Text

2014-05 Draft Operating Test
	ML14184B148
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	05/22/2014
From:	Vincent Gaddy; Operations Branch IV
To:	; Omaha Public Power District
	laura hurley
References
	50-285/14-005
	Download: ML14184B148 (391)
	v • d • e

PAGE 1 OF 16 Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 TDB-V.9 TECHNICAL DATA BOOK SHUTDOWN MARGIN WORKSHEET Change No. EC 55737, 55738 Reason for Change Change requirement in Condition Step 4 Parts I and II, to require RCS boron analysis to be performed within the past 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months vice 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (EC 55738). Incorporate a table method to simplify the calculation. Reformat to a simpler approach (EC 55737). Major Change, no rev bars used.

Requestor J. Willett, K. Kingston Preparer K. Bessey Issue Date 05-21-13 3:00 pm R41

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-V.9 TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 2 OF 16 SHUTDOWN MARGIN WORKSHEET PART I - Instantaneous Shutdown Margin for use prior to a Reactor Trip or immediately following a Reactor trip. No changes are assumed for either boron or xenon, since this worksheet is only applicable for calculation of an instantaneous shutdown margin.

NOTE: Enter values in Table TDB-V.9-1, exactly as determined from the figures in the Technical Data Book and carry the algebraic signs through the calculations.

Plant Conditions

1. Record Present Date/Time

2. Record Reactor Power (before trip)

3. Record CEA Group Positions

4. Record Reactor Coolant System Boron Concentration prior to shutdown (Boron concentration analysis must have been performed within the past 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or more recently if boration or dilution has occurred)

5. Record Burnup - Take the most recent burnup from GARDEL OR take the most recent Burnup from the Control Room Log and add 30 MWD/MTU per EFPD to the Control Room Log Burnup Value.

Calculation of Shutdown Margin

6. Enter Regulating Group Worth, based on burnup (Step 5) and CEA positions using TDB Figure II.B.2.

7. Enter Shutdown Group Worths, based on burnup (Step 5) using TDB Figure II.B.1.a.

a. Sum the total shutdown CEA worth by adding Group A (7.a) and Group B (7.b) and recording in line 7.c.

8. Determine Power Defect

a. Enter Power Defect based on Reactor power level (Step 2 ) and burnup (Step 5) using TDB Figure II.C.2.b.

b. Calculate power defect by multiplying Reactor Power Level (Step 2) by Power Defect per Percent Reactor Power (Step 8.a).

R41

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-V.9 TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 3 OF 16

9. Determination of Stuck CEA Allowance (3 cases)

NOTE: Consider dropped CEAs which cannot be verified to be fully inserted as inoperable.

a. Case I - All CEAs are assumed to be operable. (No known inoperable CEAs)

(Enter N/A if this case is not applicable.)

Assume the highest worth CEAs will stick out of the core upon a Reactor trip.

Enter the value of the most reactive CEA, based on burnup (Step 5), from TDB Figure II.B.1.b., lines (1) thru (3) for the pre-trip configuration. Select the higher value.

NOTE: The worth of one inoperable CEA is dependent on the configuration of the withdrawn group(s) and the inoperable CEA.

b. Case II - One CEA is known to be inoperable (per Technical Specification 2.10.2(4) a.)

(Enter N/A if this case is not applicable.)

Account for this defective CEA (and the highest worth stuck CEA) by entering only the value from lines (4) thru (17) of TDB Figure II.B.1.b. for the inoperable CEA, based on burnup (Step 5). Select the higher value.

NOTE: The worth of more than one inoperable CEA is calculated by multiplying the most conservative Stuck CEA plus Ejected CEA Worth (TDB Figure II.B.1.b.

lines 4-17 by the number of inoperable CEAs).

NOTE: The values of lines (4) thru (17) of TDB Figure II.B.1.b. Include the total reactivity associated with the known inoperable CEA and the highest worth CEA which is assumed to stick out of the core upon a Reactor trip.

c. Case III - More than one CEA is known to be inoperable (per Technical Specification 2.10.2.(4)a.).

(Enter N/A if this case is not applicable.)

i. Enter total number of CEAs which are known to be inoperable per Technical Specification 2.10.2.(4) a.

ii. Enter the most conservative defective CEA worth from TDB Figure II.B.1.b.

Lines (4) thru (17) depending on inoperable CEA(s) location, based on burnup (Step 5). Select the higher value.

iii. Multiply the total number of inoperable CEAs (Step 9.c.i) by the highest/

most conservative CEA Worth (Step 9.c.ii).

R41

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-V.9 TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 4 OF 16 9.c iv. Enter total available CEA worth from TDB Figure II.B.1.a. based on burnup (Step 5) (Use Worth Without Group N value unless Group N Rods are inserted.)

NOTE: The Rod Worth Value found in Step 9.c.iv, is the maximum CEA Worth possible, therefore using the lesser of the two values from Steps 9.c.iii and 9.c.iv is more accurate and conservative.

v. Determine the Multiple Stuck CEA Worth by selecting the minimum of either Step 9.c.iii or Step 9.c.iv and record that value.

d. Enter Stuck CEA Allowance value from Step 9.a or 9.b or 9.c.v as appropriate.

10. Calculation of the Total Instantaneous Shutdown Margin (SDMI):

SDMI = Stuck CEAs (Step 9.d) + Power Defect (Step 8.b) - S/D CEAs worth (Step 7.c) -

Regulating CEA worth (Step 6)

11. Document the Technical Specification required Shutdown Margin per TS 2.10.1(1).

12. Calculate difference from required Shutdown Margin per TS 2.10.2(1).

NOTE: A 3.6% shutdown margin must be maintained in a Hot Shutdown condition, Tc > 210°F and a 3.0% Shutdown Margin must be maintained Tc<210°F.

(Technical Specification 2.10.2(1) and TDB-VI Item 13.0).

13. Shutdown Margin check:

a. If Step 12 is less than or equal to zero, the shutdown margin is adequate.

b. If Step 12 is greater than zero, use OI-ERFCS-1, to determine the number of gallons of acid to add.

REMARKS Completed by Date/Time /

R41

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-V.9 TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 5 OF 16 TDB-V.9 - 1

1. Present Date/Time /

2. Reactor Power (before trip) %

3. CEA Positions:

a. Group 1 inches

b. Group 2 inches

c. Group 3 inches

d. Group 4 inches

4. RCS Boron Concentration ppm

5. Burnup MWD/MTU

6. Regulating Group Worth %

a. Figure Used

7. Shutdown Worths

a. Group A %

b. Group B %

c. Total Shutdown Worth (Step 7.a + Step 7.b) %

8. Power Defect

a. Power Defect per Percent power % / %

b. Total Power Defect (Step 2 X Step 8a.) %

9. Stuck CEA Allowance

a. Highest CEA Worth %

b. Inoperable CEA Worth %

c. Multiple Inoperable CEAs

i. Number of Inoperable CEAs ii. Most Conservative CEA Worth %

iii. Total Inoperable CEA Worth (Step 9.c.i X Step 9.c.ii) %

iv. Total Available CEA Worth %

v. Multiple Stuck CEA Worth (Step 9.c.iii or Step 9.c.iv) %

d. Stuck CEA Allowance Value (9.a Step or 9.b or 9.c.v)

10. Instantaneous Shutdown Margin=

Step 9.d + Step 8.b - Step 7.c - Step 6 %

11. Tech. Spec. Shutdown Margin 3.6 %

12. Shutdown Margin (Step 10 + Step 11) %

13. Is Shutdown Margin Adequate? YES( 0 ) / NO ( > 0)

R41

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-II TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 24 OF 50 Figure II.B.1.a Table 1 - Fort Calhoun Station Cycle 27 CEA Group Worths at HZP in %

When Inserted Sequentially Table 2 - Fort Calhoun Station Cycle 27 CEA Groups 1 - 4 Worth of the Bottom 20 Inches at HZP in %

R34

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-II TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 25 OF 50 Figure II.B.1.b - Fort Calhoun Station Cycle 27 Reduction in Shutdown Margin or Stuck CEA(s) Worth (%)

R34

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-II TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 26 OF 50 Figure II.B.2.a - Cycle 27 Sequential Rod Worth vs. Rod Position (HZP, 0 to 5 GWD/MTU)

GROUPS 1-4 R34

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-2 Rev. 1 JPM

Title:

Time to empty EFWST Location: Classroom Approximate Time: 10 minutes Start Time:__________________

End Time:___________________

Actual Time: _________________

Reference(s): K/A 2.1.25 (RO Imp: 3.9)

Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

AOP-30 TDB VII EFWST Tank Curve Handout(s): AOP-30 Attachment A TDB-VII, EFWST Tank Curve Task List #: 0780 Applicable Position(s): RO Time Critical: NO Alternate Path: NO JPM Prepared by: Date:

JPM Reviewed by: Date:

1

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-2 Rev. 1 JPM

Title:

Time to empty EFWST Operators Name: __________________________________________

All Critical Steps (shaded) must be performed or simulated in accordance with the standards contained in this JPM The Operators performance was evaluated as (circle one):

SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Evaluators Signature: _____________________________ Date: __________

Reason, if unsatisfactory:

Tools & Equipment: None Safety Considerations: None Comments: None 2

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-2 Rev. 1 JPM

Title:

Time to empty EFWST TASK The time to empty the EFWST has been determined.

STANDARD:

INITIAL A loss of feedwater has occurred. FW-6 is being used to CONDITIONS: provide auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators at a rate of 110 gpm each. The water level in the Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank is at 120 inches.

INITIATING CUE: The CRS has directed you to determine how long it will take to empty the Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank.

3

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-2 Rev. 1 JPM

Title:

Time to empty EFWST Critical Steps shown in gray STEP ELEMENT STANDARD 1

Applicant refers to AOP-30, Attachment Applicant referred to AOP-30, Attachment A EFWST Emptying Characteristics or A and or TDB VII, EFWST Tank Curve.

TDB VII EFWST Tank Curve.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

2 Applicant Determines that the time to Applicant determined that the time to empty. empty the EFWST is 3.98 hours0.00113 days 0.0272 hours 1.62037e-4 weeks 3.7289e-5 months +/- .10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months .

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

Termination Criteria: The time to empty the EFWST has been determined.

4

NAME: ______________________

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL A loss of feedwater has occurred. FW-6 is being used to CONDITIONS: provide auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators at a rate of 110 gpm each. The water level in the Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank is 120 inches.

INITIATING CUE: The CRS has directed you the BOPO to determine how long it will take to empty the Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank.

Time to Empty: __________________

AOP-30 Page 32 of 34 Attachment A EFWST Emptying Characteristics End of Attachment A R12a

AOP-30 Page 33 of 34 Attachment B EFWST Time Available Between 50% and 25%

End of Attachment B R12a

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-VII TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 13 OF 29 Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank, FW-19 NOTES:

1. The RCS shall not be heated above 300°F without a minimum of 55,000 gal. (137 in. on the local sight glass) in the EFWST per T.S. 2.5(3). With instrument uncertainty for LIA-1183 and LIA-1188, this shall be considered 88%. Desired level is greater than 91%.

2. Tank curve is based on optimal calibration of LIA-1183 and LIA-1188.

3. The zero level indication (percent and inches) is taken to be the bottom of the tank. The percent level corresponds to the instrument reading in the Control Room.

R18a

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-3 Rev. 1 JPM

Title:

Boration paths with equipment out of service Location: Classroom Approximate Time: 20 minutes Start Time:__________________

End Time:___________________

Actual Time: _________________

Reference(s): K/A 2.2.15 (RO Imp: 3.9)

Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentation, such as drawings, line-ups, tag-outs, etc.

SO-O-21 TDB-VI One line electrical drawing TS section 2.2 Handout(s):

Task List #: 0119 Applicable Position(s): RO Time Critical: NO Alternate Path: NO JPM Prepared by: Date:

JPM Reviewed by: Date:

1

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-3 Rev. 1 JPM

Title:

Boration paths with equipment out of service Operators Name: __________________________________________

All Critical Steps (shaded) must be performed or simulated in accordance with the standards contained in this JPM The Operators performance was evaluated as (circle one):

SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Evaluators Signature: _____________________________ Date: __________

Reason, if unsatisfactory:

Tools & Equipment: None Safety Considerations: None Comments: SOs, TDB, TS, and plant drawings 2

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-3 Rev. 1 JPM

Title:

Boration paths with equipment out of service TASK Boration paths have been identified.

STANDARD:

INITIAL The plant is in SO-O-21, Shutdown Condition 1, CONDITIONS: Refueling Cavity Water Level Greater than or Equal to 23 feet above the top of the core with UGS removed CH-11A and CH-11B levels are both 30% with a boron concentration of 3.5 WT % Boric Acid. The SIRWT level is 42 with a boron concentration of 2150 ppm. Charging pump CH-1C has been tagged out of service.

480 volt buses 1B3A and 1B3A-4A will be deenergized to allow work to be performed on BT-1B3A.

INITIATING CUE: You have been requested to determine if 2 independent boration paths will be available once the buses are deenergized. If so, identify:

(1) the borated water source(s) and (2) pump(s) for each boration path.

3

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-3 Rev. 1 JPM

Title:

Boration paths with equipment out of service Critical Steps shown in gray STEP ELEMENT STANDARD

1. Determine equipment that will be NOTE to Evaluator; Steps 1-3 may affected by deenergizing the be performed in any order:

busses.

Applicant referred to plant one line electrical drawing (or other suitable plant reference) and determined that there will be no power to CH-1A, SI-2A and SI-2C.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

2. Determine BAST suitability as a boric acid source. Applicant referred to TDB-VI (COLR) figure 9 and determines that with 2150 PPM in the SIRWT and BAST boron at 3.5%, BAST level must be greater than 32%.

With a level of 30% in each BAST neither BAST can be a source by itself, but together they can count as one source.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

3. Determine SIRWT suitability as a boric acid source. Determine that the SIRWT cannot be used as a source with the charging pumps because the level is less that 80 but that it can be used as a source for the HPSI pump.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

4

STEP ELEMENT STANDARD

4. Determines if two independent boration paths are available with Applicant determined that 2 the buses deenergized and independent boration paths are identifies them. available:

1. CH-11A AND CH-11B (source) through (pump) CH-1B or CH-1C

2. SIRWT (Source) through pump SI-2B

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

Termination Criteria: Boration paths have been identified.

5

NAME: __________________________

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL The plant is in SO-O-21, Shutdown Condition 1, Refueling CONDITIONS: Cavity Water Level Greater than or Equal to 23 feet above the top of the core with UGS removed CH-11A and CH-11B levels are both 30% with a boron concentration of 3.5 WT % Boric Acid. The SIRWT level is 42 with a boron concentration of 2150 ppm. Charging pump CH-1C has been tagged out of service.

480 volt buses 1B3A and 1B3A-4A will be deenergized to allow work to be performed on BT-1B3A.

INITIATING CUE: You have been requested to determine if 2 independent boration paths will be available once the buses are deenergized. If so, identify:

ANSWERS: (1) the borated water source(s) and (2) pump for each boration path.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System 2.2.1 Boric Acid Flow Paths - Shutdown Applicability Applies to the operational status of the boric acid flow paths in MODES 4 and 5 when fuel is in the reactor.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to add negative reactivity.

Specification As a minimum, one of the following boric acid flow paths from an OPERABLE borated water source shall be OPERABLE:

a. A flow path from boric acid storage tank CH-11A via either a boric acid transfer pump or a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

b. A flow path from boric acid storage tank CH-11B via either a boric acid transfer pump or a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

c. A flow path from both boric acid storage tanks (CH-11A and CH-11B) via either a boric acid transfer pump or gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

d. A flow path from the SIRW tank via either a charging pump or a high pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

Required Actions (1) With none of the above boric acid flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

2.2 - Page 1 Amendment No. 131,172

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued) 2.2.2 Boric Acid Flow Paths - Operating Applicability Applies to the operational status of the boric acid flow paths whenever the reactor coolant temperature (Tcold) is greater than or equal to 210°F.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to add negative reactivity.

Specification At least two of the following boric acid flow paths from OPERABLE borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. A flow path from boric acid storage tank CH-11A, via either a boric acid transfer pump or a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

b. A flow path from boric acid storage tank CH-11B, via either a boric acid transfer pump or a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

c. A flow path from both boric acid storage tanks (CH-11A and CH-11B) via either a boric acid transfer pump or gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

d. A flow path from the SIRW tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

Required Actions (1) With only one of the above required boric acid flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore to at least two OPERABLE boric acid flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

(2) With the required actions of (1) not met, or with none of the required boric acid flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , in at least subcritical and <300°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in at least COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

2.2 - Page 2 Amendment No. 43,103,131,157,172, 249

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued) 2.2.3 Charging Pumps - Shutdown Applicability Applies to the operational status of charging pumps in MODES 4 and 5 when fuel is in the reactor.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to add negative reactivity.

Specification At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump in the boric acid flow path required to be OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 2.2.1 shall be OPERABLE.

Required Actions (1) With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

2.2 - Page 3 Amendment No. 131,172

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued) 2.2.4 Charging Pumps - Operating Applicability Applies to the operational status of charging pumps whenever the reactor coolant temperature (Tcold) is greater than or equal to 210°F.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to add negative reactivity.

Specification At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

Required Actions (1) With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore to at least two OPERABLE charging pumps within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

(2) With the required actions of (1) not met, or with no charging pumps OPERABLE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , in at least subcritical and <300°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in at least COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

2.2 - Page 4 Amendment No. 172, 249

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued) 2.2.5 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps - Shutdown Applicability Applies to the operational status of the boric acid transfer pumps in MODES 4 and 5 when fuel is in the reactor.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to add negative reactivity.

Specification At least one boric acid transfer pump shall be OPERABLE if the flow path through the boric acid transfer pump in Specification 2.2.1 is OPERABLE.

Required Actions (1) With no boric acid transfer pump OPERABLE as required to complete the flow path of Specification 2.2.1, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

2.2 - Page 5 Amendment No. 172

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued) 2.2.6 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps - Operating Applicability Applies to the operational status of the boric acid transfer pumps whenever the reactor coolant temperature (Tcold) is greater than or equal to 210°F.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to add negative reactivity.

Specification At least the boric acid transfer pump(s) in the boric acid flow path(s) required to be OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 2.2.2 shall be OPERABLE if the flow path(s) through the boric acid transfer pump(s) in Specification 2.2.2 is OPERABLE.

Required Actions (1) With one boric acid transfer pump required to be OPERABLE to complete one of the two boric acid flow paths of Specification 2.2.2 inoperable, restore the boric acid transfer pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

(2) With the required actions of (1) not met, or with two boric acid transfer pumps required to be OPERABLE to complete both of the boric acid flow paths of Specification 2.2.2 inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , in at least subcritical and <300°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in at least COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

2.2 - Page 6 Amendment No. 172, 249

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued) 2.2.7 Borated Water Source - Shutdown Applicability Applies to the operational status of borated water sources in MODES 4 and 5 when fuel is in the reactor.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to add negative reactivity.

Specification As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Boric acid storage tank CH-11A with the contents of the tank in accordance with the COLR for a SIRW tank boron concentration at REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION, and with the ambient temperature of the boric acid solution greater than or equal to the solubility temperature of Figure 2-12.

b. Boric acid storage tank CH-11B with the contents of the tank in accordance with the COLR for a SIRW tank boron concentration at REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION, and with the ambient temperature of the boric acid solution greater than or equal to the solubility temperature of Figure 2-12.

c. Both boric acid storage tanks CH-11A and CH-11B with the combined contents of both tanks in accordance with the COLR for a SIRW tank boron concentration at REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION, and with the ambient temperature of the boric acid solution greater than or equal to the solubility temperature of Figure 2-12.

d. The SIRW tank with:

1. A minimum useable borated water volume of 10,000 gallons,

2. A minimum boron concentration of REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 50°F.

Required Actions (1) With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

2.2 - Page 7 Amendment No. 172,192

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued) 2.2.8 Borated Water Sources - Operating Applicability Applies to the operational status of borated water sources whenever the reactor coolant temperature (Tcold) is greater than or equal to 210°F.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to add negative reactivity.

Specification Both of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. At least one boric acid storage tank (CH-11A or CH-11B) with the contents of the tank in accordance with the COLR, or both boric acid storage tanks (CH-11A and CH-11B) with the combined contents of both tanks in accordance with the COLR, and with the ambient temperature of the boric acid solution greater than or equal to the solubility temperature of Figure 2-12.

b. The SIRW tank with:

1. A minimum useable borated water volume of 25,000 gallons,

2. A minimum boron concentration of REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 50°F.

Required Actions (1) With the above required boric acid storage tank(s) inoperable, restore the tank(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

(2) With the SIRW tank inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , in at least subcritical and <300°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in at least COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

(3) With the required actions of (1) not met, or with no OPERABLE borated water source, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , in at least subcritical and

<300°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in at least COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

2.2 - Page 8 Amendment No. 172, 192

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued)

Basis The chemical and volume control system provides control of the reactor coolant system boron inventory.(1) This is normally accomplished by using any one of the three charging pumps in series with one of the two boric acid pumps, or taking suction from one or both of the gravity feed valves. An alternate method of boration is to use the charging pumps directly from the SIRW tank. A third method is to depressurize and use the safety injection pumps.

The chemical and volume control system (CVCS) operates in conjunction with the safety injection system to inject concentrated boric acid into the reactor coolant system on receipt of a pressurizer pressure low signal (PPLS) and/or a containment pressure high signal (CPHS). Because this system is not necessary to mitigate the consequences of accidents, as documented in USAR Chapter 14, this system, including charging pumps, is not classified as Engineered Safeguards equipment.(2)

Operability requirements for the CVCS borated water sources, boric acid flow paths, boric acid transfer pumps, and charging pumps ensure that an adequate source of boric acid is available to provide required shutdown margin during a plant cooldown and applicable plant modes. Operator actions have been identified to ensure the ability of the CVCS system to perform its function in the event of an equipment failure.

Borated water sources The sources of borated water available are: (1) boric acid storage tank CH-11A, boric acid storage tank CH-11B, or the combination of boric acid storage tanks CH-11A and CH-11B; and (2) the SIRW tank. These sources have sufficient boron to maintain required shutdown margin during a plant cooldown.

Whenever the reactor coolant temperature (Tcold) is greater than or equal to 210°F, two borated water sources must be operable in order to ensure sufficient capacity. For a borated water source to be considered operable, tank volume, boron concentration, and temperature of the contained boric acid solution must be within their respective requirements.

In Modes 4 and 5 when fuel is in the reactor, only one of these sources must be operable. One source is acceptable during these modes on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting core alterations and positive reactivity changes in the event the single source becomes inoperable. If no sources are operable, restore at least one source to operable status.

2.2 - Page 9 Amendment No. 172 TSBC-03-005-0

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued)

Basis (Continued)

Boric acid flow paths Consistent with the requirement to maintain two borated water sources operable when the RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 210(F, a minimum of two boric acid flow paths from operable borated water sources must also be operable. For a flow path to be considered operable, boric acid must be capable of being transported from the operable borated water source to the reactor coolant system. Consistent with the requirements for borated water sources, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is allowed to restore the system to two operable flow paths.

The flow paths available depend on which sources of borated water are operable. A flow path from a boric acid storage tank may be through the gravity feed connection or a boric acid transfer pump. When one of the operable sources is the combined contents of both boric acid storage tanks, then the flow path from this source requires that a flow path from each tank to the RCS be operable. This flow path can be established by using various combinations of gravity feed connections and/or boric acid transfer pumps. Both tanks could also be aligned to a single boric acid transfer pump since the specification requires, when using this flow path, that a flow path from the SIRW tank be operable. Therefore, two flow paths are available by maintaining the additional flow path from the SIRW tank.

In Modes 4 and 5 when fuel is in the reactor, only one flow path must be operable. One flow path is acceptable during these modes on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting core alterations and positive reactivity changes in the event the single flow path becomes inoperable. If no flow path is operable, restore at least one flow path to operable status.

Boric Acid Transfer Pumps Boric acid transfer pumps need only be operable if required to complete an operable boric acid flow path.

Whenever the reactor coolant temperature (Tcold) is greater than or equal to 210°F, two flow paths from operable borated water sources are required to be operable. The flow path from an operable boric acid storage tank may be through the gravity feed connection or a boric acid transfer pump. If the gravity feed connection from the operable boric acid storage tank is inoperable, then a boric acid transfer pump must be operable in order to complete an operable flow path. The specification allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to restore one boric acid transfer pump if it is required to complete a flow path. In this situation, the one inoperable pump renders one required flow path inoperable. The specification requires a plant shutdown if two boric acid transfer pumps are inoperable that are required to complete two flow paths. In this situation, the inoperable pumps render both required flow paths inoperable.

2.2 - Page 10 Amendment No. 172 TSBC-03-005-0

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued)

Basis (Continued)

In Modes 4 and 5 when fuel is in the reactor, only one flow path must be operable. This is consistent with the number of operable borated water sources required during these modes. If the gravity feed connection from the operable boric acid storage tank is inoperable, then a boric acid transfer pump must be operable in order to complete an operable flow path.

Boric acid transfer pumps are each of sufficient capacity to feed all three charging pumps at their maximum capacity.

Charging Pumps Whenever the reactor coolant temperature (Tcold) is greater than or equal to 210°F, two charging pumps must be operable in order to ensure it is possible to inject concentrated boric acid into the reactor coolant system. With only one pump operable, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is allowed to restore the system to two operable charging pumps. This is consistent with the allowed outage time for the borated water sources and flow paths required during these modes.

In Modes 4 and 5 when fuel is in the reactor, only one charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump must be operable. This is consistent with the number of operable borated water sources and flow paths required during these modes. A pump is required in order to complete an operable flow path to the reactor coolant system. There are additional restrictions on the use of high pressure safety injection pumps contained in Technical Specification 2.3 to ensure that the reactor vessel is not overpressurized.

Figure 2-12 contains a 10°F bias to account for temperature measurement uncertainty.

