Text

Forwards Revision 2 to Hb Robinson & Revision 1 to Brunswick 90-day Repts.W/O Brunswick Rept
	ML14174A744
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick, Robinson
Issue date:	11/21/1980
From:	Furr B; CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Moseley N; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML14174A745	List: ML14174A744; ML19340D706;
References
	NO-80-1691, NUDOCS 8101050184
	Download: ML14174A744 (126)
	v • d • e

DISTRIBUTION RESPONSES TO BULLETIN;79-01.B Jordan 3 copies IE FILES 1 copy NRR(Zoltan Rosztoczy) I copy 1cp PDR1 copy LPDR 2 copies Ns~c 1 cop TIC1 copy n

November 21, 1980 FILE:

NG-3513 (B&R)

SERIAL:

NO-80-1691 Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET 50-261, LICENSE NO. DPR-23 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 IE BULLETIN 79-01B REVISIONS -

ADDITIONAL COPIES

Dear Mr. Moseley:

As requested by Mr. Al Ruff of Region II on November 12, 1980, you will find attached two copies of Revision 1. to the Brunswick Ninety-Day Report and one copy of Revision 2 to the H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2 Ninety-Day. Report.

If you have any further requests of this nature, please do not hesitate to contact my staff.

Yours very truly, B. J. Furr Vice"1President Nuclear Operations CSB:pfb*

Attachments cc:

Mr. Al Ruff, w/o attachment 810105O4 a

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dock{et No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23 Electrcal vgup e R b i nobinson

. P.n Uni; 2 NRC -E Su Iletin 79-013 (90 Day Report)

June 1980 Revision 2 - November 1 1980 IL

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket No.

50 -

261 License No. DPR 23 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT H. B. ROBINSON E. G. PLANT UNIT 2 NRC IE BULLETIN 79-01B (90-DAY REPORT)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY RALEIGH.

NORTH CAROLINA FIRST ISSUE JUNE 1980 PREPARED BY:

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA Revision Date Revision Date 8/21/80

4.

2.

2 11/1/80

5.

3.

6.

Soo aOOV~

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT NRC Bulletin 79-O1B (90-Day Report TABLE OF CONTENTS

i.

Table of Contents

11.

List of Figures iii.

List of Tables 1.0 General 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Preparation of Report 1.3 Report Parameters 2.0 MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION UNDER POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITION 2.1 Reference Sheet 3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION UNDER POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITIONS 3.1 Documentation Reference.Sheet 3.2 Electrical Equipment Qualification Evaluation

4.0 CONCLUSION

S 5.0 REPORT QUALITY ASSURANCE APPENDICES Appendix A Calculations per Appendix B of IE Bulletin 79-01B to Determine Total Anticipated Radiation Appendix B Calculations per Appendix II to H.B. Robinson 10th Semi Annual Operating Report to Determine Submergence Depth Appendix C Extracted Information Related to Radiation Exposure of Diallyl Phthalate

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT NRC Bulletin 79-01B (90-Day Report)

LIST OF FIGURES 1.3.1 H. B. Robinson Reactor Containment Radiation Level Measurement Locations 1.3.2 H. B. Robinson Containment Radiation Level Measurements 1.1 Containment Temperature vs. Time -

LOCA 3.1.2 Containment Pressure vs. Time.- LOCA ii

0

.ENVIRONMENT QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT NRC Bulletin 79-01B.

(90-Day Report)

LIST OF TABLES 1.3.1 H. B. Robinson Calculated Radiation Accumulation 1.3.2 Reactor Coolant System Doses 1.3.3 Equipment'Total Radiation Accumulation by Location and LOCA Operating Time 1.4.1 Equipment List for Safety Injection and Air Recirculation 1.4.2 Equipment List for Containment Isolation (Phase A) 1.4.3 Equipment List for Containment Spray Actuation and Containment Isolation (Phase B) 1.4.4 Equipment List for Long-term Accident Mitigation

1 0 GENERAL 0

1L1 Introduction The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 79-013 issued on Jan uary 17, 1980 required two responses-a 45-day and 90-day report. Carolina Power and Light responded to the 45-day report on March 10, 1980. The submitted volume is used as a base document for this 90-day report which will be referenced, extracted and updated within this volume to comply with the total requirements of IE Bulletin 79-013 and subsequent NRC Region meeting minutes.

The 45-day report provided an overview listing of all elec trical equipment within the Engineered Safety Systems which is required to function under the postulated accident conditions and did not limit the listing to only Class IE equipment.

It also was concerned with equipment inside and outside the containment related to the detection of accident conditions, initial actuation of safety systems and the long-term miti gation of postulated events.

The postulated events covered within containment are LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) and MAIN STEAM HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (MSLB).

Also covered was the HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (HELB) inside and outside of containment.

Review of the 45-day report indicates only a small number of electrical equipment is exposed to any actual harsh accident environment which would endanger functioning if not designed and qualified to withstand the postulated conditions. All other identified equipment must performwithin near normal environments during and after postulated accident events.

Therefore this report will be limited to detailing in full the qualification of equipment identified as within the postulated.

accident environment. An area of exception is the RHR pump compartment which will have high radiation level fluid cir culating through the pumps and piping during the mitigation aspect of accident condition. Therefore, electrical equipment outside of containment exposed to these radiation levels are also included in this.report.

'Additionally, the LOCA environment is more limiting when compared with Steam ne Breaks or High Energy Line Breaks within containment.

Therefore, -the LOCA parameters will be used when qualifying or reviewing qualifications programs for all the accident conditions associated with the safety elec trical equipment addressed in this report.

(1)Recent study performed for NRC IE Bulletin 80-04 (Analysis of a PWR Main Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Addition) indicates a maximum containment pressure of 34.4 psig and a temperature of 257 0F attained. Therefore, LOCA conditions still remain as limiting parameters for qualification.

1. 2 Preparation of Report The preparation of this 90-day report proceeded as ollws The A/E; Ebasco Services, Incorporated, was consulted to establish validity of data associated with original purchase orders and vendor preshipment testing.

The NSSS supplier, Westinghouse, was consulted to establish qualification coverage of electrical equipment in containment by WCAP or manufactured product testing programs.

Original manufacturers of containment electrical equipment and manufacturers of replacement equipment and hardware were contacted to provide qiialification test programs/reports related to the types of equipment supplied.

Plant operating report data from original commercial operation date was reviewed to determine any electrical equipment failure trends.

Factors affecting operational life and accident condition performance were compiled and a program of preventative maintenance and/or replacement devised.

Reviewed the qualification parameters and compm-ed them with current data to obtain realistic qualification values.

Compared current data against the previously submitted 45-day report and revised forms.

Compiled a testing program, where required, to establish or complete qualification of the safety electrical equipment where data is unavailable.

1.3 Report Parameters 1.3.

Flood Level The H. B. Robinson containment lower level consists of a reactor vessel sump area and compartmented base floor. The floor level elevation is at 228 feet.

The sump geometry will account for a filled volume of 68 gallons of water. The containment geometry is such that each additional 120,000 gallons will add a one- (1) foot depth of water within containment.

The anticipated volume of water available to flood the con tainment during an accident is.451,000 gallons. This is comprised of Refueling Water Storage Tank, Accumulators, Spray Addition Storage Tank, and Reactor Coolant Loop water volumes emptied within containment.

(2)See Appendix B to this report for calculations.

This will produce a floor flood level of approximately 3.2 feet or a flood elevation of 231.2 feet within containment.

Three (3) instrumeits mounted on the shield'wall at a level of 230 ft. will be covered by the postulated flood elevation These are LT-459, LT-460 and LT-461,- associated with pres surizer water level indicating and alarming. These instruments not the only source of data for operator assessment and decision needed for HELB and LOCA situations.

Emergency Instruction (E.I.1) states that information may be erroneous because of transmitter malfunction or failure due to accident environment in containment or abnormal conditions within the reactor coolant system. Operators are instructed to use confirmed data for pressurizer level and if level data is suspect, or lacking, to utilize other system information in decision situations. The major contribution of pressurizer

',level information in an accident situation is to alert the operator that an accident has.happened and initially aid in identifying the type of accident. This occurs early in the accident scenerio. As pressurizer level is not essential information to achieve accident mitigation, their assumed failure under submergence will not necessitate relocation or replacement.

The lowest mounted elevation of electrical equipment used for accident detection and mitigation is 231.5 feet. Revision 1, dated August 21, 1980, of the 90-day report stated a flood.

level of 231.67 feet would be experienced and-that certain instrumentation would be.partially submerged. Only the nonelectronic sections of the instruments-were affected and no operational difficulties were anticipated. With more exact data on flood level as reported in.Appendix B it was determined that the flood level would not achieve the 231.67-foot height but only 231.2 feet; therefore, the instruments previously listed as partially submerged are no longer in contact with flood water.

However, due to the close proximity of Instruments PT-444, PT-445 (Pressurizer Pressure Control), PT-455, PT-456, PT-457 (Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injection Signal), FT-474, FT-475

-(Steam Line Break Monitor -

Generator A), FT-484, FT-485 (Steam Line Break Monitor -

Generator B), FT-494 and FT-495

.. (Steam Line Break Monitor -

Generator C) -to the calculated flood level, additional radiation source exposure has been assigned and used to determine qualification (see Paragraph 1.3.2).

To establish additional distance between flood level and instruments, replacement transmitters for the above listed have been mounted with the maximum height permissible in the instrument cabinets and still maintain operability.,

For illustration purposes each identified class IE equipment location is listed and compared with the established flood level on the enclosed Environmental Qualification 'Equipment Required to' Function Under Postulated Accident Conditions forms.

3.2 Radiation Inside containment accumulated radiation dosage for forty (40) year life and single accidgnt inc It for H. B. Robinson had been designated as l.5'x 10 RADS.

This figure, when applied, was used for design'performance and testing require ment within equipment specifications.

This figure is one of a series of calculated values associated with WestinghouseNSS supplied plants. Initially a point kernel attentuation program modeled on the R. E. Ginna nuclear plant was used in 1971 to derive an accumulated dosage figure of),2.0 x 10 RADS. A refinement of this figure was performed by Westinghouse to accommodate the requ rements of IEEE 323, 1974. The resultant figure of 1.5 x 10 RADS in the original issuance of WCAP 8587, Westinghouse Environmental Qualification of NSSS Glass IE Equipment, was stated as conservative and subject to revision when the source term issue was resolved.

Noted within this environmental program is the differential parameter for radiation exposure of equipment inside con tainment by physical location.

Subsequent revision of WCAP 8587 accounts for location of equipment by level within containment to establish 'radiation exposure during bo h operation and under accident condition. A figure of 2.7 x 10 RADS is established as the most signi ficant dosage accumulated.

For consideration wit in th{ report the radiation service condition of 1.4 xl RADS

, determined by use of IE Bulletin.79-01B, Appendix B, will be used when reviewing in containment electrical.equipment.

This figure -is represen tative of H. B. Robinson parameters and depicts a thirty- (30) day integrated gamma dose.

Dose rates as listed in Table 1.3.1 have been used to evaluate equipment.by. location and application within containment to.

-determine forty- (40) year life dose accumulation. To support these radiation levels an evaluation was made of data accumu lated during actual plant operation. Six separate radiation readings at varied plant locations were collected during sequential years. Approximate locations are shown in Figure 1.3.1. Radiation readings are charted on Figure 1.3.2 and Table 1.3.1 projects the data for a forty- (40) year operating period.

(3)FSAR Section 7A.

(4)See Appendix A to this report for calculations.

Operating time after design event occurrence will determine the additional radiation dose accumulated. After the appli cation of a ten (10) percent margin, a total radiation dosage is listed in Table 1.1.3.

This total dosage will be used for comparison with equipment tests performed and/or calculated values to determine overall qualification.

Outside of containment areas where recirculation fluids from inside6containment are encountered the radiation, dose of 4 x 10 RADS as stated within section 4.3.2 of IE Bulletin 79-01B represents the anticipated total dosav'e found a-t-e outer diameter of pipe carrying Reactor Coolant water for a period of thirty (30) days after postulated event.

Use of Table 1.3.2 indicates a 4:1 ratio between pipe outer diameter and general area where affected electrical equipment is locatgd. Therefore, a one- (1 month accumulated dose of 1.0 x 10 RADS is what 'can be expected within the RHR com partment when evaluating qualification of electrical equipment used to establish recirculation of containment sump water.

In containment following postulated accident, the flood level as established in Paragraph 1.3.1 will bring contaminated water close to and over some electrical transmitters. Transmitters(5 )

close to.the water level.will be exposed to an additional radiation source. Source levels are established in Table D-8, Containment Sump Gamma Dose Rates and Integrated Doses Vs.

Time, within NUREG 0588, Interim Staff Position onEnvironmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment, Appendix D.

Since time will be required for the water level to rise close to the transmitters, the total integrated ga-ma dose at the surface utilized to calculate the total anticipated radiation exposure and listed in Table 1.3.3 is conservative.

Therefore no additional radiation margin' is required.

(5)Transmitters affected are:

PT-444, PT-445, PT-455, PT-456, PT-457 -

(30-minute operation required -

1-hour minimum used in calculation.)

FT-474, FT 475, FT-484, FT-485, FT-494, FT-495 -

1-day operation.

H.B. ROBINSON REACTOR CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVEL MEASUREMENT LOCATIONS Operating Floor Equipment nCompartment I

(Arrangement rotated for graphic presentation) 1 CV Operating Deck (Pressurizer) 2 CV Lower Level Polar Crane Wall (Regen. Heat Exchanger) 3 CV Second Level Seal Table Room 4 Reactor Coolant Pump Bay A 5 Reactor Coolant Pump Bay B 6 Reactor Coolant Pump Bay C Figure 1.3.1

H. B. ROBINSON CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVEL MEASUREMENTS Recording Stations

1.

CV Operating Deck (pressurizer Note'1 RADs MREMS

2. CV Lower Level Polar Crane Wall 6

9 (Regen. Heat Exchanger) 10 10 10

10.

3.

CV Second Level -

Seal Table Room 5

84.

Reactor Coolant Pump BAY-A 5

8 105.

Reactor Coolant Pump BAYB

6. Reactor Coolant Pump BAY-C 10 10 4,

6 10 10 10 10 10 10 4I 100 10 2

Notes:

10 1 No data recorded for the 1

year 1976 10 Known data

.Extrapolated data 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Y. ea Year

TABLE 1. 3.1 H. B. ROBINSON CALCULATED RADIATION ACCUMULATION (1)

(2)

AREA YR.

ACCUM.

40 YR.

ACCUN.

ELEV.(ft) 0

1. CV Operating Deck (Pressure) 4.8 x 10 1.9 x 102 280 1

3,

2. CV Lower Level Polar Crane 5.7 x 10 2.3 x10 233 0

2

3. CV Second Level-Seal Table Rm.

8.5 x 100 3.4 x 10 254

4. Reactor Coolant Pump -

Bay A 1.1 x 10 4.4 x 105 243

5. Reactor Coolant Pump -.Bay B 2.8 x 10.

1.1 x 106 243

6. Reactor Coolant Pump Bay C 9.6 x 103 3.9 x 105 243 (3)

(3) 7.2 x 103 2.9 x 10 (1) See figure 1.3.1 for locations.

(2) Calculations in (RADs)

(3) Total Containment (Averaged)

TABLE 1.3.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DOSES LOCATION DOSE r/hr PIPE CENTER 820 PIPE ID 470 PIPE OD 200 GENERAL AREA 50

TABLE 1. 3.'3 EQUIPMENT TOTAL RADIATION ACCUMULATION BY LOCATION, AND LOCA OPERATING TIME Componenc acacion Level(Ec) Time Of Radiation Exp.

Accident (3 )

Margin ToTal Ancicipaced (Aoorox.) Oncration (40 yrs) 1 ) adiation Exp.

(10%)

diacion Exposure TRANSMITTERS fT-444(2) 5231.5 30 MIN(8) 2.3 x 9.S x 1 5 PT-445(2) cv 231.5 30 MIN 4 2.3 x 103 9.5 X10 1.0 X 106 PT-456(2 )

CV 231.5 30 MIN' 2.3 X10 9.5' X 10 1.0 x

o.

PT457(2)

(4)231.5 30 5IN 2.3 103 9.5 x10 5

.0x 106 8)

PT-55 CV 231.5 30 MIN 2.3 x 10 9.5 x 105 1.0 x 106 LT-2474 CV 233 1

2.3x10 3.5x 106 35105 3.8x 106 LT-475 CV 233 1D0AY 2.3-103 3.5x106 35 10 8x106 LT476 CY 23 1

AY 23 x 3

&5 z 06 9.5 x 10 5 0

LT-477 CV 233 1 DAT 2.3 x103 3.51x106 3.5 x105 3.81&106 LT-484 CV 233

10.

DT

.3x13 35x06 3.5 x105 0

LT-485 CV 233 10 D.

2.3 x 10 3.5 x 10 3.8 106

-43 6

5 LT-487-CV 233 1 DAY 2.3103 3.5 106 3.x10 3.8 10 LT-43 1

103.

3.5x106 3.5 105 3.8 x: 10 LT-495 CV 233 1DAY 2.3 x 10 3.5 x 106 3.5 x 105 3.8x 106 3

6 6

LT-496 CV 233 1 DAY 2.3 x 10 3.5 X 10 3.5 x 10 3.8 x 10 LT-497 CV 233 1 DAY 2.3 X 103 3.5 10 3.5x 10 3.8 x 10 LT-494 CV 233 10MI 2.3 X 103 3.5 x 106 3.5 x

106 LT46 ()

3 3 MN

.3 13 6 x 10

.5x1 LT-474 Cv 233 1 DAY 2.3 x 103 3.5 106 3.5 x 10 3.8 x 106 LT-46 CV 23 1 DAY 2.3 x 103 3.5 z 106 3.5 x 105 3.8 106 LT-487 CV 233 1

Y 2.3 x 103 3.5 10 3.5 x 10 5

.0..

6 LT-485(2)

CV 2303 1 DAY 2.3x10 3

.5 x

95 5 x 10 LT-494 CV 231.5 10DY 2.3x10 3.5x 10 3.5 x 105

.0 x 10 3

6 5

.0 61 LT-495 CV 231.5 1 DAY 2.3 x 10 3.5 X 106 3.5 x 105 5.0 X 106 (6)

LT-494 CV 231.5 DAY 1.0 10 6 3.5 X 10 x 105 10 PT-40 Rs 23 3

DAS

.0 16 3.05 1

5.0.:. 106 PT-943 RAB 230 0

2AYS10.06 106 6

T-49 CV 231 1 1.!

