pool, with an additional 35 minutes to provide water to the second pool without having to relocate the trailer-mounted pump. Relocation of the trailer-mounted pump, if required, would take approximately 30 additional minutes. In a letter dated October 1, 2014, Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Supplement 1 to Amendment Applications 266 and 251 Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14280A264), SCE withdrew its proposed changes to the Mitigating Strategies License Condition for Units 2 and 3 (2.C(26) for Unit 2 and 2.C(27) for Unit 3). These license conditions require the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) to maintain its SFP inventory makeup strategies as discussed above.

3

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification (1) Primary responsibilities for emergency Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

response by the nuclear facility licensee and by State and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.

(3) Arrangements for requesting and Decommissioning power reactors present a low effectively using assistance resources likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a have been made, arrangements to radiological release together with the time available accommodate State and local staff at the to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective licensees Emergency Operations Facility actions using a CEMP between the initiating event have been made, and other organizations and before the onset of a postulated fire. As such, capable of augmenting the planned an emergency operations facility would not be response have been identified. required. The nuclear island, control room, or other onsite location can provide for the communication and coordination with offsite organizations for the level of support required.

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

(4) A standard emergency classification Decommissioning power reactors present a low and action level scheme, the basis of likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a which include facility system and effluent radiological release together with the time available parameters, is in use by the nuclear to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective facility licensee, and State and local actions using a CEMP between the initiating event response plans call for reliance on and before the onset of a postulated fire. As such, information provided by facility licensees formal offsite radiological emergency response for determinations of minimum initial plans are not required.

offsite response measures.

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 99-01, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors (Revision 6), was found to be an acceptable method for development of emergency action levels (EALs) and was endorsed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a letter dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463). NEI 99-01 provides EALs for non-passive operating nuclear power reactors, permanently defueled reactors and ISFSIs.

SCE requested a license amendment to revise its EAL scheme to NEI 99-01, Revision 6 in a letter 4

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification dated March 31, 2014, Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level Scheme, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Respectively, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ADAMS Accession No. ML14029A249).

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

(5) Procedures have been established for Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and follow up messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.

(6) Provisions exist for prompt Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

(7) Information is made available to the Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), [T]he principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established.

(9) Adequate methods, systems, and Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.

5

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification (10) A range of protective actions has In the unlikely event of an SFP accident, the iodine been developed for the plume exposure isotopes, which contribute to an off-site dose from pathway EPZ for emergency workers and an operating reactor accident, are not present, so the public. In developing this range of potassium iodide distribution would no longer serve actions, consideration has been given to as an effective or necessary supplemental evacuation, sheltering, and, as a protective action.

supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. The Commission responded to comments in its Evacuation time estimates have been SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for developed by applicants and licensees. ISFSIs and MRS facilities (60 FR 32435), and Licensees shall update the evacuation concluded that, the offsite consequences of time estimates on a periodic basis. potential accidents at an ISFSI or an MRS would Guidelines for the choice of protective not warrant establishing Emergency Planning actions during an emergency, consistent Zones. Additionally, in the SOC for the final rule for with Federal guidance, are developed and EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS facilities in place, and protective actions for the (60 FR 32430), the Commission responded to ingestion exposure pathway EPZ comments concerning site-specific EP that includes appropriate to the locale have been evacuation of surrounding population for an ISFSI developed. not at a reactor site, and concluded that, The Commission does not agree that as a general matter emergency plans for an ISFSI must include evacuation planning.

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

(c)(2) Generally, the plume exposure Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).

pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal. The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.