An administrative procedure to monitor the temperature of the BASTs and boric acid system piping in the Auxiliary Building ensures that the temperature requirements of Figure 2-12 are met. Should the system temperature be unacceptable for operation at the current boric acid concentration, steps will be taken to reduce the boric acid concentration or raise the temperature of the system such that the concentration is within the acceptable range of Figure 2-12.

The limits on component operability and the time periods for inoperability were selected on the basis of the redundancy indicated above and NUREG-0212 Revision 2. The allowed outage times for the various components are consistent such that a support system has the same allowed outage time as the supported system.

References (1) USAR Section 9.2 (2) USAR Section 6.1.2.1 2.2 - Page 11 Amendment No. 172 TSBC-03-005-0

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Figure 2-12 2.2 - Page 12 Amendment No. 131

SO-O-21 Informational Use Page 30 of 60 Shutdown Operations Protection Plan Revision 54 Attachment 1 - Shutdown Condition 1 Refueling Cavity Water Level Greater Than Or Equal To 23 Feet Above The Top Of The Core Key Safety Function Minimum Options Initial (Available unless otherwise specified) Required (Circle available/operable trains and place check mark next to each operating train.)

Heat Removal SDC (1 OPERABLE Loop and in 1 SI-1A SI-1B SI-3A SI-3B SI-3C T.S.

operation) T.S. 2.8.1(3) 2.8.1(3)2 1 AC-4A AC-4B SFP Cooling Pumps (1 in operation) 2 AC-5A AC-5B CCW Pumps (1 in operation) 2 AC-3A AC-3B AC-3C RW Pumps (1 in operation) 2 AC-10A AC-10B AC-10C AC-10D Spent Fuel Pool Temperature 45-100°F (Record value)

Inventory Control (Makeup flow paths, Form FC-1291)

CS Pump (with flow path) 1 SI-3A SI-3B SI-3C HPSI and Charging Pumps (with flow 1 HPSI paths) or SI-2A SI-2B SI-2C CH-1A CH-1B CH-1C 2 Charging Suction Path from Containment 1 HCV-383-3 HCV-383-4 Containment Sump Level Instruments 1 LI-387 LI-387-1 LI-388 LI-388-1 RCS Level Instruments 2 LRC-101X LRC-101Y LI-106 LI-199 Spent Fuel Pool Makeup Source 1 FP-1B Ability to cross-tie Blair water to FP (OI-FP-1 Att. 36)

Spent Fuel Pool Makeup Flow Path 1 Flow path to fire cabinet in Room 69 and sufficient hose to reach SFP Power System Availability Offsite Power 1 345 KV 161 KV Diesel Generators 1 DG-1 DG-2 Vital 4160V Buses 1 1A3 1A4 DC Bus with Battery DC Bus DC Bus #2 1 #1 & EE-

& EE-8B 8A Vital AC Instrument Buses 2 AI-40A AI-40B AI-40C AI-40D Non-vital AC Instrument Bus 2 AI-42A AI-42B SDC Control Power Inverter No. 2 Bypass 2 Inverter No. 2 (EE-8Q) powered from battery Transformer (MCC-4A1)

Instrument Air System Availability Air Compressors (1 in operation) 2 CA-1A CA-1B CA-1C Air Compressor Cooling 1 AC-9A AC-9B Potable water to in service air compressor Reactivity Control (Boric Acid flow paths, Form FC-1290)

Borated Water Source (OPERABLE) CH-11A + SIRWT T.S. 2.2.7 CH-11A CH-11B 1 CH-11B >34" >42" >92 (TDB-VI) (TDB-VI)

(TDB-VI) (1 HPSI) (2 HPSI) (Charging)

Charging Pumps (1 OPERABLE) 2 CH-1A CH-1B CH-1C SI-2A SI-2B SI-2C T.S. 2.2.3 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps If credited in CH-4A CH-4B (OPERABLE) T.S. 2.2.5 Boric Acid Flow Path (1 OPERABLE) CH-11A + SIRWT SIRWT SIRWT 2 CH-11A CH-11B T.S. 2.2.1 CH-11B (1 HPSI) (2 HPSI) (Charging)

Wide Range NI (OPERABLE) 2 AI-31A AI-31B AI-31C AI-31D T.S. 2.8.1(2)

SO-O-21 Informational Use Page 31 of 60 Shutdown Operations Protection Plan Revision 54 Attachment 1 - Shutdown Condition 1 Refueling Cavity Water Level Greater Than Or Equal To 23 Feet Above The Top Of The Core Key Safety Function Minimum Options Initial (Available unless otherwise specified) Required (Circle available/operable trains and place check mark next to each operating train.)

Containment Containment Fan with Cooling Water 1 VA-3A VA-3B VA-7C VA-7D Radiation Monitor (OPERABLE when 1 RM-051 RM-052 RM-062 required per T.S. 2.8.2(3))

CRHS/VIAS Channels (OPERABLE 86A/CRH 86B/CRHS when required per T.S. 2.8.2(3)) 1 S 86B/VIAS 86A/VIAS VIAS Manual Actuation (OPERABLE 86A/CRH 86B/CRHS when required per T.S. 2.8.2(3)) 1 S Test No Refueling In Progress Test Switch Switch Comments (List key aspects of any contingencies in place to support maintaining a key safety function)

Performed by SSA: Date/Time: /

Approved by SM: Date/Time: /

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-VI TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 19 OF 19 R41

PAGE 1 OF 16 Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 TDB-V.9 TECHNICAL DATA BOOK SHUTDOWN MARGIN WORKSHEET Change No. EC 55737, 55738 Reason for Change Change requirement in Condition Step 4 Parts I and II, to require RCS boron analysis to be performed within the past 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months vice 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (EC 55738). Incorporate a table method to simplify the calculation. Reformat to a simpler approach (EC 55737). Major Change, no rev bars used.

Requestor J. Willett, K. Kingston Preparer K. Bessey Issue Date 05-21-13 3:00 pm R41

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-V.9 TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 2 OF 16 SHUTDOWN MARGIN WORKSHEET PART I - Instantaneous Shutdown Margin for use prior to a Reactor Trip or immediately following a Reactor trip. No changes are assumed for either boron or xenon, since this worksheet is only applicable for calculation of an instantaneous shutdown margin.

NOTE: Enter values in Table TDB-V.9-1, exactly as determined from the figures in the Technical Data Book and carry the algebraic signs through the calculations.

Plant Conditions

1. Record Present Date/Time

2. Record Reactor Power (before trip)

3. Record CEA Group Positions

4. Record Reactor Coolant System Boron Concentration prior to shutdown (Boron concentration analysis must have been performed within the past 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or more recently if boration or dilution has occurred)

5. Record Burnup - Take the most recent burnup from GARDEL OR take the most recent Burnup from the Control Room Log and add 30 MWD/MTU per EFPD to the Control Room Log Burnup Value.

Calculation of Shutdown Margin

6. Enter Regulating Group Worth, based on burnup (Step 5) and CEA positions using TDB Figure II.B.2.

7. Enter Shutdown Group Worths, based on burnup (Step 5) using TDB Figure II.B.1.a.

a. Sum the total shutdown CEA worth by adding Group A (7.a) and Group B (7.b) and recording in line 7.c.

8. Determine Power Defect

a. Enter Power Defect based on Reactor power level (Step 2 ) and burnup (Step 5) using TDB Figure II.C.2.b.

b. Calculate power defect by multiplying Reactor Power Level (Step 2) by Power Defect per Percent Reactor Power (Step 8.a).

R41

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-V.9 TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 3 OF 16

9. Determination of Stuck CEA Allowance (3 cases)

NOTE: Consider dropped CEAs which cannot be verified to be fully inserted as inoperable.

a. Case I - All CEAs are assumed to be operable. (No known inoperable CEAs)

(Enter N/A if this case is not applicable.)

Assume the highest worth CEAs will stick out of the core upon a Reactor trip.

Enter the value of the most reactive CEA, based on burnup (Step 5), from TDB Figure II.B.1.b., lines (1) thru (3) for the pre-trip configuration. Select the higher value.

NOTE: The worth of one inoperable CEA is dependent on the configuration of the withdrawn group(s) and the inoperable CEA.

b. Case II - One CEA is known to be inoperable (per Technical Specification 2.10.2(4) a.)

(Enter N/A if this case is not applicable.)

Account for this defective CEA (and the highest worth stuck CEA) by entering only the value from lines (4) thru (17) of TDB Figure II.B.1.b. for the inoperable CEA, based on burnup (Step 5). Select the higher value.

NOTE: The worth of more than one inoperable CEA is calculated by multiplying the most conservative Stuck CEA plus Ejected CEA Worth (TDB Figure II.B.1.b.

lines 4-17 by the number of inoperable CEAs).

NOTE: The values of lines (4) thru (17) of TDB Figure II.B.1.b. Include the total reactivity associated with the known inoperable CEA and the highest worth CEA which is assumed to stick out of the core upon a Reactor trip.

c. Case III - More than one CEA is known to be inoperable (per Technical Specification 2.10.2.(4)a.).

(Enter N/A if this case is not applicable.)

i. Enter total number of CEAs which are known to be inoperable per Technical Specification 2.10.2.(4) a.

ii. Enter the most conservative defective CEA worth from TDB Figure II.B.1.b.

Lines (4) thru (17) depending on inoperable CEA(s) location, based on burnup (Step 5). Select the higher value.

iii. Multiply the total number of inoperable CEAs (Step 9.c.i) by the highest/

most conservative CEA Worth (Step 9.c.ii).

R41

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-V.9 TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 4 OF 16 9.c iv. Enter total available CEA worth from TDB Figure II.B.1.a. based on burnup (Step 5) (Use Worth Without Group N value unless Group N Rods are inserted.)

NOTE: The Rod Worth Value found in Step 9.c.iv, is the maximum CEA Worth possible, therefore using the lesser of the two values from Steps 9.c.iii and 9.c.iv is more accurate and conservative.

v. Determine the Multiple Stuck CEA Worth by selecting the minimum of either Step 9.c.iii or Step 9.c.iv and record that value.

d. Enter Stuck CEA Allowance value from Step 9.a or 9.b or 9.c.v as appropriate.

10. Calculation of the Total Instantaneous Shutdown Margin (SDMI):

SDMI = Stuck CEAs (Step 9.d) + Power Defect (Step 8.b) - S/D CEAs worth (Step 7.c) -

Regulating CEA worth (Step 6)

11. Document the Technical Specification required Shutdown Margin per TS 2.10.1(1).

12. Calculate difference from required Shutdown Margin per TS 2.10.2(1).

NOTE: A 3.6% shutdown margin must be maintained in a Hot Shutdown condition, Tc > 210°F and a 3.0% Shutdown Margin must be maintained Tc<210°F.

(Technical Specification 2.10.2(1) and TDB-VI Item 13.0).

13. Shutdown Margin check:

a. If Step 12 is less than or equal to zero, the shutdown margin is adequate.

b. If Step 12 is greater than zero, use OI-ERFCS-1, to determine the number of gallons of acid to add.

REMARKS Completed by Date/Time /

R41

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-V.9 TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 5 OF 16 TDB-V.9 - 1

1. Present Date/Time /

2. Reactor Power (before trip) %

3. CEA Positions:

a. Group 1 inches

b. Group 2 inches

c. Group 3 inches

d. Group 4 inches

4. RCS Boron Concentration ppm

5. Burnup MWD/MTU

6. Regulating Group Worth %

a. Figure Used

7. Shutdown Worths

a. Group A %

b. Group B %

c. Total Shutdown Worth (Step 7.a + Step 7.b) %

8. Power Defect

a. Power Defect per Percent power % / %

b. Total Power Defect (Step 2 X Step 8a.) %

9. Stuck CEA Allowance

a. Highest CEA Worth %

b. Inoperable CEA Worth %

c. Multiple Inoperable CEAs

i. Number of Inoperable CEAs ii. Most Conservative CEA Worth %

iii. Total Inoperable CEA Worth (Step 9.c.i X Step 9.c.ii) %

iv. Total Available CEA Worth %

v. Multiple Stuck CEA Worth (Step 9.c.iii or Step 9.c.iv) %

d. Stuck CEA Allowance Value (9.a Step or 9.b or 9.c.v)

10. Instantaneous Shutdown Margin=

Step 9.d + Step 8.b - Step 7.c - Step 6 %

11. Tech. Spec. Shutdown Margin 3.6 %

12. Shutdown Margin (Step 10 + Step 11) %

13. Is Shutdown Margin Adequate? YES( 0 ) / NO ( > 0)

R41

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-II TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 24 OF 50 Figure II.B.1.a Table 1 - Fort Calhoun Station Cycle 27 CEA Group Worths at HZP in %

When Inserted Sequentially Table 2 - Fort Calhoun Station Cycle 27 CEA Groups 1 - 4 Worth of the Bottom 20 Inches at HZP in %

R34

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-II TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 25 OF 50 Figure II.B.1.b - Fort Calhoun Station Cycle 27 Reduction in Shutdown Margin or Stuck CEA(s) Worth (%)

R34

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-II TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 26 OF 50 Figure II.B.2.a - Cycle 27 Sequential Rod Worth vs. Rod Position (HZP, 0 to 5 GWD/MTU)

GROUPS 1-4 R34

FORT CALHOUN STATION TDB-II TECHNICAL DATA BOOK PAGE 27 OF 50 Figure II.B.2.b - Cycle 27 Sequential Rod Worth vs. Rod Position (HZP, 5 to 7 GWD/MTU)

GROUPS 1-4 R34

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-6 Rev. 2 JPM

Title:

Determine Shift Staffing per Technical Specifications and SO-O-1 Location: Classroom Approximate Time: 10 minutes Start Time:__________________

End Time:___________________

Actual Time: _________________

Reference(s): K/A 2.1.5 (SRO Imp 4.6)

Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

SO-O-1 T.S. 5.2.2 SO-G-52 Handout(s):

Task List #: 1656 Applicable Position(s): SRO Time Critical: NO Alternate Path: NO JPM Prepared by: Date:

JPM Reviewed by: Date:

1

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-6 Rev. 2 JPM

Title:

Determine Shift Staffing per Technical Specifications and SO-O-1 Operators Name: __________________________________________

All Critical Steps (shaded) must be performed or simulated in accordance with the standards contained in this JPM The Operators performance was evaluated as (circle one):

SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Evaluators Signature: _____________________________ Date: __________

Reason, if unsatisfactory:

Tools & Equipment: None Safety Considerations: None Comments: None 2

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-6 Rev. 2 JPM

Title:

Determine Shift Staffing per Technical Specifications and SO-O-1 TASK Shift Staffing has been determined per T.S. 5.2.2 and STANDARD: SO-O-1 and actions taken to ensure requirements are met.

INITIAL The Station is at 100% power and stable. You are the CONDITIONS: Shift Manager and are preparing to assume the shift when your CRS notifies you that due to an accident he will not be at work today.

INITIATING CUE: Determine what actions need to be taken to assure proper Shift staffing is adhered to.

3

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-6 Rev. 2 JPM

Title:

Determine Shift Staffing per Technical Specifications and SO-O-1 Critical Steps shown in gray STEP ELEMENT STANDARD

1. Obtain and review procedure SO-O-1, Conduct of Operations, 5.10, Operations Shift Manning. Applicant obtained and reviewed SO-O-1, Conduct of Operations, 5.10, Operations Shift Manning.

NOTE to Evaluator; SO-O-1 refers to T.S. 5.2.2

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

2. Obtain and review T.S. 5.2.2, Plant Staffing. Applicant obtained and reviewed T.S. 5.2.2, Plant Staffing and Table 5.2-1 and determined Table 5.2-1 (ii) applies.

Applicant determined Shift manning will be as specified in T.S.

5.2.2a,b,c and e

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

3. Determine required actions to ensure proper staffing Per T.S. 5.2.2 and Table 5.2-1(ii),

requirements are met. Applicant determined that two SROs are required to be on-shift. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months are allowed to find a relief.

However, This provision does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crew member being late or absent.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

4

STEP ELEMENT STANDARD

3. Determine that the present CRS needs to be held over. Applicant determined that the present CRS needs to be held over per T.S. Table 5.2-1 (ii).

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

4. Due to T.S. Table Review Procedure SO-G-52 and determine that a maximum Applicant reviewed SO-G-52 and holdover time for the on-shift determined that a maximum CRS is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months so that the 16 holdover time for the on-shit CRS is hour maximum limit is not 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months so that the 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months exceeded. maximum limit is not exceeded.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

5. Uses the Operations Call list of SO-O-1 Section 5.10.2.B to Applicant uses the Operations Call locate an off-shift SRO to take list of SO-O-1 Section 5.10.2.B to the remainder of the shift. locate an off-shift SRO to take the remainder of the shift.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

STOP. JPM is Finished.

Termination Criteria: Shift Staffing has been determined per T.S. 5.2.2 and SO-O-1 and actions taken to ensure requirements are met.

5

NAME: ________________________________

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL The Station is at 100% power and stable. You are the Shift CONDITIONS: Manager and are preparing to assume the shift when your CRS notifies you that due to an accident he will not be at work today.

INITIATING CUE: Determine what actions need to be taken to assure proper Shift staffing is adhered to.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1 Responsibility 5.1.1 The plant manager shall be responsible for overall facility operation and shall delegate in writing the succession to this responsibility during his absence.

5.2 Organization 5.2.1 Onsite and offsite organizations shall be established for unit operation and corporate management, respectively. The onsite and offsite organizations shall include the positions for activities affecting the safety of the nuclear power plant.

a. Lines of authority, responsibility, and communication shall be established and defined for the highest management levels through intermediate levels to and including all operating organization positions. These relationships shall be documented and updated, as appropriate, in the form of organizational charts, functional descriptions of departmental responsibilities and relationships, and job descriptions for key personnel positions, or in equivalent forms of documentation.

These requirements shall be documented in the USAR.

b. The plant manager shall be responsible for overall unit safe operation and shall have control over those onsite activities necessary for safe operation and maintenance of the plant.

c. The corporate officer with responsibility for overall plant nuclear safety shall take any measures needed to ensure acceptable performance of the staff in operating, maintaining, and providing technical support to the plant to ensure nuclear safety.

d. The individuals who train the operating staff and those who carry out health physics and quality assurance functions may report to the appropriate onsite manager; however, they shall have sufficient organizational freedom to ensure their independence from operating pressures.

5.2.2 Plant Staff The plant staff organization shall be as described in Chapter 12 of the USAR and shall function as follows:

a. The minimum number and type of licensed and unlicensed operating personnel required onsite for each shift shall be as shown in Table 5.2-1.

5.0 - Page 1 Amendment No. 9,19,29,38,53,76, 78,101,115,119,132,157,168, 202

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.2 Organization (Continued)

b. An Operator or Technician qualified in Radiation Protection Procedures shall be onsite when fuel is in the reactor.

c. All core alterations shall be directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator limited to fuel handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during the operation.

d. Fire protection program responsibilities are assigned to those positions and/or groups designated by asterisks in USAR 12.1-1 through 12.1-4 according to the procedures specified in Section 5.8 of the Technical Specifications.

e. The Manager - Shift Operations, the Shift Managers, and the Control Room Supervisors shall hold a senior reactor operator license. The Licensed Operators shall hold a reactor operator license.

5.3 Facility Staff Qualification 5.3.1 Each member of the plant staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971 for comparable positions, with the exception of the Manager - Radiation Protection (MRP) and the Shift Technical Advisor (STA), the senior reactor operator licensees, and the reactor operator licensees, who shall meet the requirements set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.8, Revision 3, dated May 2000, entitled "Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants."

5.0 - Page 2 Amendment No. 38,54,85,115, 160,181,190,202, 262

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 5.2-1 MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION(ii)

Operating License Core Cold Shutdown or or Hot Category Alteration Refueling Shutdown Shutdown Modes Senior Operator License 2(i) 1 2(iii)

Operator License 2 1 2(iv)

Non-Licensed (As required) 1 2 Shift Technical None None 1 Advisor (i) This includes the individual with Senior Operator License supervising Core Alterations.

(ii) Shift crew composition may be one less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements of Table 5.2-1. This provision does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewmember being late or absent.

(iii) At least one of these individuals must be in the control room at all times.

(iv) At least one of these individuals (or the second senior licensed operator, if both senior licensed operators are in the control room) must be present at the controls at all times.

5.0 - Page 3 Amendment No. 9,24,54,78, 202

FORT CALHOUN STATION SO-O-1 STANDING ORDER INFORMATION USE PAGE 33 OF 77 5.9 Control Room References 5.9.1 Limitations Regarding Use of References Control Room references (curves and graphs) shall not be extrapolated beyond their axes. The assumptions made for a particular curve or graph are only valid within the relevant range presented or delineated by the axes. Therefore, extrapolation beyond the relevant range presented in the curve or graph is prohibited.

5.9.2 Reference List 5.9.2.A Abnormal Operating Procedures - See SO-O-18A.

5.9.2.B Control Room Drawings - See SO-G-47.

5.9.2.C Emergency Operating Procedures - See SO-O-18.

5.9.2.D ERF Computer - See OI-ERFCS-1 5.9.2.E Operations Memorandums - See SO-O-13.

5.9.2.F Technical Data Book 5.9.2.G Temporary Labels, Curves, Notes, and Instructions - See SO-O-41.

5.10 Operations Shift Manning 5.10.1 Responsibility NOTE: The RERP Table B-1 requires one STA and Control Room Communicator in all modes of operation for ERO duties.

5.10.1.A It is the responsibility of the Shift Manager to ensure that the required number of Licensed and Equipment Operators are available.

5.10.1.B Additional Operations Department personnel may be required on shift because of unusual plant conditions or operational needs. The Shift Manager shall obtain the additional personnel as necessary. Activities requiring additional personnel will not be undertaken until the required personnel are available.

R101

FORT CALHOUN STATION SO-O-1 STANDING ORDER INFORMATION USE PAGE 34 OF 77 5.10.2 Staffing Requirements (Minimum) 5.10.2.A Shift manning will be as specified in Technical Specification 5.2.2.a, b, c, and e. When overtime is required for shift coverage, then the SM will use the operator overtime list as a guideline. When overtime is not required for on-shift needs, additional personnel shall be scheduled, as appropriate, on the weekly schedule.

5.10.2.B The Operations Call List (located in the Shift Manager's Office), the Duty Assignment Call List or the Operator overtime list will be used by the Shift Manager to facilitate the recall of personnel as required.

5.10.2.C In the event it is anticipated that these requirements cannot be satisfied, the Director, Site Operations, Manager-Shift Operations, or the Plant Manager or designated alternate shall be notified immediately.

5.10.2.D Technical Specification 5.2 designates Licensed Operator placement as follows:

5.10.2.D.1) Two Licensed individuals (Shift Manager, Control Room Supervisor, or Reactor Operator) must be within the Control Room boundary, as defined in Attachment 7.1 at all times whenever fuel is in the reactor except as noted in Step 5.10.2.E.

5.10.2.D.2) The placement of the two Licensed Operators required above must also meet the following requirements; 5.10.2.D.2)a) Either the SM or the CRS must be within the Control Room boundary, as defined in Attachment 7.1 at all times whenever fuel is in the reactor except as noted in Step 5.10.2.E.

5.10.2.D.2)b) One RO or SRO should be within the at the controls area as defined in Attachment 7.1 at all times whenever fuel is in the reactor except as noted in Step 5.10.2.E. Further clarification is provided in the OPD (Procedure Maintenance and Ownership).

5.10.2.D.2)c) Occasionally, two SROs are present in the Control Room. It should be clearly understood that there is only one official CRS on watch at any one time and that the functional duties of the two SROs are not to be swapped back and forth on the same shift.

The official CRS is the one who accepted the turnover from his/her counterpart at the beginning of the shift and who signed into the shift turnover log as the oncoming CRS. This CRS shall remain as the official CRS for the duration of the shift unless properly relieved by the other CRS on-shift.

R101

FORT CALHOUN STATION SO-O-1 STANDING ORDER INFORMATION USE PAGE 35 OF 77 5.10.2.E The (2) Licensed members of the plant staff shall be in the Control Room at all times except during off-normal operation conditions having potential safety related impact which could jeopardize the health and safety of the public and which requires prompt operator actions outside the Control Room complex. Safety related impact is subject to Operator discretion at the time of the off-normal operating condition.

5.10.2.E.1) In the event of a Control Room Evacuation, the Control Room Supervisor shall be stationed at the Alternate Shutdown Panel. See Attachment 7.4 for CRS Operating Area.

5.10.2.F Shift crew assignments during periods of core alterations shall include a Licensed Senior Reactor Operator to directly supervise the core alterations.

This Licensed Senior Reactor Operator shall not have other concurrent duties.

5.10.2.G The Manager-Shift Operations will determine the appropriate amount of management oversight during critical evolutions, and during Refueling Outages. This oversight will be documented in an Operations RFO Organizational Plan. This plan will normally designate a shutdown SRO, in case one is needed, and will provide resources for oversight in addition to the SM and CRS both in the Control Room and in the field as appropriate.

5.10.2.H Temporary absence from normal work locations may be authorized by the Shift Manager for on-shift personnel, except as specifically required by Technical Specification 5.2, to facilitate performance of required job functions, provided the on-site requirement of Technical Specification 5.2.2.a, b, and e is maintained.

5.10.2.H.1) On-site is defined as on the Owner Controlled Area at the Fort Calhoun Station site.

5.10.2.H.2) In addition to Shift Operations, the Shift Radiation Protection Technician and Chemistry Technician are included in this provision.

R101

FORT CALHOUN STATION SO-O-1 STANDING ORDER INFORMATION USE PAGE 36 OF 77 5.10.3 Operations Personnel for Fire Response The following personnel are required for response to a fire inside the Protected Area. Their responsibilities will vary based on the location and severity of the fire. Refer to fire response procedures - AOP-06, SO-G-28 and E-Plan for specific actions for each staffed position.

1. Shift Manager

2. Control Room Supervisor

3. Licensed Operators - 2

4. Equipment Operator Nuclear Auxiliary (EONA)

5. Equipment Operator Nuclear Turbine (EONT)

6. Auxiliary Operator Nuclear (AON)

7. Control Room Communicator

8. Shift Technical Advisor 5.10.4 Department Work Hours 5.10.4.A Operations Staff working hour restrictions are defined in SO-G-52. It is critically important that all Operations Department personnel carefully track their workhours to ensure they do not exceed the workhour limitations.