2.3 x 103 3.5 x 105 3.5 x 10 5.0 X 106 V-66B CV 231.

1 01.!

2.3 x 103 9.5 x10

9. 6 5 x 10~

1.0 x 106 (

T-9 RAE 230 30 DAYS 1.0 x 106 1.0 10 1.1 x106 PT-44A CV 230 30MIN 2.3 103 x 10 9.5 x 105 L-461o RAE 230 30.m DAYS Z

1.0 10 10

1. 10 10 1.1 x 10 PT-94 CA 230.5 30 DAyS

2.

0 35x1 6(6.)

X'1 5

50. 1

'FT-45 C7 Z31.

I. DY 2.. X 0 3

1.0 x 10 1.0 z 10 5 1.1.

106(9 IPT-84 CV 231.

1 DA.

2.3 x 10 39.5 10 3.x 10~

5.0. X.0

-66 CV 21 1H.

2.3 x 10 9 3.5-X 10~ 6 3.5 x 10~

1.0 x 10 6(9 V869 RAE 241.

30 DAYS 0

0 V-44 cv

.23L0 DAYN 2.3 x 10~ 3 9.5 x, 10~ 6

3.

05 S.0X1 9

V-7445 CV 240 51NS 2.3 x 103 9.5 x 105 9.5 x 105 Sheet 1 of 2

TABLE 1.3.3 (Continued)

EQUIPMENT TOTAL RADIATION ACCUMULATION BY LOCATION AND LOCA OPERATING TIME Component Location Level(ft) Time Of Radiation Exp.

Accident Margif Total Ancicipated (Approx.)

Optration (40 yrs)(1)

(adiation Exp.

(10%)

diation Exposure V-860A RAB 212 30 6YS 1.0 X 10 1.0 x 10 1x 10 6

5 6

V-860B RAR 212 30 DAYS 1.0x 106 1.0 X i0

1. Ix 10 6

1 05 6

V-861A RAB 212 30 DAYS 1.0 x1 10 11.1 x 10 V-861B RAB 212 30 DAYS 1.0 x 106 1.1 x 105 11 x 106 V-863A RAB 212 30DAYS 61.0x 10 1.1x105 1ix 106

1. 06 11 5

6 V-863B RAB 212 30 DAYS

-1.0x10 1.x10 1.1 x 10 CVC-381 RAB 240 10 DAYS 0 x06 i.1 X 105 1.1 x 106 SOLENOIDS V12-7 CV 233 55 MIN 2.3.5 x

1 9.5 x 105 V12-9 CV 233 5 MIN 4

2.3 x103 9.5 z105

9.

X 105 V12-11 CV 233 5 MIN 2.3x 103 9.5x 10

. x 15 112-13 CV 233' 5 MIN.

2.3 x 10 9.5 X-10 9.5 x 10 MOTORS EVE-1 CV 3 ERS.

i.9,x 102 3.1 x 106 3.1 x 105 3.4 x 10 8V-2 CV 275 3 ERS.

1.9 x 102 3.1 x 106 3.1 105 3.4 x 106 EVE-3 C

275

3. ES.

i.9 x 102 3.1 x 106 3.1 z 10

3.

106 H98-4 CV 275 3 MS.

1.9 1

3.1:106 3.1 x 10 3.4x10 ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS Type 2 CV 234 -246 30 DAYS 2.3 x 10 3 1.4 x 107 TEMPERATURE ELEHENTS TE-4128 CV 243 (7) 1.1 1 106 15 I 107 TE-412D CV 243 (7) 1.1 x 106 71.5x 10(5)

TE-4223 CV 243 (7) 1.1 1

5 1.5 x 10 TE-422D CV 243 (7) 1.1 x 106 1.5 x 10 TE-4328 C7 243 (7) 1.1 x 106

-1.5 x 10 (5 TE-432D CV 243 (7) 1.1 X 6

1.5 x 10 (5)

(1 )Extrapolated from plant data (See Table 1.3.1)

Equipment located in instrument cabinets.

( 3 )Calculatian based on IE Bulletin 79-013, Appendix 3.

CHARTS/CRAPHS, Procedures for Evaluating Gama Radiation Service Conditions.

(4 )Charts/Craphs per ITr Bulletin 79-01B, Appendix B allow calculation to a minimum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months exposure.

This figure is conservative-no margia required.

Total Integrated Radiation for accident condition (30 days) per IE Bulletin 79-013, Appendix B.

CHARTS/GRAPHS.

(6) 7 Calculation based on Accident Radiation figure

2 x 10 RADS.

(7)

Not required for DBE-used only for outaide containment MSLB protection.

Includes added 7.9 x 10 4 RADS for -1 hour cocal integrated gamma dose at the surface of concatnmcnc sump wacer ( Per Appendix 0, Table 0-8, NUREC 0588).

Includes added 1.15 x 1 6 RAM for I day tuil itcagrated gamma dose at the sirfhce of 7 containment sump water (Per Appendix 0. Table D-8.

NU',IE* 0188).

Sheet 2 of 2

1.3.3 Aging Since class IE electrical equipment specified, designed and built for H. B. Robinson did not require continued thermal and radiation aging called.for under present qualification pro grams each component has to be reviewed using broad spectrum data sources. Three (3) sources have been 'selected as best meeting the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-01B. These are:

(1) identification of similar equipment tested more recent than H. B. Robinson's equipment, (2) reinterpretation of existing test data performed during qualification testing but not specifically for aging purposes, and (3) evaluation of equipment materials for susceptibility to degradation due to thermal and radiation exposure.

Aging data available per the three categories above for listed components in section 3.0 of this report will be shown within the ENVIRONMENT, Qualification column of the System Component Evaluation Work Sheet forms. For the third category listed above degradation susceptibility sources utilized are (1)

NRC IE Bulletin.79-O1B, Environmental Qualification of>Class IE Equipment, Appendix C, (2) Radiation Effects Design Handbook, Section 3, NASA CR-1787, and (3) A Review of Equipment Aging Theory and Technology, (Draft Copy) EPRI RP 890-1.

Empirical data to date for H. B, Robinson gives a time base of ten (10) years' life for the electrical equipment identified within the Master List of Electrical Equipment Required. to Function Under Postulated Accident Condition. No significant failure rate has been experienced at H. B. Robinson with the listed equipment and' only routine maintenance and alignment/

calibration procedures have been required.

1.4 Engineered Safety Feature Systems Electrical Equipment The following engineered safety feature systems were iden tified as having electrical equipment required to function under the defined accident conditions:

o Safety Injection o Containment Isolation o Air Recirculation o Containment Spray Electrical equipment associated with these systems is listed in Tables 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3.

The FSAR lists the above as Engineered Safety Feature Systems. They are segregated by plant design systems and identified as to their functions by

use of reference sheet 2.1 within Section 2. 0 Master List of

-Electrical Equipment Required to Furction Under Postulated Accident Conditions of the 45-day report previously submitted The reference sheet 2.1 of this report segregates the equip ment to be further evaluated and details additionally iden tified systems and equipment.

Graphic portrayal of the listed instrumentation by accident function is located in figures 2.1.1 through 2.1.4 within the 45-day report submitted by CP&L in March 1980 and are not repeated for this submittal.

The environmental test profiles used for qualification pro grams included in the 45-day report have not been resubmitted for this report. It 'is noted that the formal documents referred and used to substantiate qualification contain the formated environmental profiles required. When these docu ments are reviewed for qualification confirmation,' the pro files can be. checked for plant accident parametric coverage.

Sheet 1 of1 TABLE 1.4.1 EQUIPMENT LIST FOR SAFETY INJECTION AND AIR RECIRCULATION

1.

V478, 488, 498 Main Feedwater Valve

2. V479, 489, 499 Bypass Feedwater Valve

3. V867 A, B. Boron Injection Inlet

4.

V870 A, B Boron Injection Discharge

5. V866 A, B Hot Leg Injection (a)

6. V744 A, B Core Deluge

7. Safety Injection Pump Motor A, B, C

8. Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor A, B

9.

Service Water Pump Motor A, B, C, D

10.

Service Water Booster Pump Motor A,. B

11.

Containment Fans HVE-1, 2,

3, 4

12.

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor A, B

13.

Containment Spray Pump Motor A, B

14.

V878 A, B Safety Injection Pump Crosstie Equipment used for Air Recirculation (a) Removed from automatic activation by Safety, Injection Signal.

Sheet 1 of 2 TABLE 1.4.2 EQUIPMENT LIST FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, (PHASE A)

1.

CVC-200A Letdown orifice isolation

2.

VC-200B Letdown orifice isolation

3. CVC-200C Letdown orifice isolation

4. CVC-204A Letdown line isolation

5. CVC-204B Letdown line isolation

6. PS-956A Sample line isolation (pressurizer steam)

7. PS-956B Sample line isolation (pressurizer steam)

8. PS-956C Sample line isolation (pressurizer liquid)

9. PS-956D Sample line isolation (pressurizer liquid)

10. PS-956E Sample line isolation (hot leg)

11.

PS-956F Sample line isolation (hot leg)

12.

PS-956G Sample line isolation (accumulator)

13. PS956H Sample line isolation (accumulator)

14.

RC-HC-516 Pressurizer relief tank to gas analyzer

15. RC-HC-519A Primary water to pressurizer relief tank

16. RC-HC-519B Primary water to pressurizer relief tank

17.

RC-HC-553 Pressurizer relief tank to gas analyzer

18.

CC-HC-739 Component cooling from excess letdown heat exchanger

19.

SI-855 Nitrogen supply for the accumulators

20.

WD-1721 Reactor coolant drain tank pump discharge

21. WD-1722 Reactor coolant drain tank pump discharge

22. WD-1723 Containment sump to waste holdup tank

23. WD-1728 Containment sump to water holdup tank

24.

WD-1786 Vent header from reactor coolant drain tank

25.

WD-1787 Vent header from reactor coolant drain tank

26.

WD-1789 Gas analyzer from reactor coolant drain tank

27. WD-1794 Gas analyzer from reactor coolant drain tank

28.

SGB-FCV-1930A Steam generator A blowdown line

29.

SGB-FCV-1930B Steam generator A blowdown line

30. SGB-FCV-1931A Steam generator B blowdown line

Sheet 2 of 2 TABLE 1.4.2 (Continued)

31.

SGB-FCV-1931B Steam generator B blowdown line.

32.

SGB-FCV-1932A Steam generator C blowdown line

33.

SGB-FCV-1932B Steam generator C blowdown line

34.

SGB-FCV-1933A Steam generator A sample line

35.

SGB-FCV-1933B Steam generator A sample line

36.

SGB-FCV-1934A Steam generator B sample line

&B

37.

SGB-FCV-1935A-Steam generator C sample line

38.

SGB-FCV-1935B Steam generator. C sample line

39. RM-1 Radiation monitoring pump outlet 40 RM-2 Radiation monitoring pump inlet

41. RM-3 Containment outlet

42. RM-4 Containment inlet

43. IVSW-PCV-1922A Isolation valve seal water system

44.

IVSW-PCV-1922B Isolation valve seal water system

45.

HVAC-V12-6 Containment ventilation isolation valve

46.

HVAC-V12-7 Containment ventilation isolation valve

47. HVAC-V12-8 Containment ventilation isolation valve

48.

HVAC-V12-9 Containment ventilation isolation valve

49.

EVAC-V12-10 Containment ventilation isolation valve

50.

HVAC-V12-ll Containment ventilation isolation valve

51.

HVAC-V12-12 Containment ventilation isolation valve

52.

HVAC-V12-13 Containment ventilation isolation valve

53.

V841A, B Boron Injection Tank Recirculation

TABLE 1.4. 3 EQUIPMENT LIST FOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION AND CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE B

1.

Containment Spray Pump A, B

2.

V880 A, BI C. D -

Containment Spray Discharge Valves

'3. V381 -

Reactor Coolant Pump'Seal Water Return Line

4.

V626 -

Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Cooling Water Return Line

5.

V735 Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Cooling Water Return Line

6.

V716 A, B - Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling Water Inlet Line

7.

V730 - Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing Oil Cooler Cooling Water Return Line

8.

Vl-3A, V1-3B, V1-3C -

Main Steam Isolation Valves Equipment used for Containment Isolation Phase B

Sheet 1 of 1 TABLE 1.4.4 EQUIPMENT LIST FOR LONG TERM ACCIDENT MITIGATION

1. Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor A, B

2. V869 Hot Leg Injection

3. V860 A, B C.V. Sump to RHR Suction

4. V861 A, B C.V. Sump-to RHR Suction

5. V863 A, B RHR Discharge to SI/Spray Suction

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B (90-Day Report) 2.0 MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION UNDER POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

2.0 MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION UNDER POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITIONS The master list was developed by reviewing the FSAR, Westinghouse

,Technical Descriptions, Emergency Instructions, System Flow.

Diagrams and Plant Modifications.

Both safety-related equipment and associated equipment for accident mitigation were addressed and evaluated per the environmental conditions existing during their accident and post-accident application.

Systems presented on the Master List sheets represent the plant systems as shown on the flow.diagrams contained in the FSAR and.

Westinghouse PWR NSSS drawings. To aid in cross referencing the plant systems to the Appendix A, Typical Equipment/Functions Needed for Mitigation of a LOCA or MSLB Accident, listing the following descriptive paragraphs apply. In some cases equipment in the Plant System will appear in more than one Appendix A listing.

Engineered Safeguards Actuation All devices required for engineered safeguards initiation that are subject to a harsh environment are included in the Master List under. the Safety Injection System. The processors of the signals (logic cabinets) are not included as they are located in the control room area. and are not subject to any accident harsh environment conditions.

Reactor Protection Reactor Coolant System and Reacto Protection System list the instrumentation (RTDs, Pressure and Level Transmitters) required to provide Reactor Protection.

Containment Isolation Containment isolation valves are located outside containment and close shortly after the accident occurs. They are not exposed to the containment harsh accident environment. There fore, they are not listed or evaluated in this section.. As they are part of the Engineered Safety Feature Systems actuated by Phase A containment isolation signal, they are listed in Table 1.4.2, Equipment List for Containment Isolation (Phase A).

Main and Auxiliary Steam Line Isolation The main steam line isolation and break protection electrical equipment is included in the Master List under Main Steam System.

The electrical equipment for this system is located outside of containment and does not see the harsh accident environment and is not.evaluated in this report. Evaluation data on these items is found in the H. B. Robinson 45-day Report.

Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Electrical Equipment related to LOCA and Steam Line Break for this title are listed under Feedwater System. The electrical equipment'for this system located, outside of-containment'does not see the harsh accident environment and are not evaluated in this report. Evaluation data on these items is found in the H. B. Robinson 45-day Report.

Emergency Power The Emergency Diesel Generators, 4 kV Switchgear, 600 volt Load Centers and D.C. Systems are not part of this report as they are physically located away from containment and any other accident environment areas.

Containment Heat Removal HVAC System equipment list provides the electrical equipment provided' for this function.. This includes fan motors and con tainment isolation valves.

Containment Ventilation The equipment required for this function is described under Containment Heat Removal and Containment Isolation paragraphs of this section.

Control Room Habitability Systems and Ventilation for Areas Containing Safety-Related Equipment This equipment is not subject to any harsh environment condi tions due to accident and is not included in this report for evaluation.

Service Water The equipment list for Service and Cooling ater System includes this title.

As this equipment is not in the harsh accident environment, evaluation is presented in the 45-day Report.

Emergency Shutdown This function has been covered by reviewing the Plant Emergency Procedures and assuring that all electrical equipment stated pertaining to shutdown has been covered by listing and evaluation.

Post-Accident Sampling *.nd Monitoring Equipment included for post-accident monitoring purposes is located in Main Steam System and Feedwater System listings.,

Evaluation sheets are included in the 45-day Report.

Radiation Monitoring The H. B. Robinson radiation monitoring system is not safety related and is not included in this report.

Safety-Related Display Information All of the display instrumentation associated with accident evaluation and accident mitigation is located in the control room or other non-harsh environment locations. Therefore, they are not included in the Master List.

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B (90-Day Reprt) 2.1 REFERENCE SHEET (2)

Component.is not exposed to DBE.

No qualification required. Evaluation Work Sheet is not included in this report. See H.B.Robinson 45-day report on IE Bulletin 79-01B for data and evaluation.

(3) Component is not exposed to DBE but used for long term accident mitigation. Evaluation Work Sheet included in the report.

(4) Component was not included in H.B.Robinson 45-day report-on IE Bulletin 79-01B. Evaluation Work Sheet included in this report.

(5) Component is required for Main Steam Line Break

detection only. Evaluation Work Sheet included in this report.

(6) Component is being replaced by another more significantly qualified component. See Evaluation Work Sheets this report for replacements. For known qualification information on this component seeR.B.Robinson 45-day report on IE Bulletin 79-01B.

SYSTEM SAFETY INJECTION COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment FT-940 (3)

(4)

FLOW TRANSMITTER X

FT-943 (3)

(4)

FLOW TRANSMITTER X

PT-934 (3)

(4)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER X

PT-940 (3)

(4)

PRESSURE TRAINSHITTER.

PT-943 (3) (4)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER X

PT-950 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER X

PT-951 (2)

PRESSURE TR'NSMITTER PT-952 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER I PT-953 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER X

PT-954 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER K

PT-955 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER A

LS-1925A (4)

LEVEL SWITCH K

LS-1925B (4)

LEVEL SWITCH K

(1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc.., will be used.

Sheet 1 of3

SYSTEM:

SAFETY INJECTION (continued)

COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name uside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment V-841A (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID V-841B (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID x

V-866A.

I VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR X

V-866B

fVALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR x

V-867A -(2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR j_

V-867B (2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR V-869 (3) (4)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR x

V-870AVALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR V-870B (2)

VALVE MOTOR OPERATOR X

V-878A (2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR V-878B (2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR V-880A (2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR K

V-880B (2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR K

V-880C 2

VALVE,. MOTOR OPERATOR (1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1) 23

SYSTEM: SAFETY INJECTION (continued)

COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment V-880D

2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR.