6

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification

1. The applicant's emergency plans shall The EP rule published in the Federal Register contain, but not necessarily be limited to, (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011) amended information needed to demonstrate certain requirements in 10 CFR Part 50. Among compliance with the elements set forth the changes, the definition of hostile action was below, i.e., organization for coping with added as an act directed toward a nuclear power radiological emergencies, assessment plant or its personnel. This definition is based on actions, activation of emergency the definition of hostile action provided in NRC organization, notification procedures, Bulletin 2005-02, Emergency Preparedness and emergency facilities and equipment, Response Actions for Security-Based Events.

training, maintaining emergency NRC Bulletin 2005-02 is not applicable to nuclear preparedness, and recovery, and onsite power reactors that have permanently ceased protective actions during hostile action. In operations and have certified that fuel has been addition, the emergency response plans removed from the reactor vessel.

submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license under this The NRC excluded non-power reactors from the Part, or for an early site permit (as definition of "hostile action" at the time of the applicable) or combined license under rulemaking because, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a 10 CFR Part 52, shall contain information non-power reactor is not considered a nuclear needed to demonstrate compliance with power reactor and a regulatory basis had not been the standards described in § 50.47(b), developed to support the inclusion of non-power and they will be evaluated against those reactors in the definition of hostile action.

standards. Similarly, a decommissioning power reactor or ISFSI is not a nuclear reactor as defined in the NRCs regulations. A decommissioning power reactor also has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. For all of these reasons, the staff concludes that a decommissioning power reactor is not a facility that falls within the definition of hostile action.

Similarly, for security, risk insights can be used to determine which targets are important to protect against sabotage. A level of security commensurate with the consequences of a sabotage event is required and is evaluated on a site-specific basis. The severity of the consequences declines as fuel ages and, thereby, removes over time the underlying concern that a sabotage attack could cause offsite radiological consequences.

Although this analysis provides a justification for exempting SONGS from hostile action related requirements, some EP requirements for security-based events are maintained. The classification of 7

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification security-based events, notification of offsite authorities and coordination with offsite agencies under a CEMP concept are still required.

2. This nuclear power reactor license Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).

applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the NRC.

3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, use NRC approved evacuation time Section IV.2.

estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the formulation of protective action recommendations and shall provide the ETEs and ETE updates to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.

4. Within 365 days of the later of the date Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, of the availability of the most recent Section IV.2.

decennial census data from the U.S.

Census Bureau or December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor licensees shall develop an ETE analysis using this decennial data and submit it under § 50.4 to the NRC. These licensees shall submit this ETE analysis to the NRC at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies

5. During the years between decennial Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, censuses, nuclear power reactor Section IV.2.

licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of the previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and State/local government population data, if available. These licensees shall maintain these estimates so that they are available 8

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification for NRC inspection during the period between decennial censuses and shall submit these estimates to the NRC with any updated ETE analysis.

6. If at any time during the decennial Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, period, the EPZ permanent resident Section IV.2.

population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the nuclear power reactor licensee's currently NRC approved or updated ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the NRC under § 50.4 no later than 365 days after the licensee's determination that the criteria for updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.

A.1. A description of the normal plant Based on the permanently shut down and defueled operating organization. status of the reactor, a decommissioning reactor is not authorized to operate under 10 CFR 50.82(a).

Because the licensee cannot operate the reactors, the licensee does not have a plant operating organization.

A.3. A description, by position and The number of staff at decommissioning sites is function to be performed, of the licensee's generally small but is commensurate with the need headquarters personnel who will be sent to safely store spent fuel at the facility in a manner to the plant site to augment the onsite that is protective of public health and safety.

emergency organization. Decommissioning sites typically have a level of emergency response that does not require response by the licensees headquarters personnel.

A.4. Identification, by position and function Although the likelihood of events that would result to be performed, of persons within the in doses in excess of the EPA PAGs to the public licensee organization who will be beyond the owner controlled area boundary based responsible for making offsite dose on the permanently shut down and defueled status projections, and a description of how of the reactor is extremely low, the licensee still 9

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification these projections will be made and the must be able to determine if a radiological release results transmitted to State and local is occurring. If a release is occurring, then the authorities, NRC, and other appropriate licensee staff should promptly communicate that governmental entities. information to offsite authorities for their consideration. The offsite organizations are responsible for deciding what, if any, protective actions should be taken based on a CEMP.