5.10.4.B Operations staff working hour waivers shall be implemented in accordance with SO-G-52.

5.11 Pre-Shift Briefings 5.11.1 Conduct of Pre-Shift Briefings 5.11.1.A At the beginning of each shift, the on-coming Operating crew shall report to the Control Room Loft for a Pre-Shift Briefing. Seating in the loft shall be by position (Reference Attachment 7.3).

5.11.1.B The briefing shall be conducted by the off-going Shift Manager or designee.

Priorities for the shift are to be provided by the on-coming SM.

NOTE: Extra Operators shall report to the Control Room Loft as part of the operating crew during normal operations.

5.11.1.C The following on-coming Shift Personnel shall attend the Pre-Shift Briefing:

5.11.1.C.1) Licensed Operators 5.11.1.C.2) Equipment Operators 5.11.1.C.3) Auxiliary Operators 5.11.1.C.4) Shift Technical Advisor 5.11.1.C.5) Shift Chemist R101

SO-G-52 Information Use Page 14 of 38 Plant Staff Working Hours Revision 11a 3.12 Training 3.12.1 Biennial refresher will be conducted for covered worker supervisors.

Refresher will include:

x Significant changes to SO-G-52 or the controlling compliance software x Recent station and industry problems (OE) pertaining to work hour rule compliance and implementation 3.13 In-Processing 3.13.1 It is the responsibility of the Supervisor to identify covered workers at the time of in-processing. See Step 3.3.1.

4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 General 4.1.1 Work hour restrictions apply only to personnel that are currently authorized un-escorted access and who are performing Covered Work.

4.1.2 Work hour restrictions specifically do not apply to the following individuals and activities:

A. Maintenance activities performed on systems, structures, and components that are located off site; B. Nuclear Oversight inspections and activities; C. Predictive maintenance activities that do not result in a change of condition or state of a structure, system, or component (SSC).

Predictive maintenance activities that may be excluded if they do not change the state or condition of an SSC include, but are not limited to, nondestructive examination (NDE), thermography, vibration analysis, and data collection and analysis.

D. Workers who perform non-intrusive predictive maintenance or other data collection on risk significant SSCs are not covered workers as long as they are not operating or maintaining the SSC as part of the predictive maintenance activity.

SO-G-52 Information Use Page 15 of 38 Plant Staff Working Hours Revision 11a 4.1.2 (continued)

E. Activities supporting covered maintenance and operations functions must be evaluated separately to determine if they are covered work per Attachment 1. Examples of supporting activities that are not considered to be covered work include the following:

x Scaffold erection and removal x FME monitoring x Confined space monitoring x Quality inspections x Engineering reviews x Painting (with the exception of Qualified Coatings)

F. Supplemental personnel (vendors/contractors) who are not granted unescorted access (i.e., the individual(s) are escorted), but are conducting work on a risk significant system, structure, or component. In such cases, the OPPD person responsible for oversight of the supplemental worker shall ensure that work hour limits are set for the task performed and oversight is provided to ensure performance is not impacted by worker fatigue.

G. Emergency response personnel who DO NOT perform health physics or chemistry duties required as a member of the onsite Emergency Response Organization minimum shift complement.

4.1.3 Security personnel need not meet the work hour restrictions of 10 CFR 26 Subpart I when informed, in writing by the NRC, that these requirements, or any subset thereof, are waived for security personnel in order to assure the common defense and security, for the duration of the period defined by the NRC.

4.1.4 Emergency response personnel need not meet work hour restriction requirements during declared emergencies, as defined in the FCS Emergency Plan.

4.2 Work Hour Restrictions for ON-LINE Periods 4.2.1 FCS adheres to the Online Averaging requirements in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7).

4.2.2 When practical, maintain a forty-hour week during normal plant operation.

AVOID the use of overtime to meet routine operational requirements. If overtime is necessary, the use of overtime shall be considered on an individual basis and not for the entire work group.

4.2.3 Overtime SHALL be tested in EmpCenter prior to being worked.

SO-G-52 Information Use Page 16 of 38 Plant Staff Working Hours Revision 11a 4.2.4 The averaging period starts rolling after a work history has been established for a worker equal to the length of the averaging period. This period of establishing a work history is also referred to as a fixed period.

4.2.5 The averaging period advances by 7 consecutive calendar days at the finish of every averaging period. This advancing is referred to as rolling.

4.2.6 FCS has established that the week begins on Sunday at 0000 and ends the following Sunday at 0000. When an individuals work shift starts on one calendar day and concludes the next calendar day, the hours will be attributed to the calendar days on which the hours are actually worked.

4.2.7 Individuals SHALL NOT:

x Work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months in any rolling 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period x Work more than 26 hours3.009259e-4 days 0.00722 hours 4.298942e-5 weeks 9.893e-6 months in any rolling 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months period x Work more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months in any rolling 7 day period AND Individuals SHALL have a continuous 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months break between successive work periods. For exceptions, see note in Section 4.7.

AND Individuals SHALL have a continuous 34 hour3.935185e-4 days 0.00944 hours 5.621693e-5 weeks 1.2937e-5 months break in any rolling nine-day period.

4.2.8 In addition to the limits established above, individuals SHALL NOT work more than a weekly average of 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months , calculated using an averaging period of up to six (6) weeks, which advances by 7 consecutive calendar days at the finish of every averaging period.

4.3 Work Hour Restrictions for OUTAGE Periods 4.3.1 When entering an unplanned outage, unplanned security system outage, or increased threat condition, individuals will be considered to be in compliance with this standing order if the schedule for the shift cycle would have met the 54 hour6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months calculated averaging period in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7).

4.3.2 For security personnel, during the first 60 days of an unplanned security system outage or increased threat condition, the MDO requirements do not apply.

SO-G-52 Information Use Page 17 of 38 Plant Staff Working Hours Revision 11a NOTE The 60-day period may be extended for an individual in seven-i day increments for each non-overlapping seven-day period in which the individual has worked not more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months during i the unit or security system outage or increased threat conditions as applicable.

4.3.3 An outage is defined as the time period when the unit is disconnected from the electrical grid up to a period of 60 days.

4.3.4 Security personnel MDO requirements are considered more conservative than Operations personnel MDO requirements which, in turn, are considered more conservative than Maintenance personnel MDO requirements. When an individual may be performing multiple functions, they should be assigned to the most conservative MDO requirement and not attempt to change back and forth between MDO requirements.

4.3.5 During an outage, individuals SHALL NOT:

x Work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months in any rolling 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period.

x Work more than 26 hours3.009259e-4 days 0.00722 hours 4.298942e-5 weeks 9.893e-6 months in any rolling 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months period.

x Work more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months in any rolling 7 day period.

AND Individuals SHALL have a continuous 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months break between successive work periods. For exceptions, see not in Section 4.7.

AND Individuals SHALL have a continuous 34 hour3.935185e-4 days 0.00944 hours 5.621693e-5 weeks 1.2937e-5 months break in any rolling nine-day period.

SO-G-52 Information Use Page 18 of 38 Plant Staff Working Hours Revision 11a NOTE i For the purposes of calculating OUTAGE MDO requirements, the 15 day periods are fixed and not rolling.

i 4.3.6 In addition to the work hour limits, an individual worker SHALL meet the Minimum Day Off (MDO) requirements as listed in the table below.

OUTAGE Minimum Days Off (MDO) Requirements Group 8 Hour Shifts 10 Hour Shifts 12 Hour Shifts Maintenance 1 day/week 1 day/week 1 day/week Operations, RP, 3 days off in each 3 days off in each 3 days off in each Chemistry 15 day period 15 day period 15 day period Security 4 days off in each 4 days off in each 4 days off in each 15 day period 15 day period 15 day period 4.4 Calculating Work Hours 4.4.1 Work hours for covered workers SHALL be calculated based on the amount of time the individual is performing duties for OPPD while the individual is authorized unescorted access at Fort Calhoun Station.

4.4.2 Work periods of less than one week, typically applicable to short term supplemental personnel, are insufficient to calculate the work hour average.

Application of other portions of this standing order are sufficient to ensure well rested workers in those cases.

4.4.3 The calculated work hours SHALL include all time spent performing duties for OPPD, including performing covered and non-covered work, all within-shift break times, meal breaks, and rest periods during which there are no reasonable opportunities or accommodations appropriate for restorative sleep.

4.4.4 Work hours include:

A. Holding over at end of shift to cover for late arrival of incoming shift members.

B. Early arrival or holding over by individuals for required meetings, training, or pre-shift briefings for special evolutions. These activities are NOT considered shift turnover activities.

C. Holding over or early arrival for interviews needed for event investigations or other required OPPD business.

SO-G-52 Information Use Page 19 of 38 Plant Staff Working Hours Revision 11a 4.4.4 (continued)

CAUTION A call-out before a worker has been provided a full 10-hour break may result in not meeting the 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months in 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period requirement.

D. For call-out work periods, the time between leaving the station and the call-out work period is also included if the worker was not provided a full 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months break.

E. Hours worked during turnovers between individuals within a shift period due to rotations or relief within a shift.

NOTE Off-site work hours for OPPD, such as business trips or vendor visits, off-site training, and company required i professional development, although not covered work, SHALL be considered as worked hours. Personal time i away from work, at the employee's choice, to study training materials or to attend meetings, seminars, or training is not considered work hours.

F. Hours worked off-site at the specific direction of an individual's supervisor are considered worked hours and SHALL be reported to the supervisor upon returning on-site.

G. Hours worked on-site at the discretion of the individual SHALL be considered work hours (e.g., time spent by a maintenance supervisor who comes to work on a weekend to "catch up" on work activities).

4.4.5 It is the individual's responsibility to be aware of work hour restrictions and accurately report all hours worked. Time spent in shift turnovers MAY be excluded from the calculation of an individual's work hours. Shift turnover includes only those activities that are necessary to safely transfer information and responsibilities between two or more individuals between shifts. Shift turnover activities may include, but are not limited to, discussions of the status of plant equipment and the status of ongoing activities, such as extended tests of safety systems and components.

4.4.6 Time spent on a break or rest period MAY be excluded from the calculation of an individual's work hours if there is a reasonable opportunity and accommodations for restorative sleep (e.g., a nap).

SO-G-52 Information Use Page 20 of 38 Plant Staff Working Hours Revision 11a 4.4.7 If an individual begins or resumes performing covered work during the calculation period, all work hours worked for OPPD, including hours worked performing duties that are not considered covered work, SHALL be included in the calculation of hours worked.

4.4.8 Time spent participating in the actual conduct of an UNANNOUNCED emergency preparedness exercise or drill MAY be excluded from the calculation of an individual's work hours.

4.4.9 Time spent performing unscheduled work off site (e.g., technical assistance provided by telephone from an individual's home) MAY be excluded from calculation of an individual's work hours provided the total duration of the work does not exceed a nominal 30 minutes during any single break period.

For the purposes of compliance with the minimum break requirements and the minimum day off requirements, such duties do not constitute work periods or work shifts.

4.4.10 Shifts worked by security personnel during the actual conduct of force-on-force tactical exercises evaluated by the NRC MAY be excluded from calculation of hours worked. Only those hours worked in excess of 54 during the week of the exercise may be excluded.

4.5 Directing Work 4.5.1 For the purpose of compliance with this standing order, directing ONLY applies to Operations and Maintenance activities. Directing is defined as the exercise of control over a work activity by an individual who is directly involved in the execution of the work activity, and either makes technical decisions for that activity without subsequent technical review, or is ultimately responsible for the correct performance of that work activity.

4.5.2 Individuals who provide specific communication to a front-line covered operations or maintenance worker without review by cognizant line supervision concerning WHAT the worker should do, HOW the worker should do it, or WHEN the worker should perform the task are considered to be directing work.

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-7 Rev. 2 JPM

Title:

Determine Allowed Outage Time for Failed CS Valves Location: Classroom Approximate Time: 12 minutes Start Time:__________________

End Time:___________________

Actual Time: _________________

Reference(s): K/A 2.2.23 (SRO Imp 4.6)

Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations.

Technical Specifications 2.3 TDB-VIII Handout(s):

Task List #:

Applicable Position(s): SRO Time Critical: NO Alternate Path: NO JPM Prepared by: Date:

JPM Reviewed by: Date:

1

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-7 Rev. 2 JPM

Title:

Determine Allowed Outage Time for Failed CS Valves Operators Name: __________________________________________

All Critical Steps (shaded) must be performed or simulated in accordance with the standards contained in this JPM The Operators performance was evaluated as (circle one):

SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Evaluators Signature: _____________________________ Date: __________

Reason, if unsatisfactory:

Tools & Equipment: None Safety Considerations: None Comments: None 2

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-7 JPM

Title:

Determine Allowed Outage Time for Failed CS Valves TASK STANDARD: Outage Time for Failed CS Valve has been determined.

INITIAL The plant is operating at full power. The Equipment CONDITIONS: Operator reported the airline is disconnected from the valve operator of LCV-383-1 and that he has isolated the airline.

INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to determine the applicable Technical Specification(s) and required actions, if any, to be taken.

3

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: A-7 Rev. 2 JPM

Title:

Determine Allowed Outage Time for Failed CS Valves Critical Steps shown in gray STEP ELEMENT STANDARD

1. Determines from drawings, AOPs, TDB or plant knowledge that HCV-385 fails open without Applicant made determination.

air

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

2. Refers to Technical Specification 2.3.

Applicant determined that T.S.

2.3(2)e requires that the valve must be restored to operability within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

4. Refers to TDB VIII Applicant determined that with LCV-383-1 failed open, Table 1.2 determined that plant is in 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months LCO.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

5. Determines appropriate LCO and Action Statements. Applicant entered Tech Specs 2.3(2)e. and determined that operation may continue for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months with LCV-383-1 inoperable.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

Termination Criteria: Outage Time for Failed CS Valve has been determined.

4

NAME: ________________________________

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL The plant is operating at full power. The Equipment CONDITIONS: Operator reported the airline is disconnected from the valve operator of LCV-383-1 and that he has isolated the airline.

INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to determine the applicable Technical Specification(s) and required actions, if any, to be taken.

ANSWER:

Tech Spec(s) Entered:

Required Actions with Time Limits:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System Applicability Applies to the operating status of the emergency core cooling system.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to remove decay heat from the core.

Specifications (1) Minimum Requirements The reactor shall not be made critical unless all of the following conditions are met:

a. The SIRW tank contains not less than 283,000 gallons of water with a boron concentration of at least the refueling boron concentration at a temperature not less than 50oF.

b. One means of temperature indication (local) of the SIRW tank is operable.

c. All four safety injection tanks are operable and pressurized to at least 240 psig and a maximum of 275 psig with tank level of at least 116.2 inches (67%) and a maximum level of 128.1 inches (74%) with refueling boron concentration.

d. One level and one pressure instrument is operable on each safety injection tank.

e. One low-pressure safety injection train is operable on each associated 4,160 V engineered safety feature bus.

f. One high-pressure safety injection pump is operable on each associated 4,160 V engineered safety feature bus.

g. Both shutdown heat exchangers are operable.

h. Piping and valves shall be operable to provide two flow paths from the SIRW tank to the reactor coolant system.

i. All valves, piping and interlocks associated with the above components and required to function during accident conditions are operable. HCV-2914, 2934, 2974, and 2954 shall have power removed from the motor operators by locking open the circuit breakers in the power supply lines to the valve motor operators.

FCV-326 shall be locked open.

2.3 - Page 1 Amendment No. 17,32,43,103,117, 119,133,141,157,175,217,221

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System (Continued)

(1) j. One high-pressure safety injection pump is operable on each safety injection refueling water tank-containment sump header.

2.3 - Page 2 Amendment No. 17

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System (Continued)

(2) Modification of Minimum Requirements During power operation, the Minimum Requirements may be modified to allow one of the following conditions to be true at any one time. If the system is not restored to meet the minimum requirements within the time period specified below, the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . If the minimum requirements are not met within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

a. One low-pressure safety injection train may be inoperable provided the train is restored to operable status within seven (7) days.

b. One high-pressure safety injection pump may be inoperable provided the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

c. One shutdown heat exchanger may be inoperable for a period of no more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

d. Any valves, interlocks or piping directly associated with one of the above components and required to function during accident conditions shall be deemed to be part of that component and shall meet the same requirements as listed for that component.

e. Any valve, interlock or piping associated with the safety injection and shutdown cooling system which is not covered under d. above but which is required to function during accident conditions may be inoperable for a period of no more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

f. One safety injection tank may be inoperable for reasons other than g. or h. below for a period of no more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

g. Level and/or pressure instrumentation on one safety injection tank may be inoperable for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

h. One safety injection tank may be inoperable due to boron concentration not within limits for a period of no more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

2.3 - Page 3 Amendment No. 49,171,175,186,206,217, 223 Correction letter of 06-03-2004

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System (Continued)

(3) Protection Against Low Temperature Overpressurization The following limiting conditions shall be applied during scheduled heatups and cooldowns. Disabling of the HPSI pumps need not be required if the RCS is vented through at least a 0.94 square inch or larger vent.

Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 350(F, at least one (1) HPSI pump shall be disabled.

Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 320(F, at least two (2) HPSI pumps shall be disabled.

Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 270(F, all three (3) HPSI pumps shall be disabled.

In the event that no charging pumps are operable when the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 270(F, a single HPSI pump may be made operable and utilized for boric acid injection to the core, with flow rate restricted to no greater than 120 gpm.

(4) Containment Sump Buffering Agent Specification and Volume Requirement During operating Modes 1 and 2, the containment sump buffering agent baskets shall contain a volume of hydrated sodium tetraborate (NaTB) that is within the area of acceptable operation shown in Figure 2-3.

a. With the above buffering agent requirements not within limits, the buffering agent shall be restored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

b. With Specification 2.3(4)a required action and completion time not met, the plant shall be in hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and cold shutdown within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

Basis The normal procedure for starting the reactor is to first heat the reactor coolant to near operating temperature by running the reactor coolant pumps. The reactor is then made critical. The energy stored in the reactor coolant during the approach to criticality is substantially equal to that during power operation and therefore all engineered safety features and auxiliary cooling systems are required to be fully operable.

2.3 - Page 4 Amendment No. 17,39,43,47,64,74,77, 100,103,133,141,157,161,179,201,221,232, 247, 253

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System (Continued)

The USAR Loss of Coolant Accident analysis assumes a minimum SIRW tank inventory of 250,000 gallons has been pumped from the SIRW tank when recirculation begins.

Technical Specification 2.3(1) requires that the SIRW tank contains a minimum of 283,000 gallons of usable water. This additional volume over that assumed in the USAR analysis provides sufficient margin to account for the instrument uncertainty. The SIRW tank contains water containing a boron concentration of at least the refueling boron concentration. This is sufficient boron concentration to provide a shutdown margin of 5%,

including allowances for uncertainties, with all control rods withdrawn and a new core at a temperature of 54F.(2)

The four pressurized safety injection tanks are of the passive type and require no outside power or safety injection actuation signal to operate. The limits for the safety injection tank pressure and volume assure the required amount of water injection during an accident and are based on values used for the accident analyses. The minimum 116.2 inch level corresponds to a volume of 825 ft3 and the maximum 128.1 inch level corresponds to a volume of 895.5 ft3. Prior to the time the reactor is brought critical, the valving of the safety injection system must be checked for correct alignment and appropriate valves locked. Since the system is used for shutdown cooling, the valving will be changed and must be properly aligned prior to start-up of the reactor.

The operable status of the various systems and components is to be demonstrated by periodic tests. A large fraction of these tests will be performed while the reactor is operating in the power range.

If a component is found to be inoperable, it will be possible in most cases to effect repairs and restore the system to full operability within a relatively short time. For a single component to be inoperable does not negate the ability of the system to perform its function. If it develops that the inoperable component is not repaired within the specified allowable time period, or a second component in the same or related system is found to be inoperable, the reactor will initially be put in the hot shutdown condition to provide for reduction of cooling requirements after a postulated loss-of-coolant accident. This will also permit improved access for repairs in some cases. After a limited time in hot shutdown, if the malfunction(s) is not corrected, the reactor will be placed in the cold shutdown condition utilizing normal shutdown and cooldown procedures. In the cold shutdown condition, release of fission products or damage of the fuel elements is not considered possible.

The plant operating procedures will require immediate action to effect repairs of an inoperable component and therefore in most cases repairs will be completed in less than the specified allowable repair times. The limiting times to repair are intended to assure that operability of the component will be restored promptly and yet allow sufficient time to effect repairs using safe and proper procedures.

The time allowed to repair a safety injection tank is based on the deterministic and probabilistic analyses of Reference (8). The time allowed to repair a LPSI train is based on the deterministic and probabilistic analysis of Reference (9). These analyses concluded that the overall risk impact of the completion times are either risk-beneficial or risk neutral.

The requirement for core cooling in case of postulated loss-of-coolant accident while in the hot shutdown condition is significantly reduced below the requirements for a postulated loss-of-coolant accident during power operation. Putting the reactor in the hot shutdown condition reduces the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident and also allows more free access to some of the engineered safeguards components in order to effect repairs.

Failure to complete repairs within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months of going to the hot shutdown condition is considered indicative of a requirement for major maintenance and, therefore, in such a case, the reactor is to be put into the cold shutdown condition.

2.3 - Page 5 Amendment No. 32,39,47,49,74,179,186,217 TSBC 03-002-0 TSBC 03-009-0 TSBC 12-003-0

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System (Continued)

With respect to the core cooling function, there is functional redundancy over most of the range of break sizes.(3)(4)

The LOCA analysis confirms adequate core cooling for the break spectrum up to and including the 32 inch double-ended break assuming the safety injection capability which most adversely affects accident consequences and are defined as follows. The entire contents of all four safety injection tanks are assumed to be available for emergency core cooling, but the contents of one of the tanks is assumed to be lost through the reactor coolant system. In addition, of the three high-pressure safety injection pumps and the two low-pressure safety injection pumps, for both large break analysis and small break analysis it is assumed that one high pressure pump and one low pressure pump operate (5)

and also that 25% of their combined discharge rate is lost from the reactor coolant system out of the break. The transient hot spot fuel clad temperatures for the break sizes considered are shown in USAR Section 14.

The restriction on HPSI pump operability at low temperatures, in combination with the PORV setpoints ensure that the reactor vessel pressure-temperature limits would not be exceeded in the case of an inadvertent actuation of the operable HPSI and charging pumps.

Removal of the reactor vessel head, one pressurizer safety valve, or one PORV provides sufficient expansion volume to limit any of the design basis pressure transients. Thus, no additional relief capacity is required.

Technical Specification 2.2(1) specifies that, when fuel is in the reactor, at least one flow path shall be provided for boric acid injection to the core. Should boric acid injection become necessary, and no charging pumps are operable, operation of a single HPSI pump would provide the required flow path. The HPSI pump flow rate must be restricted to that of three charging pumps in order to minimize the consequences of a mass addition transient while at low temperatures.

Hydrated Sodium Tetraborate (NaTB) is required to adjust the pH of the recirculation water to 7.0 after a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This pH value is necessary to prevent significant amounts of iodine, released from fuel failures and dissolved in the recirculation water, from converting to a volatile form and evolving into the containment atmosphere. Higher levels of airborne iodine in containment may increase the releases of radionuclides and the consequences of the accident. A pH of 7.0 is also necessary to prevent stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of austenitic stainless steel components in containment. SCC increases the probability of failure of components.

NaTB is used because of the high humidity in the containment building during normal operation. Since the NaTB is hydrated, it is less likely to absorb large amounts of water from the humid atmosphere and will undergo less physical and chemical change.

Radiation levels in containment following a LOCA may cause the generation of hydrochloric and nitric acids from radiolysis of cable insulation and sump water. NaTB will neutralize these acids.

The required amount of NaTB is represented in a volume quantity converted from the Reference 7 mass quantity using the manufactured density. Verification of this amount during surveillance testing utilizes the measured volume.

2.3 - Page 6 Amendment No. 39,47,64,74,77,100,161, 179, 201,232, 247

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System (Continued)

References (1) USAR, Section 14.15.1 (2) USAR, Section 6.2.3.1 (3) USAR, Section 14.15.3 (4) USAR, Appendix K (5) Omaha Public Power District's Submittal, December 1, 1976 (6) Deleted (7) USAR, Section 4.4.3 (8) CE NPSD-994, "CEOG Joint Applications Report for Safety Injection Tank AOT/SIT Extension," May 1995.

(9) CE NPSD-995, "CEOG Joint Applications Report for Low Pressure Safety Injection System AOT Extension," May 1995.