X.

SI-A (2)

SAFETY INJECTION pTPMy MOTnR X

SI-B (2)

SAFETY INJECTION PUMP, MOTOR X

SAFETY INJECTON SI C 2

PUMP, MOTOR X

CS-A

2)

CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP, MOTOR X

CS-

2)

CONTAINMENT SPRAY

__________PTTMP MOTOR X

(1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

Sheet 3 of3

SYSTEM:

SAFETY INJECTION EQUIPMENT/COMPONENTS COMPONENTS Location Plant' Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment 2/C SHIELDED #16 INSTRUMENTATION CABLE X

AMP #16/9 INSULATED TERMINAL LUG X

X 3/C 19/22 CABLE X

HEAT SHRINK TUBING CABLE SPLICE x

X C-3 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

D-2 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

D-8 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION D-9.

ELECTRICAL PENETRATION SILICONE RUBBER TAPE #70 CONNECTION PROTECTION X

2/C #16, 3/C #16 ONTROL CABLE x

X 1 C 500 MCM OWER CABLE x

(1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1).

Sheet 1 of 1

SYSTEM:

REACTOR COOLANT COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification

'Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment LT-459 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER X

LT-460 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-461 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER X

PT-444 (6)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-445 (6)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER X

PT-455 (6)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER X

PT-456 (6)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER x

PT-457 (6)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER X

hena component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1)

Sheet 1 of 1

SYSTEM REACTOR COOLANT EQUIPMENT/COMPONENTS COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment 2/C SHIELDED'#16 INSTRUMENTATION CABLE AMP #16 INSULATED TERMINAL LUG X

B-2 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

B-5ELECTRICAL PENETRATION B-9 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

CROUSE HINDS RPC 31 7 -160-SOIN/SO8N CONNECTOR, ELECTRICAL X

CROUSE HINDS RPC II7-150-POIN/PO8N CONNECTOR, ELECTRICAL X

X 1 When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

Sheet 1 of 1

SYSTEM:

MAIN STEAM COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment FT-474 (6)

FLOW TRANSMITTER X

FT-475 (6)

FLOW TRANSMITTER x

FT-484 (6)

FLOW TRANSMITTER X

FT-485 (6 FLOW TRANSMITTER:.

FT-494 (6)

FLOW TRANSMITTER X

FT-495 (6)

FLOW TRANSMITTER K

PT-474 (2)

PRESSURETRANSMITTER PT-475 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTERX PT-476 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER X

PT-484 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-485 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER x

PT-486 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER X

PT-494 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER K

PT-495 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER K

PT-496 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER x

- (1) When a component is not identified -by plant identification numbr, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1)

She.1 O.2

SYSTEM:

MAIN STEAM (Continued)

COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Prima Containment Containment PT 464 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER X

PT 466 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT 468 (2)

PRESSURE TRANSMITTER x

Vl-3A (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID x

V1-3B (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID X

V1-3C (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID x

1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.,

(Rev-1)

Sheet 2 2

SYSTEM:

MAIN STEAM EQUIPMENT/COMPONENTS COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment 2/C SHIELDED #16 INSTRUMENTATION CABLE XX AMP #16 INSULATED TERMINAL LUG K

X B-1 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION C-1 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

HEAT SHRINK TUBING CABLE SPLICE x

SILICON RUBBER TAPE 70 CONNECTION PROTECTION.

3/C #16 2/C #16 CONTROL CABLE CROUSE-HINDS RPC 317-160-SO1N/SO8N CONNECTOR, ELECTRICAL x

RPC-117-150 POIN/PO8N CONNECTOR, ELECTRICAL x

(1 hen a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1)

Sheet 1 of

SYSTEM:

FEEDWATER COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment LT-474' (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER K

LT-475 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-476 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER K

LT-477

6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER K

LT-484 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER K

LT-485 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-486 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER K

LT-487 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER K

LT-494.

(6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER K

LT-495 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER

LT-496 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-497 (6)

LEVEL TRANSMITTER X

V-478 (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID V-479 (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID K

(1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Re,-1)

Sheet 1 of 2

SYSTEM:. FEEDWATER (Continued)

COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment v-488 (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID V-489 (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID X

V-498 (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID X

V-499 (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID X

AF -A (2)

FEEDWATER PUMP, MOTOR X

A-(2)

FEEDWATER PUMP, MOTOR (1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-S)

Sheet 2 of 2

SYSTEM:

FEEDWATER EQUIPMENT/COMPONENTS COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primay Outside Primary Containment Containment 2/C SHIELDED #16 INSTRUMENTATION CABLE K

X AMP #16 INSULATED TERMINAL LUG X

X HEAT SHRINK TUBING CABLE. SPLICE:

C-1 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

C-2 ELZCTRICAL PENETRATION K

C-4 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION K

C-9 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

3/C #16, 2/C 416 CONTROL CABLE K

SILICON RUBBER TAPE CONNECTION PROTECTION X

CROUSE-HINDS RPC 317-160-SO1N/SO8N CONNECTOR, ELECTRICAL K

CROUSE -HINDS RPC 117-150-PO1N/PO8N CONNECTOR, ELECTRICAL x

x 1/C 500 MCM POWER CABLE (1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the anufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1)

Sheet 1 of'

SYSTEM:

AUXILIARY COOLING COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment

-626 (2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR X

V-716A (2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR X

V-716B (2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR X

V-730 (2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR X

V--735 (2)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR x

V-744A VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR V-744B VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR X

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL RHR-A (3)

PUMP, MOTOR X

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL RHR-B(3)

PUMP, MOTOR x

(1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1)

Sheet 1Of 2

SYSTEM AUXILARY COOLING (RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL)

COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment V-860A (3) (4)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR X

V-860B (3) (4),

V-60

()

4)VALVE.

MOTOR OPFRATOR

_________X V-861A (3) (4)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR x

V-861B (3) (

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR X

V-863A (3) (4)

VALVE, MOTOR OPERATOR V-863B (3) (4)

VALVE. MOTOR OPERATOR x

(1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

Sheet 2 of2

SYSTEM:

AUXILIARY COOLING EQUIPMENT/COMPONENTS COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment D-2 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

a0 IC 500 MCM POWER CABLE x

AMP #16/9 INSULATED TERMINAL LUG X

X HEAT SHRINK TUBING CABLE SPLICE X

X SILICON RUBBER TAPE 70 CONNECTION PROTECTION x

3/C #19/22 CONTROL CABLE X

X 2/C #16/3C #16 CONTROL CABLE x

x (1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1)

'Sheet 1 Of1

SYSTEM:

REACTOR PROTECTION COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment TE-412B (5)

TEMPERATURE ELEMENT X

TE-412D (5)

TEMPERATURE ELEMENT X

TE-422B (5)

TEMPERATURE ELEMENT X

TE-422D (5)

TEMPERATURE ELEMENT-X TE-432B (5)

TEMPERATURE ELEMENT X

TE-432D (5)

TEPERATURE ELEMENT (1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial'number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1)

Sheet 1 of 1

SYSTEM:

REACTOR PROTECTION EQUIPMENT/ COMPONENTS COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment 4/c SHIELDED. 16 INSTRUMENTATION CABLE X

Amp16

-TERMINAL LUG X

C-4 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

C-9 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION CROUSE-HINDS RPC 317-160-SON/SO8N CONNECTOR ELECTRICAL X

CROUSE-HINDS RPC 117-lso-P01N/PO8N CONNECTOR, ELECTRICAL (1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-l)

Sheet 1 of 1

SYSTEM:

SERVICE AND COOLING WATER COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment SW-A (2)

SERVICE WATER PUTP MOTOR SW-B (2)

SERVICE WATER PUMP, MOTOR S ()SERVICE WATER PUMP,_

SW-C (2)MOTORx SW-D (2)

SERVICE WATER PUMP, MOTOR S-B-A (2)

SERVICE WATER BOOSTER

PUMP, MOTOR BA (2)

SERVICE WATER BOOSTER PUMP, MOTOR 1When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1)

Sheet I of1

SYSTEM:

SERVICE AND COOLING WATER EQUIPE COMPONTS COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment 1/C 500 MCM POWER CABLE RUBBER TAPE MOTOR CABLE SPLICE X

(1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc.,.will be used.

Sheet 1 of

SYSTEM.

CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment CVC-200A (6)

VALVE, SOLENOID X

CVC-200B (6)

VALVE, SOLENOID X

CVC-200C (6)

VALVE, SOLENOID.

CVC-381 (3)(4)

VALVE, Motor Operator 1 ei a coipoient is not identified. by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

Sheet 1 f1

SYSTEM:

CHEMICAL'& VOLUME CONTROL EQUIPMENT /COMPONENT COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment 2/C 416 CONTROL CABLE x

3/C #19/22 (2)

CABLE X

2/C #16, 3/C #16 CONTROL CABLE XX SILICON RUBBER TAPE #70 MOTOR CABLE SPLICE X

HEAT.SHRINK CABLE SPLICE X

TUBING C-3 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION x

D-9 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

(1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the

anufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

Sheet 1 Of 1

SYSTEM:

HVAC COMPONENTS Locatioin Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment V12-6 (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID X

V12-7 (6)

VALVE, SOLENOID X

V12-81(

VALVE., SOLENOID X

V12-9 (6)

VALVE, SOLENOID X

V12-10 (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID x

-V12-11 (6)

VALVE, SOLENOID X

v12-12 (2)

VALVE, SOLENOID V12-13 (6)

VALVE, SOLENOID x

HVH FAN, MOTOR X

HVH-2 FAN, MOTOR X

HVH-3 FAN, MOTOR X

HVH-4 FAN, MOTOR K

1) hen a component is not identified by plant identification numberthe anufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

(Rev-1)

Sheet 1 of I

SYSTEM:

HVAC EQUIPMENT/COMPONENT COMPONENTS Location Plant Identification Number (1)

Generic Name Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment 3/C 16, 2 /C #16 CONTROL CABLE

-x AMP #16 TERMINAL LUG X

X C-3 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

C-6 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

C-8 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

D-1 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION X

_ELECTRICAL PENETRATION D-5 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION_

HEAT SHRINK TUBING CABLE SPLICE c 500 MCM POWER CABLE SILICON RUBBER CONNECTION PROTECTION x

TAPE #7-n MOTOR CABLE SPLICE (1) When a component is not identified by plant identification number, the manufacturer, model number, serial number, etc., will be used.

Sheet 1 of I

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT NRC I

Bulletin 79-OlB (90-Day Report) 3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION UNDER POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT.

0 NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B (90-Day Report) 3.1 DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE SHEET

1.

Specification CPL-R2-E3 Containment Structure Electrical Penetrations

2.

Westinghouse Letter CPL-77-550 (Electrical Penetrations)

3.

Crouse Hinds Quality Control Inspection Reports (Electrical Penetrations)

4.

NPR Penetration -

Steam Incident and Helium Leakage Tests with attached Stress Analysis Report

5.

Ebasco Specification:

CPL-R2-E13, Electrical cable, I&C

6.

Ebasco Specification:

CPL-R2-E14, Electrical Cable, 4160v and 480v

7.

Ebasco Specification:

CPL-R2-E-1, Motor Operators for Valves

8.

Westinghouse Specification:

E-676258, Motor Operated Valves

9.

Westinghouse Specification:

E-676270, Control Valves

10.

Ebasco PO NY-435227 to McIntosh Equipment Corp. for Containment Level Switches

11.

Ebasco Specification CPL-R2-IN-7, Level Switches

12.

Westinghouse Specification 676410, Instruments, general, inside containment

13.

Crouse Hinds Connector Data, Electrical Penetrations

14.

WCAP -

7410-L Vol. I Environmental Testing of ESF Related Equipment References not used within the 90-Day Report.

3.1 DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE SHEET (continued)

15.

WCAP -

7410-L Vol. II Environmental Testing of ESF Related Equipment

16.

WCAP -

9003 Fan Cooler Motor Unit Test

17.

WCAP -

7744-L Environmental Testing of ESF Related Equipment

18.

WCAP -

7829-L Fan Cooler Motor Unit Test

19.

WCAP -

8587 Environmental Qualification of Westinghouse NSSS Class IE Equipment

20.

H. B. Robinson Modification and Setpoint Revision No. 212 MSLB Transmitter Shielding

21.

Postulated Pipe Failure Analysis Outside of Containment

22.

Rosemount Test Report 117415 Rev. B, Model 1152 Transmitter

23.

Rosemount Test Report 3788, Model 1153A Transmitter

24.

Rosemount Product Data Sheet 2256, Model 1151 Transmitter

25.

Rosemount Test Report 97215A, Model 1151 Transmitter

26.

Rosemount Test Report 127227 Rev. A, Model 1151 Transmitter

27.

ASCO Service Bulletin, Solenoid Valves

28. WCAP-7153 Investigation of Chemical Additions for Reactor Containment Sprays

29.

Vendor Drawing 5379-4093 Motor Terminal Lead

30.

Emergency Instructions (E.I. -

1) Incident Involving Reactor coolant System Depressurization

31.

FSAR, pg. 5.1.2-28, Electrical Penetrations

32.

FSAR, pg. 7.5-11, Environmental Capability

3.1 DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE SHEET (continued)

33.

FSAR, pg.

6.3-14 to 6.3-20, Fan Cooler Evaluation

34.

FSAR, pg. 6.2-14, Motor Design Criteria

35.

FSAR, pg. 6.2-31,32, Pump & Valve motor Criteria

36.

FSAR, pgs. 6.3-4, 6.3-10, Air Recirculation System Criteria

.37.

FSAR, pg. 6.4-12, Containment Spray System Criteria

38.

FSAR, Section 7, Amendment 7A, Component Environmental Testing Program

39.

Standard Manufacturer s Testing Program to Meet Design Criteria

40.

FSAR, pg. 7.5-11, Operating Time Requirements

41.

Rosemount Report 37821, Model 1153 Transmitter

42.

Limitorque Test Report FP-3271

43.

Qualification Tests for a Modular Penetration, Report AB-11 12/13

44.

RAYCHEM, Technical Report F-C4033-3, Tests of Raychem Thermofit Insulation Systems Under Simultaneous Exposure to Heat, Gamma Radiation, Steam and Chemical Spray

45.

AMP Test. Reportl110-11002, Qualification Test Report on AMP.- Radiation resistant PIDG Terminals

46.

Continental Wire & Cable Company, Technical Report F-C2935, Test of Electrical Cables Under Simulated Post-Accident Reactor Containment Service

47.

ASCO Test Report No. AQS21678/TR, Revision A, Qualification Tests of Solenoid Valves by Environmental Exposure to Elevated Temperature, Radiation, Wear Aging, Seismic Simulation, Vibration Endurance, Accident Radiation and LOCA Simulation

48.

WCAP -

9157 Environmental Qualification-of Safety Related Class 1E Process Instrumentation

3.1 DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE SHEET (continued)

49.

KERITE COMPANY - Letter dated August 5, 1980 enclosures: LOCA QUALIFICATION OF KERITE 1000 VOLT FR/FR CONTROL.CABLE LOCA QUALIFICATION OF KERITE 1000 VOLT HT /FR POWER CABLE

50.

KERITE COMPANY

-. Letter dated October 21, 1980 in response to CP&L letter, CO-02726, dated October 13,1980 requesting qualification data on use of SCOTCH 70 Silicone Rubber Tape

lty:

I. B. Robinson #2 Sheeto of 25 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION ORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE QUALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Speciti-Qualifi-METHOD cation cation cation cation (4)M System: SAFETY INJECTION Operating 30 DAYS 2 HRS.

38 17 SIMULTAN (1)

Time NONE Plant ID No. FT-940 Component:

Tem te AMBIENT 287 38 17 SIMULTAN FLOW TRANSMITTER EOUS TEST NONE Manufacturer:

Pressure ATMOS.

75 38 17 SIMULTAN FISHER & PORTER (PSIA)

EOUS TEST NONE Model Number:

Relative 1OB2496PBBABBB Humidity AMBIENT 100 38 17 SIMULTAN

(%)

EOUS TEST NONE Function:

Chemical NOT SAFETY INJECTION Spray REQUIRED Accuracy:

Spec:

1/2%

Demon:

8 Radiation 1.1 x 106 2

0 (3) 17 SEQUENTIAL Service:

TEST (5)

NONE HEADER FLOW (Hot Leg)

Location:

Aging REACTOR AUXILIARY BLDG.

Flood Level Elev:

(2)

NOT Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence REQUIRED No (1) Transmitter not exposed to DBE -

Long-term mitigation radiation exposure only (2) Not involved in containment flood postulation (3) See Section 1.3.2 (4) See Section 3.2.2 for evaluation.

(5). Test performed after LOCA simulated environmental exposure

F ty.

Robinson 2 She f

5 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORK SHEET EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTIONENVIRONENT DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE AL OUTST D

Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-SPEC11-ualifi-CATHON I

cation cation cation cation (4)

System: SAFETY INJECTION Operating 30 DAYS 2 HRS.

38 17 SIMULTAN Time EOUS TEST NONE Plant ID No. FT-943(1 )

Component:

Temperature (OF)

AMBIENT 287 38 17 SIMULTAN FLOW TRANSMITTER EOUS TEST Manufacturer:

Pressure ATMOS 38 17 SIMULTAN-NONE FISHER & PORTER (PS IA)

EOUS TEST Model Number:

Relative 1OB2496PBBABBB AMBIENT 100 38 SIMULTAN Humidity ABET 10317NONE

(%)

EOUS TEST Function:

Chemical NOT SAFETY INJECTION Spray REQUIRED.

Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon.

Radiation 1.1 x 106 2 x 10

3) 17 SEQUENTIAL NONE Service:

TEST (5)

HEADER FLOW (Cold Leg)

Location:

REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDIN(

Aging Flood Level Elev: (2)

Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence NOT No

REQUIRED, No

1) Transmitter, not exposed to DBE -

Long-term mitigation radiation exposure only

2)

Not involved in containment flood postulation (3) See Section 1.3.2 (4) See Section 3.2.2 for evaluation.