A.5. Identification, by position and function SONGS has performed an on-shift staffing to be performed, of other employees of analysis, addressing SFP mitigating strategies, the licensee with special qualifications for including review of collateral duties. The specific coping with emergency conditions that event scenario utilized for the staffing analysis may arise. Other persons with special involves a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory in qualifications, such as consultants, who one SFP.

are not employees of the licensee and who may be called upon for assistance for In addition to the scenario described above, emergencies shall also be identified. The SONGS performed a separate case study to special qualifications of these persons validate that the minimum on-shift staff can perform shall be described. mitigation efforts in the event that the second SFP is also affected by a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory.

A.7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and a description of the assistance Section IV.1.

expected from, appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, including hostile action at the site. For purposes of this appendix, hostile action is defined as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that include the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force.

A.8. Identification of the State and/or local Offsite emergency measures are limited to support officials responsible for planning for, provided by local police, fire departments, and ordering and controlling appropriate ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate.

protective actions, including evacuations Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible when necessary. events to exceed the EPA PAGs, protective actions such as evacuation should not be required, but could be implemented at the discretion of offsite authorities using a CEMP.

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).

10

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification A.9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear Responsibilities should be well defined in the power reactor licensees, a detailed emergency plan and procedures, regularly tested analysis demonstrating that on-shift through drills and exercises audited and inspected personnel assigned emergency plan by the licensee and the NRC. The duties of the on-implementation functions are not assigned shift personnel at a decommissioning reactor responsibilities that would prevent the facility are not as complicated and diverse as those timely performance of their assigned for an operating power reactor.

functions as specified in the emergency plan. The staff considered the similarity between the staffing levels at a permanently shut down and defueled reactor and staffing levels at an operating power reactor site. The minimal systems and equipment needed to maintain the spent nuclear fuel in the SFP or in a dry cask storage system in a safe condition requires minimal personnel and is governed by Technical Specifications. In the EP final rule published in the Federal Register (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011), the NRC concluded that the staffing analysis requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees due to the small staffing levels required to operate the facility.

The staff also examined the actions required to mitigate the very low probability beyond design-basis events for the SFP. In a letter dated October 1, 2014, Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Supplement 1 to Amendment Applications 266 and 251 Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14280A264), SCE withdrew the proposed changes to the Mitigating Strategies License Condition for Units 2 and 3 (2.C(26) for Unit 2 and 2.C(27) for Unit 3). This license condition requires SONGS to maintain its SFP inventory makeup strategies as discussed above.

SONGS has performed an on-shift staffing analysis, addressing SFP mitigating strategies, including review of collateral duties. The specific event scenario utilized for the staffing analysis involves a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory in one SFP.

11

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification In addition to the scenario described above, SONGS performed a separate case study to validate that the minimum on-shift staff can perform mitigation efforts in the event that the second SFP is also affected by a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory.

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1.

B.1. The means to be used for NEI 99-01 was found to be an acceptable method determining the magnitude of, and for for development of EALs. No offsite protective continually assessing the impact of, the actions are anticipated to be necessary, so release of radioactive materials shall be classification above the alert level is no longer described, including emergency action required, which is consistent with ISFSI facilities.

levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and As discussed previously, SCE requested a license participation of local and State agencies, amendment to revise its EAL scheme to NEI 99-01, the Commission, and other Federal Revision 6 in a letter dated March 31, 2014, agencies, and the emergency action Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level levels that are to be used for determining Scheme, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, when and what type of protective Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and Independent measures should be considered within Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ADAMS and outside the site boundary to protect Accession No. ML14029A249).

health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, conditions and instrumentation in addition Appendix E,Section IV.1.

to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant. The initial emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant or licensee and State and local governmental authorities, and approved by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be reviewed with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis.