2.3 - Page 7 Amendment No. 47,64,74,179, 206, 217, 221, 223 Correction letter of 06-03-2004

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System (Continued)

Figure 2-3 NaTB Volume Required for RCS Critical Boron Concentration (ARO, HZP, No Xenon) 114.0 113.0 112.0 111.0 110.0 NaTB Volume Reqd, ft3 109.0 Area of acceptable operation 108.0 107.0 106.0 105.0 104.0 Area of unacceptable 103.0 operation 102.0 101.0 100.0 1800 1700 1600 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 RCS Critical Boron Concentration (ARO, HZP, No Xenon), ppm 2.3 - Page 8 Amendment No. 232,247, 253

TDB-VIII Information Use Page 6 of 71 Equipment Applicability Guidance Revision 62 Attachment 1 - LCO Applicable Valve Matrix Table 1.2 - CCW, ECCS & Containment Spray Item Tag(s) Mode Tech Spec LCO Applicability HCV-304 Closed T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-305 Closed T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-306 Closed T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-307 Closed T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-311 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-311 Will Not Close None HCV-312 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-312 Will Not Close None HCV-314 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-314 Will Not Close None HCV-315 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-315 Will Not Close None HCV-317 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-317 Will Not Close None HCV-318 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-318 Will Not Close None HCV-320 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-320 Will Not Close None HCV-321 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-321 Will Not Close None HCV-327 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-327 Will Not Close None HCV-329 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-329 Will Not Close None HCV-331 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-331 Will Not Close None HCV-333 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-333 Will Not Close None HCV-478 N/A None HCV-497 Will Not Close T.S. 2.4(2)d TCV-2897A and/or TCV-2897B N/A None HCV-474 Will Not Open T.S. 2.1.1(3) (Note 9)

HCV-2898A and B Will Not Close None (Note 1)

HCV-2899A and B Will Not Close None (Note 1)

TDB-VIII Information Use Page 7 of 71 Equipment Applicability Guidance Revision 62 Attachment 1 - LCO Applicable Valve Matrix Table 1.2 - CCW, ECCS & Containment Spray Item Tag(s) Mode Tech Spec LCO Applicability HCV-344 Will not Open or T.S. 2.4(2)

Close Not Closed and T.S. 2.6(1)a RCS 210°F HCV-345 Will not Open or T.S. 2.4(2)

Close Not Closed and T.S. 2.6(1)a RCS 210°F HCV-341 N/A None HCV-2916 Open T.S. 2.3(2)f HCV-2936 Open T.S. 2.3(2)f HCV-2956 Open T.S. 2.3(2)f HCV-2976 Open T.S. 2.3(2)f HCV-2987 Closed T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-2987 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-2987 Will Not Close T.S. 2.3(2)e PCV-2909 Will Not Close T.S. 2.3(2)e PCV-2929 Will Not Close T.S. 2.3(2)e PCV-2949 Will Not Close T.S. 2.3(2)e PCV-2969 Will Not Close T.S. 2.3(2)e PCV-2909 Will Not Open None (Note 8)

PCV-2929 Will Not Open None (Note 8)

PCV-2949 Will Not Open None (Note 8)

PCV-2969 Will Not Open None (Note 8)

PCV-2839 (relief valve) Will Not Close Tech Spec 2.0.1 (Note 2)

AC-341 (relief valve) Will Not Close Tech Spec 2.0.1 (Note 2)

AC-364 (relief valve) Will Not Close Tech Spec 2.0.1 (Note 2)

HCV-480 or HCV-484 (AC-4A) Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)c HCV-481 or HCV-485 (AC-4B) Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)c LCV-383-1 or LCV-383-2 Will Not Open T.S. 2.0.1 LCV-383-1 or LCV-383-2 Will Not Close T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-383-3 or HCV-383-4 Will Not Open T.S. 2.3(2)e HCV-383-3 or HCV-383-4 Will Not Close T.S. 2.0.1 HCV-385 or HCV-386 Will Not Open Tech Spec 2.0.1 (Note 5)

HCV-385 or HCV-386 Will Not Close T.S. 2.3(2)e (Note 6)

HCV-385 and HCV-386 Will Not Close T.S. 2.0.1 (Note 7)

YS-351 In ALARM T.S. 2.3(2)e (Note 3 and 4)

TDB-VIII Information Use Page 8 of 71 Equipment Applicability Guidance Revision 62 Attachment 1 - LCO Applicable Valve Matrix Table 1.2 - CCW, ECCS & Containment Spray Item Tag(s) Mode Tech Spec LCO Applicability YS-352 In ALARM T.S. 2.3(2)e (Note 5 and 6)

YS-353 In ALARM T.S. 2.3(2)e (Note 5 and 6)

YS-354 In ALARM T.S. 2.3(2)e (Note 5 and 6)

NOTES:

1. On a VIAS override, and BOTH valves HCV-2898A and B (or HCV-2899A and B) will not close, at least one of the Control Room Air Conditioners would be considered inoperable due to possible overheating.

2. PCV-2839, AC-341 and AC-364 are relief valves and if one (or more of these valves) is STUCK-OPEN, the operability of the CCW system has been affected by loss of Nitrogen to the CCW Surge Tank. Therefore, a more restrictive LCO (e.g., Tech Spec 2.0.1) may be entered by Operations.

3. For Tech Spec 2.3(2)e, there may be multiple inoperable components and still meet the requirements so long as no other Tech Spec modification applies.

4. For Tech Spec 2.3(2)e, the LCO time limit begins with the first inoperable component.

Should additional components become inoperable while the first component is inoperable, the time limit for the LCO remains until all inoperable components are restored to operable.

5. Minimum recirculation path, prior to RAS, is required for LPSI and HPSI pump operability.

T.S. 2.0.1 entry may apply.

6. At least one SIRWT Recirculation valve is required to be closed, post RAS, to prevent pumping highly radioactive water back to the SIRWT.

7. The inability of HCV-385 and HCV-386 to close would result in a loss of Containment Integrity following RAS.

8. If the leakage control valves cannot be maintained in AUTO and a pressure lock condition exists (i.e., > 500 psig on SIT Discharge Pressure Indicator) then RCS coolant leakage by may result due to lower differential pressure across the SI check valve. In this condition, contact Design Engineering for assistance in assessing System Operability.

TDB-VIII Information Use Page 9 of 71 Equipment Applicability Guidance Revision 62 Attachment 1 - LCO Applicable Valve Matrix NOTES: (continued)

9. When CCW cooling is used to support an Operable Shutdown Cooling Loop, the following guidance applies:

T.S. 2.1.1 may be applicable if CCW is isolated to an Operable Shutdown Cooling pump while the RCS is greater than 176°F. EA-FC-91-014 documents the acceptability of SI/CS pump operation with CCW isolated for operating conditions that result in Shutdown Cooling pump suction temperatures as high as 176°F. Technical Specification 2.8 may not apply when CCW is isolated from the associated Shutdown Cooling Pump because when the RCS is greater 176°F, all reactor vessel head closure bolts are fully tensioned in accordance with OP-3A.

(Reference USAR 6.2, 6.3)

TDB-VIII Information Use Page 10 of 71 Equipment Applicability Guidance Revision 62 Attachment 1 - LCO Applicable Valve Matrix Table 1.3 - Containment Coolers Containment Item Tag(s) Mode Tech Spec LCO Cooler Applicability VA-1A(coil) HCV-400A Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

VA-3A (hsg) Unavailable with Valve in any (Notes 1, 3) position HCV-400B Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

Unavailable with Valve in any (Notes 2, 3) position HCV-400C Air Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1 (Note 1)

Unavailable with Valve closed HCV-400D Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

Unavailable with Valve closed (Note 2)

VA-1B (coil) HCV-401A Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

VA-3B (hsg) Unavailable with Valve in any (Notes 1, 3) position HCV-401B Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

Unavailable with Valve closed (Note 2)

HCV-401C Air Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

Unavailable with Valve closed (Note 1)

HCV-401D Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

Unavailable with Valve in any (Notes 2, 3) position VA-8A (coil) HCV-402A Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

VA-7C (hsg) Unavailable with Valve closed (Note 1)

HCV-402B Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

Unavailable with Valve in any (Notes 2, 3) position HCV-402C Air Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

Unavailable with Valve closed (Note 1)

HCV-402D Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

Unavailable with Valve closed (Note 2)

TDB-VIII Information Use Page 11 of 71 Equipment Applicability Guidance Revision 62 Attachment 1 - LCO Applicable Valve Matrix Table 1.3 - Containment Coolers Containment Item Tag(s) Mode Tech Spec LCO Cooler Applicability VA-8B (coil) HCV-403A Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

VA-7D (hsg) Unavailable with Valve closed (Note 1)

HCV-403B Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

Unavailable with Valve closed (Note 2)

HCV-403C Air Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1)

Unavailable with Valve closed (Note 1)

HCV-403D Nitrogen Backup Accumulator T.S. 2.4(1 Unavailable with Valve in any (Notes 2, 3) position NOTES:

1. The HCV-400 (401, 402, 403) A and C valves are not required to close upon a CCW Low Flow signal and CIAS signal in order for the Containment Coolers to be operable.

2. The HCV-400 (401, 402, 403) B and D valves share a common nitrogen backup accumulator (gas cylinder).

3 Because of the effects of flow induced hydrodynamic torque, the valve is assumed to self-close when pneumatic pressure to the actuator is lost.

FORT CALHOUN STATION FC-213 CHEMISTRY FORM R27 Page 1 of 7 WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RELEASE PERMIT RELEASE NUMBER: 2014001 "B" WGDT I. Permit Information:

Issue Date: 20-MAY-2014 Issue Time: 08:59 Sample Date: 15-JAN-2014 Sample Time: 21:48 Isolation Date: 25-APR-2014 Days of Isolation: 31 Preparer: TEST Pressure (psig): 91.0 II. Initial Plant Status:

Radiation Monitors/Sampler:

Gross(cpm) Bkgd(cpm) Net(cpm)

RM-062 6.00E+01 5.OOE+01 1.00E+01

Particulate/Iodine Sample Collection via: RM-062 NOTE - An Aux Bldg Stack Gas Monitor MUST be in operation, or WGDT samples done in accordance with the ODCM.

NOTE - The monitor in service for gaseous analysis of the Auxiliary Building Stack should be utilized for Particulate/Iodine Sample Collection.

FORT CALHOUN STATION FC-213 CHEMISTRY FORM R27 Page 2 of 7 WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RELEASE PERMIT RELEASE NUMBER: 2014001 "B" WGDT III. Gamma Analysis (uCi/cc):

WGDT Sample 1: 11862 WGDT Sample 2: 11863

NSA *

NSA

Total: O.OOE+OO Total: O.OOE+OO AEC Sum: O.OOE+OO AEC Sum: O.OOE+OO Spectrum 11863 will be used for all release calculations.

No Significant Activity

IV. Projected Release Information at 907 scfh:

WGDT Unrestricted AEC Cone. Area Cone. Limit UA Activity Nuclide (uCi/cc) (uCi/cc) (uCi/cc) Fraction (uCi)

No Significant Activity

Projected Dose Rate Calculations:

Dose Rate Limit % Limit Total Body (mRem/yr): O.OOE+OO <= 500 0.00 Skin (mRem/yr): O.OOE+OO <=3000 0.00 Total Organ (mRem/yr): O.OOE+OO <=1500 0.00 "NSA" - (No Significant Activity) No identified activity above sample LLD.

FORT CALHOUN STATION FC-213 CHEMISTRY FORM R27 Page 3 of 7 WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RELEASE PERMIT RELEASE NUMBER: 2014001 "B" WGDT V. Special Instructions:

A. Verify that "B" WGDT was isolated on 25-MAR-2014 per Section I, Permit Information, prior to release . I Ops B. Release Flowrate Maximum: 907 scfh MANUAL RELEASE

c. Terminate the Release if Iodine/Particulate sampling is lost and alternate sampling can not be established.

D. Make release using installed orifice of 0.10 inch diameter, with a maximum flow rate capacity at 100 psi of 907.24 scfh.

Remarks:

FORT CALHOUN STATION FC-213 CHEMISTRY FORM R27 Page 4 of 7 WASTE GAS RELEASE PERMIT 2014001 V. Projected Cumulative Dose Information Current Year to Percent of Release Date Annual Obj Annual Obj C. Noble Gas Air Dose Total Body Gamma(mRad): O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO 1.00E+01 0.00%

Total Body Beta(mRad): O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO 2.00E+01 0.00%

D. Iodine, Tritium, and Particulate Air Dose Total Body(mRem): O.OOE+OO 3.69E-04 1.50E+01 0.00%

Critical Organ(mRem): O.OOE+OO 3.69E-04 1.50E+01 0.00%

VI. Approvals:

Form Revision Number Agrees with Master Form Revision Number: _____________________________________

Qualified Chem Tech Permit Reviewed by: Date:

Shift Chemist Release Approved: _______________________________________ Date:

Supervisor - System Chemistry Reason for Release:

Authorized by: _______________________________________ Date:

FCS Plant Manager

NOTE - Per the ODCM, a WGDT must be isolated a minimum of 30 days, unless a release is required to support plant operations.

FORT CALHOUN STATION FC-213 CHEMISTRY FORM R27 PAGE 5 OF 7 VIII. OPERATIONS CHECKLIST(Continued)

A. Initiate Waste Gas release I.A.W 01-WDG-2 and record initial readings in Gas Discharge Log (IF APPLICABLE).* I B. During Waste Gas Release

1. Record applicable data in Gas Discharge Log* every four (4) hours, if applicable. I

2. If gas release is terminated for a period prior to completion of release, record required readings in Table I of 01-WDG-2. I

c. Waste Gas Release Termination

1. Terminate waste gas release I.A.W. 01-WDG-2. I

2. Record final readings in Gas Discharge Log (If Applicable)* I

3. Attach the working copy of the applicable operating instruction to the permit. I

(Gas Discharge Log is applicable only if one or more of the recorders itemized in 01-WDG-2 Prerequisites are in operable, or when manual release thru the orifice is used.)

Shift Manager (CH-AD-0027)

FORT CALHOUN STATION FC-213 CHEMISTRY FORM R27 PAGE 6 OF 7 GAS DISCHARGE LOG PERMIT No. _ Gas Decay Tank No. _

TIME/DATE WASTE GAS FLOW TOTAL STACK FLOW AUX. BLDG DECAY TANK SIGN OFF NOBLE GAS PRESSURE (psig)

Rate Total* FT-758 (CFM) MONITOR Fr-532-SCFH FIC-532-fe FQI-758 FR-758 ERF F758 or as calculated below NOTE: This log Will be used per ODCM to record applicable readings when one or more of the recorders itemized in OI-WDG-2 Prerequisites are inoperable, or when manual release thru the orifice is used.

Not required for manual releases.

(400 ft 3/WGDT) (L\P)

Flow Rate =

(14. 7 psia) (L\t)

Calculate flowrate during manual releases as follows; Where: AP = Difference between previous and current tank pressure on psia.

At= Difference between previous and current time in hours.

(CH-AD-0027)

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: P-3 Rev. 0 JPM

Title:

Perform Concentrated Boric Acid Batching Location: Room 69 Approximate Time: 15 minutes Start Time:__________________

End Time:___________________

Actual Time: _________________

Reference(s): NRC K/A 004 A4.04 (RO 3.2/SRO 3.6)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room OI-CH-5 Attachment 1 T.S. Fig. 2-12 Handout(s): OI-CH-5 Attachment 1 T.S. Fig. 2-12 Task List #: 0144 Applicable Position(s): RO/SRO Time Critical: NO Alternate Path: YES Date:

JPM Prepared by:

JPM Reviewed by: Date:

1

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: P-3 Rev. 0 JPM

Title:

Perform Concentrated Boric Acid Batching Operators Name: __________________________________________

All Critical Steps (shaded) must be performed or simulated in accordance with the standards contained in this JPM The Operators performance was evaluated as (circle one):

SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Evaluators Signature: _____________________________ Date: __________

Reason, if unsatisfactory:

Tools & Equipment: None Safety Considerations: None Comments: This JPM will be performed as a static JPM.

2

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: P-3 Rev. 0 JPM

Title:

Perform Concentrated Boric Acid Batching TASK The Applicant has simulated batching boric acid to CH-STANDARD: 11B, Boric Acid Stroage Tank.

INITIAL The Contol Room has enterd EOP-3 for a Loss of CONDITIONS: Coolant Accident. Additional borated water is needed to replenish the SIRWT post RAS. EOP/AOP Attachment IC-15, Methods for Refilling The SIRWT has been entered. Flushing of the Batching Tank has been completed.

INITIATING CUE: The CRS directs you to relieve the EONA and continue batching batching boric acid using a 3 and 2 bag batching rotation, starting with 3 bags to CH-11B, Boric Acid Storage Tank using OI-CH-5 Attachment 1 starting at Step 17 for additional batching required. All prerequisites have been completed.

3

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: P-3 Rev. 0 JPM

Title:

Perform Concentrated Boric Acid Batching Critical Steps shown in gray STEP ELEMENT STANDARD Read CAUTIONS prior to Step Applicant may read CAUTIONS.

1.

NOTE to Evaluator; Per Initiating Cue, additional batching is required. Applicant started at Step 17.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

17. IF additional batching is (RM 69) required, open DW-147 and GO TO Step 4.

Applicant started at Step 17 and simulated opened DW-147. (CC)

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

4. WHEN flushing is completed, (RM 69)

THEN close the following valves:

Applicant simulated closing

CH-444 /checking closed CH-444 and

CH-279 CH-279. (C)

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

4

STEP ELEMENT STANDARD

5. WHEN Batching Tank is (Rm 69) approximately 4 inches below overflow when using 50 pound NOTE to Evaluator; bags, 8 inches below the over Student determines tank level flow when using 25 kilogram due to size of bags being used.

bags, OR desired level is reached, THEN close DW-147.

When needed CUE: 50lb bags are being used.

4 below for 50lbs 8 below for 25kgs.

After Applicant determined level CUE: Use pointing device to indicate ~4 below tank overflow.

Applincant closed DW-147.

(C)

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

Applicant reads CAUTIONS Reads CAUTIONS.

prior to Step 6 If needed; CUE: You have reviewed MSDS and are adhering to FCSG 12.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT 5

STEP ELEMENT STANDARD

6. IF Batching Tank Heaters are (Room 69) available, (MCC-3C2-D03, Corr 26), THEN place Boric Acid If needed; Batching Tank Heaters Control CUE: Heater indication is as Switch in AUTO. (Room 69) you see it.

Green light on.

Applicant determined Electric Heaters are available.

Applicant placed heater switch in AUTO.

Applicant may notice the heaters did not coming on. If needed; CUE: Indications are as you see them.

If needed; CUE: CRS Acknowledged

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT]

6.a Set TIC-252, Boric Acid Applicant verified solubility Batching Tank CH-12 temperature per T.S. 2-12 Temperature Indicator operator aid.

Controller above 80°F (approximately 30°F above TIC-252 should be set to >80°F.

desired boric acid solubility temperature, per Tech Spec Applicant should N/A step due to Figure 2-12). the Electric Heater not working.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT]

7. IF placing the Aux Steam (RM 69)

Heating Coil in service, THEN open the following: Alternate Path

AS-868, Steam Trap AS- Applicant opened AS-868. (CC) 20H Inlet Drain Valve

AS-813, Aux Steam to Applicant opened AS-813. (CC)

Boric Acid Batching Tank Ch-12 Heating Coil Isolation Valve

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

6

STEP ELEMENT STANDARD

8. Start CH-12-AG, Boric Acid (RM 69)

Batching Tank Mixer.

Applicant simulated starting CH-12-AG.

If needed; CH-12-AG is running.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

Read NOTES prior to Step 9. Reads NOTES.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

9. WHEN the desired temperature (RM 69) is reached, THEN slowly add the desired number of Boric Applicant calculated required Acid Crystal bags (3 for 50 temperature using information in pound bags, 2 for 25 kilogram previous note and T.S. Figure 2-bags, or the amount directed by 12.

the Shift Manager). [AR 15144]

Three 50lbs bags = 3.9%

(~97°F)

After Applicant verified temperature requirements and indication on the temperature indicator; CUE: Use pointing device to indicate a temperature of 97°F.

Applicant simulated adding 3 50lbs bag.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

10. WHEN Boric Acid Crystals are completely dissolved, THEN CUE: Boric Acid Crystals are stop Batching Tank Mixer. completely dissolved.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

11. IF Batching Tank Heaters are NOTE to Evaluator; energized, THEN place Heater Heaters did not work.

Control Switch in OFF. Applicant turned them off if not already done.

Step is N/A

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

7

STEP ELEMENT STANDARD

12. IF Aux Steam Coil is in service, (RM 69)

THEN close the following:

AS-868 Applicant simulated closing AS-

AS-813 868. (C)

Applicant simulated closing AS-813. (C)

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

13. Unlock and Open CH-103, Boric (RM 69)

Acid Batching Tank CH-12 Outlet Valve. Applicant simulated unlocking and opening CH-103. (CC)

Applicant may contact the Control Room. If so; CUE: CRS Acknowledged.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

14. Open desired Boric Acid (RM 69)

Storage Tank Inlet valve to drain the Boric Acid Batching Tank:

CH-105, Boric Acid Storage Tank CH-11A Boric Acid Inlet Valve

CH-104, Boric Acid Storage Tank CH-11B Boric Acid Inlet Valve. Applicant simulated opening CH-104. (CC)

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

17 WHEN the Boric Acid Tank is drained, THEN close the selected valve:

CH-105 Applicant simulated closing CH-

CH-104 104. (C)

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

8

STEP ELEMENT STANDARD 18 Close CH-103. Applicant simulated closing CH-103. (C)

STOP, JPM is Finished.

[ SAT ] [ UNSAT ]

Termination Criteria: The student has simulated batching boric acid to CH-11B, Boric Acid Stroage Tank.

9

Fort Calhoun Station - Operations Training JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL The Contol Room has enterd EOP-3 for a Loss of CONDITIONS: Coolant Accident. Additional borated water is needed to replenish the SIRWT post RAS. EOP/AOP Attachment IC-15, Methods for Refilling The SIRWT has been entered. Flushing of the Batching Tank has been completed.

INITIATING CUE: The CRS directs you to relieve the EONA and continue batching batching boric acid using a 3 and 2 bag batching rotation, starting with 3 bags to CH-11B, Boric Acid Storage Tank using OI-CH-5 Attachment 1 starting at Step 17 for additional batching required. All prerequisites have been completed.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Figure 2-12 2.2 - Page 12 Amendment No. 131

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Scenario No.: __1____ Revision __0__ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% power, FW-54 Out of service due to excessive vibration.

Turnover: Continue full power operation. Rotate CA-1A on and place CA-1C in CR Start.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1

N-BOPO Rotate Air Compressors.

2 I-ATCO Power Range NI Channel B Fails TS-CRS 3 C-BOPO Condensate pump FW-2B trips 4 C-ATCO Charging pump CH-1C degraded flow 5 C-BOPO Pressure Control valve, PCV-910, fails open 6 C-All Instrument Inverter D fails TS-CRS 7 N-All AOP-05 or OP-4 Power Reduction R-ATCO 8 M-All DC Bus #2 fails 9 I-ATCO PPLS fails to actuate 10 C-BOPO S/G Safety Valve Fails Open

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 8

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2

3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1

7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #1 The crew will assume the watch at 100% power, with FW-54 out of service for excessive vibrations and instructions to continue full power operations.

The first event is rotating Air Compressors, AC-1A will be placed in service and AC-1C will be made the CR Start Air Compressor.

The next event is a failure of Power Range NI Channel B high voltage power supply. Operator actions are per ARP-CB-4/A20 and AOP-15 and will direct bypassing affect trip units on the inoperable channel. SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. T.S. 2.15.1(1) applies.

The next event is Condensate Pump, FW-2B, trips on overcurrent and the standby pump does not automatically start. Operator actions are per ARP-CB-10,11/A12 and will direct manual starting of the standby Condensate Pump.

The next event is Charging Pump, CH-1C, degraded flow due to discharge relief valve leaking by. Operator actions are per ARP-CB-1,2,3/A2 and will direct rotation of Charging Pumps per OI-CH-1.

The next event is Steam Dump and Bypass valve, PCV-910 fails open. Operator actions may be to attempt to take manual control and close the valve and dispatching operator to isolate air to valves. CRS may enter AOP-40, OVERCOOLING/EXCESSIVE STEAM DEMAND., and direct the BOPO to reduce turbine load to maintain Tcold on program.

The next event is a failure of Instrument Inverter D which deenergizes Instrument Bus AI-40D.

Operator actions are per ARP-CB-20/A15, AOP-16 and continue in AOP-15. SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. With two Power Range Safety Channels inoperable, reduce power to less than or equal to 70% per OP-4, this is per T.S. 2.15 Table 2.2. But T.S. 2.15.2(5) is more limiting, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to hot shutdown for two or more RPS Logic Matrices inoperable and T.S.

2.7(2)h which requires all reactor protective and engineered safeguards instrument channels supplied by the other three buses to be operable, is not met and requires entry into T.S. 2.0.1 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to be in hot shutdown.

The next event is a power reduction per AOP-05, EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN or OP-4, LOAD CHANGE AND NORMAL POWER OPERATION.

The next event is a loss of DC Bus #2, resulting in the MSIVs going closed and tripping the reactor. The crew will enter EOP-00 and perform standard post trip actions. Following diagnosis of event, SRO will transition to EOP-20, FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE. A S/G safety valve will fail open on RC-2B on the trip. The crew will take action to steam the unaffected S/G, RC-2A, prior to RC-2B reaching 27% WR by opening MS-291 (critical task).

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 When Pressurizer pressure lowers to 1600 psia PPLS will fail to actuate. The crew will recognize the failure of PPLS to actuate and manually actuate PPLS using the test switches (critical task).

The scenario may be terminated when the affected S/G is isolated and the unaffected S/G has steam and feed flow established.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 4 of 29 Event

Description:

Rotate CA-1A on and place CA-1C is CR Start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct BOPO to place CA-1A in service and place CA-1C in CR Start per OI-CA-1 Att 4.

BOPO Per OI-CA-1 Att 4.

Directs Waterplant Operator to Room 19 for rotation.

Read notes on page 23.

BOPO If only rotating Standby and CR Start Compressors. (Step 1) NOTE:

Rotating CR Start and running compressors, step is N/A.

BOPO If starting CA-1A perform the following:

Direct Waterplant Operator to perform step 2.a, b, c, d and e.1. NOTE:

Step 2.d is N/A.

Report as Waterplant Operator after one minute, that step 2.a, b, c and e.1 are complete:

Crankcase oil level greater than one-half

PI-1942A, CA-1A Intercooler Inlet Pressure is greater than 30 psig

CA-1A-V, Crankcase Vent valve has been cycled

CA-1A Load Transfer Switch, 1LTS, in OFF

CA-1A Control Selector Switch, 1SS, in OFF BOPO Place CA-1A Control Switch in AFTERSTART. (Step 2.e.2)

Direct Waterplant Operator to start CA-1A by placing the 1SS switch to CS Report as Waterplant operator that the 1SS is in CS.

BOPO Direct the Waterplant Operator to perform steps 2.f - k.

Report as Waterplant Operator after one minute that steps 2.f through k are complete, all local indications are normal, the Load Transfer Switch for CA-1A is in position 1 and CA-1C is in OFF and CA-1A is holding pressure.

BOPO Steps 3 and 4 are for starting CA-1B and CA-1C, steps are N/A.

BOPO If the Off-Going Compressor is to be placed in CR Start, perform the following: (Step 5)

Direct Waterplant Operator to perform steps 5.a and b.