(5) Test performed after LOCA simulated environmental exposure

FAWity: H. B. Robinson 12 Sheet of25 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION REFERENCEQALF EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi Qpalifi METHO ITEMS cation cation cation cation (4)

System: SAFETY INJECTION Operating 3DAYS 21HRS..

38 1L7.

SIMULTAN Plant ID No. PT-934 (1)

EOUS TEST NONE Temperature Component:

AMBIENT 287 38 17 SIMULTAN PRESSURE TRANSMITTER EOUS TEST NONE Manufacturer:

Pressure AMOS.

75 38 17 SIMULTAN FISHER & PORTER EOUS TEST NONE Model Number:

Relative 50IP1041BCA Humidity AMBIENT 100 38-17 SIMULTAN

(%)

EOUS TEST NONE Function:

Chemical NOT BORON INJECTION Spray REQUIRED Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:.

Radiation

1. x 106 2 x 10 17 SEQUENTIAL Service TEST (5 NONEj..z TANK HEADER PRESSURE Location; Aging REACTOR AUXILIARY BLDG.

Flood Level Elev: (2)N Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence REQUIRED No (1) Transmitter not exposed to DBE-Long-term mitigation radiation exposure only (2) Not involved in containment flood postulation (3) See Section 1.3.2 (4) See Section 3.2.2 for-evaluation.

(5) Test performed after LOCA simulated environmental expusure

FW ity:

11.

B. Robinson #2 Sheet f

SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORK, SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION REFEENCE QUALIFI EQUIPMENTCATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Speciti-Qualifi-METHNITEMS cation cation cation catio (4)

HOD System: SAFETY INJECTION Operating 3

Tie30 DAYS 2 HRS,.

38 17SIMULTAN_

Time NONE Plant ID No. PT-940 EOUS TEST Component:

Temperature AMBIENT 287 38 17 SIMULTAN-NONE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER EOUS TEST Manufacturer:

Pressure (PSIA)

ATO.7 817 SIMLTAN FISHER & PORTER EOUS TEST NONE Model Number:

Relative 50EP1041 Humidity AMBIENT 100 38 17 STMULTAN-NONE

(%)

EOUS TEST Function:

Chemical NOT.

SAFETY INJECTION Spray REQUIRED Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

Radiation 1.1 x 10 2 x 0

(3)17 SEQUENTIAL Service:

TEST (5)

NONE HEADER PRESSURE (Hot Location:

Leg)

REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDIN Aging Flood Level Elev:

(2)

NOT jAboveFlood Level: Yes Submergence REQUIRED No (1) Transmitter not exposed to,DBE -

Long-term mitigation radiation exposure o (2) Not involved in containmeit flood postulationo (3) See Section

.3.2 (4)

See Section 3.2.2 for evaluation.

(5) Test performed after LOCA simulated environmental exposure

F ty:

11. B. Robinson (2 Sheet of 2

'SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WO1( SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOIMNAINRFRNEQUAIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE A

N OUTSTANN Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Speciti-Qualifi-ITTMS cation cation cation cation (4)

METHOD System: SAFETY INJECTION Operating 30 DAYS 2 HRS.

38 17 SIMULTAN (1)

Time EOUS TEST NONE Plant ID No. PT-943 Component:Temperature SIMULTAN oF)

AMBIENT.

28 3817NF CoOonnt

NONE, PRESSURE TRANSMITTER EOUS TEST Manufacturer:

Pressure SIMULTAN FISHER & PORTER (PSIA)

AMOS.

38 17 EOUS TEST NONE Model Number:

Relative 50EP1041BCXA Humidity AMBIENT 100 38 17 SIMULTAN NONE EOUS TEST

(%)

Function:

Chemical NOT SAFETY INJECTION Spray REQUIRED Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon.

Radiation 1.1 x 106 2 x 1 8

17 SEQUENTIAL Service:

TEST (5)

NONE HEADER PRESSURE (Cold Location:

Leg)

REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDIN Aging Flood Level Elev:

(2)

NOT Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence REQUIRED No (1) Transmitter not exposed to DBE-- Long-term mitigation radiation exposure only (2) Not involved in containment flood postulation (3)

See Section l.3.2 (4)

See Section 3.2.2 for evaluation.I (5). Test performed after LOCA simulated environmental exposure

Fa W

11.

Robinson /12 SYSTEM COMPONENT E UATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION RE ENCE QUALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Specit-Qualifi-M cation cation cation cation. (5)

System: SAFETY INJECTION Operating SIMULTAN O1 HR 7 DAYS 38 14 Time EOUS TEST NONE Plant ID No. V-866A (1)

Component:MOTOR OPERATOR Temperature (2

308 3

38 14, 17 SIMULTAN-NONE EOUS TEST Manufacturer: LIMITORQUE Pressure SIMULTAN (PSI) 75 35 14, 17 EOUS TEST NONE Model Number: SMB00 Relative Humidity 100 100 35 14, 17 SIMULTAN-NONE EOUS TEST Function: HOT LEGC INJECTION Cpra N3BO HBO SIMULTAN Spray N OH

NOH, 14EUTS NONE a aEOUS TEST-NN Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

Radiation 1.0 x 106 2 x 10 (4) 17 SEQUENTIAL NONE Service:MOTOR OPERATED.

TEST (6)

VALVE-SIS Location:

Aging 0 YRS 17 SEQUENTIAL NONE CONTAINMENT 241 TEST (6)

Flood Level Elev: 231.2' Above Flood Level: Yes X Submergence NOT No REQUIRED NOTES:

(1) Same data this sheet applies to V-866B.

(2) See accident profile -

Temperature -.Figure 3.1-1.

(3)

See accident. profile -

Pressure -

Figure 3.1-2.

(4) See Section 1.3.2.

(5) See Section 3.2.3 for evaluation.

(6) Test performed prior to LOCA simulated environmental exposure

FRy:

1.

y.

Robinson #2 Sheet 25 SYSTEM COMPONENT WUAIONORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION IIFERENCE QUALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Specifi-Qualifi-METHOD ITEIS cation cation cation cation (3)

System:SAFETY Operating (1) 7 DAYS 30 1

SIMULTAN-NONE SytmSAEyINJECTION E14 TEST9 Time EOUS-TEST Time Plant ID No. V869 Temperature Component:MOTOR OPERATOR Temp AMBIENT 308 1

7 SIMULTAN NONE EOUS TEST SIMULTAN Manufacturer:LIMITORQUE Pressure ATMOS.

75 35 1E1 NONE (PSIA)EOUS TEST (PSIA)

Model Number: SMB00 Relative SIMULTAN midity AMBIENT 100 35 14,17 EOUS TEST NONE Function:HOT LEG INJEC Chemical NOT H BO SIMULTAN 3

3

.0 TION BORON Spray REQUIRED NaOH 14,17 EOUS TEST NONE INJECTION Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

-8SQE Radiation 1.1 x 106 20 x 10 (2) 17 SEQUENTIAL NONE Service: MOTOR OPERATED VALVE Location:

REACTOR AUXILIARY BLDG.

Aging 0 YRS 17 QUENTA NONE TEST ()N N

Flood Level Elev:

(4)

Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence NOT No APPLICABLE (1) To be used intermittantly during mitigation of LOCA (2) See Section 1.3.2.

(3) See Section 3.2.3 for evaluation.

(4) Not involved in containment flood postulation (5)

Test performed prior to LOCA simulated environmental exposure

F y:

11.

B. Robinson #/2et f

SYSTEM COMPONENT ALUATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOCUIENTATION REFRENCE QUALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION RN S

fCATION OUTSTAND ING' Parameter Specift-Qualifi-Speciti-Qualifi-METHOD ITIDIS cation cation cation cation (4)

System:SAFETY INJECTION Operating N

ONTINUOUS NONE (5)

Time Plant ID No. LS-1925A Component: LEVEL SWITC Temperature (2)

NONE (OF)

Manufacturer: MADISON Pressure NONE'(

(PSIA)

Model Number 5602 Relative 100 NONE

5)

Humidity(5

(%)

Function:CONTAINMENT SUM Chemical 113 B03 NONE (5)

WATER LEVEL MEASUREMENT Spray NaOH Accuracy:

Spec: 1/2' in Demon: cremen Radiation 1.4 x 10 NONE (5

Service:DETECT WATER LEVEL CHANGES Location:

CONTAINMENT 228 Aging NONE (5)

Flood Level Elev: 231.2' bove Flood Level: Yes Submergence NONE2%

No X (1) Same data this sheet applies tQ LS-1925B

2)

See accident profile -

Temperature -

Figure 3.1-1

3) See accident profie -

Pressure -,Figure 3.1-2

4)

See Section 3.2.7 for evaluation (5) Function to be superceded by two channels of analog measurement equipment. No qualification testing required.

FacO H B. Robinson #2 Sheet 9

.25:

SYSTEM COMPONENTi E AION WORK'SHEET ENVIRONMENT OCENAINQUALF EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION OUMENTATN REFEROUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-pc THOD cation cation cation cation (5)

ITEMS System: AUXILIARY COOLIN, Operating SIMULTAN S5 MIN 7 DAYS 40 14 EOUS TEST NONE Time Plant ID No. V-744A (1),

Temperature (23035 38 1,1SMLTN Component: MOTOR OPERATOI eE (2) 308 EOUS TEST Manufacturer:

Pressure SIMULTAN LIMITORQUE (PSIA)

(3) 75 35 14, 17 O

TEST NONE Model Number Relative.

SMB-3 Humidity 100 100 35 17 SIMULTAN-NONE EOUS TEST Function: REACTOR CORE DEUEChemical IH3BO3 113B03:

Spray N0NOHSIMULTAN-N E

Accuracy:

Spec:

EOUSTEST Demon:

Radiation 9.5 x 105 2 x 10

)

17 SEQUENTIAL Service: MOTOR-OPERATED EST NONE VALVE-S IS Location: CONTAINMENT SEQUENTIAL Aging 40 YRS 17 TEST 6

NONE 24.5'TET (6

Flood Level Elev: 231.21 Above Flood Level: Yes X Submergence No NOTES; (1)

Same data this sheet applies to.V-744B.

(2) See accident profile -

Temperature-Figure 3.1-1.

(3)

See accident profile -

Pressure -

Figure 3.1-2.

(4) See Section 1.3.2.

(5) See Section 3.2.3 for evaluation.

(6)

Test performed prior to LOCA simoulated environmental exposure

Fa

1.

8 Robitison!42 Seet 12:

SYSTEM COMPONENT PELUATION WORK SHEFT ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE QUALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION I__

CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-SpeciTfi-Qualifi cation

cation, ration cation (4)

METHOD IT[IS System: AUXILIARY COOLING Operating (2) 7 DAYS 30 14 SIMULTAN-NONE Time EOUS TEST Plant ID No. V860A Component. MOTOR OPERATOR Tepeatr (CF)

AMBIENT 308 35 J1417 SIMULTAN-NONE EOUS TEST Manufacturer: LIMITORQUE Pressure ATMO.

75 35 1417 SIMULTAN-NONE (PSIA)

E0US TEST Model Number: SMB-1 Relative AMBIENT 100 35 14 17 SIMULTAN-NONE EOUS TEST Function: CV SUMP TO RHR Chemical NOT H BO SUCTION Spray REQUIRED NaOH SIMULTAN-ST EOUS TEST:

Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

6 8

Radiation 1.1 x 10 2.0 x 10 (3) 17 SEQUNTIALE TEST

()

NN Service: MOTOR OPERATED VALVE.J Location:

SEQUENTIAL REACTOR AUXILIARY BLDG.

in 40 YRS.

17 TEST (6)

NONE Flood Level Elev:

(5)

NOT Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence APPLICABLE No (1)

Same data this sheet applies to V860B (2)

-To be used intermittantly during mitigation of LOCA.

(3) See Section 1.3.2.

(4)

See Section 3.2.3 for evaluation.

J(5)

Not involved in containment flood postulation (6)

Test performed prior to LOCA simulated environ ental expourer EIkta xpsr

yII.. Robinson /2 Sheet f

SYSTEM COMPONENT AUTO RKSHEET ENVIRONMENT, DOCUMENTATION iU4PERENCEQAII EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Speciti Qualifi-METHOD ITEMS cation cation cation cation (4)

System: AUXILIARY COOLING Operating (2) 7 DAYS 30 14 SIMULTAN-NONE

Time, EOUS TEST Plant ID No. V861A( 1 )

Temperature Component: MOTOR OPERATOR OF)

AMBIENT 308 35 14,17 SIMULTAN-NONE EOUS TEST Manufacturer: LIMITORQUE Pressure ATMOS' 75 35 11 SIMULTAN-NONE (PSIA)IbLAN NOE (PSIA)

EOUS TEST Model Number: SMB-1 Relative Humidity AMBIENT 100 35 14,17 SIMULTAN-NONE M)

EOUS TEST Function: CV SUMP TO RHR Chemical NOT H BO SUTIN3 3

SI.MULTAN4" SUCTION Spray REQUIRED 14,17 E

NONE Na0H' EOUS TEST 9

Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

6 8

Radiation 1.1 x 10 2.0 x 10 (3) 17 SEQUENTIAL NONE Service: MOTOR OPERATED TEST (6)

VALVE Location:

Aging 40 YRS 17 SEQUENTIAL REACTOR AUXILIARY BLDG.

TEST (6)

Flood Level Elev: (5)

Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence NOT APPLICABLE No (1) Same data this sheet applies to,'V861B (2) To be used intermittantly duriig mitigation of LOCA.

(3) See Section 1.3.2..

(4) See Section 3.2.3 for evaluation.

(5)

Not involved in containment flood postulation NONEl (6)

Test performed prior to LOCA simulated ennetal exposure

Fa y:

11.

R. Robinson 12 Sheet SYSTEM COMPONENT UATW3O' ORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT__

DOCUMENTATION 1, 1A1;-R ENC E QUALIFI-EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION ENVIRONMENT DOCU 1ENTATION OUTSTANDING Paraneter Specifi-Qualifi Speciti-Qualifi-EITIIS cation cation cation cation (4 System: AUXILIARY COOLING Operating (2) 7 DAYS 30 14 SIMULTAN-NONE Time EOUS TEST Plant ID No. V863A Component: MOTOR OPERATOR Temperature AMBIENT 308 35 14,17 SIMULTAN-NONE (oF)

EOUS TEST Manufacturer: LIMITORQUE Pressure ATMOS.

75 35 17 SIMULTAN-NONE (PSIA) 3 4

IMULTAN-NONE EOUS TEST Model Number: SMB-00 Relative Humidity AMBIENT 100 35 14,17 SIMULTAN-NONE

(%)

EOUS TEST Function: RHR DISCHARGE Chenical NOT H BO TO SI SPRAY RQIE SSEMSA Spray REQUIRED NaOH 14,17 SIMULTAN-NONE Accuracy:

Spec:,

EOUS TEST Demon.6 Radiation 1.1 x 10 2.0 x 10 (3)

SEQUENTIAL NONE Service: MOTOR OPERATED TEST (6)

VALVE Location:

SEQUENTIAL Aging

-40 YRS.

17 TET()NONE REACTOR AUXILIARY BLDG.

ST (6) flood Level Elev:

(5)O Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence APPLICABLE No (1)

Same data this sheet applies tojV863B (2)

To be used intermittantly'during mitigation of LOCA.

(3) See Section 1.3.2.

( )

See Section 3.2.3 for evaluation.

( )

Not involved in containment flood postulation (6) Test. performed prior to LOCA simulated 'environmental exposure

FdL*

COMPONENT U 2Shee13 SYSTEM COMPONENT ATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE ~JLF EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION OUTSTANDING System: AUXILIARY Operating C

COOLING Time COTNOSCNIUS3 35(

Plant ID No. RI-1 Com

Aemperature 5 (AVG 90 Compnent

MOTR,

~

(0F)

AMBIENT RISE Manufacturer:

Pressure WESTINGHOUSE (PSIA) 15 15 35 19 (4)

(2)

Model Number: 506UPZ Relative j

Function: CIRCULATE SUMP Humidity AMBIENT AMBIENT 35 19 (4)

(2)

WATER & BORATED REFUELING

(*)

WATER TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM-POST LOCA Chemical NOT NOT Spray REQUIRED REQUIRED Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

6 8

Radiation 1.1 x 10 2.0 x 10 19 (3) 18 SEQUENTIAL NONE Service; RESIDUAL HEAT TEST REMOVAL PUMP -

SIS Location:

AUXILIARY BUILDING Agin 0 yrs.

18 SEQUENTIAL NONE TEST Flood Level Elev:

N/A NOT Aove Flood Level: Yes Submergence APPLICABLE No NOTES:

(1) Same data this sheet. applies to RHR-B/

(2) Motor not exposed to DBE, no qualification testi g needed.

(3) See Section 1.3.2

4)

Information to be obtained from manufacturer.

(5) See Section 3.2.8.for evaluation

Fa y: H. B. Robinson #2 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION Rl ERENCE QUALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION TCTO USADN Para eter Specifi-Qualifi-Specifi-Q CATIOD cation cation cation cation METHOD ITS System: REACTOR PROTECTIO Operating 8SIMULTAN 1 HR 2

K 21' 48

.UTN Time EOUS TEST(5 Plant ID No. TE-412B (1)

Component:

Tmeaue-SIMULTAN-NONE (OF)

(320 21U EOUS TEST TEMPERATURE ELEMENT Mnfcue:RSMUT Pressure (3) 81 21 48' SIMHLTAN-ON NONE.

M a n u f a c t u r e r R O E O U TE O U S -T E S T (5)

Model Number: 176KF

(

Humidity 100e100 21 48 SIMULTAN-NONE EOUS TEST (5)

Funtin:MAIN STEAM4 Chemical-IB48IMLP LINE BREAK MONITOR T

Pray (O

21 SIMULTAN NONE (PI)EOUS TEST (5)

Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

Radiation 7

8 SEQUENTIAL NONE Service T

-REACTOR.15x1 0(4 8TS 6

5 HumidityEOSTES (5)

SIS GENERATION I

Location: M S

Mm CONTAIN 243' A40YRS.

SEQUENTIAL NONE Service_2 W

TEST (6)

Flood Level Elev: 231.2' N

Above Flood Level: Yes X Submergence NOT PPLICABLE..