C.1. The entire spectrum of emergency Containment parameters do not provide an conditions that involve the alerting or indication of the conditions at a defueled facility activating of progressively larger and emergency core cooling systems are no longer segments of the total emergency required. Other indications, such as SFP level or organization shall be described. The temperature, can be used at sites where there is communication steps to be taken to alert spent fuel in the SFPs.

or activate emergency personnel under 12

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification each class of emergency shall be In the SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for described. Emergency action levels ISFSIs and for MRS facilities (60 FR 32430), the (based not only on onsite and offsite Commission responded to comments concerning a radiation monitoring information but also general emergency at an ISFSI and MRS, and on readings from a number of sensors concluded that, an essential element of a that indicate a potential emergency, such General Emergency is that a release can be as the pressure in containment and the reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAGs response of the Emergency Core Cooling exposure levels off site for more than the System) for notification of offsite agencies immediate site area.

shall be described. The existence, but not the details, of a message authentication The probability of a condition reaching the level scheme shall be noted for such agencies. above an emergency classification of alert is very The emergency classes defined shall low. In the event of an accident at a defueled include: (1) notification of unusual events, facility that meets the conditions for exemption (2) alert, (3) site area emergency, and from formal EP requirements, there will be (4) general emergency. These classes are available time for event mitigation and, if further discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA- necessary, implementation of offsite protective REP-1. actions using a CEMP.

NEI 99-01 was found to be an acceptable method for development of EALs. No offsite protective actions are anticipated to be necessary, so classification above the alert level is no longer required.

13

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification C.2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power In the EP rule published in the Federal Register reactor licensees shall establish and (76 FR 72560), non-power reactor licensees were maintain the capability to assess, classify, not required to assess, classify and declare an and declare an emergency condition emergency condition within 15 minutes. An SFP within 15 minutes after the availability of and an ISFSI are also not nuclear power reactors as indications to plant operators that an defined in the NRCs regulations. A emergency action level has been decommissioning power reactor has a low likelihood exceeded and shall promptly declare the of a credible accident resulting in radiological emergency condition as soon as possible releases requiring offsite protective measures. For following identification of the appropriate these reasons, the staff concludes that a emergency classification level. Licensees decommissioning power reactor should not be shall not construe these criteria as a required to assess, classify and declare an grace period to attempt to restore plant emergency condition within 15 minutes.

conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an emergency action level that has been exceeded.

Licensees shall not construe these criteria as preventing implementation of response actions deemed by the licensee to be necessary to protect public health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.

D.1. Administrative and physical means Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and for notifying local, State, and Federal 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).

officials and agencies and agreements reached with these officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become necessary, shall be described. This description shall include identification of the appropriate officials, by title and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the EPZs.

14

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification D.2. Provisions shall be described for Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, yearly dissemination to the public within Section IV.D.1.

the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency planning information, such as the methods and times required for public notification and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects of radiation, and a listing of local broadcast stations that will be used for dissemination of information during an emergency.

Signs or other measures shall also be used to disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would be helpful if an accident occurs.

D.3. A licensee shall have the capability to While the capability needs to exist for the notify responsible State and local notification of offsite government agencies within a governmental agencies within 15 minutes specified time period, previous exemptions have after declaring an emergency. The allowed for extending the State and local licensee shall demonstrate that the government agencies notification time up to appropriate governmental authorities have 60 minutes based on the site-specific justification the capability to make a public alerting provided.

and notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an SCEs exemption request provides that the emergency condition. Prior to initial SONGS will make notifications to the State of operation greater than 5 percent of rated California, the local counties (Orange and San thermal power of the first reactor at the Diego), and Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton site, each nuclear power reactor licensee within 60 minutes of declaration of an event. In the shall demonstrate that administrative and permanently defueled condition of the reactor, the physical means have been established for rapidly developing scenarios associated with alerting and providing prompt instructions events initiated during reactor power operation are to the public with the plume exposure no longer credible.

pathway EPZ. The design objective of the prompt public alert and notification system Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and shall be to have the capability to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).

essentially complete the initial alerting and notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and notification capability will range from immediate alerting and notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is 15

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification substantial time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and notification system. The alerting and notification capability shall additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup method of public alerting and notification capable of being used in the event the primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable during an emergency to alert or notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. The backup method shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15 minute design objective for the primary prompt public alert and notification system. When there is a decision to activate the alert and notification system, the appropriate governmental authorities will determine whether to activate the entire alert and notification system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such a public alert and notification system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities.