Report as Waterplant Operator that the 2SS switch is in OFF and FI-1955C indicates no flow.

BOPO Place CA-1C control switch in AFTERSTOP. (Step 5.c)

Event description continued on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 5 of 29 Event

Description:

Rotate CA-1A on and place CA-1C is CR Start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Direct Waterplant Operator to perform steps 5.d and e.

Report as Waterplant Operator that the 2SS switch is in CS and the load transfer switch is in position 1.

BOPO Steps 6,7 and 8 are for the standby Air Compressor, steps are N/A.

BOPO Direct Waterplant Operator to perform steps 9 and 10.

Report as Waterplant Operator that all Load Transfer switches are in position 1 or 2 and CA-1A has 35 psig of oil pressure.

BOPO OI-CA-2 will not be performed, step is N/A.

Event is terminated once the Air Compressors are rotated. Lead examiner will cue next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 29 Event

Description:

Failure of Power Range NI Channel B high voltage power supply.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Respond to multiple alarms including CB-4/A20 Window B-7, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL INOPERATIVE, Window B-6, ROD DROP NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL, and Window E-6, NUCLEAR T POWER CHANNEL DEVIATION CRS With multiple alarms, directs BOPO or ATCO to monitor primary.

ATCO Enter ARP-CB-4/A20 Window B-7.

CRS Determine that entry conditions for AOP-15, LOSS OF FLUX INDICATION OR FLOW STREAMING, are met and enters AOP-15, Section I, Loss of Power Range Safety Channels.

ATCO Per ARP-CB-4/A20 Verify testing of nuclear instrumentation is in progress. (Step 1) NOTE:

No testing in progress, step is N/A.

ATCO If testing is not in progress, check the non-op light is on for one of the Safety Channel Drawers or WRNI drawers. (Step 2) NOTE: Channel B on.

ATCO Check the following for the Safety Channel with the non-op light: (Step 3):

Test Select Switches on Linear Power Range Drawer in OFF

Test Enable Switch on Linear Power Range Drawer in OPERATE

Level Test and Rate Test Switches in OPR for WRNI Drawers

NI drawer power on lights are on for WRNI Drawers

Detector high voltage dropped by greater than 100 volts for Linear Power Range Drawers NOTE: High voltage will indicate zero.

ATCO Verify the NI-004 non-operate light for D Channel at AI-212 is out. (Step 4)

Dispatch the Waterplant Operator to verify.

When dispatched as Waterplant Operator to verify non-op light at AI-212, report after one minute that the non-op light is out.

ATCO If a safety channel is failed, implement AOP-15, LOSS OF FLUX INDICATION. (Step 5) NOTE: CRS may already be in AOP-15.

ATCO If a wide range channel has failed and power between 10-4% and 15%,

implement AOP-15. (Step 6) NOTE: WR did not fail, AOP-15 entered in previous step, step is N/A.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 7 of 29 Event

Description:

Failure of Power Range NI Channel B high voltage power supply.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Per AOP-15.

Read notes on page 4.

CRS If any trip units, 1,2,9,10,12, are bypassed then bypass the remaining trip units. (Step 1) NOTE: No trip units are bypassed, step is N/A.

CRS Notify Manager Shift Operations or Work Week Manager of Power Range Safety Channel failure per SO-O-28. (Step 2)

CRS If one power range safety channel is inoperable, then place RPS Trip Units 1,2,9,10 and 12 in bypass within one hour. Directs the ATCO to bypass trips units. (Step 3)

ATCO Place RPS Trip Units 1,2,9,10 and 12 in bypass within one hour.

CRS If one power range safety channel is inoperable and the channel will be tripped, place affected Trip Units in trip within one hour. (Step 4) NOTE:

No trips units are to be tripped, step is N/A.

ATCO Bypass the inoperable Power Range Channel on DCS. (Step 5)

ATCO If a dropped rod bistable is tripped, then reset the dropped rod bistable by:

Toggle the reset switch and verify the bistable light is out. (Step 6) NOTE:

There are no dropped rod bistables active.

CRS Direct Work Week Manager to restore Power Range Safety Channel to service. (Step 7)

CRS Read Note: Bypass of RPS Trip Units which receive an input from an inoperable Power Range Safety Channel is allowed for a maximum of seven days if the failure is due to a malfunctioning detector per TS 2.15.

CRS If the failure of the Power Range Safety Channel is due to a malfunctioning detector and seven days has elapsed, initiate plant shutdown. (Step 8)

NOTE: Failure is not from a malfunctioning detector, step is N/A.

CRS Enter T.S. 2.15.1(1). Place the inoperable channel in either bypass or tripped condition within one hour. Channel may be bypassed up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

Event is terminated once T.S. call is made. Lead examiner will cue the next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 29 Event

Description:

Condensate Pump, FW-2B trips and standby pump fails to auto start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Respond to alarm CB-10,11/A12 window A-5L, CONDENSATE PUMP B OVERLOAD/TRIP.

BOPO Informs CRS of trip of FW-2B and failure of automatic start of the standby pump.

CRS May direct BOPO to start FW-2C using ARP guidance or to start FW-2C and backup with ARP or procedure.

BOPO Enter ARP-CB-10,11/A12 window A-5L.

ATCO/BOPO Per ARP-CB-10/11.

Dispatch operator to check status of FW-2B. (Step 1)

May dispatch the Waterplant Operator to the breaker and Turbine Bldg Operator to FW-2B.

When directed as Turbine Bldg and/or Waterplant Operator to investigate FW-2B trip. Report after one minute that the breaker has tripped on overcurrent (WP), and/or FW-2B is hot to the touch. (TB)

BOPO Verify the standby Condensate Pump has started, FW-2C. (Step 2)

NOTE: Standby pump does not automatically start.

BOPO Start the standby Condensate Pump, FW-2C. (Step 2.1) 2.1.1 Place the 43/FW, Feedwater Pumps Selector Switch, in Off and verify 43/FW TRANSFER SWITCH OFF-AUTO is in alarm. CB-10,11/A10 B-6L NOTE: Alarm does not come in due to failure of stby circuit.

2.1.2 Start FW-2C, Condensate Pump.

2.1.3 Place the 43/FW switch in AUTO and verify alarm reset CB-10,11

/A10 B-6L NOTE: Alarm was not in.

BOPO Check for proper Feedwater Pump suction flow and Condenser Hotwell level. (Step 2.2) NOTE: The increase in feedflow may cause RCS pressure to drop less than 2075 psia.

CRS If transient causes RCS pressure to lower to less than 2075 psia, enter T.S. 2.10.4(5)(a)(ii) for RCS pressure less than 2075 psia, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to restore pressure.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 29 Event

Description:

Condensate Pump, FW-2B trips and standby pump fails to auto start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Ensure 43-SIAS/FW2, Post SIAS/CSAS Running Condensate Pump is selected to FW-2C. (Step 2.3)

BOPO Check the following for the cause of the FW-2B trip (Step 2.4):

49-50-83/FW-2B, time overcurrent relay tripped at 1A2

Motor stopped from local stop pushbutton

Motor stopped from the 69 permissive switch

Low voltage on 4160V Bus 1A2 CRS Notify Work Week Manager of pump trip and standby pump fail to start.

(Step 2.5)

BOPO IF automatically started, place the standby pump in After-Start. (Step 2.6)

NOTE: Pump did not auto start, step is N/A.

BOPO Evaluate impact of standby pump start on XC105 and Gardel. (Step 2.7)

BOPO Read Note: Prevent a pump in PULL-OUT from auto starting by first matching flags for the pumps not in PULL-OUT.

BOPO If it is desired to align another pump to Standby. (Step 3) NOTE: No other pump available as a standby pump, step is N/A.

Event is terminated when standby Condensate Pump is operating.

Lead examiner will cue the next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 29 Event

Description:

Charging Pump, CH-1C develops degraded flow.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Respond to alarm CB-1,2,3/A2 A-6L CHARGING FLOW LO.

ATCO Informs CRS of lower than normal flow (~25 gpm).

CRS Direct ATCO to carry out actions of ARP.

ATCO Enter ARP-CB-1,2,3/A2 A-6L.

ATCO/BOPO Dispatch an operator to investigate degraded flow.

When directed as Auxiliary Bldg Operator to investigate CH-1C degraded flow. Report after one minute that the discharge relief valve piping appears to have flow.

ATCO Per ARP-CB-1,2,3/A2.

Check Charging Header flow. (Step 1)

ATCO If Charging Flow is lost, isolate Letdown by closing TCV-202 and HCV-204. (Step 2) NOTE: Charging flow is not lost.

ATCO If Charging Flow is less than 30 gpm, check the following: (Step 3)

NOTE: Flow is ~25 gpm.

Charging Pump operation

Valve alignment

Piping break

Charging Pump discharge or suction relief valve ATCO If a system leak is identified, implement AOP-33 or AOP-22. (Step 4)

NOTE: There is no system leakage.

ATCO Read Note: Based on plant conditions, XC-105 and GARDEL may be invalid.

ATCO If required, rotate Charging Pumps per OI-CH-1. (Step 5)

CRS Directs rotating CH-1A or CH-1B on the securing CH-1C.

CRS Ensure compliance with T.S. 2.2 and 2.15. (Step 6) NOTE: T.S. 2.2.4 should be referenced, two Charging Pumps are required to be operable and is met by CH-1A and CH-1B.

ATCO Ensure compliance with SO-O-23. (Step 7)

ATCO Per OI-CH-1.

Read prerequisites for OI-CH-1 Attachment 5, Alternating Charging Pumps.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 11 of 29 Event

Description:

Charging Pump CH-1C development degraded flow.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Start the selected Packing Cooling Pump a minimum of 30 minutes prior to starting Charging Pump. (Step 1) NOTE: Crew will determine not required, step is N/A.

CRS May direct not waiting 30 minutes.

ATCO If desired by SM to equalize the boron concentration in the oncoming pump, flush through drain valve. (Step 2) NOTE: Crew will determine not required, step is N/A.

CRS May direct flush not required.

ATCO Start the selected Charging Pump, CH-1A or CH-1B. (Step 3)

ATCO When charging flow has increased to 30 gpm on FIA-236, secure CH-1C.

(Step 4)

ATCO Ensure any pressure oscillations in the Letdown line are dampened and stabilized by PCV-210. (Step 5)

ATCO Position the Charging Pumps Mode Select Stby switch to the desired backup Charging Pumps start sequence. (Step 6)

ATCO Stop CH-1C-1 Packing Cooling Pump 30 minutes after stopping Charging Pump CH-1C. (Step 7)

ATCO May place CH-1C in PULL-OUT to prevent automatic starting of a degraded pump.

Event is terminated once Charging Pump is operating. Next event is cued at Lead Examiner's direction.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 29 Event

Description:

Steam Dump and Bypass valve, PCV-910, fails open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO/BOPO Recognize RCS Tcold lowering from alarms and indications. NOTE: DCS will alarm for deviation between valve demand and valve position.

BOPO Direct Turbine Bldg Operator to isolate air to Steam Dump and Bypass valves.

CRS May direct BOPO to take manual control of PCV-910 and close valve.

NOTE: Valve will not close.

When dispatched as Turbine Bldg Operator to isolate air to Steam Dump and Bypass, report after one minute that air is isolated and IA-594 is closed.

CRS May enter AOP-40, OVERCOOLING/EXCESSIVE STEAM DEMAND.

CRS Verify no conditions that would require a plant trip. (Step 1) NOTE: No trip is required.

BOPO If Reactor Power is greater than 15%, adjust turbine load to maintain RCS Tcold on program per Attachment HR-12. (Step 2)

BOPO Per Attachment HR-12.

Secondary Heat Removal per Attachment HR-12. If Turbine is online, ensure Turbine Control is in MANUAL. (Step 1)

BOPO Read Note: Output will be highlighted by a yellow box when selected.

BOPO Select OUTPUT by pushing the OUT button. (Step 2)

BOPO Read Note: Single arrow will adjust turbine load 0.1% and the double arrow 0.5% and maintain temperature within the program.

BOPO Adjust Turbine load by pressing the single or double UP or DOWN arrows to maintain the following: (Step 3)

Tcold 527-545°F

Tcold within +0°F, -1°F of program BOPO When PCV-910 closes, direct Turbine Bldg Operator to close the IA isolation to PCV-910 and reopen IA-594.

When dispatched to close the local isolation for PCV-910 and open IA-594, report after one minute that the local IA isolation for PCV-910 is closed and IA-594 is open.

Event is terminated air is isolated to PCV-910 and restored to the rest of the valves. Next event is cued at Lead Examiner's direction.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 29 Event

Description:

Instrument Inverter D failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Respond to alarms CB-20/A15 D-6, INVERTER D TROUBLE, and CB-20/A15 D-8, INSTRUMENT BUS D LOW VOLTAGE/GROUND.

BOPO Inform CRS of alarms and loss of D Instrument Bus.

CRS Directs ATCO to monitor the primary due to multiple alarms.

BOPO Enter ARP-CB-20/A15 D-6.

CRS Enters AOP-16, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS POWER, Section I Loss of Instrument Bus Power. Transitions to Section V Loss or Instrument Bus AI-40D.

BOPO Per ARP-CB-20/A15.

Read Note: Failure of one or both fans derates the ambient temperature limits of the inverter.

BOPO Dispatch operator to D Inverter and check the following: (Step 1)

Inverter Supplying load light lit

In Sync light lit

Precharge light lit

Manual Switch 1 in Normal Position light lit

All other lights out

Both fans on top are operating

Manual Bypass Switch in Normal Operation When directed as Waterplant Operator to investigate Inverter D. Report after one minute that the Inverter has good voltage but no current and is on the bypass transformer.

When asked about indications per step 1, all indicate as required.

BOPO Check Inverter D Bypass Transformer breaker, MCC-4C1-F05. (Step 2)

BOPO Check indications on AI-40D. (Step 3)

If V/I BUS D is less than 108 VAC, implement AOP-16. NOTE:

Bus is de-energized and reading zero volts

Instrument Bus D ground light lit. NOTE: Both lights will be off due the being de-energized BOPO If I-BUS-D-GRND1 or I-BUS-D-GRND2 is brightly lit, locate source. (Step

4) NOTE: Both ground indicating lights are off, step is N/A.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 29 Event

Description:

Instrument Inverter D failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO If any of the following conditions exist determine reason: (Step 5)

EE-8L-S1 in bypass

MCC-4C1-F05 is open CRS Notify the Work Week Manager of Inverter D trouble. (Step 6)

CRS Per AOP-16.

Read Notes on page 65.

CRS Verify a loss of Instrument Bus D by one of the following: (Step 1)

Instrument Bus D voltage less than 108v

Inverter D Trouble alarm

Swing Inverter, EE-8T, trouble alarm

Instrument Bus D Low Voltage/Ground alarm CRS Read Note: Instruments or equipment inoperable associated with RCS Heat Removal Safety Function BOPO Verifies S/G levels are 35-85% NR (Step 2)

CRS Read Notes: Instruments or equipment inoperable associated with Reactivity Control Safety Function.

ATCO Verify clutch power supply is deenergized by the following: (Step 3)

AI-3-PS2 output current is 0

AI-3-PS4 output current is 0

AI-3-PS2 indicating lights are out

AI-3-PS4 indicating lights are out ATCO Bypass all Channel D Bistable Trip Units. (Step 4) NOTE: Channel B has trip units bypassed, D Channel fails to trip condition which will satisfy AOP-15 for two Power Range channels failed.

CRS Comply with T.S. 2.15.2(5). (Step 5)

Enter T.S. 2.15.2(5). Be in Hot Shutdown and verify no more than one CEA is capable of being withdrawn within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . For two or more RPS Logic Matrices inoperable.

NOTE: Three RPS Logic Matrices are inoperable.

CRS Read Notes: Instruments or equipment inoperable associated with Vital Auxiliaries Safety Function Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 29 Event

Description:

Instrument Inverter D failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Ensures CCW system operation: (Step 6)

At least one CCW pump running

CCW pressure greater than or equal to 60 psig ATCO Ensures at least one Raw Water Pump running. (Step 7)

BOPO Ensures Instrument Air Pressure greater than or equal to 90 psig. (Step 8)

CRS Read Note: Instruments or equipment inoperable associated with RCS Inventory Control Safety Function ATCO Maintain pressurizer level at 30-70%, trending to 45-60% using CH-1A or CH-1B per Attachment IC-11, Inventory Control. (Step 9)

CRS Read Note: Instruments or equipment inoperable associated with RCS Pressure Control Safety Function ATCO Maintain RCS pressure per Attachment PC-12, RCS Pressure-Temperature Limits and Attachment PC-11, Pressure Control. (Step 10)

CRS Read Notes: Associated with PORVs CRS Consider closing both PORV block valves. (Step 11)

ATCO If directed, close HCV-150 and HCV-151.

CRS Read Note: Instruments or equipment inoperable associated with Core Heat Removal Safety Function.

ATCO Verify at least one RCP is running. (Step 12)

CRS Read Note: Instruments or equipment inoperable associated with Containment Integrity Safety Function ATCO Confirm Containment Integrity: (Step13)

No unexpected rise in Containment Sump Level

No alarms on Containment Area Radiation Monitors

RM-051 not in alarm

RM-054A and RM-057 not in alarm

Containment Pressure less than 3 psig

Containment Temperature less than 120°F Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 29 Event

Description:

Instrument Inverter D failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Terminate all radioactive releases. (Step 14)

CRS If RM-052 is powered from AI-40D, direct transfer of RM-052 power to Instrument Bus C by placing AI-81-SW1 in C position. (Step 15) NOTE:

RM-052 is normally powered from AI-40C, step is N/A.

BOPO Isolate S/G Blowdown by closing the following valves: (Step 16)

HCV-1389 and HCV-1390

HCV-1387A/B and HCV-1388A/B ATCO Place the following radiation monitors in KEYPAD. (Step 17)

RM-054B

RM-055

RM-062

RM-063 CRS Read Note: Instruments or equipment inoperable associated with Engineered Safety Features System CRS Refer to CH-ODCM-0001, Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual and Technical Specifications, 2.1.6 (if PORVs were isolated), 2.2, 2.7, 2.15, 2.21.

NOTE: The limiting TS is 2.15.2(5) which was referenced at step 5.

CRS May return to AOP-15.

Recognize two Power Range Safety Channels are inoperable and continue in AOP-15 step 10.

CRS Determine all Trip Units for D Channel are already in the trip condition.

(Step 10 and 11)

ATCO Bypass Power Range Channel D on DCS. (Step 12)

CRS With two Power Range Safety Channels inoperable, reduce power to less than or equal to 70% per OP-4, Load Change and Normal Power Operation. (Step 13) NOTE: T.S. 2.15 Table 2.2 requires power reduction to 70% for two inoperable safety channels, but T.S. 2.15.2(5) is more limiting, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to hot shutdown and T.S. 2.7(2)h which requires all reactor protective and engineered safeguards instrument channels supplied by the other three buses to be operable, is not met and requires entry into T.S. 2.0.1 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to be in hot shutdown.

Next event is terminated upon transition to shutdown.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 29 Event

Description:

Power Reduction per OP-4 or AOP-05.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Enter AOP-05, EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN or OP-4, LOAD CHANGE AND NORMAL POWER OPERATION.

CRS Per AOP-05.

Read notes on page 3, briefs the crew on the shutdown and gives Reactor trip criteria. NOTE: Trip criteria is in note 4.

CRS Read Note: TDB-III-23a and Power Ascension/Power Reduction Strategy provide guidance for shutdown.

CRS For additional guidance contact Reactor Engineer. (Step 1)

CRS Read Note: Operation of more than one Charging Pump will raise the rate of power reduction.

ATCO If borating from the SIRWT, perform the following: (Step 2)

Ensure one Charging Pump is operating

Open LCV-218-3

Close LCV-218-2 CRS If borating from CVCS. (Step 3) NOTE: Step is N/A.

CRS Notify Energy Marketing of the power reduction. (Step 4)

CRS Read Note: Maintain Tcold per TDB Figure III.1, Tave Program.

BOPO Maintain RCS Temperature Control using Attachment HR-12, Secondary Heat Removal Operation within the following: (Step 5)

Tcold 527-545°F

Tcold within +0°F, -1°F of program ATCO Maintain Pressurizer Level using Attachment IC-11, Inventory Control within the following: (Step 6)

PZR level 45-60%

PZR level within 4% of program ATCO Maintain VCT level 55-85% by performing the following: (Step 7)

Place LCV-218-1 to RWTS

When diversion to waste is complete, place LCV-218-1 in AUTO When down power has commenced and reactor effects have been noted. Lead examiner will cue the next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 29 Event

Description:

Power Reduction per OP-4 or AOP-05.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Maximize pressurizer heaters and spray per the following: (Step 8)

Energize Backup Heaters by placing the Control Switch to ON for all four banks of heaters

Adjust the controller, PC-103X, setpoint pushbutton to maintain pressure 2080-2145 psia NOTE: Controller setpoint will be adjusted in the lower direction CRS Per OP-4, Attachment 2.

Read notes on page 21, briefs the crew on the shutdown and gives.

CRS Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of shutdown lower VCT overpressure. (step 1) NOTE:

Step is N/A.

ATCO Maximize pressurizer heaters and spray per OI-RC-7. (Step 2)

Verify selected controller is in Automatic, PC-103X

Ensure Proportional Heaters are in AUTO

Ensure Spray Valve Control Switches are in AUTO

Energize Backup Heaters by placing the Control Switch to ON for all four banks of heaters

Adjust the controller, PC-103X, setpoint pushbutton to maintain pressure 2080-2145 psia NOTE: Controller setpoint will be adjusted in the lower direction CRS If additional charging is desired. (Step 3) NOTE: Additional not desired.

CRS Read Caution.

BOPO If Feed Reg valves oscillate, operate in Single Element or Manual per OI-FW-3. (Step 4)

CRS Read Note.

CRS Lower Reactor Power while performing the following: (Step 5.a-f)

Lower Generator load to maintain Tave on program

If power lowers by more than 15% in one hour, inform chemist

Maintain Pressurizer level within 4% of program

Maintain Pressurizer pressure 2075-2150 psia

Maintain S/G level 55-75%

Maintain ASI per OI-RR-1 ATCO Add boric acid/demin water as necessary per OI-CH-4.

When down power has commenced and reactor effects have been noted. Lead examiner will cue the next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8,9,10 Page 19 of 29 Event

Description:

DC Bus #2 is lost, S/G Safety valve,MS-279 fails open and PPLS fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Enter EOP-00, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS ATCO/BOPO Respond to reactor trip. Perform SPTAs, EOP-00, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS ATCO Verify reactivity control established: reactor power is lowering, startup rate is negative, no more than 1 regulating or shutdown CEA not inserted, and monitor for uncontrolled RCS cooldown ( Step 1)

ATCO Commences Emergency Boration when the uncontrolled cooldown is identified and performs contingency actions as follows: (Step 1.2)

Ensure both FCV-269X and FCV-269Y are closed

Open HCV-268, HCV-265 and HCV-258

Start all Boric Acid and Charging Pumps

Close LCV-218-2

Ensure LCV-218-3, HCV-257 and HCV-264 are closed

Borate until adequate shutdown margin is established BOPO Verify turbine tripped as indicated by stop and intercept valves indicating closed. (Step 2)

ATCO/BOPO May direct operators to investigate for steam leaks.

When directed as Turbine Bldg operator to investigate for steam leaks, report after three minutes that there is steam in Room 81, but unable to see location.

BOPO Ensure all of the following generator breakers tripped: output breakers 3451-4, 3451-5, and field breaker 41E/G1F. (Step 3)

NOTE: 86/SVG relays do not trip, operator action will be required to open 4 & 5 breakers and may direct Turbine Bldg Operator to locally open the field ckt bkr.

If directed as Turbine Bldg Operator to open the field breaker, report after one minute that the breaker is open.

BOPO Verify buses 1A3 and 1A4 energized. (Step 4)

BOPO Ensure Diesel Generators have started if SIAS has occurred. (Step 5)

BOPO Check that Buses 1A1 and 1A2 are energized. (Step 6)

BOPO Check that 125 VDC buses 1 and 2 are energized. (Step 7) NOTE: DC Bus 2 is deenergized.

Event description continued on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8,9,10 Page 20 of 29 Event

Description:

DC Bus #2 is lost, S/G Safety valve,MS-279 fails open and PPLS fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Verify instrument air is available by both of the following: IA pressure greater than or equal to 90 psig and at least one air compressor running.

(Step 8)

ATCO Determine normal CCW system operation: At least one CCW pump operating, CCW pressure is greater than or equal to 60 psig, at least one RW pump is operating, and RCP coolers CCW valves HCV-438A/B/C/D are open. (Step 9).

ATCO Verify RCS Inventory Control by all of the following: PZR level 30-70%,

trending to 45-60%, RCS subcooling greater than or equal to 20°F.

Transition to contingency actions and manually control Charging and Letdown to restore Pzr level. (Step 10 and 10.1)

NOTE: HCV-204 failed closed and isolated letdown on loss of DC bus and CH-1B has lost control power and can not be started if it was not running prior to trip.

ATCO When all the following stop and throttle criteria are satisfied: (Step 10.1.b)

RCS subcooling greater than or equal to 20°F

PZR level greater than or equal to 10% and not lowering

At least one S/G available for RCS heat removal

RVLMS indicates level above the top of the hot leg (43%)

Throttle and stop any or all of the HPSI Pumps.

NOTE: Stop and Throttle will be performed after the S/G has blown down.

The ATCO will inform the CRS that the criteria is satisfied and be directed to perform by the CRS.

ATCO Verify RCS Pressure Control by all of the following: RCS pressure 1800-2300 psia, trending to 2050-2150 psia, and PORVs are closed. Transition to contingency actions to manually control PZR heater and spray to restore RCS pressure. (Step 11 and 11.4)

ATCO If RCS pressure is less than or equal to 1350 psia, trip a RCP in each loop. (Step 11.2) NOTE: RC-3B and RC-3D have lost control power which will require securing RC-3A and RC-3C.

ATCO When RCS pressure reaches 1600 psia, operator will manually initiate PPLS when PPLS fails to actuate prior to exiting EOP-00.