No NOTES:

(1)

Same data this sheet applies to TE-412D (2)

See accident profile Temperature -- Figure 3.1 1 (3)

See accident profile-Pressure -Figure 3.142 (4)

See Section 1.3.2 (5)

Not required for DBE -

used only for out sideicontainment Main Steam line Break protection (6)

Test performed prior to LOCA simulated environmental exposure,

F ty

1. R. Robinson #2 Shee t.9 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORK SHEET EQUIPENT DESCRIPTION DOCUENTATION REFERENCE QUIALIFI Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Specifi-Qualifi-METION cation cation cation catioETnOD ITI IS System:REACTOR PROTECTION Operating peang 1HR.

2: WKS.

21-48 SIMULTAN" NONE Time EOUS TEST (5)

Plant ID No. TE-422B (1)

Component:

Tempature (2) 320 21 48 SIMULTAN-NONE TEMPERATURE ELEMENT (F)US TEST (5)

Manufacturer ROSEMOUNT Pressure (3) 81 21 8

SIMULTANI NONE:

(PSIA)

EOUS TEST (5)

Model Number:

176 KF Relative lumidity 1010248SIMULTAN-.

NONE (m)

EOUS TEST (5)

Function: MAIN STEAM Chemical HBO SIMULTAN-NONE LINE BREAK MONITOR Spray N OH3 ML48T N

Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

78 DRadiation 1.5 x 10 1.0 x 10

)

SEQUENTIAL Service: TAV -REACTOR TEST (6)

COOLANT LOOP #2 JoS (fi A TION 40 YRS. +

Aging SEQUENTIAL ACON N

2 WK. POST 48 (6

NONE ONTAINMENT 243' ACCIDENT TEST Flood Level Elev: 231.2' NOT Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence APPLICABLE No NOTES:

(1) Same data this sheet applied to TE-422D (2) See accident profile -

Temperature -

Figure 3.1-1 (3) See accident profile -

Pressure -

Figure 3.1-2 (4) See Section 1.3.2 (5) Not required, for DBE only used foroutsideco team Line Break protection (6)

Test perf ormed prior to, LOCA simulated environmental exposure

F ty: 11. B. Robinson /2 S25 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATfON WORK SHEET EQUIPMENTENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE QUA N

E~uPMET ESCIPTONCATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Specifi-Qualifi-METHOD cation cation cation cation System:REACTOR PROTECTION Operating 1 HR.

2 NKS.

21:

48NOA Time EOUS TEST (5)

Plant ID No. TE-432B (1)

Component:

Temperature (2) 320 21 48 SIMULTAN-NONE (OF)

(0 F)

.EOUS TEST (5

TEMPERATURE ELEMENT Manufacturer: ROSEMOUNT Pressure (3) 8 21 48 SIMULTAN (PSIA)

EOUS TEST (5)

Model Number: 176KF Relative 100 10 1

48 SIMULTAN-NONE HumidityEU TS EQUS TEST (5):

(%)

Function: MAIN STEAM-Chemical H BO SIMUTAN-NONE LINE BREAK MONITOR Spray NdOH 48 EOUS TEST (5)

Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

7 8

Radiation 1.5 x 10 1.0 x 10

)

SEQUENTIAL NONE Service: T

-REACTOR TEST (6)

(5)

COOLANT LOXN T

S Location:

4o YRS.

SEQUENTIAL CONTAINMENT 243' 2 KS TEST (6)

Flood Level Elev: 231.2' Above Flood Level: YesX Submergence NOT APPLICABLE No OTES:

(1)

Same data this sheet applies to TE-432D (2)

See accident profile -

Temperature -

Figure 3.1-1 (3)

See accident profile -

Pressure -Figure 3.1-2 (4)

See Section 1.3.2 (5)

Not required for DBE -

only used for outside containment iain steam ine break protection

!(6)

Test performed prior to LOCA simulated environmient al exoure 9

Sheet f25z

Fa H. a. Robinson #/2She II.'Sheet SYSTEM COMPONENT E UATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT, DOCUMENTATION'REF 4KRENCEQLI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION EVOMTCUNA NRFI CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi Qualifi

Sec, Qualifi-METHOD cation cation cation cati JTEMS System:

HVAC Operating 3 hrs 24 hrs. +

36 16 Simultaneous No Time Test Plant ID No.

HVH-1 (1)

Component:

MOTOR, FAN Temp ture 315 36 16 Simultaneous TestN Manufacturer:

Pressure (3

75-95 36 16 Simultaneous None WESTINGHOUSE (PSIA)

Test Model Number:

685.5 S Relative Humidity 100 100 36 16 None Test

(%)_____

Functon T

SER HEAT Chemical HBO H BO Simultaneous Spray

None, F R O M C O N A I N M N T O

S n a y 3

3 3 3

1 6T e s t SERVICE WATER S

NaOh NaOh Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

Radiatin 16-8 Nonenia tio x 10 1.41.x0 (4) 15 SequentialNone Service:

CONTAINMENT Test (6)

FAN COOLER Location:

Aging 0 yrs.

15 Sequential CONTAINMENT Test (6)

None Flood Level Elev: 231.2' Above Flood Level: Yes X SubmergenCe NOT R2 No APPLICABLE NOTES:

1) Same data this sheet applies to IIVH-2, HIVH-3, HVH-4

2) See accident profile - Temperature -

Figure 3.1-1 (3)

See accident profile -

Pressure Figure 3.1-2 t4) See Section 1.3.2.

(5) See Section 3.2.8 for evaluation.

6) Test performed on selected motor components -nct part of-LOCA simulated environmental exposure

F y:

H. B. Robinson #2 Sheet f 25 SYSTEMCOMPONEN LUATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT:.

DOCUMENTATION. rFRENCEQALF EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION EVOMTDUlAINIR CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi.- Specifi-Qualifi-METHOD ITDIS cation cation cation cation System:

ALL Operating CONTINUOUS 105 hrs.

1 243 IMULTANEOUS NONE Time TEST Plant ID No. SEE NOTE(l)

Component: ELECTRICAL Temperature PENETRATION oF)

(2) 3 1

2,3,4,43 SIMULTANEOUS NONE TEST Manufacturer:

Pressure (3)7 1

23,43 SIMULTANEOUS NONE CROUSE-HINDS (PS IA)

TEST Model Number:

Relative 1.2.2 (745) 1.2.5 (751)

Humidity 100 100 1

243 SIMULTANEOUS NONE 1.2.2 (747)

(7)

TEST 1.2.4 (749).

Function:

ACCIDENT Chemical 3BO CONDITION MONITORING Spray NaOi 43 SIMULTANEOUS NONE TEST Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

Radiation 1.4 x 10 2.13 x10 (6) 43 SEQUENTIAL NONE (5)

Service: PROVIDE CABLE TEST (7)

CONTINUITY THROUGH Loca T TifENT SHELL 524 hrs. @

CONTAINMENT 234' -

246 Aging 0

150 C (40 yr TEST (7)

'Flood Level Elev: 231.2' Above Flood Level: Yes X Submergence APPLICABLE No NOTES:

(1) Data this sheet applies to penetrations.B-1,B-2,B-5 B 9 6-1, 2,C-3C C-6,C-8,C-D-iD2 D-3 D5

-8,D79 (2) See accident profile-Temperature -

Figure 3.1.1 (3) See accident profile -

Pressure -

Figure 3.1.2 1(4) See Section 3.2.1 for evaluation (5)

Qualification established for penetration cartridge only. Pigtail cable requires separate testing as reported in Section 3.2.1

6) See Section 1.3.2 (7) Test performed prior toLOCA simulated environmental exposure

FaH, H, Robinson # 2h 5'

Faj RSYSTEM COMPONENT 9AUATION WORK SHEET, EQUIPENTNENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE QUALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi Speciti-Qualifi cation cation catatio n tion (6)

METHOD ITEMS System:

ALL Operating SIMULTAN 1HR. -1 DAY 67HRS.

3823

tUNONE, Time EOUS TEST Plant ID No. SEE NOTE(l)

Component:

Temperature SIMULTAN-NO jOF)

SIMUTAN TRANSMITTER.

(EOUS TEST Manufacturer:

OSEMOUNT Pressure

3) 135 38 2

SIMULTAN-NONE (PSIA)

EOUS TEST Model Number:

1153A Relative Humidity 100 100 23 SIMULTAN-NONE

(%)

TEST Function:

Chemical H BO H BO SIMULTAN REPLACEMENT COMPONENT 3Spray N

N 23,41 EOUS TEST NONE NaOH Na H Accuracy:

Spec:

+ %

Demon:

6 7

Radiation 5.0 x 10 4.4x10 (5

23 SEQUENTI (4)

Servce:TEST (7)

Service:

Location:

NOT WITHIN CONTAINMENT Aging MFGR.

TEST PROGRAM(

Flood Level Elev 231.2x Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence No NOTES:

(1)

Replacement transmitter to be suppl fo PLT-475, LT-476,

LT-477.,,LT-484,'LT-486, LT-48 7, LT-494', LT-495 -LT7496, LT-49 7, LT-459., LT-460,,LT-461, FT-474, FT-475, FT-484, FT-485, FT-494, FT-495, LT--485 01 (2) See accident profile -

Temp-erature Figure 3.1-1 (3)

See, acident profile - Pressure.- Figre 3.1-2 (4)

Replacement transmitters tested under IEEE 323197 oma Rosemoun c

tly testing to. meet IEEE 323-1974 requirements.

(5) See Section 1.2.3 (7) Test performed prior to LOCA simulated environmental (6

So S e Spe t

inn 1

9 1

For a 1,.

t fe"

-v----

Ha y

R. Robnson #/2 112 Sheet 2

SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DCENAINREFERENCE QUALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualif peciQualMETHOD ITEMS cation cation cation cation(5 System:

ALL Operating Simultaneous 5 min.

30 days 407 me Test None Plant ID No. SEE NOTE (1)

Component:

Tempeature 0

7 Simultaneous

.,Test None SOLENOID, VALVE Mauatrr SOPressure Simultaneous Manufacturer:

ASCO

()

.125 40 47 Sm oNn (PS IA)

Test40.

.4 None Model Number:

NP831665E Rltv NP8316E358 Humidity 100 100 40 47 Simultaneous None (g)

Test 206-381-2U Function:

Chemical H BO 1 BO Simulaneous None 33 3

3-47 Smlaeu oe, REPLACEMENT COMPONENT Spray Test NaOH NaOH Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

Deo:5

8 Sequential Radiation 9.5 x 10 2.0 xO est None Service:

Te(t (6)

Location:

40 yrs.

CONTAINMENT 283 Aging yr

)

Sequenta l 283' Test (6)

None Flood Level Elev: 231.2' Not Above Flood Level: Yes X Submergence Applicable No NOTES:

(1) Replacement solenoid valves to be supplied for: -VI2-7, V12-9, V12-11, V12-13 CC200A CC200B, CVC2200C (2) See accident profile -

Temperature - Figure 3.1-1 (3) See accident profile -

Pressure -

Figure 3.1-2 (4) See' Section 1.3.2 (5) See Section 3.2.6 for evaluation (6) Test performed prior to LOCA simulated environ ental exposure I

F y:

11. B. Robinson 2

Sheet f 2 SYSTEM COMPONENW VALUATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DCMETTONRFEEC QUALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Paaetr Specifi-. Qualifi-.

SpeciT3 Qualif i-M~O cation cation cation cation ITEMS System:

ALL Operating Time CONTINUOUS 240 hrs.

46 NONE Time TEST Plant ID No.

Component:

CABLE Temperature SIMULTANEOU NONE 4/C #16, 2/C #16, F

5 46 TEST Shielded Manufacturer:

Pressure (3) 115 46 SIMULTANEOUS NONE CONTINENTAL WIRE & CABLE (PSIA)

TEST Model Number: CC2115 Relative Humidity 100 100 46 SIMULTANEOUS

(%)

TEST Function: FIELD CABLE Chemical HI BO Spray 3 B3 46 SEQUENTIAL NONE.

Accuracy:

Spec TEST Demon:

Radiation 1.4 x 107 1.0 x 10 (1) 46 SEQUENTIAL NONE Service: INSTRUMENTATION TEST Location: CONTAINMENT Aging 5

(4)

Flood Level Elev: 231.2'

'Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence NOT No APPLICABLE NOTES:

(1) See Section 1.3.2 (2) See accident profile -

Temperature -

Figure 3 1.1 (3) See accident profile -

Pressure -Figure 3.1.2 (4) See Section 3.2.4 for.-evaluationt

F i ty:

H. B. Robinson 12 Sheet of25 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE. QIJALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Specifi Qualifi cation cation cation cationM(

System:

ALL Operating SIMULTAN Time CONTINUOUS 50 DAYS 9EOUS TESTNONE Plant ID No.

Component:

CABLE Temperature SIMULTAN (OF).LTA49 NONE 3/C #16, 2/C, #16, (F)

2) 346 6

49 TEST 500 MCM, 3/C 19/#22 er:

KERITE Pressure (3) 128 SIMULTAN-NONE Mauatue:49.

EOMJ TEST.

(PSIA)E Model Number:

Relative HIGH TEMP, FIRE RESISTAN1 Humidity 100 100 SIMULTAN NONE EOUS TEST Function: FIELD CABLE Chemical130SIUTN Spray 3

EOUS TEST NONE NaOH Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

Deon:

S IMULTAN Radiation 1.4(1SIUA

1. 0 2.0 x1049EUTETON Service:

CONTROL AND 10 9

FOUS TEST NONE LOW POWER Location.:

Loca t ONTAINENT A

40YEARS 6

49 SEQUENTIAL TEST Flood Level Elev: 2 3 NOT Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence APPLICABLE No NOTES:

(1) See Section 1.3.2 (2) See accident profile.-, Temperature.- Figure 3. 1.1 (3) See accident profile -Pressure

- Figure 3.1.2 (4) See Section 3.2.4

F ty:

11.

Robinson #2 SYSTEM COMPONEN LUATION WORK-SHEET EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION EN CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Speci Qualifi-ITITS cation cation cation cation

( 3 )

MTO System: CHEMICAL & VOLUME Operating D1 SIDASULTAN-NONE Time EOUS TEST Plant ID No. CVC-381 Component: MOTOR OPERATOR Temperature SIMULTAN (OF)

AMBIENT 308 35 14,17 NONE Manufacturer: LIMITORQUE Pressure ATMOS.

75 35 14,17 SIMULTAN-NONE (PSIA)

EOUS TEST Model Number:

SMB-00 Relative AMBIENT 100 35 14,17 UNONE Humidity EOUS TEST

(%)

Function: REACTOR COOLANT Chemical NOT H BO PUMP SEAL WATER RETURN Sp REQUIRED NaH

.1E17 SIRTAN-NONE

ray, NaOH EOUS TEST Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

6 8

Radiation 1.1 x 10 2.0 x 10 (2) 17 SEQUENTIAL NONE MOTOR OPERATED Service:

VALVE TEST (5)

Location; 240' SEQUENTIAL REACTOR AUXILIARY BLDG.

Agin YRS.

17 TEST (5)

NONE flood Level Elev:

(4)

NOT Above Flood Level: Yes Submergence APPLICABLE No T1) o be. used intermittantly during mitigation of LOCA (2) See Section 1.3.2,

3)

See Section 3.2.3 for evaluation

4)

Not involved in containment flood postulation (5) Test performend prior to LOCA simulated environmental exposure

F y:

I. B. Robinson #12 5

SYSTEM COMPONENT VALUATION RK SHEET NVROMETDOCUMENTATION. REFERENCE QAII EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-7 Specifi-Qualifi

.,cation cation cation cationMETHOD ITS System:

AL Operating y

SIMULTANEOUS NONE Time TEST Plant ID No.

(1 Temperature Component: CABLE SPLICES Temp (2) 357 IMULTANEOUS NONE TEST Manufacturer: RAYCHEM Pressure (PSIA),

85SMULTANEOUS NONE TEST Model Number:

Relative 3000-12N, 500-12N, Humidity 100 100

44.

SIMULTANEOUS NONE 300-12N, 200-12N,

(%0TS 115-6N, 070-6N TEST Function:

SINGLE CONDUC Chemical H BO4 TOR AND MULTICONDUCTOR Spray3 SIMULTANEOU NON CABLE SPLIC IG TEST uracy:

pec:

Demon:

78 Radiation

1.

10 2.0x 10 (5) 44 SEQUENTIAL NONE Service:

ELECTRICAL TEST (6)

PENETRATIONS Location:

days CONTAINMENT 234' -

246 Aging 302F 44 SIMULTANEOU NONE 5'x 10 RAD TEST Flood Level Elev: 231. 2' NOT w_

Above Flood Level: Yes X Submergence APPLICABLE No NOTES:

(1) Plant procedure developed and approved for installation and checkout:' M-521 (Revision 0)

(2) See accident profile' -

Temperature -

Figure 3.1.1 (3) See accident profile -

Pressure -

Figure 3.1.2 (4) See Section 3.2.5 for evaluation

5) See Section 1.3.278 (6) Test performed prior to (5 x 10 R) and after (1.5 x 10 R) OCA smulated environmental expour

ty:

11.. Robinson /2 Sheet 25 SYSTEM COMPONENT ALUATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT RFRNEQIJALIFI EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

__________TDOCIENTATION REFERENCE A

OUTSTANDING Paramete Specifi-Qualifi-Speciti-Qualifi cation cation cation cation METHOD System:

ALL Operating STig CONTINUOUS days SIMULTANEOUS NONE JR Time TESTy Plant ID No.

TEST Component: TERMINALS Temperature (2)

SIMULTANEOUS NONE CABLE F)

(TEST Manufacturer:

AMP Pressure (3) 137 5SIMULTANEOUS NONE (PSIA)

TEST Model Number: 53548-1 Relative (wire size Humidity 100 100 5

SIMULTANEOUS NONE

16)

TEST Function: -CONDUCTOR BUTTn CO CTR Chemical H BO SIMULTANEOUS NONE BUTT SPLICE S3a

.3 TEST Spray NaHTST NAOH Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

7 8

Radiation 1.4 X 10 2.0 x 10 (5)

45.