D.4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, power reactor site's alert and notification Section IV.D.3 regarding the alert and notification design report, including the backup alert system requirements.

and notification capability, as of December 23, 2011, then the backup alert and notification capability requirements in Section IV.D.3 must be implemented by December 24, 2012. If the alert and notification design report does not include a backup alert and notification capability or needs revision to ensure adequate backup alert and notification capability, then a revision of the alert and notification design report must be submitted to FEMA for review by June 24, 2013, and the FEMA-approved backup alert and notification means must be implemented 16

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification within 365 days after FEMA approval.

However, the total time period to implement a FEMA-approved backup alert and notification means must not exceed June 22, 2015.

E.8.a.(i) A licensee onsite technical Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible support center and an emergency events to exceed the EPA PAGs at the site operations facility from which effective boundary, the available time for event mitigation at direction can be given and effective a decommissioning power reactor and, if needed, control can be exercised during an to implement offsite protective actions using a emergency; CEMP, an emergency operations facility (EOF) would not be required to support offsite agency response. Onsite actions may be directed from the control room or other location, without the requirements imposed on a technical support center (TSC).

E.8.a. (ii) For nuclear power reactor NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency licensees, a licensee onsite operational Response Facilities, provides that the operational support center; support center (OSC) is an onsite area separate from the control room and the TSC where licensee operations support personnel will assemble in an emergency. For a decommissioning power reactor, an OSC is no longer required to meet its original purpose of an assembly area for plant logistical support during an emergency. The OSC function can be incorporated into another facility.

E.8.b. For a nuclear power reactor Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).

licensee's emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, either a facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s), or a primary facility located less than 10 miles from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s). An emergency operations facility may serve more than one nuclear power reactor site.

A licensee desiring to locate an emergency operations facility more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site shall request prior Commission approval by submitting an application for an amendment to its license. For an emergency operations facility located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power 17

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification reactor site, provisions must be made for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and offsite responders can interact face-to-face with emergency response personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor site. Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the emergency operations facility must include the following:

(1) Space for members of an NRC site team and Federal, State, and local responders; (2) Additional space for conducting briefings with emergency response personnel; (3) Communication with other licensee and offsite emergency response facilities; (4) Access to plant data and radiological information; and (5) Access to copying equipment and office supplies; E.8.c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).

power reactor licensee's emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, a facility having the following capabilities:

(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves; (2) The capability to analyze plant technical information and provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves; and (3) The capability to support response to events occurring simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the emergency operations facility serves more 18

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification than one site; and E.8.d. For nuclear power reactor Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, licensees, an alternative facility (or Section IV.1 regarding hostile action.

facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively having the following characteristics: the capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation, for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action. The requirements in this paragraph 8.d must be implemented no later than December 23, 2014, with the exception of the capability for staging emergency response organization personnel at the alternative facility (or facilities) and the capability for communications with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security, which must be implemented no later than June 20, 2012.

E.8.e. A licensee shall not be subject to Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).

the requirements of paragraph 8.b of this section for an existing emergency operations facility approved as of December 23, 2011; E.9.a. Provisions for communications with Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and contiguous State/local governments within 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).

the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such communication shall be tested monthly. The State and the local governments in which the nuclear facility is located need to be informed of events and emergencies, so lines of communication must be maintained.

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10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification E.9.c. Provision for communications Because of the low probability of DBAs or other among the nuclear power reactor control credible events that would be expected to exceed room, the onsite technical support center, the EPA PAGs and the available time for event and the emergency operations facility; mitigation and, if needed, implementation of offsite and among the nuclear facility, the protective actions using a CEMP, there is no need principal State and local emergency for the TSC, EOF, or offsite field assessment operations centers, and the field teams.

assessment teams. Such communications systems shall be tested Also refer to justification for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).

annually. Communication with State and local emergency operations centers is maintained to coordinate assistance on site if required.

E.9.d. Provisions for communications by The functions of the control room, EOF, TSC, and the licensee with NRC Headquarters and OSC may be combined into one or more locations the appropriate NRC Regional Office due to the smaller facility staff and the greatly Operations Center from the nuclear power reduced required interaction with State and local reactor control room, the onsite technical emergency response facilities.

support center, and the emergency operations facility. Such communications Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

shall be tested monthly.