(CT)

NOTE: Channel B PPLS will not actuate due to loss of DC Bus 2.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8,9,10 Page 21 of 29 Event

Description:

DC Bus #2 is lost, S/G Safety valve,MS-279 fails open and PPLS fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO If RCS pressure is less than or equal to 1600 psia, verify safeguards are actuated by the following: (Step 11.3)

All PPLS relays have tripped

All VIAS relays have tripped

All SIAS relays have tripped

All CIAS relays have tripped

Ensure required pumps are running, SI-2A/B, SI-1A/B, CH-1A/B/C

Ensure SI flow is adequate per Attachment IC-13 NOTE: Only relays with power that actuate are 86A and 86A1. Due to loss of DC bus 2, SI-1B and SI-2B do not start due to no control power, CH-1B will not start if it was not running prior to trip due to no control power.

ATCO Verify Core Heat Removal by all of the following: RCP NPSH satisfied per Attachment PC-12, at least one RCP running and core T less than or equal to 10°F. (Step 12)

BOPO Verify Main Feedwater is restoring level in at least one steam generator.

(Step 13) Transition to contingency step 13.1, SGLS has actuated, feed will not be established.

BOPO Ensure both Feed Reg valves are closed and Bypass Valves ramped to 40-45%. (Step 13a,b) NOTE: SGIS will have closed the Bypass valves.

BOPO Place the 43/FW switch in OFF. (Step 13c)

BOPO Ensure no more than one Feed Pump is operating. (Step 13d) NOTE:

FW-4A will be secured, FW-4B is running but has no control power.

BOPO Ensure no more than one Condensate Pump is operating, (Step 13e)

NOTE: FW-2A will be secured, FW-2C is running but has no control power.

BOPO Stop all Heater Drain Pumps. (Step 13f) NOTE: FW-5A will be secured, FW-5B is running but has no control power.

BOPO Ensure S/G Blowdown Isolation valves are closed, HCV-1387A/B and HCV-1388A/B. (Step 13g)

BOPO Verify Steam Dump and Bypass Valves controlling RCS TC 525-535°F and S/G pressure 850-925 psia. (Step 14) Transition to contingency action 14.2 for Tcold less than 525°F.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8,9,10 Page 22 of 29 Event

Description:

DC Bus #2 is lost, S/G Safety valve,MS-279 fails open and PPLS fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Steam the unaffected S/G, RC-2A, prior to 27% WR in the most affected S/G, RC-2B, by placing the control switch for MS-291 in (CT) OPEN and be in progress prior to dryout in RC-2B at 5%.

BOPO Stop the cooldown by performing the following:

Close Steam Dump and Bypass valves and HCV-1040. (Step 14.2a,b) NOTE: MSIVs closed on loss of DC bus, the position of the valves has no affect on the RCS

Check both Air Assisted MS Safety Valves closed. (Step 14c)

NOTE: MS-292 is closed and has no control power, MS-291 will be open for contingency action 14.2g to steam the least affected S/G prior to an uncontrolled Tcold rise of 5°F or 27% WR in the most affected S/G.

Isolate Steam Header by closing MSIVs when S/G pressure is less than 700 psia. (Step 14.2d) NOTE: MSIVs closed on loss of DC bus.

Ensure the following valves are closed when S/G pressure is less than or equal to 500 psia: HCV-1041A/C, HCV-1042A/C, HCV-1105/1106, HCV-1385/1386, HCV-1103/1104 (Step 14e)

When Tcold is less than 500°F, secure one RCP. (Step 14.3)

NOTE: Two RCPs were secured when RCS pressure lowered to 1350 psia.

ATCO Verify normal containment conditions: no unexpected rise in sump level; no containment area radiation monitor alarms; RM-051, RM-052, and RM-062 not in alarm; no steam generator blowdown or condenser off gas radiation monitors in alarm or trending upward; containment pressure less than 3 psig; and containment temperature less than 120°F. (Step 15)

NOTE: There is no power to the containment area radiation monitors, RM-062 and RM-054B.

CRS Determine that EOP-20 should be implemented per EOP-00 Section 6.0 (Step 16)

CRS Enter EOP-20, Functional Recovery Procedure, Success Path MVA-DC.

CRS Ensures that the MVA-DC is the appropriate success path. (Step 1)

CRS If both DC Buses are energized, go to step 81. (Step 2) Transition to contingency actions 2.1. If DC Bus 2 is deenergized, go to step 42. (Step 2.1b)

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8,9,10 Page 23 of 29 Event

Description:

DC Bus #2 is lost, S/G Safety valve,MS-279 fails open and PPLS fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Read Caution: HCV-438B and D may close after control power is transferred on AI-41B.

BOPO Transfer DC control power on AI-41B to emergency using pushbutton AI-41B-PB/EMERG, AI-41B-MTS EMERG SOURCE MANUAL TRANSFER.

(Step 42a)

BOPO Direct operator to transfer control power to emergency per EOP-20, MVA-DC step 42b,c,d, e for the following:

PB-2/1A2-1A4-MTS, MANUAL TRANSFER PUSHBUTTON 1A2-1A4-MTS EMERGENCY SOURCE

PB-2/1B3B-4B-MTS, MANUAL TRANSFER PUSHBUTTON 1B3B-4B MTS EMERG SOURCE

ATD-D2, DIESEL D2 125 VDC MANUAL TRANSFER SWITCH

AI-179 DC POWER TRANSFER SWITCH, if FW-10 has a start signal and not running CRS When DC Control Power is transferred to DC Bus 1 go to appropriate success path for jeopardized safety functions. (Step 43)

CRS May direct tripping of the B Channel of safeguards.

CRS Go to the start of EOP-20 and commence with step 1.

CRS Implement the Emergency Plan. (Step 2)

CRS Read Note: Floating Step BB, Minimizing DC Loads, operator action required within 15 minutes of loss of a battery charger ATCO/BOPO Monitor the floating steps. (Step 3)

ATCO May perform Floating Step DD, LETDOWN RESTORATION CRITERIA, which directs restoring letdown per Attachment IC-12, RESTORATION OF LETDOWN.

CRS If all feedwater was lost perform actions of stopping RCPs and isolating blowdown. (Step 4) NOTE: All feedwater has not been lost, step is N/A.

CRS Verify RCP operating parameters. (Step 5) NOTE: Actions required at this step should have been completed in EOP-00.

CRS If CIAS is present, direct Shift Chemist to perform rapid activity analysis on both S/Gs. (Step 6) Transition to contingency actions, CIAS is present.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8,9,10 Page 24 of 29 Event

Description:

DC Bus #2 is lost, S/G Safety valve,MS-279 fails open and PPLS fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Direct Shift Chemist to sample both S/Gs with CIAS present per the following: (Step 6.1)

Ensure sample drains swapped to waste, HCV-2509 is open and HCV-2508 is closed.

Perform a rapid activity analysis of both S/Gs

Sample both S/Gs per CH-SMP-SE-0015 When directed as Shift Chemist to swap sample drains and perform rapid activity analysis, report after two minutes that sample drains have been swapped and rapid activity analysis shows no activity in either S/G.

CRS Identify a success path for each safety function using the Resource Assessment Trees. (Step 7)

CRS Determine that Heat Removal is in jeopardy and go to success path HR-3.

NOTE: HR-3 is in jeopardy due to S/G level not being restored.

CRS Read Cautions: States LOCAs in containment can raise instrument inaccuracies and do not allow DG loads to exceed rating limits.

CRS If RCS pressure is less than or equal to 1600 psia, verify Engineered Safeguards. Verify PPLS, VIAS, SIAS and CIAS relays have actuated.

(Step 1) NOTE: All relays previously verified in EOP-00.

CRS If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 5 psig, verify Engineered Safeguards. (Step 2) NOTE: Pressure is <5 psig, step is N/A.

ATCO If SIAS has actuated, optimize SI flow by performing the following: (Step 3)

HPSI Pumps SI-2A/B running

LPSI Pumps SI-1A/B running

Charging Pumps CH-1A/B running

Emergency Boration in progress per Attachment RC-11

Ensure acceptable SI flow per Attachment IC-13 NOTE: ATCO may secure CH-1B due to Stop and Throttle is progress.

CRS If high RCS pressure is preventing adequate SI flow. (Step 4) NOTE: SI flow is adequate, step is N/A.

BOPO May direct operator to restore normal power to DCS per Attachment MVA-

23. (Step 5)

CRS If a SGTR is not is progress, go to step 21. (Step 6)

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8,9,10 Page 25 of 29 Event

Description:

DC Bus #2 is lost, S/G Safety valve,MS-279 fails open and PPLS fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS If rising Containment pressure due to high energy line break. (Step 21)

NOTE: There is no break in containment, step is N/A.

CRS If a UHE is not in progress, go to step 29. (Step 22) NOTE: There is a UHE due to the Main Steam safety failing open, continues to step 23.

BOPO Identify the most affected S/G by downward trends in any of the following:

(Step 23)

Steam pressure

S/G level

RCS Tcold CRS If either S/G pressure is less than or equal to 500 psia, ensure SGIS closes all valves. (Step 24) NOTE: Valves closed by SGIS were verified in EOP-00.

CRS If the UHE has been stopped due to SGIS, go to step 29. (Step 25)

NOTE: UHE was not stopped by SGIS, continues to step 26.

BOPO Isolated the most affected S/G, RC-2B per Attachment HR-20. (Step 26b)

BOPO Per Attachment HR-20.

Read Note: RCS Heat Removal takes precedence over isolation of a S/G with a tube rupture.

BOPO Isolate RC-2B by ensuring the following valves are closed: (Step 1a)

HCV-1042A, RC-2B MSIV

HCV-1042C, RC-2B MSIV Bypass valve

MS-292, Air Assisted MS Safety valve

FCV-1102, RC-2B Feed Reg valve

HCV-1106, RC-2B Feed Reg Bypass valve

HCV-1385, RC-2B Feed Header Isolation valve

HCV-1104, RC-2B Feed Reg Block valve

HCV-1387A, RC-2B Blowdown Isolation valve

HCV-1387B, RC-2B Blowdown Isolation valve

HCV-1108A, RC-2B AFW Isolation valve

HCV-1108B, RC-2B AFW Isolation valve BOPO Direct operator to close MS-298, Steam Valves HCV-1041A & 1042A Packing Leakoff Line Isolation valve. (Step 1b)

When directed as Turbine Bldg operator to close MS-298, report after one minute that the valve has been closed.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.:1 Event No.: 8,9,10 Page 26 of 29 Event

Description:

DC Bus #2 is lost, S/G Safety valve,MS-279 fails open and PPLS fails to actuate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO If sampling is not in progress, close HCV-2507A/B. (Step 1c)

If contacted about sampling of S/Gs, report as Shift Chemist that S/G sampling is not in progress.

BOPO Close YCV-1045B by placing the ISOLATION VALVE YCV-1045B OVERRIDE SW in Override and the S/G RC-2B STM TO FW-10 HDR B ISOLATION VALVE YCV-1045B in close. (Step 1d)

BOPO Read Note: Air accumulators will maintain valve in a closed position for 30 minutes after loss of instrument air.

BOPO Direct the operator to handjack closed YCV-1045B When directed as Turbine Bldg operator to handjack closed YCV-1045B, report after one minute that the valve has been handjack closed.

BOPO Record time RC-2B was isolated. (Step 1e)

BOPO Verify RC-2B is the most affected S/G per Attachment HR-18. (Step 2)

BOPO Read Note: RCS Heat Removal takes precedence over isolation of a S/G with a tube rupture. (Att. HR-18)

BOPO Determine the most affected S/G by considering all of the following:

(Step1) NOTE: HR-18 has one step.

S/G availability for heat removal

S/G contribution to offsite exposure

Severity of uncontrolled cooldown

Location of the leak

Containment conditions

Safety of personnel and safety related equipment BOPO Verify RC-2B is isolated by downward trends on all of the following: (Step 27 of EOP-20 HR-3)

Steam pressure

S/G level

RCS Tcold CRS Read Cautions: At top of page 331.

CRS If RC-2A is the least affected S/G, prepare to steam prior to 27% WR in RC-2B. (Step 28) NOTE: Steaming was commenced in EOP-00 using MS-291.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8,9,10 Page 27 of 29 Event

Description:

DC Bus #2 is lost, S/G Safety valve,MS-279 fails open and PPLS fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Steam least affected S/G by any or all of the following: (Step 29)

Attachment HR-12, Secondary Heat Removal

Attachment HR-21, Blowdown Operation NOTE: Steaming was commenced in EOP-00 using MS-291, Att. HR-12 step 11 is the direction for using MS-291.

CRS If both the feedring is available and SGIS has actuated, override SGIS on the least affected S/G per Attachment HR-14. (Step 30)

NOTE: AFAS may actuate before feeding through the feedring can be established. Crew shall ensure that RC-2A is the only S/G being fed.

BOPO Place both SGIS Override Switches in OVERRIDE for the least affected S/G, RC-2A: (Step 1a Att. HR-14)

OR/HC-1386

HC-1105 BOPO Open HCV-1386. (Step 1b)

BOPO Manually control HCV-1105, Feed Reg Bypass valve, to feed least affected S/G per Attachment HR-11, Manual Feed Control. (Step 2)

BOPO Verify S/G levels are controlled in automatic. (Step 1, Att. HR-11) NOTE:

Manual control is directed by Att. HR-14, step is N/A.

BOPO If feeding RC-2A with FCV-1101 in manual. (Step 2) NOTE: SGIS is in override for the Bypass Valve, HCV-1105, step is N/A.

BOPO If feeding RC-2A with HCV-1105 in manual, perform the following: (Step 3)

Verify DCS screen displayed, Feedwater REG & BYP VALVES or Feedwater Control 2A.

Verify FCV-1101, Feed Reg valve is in manual and closed.

Push the MANUAL button for HCV-1105.

Read Note: The out button will be highlighted by a yellow box when selected.

Verify OUT is selected for HCV-1105.

Read Note: The single arrow will change output by 0.25%, the double arrow will change output by 5%.

Adjust output by pushing up or down single or double arrows.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8,9,10 Page 28 of 29 Event

Description:

DC Bus #2 is lost, S/G Safety valve,MS-279 fails open and PPLS fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Restores Feedwater flow to RC-2A via the feedring by overriding SGIS.

OR AFAS has actuated and is feeding RC-2A via the Aux Feedwater nozzles and proper operation has been verified.

Scenario is terminated after steam and feed is established to RC-2A.

Page 29 of 29 Procedure Number Procedure Title Revision OI-CA-1 COMPRESSED AIR NORMAL OPERATION 75 ARP-CB-4/A20 46 AOP-15 LOSS OF FLUX INDICATION OR FLOW STREAMING 14a ARP-CB-10,11/A12 15 ARP-CB-1,2,3/A2 42a OI-CH-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM NORMAL 92 OPERATION AOP-40 OVERCOOLING/EXCESSIVE STEAM DEMAND 2 ARP-CB-20/A15 42 AOP-16 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS POWER 20 AOP-05 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN 12 EOP-00 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 31 EOP/AOP ATTACHMENTS 0 EOP/AOP FLOATING STEPS 5 EOP-20 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE 27a

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Scenario No.: 2 Revision 0 Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% power. FW-54 Out of service due to excessive vibration.

Turnover: Continue full power operations. Rotate EHC-3A on and EHC-3B off.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N-BOPO Rotate EHC Pumps 2 I-ATCO Pressurizer Pressure Safety Channel, A/PIA-102Y, fails low TS-CRS 3 C-BOPO 480v Bus, 1B3B-4B, Bus Tie Breaker trip TS-CRS 4 C-ATCO B RCP Lower and Middle Seal failure 5 N-All AOP-05 Power Reduction R-ATCO 6 C-BOPO Stator Cooling Water Pump failure 7 M-All Feedwater piping ruptures on discharge of FW-4B. Water spray will trip FW-4A. FW-4C will not start. Loss of all Feedwater.

8 C-BOPO FW-6 pump coupling failure 9 C-BOPO FW-10 trips on overspeed when started 10 C-ATCO HPSI Pump, SI-2B, fails to start on safeguards actuation

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3

3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2

4. Major transients (1-2) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2

7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #2 The crew will assume the watch at 100% power with FW-54 out of service due to excessive vibrations.

The first event is a rotation of Electrohydraulic Pumps, EHC-3A on and EHC-3B off.

The next event is a safety channel of pressurizer pressure, A/PT-102Y failing low. Operator actions are per ARP-CB-1,2,3/A4, Trip Unit #9 will be bypassed and T.S. 2.15.1(1) applies, and requires bypass within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and can remain bypassed for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

The next event is a trip of 480v bus 1B3B-4B. Operator actions are per ARP-CB-20/A17 and include determining the cause and entry into AOP-32, LOSS OF 4160 VOLT OR 480V BUS POWER. SRO will refer to the Technical Specifications. Reference T.S. 2.7(2)l for Island bus 1B3B-4B inoperable, no time limit because 1B3A-4A and 1B3C-4C are operable. Enter T.S.

2.4(1)b, 7 day time limit for VA-7D being inoperable.

The next event is a failure of RC-3B Lower and Middle Seals. Operator actions are per ARP-CB-1,2,3/A6, ARP-CB-1,2,3/A1 and AOP-35, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MALFUNCTIONS.

Actions may include adjusting CCW flow to the seal cooler to clear high temperature alarm and adjusting RCP Bleedoff pressure. SRO will enter AOP-05, EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN, for two failed seals.

The next event is a plant shutdown per AOP-05.

Then next event is a failure on the running Stator Cooling Water pump. Operator actions are per ARP-CB-10,11/A10 and ARP-DCS-EHC. Operator will be dispatched and the standby Stator Cooling Water pump will be started and alarms will reset.

The next event will be a feedwater discharge piping rupture on FW-4B, the control room will attempt to start the standby feedwater pump, FW-4C, which fails to start. FW-4A will trip and the crew will recognize the need to trip the reactor due to inadequate feed flow. On the trip, FW-4B will trip.

When operators attempt to restore feedwater during post trip actions. FW-6 will start but the pump coupling will fail and the pump will have no flow. On start of FW-10, it will trip on overspeed. SRO will determine that all feedwater is lost and diagnostics will direct entering EOP-06, LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER.

The crew will attempt to feed S/Gs with condensate in EOP-06. During this time S/G level will lower to entry conditions for once through cooling. The crew will recognize once through cooling is required and perform actions for once through cooling prior to the least affected S/G level reaching 27% WR (critical task). EOP-06 will send crew to EOP-20 HR-4 for once through cooling and verify actions taken. When initiating PPLS for once through cooling, SI-2B will fail to start. Crew will recognize the need for two HPSI pumps for adequate heat removal during once through cooling and start SI-2C (critical task).

The scenario can be terminated when once through cooling is established.

Page 2 of 20

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 20 Event

Description:

Rotate EHC-3A on and EHC-3B off.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct BOPO to rotate EHC-3A on and EHC-3B off.

BOPO Enters OI-ST-12, Attachment 7, "NORMAL ROTATION OF ELECTROHYDRAULIC PUMPS."

BOPO Read Notes on page 15.

BOPO Start standby EHC Pump, EHC-3A. (Step 1)

BOPO Ensure EHC system pressure is stable and indicating greater than 1500 psig on PI-2101. (Step 2)

BOPO Check EHC-3A motor current is 40 to 50 amps. (Step 3)

BOPO Read Note BOPO Check for proper local operation. (Step 4)

PI-5116 pressure approximately equal to PI-2101A pressure

PI-5115 pressure approximately equal to PI-2101A pressure

No bubbles visible in EHC-3A suction strainer NOTE: BOPO will direct the Turbine Bldg Operator to verify local operation per step 4.

When directed as Turbine Bldg Operator to verify local operation per step 4, report after 30 seconds that step 4 is completed and everything looks good.

BOPO Stop EHC pump, EHC-3B by placing pump control switch in AFTERSTOP.

(Step 5)

BOPO If EHC-3A fails to maintain adequate pressure, start EHC-3B. (Step 6)

NOTE: Pressure is maintained, step is N/A.

Event is terminated when EHC pumps are rotated. Lead examiner will cue next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 20 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Safety Channel fails low.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Respond to alarms CB-4/A20 Window A-5, TM/LOW PRESSURE CHANNEL TRIP, Window B-5, TM/LOW PRESSURE PRETRIP and CB-1,2,3/A4 Window A-5, PRESSURIZER SAFETY INJ SIGNAL LO-LO PRESSURE A/P102Y.

ATCO Inform CRS of failure of A/P102Y.

BOPO May verify common taps using P&ID.

ATCO Enters ARP-CB-4/A20 Window A-5.

ATCO Check for TM/LP trip lights. (Step 1) NOTE: Channel A RPS will indicate tripped and no other channels.

ATCO Verify the following Reactor Protection and RCS parameters: (Step 2)

A,B,C,D/PIA-102Y, Pressurizer Pressure. NOTE: Only A failed

TI-112C/122C, RCS Cold Leg Temps. NOTE: All are normal

ASI, NI and T Power. NOTE: All are normal

TM/LP setpoint greater than 1750 psia. NOTE: All are normal

Verify Turbine load corresponds to Reactor Power. NOTE: No change in power ATCO If any parameter is out of limit, trip the Reactor. (Step 3) NOTE: No parameters are out of limit.

CRS If all parameters are within limits, notify Work Week Manager. (Step 4)

ATCO If a TM/LP channel is declared inoperable, bypass the affected channel.

(Step 5)

CRS Enter T.S. 2.15.1(1) Table 2-2, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to bypass trip unit and may be bypassed for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

Direct ATCO to bypass TL/LP Trip Unit on AI-31A.

ATCO Bypass Trip Unit #9 on AI-31A.

Event is terminated once Tech Spec call is made and Trip Unit is bypassed. Lead examiner will cue next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 20 Event

Description:

Loss of 480v Bus 1B3B-4B.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Respond to alarms CB-20/A17 Window B-9, 480V BUS TIE BKRS TRIP/OFF NORM and Window D-8, 480V BUS 1B3A-4A 1B3B-4B 1B3C-4C LOW VOLTAGE. Will determine the 480v Bus which was lost and update the crew. May read placard on CB-20 which lists the major loads on the bus.

BOPO May walk down panels to verify proper equipment operation and determine that Condenser Evacuation pump, FW-8C, has tripped. FW-8A will be started on direction of CRS or per ARP-CB-10,11/A9 Window B-6U, VAC PUMP C STOPPED OR SEAL TEMP HI.

CRS Enter AOP-32, LOSS OF 4160 VOLT OR 480 VOLT BUS POWER, Section 1, Plant Stabilization and Diagnostics.

BOPO Enter ARP-CB-20/A17 Window B-9.

BOPO Per ARP-CB-20/A17.

Determine the 480v Island Bus with the off normal breaker. (Step 1)

BOPO If the breaker has tripped, notify Work Week Manager. (Step 1.1)

CRS Notifies Work Week Manager of breaker trip.

BOPO Ensure minimum operable Safeguards Equipment is available. (Step 1.2)

NOTE: Operator may have read the placard on CB-20 which lists major loads on the bus.

BOPO If the 480v supply breaker is not tripped and the normally closed bus tie breaker is open, perform the following: (Step 2 and 2.1)

Dispatch Operator to check the following:

Check local 69 switch not in PULL TO LOCK

Check the 69 switch not in AFTER-TRIP

Check breaker is properly racked into position

Check Micrologic Trip unit alarm indication Check the Control Room switch not in PULL TO LOCK.

When directed as Waterplant Operator to investigate breaker trip, report after one minute that breaker BT-1B4B has tripped on overcurrent.

BOPO If any 480v Bus is deenergized, implement AOP-32. (Step 3) NOTE: CRS may have entered the AOP earlier.

BOPO Refer to Technical Specification 2.7. (Step 4) NOTE: BOPO may inform CRS of TS reference.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 20 Event

Description:

Loss of 480v Bus 1B3B-4B.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Per AOP-32 Section I.

If a Reactor trip has occurred. (Step 1) NOTE: There was no reactor trip, step is N/A.

ATCO Ensure both DG Mode Selector Switches are in EMERGENCY STANDBY.

(Step 2)

CRS If plant is not on SDC, go to step 9. (Step 3) NOTE: Plant is not on SDC, CRS shall go to step 9.

BOPO Verify at least one vital 4160v Bus is energized. (Step 9)

ATCO Verify CCW and RW operation. At least one CCW pump running with greater than 60 psig and at least one RW pump running. (Step 10 and 11)

BOPO Verify a Bearing Water pump is running and an Air Compressor with greater than 90 psig Instrument Air pressure. (Step 12 and 13)

ATCO Ensure a Charging Pump is operating and RCS pressure is maintained per Attachment 12. (Step 14 and 15)

CRS Terminate all radioactive releases. (Step 16)

CRS If the plant is on SDC, go to step 21. (Step 17) NOTE: Plant is not on SDC, step is N/A continues with step 18.

ATCO Verify at least one RCP is operating. (Step 18)

BOPO Maintains S/G levels at 35-85% per Attachment HR-11. (Step 19)

BOPO If condenser vacuum is greater than 19 inches, verify RCS temperature control by Normal Turbine Generator operation per Attachment HR-12.

(Step 20)

CRS If lighting was lost. (Step 21) NOTE: Lighting was not lost, step is N/A.

CRS Determine lost bus and go to appropriate section of AOP. (Step 22)

NOTE: CRS will go to section XX for Loss of 480v Bus 1B3B-4B.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 20 Event

Description:

Loss of 480v Bus 1B3B-4B.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Per AOP-32 Section XX.

Verify any or all of the following: (Step 1)

Low voltage alarm on CB-20/A17 Window D-8.

Breaker BT-1B3B tripped.

Breaker BT-1B4B tripped.

NOTE: Low voltage alarm is in and BT-1B4B is tripped.

CRS If CH-1C was lost. (Step 2) NOTE: CH-1A is operating, step is N/A.

CRS Restore Condenser vacuum by starting FW-8A/B. (Step 3) NOTE: CRS may have directed starting of FW-8A when FW-8C tripped.

CRS Refer to Attachment B for list of components powered from 1B3B-4B.

(Step 4)

CRS Determine the cause for loss of Bus 1B3B-4B. (Step 5) NOTE: CRS may have contacted the Work Week Manager of failure.