SEQUENTIAL NONE Service:

ELECTRICAL TEST (6)

PENETRATIONS Location:

CONTAINMENT 234 246' Aging

()

Flood Level Elev: 2 3 1.2'I Above Flood Level: Yes X Submergence NOT No APPLICABLE NOTES:

(1) Plant procedure developed and approved for installation and checkout -

M-521 Revision 0)

(2) See accident profile'- Temperature - Figure 3.1.1 (3) See accident profile -Pressure

-Figure 3.1.2 (4) See Section 3.2.5 for evaluation (5) See Section 1.3.2 (6) Test performed prior to LOCA simulated environmental exposure (7) Butt splice connection to be qualified durin yle Lab test f PVC caieI M

ed d r

n

'4lL bo V

c b

e

FaWy:

Hc Y,

Robinson 112 Sheet SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORK SHEET QUALIFI-'

ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION REFERENCE EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CATION OUTSTANDING Parameter Specifi-Qualifi-Specii Qualifi-METHOD ITEMS cation cation cation cation System:

ALL Operating CONTINUOUS (4(6)

Time Plant ID No.

Component:

TAPE, SILICON mperature (4)

6)

RUBBER OF)

(2)

Manufacturer:

3M/ELECTRO Pressure

6)

PRODUCTS DIVISION (PSIA)

(3)

Model Number:

SCOTCH 70 Relative Humidity 100 (4)

(6)

(%)

Function: CABLE TERMINATI Chemical(

PROTECTION Spray Accuracy:

Spec:

Demon:

(

Radiation 1.4 x 10

())

(6)

Service:

Jocation: CONTAINMENT A

Aging (6)

Flood Level Elev: 231.2' R

bove Flood Level: Yes X Submergence (5)

No NOTES:

(1) See Section 1.3.2 (2) See accident.profile -

Temperature -

Figure 3.1.1 (3) See accident profile -

Pressure -

Figure 3.1.2 (4)

Qualification performed in conjunction with Kerite cable testing per IEEE 323-1974 (5) Not required (6)

Qualification per H.B. Robinson parameters to be performed by Wyle Labs in conjunction with PVC cable test program

3.2 Electrical Equipment Qualification Evaluation 3.2.1 Electrical Penetrations and Connectors The H. B. Robinson Nuclear Power Plant electrical penetrations are cartridge types with provisions for continuous pressuri zation. They were manufactured by Crouse-Hinds Company (Syracuse, N. Y.) to a Westinghouse design and specification, CPL-R2-E3.

Location within containment forms a grid.pattern extending from elevation 234 feet to 246 feet.

This places the penetrations above the established containment flood level of 231.2 feet. The electrical penetrations utilized by iden tified safety class electrical equipment are designated:

Low Voltage (600V) 500 MCM, Low Voltage (600V) 3/C 19/#22, ow Voltage Control and Power (600V). 2/C #16, 3/C #16, and Instrumentation (600V) 2/C #16, 4/C #16 shielded. These types consist of a mixture of one-, two-and three-conductor cable interfaces and appropriate shields. Individual conductors are carried through the penetration and end in either a 60-inch or 72-inch pigtail.

2/C #16 and 3/C #16 pigtails are grouped and attached to electrical connectors (Crouse-Hinds model number RPC-317-160 SOIN/SO8N).to provide the appropriate cable match. The connectors are located in cable trays and lie in the horizontal plane.

The cable tray runs are located essentially on the outside diameter of the polar crane shield wall to route cable to the respective instrumentation or control equipment.

The electrical penetration material which is located within containment and exposed to. accident environment conditions consists of stainless steel (container) ceramic plate (con ductor spacer) PVC and Kerite formula (condu tor insulation) and aluminum (electrical connectors).

By specification each.penetration type was designed to perform under the LOCA environmental conditions of pressure 'and temperature depicted within'the H. B. Robinson FSAR (shown as Figure 3.1.1 and 3.1.2-in this report). Test information is recorded in References 3 and 4.

The CP&L Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant uses Westinghouse designed and fabricated electrical penetrations which are similar to those.in use at H. B. Robinson. Both are cartridge type with stainless steel sleeves and both have potting compound seals, for the internal connections of the feed-through solid copper conductors. Brunswick penetrations utilize heat-shrink tubing for small conductors internal insulation spliced to Okonite jacketed cables forming pigtails for field cable hookup. H. B, Robinson penetrations use silicone rubber internal insulation spliced with heat-shrink tubing to two (2) types of jacketed.insulation cables (PVC and Kerite) forming pigtails for field cable hookup. Both use a ceramic seal to encapsulate pigtail entry.and provide an impervious shield

with the cartridge sleeve.

A greater degree of testing was performed on Brunswick type penetrations with results found in Reference 43.

Briefly summarized:

0 0

Thermal cycling -

20 C to 135 C (5 cycles)

Pre-aging -

524 hrs.

700C (40 years)

Radiation -

2.13'x 10 RAD Steam Test Temperature, Pressure, Humidity and Spray (per report)

Due to the dual nature of the electrical penetrations, one side in containment the other outside, mock-up of only the in containment area was required for testing purposes. The test data recorded and referenced above should vaiidate qualification of the cartridge portion of the Il. B. Robinson electrical penetrations.

The electrical connectors (Crouse-Hinds Model Number ((RPC 317-160-S01N/SO8N)) used with the penetrations consist of an extruded aluminum shell with a hard anodized finish. The connector pins/sockets are silver-plated copper. The insert material is mineral filled diallyLphthalate with a thin wafer of silicone rubber provided for sealing purposes.

ineral filled dial ylphth ate can withstand radiation exposure betV n 10 and 10 RADS with little or no permanent degradation.

'The silicone rubber' seal wafer is positioned between two plugs of diallyl phthalate and will not be significantly' affected by irradiation. The connector proper will not be

-affected by normal plant life operation of forty:(40) years or the added accident radiation dosage as presented in Table 1.3.3.

e aluminum shell is comprised of 6061 alloy which contains

(%):

.25 copper,

.6 silicon, 1.0 magnesium and.25 chromium.

A Martin. hard-coat anodized finish is applied to a depth of 1.7-2.0 thousaniths. The alloy used experiences a weight 2

loss of 932 mg/dm for the first day and an average of 370 mg/dn per day thereafter when completely immersed a NaOH adjusted boric acid, solution (pH-9) heated to 200 0 F Asthe shellR is anodized.its corrosion resistance is improved. Additionally, the connectors will not be' completely immersed in boric acid solution under spray conditions, nor will the high temperature be maintained for a thirty- (30) day period. Therefore, the worst case of loss of mass (.8 ounce per square decimeter after 30 days) will not be realized. Sufficient shell material will remain to preserve connector integrity.

(2)See Appendix C to this report for reference information.

(3)WCAP 7153 Investigation of Chemical Additives for Reactor Containment Sprays.

(Reference Table 8 and Figure 9.)

ted b Crose-Hinds the anodize finish provides protection sufficient to enable specifying connector to be

corrosionresistant to salt spray for 300 days (in tests per MIL C-5015D and MIL-E-4970A),

Per manufacturer's installation instructions, connector will provide watertight seal and will exclude water by hose spray or stream. During refueling (August-October, 1980), all connectors in containment were checked and tightened to provide watertight fit.

A periodic check of connector clamp and shell cover screw tightness will be established and performed to assure connectors will function for the LOCA prescribed operation time of the penetrations (see Table 1.3.3).

As the clamp seal was able to maintain connector operability after a three-hundred (300) day salt spray test per stated MIL SPECS it is concluded that properly maintaided clamp seals will providechemical spray protection for the required operational times of electrical penetration connector circuits (thirty (30) minutes to one (1) day),

No significant degradation due to thermal aging will be experienced.by the connector during operation plant life due to materials used in design and/or fabrication. The connector design temperature range is -80F.

to 275F and is sufficient to meet the operating and LOCA temperature range established for H. B. Robinson.

The electrical penetrations utilize a combination of five- (5) and six- (6).foot lengths of single or multiconductor cable to connect the penetration feed-through conductors to the field cable inside and outside containment.

These "pigtail" cable were installed by the manufacturer and sleeved at the penetration end with heat-shrink tubing. For selective conductors, connectors were installed while the majority -of pigtail cables required butt-style splicing for field cable connection.

The cabling used for pigtails.was provided by CP&L/Ebasco specification/purchase and shipped to Crouse-Hinds Company for fabrication use.

For the Low Voltage Power, (600V) electrical penetrations, 500 MOM Kerite cable with HI TP conductor insulation was provided (see Section 3.2.4 for qualification evaluation). For Low Voltage Control and Power (600V) electrical penetrations, 3/C #16 and 2/C 1#16 Kerite cable with FR conductor insulation was provided (see Section 3.2.4 for.qualification evaluation).

For Instrumentation (600V) electrical penetrations 2/C #16 Cshielded) and:4/C #16(shielded), Continental'Wire and Cable Company cable with PVC conductor insulation was provided. No qualification data is available for this cable.

CP&L has initiated a qualification test program to determine the ability of this cable to meet IEEE 323-1974 requirements using FSAR established accident parameters.

Spare pigtails will be used and cable splices per Section 3.2.5 will be

utilized to maintain plant configuration during tests.

Wyle Laboratories will perform the tests per Qualification Plan 543/4464/ES dated July 10' 1980. Testin and reportin will require thirty-five (35) weeks--after Receipt of Order.

Major time factor will be. thermal aging to achieve forty- (40) years operating life -before LOCA testing can be performed.

After review of results, a report will be sent to NRC detailing any action by CP&L dictated by these tests.

These PVC insulated pigtails are used for instrumentation or within circuits which must perform their functions after short elapsed time periods; therefore, their long-term operability problems should not affect plant response to accident conditions.

Results of the qualification test program will determine the ultimate disposition of these pigtails.

If replacement is required, a plan and schedule for accomplishment will be included in the.report already stated above.

3.2.2 Electronic Transmitters H. B. Robinson s original design and specification called for installation and use of Fisher and Porter electronic trans mitter for the measurement of Pressure, Level and Flow para meters.

As stated within CP&L response to.NRC IE Bulletin 79 01 and the 45-day response to NRC DE Bulletin 79-01B CP&L preference, to obtain better operation and maintenance per formance, is to change out the existing transmitters within containment-to be replaced by Rsemounts' Model No. 1153A.

Environmental tests performed on Fisher & Porter's trans mitters (Model.No. 10B2496) indicate failure occurs during the high temperature, steam/chemical spray testing stage while attempting to qualify to IEEE 323-1971 parameters.

(Reference WCAP 9157 Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Class XE:Process Instrumentation).

Qualification testing of Rosemount Model 1153, Series A, per Rosemount Report No. 3788:states that the transmitter is qualified per the requirements of IEEE 323-1971. Missing from this report is the aging parameter not required: for IEEE 323 1971 but necessary for complete LOCA qualification. Recent Rosemount testing to qualify a transmitter to meet IEEE 323 1974 requirements has resulted in failure. A combination of thermal aging, irradiation and chemical spray test speci fication parameters has resulted in failed components. The initial failed element was an 0-ring comprised of sulphur cured polyethylene rubber. This allowed steam/chemical spray to affect electronic components. The 0-ring mode of failure is attributed to high temperature vs. time necessary for the Arrhenius curve time compression to satisfy aging test re quirements.'

This testing failure does not preclude the use of the Rcse mount 1153A within H, B, Robinson containment as it has successfully performed within the H. B. Robinson accident parameters of temperature, pressure and radiation levels.

Transmitters located in containment will be required to perform within a maximum time period of twenty-four (24) hours following accident. O.ting failure due to high temperature should not occur during this time period.

Reviewing Table C-1 of Appendix C, NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B, Thermal and Radiation Aging Degradation of Selected Materials, shows that poly ethylene rubber has a potential for significant aging at t n (10) years and an allowable radiation susceptibility of 10 RADS before serious degradation occurs.' Evaluating the above establishes the need to perform periodic changeout of trans mitter 0-rings.

Additionally, the time span to which Rosemount will qualify its IEEE 373-1974 transmitters is ten.(10) years. To assure that listed transmitters within H. B. Robinson containment remain qn ified a ten-10) year replacement cycle will be adopted.

For long-term accident mitigation, Fisher & Porter trans mitters, Model Nos. 10B2496 and 50EP1041, located within the Reactor Auxiliary Building are used. Transmitter identification numbers are FT-940, FT-943, PT-934, PT-940 and PT-943.

As these transmitters are not exposed to the LOCA accident environment, but will see the elevated radiation levels associated with reactor coolant recirculation, qualification is limited to their radiation withstand capability.

As previously stated 'Fisher &.

Porter 10B2496 transmitters had failed environmental testing per IEEE 323-1971 requirements and reported in WCAP 9157.

Failure occurred withing six (6) minutes of operation when in the high temperature/high pressure/sp'ray testing environment (Table A-7, WCAP 9157).

It is.noted, though, and stated, that the "trip" function time of operation for the transmitters was accomplished. -This portion' of the test program is not relevant. to H. B. Robinson use of.the listed Fisher & Porter transmitters as they are not within containment and, therefore, not required. to function under the

'harsh environmental conditions which caused test failure.

Within the same report, it'is stated that Fisher & Porter transmitters had successfully operated during and after irradiation testing (Tabl A-6, WCAP 9157).

As only a total radiation level of 4xl0 RADs were achieved, additional qualification was required to meet the radiation requirements established in Table 1.3.3 (1)Additional design changes/improvements by Rosemount would be followed to adopt improved components or materials to minimize changeout cycles.

-Westinghouse WCAP 7744, Environnental Testing of Engineered Safety Features Related Equipment states that transmitters, identified by Westinghouse as Fisher & Porter, cel1

B2496, had been successfully tested to a level of 2.Oxl0 RADs. As the ligted Fishr &Porter transmitters are exposed to a l1.xlO RAD level, they are considered qualified for the application and functions stated within this report. To further identify the transmitters in use at H. B. Robinson with those tested, -Westinghouse has stated that instruments used were ordered as NS (nonstandard) from Fisher & Porter.

Check of purchase order and manufacturer's fabrication instructions show that the listed H. B. Robinson Fisher & Porter transmitters were supplied as NS (nonstandard),

Westinghouse has been requested to supply the specific data and/or reports associated with the testing program, and it will be available for review after receipt.

3.2.3 Motor-Operated Valves Within containment at H. B, Robinson four (4) motor operators are used forvalve actuation for the,listed equipment.in this report. They are:

V-744A and V,-744B'_ Auxiliary Cooling System and V-866A and V-866B, Safety Injection System. They are Limitorque Models SMB-O0 (V866AB) And SMBm.3, with motor brake (V-744AB), Torque motors for V.744A&B have been wound

-with Class H insulation. V-866A&B Torque motors and V 744A&B motor brakes are wound with Class B insulation. Model SMB-00 has a Peerless built torque motor and Model SMB-3 has a Reliance built torque motor.

Qualification testing of Limitorque motor operators was performed by Franklin Institute Research Laboratories and the.

test reports included in Westinghouse.WCAP 7410-L, Environmental Testing of Engineered Safety Features Related Equipment.

Limitorque Model SMB-0s,.with and without motor brake, and Class B and Class H insulation were used during the tests.

The results are applicable to the Models SMB-00 and SMB-3 used at H. B. Robinson as differences are dimensional and in torque rating only.

The qualification testing performed by FIRL encompasses the temperature, pressure, relative -humidity and chemical spray parameters for H. B. Robinson; therefore, the Limitorque motor operations within containment are considered qualified per these parameters for.H. B. Robinson operation.

Of concern was motor brake operation due to the results of FIRL. Final Report.F-C2485-01, Tests of a Limitorque Valve Operator and Motor Brake Assembly, Both with Class B Insulation Under-Simulated Reactor Containment Post Accident Steam and Chemical Environments. Failure of the motor brake with sub-

sequent valve operator failure was reported as occurring af ter seven (7) days within the test program Performance prior to this time was, recorded as satisfactory.

Since the H. B.

Robinson application of the motor brake, valve operator comr, bination occurs within five (5) minutes after LOCA initiation, it is concluded that the intended function of this equipment will, be met by the installed equipment; no further qualifying or changeout is planned.

Radiation exposure and aging tests are described within Westinghouse WCAP 7744, Environmental Testing of Engineered Safety Features Related Equipment. Total irradiation to 2 x 108 RADS and a thermal aging equivalent to forty (40) years is reported. Support data for these tests are on request from from Westinghouse and will be made available for review when received..:

Outside of containment for long-term accident mitigation are additional Limitorque motor valve operators which will be exposed to elevated radiation levels only. These are CVC-381, V-860A, V-860B, V-861A, V-861B, V-863A V1863B, V-869..

The Limitorque models used are SMB-00 and SMB-l. No motor-brakes are associated with these operators. As stated previously, Westinghouse CA 7744 reports a test which achieved irradiation levels of 2 x-10 RADS with no failures encountered. CP&L has requested copies of the test data from Westinghouse, and it will be made available upon receipt. No other accident environment parameters are experienced. at this location; therefore, CP&L considers these motor valve operations qualified for their intended use and location.

3.2.4 Electrical Cable The electrical equipment in containment and reported within the equipment list of this report is connected by either single conductors or multiconductor cables. These cables run via cable trays and conduit from the electrical penetrations to the equipment.

Connections to the electrical penetrations are made by individual or grouped cable splices, or by elec trical connectors. *At. the equipment end, formal component terminals with overall tape or crimped terminals with overall tape are used for connection.

The connectors used (Crouse-Hinds Model No. RPC-117-150 POIN/PO8N) were supplied with the electrical penetrations" and mounted on the matching cable during construction. For details concerning qualification of this connector, see Section 3.2.1.

For details concerning cable splices and terminals see Section 3.2.5.

The electrical cable used for equipment hookup is divided into three (3) classifications:

a multiconductor 2/C #16, 3/C #16, 3/C 19/#22 multiconducto

_2/C #16,/C #16 (single drain wire utilized 's shield) o single conductor -

500 MCM The unshielded multiconductor cable is used to power the identified motor-operated valves (3C 19/#22), control the identified solenoid valves and provide limit switch outputs (2/C #16, 3/C #16).

The shielded multiconductor cable is.used for analog signals obtained from the listed ttansmitter and the listed RTD temperature elements (2/C #16, 4/C #16 shielded)

The single conductor cable (500 MCM) provides power for the containment fans (HVH-1 through VH-4). The shielded cables used for containment instrumentation utilize the provided electrical connectors at the penetration end.