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10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification F.1. The program to provide for: (a) The Decommissioning power reactor sites typically training of employees and exercising, by have a level of emergency response that does not periodic drills, of radiation emergency require additional response by the licensees plans to ensure that employees of the headquarters personnel. Therefore, the staff licensee are familiar with their specific considers exempting licensees headquarters emergency response duties, and (b) The personnel from training requirements to be participation in the training and drills by reasonable.

other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible emergency shall be described. This shall events to exceed the EPA PAGs, offsite include a description of specialized initial emergency measures are limited to support training and periodic retraining programs provided by local police, fire departments, and to be provided to each of the following ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate.

categories of emergency personnel: Local news media personnel no longer need radiological orientation training since they will not

i. Directors and/or coordinators of the be called upon to support the formal Joint plant emergency organization; Information Center. The term Civil Defense is no longer commonly used; references to this term in ii. Personnel responsible for accident the examples provided in the regulation are, assessment, including control room shift therefore, not needed personnel; iii. Radiological monitoring teams; iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades);

v. Repair and damage control teams; vi. First aid and rescue teams; vii. Medical support personnel; viii. Licensees headquarters support personnel; ix. Security personnel.

In addition, a radiological orientation training program shall be made available to local services personnel; e.g., local emergency services/Civil Defense, local law enforcement personnel, local news media persons.

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10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification F.2. The plan shall describe provisions for Because of the low probability of DBAs or other the conduct of emergency preparedness credible events that would be expected to exceed exercises as follows: Exercises shall test the limits of EPA PAGs and the available time for the adequacy of timing and content of event mitigation and, if necessary, offsite protective implementing procedures and methods, actions from a CEMP, the public alert and test emergency equipment and notification system will not be used and, therefore, communications networks, test the public requires no testing.

alert and notification system, and ensure that emergency organization personnel Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

are familiar with their duties.

F.2.a. A full participation exercise which Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible tests as much of the licensee, State, and events that would be expected to exceed the limits local emergency plans as is reasonably of EPA PAGs, the available time for event achievable without mandatory public mitigation and, if necessary, implementation of participation shall be conducted for each offsite protective actions using a CEMP, no formal site at which a power reactor is located. offsite radiological emergency plans are required.

Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at The intent of submitting exercise scenarios at an least 60 days before use in a full operating power reactor site is to check that participation exercise required by this licensees utilize different scenarios in order to paragraph 2.a. prevent the preconditioning of responders at power reactors. For decommissioning power reactor F.2.a.(i), (ii), and (iii) are not applicable. sites, there are limited events that could occur and, as such, the previously routine progression to general emergency in an operating power reactor site scenario is not applicable.

The licensee would be exempt from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii) because the licensee would be exempt from the umbrella provision of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.

F.2.b. Each licensee at each site shall Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, conduct a subsequent exercise of its Section IV.F.2.a.

onsite emergency plan every 2 years.

Nuclear power reactor licensees shall The low probability of DBAs or other credible submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at events that would exceed the EPA PAGs, the least 60 days before use in an exercise available time for event mitigation and, if required by this paragraph 2.b. The necessary, implementation of offsite protective exercise may be included in the full actions using a CEMP, render a TSC, OSC and participation biennial exercise required by EOF unnecessary. The principal functions paragraph 2.c. of this section. In addition, required by regulation can be performed at an the licensee shall take actions necessary onsite location that does not meet the requirements to ensure that adequate emergency of the TSC, OSC or EOF.

response capabilities are maintained during the interval between biennial 22

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification exercises by conducting drills, including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the principal functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency response include activities such as management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, event classification, notification of offsite authorities, and assessment of the onsite and offsite impact of radiological releases, protective action recommendation development, protective action decision making, plant system repair and mitigative action implementation. During these drills, activation of all of the licensee's emergency response facilities (Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF))

would not be necessary, licensees would have the opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be permitted, operating staff in all participating facilities would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on the onsite exercise training objectives.