CRS Refer to Technical Specifications for operability requirements. (Step 6)

Reference T.S. 2.2.4 for CH-1C inoperable, CH-1A/B are both operable (TS) and meet T.S. requirements. Reference T.S. 2.7(2)l for Island bus 1B3B-4B inoperable, no time limit because 1B3A-4A and 1B3C-4C are operable.

Enter T.S. 2.4(1)b, 7 day time limit for VA-7D being inoperable CRS Read Note.

CRS If no fault exists on bus 1B3B-4B. (Step 7) NOTE: Cause of breaker trip is still unknown, crew will not energize bus.

CRS If Bus 1B3B-4B is energized for Bus 1B3B. (Step 8) NOTE: Bus is not energized, step is N/A.

Event terminated when AOP-32 Section XX is completed. Lead examiner will cue next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 20 Event

Description:

RCP, RC-3B Lower and Middle Seals fail.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Respond to alarms CB-1,2,3/A6 Window B-1, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP RC-3B SEAL LEAKAGE FLOW HI.

ATCO/BOPO Determine that the lower and middle seals have failed on RC-3B by indications on the ERF and inform the CRS.

CRS Enter AOP-35, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MALFUNCTIONS.

ATCO Enter ARP-CB-1,2,3/A6 Window B-1 ATCO Per ARP-CB-1,2,3/A6.

Check RC-3B Seal parameters on ERF display 342 or 441. (Step 1)

ATCO If either of the following conditions is satisfied: (Step 2)

One or more seals indicate D/P less than 200 psid. NOTE: D/P is less than 200 psid.

Seal Bleedoff temperature greater than 180°F.

Implement AOP-35 and inform the Director-Operations and Work Week Manager.

CRS Informs Director-Operations and Work Week Manager of entry into AOP.

ATCO If Seal Bleedoff flow is greater than 2.0 gpm, verify pressure is 40 to 60 psig. (Step 3) NOTE: Seal Bleedoff flow is less than 2.0 gpm and RCP Bleedoff pressure may be outside the normal band.

ATCO If pressure is outside 40 to 60 psig, perform the following: (Step 4)

Ensure HCV-241 and HCV-206 are open. NOTE: Both valves are open.

Adjust CH-275 to maintain Bleedoff Pressure in the normal band.

NOTE: Pressure is outside normal band.

Monitor proper Seal Bleedoff flow for all RCPs.

Note: May direct Aux Bldg Operator to adjust Seal Bleedoff Pressure.

If directed as Aux Bldg Operator to adjust Controlled Bleedoff pressure, report after one minute that you are standing by to adjust CH-275 or have opened the requested amount.

ATCO Respond to alarm CB-1,2,3/A1 Window A-5L, CC WATER FROM RC-3B SEAL COOLER TEMP HI.

ATCO May enter ARP-CB-1,2,3/A1 Window A-5L.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 20 Event

Description:

RCP, RC-3B Lower and Middle Seals fail.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Per ARP-CB-1,2,3/A1.

Read Caution: RCP operation is terminated after five minutes with no CCW flow.

ATCO Check the position of HCV-438A/B/C/D, RCP Cooler Containment Isolation valves. (Step 1) NOTE: Valves are open, steps 1.1 and 1.2 are N/A.

ATCO If high temperature is due to a loss of CCW, go to AOP-11. (Step 2)

NOTE: CCW is not lost, step is N/A.

ATCO Read Note: Operating selector switch (HC-450/465) may cause momentary hi temp alarms.

ATCO Check TI-558/465, CCW temperature from RC-3B seal cooler, greater than 120°F. (Step 3) NOTE: Temperature is greater than 120°F.

ATCO Raise flow through RC-3B seal cooler by throttling open HCV-443, RC-3B PUMP SEAL CLR AC OUTL. (Step 4)

Monitor CCW flow on FI-450/453.

Monitor RC-3B parameters on the ERF.

NOTE: ATCO will adjust controller to put more flow on seal cooler.

CRS Per AOP-35, Section I.

Read notes on page 4.

ATCO Verify none of the following conditions exist: (Step 1)

Lower seal cavity temperature of 200°F

Vapor seal pressure equals RCS pressure

More than two seals failed NOTE: None of the conditions are met, does not trip reactor.

ATCO Verify proper seal operation by all of the following: (Step 2)

D/P across each pump seal is greater than 200 psid

Middle seal inlet pressure is greater than 500 psig with bleedoff flow greater than 0.5 gpm

Controlled Bleedoff temperature is less than 250°F NOTE: D/P is not met and transitions to contingency actions.

Event description continued on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 20 Event

Description:

RCP, RC-3B Lower and Middle Seals fail.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS If only one seal is failed, continue to monitor seal parameters. (Step 2.1)

NOTE: Two seals are failed.

CRS If any of the following conditions exists: (Step 2.2)

Two seals have failed

Middle seal inlet pressure is greater than 500 psig with bleedoff flow greater than 0.5 gpm

Controlled Bleedoff temperature is less than 250°F And the Reactor is critical, stop the affected RCPs by performing.

NOTE: CRS will continue in this contingency action CRS Commence immediate Plant Shutdown per AOP-05, EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN. (Step 2.2a)

CRS Continue to monitor seal parameters and for entry conditions of AOP-22.

When Reactor is shutdown, stop the affected RCP. (Step 2.2b,c,d)

ATCO If Controlled Bleedoff temperature is greater than 165°F, ensure adequate CCW flow. (Step 3) NOTE: When temperature alarm comes in the ATCO will perform actions of ARP.

CRS Read Note: RCP Bleedoff pressure may not be obtained if the RCS is operating at low pressure.

ATCO Verify RCP Controlled Bleedoff pressure is 40 to 60 psig. (Step 4) NOTE:

Pressure restoration also directed by ARP.

ATCO Ensure HCV-241 and HCV-206, CONTROLLED BLEEDOFF INBOARD AND OUTBOARD ISOLATIONS, are open. (Step 5) NOTE: Valve positions also verified by ARP.

CRS Verify normal seal operating parameters. (Step 6) NOTE: Seal does not meet normal parameters, transition to contingency actions and continue efforts to restore normal seal operation. (Step 6.1)

Event is terminated when crew enters AOP-05 for shutdown.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 20 Event

Description:

AOP-05, Emergency Shutdown.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Enter AOP-05, EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN.

CRS Per AOP-05.

Read notes on page 3, briefs the crew on the shutdown and gives Reactor trip criteria. NOTE: Trip criteria is in note 4.

CRS Read Note: TDB-III-23a and Power Ascension/Power Reduction Strategy provide guidance for shutdown.

CRS For additional guidance contact Reactor Engineer. (Step 1)

CRS Read Note: Operation of more than one Charging Pump will raise the rate of power reduction.

ATCO If borating from the SIRWT, perform the following: (Step 2)

Ensure one Charging Pump is operating

Open LCV-218-3

Close LCV-218-2 CRS If borating from CVCS. (Step 3) NOTE: Step is N/A.

CRS Notify Energy Marketing of the power reduction. (Step 4)

CRS Read Note: Maintain Tcold per TDB Figure III.1, Tave Program.

BOPO Maintain RCS Temperature Control using Attachment HR-12, Secondary Heat Removal Operation within the following: (Step 5)

Tcold 527-545°F

Tcold within +0°F, -1°F of program ATCO Maintain Pressurizer Level using Attachment IC-11, Inventory Control within the following: (Step 6)

PZR level 45-60%

PZR level within 4% of program ATCO Maintain VCT level 55-85% by performing the following: (Step 7)

Place LCV-218-1 to RWTS

When diversion to waste is complete, place LCV-218-1 in AUTO Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 12 of 20 Event

Description:

AOP-05, Emergency Shutdown.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Maximize pressurizer heaters and spray per the following: (Step 8)

Energize Backup Heaters by placing the Control Switch to ON for all four banks of heaters

Adjust the controller, PC-103X, setpoint pushbutton to maintain pressure 2080-2145 psia NOTE: Controller setpoint will be adjusted in the lower direction CRS Read Caution: Do not insert CEAs below PDIL.

ATCO Adjust Regulating Group 4 during shutdown to control ASI per OI-RR-1 Attachment 4. (Step 9)

CRS Notify Shift Chemist to sample RCS to satisfy T.S. 3.2, Equipment and Sampling Tests, for Reactor power changes greater than 15% in one hour.

(Step 10)

BOPO Per Attachment HR-12.

If Turbine is online, ensure Turbine Control is in MANUAL. (Step 1)

BOPO Read Note: Output will be highlighted by a yellow box when selected.

BOPO Select OUTPUT by pushing the OUT button. (Step 2)

BOPO Read Note: Single arrow will adjust turbine load 0.1% and the double arrow 0.5% and maintain temperature within the program.

BOPO Adjust Turbine load by pressing the single or double UP or DOWN arrows to maintain the following: (Step 3)

Tcold 527-545°F

Tcold within +0°F, -1°F of program When down power has commenced and reactor effects have been noted. Lead examiner will cue the next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 20 Event

Description:

Stator Cooling Water Pump Trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Respond to alarm CB-10,11/A10 Window B-5U, STATOR COOLER PANEL TROUBLE. DCS alarms will show Low Flow and Low Pressure on Stator Cooling.

BOPO Enters ARP-CB-10,11/A10 and dispatches Turbine Bldg Operator to investigate Stator Cooling pumps. Informs CRS of alarms and failure of the standby Stator Cooling Water pump to start.

CRS May direct starting of the standby pump, ST-6A.

When directed as Turbine Bldg Operator to investigate Stator Cooling Water, report after 30 seconds that the pump is hot to the touch. If dispatched to the breaker, report after one minute that it has tripped.

BOPO May direct Turbine Bldg Operator to ensure proper operation of Stator Cooling pump, ST-6A and ensure normal indications at AI-134.

When directed as Turbine Bldg Operator to ensure proper operation of Stator Cooling, report after one minute that ST-6A looks good and all indications and alarms at AI-134 are normal.

BOPO May backup actions with ARP-DCS-EHC for the Stator Cooling Low Flow and Pressure alarms. NOTE: Dispatching operator and starting the standby pump was performed, all other actions will be N/A.

Event is terminated when Stator Cooling Pump is started and plant is stable. Lead examiner will cue the next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7,8,9 Page 14 of 20 Event

Description:

Feedwater Rupture and FW-6 pump coupling fails, FW-10 trips on overspeed on start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Report as Turbine Bldg Operator that there is a feed rupture on the discharge of Feedwater pump, FW-4B. If location is requested, report that it is between the pump and discharge valve.

BOPO Recognize lowering S/G levels and verifies the following:

Feed Pump suction flow on CB-10/11

Feed flow of DCS

Feed Regulating valves opening CRS Directs starting of FW-4C and securing FW-4B.

BOPO Places 43/FW switch in OFF and verifies 43/FW TRANSFER SWITCH OFF-AUTO is in alarm.

BOPO Starts FW-30C, FW-4C Lube Oil pump.

BOPO Attempts to start FW-4C, pump does not start. Informs CRS of failure of FW-4C to start.

BOPO Report that FW-4A trips. May recommend tripping the reactor.

CRS Directs ATCO to trip the reactor and may direct BOPO to trip FW-4B.

CRS Enter EOP-00, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS ATCO/BOPO Respond to reactor trip. Perform SPTAs, EOP-00, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS ATCO Verify reactivity control established: reactor power is lowering, startup rate is negative, no more than 1 regulating or shutdown CEA not inserted, and monitor for uncontrolled RCS cooldown ( Step 1)

BOPO Verify turbine tripped as indicated by stop and intercept valves indicating closed. (Step 2)

BOPO Ensure all of the following generator breakers tripped: output breakers 3451-4, 3451-5, and field breaker 41E/G1F. (Step 3)

BOPO Verify buses 1A3 and 1A4 energized. (Step 4)

BOPO Ensure Diesel Generators have started if SIAS has occurred. (Step 5)

NOTE: No SIAS, DGs do not start.

BOPO Check that Buses 1A1 and 1A2 are energized. (Step 6)

BOPO Check that 125 VDC buses 1 and 2 are energized. (Step 7)

Event description continued on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7,8,9 Page 15 of 20 Event

Description:

Feedwater Rupture and FW-6 pump coupling fails, FW-10 trips on overspeed on start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Verify instrument air is available by both of the following: IA pressure greater than or equal to 90 psig and at least one air compressor running.

(Step 8)

ATCO Determine normal CCW system operation: At least one CCW pump operating, CCW pressure is greater than or equal to 60 psig, at least one RW pump is operating, and RCP coolers CCW valves HCV-438A/B/C/D are open. (Step 9).

ATCO Verify RCS Inventory Control by all of the following: PZR level 30-70%,

trending to 45-60%, RCS subcooling greater than or equal to 20°F.

Transition to contingency actions and manually control Charging and Letdown to restore Pzr level. (Step 10)

ATCO Verify RCS Pressure Control by all of the following: RCS pressure 1800-2300 psia, trending to 2050-2150 psia, and PORVs are closed. (Step 11)

ATCO Verify Core Heat Removal by all of the following: RCP NPSH satisfied per Attachment PC-12, at least one RCP running and core T less than or equal to 10°F. (Step 12) NOTE: CRS may have directed tripping of RC-3B due to failed seals.

BOPO Requests from CRS to perform a contingency action 13.1c and start FW-6 to feed. Report to CRS on start of FW-6 that there is no flow but the pump is running.

BOPO Requests from CRS to perform a contingency action 13.1c and start FW-10 to feed. Report to CRS on start of FW-10 that the trouble alarm came in and the pump is not running.

BOPO May direct Waterplant Operator to investigate FW-6 and FW-10 failure to function correctly.

If directed as Waterplant Operator to investigate FW-6 & FW-10, report after one minute that FW-6 pump coupling has failed and FW-10 has tripped on overspeed.

BOPO Verify Main Feedwater is restoring level in at least one steam generator.

(Step 13) Transition to contingency step 13.1c, attempts to start AFW pumps failed.

BOPO Ensure both Feed Reg valves are closed and Bypass Valves ramped to 40-45%. (Step 13a,b)

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7,8,9 Page 16 of 20 Event

Description:

Feedwater Rupture and FW-6 pump coupling fails, FW-10 trips on overspeed on start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Place the 43/FW switch in OFF. (Step 13c)

BOPO Ensure no more than one Feed Pump is operating. (Step 13d) NOTE: No Feedwater Pumps are running.

BOPO Ensure no more than one Condensate Pump is operating, (Step 13e)

NOTE: FW-2A will be secured, FW-2B is running.

CRS May direct securing all Condensate pumps to prevent feeding the leak.

BOPO Stop all Heater Drain Pumps. (Step 13f)

BOPO Ensure S/G Blowdown Isolation valves are closed, HCV-1387A/B and HCV-1388A/B. (Step 13g)

BOPO Verify Steam Dump and Bypass Valves controlling RCS TC 525-535°F and S/G pressure 850-925 psia. (Step 14)

ATCO Verify normal containment conditions: no unexpected rise in sump level, no containment area alarms, RM-051, 052, and 062 not in alarm, RM-054A/B and RM-057 not in alarm or trending upward, containment pressure less than 3.0 psig and containment temperature less than 120°F (Step 15)

CRS Determine appropriate procedure to implement per Section 6, Diagnostic Actions (Step 16)

CRS Enters EOP-06, LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER.

CRS Confirm SPTAs performed. (Step 1)

CRS Confirm diagnosis of Loss of All Feedwater by verifying Safety Function Status Check Acceptance Criteria. (Step 2)

CRS Implement the Emergency Plan. (Step 3)

CRS Read Note: Floating Step BB requires minimizing DC loads within 15 minutes of either battery charger.

ATCO/BOPO Monitor the Floating Steps. (Step 4)

ATCO Trip all RCPs. (Step 5)

BOPO May place TCV-909 controller in MANUAL and make output zero percent.

Event description continued on next page

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:10 Page 17 of 20 Event

Description:

HPSI Pump, SI-2B fails to start on safeguards actuation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Minimize loss of S/G inventory by: (Step 6)

Ensure blowdown is isolated. NOTE: Blowdown was isolated in EOP-00.

Isolate blowdown sampling.

BOPO If Feedwater line break is suspected, isolate leak. (Step7) NOTE: May direct the Turbine Bldg operator to determine leak location.

If directed as Turbine Bldg operator to determine feed leak location, report after one minute that it is between the pump and discharge valve and still has some flow coming from break. Will require shutting the suction valve to completely isolate.

CRS If SGIS has actuated. (Step 7) NOTE: SGIS has not actuated, step is N/A.

CRS If Off-Site power has been lost. (Step 9) NOTE: Off-Site power has not been lost, step is N/A.

CRS If Main Feedwater is available. (Step 10) NOTE: No Feedwater pumps are available, step is N/A.

CRS Initiate AFW using FW-6 or FW-10. (Step 11 & 12) NOTE: No AFW pumps are available, step is N/A.

CRS Make request status of FW-54 maintenance from the Work Week Manager and how long to return it to service.

If contacted as Work Week Manager on when FW-54 can be returned to service, report that it is partially disassembled and will require two hours to restore.

CRS Read Caution on page 10.

CRS If any Condensate Pumps are operating and a flow path to at least one S/G is available perform the following. (Step 13)

BOPO Place all Feed Pump control switches is PULL TO LOCK. (Step 13a)

BOPO Locally open all Feed Pump Discharge valves. (Step 13b) NOTE: CRS and BOPO should discuss not using FW-4B due to rupture. BOPO will dispatch Turbine Bldg operator to open valves HCV-1150A and HCV-1150C.

When directed as Turbine Bldg operator to open HCV-1150A and HCV-1150C, report when valves are full open.

Event description continued on next page

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 10 Page 18 of 20 Event

Description:

HPSI Pump, SI-2B fails to start on safeguards actuation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Verify all Feed Pump Recirc valves, FCV-1151A/B/C are closed.

BOPO Start all Feed Pump Lube Oil pumps, FW-30A/B/C. (Step 13d) NOTE:

CRS and BOPO should discuss only starting FW-30A and FW-30C.

BOPO Reduce S/G pressure to less than 550 psia per Attachment HR-12. (Step 13e)

BOPO Per Attachment HR-12.

If Turbine is online. (Step 1) NOTE: Turbine is not online, transitions to contingency action 1.1 which directs go to step 4.

BOPO Reads notes and caution on page 16.

BOPO If Steam Dump and Bypass is available, control RCS temperature with a single valve by performing the following: (Step 4) NOTE: BOPO will select PCV-910 as the valve to use.

Select the valve to be operated (PCV-910)

Place the controller for PCV-910 in MANUAL

Push the UP and DOWN arrows as required to adjust PCV-910 output NOTE: BOPO will lower S/G pressure till feed flow is established.

ATCO Per EOP-06 Maintain PZR level 10-70% per Attachment IC-11. (Step 13f)

ATCO Maintain RCS pressure per Attachment PC-12 by controlling PZR heaters and spray per Attachment PC-11. (Step 13g)

BOPO Locally ensure FCV-1172, Condensate Pump Recirc valve is closed.

(Step 13h) NOTE: BOPO will direct Turbine Bldg Operator to ensure FCV-1172 is closed.

When directed as Turbine Bldg Operator to ensure FCV-1172 is closed, report after one minute that the valve is closed.

CRS Read Note: SGLS Block Permissive is enabled at less than 550 psia.

BOPO When S/G pressure is less than 550 psia, ensure SGLS is blocked by performing: (Step 13i)

Place SGLS Block key into SGLS Block key switch

Block SGLS by turning key to BLOCK

Verify both SGLS A and B BLOCKED alarms Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 10 Page 19 of 20 Event

Description:

HPSI Pump, SI-2B fails to start on safeguards actuation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Ensure both Feed Header Isolation valves are open, HCV-1385/1386, and both Feed Reg Block valves are closed, HCV-1103/1104. (Step 13j, k)

BOPO Control feed flow with Feed Reg Bypass valves, HCV-1105/1106, per Attachment HR-11.

ATCO/BOPO Verify adequate RCS Heat Removal by both of the following: (Step14)

At least one S/G has level greater than or equal to 27% WR

TCS Tcold is stable or lowering.

BOPO When the least affected S/G level is less than 27% WR, the crew will commence once through cooling and it will be in progress by 10%

(CT) WR.

CRS Transition to contingency action 14.1 and perform the following: NOTE:

these steps line up plant for once through cooling and may be started prior to 27%.

ATCO If both Vital buses are energized perform the following: (Step 14.1 a.1)

Stop all RCPs. NOTE: This was performed in step 5 of EOP-06.

Deenergize all PZR heaters.

Initiate PPLS by placing both test switches in TEST.

Ensure two HPSI pumps start.

Ensure all HPSI Loop Injection valves are open.

Verify all Charging pumps start.

Ensure both PORV block valves are open, HCV-150/151.

Open PORVs.

Go to EOP-20, Success Path HR-4.

ATCO On actuation of PPLS, recognize that SI-2B failed to start and start SI-2C before isolation of S/Gs in EOP-20.

(CT)

CRS Per EOP-20 HR-4.

Read Note and Cautions on page 381.

CRS Step 1 performs the actions just completed in EOP-06 step 14. Step 1.h is a go to step 60.

BOPO Isolate both S/Gs. (Step 60)

Terminate scenario when Once through Cooling is in progress.

Page 20 of 20 Procedure Number Procedure Title Revision OI-ST-12 TURBINE HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT OPERATION 31 ARP-CB-1,2,3/A4 32 OI-RC-7 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE CONTOL 18 NORMAL OPERATION ARP-CB-20/A17 30 AOP-32 LOSS OF 4160 VOLT OR 480 VOLT BUS POWER 19 OI-RM-1 RADIATION MONITORING 67 ARP-CB-1,2,3/A6 48 AOP-35 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MALFUNCTIONS 7 ARP-CB-10,11/A10 17 ARP-DCS-EHC 5 AOP-05 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN 12 EOP-00 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 31 EOP/AOP ATTACHMENTS 0 EOP/AOP FLOATING STEPS 5 EOP-06 LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER 18 EOP-20 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE 27a

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _Fort Calhoun Station__ Scenario No.: ___3____ Revision __1__ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: Reactor is currently at 100% power. DG-1 is out of service for Generator Brush replacement.

Turnover: Rotate AC-3C off for breaker maintenance and place AC-3A in service.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N-ATCO Rotate Component Cooling Water pumps.

2 C-ATCO Dropped CEA.

TS-CRS 3 N-ALL AOP-05 shutdown to 70% power.

4 I-ATCO Controlling Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-101X, fails high.

5 C-BOPO Loss of 161 KV.

TS-CRS 6 C-ATCO Second Dropped CEA - Manual Reactor Trip Required.

7 M-ALL Circulating Water Pump, CW-1C, breaker fails to open preventing DG-2 from loading onto bus 1A4 - Station Blackout C-BOPO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 5

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2

3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2

7. Critical tasks (2-3) 3 Page 1 of 19

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #3 The crew assumes the watch with the reactor at 100% power. Diesel Generator #1 is out of service for Generator brush replacement.

The first event is rotating Component Cooling Water pumps, place AC-3A in service and secure AC-3C. SRO will refer to Technical Specification. T.S. 2.4(1)b, 7 day LCO applies while CCW pump discharge valve is closed.

The next event is CEA 03 drops into core. This will require the BOPO to lower turbine load to restore RCS Tcold to program temperature. The CRS will direct the crew to lower Reactor power to less than 70% within one hour per T.S. 2.10.2(4)e and AOP-02, CEA AND CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS. The power reduction will be per AOP-05, EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN.

The next event is a plant shutdown to 70% per AOP-05.

The next event is a failure of the controlling pressurizer level instrument. Operator actions are taken per ARP-CB-1,2,3/A4 and OI-RC-8. The CRS may direct placing the pressurizer level control switch to channel Y and verify actions with OI.

The next event is a failure of the offsite 161 KV line to the plant. Operator actions are per ARP-CB-20/A15 and AOP-31, 161 KV GRID MALFUNCTIONS and include establishing balanced 4160 V bus loading by ensuring that condensate pump FW-2A, feed pump FW-4A and heater drain pump FW-5A are operating. SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. The SRO will enter T.S. 2.7.2(c) for transformers T1A-3 and T1A-4 being inoperable and is a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time limit. The SRO will also enter T.S. 2.0.1 for loss of 161 KV and DG-1 being out of service, two components inoperable in T.S. 2.7. Requires plant to be in Hot Shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The next event is a second dropped CEA placing the plant in an unanalyzed condition (2 dropped CEAs) requiring a manual reactor trip (Critical Task). The manual reactor trip will result in a loss of offsite power. This will require minimizing of DC Loads (Critical Task). DG-1 is OOS and the breaker for CW-1C, Circulating Water Pump, does not open preventing DG-2 from loading onto bus 1A4. The crew will recognize the failure of CW-1C breaker to open and direct local opening of the breaker which will allow DG-2 to power vital bus 1A4 (Critical Task).

The scenario may be terminated when Bus 1A4 is energized and all safety functions are verified.

Page 2 of 19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 19 Event

Description:

Rotate Component Cooling Water Pump, AC-3A on and secure AC-3C.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct ATCO to place AC-3A, CCW Pump, in service and secure AC-3C, CCW Pump, per OI-CC-1 Attachment 2.

ATCO Per OI-CC-1 Att 2.

Read Note and Caution. Dispatch Aux Bldg Operator to standby for pump rotation.

ATCO Vent the pump to be started using AC-353, AC-3A Casing Vent valve.

(Step 1)

Directs Aux Bldg Operator to vent AC-3A per step 1.

When directed as Aux Bldg Operator to vent AC-3A, report after 30 seconds that AC-3A has been vented per step 1.

ATCO Start AC-3A. (Step 2)

CRS Log into T.S. 2.4(1)b, 7 day time limit. (Step 3) NOTE: AC-3C will be inoperable while its discharge valve is closed.

ATCO Read Note: When stopping a CCW pump with two or more running, the discharge valve is closed to prevent check valve slamming.

ATCO Close AC-108, AC-3C Discharge valve. (Step 4)

Directs Aux Bldg Operator to close AC-108.