For instrumentation within containment, a silicon rubber conductor insulation with.glass binder, an untinned bare copper drain wire and an overall silicon rubber jacket cable is used. The manufacturer, Continental Wire and.Cable Company, used their formulated insulation type CC-2115. This, formu lation has been tested by. the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories under Continental Wire and Cable Company instruc tion. Final Report F-C2935 dated, October 1970 with addendum dated November 1970, details the testing specifics which included a preconditioning (aging) period of six (6) hourg at 1510F, and 'a subsequent test achieved exposures of'l x 10 RADS.

cAlsoincluded was a Chemical spray for one hundred and twenty (120) hours. The combined data for.this cable insu lation material indicates there should be no problems asso ciated with L0CA pressure, temperature, humidity, spray, or radiation. :At this time aging is the only unknown variable.

Basically, silicon rubber cable insulation is designed and recommended for high temperature applications. CP&L has no plans to conduct separate testing to further qualify this cable.

For limit switch and solenoid valve operation, a Kerite fire resistant conductor, insulation with overall fire-resistant jacket cable is in use within containment.

Inspection of in-containment field cable hookup to limit switches and solenoid valves performed the week of August 18, 1980 through August 22, 1980 determined that Kerite fire resistant conductor insulation with overall fire-resistant jacket cable is used.

The Kerite Company has attested to the ability of this cable supplied for H. B. Robinson to withstand the FSAR LOCA conditions of temperature, pressure and radiation.

In addition, test qualification included forty- (40) year aging, borated spray and 100% relative humidity to meet IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 383 1974 requirements. Referenced reports are:

FIRL Report F-C4020-1 dated March 1975.

Kerite. Proprietary Engineering Memo No. 178 entitled,

"!Determining Temperature Ratings of Cables and Pre-aging Requirements for LOCA Simulation Tests,4 dated December 27, 1974 (superseded by EM178A dated May 1, 1979).

For motor power required for valve operation, a Kerite HI TEMP conductor insulation with asbestos fillers, nylon binder tape, neoprene treated tape, with fire-resistant'jacket reinforced with a cotton-sleeve cable is in use within containment.

For containment fan power, a Kerite HI TEMP conductor insu lation with overall fire-resistant jacket, reinforced by cotton-sleeve cable is in. use within containment.

The Kerite Company has attested to the ability of this cable supplied for H. B, Robinson to withstand the FSAR LOCA conditions of temperature, pressure and radiation. In addition, test qualification included forty- (40) year aging, borated spray and 100% relative humidity exposure to meet IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 383-1974 requirements. Referenced reports are:

FIRL Report F-C4020-2 dated March 1975.

Proprietary Engineering Memo No. 178 entitled, "Determining Temperature Ratings of Cables and Pre-aging Requirements for LOCA Simulation Tests" dated December 27, 1974 (superseded by EM 178A dated May 1, 1979 and EM 178B dated December 1, 1979).

To provide protection for cable termination at equipment end, when no formal termination method was provided, a silicone rubber tape was used. SCOTCH 70, high temperature silicone rubber tape, is used for safety-related terminations.

This product has undergone radiation testing by the manufacturer, Min esota Minin Manufacturing Company (3M) up to l.0xl0 RADs at 40 C temperature with no major degradation of performance.

A more comprehensive testing program to meet IEEE 323, 1974, requirements has been performed by Kerite Company utilizing SCOTCH 70 tape and Kerite Cable within LOCA testing chamber. Kerite has certified the use of SCOTCH 70, as detailed in Reference Number 50.

To assure tape qualification for H..

Robinson application, SCOTCH 70 tape will be used in conjunction with test control cables during qualification testing of the electrica penetrations PVC pigtail cable being performed at Wyle Laboratories. Results will be documented. and available after completion of PVC cable testing.

3.2.5 Cable Terminals and Splices As no qualification information could be obtained on the current in containment cable splices to the listed electrical equipment, it wasdecided to change out the splices with qualified components, prescribed tools and approved procedure.

This changeout was completed during the plant refueling outage (August -

October)-1980.

Individual conductor splices will utilize AMP Radiation Resistant/1500C Preinsulated Splices (#53548-1). T&B 2-way Cable.Connectors for Copper Cable, 500 MCI and T&B 2-way Cable Connectors for Copper Cable, #9 AWG. The splice/connector component will be crimped to the designated conductors using the manufacturer's specified crimping tool.,

An appropriate sized RAYCHEM SHRINK TUBING will be applied over the individual conductor cable splice and heat shrunk using the manufacturer's specified torch.

For the two- (2) and three- (3) conductor cables after the individual.conductors are spliced using AMP PlDG (53548-1)- splices, an overall jacket RAYCHEM SHRINK TUBING-will be applied and heat-shrunk.

The work described above has been detailed within H. B.

Robinson S.E.P. Modification and Setpoint Revision Form No. M-521 (revised) and will be the means to sign off the completed work.

Original splices specified as AMP-Nuclear Preinsulated Environmentall Sealed Splices (#52979) were found to be incompatible with the conductor insulation thickness of installed cable. Therefore, another butt-splice component, AMP Radiation resistant/1500C preinsulated splice (#53548-1). was ordered and installed. AMP Qualification Test Report 110-11002 dated October 1, 1978 describeg a program that included total radiation exposure of 2.0 x 10 RADs, maximum temperature of 350oF, maximum pressure of 137 PSIA and a borated chemical spray lasting four (4) days; To assure qualification of the H. B. Robinson in containment splices, cable undergoing testing at Wyle Laboratories will be connected with AMP PIDG terminals Raychem thermofit (heat shrink) tubing overall per the Installation Procedure M-521, Safety-Related Cable Splices Inside Containment. Appropriate matrix combinations of splice/cable and individual cables and splices will assure identification of any single component failure which could occur during qualification testing. Each

component has sufficient manufacturer-supplied test dIata to assure qualification by analytical means. The opportunity to obtain actual test results is available and will be used.

RAYCHEM Thermofit Insulation System (hea shrink tubing used to complete the replacement splice have been qualified per the H. B. Robinson acciden parameters. Franklin Institute Research Laboratories' Technical Report F-C4033-3 dated Jan uar 1975 describes a program that inc uded 40-year aging, total irradiation exposure of 2.1 x 10 RADS, maximum tem perature of 351 F, maximum pressure of; 85 PSIA and a borated spray in excess of nine days. The results of this documented test are acceptable to CP&L that the heat-shrink tubing to be used in changeover is fully1qulified.

3. 2.6 Solenoid Valves As reported in CP&L responses to NRC IE Bulletins 79-01 and 79-01B (45-day report), the listed solenoid valves in containment are to be replaced by qualified equipment. The in-place ASCO solenoid valves have not exhibited poor performance or required excessive maintenance. When manufactured and supplied, ASCO Company was not required to maintain the QC/QA procedures and programs necessary to allow traceability and certification needed for qualification.

The replacement valves are also ASCO Compady equipment Model Nos. NP831665E, NP8316E35E and 206-381-2U used singly or in combination to achieve their valving function.

These solenoid valve types were included in a qualification testing program to meet IEEE Standards :323, 344, and 382. Results of

'this testing are published in AUTOMATIC SWITCH COMPANY, Test Report No. AQS21678/TR, Revision A, entitled Qualification Tests.of Solenoid Valves by Environmental Exposure to Elevated Temperature, Radiation, Wear Aging, Seismic Simulation, Vibration Endurance, Accident Radiation and LOCA Simulation.

The.test parameters subjected the valves to. a maximum temperature of 346 F,. a maximum pressure of 125 PSIA a relative humidity of 100%, a borated spray du ing the LOCA simulation and a total radiation of 2.0 x 10 RADS. The test results are divided into' two '(2) parts--first the evaluation 'of the elastomers

'and coil materials and second the valve mechanisms and housing.

The elastomers and coil materials, as reported, are qualified for a 4.4 year life (includes a 10% margin figure).

The valve proper is qualified for a 40-year life..

This will require the coils and elastomers to be replaced on a scheduled basis to maintain the serviceability of the entire valve as well..as its qualification. The proposed'schedule is replacement of stated components'on a four- (4) year cycle.

Replacement will be performed during-the closest outage or refueling to that time period.

With the maintaining of the replacement component -scheduie, CP&L considers the ASCO solenoid valves fully qualified within H B. Robinson parameters and need do no further testing or qualifying 3.2.7 Level Switches As reported in CP&L's responses to NRC IE Bulletin 79-01 containment level switches (LS-1925A, LS-1925B) located within containment sump would be replaced with qualified equipment as the in-place equipment was never qualified. As supplied, the level switches are magnetic in operation and provided incremental one- (1) foot level data as water would rise in the sump.

This equipment could operate completely submerged.

A market search did not uncover any source of qualified equipment for replacement purposes. However, a parallel investigative effort by CP&L to meet the requirements of NRC NUREG 0578, TMI Short-Term Lessons Learned, ACRS2 Containment Water Level Indication, has concluded that there should be an analog level signal generated for combined sump and containment.water level to aid in reporting and mitigating TMI type accident conditions-if ever experienced.

The current incremental level switches, Madison Model 5602 Switch Units with Type 316 Stainless Steel Stem,.10 ft.- 6 inches long, with eight (8) 316 Stainless Steel Floats and one (1)

Dry Contact Switch at each level, wired with 22AWG conductors with Silicone Rubber.insulation, will remain-in place. The.

function of these switches will be assumed by the analog system. The schedule for completion of installation is January 1, 1981. CP&L will take no furtheraction on these level switches in conjunction with NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B.

3.2.-8 Motors Within containment at H B. Robinson included in the equipment list for the report is one (1) motor type. This is a Westinghouse Type 685.5-S used with the containment fans.

There are four (4) fans mounted in containment designated HVH-l through HVH-4.

Qualification testing on a complete motor/fan assembly and on individual motor elements has been performed by Westinghouse.

Results are published.within WCAP-9003, Fan-Cooler Motor Unit Test, 1969; WCAP-7829, Fan Cooler Motor Unit Test, 1972.

WCAP-9003,testing included:

thermal preaging to an equivalent of seven (7) years a maximum pressure of 95 psia, a maximum temperature of 315 F, and use of borated spray for thirty-five (35) hours. WCAP-7829 testing8 included:

total irradiation of equipment/components to 2 x 10 RADs, preaging to a 40-year life expectancy.

Evaluation of the te reports concludes that the H. B Robinson accident parameters are covered by the test eivelopes and parameters performed on the similar Westinghouse motdr/components subjected to qualification esting. Therefore, the containment fan motors at H. B. Robinson are considered qualified.

Outside of containment, the RHR pump motors are in use during long-term mitigation of LOCA conditions. The only accident parameters experienced by these p'umps/motors is radiation.

The most susceptible elements/components of the motors are covered by the testing reported within WCAP-7829. Since the RHR pump motors are of a similar type and motor windings are Thermalastic Epoxy insulated, it is concluded that the RHR pump motor is qualified for the'service intended and, the environment experienced during post LOCA.

Data supporting the Westinghouse testing reported within the stated WCAPs has been requested from Westinghouse and' will be available for review upon receipt.

OC ENVIRONMENTAL;CONDITIONS FOREQUIPMENT TESTING 35CEMPIERATURE VS,.TIME 300 286*F, Test Conditions, 264.7 OF HBR Conditions 250 219 F 200 4 15C 0

rtl 10se1hour.10 000'sees.

1 'day TIME

C144 la 04 so, 9.4 Z-

0.

00 41

V4 0

Ia '

444 00

>U

.f.4

-to C) 0 Amnmn 7

-CONTAINMENT PRESSURE vs. TIME Fgr Fiue

4 0 Conclusions The electrical equipment listed within the H. B Robinson emergency safeguard systems and associated p ant system instrumentation (Reference Section 2.0) were evaluated by equipment groups (Reference Section 3.2) and are summarized as follows:

4.1 Electrical Penetrations Containment Sleeve Sections -

qualified by individual manu facturer' s test reports and similar type qualification testing.

Additional action required None.

Conductor Pigtails (Kerite Co')

penetrations having Kerite insulated pigtail cables are considered qualified by manu facturer's testing program and reports (Paragraph 3.1, Reference 49)

Additional action required -

None.

Conductor Pigtails (Continental Wire and Cable Co.) penetrations having PVC, conductor and jacket, insulated pigtail cables are considered nonqualified.

Additional action required -

Separate qualification testing program has been initiated and contracted with Wyle Laboratories Huntsville, Alabama. Results will determine whether any further action is required. When obtained, they will be relayed to the NRC. Analysis of operating time radiation exposure concludes that the plant can continue operation until testing is completed and reviewed (LER submitted).. Current schedule calls for the test program to be completed by May, 1981 (35-week test program).

Electrical Connectors,- considered qualified by analysis of materials.

Additional action required -

None.

4.2 Electronic Transmitters Replacement of in-containment transmitters identified within this report has been performed within the 1980 refueling outage.(August - October, 1980).

At this time, no fully qualified transmitter is available for nuclear plant in containment operation. Rosemount 1153A transmitters, qualified to IEEE 323-1971 version, were used as replacements.

Additional action required -.A program of periodic transmitter housing 0-ring replacement (performed during yearly instrument calibration check) will.provide boron spray protection capability if an accident ever occurs.

(See Pargaraph 3.2.2.)

To; assure

operational capability, a ten- (10) year transmitter replacement schedule has been adopted, to be modified when Rosemount can certify, by test, longer life equipment is available.

4.3 Motor-Operated Valves The Limitorque motor operators listed are considered qualified by similar type testing as reported within qualification reports available from Westinghouse and Limitorque.

Additional required.- None.

4Electrical Cable The identified silicone rubber insulated cables and the Kerite insulated cables are considered qualified by similar type testing as reported within qualification reports.available from the manufacturers.

Additional action required -

None.

(Inspection held in containment August 18, 1980 through August 22, 1980 concluded no PVC'field cable in use to the identified instrumentation and switches.)

.5 Cable Terminals and Splices Replacement of in-containment terminals and splices identified within Plant Procedure M-521-1 has been performed during the refueling.outage (August - October, 1980)

Additional action required -

The splice procedure and materials are being tested during the qualification testing of the pene tration pigtail cables at Wyle Laboratories to assure compatibility of materials and to assure the procedure provides proper LOCA protection for splices. The overall heat-shrink tubing is qualified per IEEE 323-1974 by manufacturer's test.

4.6 Solenoid Valves Replacement of in-containment solenoid valves identified within this report has been performed during the 1980 refueling outage CAugust - October, 1980).

The ASCO valves specified, as replacements are considered qualified by similar type testing performed by the manufacturer and reported within available qualification reports (Paragraph 3.1, Reference 47),

Additional action required -

Noted in the manufacturer's report is a certified life of 4.4 years for the coil and elastomers within these solenoid valves. These elements will be replaced on a four- (.4). year cycle to maintain complete operational capability.

4.7 Level Switches Original plans for replcement of the nonqualfied containment sump level switches with qualified equipment is no longer considered necessary. The function of level determination is being assumed by: a dual analog system provided in the TMI Short-Term Lessons Learned Program (Equipment will be GEMS Level Sensor - Transmitter XM36496, XM36495 and Receiver RE36562.)

The existing system will be left in place. Check of E.I.-1 procedure, Incident Involving Reactor Coolant System Depressuri zation, does not reference use of this equipment; therefore, no changes are required in this procedure when switchover is accomplished.

Additional action required None.

4.8 Motors The Westinghouse motors listed are considered qualified by similar type testing and component testing as reported within qualification reports and documents available from Westinghouse.

Additonal action required None.

Where required, the plant will assure a periodic maintenance program to inspect as well as replace stated elements and components. In addition, maintenance will be performed in a manner to assure equipment is returned to operation in its qualified configuration and installation.

5.0 Report Quality Assurance Basic information for NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B was initially accummulated in response to NRC IE Bulletin 79-01, issued February 8, 1979. System Flow Diagrams were reviewed and Class IE electrical equipmentwas listed. A compiled "Q" list

.for H. B. Robinson was also reviewed to supplement the basic list. Westinghouse Instruction Book of Control and Protection Instrumentation System -

Volume I -

entitled "System Description and Installation'" was used to confirm each item and complete the list.

To assure the list was current, a review of plant modifications and "as-built" drawings was performed at the plant site.

Also, at the site, an inspection was undertaken to obtain nameplate data of listed electrical equipment -

inside and outside of containment -for use in identifying manufacturer, model number and, where practicable, serial numbers. To complete the in-containment Class IE system s loops, a study was performed to identify the electrical penetration, by canister and pin number, associated with'control of, and power for, listed equipment. Utilized were Control Wiring Diagrams (B190628) and Cable Penetration Schedules (B-190670) to 'establish a list of field cables and electrical penetrations associated with Class IE electrical equipment.

Next, a search of plant documentation was made to retrieve Purchase Orders, Specifications, Quality Compliance Reports, and correspondence related to the listed electrical equipment.

The retrieved documents were reviewed to determine the level of testing originally performed and qualification data available to determine qualification level against FSAR parameters and requirements.

The data collected above was formulated to respond to NRC IE Bulletin 79-01. CP&Ls submittal letter (June 12, 1979) identified components which were to be replaced because of:

operational choice, lack of qualification data, need for further review to determine qualification disposition.

Upon receipt of NRC IE Bulletin 79-018, dated January 14, 1980, CP&L organized to. use the 79-01 data as.a base and add the supplemental data required--all within the formats.designated within the bulletin. After attending the NRC Region II Meeting held in Atlanta January 31, 1980 to clarify response to the bulletin, CP&L assigned personnel and resources to meet the 45-day and 90-day report requirements as clarified. The 45 day report essentially reformatted the 79-01 response within the designated 79-01B forms and compared qualification data accummulated under 79-01 with the requirements of the FSAR.

Differences, if any, were noted and plans for any additional qualification testing or researching were formulated. For the report, greater emphasis was placed on effects of High Energy Line Breaks outside of containment. Westinghouse's Postulated Pipe

Failure Analysis Outside of Containment Report, November 9 1973, was reviewed and it was determined that the LOCA environmental conditions would still provide the limiting environmental parameters.

As concluded in' the report and H. B. Robinson Modification and Setpoint Revision 212, MSLB shielding of vulnerable transmitters (Steam Line Pressure Transmitters PT 474, 475, 476, PT 484, 485, 486, PT 494, 495, 496) was installed and verified. Due to "open-air" turbine deck construction, any external MSLB event will not result in area elevated temperature or pressures--minimizing any environmental effects on detection, or mitigation, electrical equipment.