F.2.c. Offsite plans for each site shall be Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, exercised biennially with full participation Section IV.F.2.a.

by each offsite authority having a role under the radiological response plan.

Where the offsite authority has a role under a radiological response plan for more than one site, it shall fully participate in one exercise every two years and shall, at least, partially participate in other offsite plan exercises in this period. If two different licensees each have licensed facilities located either on the same site or on adjacent, contiguous sites, and share most of the elements defining co-located licensees, then each licensee shall:

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10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification (1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its onsite emergency plan; (2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite biennial full or partial participation exercise; (3) Conduct emergency preparedness activities and interactions in the years between its participation in the offsite full or partial participation exercise with offsite authorities, to test and maintain interface among the affected State and local authorities and the licensee. Co-located licensees shall also participate in emergency preparedness activities and interaction with offsite authorities for the period between exercises; (4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its onsite emergency plan in each exercise cycle; and (5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or partial participation hostile action exercise in alternating exercise cycles.

F.2.d. Each State with responsibility for Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, nuclear power reactor emergency Section IV.2.

preparedness should fully participate in the ingestion pathway portion of exercises at least once every exercise cycle. In States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ, the State should rotate this participation from site to site. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor emergency preparedness should fully participate in a hostile action exercise at least once every cycle and should fully participate in one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015. States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ should rotate this participation from site to site.

F.2.e. Licensees shall enable any State or Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, local Government located within the Section IV.2.

plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in the licensees drills when requested by such State or local government.

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10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification F.2.f. Remedial exercises will be required The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily is responsible for evaluating the adequacy of offsite tested during the biennial exercise, such response during an exercise. No action is that NRC, in consultation with FEMA, expected from State or local government cannot (1) find reasonable assurance that organizations in response to an event at a adequate protective measures can and decommissioning power reactor site other than will be taken in the event of a radiological firefighting, law enforcement and emergency or (2) determine that the ambulance/medical services support. A Emergency Response Organization memorandum of understanding should be in place (ERO) has maintained key skills specific for those services. Offsite response organizations to emergency response. The extent of will continue to take actions on a comprehensive State and local participation in remedial EP basis to protect the health and safety of the exercises must be sufficient to show that public as they would at any other industrial site.

appropriate corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not properly tested in the previous exercises.

F.2.i. Licensees shall use drill and Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible exercise scenarios that provide events to exceed the EPA PAGs, the available time reasonable assurance that anticipatory for event mitigation and, if needed, implementation responses will not result from of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, the preconditioning of participants. Such previously routine progression to general scenarios for nuclear power reactor emergency in power reactor site scenarios is not licensees must include a wide spectrum of applicable to a decommissioning site. Therefore, radiological releases and events, the licensee is not expected to demonstrate including hostile action. Exercise and drill response to a wide spectrum of events.

scenarios as appropriate must emphasize coordination among onsite and offsite response organizations. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1 regarding hostile action.

F.2.j. The exercises conducted under Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, paragraph 2 of this section by nuclear Section IV.F.2.

power reactor licensees must provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to implement the principal functional areas of emergency response identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. Each exercise must provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate key skills specific to emergency response duties in the control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint information center. Additionally, in each eight calendar year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor licensees shall vary the content of scenarios during exercises 25

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification conducted under paragraph 2 of this section to provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to the following scenario elements: hostile action directed at the plant site, no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public protective actions, an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, implementation of strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under § 50.54(hh)(2), and integration of offsite resources with onsite justification.

The licensee shall maintain a record of exercises conducted during each eight year exercise cycle that documents the content of scenarios used to comply with the requirements of this paragraph. Each licensee shall conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its sites no later than December 31, 2015. The first eight-year exercise cycle for a site will begin in the calendar year in which the first hostile action exercise is conducted. For a site licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the initial exercise required by Section IV.F.2.a.

I. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, reactor licensees, a range of protective Section IV.E.8.d.

actions to protect onsite personnel during hostile action must be developed to ensure the continued ability of the licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform the functions of the licensees emergency plan.

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