When directed as Aux Bldg Operator to close AC-108, report after 15 seconds that AC-108 is closed.

ATCO Verify PI-499, CCW Pump Disch Header Pressure, is approximately 90 psig. (Step 5)

ATCO Stop AC-3C. (Step 6)

ATCO Open AC-108. (Step 7)

Direct Aux Bldg Operator to open AC-108 and independently verify open.

When directed as Aux Bldg Operator to open AC-108, report after 15 seconds that AC-108 is open and independently verified open.

CRS Exit T.S. 2.4(1)b.

Event is terminated when AC-3A is in service and AC-3C is secured and T.S. exited. Lead examiner will cue next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 19 Event

Description:

Rod 03 Drops into Core.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Respond to multiple alarms including CB-4/A20 Window B-6, ROD DROP NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL, CB-4/A8 Window B-1U &

B1-L, ROD POSITION DEVIATION LOW AND LOW LOW LIMIT and Window A-5U and A-5L, ROD DRIVE POWER INTERRUPT and DROPPED ROD.

ATCO Determine that Rod 03 has dropped and is the only rod to drop. Informs the CRS.

CRS Directs the BOPO to maintain Tcold on program by reducing turbine load.

CRS Enters AOP-02, CEA AND CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS.

CRS May enter T.S 2.10.4(5)(ii) for RCS pressure lowering below 2075 psia during transient, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to restore.

ATCO Enter ARP-CB-4/A20 Window B-6.

ATCO Per ARP-CB-4/A20.

If more than one rod dropped, then trip the reactor and go to EOP-00.

(Step 1) NOTE: Only one rod dropped, so this step is N/A.

ATCO Check for indication of Dropped Rod (Step 2):

Core mimic for green rod bottom light NOTE: Rod 03 shows a green rod bottom light

Decrease in reactor power NOTE: Power is lowering

Decrease in reactor coolant loop Tavg NOTE: Tcold is lowering

DROPPED ROD (CB-4, A8, A-5L) NOTE: In alarm

4" and 8" Rod Deviation Annunciators (CB-4, A8, B-1U and B1L)

NOTE: Both in alarm

SCEAPIS indicates rod deviation NOTE: DEV indicated

SCEAPIS indicates dropped rod NOTE: ROD DROP indicated

PPDIL and PDIL alarms NOTE: In alarm

Rod drop light on RPS NOTE: On AI-31A/C ATCO If a dropped rod is indicated, go to AOP-02. (Step 2.1) NOTE: CRS has entered AOP-02.

ATCO Reset the six rod drop detection circuit bistables on the four RPS Linear Power Channel and two Power Range Control Channel drawers. (Step 2.2)

ATCO If there is no indication of a dropped rod. (Step 3) NOTE: There is a dropped rod, step is N/A.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 19 Event

Description:

Rod 03 Drops into Core.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO If NI channel high voltage is lost. (Step 4) NOTE: High voltage is not lost, step is N/A.

ATCO If switch is found out of position and testing is not in progress. (Step 5)

NOTE: No testing in progress, step is N/A.

ATCO If an NI channel is declared inoperable. (Step 6) NI channel is not inoperable, step is N/A.

CRS Per AOP-02, Section II, Misaligned Group A,B,N,1,2 or 3 CEA.

Review notes on page 21.

CRS If any of the following conditions exist: (Step 1)

Dropped CEA occurs during Reactor Startup

More than one CEA is misaligned by greater than 18 inches NOTE: No startup in progress and only one CEA dropped, step is N/A.

CRS Stop all CEA movement by placing Rod Mode Selector Switch in OFF.

(Step 2)

BOPO Adjust Turbine load to match Reactor power per Attachment HR-12. (Step

3) NOTE: CRS directed this when the rod dropped.

BOPO Per Attachment HR-12.

If Turbine is online, ensure Turbine Control is in MANUAL. (Step 1)

BOPO Read Note: Output will be highlighted by a yellow box when selected.

BOPO Select OUTPUT by pushing the OUT button. (Step 2)

BOPO Read Note: Single arrow will adjust turbine load 0.1% and the double arrow 0.5% and maintain temperature +0°F,- 1° of program per TDB-III.1.

BOPO Adjust Turbine load by pressing the single or double UP or DOWN arrows to maintain the following: (Step 3)

Tcold 527-545°F

Tcold within +0°F, -1°F of program CRS Per AOP-02.

Establish steady Reactor power. (Step 4).

ATCO Ensure RCS pressure is 2075 psia to 2150 psia per Attachment PC-11.

(Step 5)

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 19 Event

Description:

Rod 03 Drops into Core.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Ensure PZR level is within 2% of program level per Attachment IC-11.

(Step 6)

ATCO Reset the rod drop detection circuit bistables on all RPS Linear Power Range and Power Range Control Channels. (Step 7)

ATCO Verify ROD DROP NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL alarm resets. (Step 8)

CRS Notify T&D Operations of power reduction and Reactor Engineer of CEA misalignment. (Step 9 and 10)

CRS If one or more Group N CEAs becomes misaligned. (Step 11) NOTE: No Group N rods are misaligned, step is N/A.

CRS Read Note: States that steps 12 and 13 are for misalignment of between 12 and 18 inches.

CRS If misaligned CEA is less than 18 inches. (Step 12) NOTE: CEA misaligned by greater than 18 inches, transitions to contingency action 12.1 which directs go to step 14.

CRS Read note and caution on page 16.

CRS Lower Reactor power to less than or equal to 70% T Power within one hour using boration from the SIRWT per AOP-05, EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN. (Step 14)

CRS If Reactor power change is greater than 15% T power in one hour, direct Shift Chemist to sample RCS to satisfy T.S. 3.2, Equipment and Sampling Tests. (Step 15)

CRS Enter T.S. 2.10.2(4)e, one hour to reduce power to 70% and within one hour after reducing power, restore CEA to within 12 inches of any CEA in its group.

Event continues with transition to AOP-05.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 19 Event

Description:

AOP-05, Emergency Shutdown.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Enter AOP-05, EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN.

CRS Read notes on page 3, briefs the crew on the shutdown and gives Reactor trip criteria. NOTE: Trip criteria is in note 4.

CRS Read Note: TDB-III-23a and Power Ascension/Power Reduction Strategy provide guidance for shutdown.

CRS For additional guidance contact Reactor Engineer. (Step 1)

If contacted as Reactor Engineer for additional guidance, inform crew to use ReMAs guidance.

CRS Read Note: Operation of more than one Charging Pump will raise the rate of power reduction.

ATCO If borating from the SIRWT, perform the following: (Step 2)

Ensure one Charging Pump is operating

Open LCV-218-3

Close LCV-218-2 CRS If borating from CVCS. (Step 3) NOTE: Step is N/A.

CRS Notify Energy Marketing of the power reduction. (Step 4)

CRS Read Note: Maintain Tcold per TDB Figure III.1, Tave Program.

BOPO Maintain RCS Temperature Control using Attachment HR-12, Secondary Heat Removal Operation within the following: (Step 5)

Tcold 527-545°F

Tcold within +0°F, -1°F of program ATCO Maintain Pressurizer Level using Attachment IC-11, Inventory Control within the following: (Step 6)

PZR level 45-60%

PZR level within 4% of program ATCO Maintain VCT level 55-85% by performing the following: (Step 7)

Place LCV-218-1 to RWTS

When diversion to waste is complete, place LCV-218-1 in AUTO Event description is continued next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 18 Event

Description:

AOP-05, Emergency Shutdown.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Maximize pressurizer heaters and spray per the following: (Step 8)

Energize Backup Heaters by placing the Control Switch to ON for all four banks of heaters

Adjust the controller, PC-103X, setpoint pushbutton to maintain pressure 2080-2145 psia NOTE: Controller setpoint will be adjusted in the lower direction CRS Read Caution: Do not insert CEAs below PDIL.

ATCO Adjust Regulating Group 4 during shutdown to control ASI per OI-RR-1 Attachment 4. (Step 9)

CRS Notify Shift Chemist to sample RCS to satisfy T.S. 3.2, Equipment and Sampling Tests, for Reactor power changes greater than 15% in one hour.

(Step 10)

BOPO Per Attachment HR-12.

If Turbine is online, ensure Turbine Control is in MANUAL. (Step 1)

BOPO Read Note: Output will be highlighted by a yellow box when selected.

BOPO Select OUTPUT by pushing the OUT button. (Step 2)

BOPO Read Note: Single arrow will adjust turbine load 0.1% and the double arrow 0.5% and maintain temperature within the program.

BOPO Adjust Turbine load by pressing the single or double UP or DOWN arrows to maintain the following: (Step 3)

Tcold 527-545°F

Tcold within +0°F, -1°F of program When down power has commenced and reactor effects have been noted, the lead examiner will cue the next malfunction.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 19 Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer Level Transmitter fails hi.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Respond to alarm ARP-CB-1,2,3/A4 Window A-8, PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI-LO CHANNEL X.

ATCO Diagnose the failure of the X channel and inform CRS.

CRS May direct selecting the Y channel and backup actions with ARP or to perform ARP actions.

ATCO Enter ARP-CB-1,2,3/A4 Window C-8.

ATCO Verify pressurizer level on LR-101X/LR-101Y. (Step 1)

ATCO If PZR Level is low, verify the following. (Step 2) NOTE: Transmitter is failing high, step is N/A.

ATCO If PZR Level is high, verify the following: (Step 3) NOTE: ATCO will determine level is high due to transmitter failure and not actual.

Verify VCT level trend. NOTE: Trend will be up as letdown flow increases.

Ensure one Charging pump is running

Ensure Letdown flow is maximized. NOTE: Letdown flow will be increasing to maximum.

Ensure Pressurizer Backup Heaters are energized.

ATCO If Automatic Pressurizer Level Control does not control, take manual control per OI-RC-8. (Step 4)

CRS May direct selecting the Y channel and that manual control is not desired.

ATCO If LI-101X has failed, notify Work Week Manager. (Step 5)

ATCO If LI-101X has failed low, place HC-101-1, Pzr Heater Cutout Channel Selector Switch, to channel Y. (Step 5.1) NOTE: Transmitter failed high, step is N/A.

Event is terminated once level is controlled either manually or using channel Y. Lead examiner will cue the next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of 161 KV.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Respond to alarms CB-20/A15 Windows A-1, BREAKER 111 TRIPPED, Window A-2, 161 KV SUPPLY BKR LOCKOUT RELAY OPERATED 86/161, Window A-3, BREAKER 110 TRIPPED BOPO Report to CRS, 161 KV is lost and all 4160v buses are powered from 22 KV.

CRS Enter AOP-31, 161 KV GRID MALFUNCTIONS.

BOPO Enter ARP-CB-20/A15, Windows A-2.

BOPO Per ARP-CB-20/A15.

If Reactor trips, go to EOP-00. (Step 1) NOTE: No trip, step is N/A.

CRS Verify fast transfer and implement AOP-31. (Step 2) NOTE: CRS may have entered AOP-31.

CRS If any 4160v Bus is not energized. (Step 3) NOTE: All 4160v Busses are energized, step is N/A.

CRS Notify System Operator and Shift Manager. (Step 4)

When notified as System Operator of loss of 161 KV, report that the 161 kV line has been lost and there is no time estimate for its return.

CRS Per AOP-31 Section II, All 4160 V Buses Fed from 22 KV.

Read Caution: To protect 1A1, FW-2A and FW-4A should not both be left running.

CRS If greater than 50% power, ensure 2 condensate pumps, 2 feed pumps, and 2 heater drain pumps are operating. (Step 1)

BOPO Adjust main generator terminal voltage less than 22,000 volts. (Step 2)

NOTE: Voltage is less than 22 KV, step is N/A.

BOPO Establish balanced 4160 V bus loading on T1A1 and T1A2 by ensuring all the following are operating: condensate pump FW-2A, feed pump FW-4A, and heater drain pump FW-5A. (Step 3)

CRS Direct BOPO to rotate FW-5A on and FW-5B or FW-5C off per OI-VD-1.

BOPO Per OI-VD-1 Attachment 2.

Perform prereqs of OI-VD-1, Att 2.

Directs Turbine Bldg operator to go to the Heater Drain pumps for rotation.

Event description continued on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of 161 KV.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Direct Turbine Bldg operator to perform local actions of step 1.

When directed as Turbine Bldg operator to perform step 1, report after one minute that step 1 has been completed.

BOPO Inform CRS to suspend GARDEL. (Step 2)

CRS May state for STA to suspend GARDEL.

BOPO Read cautions on page 15.

BOPO Place the 43/FW switch in OFF and verify the 43/FW TRANSFER SWITCH OFF AUTO is in alarm. (Step 3)

BOPO Read caution and note.

BOPO Start FW-5A by placing control switch in AFTER-START. (Step 4)

BOPO Verify ammeter returns to less than 80 amps in less than 15 seconds.

(Step 5)

BOPO Ensure Recirculation valve, FCV-1216A, closes. (Step 6)

BOPO Read note and caution.

BOPO Stop the selected pump, FW-5B or FW-5C, by placing control switch in AFTER-STOP. (Step 7)

BOPO Read Note.

BOPO Direct Turbine Bldg operator to verify proper operation by performing local actions of steps 8 and 9.

BOPO Monitors following indications in the Control Room. (Step 8)

Motor amps

Heater Drain Tank level

Bearing temperatures on ERF display FWD When directed as Turbine Bldg operator to perform local actions of step 8 and 9, report that all local indications look good and the pump is not rotating backwards.

BOPO Place the 43/FW in AUTO and verify the alarm resets. (Step 10)

BOPO Inform CRS to restore GARDEL. (Step 11)

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of 161 KV.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOPO Per AOP-31.

Verify voltage is greater than 430 volts on all the following buses: 1B3A, 1B3B, 1B3C, 1B4A, 1B4B, 1B4C. (Step 4) NOTE: All bus voltages are greater than 430 volts.

CRS Notify NRC of loss of 161 KV within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . (Step 5)

BOPO Match flags on following breakers: 110, 111, 1A31, 1A33, 1A42, 1A44.

(Step 6)

CRS Read caution.

CRS Place signs on switchgear room doors which direct personnel to stay out during 161 KV power outage. (Step 7)

CRS Prepare for loss of Off-Site power caused by a Reactor Trip by reviewing EOP-00, EOP-02, EOP-07 and EOP-20. (Step 8)

CRS Enter T.S. 2.7.2(c) for loss of 161 kV line making both house service transformers inoperable. May be inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , after which the reactor must be placed in a hot shutdown condition within following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Notify NRC Operations Center by phone within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of inoperability of transformers.

Enter T.S. 2.0.1 because a loss of 161kV and DG-1 OOS concurrently, requires plant to be in Hot Shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Event is terminated when plant is stabilized and TS entered. Lead examiner will cue next event.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,7 Page 13 of 19 Event

Description:

Second dropped rod (#1), CW-1C breaker failed closed.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Respond to alarm CB-4/A20 Window B-6, ROD DROP NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL. Recognize a second dropped rod by alarms and indications.

ATCO Manually trips the Reactor with two rods that have dropped into core within two minutes.

(CT)

CRS Direct tripping the Reactor.

CRS Enter EOP-00, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS ATCO/BOPO Respond to reactor trip. Perform SPTAs, EOP-00, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS ATCO Verify reactivity control established: reactor power is lowering, startup rate is negative, no more than 1 regulating or shutdown CEA not inserted, and monitor for uncontrolled RCS cooldown ( Step 1)

BOPO Verify turbine tripped as indicated by stop and intercept valves indicating closed. (Step 2)

BOPO Ensure all of the following generator breakers tripped: output breakers 3451-4, 3451-5, and field breaker 41E/G1F. (Step 3)

BOPO Verify buses 1A3 and 1A4 energized. (Step 4) NOTE: Loss of off-site power, DG-1 OOS and DG-2 did not load onto 1A4, no bus is energized.

Transition to contingency action 4.1a.

BOPO Direct Waterplant Operator to minimize DC Loads per Attachment MVA-24 within 15 minutes.

(CT)

When directed as Waterplant Operator to minimize DC Loads per Attachment MVA-24, report after ten minutes that DC Loads have been minimized.

BOPO Ensure Diesel Generators have started if SIAS has occurred. (Step 5)

NOTE: DG-2 started due to loss of power.

BOPO Check that Buses 1A1 and 1A2 are energized. (Step 6) NOTE: No off-site power, no bus is energized.

BOPO Check that 125 VDC buses 1 and 2 are energized. (Step 7)

BOPO Verify instrument air is available by both the following conditions: IA pressure greater than or equal to 90 psig and at least one air compressor is operating. (Step 8) NOTE: No off-site power, no air compressor running and IA pressure will be lowering.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,7 Page 14 of 19 Event

Description:

Second dropped rod (#1), CW-1C breaker failed closed.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO Ensure at least one CCW pump is operating with discharge pressure greater than or equal to 60 psig and at least one raw water pump is operating. Ensure RCP Coolers CCW valves HCV-438A/B/C/D are open.

(Step 9) NOTE: No off-site power, no CCW or RW pumps running.

ATCO Verify RCS inventory control: pressurizer level 30-70%, trending to 45-60%, and RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 20 degrees F. (Step

10) NOTE: No off-site power, level will be lowering with no charging pumps running.

ATCO Verify RCS pressure control: RCS pressure is 1800-2300 psia, trending to 2050-2150 psia and PORVs are closed. (Step 11) NOTE: No off-site power, pressure is lowering with no PZR heaters available.

ATCO Verify core heat removal via forced circulation, with no RCPs running transition to contingency action 12.2. (Step 12)

ATCO Place TCV-909 temperature controller in manual and ensure output is zero. (Step 12.2a,b)

ATCO Verify the development of natural circulation by all of the following: (Step 12.2c)

Core T is less than or equal to 50°F

Difference between CETs and RCS Thot is less than or equal to 10°F

RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 20°F

Thot and Tcold are stable or lowering NOTE: The ATCO may inform the CRS when natural circulation has been verified.

BOPO Verify main feedwater is restoring level in at least one S/G to 35-85% NR (73-94% WR) by performing the following (Step 13):

Ensure FCV-1101 and FCV-1102 feed reg valves have ramped closed.

Ensure both feed reg bypass valves have ramped to 40-45%

Place 43/FW switch in OFF

Ensure no more than one feed pump operating

Ensure no more than one condensate pump operating

Stop all operating heater drain pumps

Ensure both sets of S/G blowdown isolation valves are closed (HCV-1387A/B and HCV-1388A/B)

NOTE: No off-site power, all pumps are off, transitions to contingency actions to restore Feedwater.

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3nnn Event No.: 6,7 Page 15 of 19 Event

Description:

Second dropped rod (#1), CW-1C breaker failed closed.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Directs initiating AFW with FW-54 when requested by the BOPO to perform contingency action for step 13.1b.

BOPO Starts FW-54 and commences restoration of S/G levels to 35-85% NR using the Feed Ring.

BOPO Verify steam dump and bypass valves are controlling RCS Tcold 525-535 degrees F and S/G pressure 850-925 psia. (Step 14) NOTE: No off-site power, no vacuum and SDBP will not be functioning, transitions to contingency actions for steaming.

CRS Directs steaming with HCV-1040 when requested by the BOPO to perform contingency action for step 14.1b.

BOPO Controls RCS temperature 525-535°F and S/G pressure 850-925 psia by controlling HCV-1040, Atmospheric Dump Valve.

ATCO Verify normal containment conditions: no unexpected rise in the containment sump level, no containment area radiation alarms, no alarms on RM-051, RM-052, and RM-062, and no S/G blowdown or condenser off-gas radiation monitors (RM-054A, RM-054B, and RM-057) are in alarm or trending upward. (Step 15a-e)

ATCO Verify containment pressure less than 3.0 psig and temperature less than 120 degrees F. (Step 15.f)

CRS Determine that EOP-07 should be implemented per EOP-00 section 6.0.

(Step 16)

CRS Enter EOP-07, STATION BLACKOUT.

CRS Call T&D Operations to determine status of off-site power.

When contacted as T&D Operations on status of off-site power, report that 161 KV and 345 KV are unavailable, return is unknown at this time.

CRS Confirm SPTAs have been performed. (Step 1)

CRS Confirm diagnosis of SBO by verifying SFSC acceptance criteria, (Step 2)

CRS Implement the Emergency Plan. (Step 3)

CRS Read Note: Floating Step BB, Minimizing DC Loads, requires action within 15 minutes.

ATCO/BOPO Monitor the Floating Steps. (Step 4)

Event description continued on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,7 Page 16 of 19 Event

Description:

Second dropped rod (#1), CW-1C breaker failed closed.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS If condenser vacuum is less than 19 inches, ensure SDBP valves and Turbine Stop valves are closed. (Step 5) NOTE: Valves are closed and verified closed in EOP-00.

ATCO Minimize RCS leakage by ensuring TCV-202, Letdown Isolation valve, is closed, RCP Controlled Bleedoff is aligned to the RCDT and RCS Sample Isolation valves, HCV-2504A/B, are closed. (Step 6)

BOPO Maintain S/G pressure 850-1000 psia by one of the following: (Step 7)

Attachment HR-12, Secondary Heat Removal Operation

Attachment HR-13, Local MS-291, MS-292 Operation

Attachment HR-17, FW-6/FW-10 Operation NOTE: Steaming was commenced in EOP-00 using HCV-1040 under contingency action 14.1b and will be controlled under Att. HR-12.

BOPO If feeding through the AFW Nozzles, operate FW-10 per Attachment HR-

17. (Step 8) NOTE: Feeding is through the Feed Ring and commenced in EOP-00 using contingency action 13.1b. The feed valves may close on loss of air, BOPO may request to use HC-1105 & 1106 by placing in OPEN or start FW-10 and feed through the AFW nozzles.

Note: Crew may decide to use an override on the Main FW regulating bypass valves, which allows the use of an accumulator to hold these valves completely open (cannot throttle). This action would allow FW-54 to continue to feed directly into the steam generators through the MFW line, since a SBO causes a loss of instrument air, resulting in these valves drifting closed. This would keep the operators from having to realign FW-54 to go through the AFW nozzles. However, the override of the feed reg bypass valves is NOT proceduralized in the EOP.

BOPO If feeding through the Feed Rings, verify S/G level 35-85% per both of the following: (Step 8.1)

Attachment HR-11, Manual Feed Control (DCS)

Attachment HR-16, FW-54 Operation CRS Terminate all radiological releases. (Step 9)

BOPO Trip all the following 4160V breakers: 1A13, 1A33, 1A24, 1A44. (Step 10)

Event description continues on next page.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,7 Page 17 of 19 Event

Description:

Second dropped rod (#1), CW-1C breaker failed closed.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCO/BOPO Ensure all the following breakers are tripped: (Step 11)

CW-1C, Circ Water Pump

FW-5C, Heater Drain Pump

FW-2C, Condensate Pump

FW-6, Electric AFW Pump

FW-4C, Feed Pump

RC-3C, RCP

RC-3D, RCP

AC-10A/B/C/D, Raw Water Pumps

SI-1A/B, LPSI Pumps NOTE: ATCO/BOPO will inform CRS that CW-1C breaker indicates closed and attempt to open breaker. When breaker does not open, direct Waterplant Operator to locally open breaker per Attachment MVA-12 per contingency action 11.1.

When directed as Waterplant Operator to open CW-IC breaker locally per Att MVA-12, report after one minute that the breaker will not open and request Electrical Maintenance support in opening breaker.

BOPO Verify none of the following lockouts are tripped, 86/1A13, 86/1A33, 86/1A3-TFB. (Step 12) NOTE: No lockouts are tripped.

CRS CRS should not perform steps 13 and 14, DG-1 is OOS.

BOPO Verify none of the following lockouts are tripped, 86/1A24, 86/1A44, 86/1A4-TFB. (Step 15) NOTE: No lockouts are tripped.

CRS CRS should not perform steps 16 and 17, DG-2 is running and CW-1C breaker is holding out DG from loading onto bus 1A4.

Report as Waterplant Operator that EM was able to get the breaker for CW-1C open.

CRS If either Vital 4160v bus is energized, go to step 26. (Step 18) NOTE:

DG-2 will load onto bus 1A4.

BOPO Ensure DG-2 has loaded onto 4160v Bus 1A4.

(CT)

CRS Direct STA to perform a Shutdown Margin Verification per RE-ST-RX-0008. (Step 26)

CRS Read note and caution.

Event is terminated when DG-2 loads onto Bus 1A4 and loads have been started.

Op-Test No.: _____ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,7 Page 18 of 19 Event

Description:

Second dropped rod (#1), CW-1C breaker failed closed.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Maintain 20 to 100°F subcooling based on CET temperature by feeding and steaming one S/G. (Step 27) NOTE: From previous note, FW-10 is the preferred pump, crew may elect to continue with feed from FW-54 and steaming using HCV-1040.

CRS Will determine steps 28 to 35 are N/A. NOTE: These steps are for safeguards verification and no safeguards have actuated.

ATCO/BOPO Attempt to start all of the following equipment: (Step 36)

Two CCW pumps, AC-3A/B/C NOTE: Power to AC-3B only

One RW pump, AC-10A/B/C/D NOTE: Power to AC-10B/D only

One Bearing Water pump, AC-9 NOTE: Power to AC-9B only

One Air Compressor, CA-1A/B/C NOTE: Power to CA-1B only NOTE: DG loading should be monitored when starting equipment.

Event is terminated when DG-2 loads onto Bus 1A4 and loads have been started.

Page 19 of 19 Procedure Number Procedure Title Revision OI-CC-1 COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM NORMAL 77 OPERATION ARP-CB-4/A20 46 ARP-CB-4/A8 26 AOP-02 CEA and CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS 10a AOP-05 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN 12 ARP-CB-1,2,3/A4 32 OI-RC-8 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEVEL CONTROL 17 NORMAL OPERATION ARP-CB-20/A15 42 AOP-31 161 KV GRID MALFUNCTIONS 14 OI-VD-1 FEEDWATER HEATER VENTS AND DRAINS 55 NORMAL OPERATION EOP-00 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 31 EOP/AOP ATTACHMENTS 0 EOP/AOP FLOATING STEPS 5a EOP-07 STATION BLACKOUT 17

ML14184B148

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