CP&L's 45-day response to IE Bulletin.79-01B was transmitted to'the NRC on March 10, 1980. In'its. conclusions, commitments on changeout of:

safety-class transmitters in containment, designated solenoid 'valves in containment, and safety-class penetration splices in containment were again stated. Also included was, coditment for changeouts to occur during the next refueling outage at HER. Two items wereidentified 'as requiring further qualification investigation., They were penetration connectors and Limitorque operator motor brakes.

During the development of the 45-day report, ground work for the 90-day report was established and initial activity. to add the necessary material and data began. Initiated was the contact of original vendors--as identified by purchase orders to collect qualification data, past or current, that related to the listed safety-class equipment. Requested were specific reports with supportive test data and/or partial data which could be additively useful in determination of guidelines established qualification. The NSSS supplier, Westinghouse, as well as "turnkey" contractor, was requested to supply qualification data in support of its FSAR statements on specific safety-class 'electrical equipment.. Current Westinghouse test data (WCAP topical reports) related to installed electrical equipment were reviewed for applicability and negotiations were started to purchase recent supportive data.

To aid in qualifying, H. B. Robinson Unit 2 listed components, many of which were built and installed prior to the Standards, Regulatory Guides and Codes related to qualification;' the Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class IE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors (part of NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B) were utilized to establish radiation and aging parameters. Rather than use the generalized values stated in the HBR FSAR, individual.caiculations were made for each item presented in the 90-day report exposed to the harsh accident environment or used in accident mitigation. Appendix B, Procedures For Evaluating Gamma Radiation Service Conditions, of the DOR Guidelines was used as source material and calculations derived are included. in this report as.Appendix A. Utilization

of this data is described in Paragraph 1.3.2 r aging onsiderations, material identification within components was made and data extracted from either DOR Gu idelines supplied charts or related charts compiled by other research laboratories.

(Reference Paragraph 1.3.3, Aging) Appendix C Thermal and Radiation Aging Degradation of Selected Materials of the DOR Guidelines was the basic source of information.

Additional sources were researched and utilized when more definitive data was needed to cover variations of materials.

Example -

Diallyl Phaphlate radiation resistance increases with added fillers, either glass, orlon, asbestos, etc.

Appendix C of this report expanded the data needed to cover the H. B'. Robinson connector insert material and provide qualification.

Qualification was established in four ways.

One, vendor supplied test reports completely responsive to H. B. Robinson parameters and formatted to IEEE 323, 1974 Standard, General Guide for Qualifying Class I Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. A majority of the.stated replacement components were qualified in this manner.

Two, vendor supplied reports responsive to H. B. Robinson parameters, formatted to IEEE 323, Standard 1971 version, and analyzed to meet radiation and aging requirements. Replacement transmitters were quali fied in this manner.,Three, identified Westinghouse WCAE documents either containing detailed test reports or backup data within.Westinghouse possession. Motor operators, external to containment transmitters, and RTDs were qualified in this manner. Fourth, vendor test data, specification information and users' test reports formed a base for analytical comparison with H. B. Robinson parameters and use of DOR Guidelines to analyze material acceptability to provide acceptable equipment qualification.

Electrical penetrations and cable were qualified in this manner.

Though not formally requested by IE Bulletin 79-01B, an additional paragraph, 3.2, Electrical Equipment Evaluation, was added to the 90-day response to aid in presenting qualification conclusions.

These are genus oriented and not on a plant identification number basis.

Additionally required was a flood level established in containment for the LOCA accident. Each contributive tankage and water source was identified from reports, drawings and specifications and.the volumes added together to determine the total amount of water available in containment. A previously reported.RCP seal leak at HBR established the 120,000 gallon-per-foot-in containment figure, as.well as the volumetric configuration of the sump and containment floor.

(Reference Appendix B) With

the calculated flood level (3.2 ft each electrical equipment location (height) was compared to this figur e. Location was determined by height measurement above the containment floor containmeng aint known ement inov the vcnt hs of accessible equipment and by estimation of height within containment against known equipment tr the.vicinity

.whose location height is identified on drawings. Height of electrical equipment close to flood level was measured exactly to assure on equipment submergence are accurate. Where achieveabie, replacement transmitters were installed in a manner to obtain greatest height above the base floor to prevent submergence of electronic compartment sections of the instruments. Review of operational requirements concluded there was no need to reposition the, pressurizer water level alarm instrumentation to avoid:submergence as it was, not required for accident mitigation. Additionally, a time factor will be involved as the flood height will not be realized immediately.

To assure conformity of listed equipment to mounting drawings and procedures, an in-containment inspection was performed.

Conduit and condulets were checked for cracks, separations, and improper terminations. Electrical tape was checked for complete coverage, neat application and correct type use.

Field cable to listed electrical equipment was verified to be other than PVC jacketed. Nameplate information was collected from equipment added to the master list and verified for.the already listed equipment. Cable used as pigtails for.select electrical penetrations was confirmed as being PVC jacketed.

Upon confirmation, contact was made with Wyle Laboratories o perform a LOCA qualification test on the PVC pigtail cable using calculated radiation-levels presented in Table 1.3.3. A test program is underway. Completion date is still uncertain as material identification by the manufacturer is needed to establish energization levels to determine base time and temperature to achieve Arrhenius-Curve aging. Lowest temperature per generic material results in a thirty-five week program.

To maximize use of the test program, it was arranged to include cable splices, per installation procedure, and termination tape in the test chamber so that direct qualification data can be obtained on H. B. Robinson application. A developed installation matrix will assure if any failure occurs, it can be attributed to the faulty item.

Two submittals were made to the NRC relaying information.

required for the 90-day response to IE Bulletin 79-01B.

Initial transmittal of July 7, 1980 was supplemented on August 29, 1980 to provide data not available at the first submittal and to add typographical or information-correction.

During the week of August 25-29, 1980, an NRC on-site inspection was he ld at H. B. Robinson to verify designated equipment status and to review CP&Ls 45-and 90-day responses to E Bulletin 79-01B. In-containment inspection indicated no items of noncompliance and observed techniques and reviewed procedures used for changeouts being performed.

An NRC report covering this inspection (RII:NW50-261/80-20) dated September 30, 1980 relayed the no items of noncompliance information as well as the request for added clarification of selected material within CP&L's 90-day response. These clarifications required additional use of Appendix C of the DOR Guidelines and selected use of data found in NUREG 0588, Appendix D Sample Calculation and Type. Methodology for Radiation Qualification Dose, to aid in determination of effect of radiation levels in containment sump water on electrical equipment close to the flood level.

The added clarification material has altered a portion of the originally subwitted 90-day response material. To aid in identifying the added and altered portions, a R2 marking has been made to the affected pages...A total report document is being made to meet the November 1, 1980 requirement date for IE Bulletin 79-01B information submittal.

APPENDIX A Calculations per Appendix B of IE Bulletin 79701B to Determine Total Anticipated Radiation

VOLUMETRIC CALCULATIONS FOR EQUIPMENT COMPARTMENT Step 1:

Reactor Power Level 2300 MWgh Containment Volume = 2.1 x 10 f t.

30-day dose 1.4 x 10 RADS Step 2:

36" Wall (Concrete Shielding) 3 Dose 1.5 x 10 RADS Step 3:

5 3

Compartment Volume= 2.8 x 10 ft.

Correction Factor 0.45 0.45(1.4 x-10

+ 1.5x 6.3015

a.

o6 6.3 x 106 RADS (30-day dose)

Step 4:

1/2 hour Correction Factor = 0.09 0.09(6.3 x 06 7 x 15 S

hour Correction Factor = 0.15 0.15(6.3 x 10

= 9.5 x 10 RADS 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Correction Factor 0.55 0.55(6.3 x 10 )

3.5 x 106 RADS Time (hrs.)

Dose (RADS)

Dose + 10% Margin (RADS) 1/2 5.7 x 105 1

9.5 x 105

.0 x 10 24 3.5 x 106 3.8 x 106

VOLUMETRIC CALCULATIONS FOR OPERATING FLOOR COMPARTMENT Step' 1:'

Reactor Power Level -2300 MW h 3

Containment Volume 2.1 x 10 ft.

30-day dose = 1.4 x 10 RADS Step 2:

Not Applicable Step 3:

Compartment Volume'

1. 6 x 10 ft. 3 Correction Factor = 0.80 7

0.08(1.4 x 10 )

1.12 x 107 RADS (30-day dose)

Step 4:

1/'hurC~'e7

6.

1/ hour Correction Factor,= 0.09 0.09(1.12 x 10-)

1.0 x 10 RA S 7

6 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months orrection Factor 0.28 0.28(1.12 x.10 0RD Time (hrs.)

Dose (RADS)

Dose'+ 10% Margin (RADS) 6 1/2 1.O 10 3

3.1 x 106 3.4 x 106

CONTAINM ENT VOLUME (fz)

-2.1X/0s 2 x 30 DAY INTEG RA7D 4 x.10 6

rDOSE 2300 20007 3

0 5

xi 11-000 500 2

10~

2000 2x1 liO os.

xS 155 3107

.5 x W 2.0 x 1O

'T'LE CCI 0

DOSE CORRECTION FACTOR FOR CONCREE SH ELDNG 7 ONLY) 1 X 107

1 5.X 04 C

0~

SI1 I

I CZ10 1.4 X10 7

DOS CORCTiON FACTOR FOR COMPARTMTO 10

.444 1 0

1.0

.55 o.28

.14 0j 01 1W1L 1L1 1 I

I 1

)

1.0 3

10 100 1000 TIME RIEQUIRlED TO REMAIN FUNCTIONAL (11RSI

APPENDIX B Calculations per Appendix II to H.B. Robinson 10th Semi-Annual Operating Report to Determine Submergence Depth

APPEND II to 10th SEMI-ANNUAL OPERATING REPCRT REACTOR COOLINT PUMP OUTAGE 1

Calculation 1 Calculating the etted Volume of the Containment Vessel V

- Wetted volume of the containment vessel

- Volume of containment sump AL

- Containment floor area at 228'level outside the polar crane wall A

- Containment floor area at 2281level inside the polar crane wall H

-Height of water above the 228 1level (1'4 1.04 ft.)

V V (A

FA)H cw s

1 Vs can be approximated as the volume of a cylinder, V1 minus the volumes of a cylinder, V and a hemisphere (the reactor vessel), V plus the volumes of two rectangular prisms, V V5 17

Vs 1

3 V1 Ir;2

=V*

2 3.14 (7.5) 27

28(10)(15) 33 4771 ft 4200 ft 3 h

1 w.h V2 5

26

= 3.14 (7) 6 14(10) (12) 924 ft 1680 ft 4

718 ft3 V

4771 -(924+

718) +4200 + 1680

= 9009 ft V

9009 f.t x 7.48 gal/ft Cs 67,390 gallons A can'be approximated by subtracting the area included in the polar crane wall from the cross sectional area of the containment vessel 2

2 2

3.14(65)2 3.14(48)2 6034 ft 2 18

Calculation 2 Calculating the quantity of Water Removed From the Containment Vessel Trucked Off-Site 217,900 gal Eptied into A CVCS 49,000 gal Holdup Tank (0% to 96%)

Eptied into Refueling 54,500 gal Water Storage Tank (67% to 83%)

Eptied to Waste.

1,600gal Holdup Tank (39.5% to 45%

Total Water Removed From Containment 133,000 gallons Calculation 3 Calculating the quantity of Water Eptied Into the Containment Vessel From the Refueling Water 86,000 gal Storage Tank (92% to 67%)

318,000 gal

-232,000 aal 86,000 gallons From the Boric Acid Blender 23,238 gal 21,986 gal primary water

+ 1,252 gal boric acid 23, 238 gallons From the Reactor Coolant System 19,762 gal Operating Level Compensated-to 200 F=48,186 gal Drain Down Level at 200 o-28,424 Amount spilled onto floor 19,762 gal Total Quantity Spilled 129,000 gallons 129,000 gallons 1.06 ft 121,698 gal/ft 1 ft 120,000 gallons 20

A can be approximated as half of the area between the missile shield and 2

the inside of the polar crane wall.

'A (area at228' level)

/2 A ~

~

r)rr 2

r 3 23 U 3.14(45

-3.14(0

)

S 2

= 2671 ft V

V + (A + A Hw cv 2

= 9009 ft 3 + (6034 + 2671) 1.04 ft) 18062 ft 3 V

= 18062 It3 ; x 7.48 gal/ft 3 cv

=135105 gallons 19

14 t*~~~~.

U1 j43~.

r

-I_

.jtI r-a

~

IIV i-V 1-L..I I

&-.A vo

.1 jt*-

3AL.

1

,~i..

a

.~

t.!:

4

~9:

a- ~*

~

iLLb

-7~..

TW 'I t'@

-,~

If.~

I..ap 13 Yib

-YE.L. ASOVE0 A

F* R

'KO I N L

LIVI F'

..L F.L 229'~~

4V_____

A1 OO

L2.S Fir u~--

APPENDIX C Extracted Information Related To Radiation Exposure of Diallyl Phthalate'

1. Report No.

2. Government Accession No.

3. Recipient's Catalog No.

NASA CR-17871

4. Title and Subtitle

5. Report Date

-RADIATION EFFECTS DESIGN HANDBOOK July 1971 SECTION 3.

ELECTRICAL INSULATING MATERIALS AND

6. Performing Organization Code CAPACITORS

7. Author(s)

S. Performing Organization Report No.

C. L. Hanks and D. 1. Hamman

10. Work Unit No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address RADIA'ION EFFECTS INFORMATION CENTER

11.

Te CoGened Memril nsitte11.

Contract or Grant No.

Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus LaboratoriesN Columbus, Ohio 43201

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address.

Contractor Report National Aeronautics and Space Administration

14. Sponsoring AgencyCode Washington, D.C.

20546

15. Supplementary Notes

16. Abstract This document contains summarized information relating to steady-state.

radistion effects on electrical insulating materials and capacitors..

The infor mation is presented in both tabular and graphical form with text discussion.

The radiation considered includes neutrons, gamma rays, and charged particles.

The information is useful to design engineers responsible for choosing candidate materials or. devices for use in a radiation environment.

I 17 Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)

18. Distribution Statement Radiation Effects, Electrical Insulators, Unclassified-Unlimited, Capacitors, Radiation Damage

9. Security Cassif.

(of this report)

20. Security Classif. (of this pagel.

21 No. of Pages

22. Price Unc lassi fied Uncla ssified 88

$53.00 For sale by the National Techniczl Information Service, Springfield. Virginia 22151 h.-

material experiences threshold damage at a dose of 8.6 x 105 rads (C) and 25 percent damage at 4.7 x 106 rads (C).

These doses are based upon losses in.

ultimate elongation and impact strength. Another property of poly amide that deteriorates from radiation exposure is stiffness in flexure which has increased between 52 and 181 percent, depending upon the nylon type, after exposure to an electron dose of 5.8 x 1016 e/cm 2 (E =1.0 MeV) at 60 C(11) This same expostire improved the tensile strength by 49 to 107 percent.

These results agree with other radiation studies which have shown increases in tensile strength of 25 percent for doses over 109.

rads (C).

Information on the effects of radiation on the electrical properties of polyamide is limited to results of the electron irradiation mentioned above.

Exposure to this radiation environment produced an increase of approxi mately one order of magnitude in the insulation resistance and a decrease of less than an order of magnitude for the' dissipation factor. :A decrease in dielectric constant was insignificant at 1 MHz and varied between 5 aid 32 percent at I KHz, depending on the polyamide type.

Diallyl Phthalate Diallylphthalate with various fillers such as glass or Orlon has shown exceptional radiation tolerance for a plastic insulating material.

Little or no permanent' degradation of physical or electrical properties have been observed with radiation exposures to doses of between 108 and 1010 rads (C). Thnsignificant changes are observed in the hardness and flexibility of this material when irradiated to these total doses.

The ultimate elonga tion and tensile strength of Orion-filled diallyl phthalate actually increased or improved with exposure to an electron dose of 5.8 x 1016 e/cm2 (E = 1. 0 MeV) at 60 C.

The electrical properties of diallylphthalate such as dielectric con stant, dissipation factor,' and insulation resistanceare affected by exposure to a radiation environment such as described above.

The amount of degra dation or change in these parameters because of this exposure is of little practical significance.

Permanent changes in.dielectric constant were less than 6 percent while the dissipation factor recovered to below the initial value. Increases in iAsulation resistance during exposure are fol lowed by complete recovery within approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after the irradi ation is terminated.

21

Damage Utility of Organic Incipient to mild Nearly always usable Mild to moderate

'Often satisfactory Moderate ao Severe.

Limited use Phenolic, glass'laminate Phenolic, asbestos filled Phenolic, unfilled Epoxy, aromotic-type curing agent Polyurethane Polyester, glass filled Polyester, mineral filled Diallyl PhtholatIe, mineral filled.,

Polyester, unfilled Mylar Silicone, glass filled silicone, mineral filled....

SilIicode, unfilled&

Melomine-formeldehyde Urea-formaldehyde Aniline -formaldehyde Polystoyrene Acryloitrile/buta~diene/styrene (ABS)

Polyimide Polyvinyl 'chloride Polyethylene Polyvinyl formal Polyvinylidene chloride....

Polycorbonate Kel-.F.Poly trifluorochloroethyleneI Polyvinyl butyrol Cellulose acetateI Polymeth Imrnethacrylrte Polyam Vinyl chloridetacetate

.Teflon (TFE) 771M3 Teflon (FEN)

Natural rubber Styrene-butodielne (S_

__R)_

Neoprene rubber Silicone rubber Polyprop lene Polyvny idene luoride Kynar 400)

O0 10 0

0 08 0

10 Gamma Dose, rods(C 0

10 i1 i15 101 101 10 0o1 Neutron Fluence, n/cm2E>0.1 Me (a) Approx mate fluence (I rd(C) 4x10a n/cm )

FIGURE 3. RE LA TIVE RADIATION RESISTANCE OF ORGANIC INSULATING M ATEIALS BASED UPON CHANGES~

IN PHYSICAL PROPERTIES, I

Siioe7ufle

ML14174A744

Text

Dear Mr. Moseley:

4.0 CONCLUSION

28(10)(15) 33 4771 ft 4200 ft 3 h

Navigation menu

Search