ML12194A512
| ML12194A512 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/2012 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Progress Energy Co |
| References | |
| 50-400/12-301 | |
| Download: ML12194A512 (213) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 05000400/2012301 Examiners: Operators: SRO: RO: BOP: Initial Conditions: IC-27, MOL, 4% power
. Plant startup to full power on HOLD
- A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan under clearance for motor replacement
- PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13 is SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage
- GP-005, Power Operation, step 95, MODE 2 Turnover:
. Power ascension is on hold for the next 12 hours due to steam generator chemistry limits exceeding the 5% power chemistry hold point requirements.
- Start the standby Cooling Tower Makeup Pump for vibration checks and secure the running Cooling Tower Makeup Pump.
Critical Tasks:
. Manually actuate Safety Injection prior to an automatic SI actuation signal from low Pressurizer pressure (1850 psig)
. Isolate the C SG prior to commencing max rate cooldown
. Isolate the A SG prior to commencing max rate cooldown Event No. Malt. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N/A N BOP/SRO Start the Standby Cooling Tower Makeup (CTMU) Pump and secure the running CTMU pump 2 RCS1O C RO/SRO Reactor Vessel Flange Leak 3 JFB7579 C-BOP/SRO AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip with back up auto start Z2715T1C TS SRO
- failure (C RCP cooling fan) 4 TT:144 I RO/SRO Letdown Temperature Controller fails LD/Diversion Valve fails to JTB143B bypass demineralizers 5 LT:496 C BOP/SRO Controlling C Steam Generator Level Transmitter, LT-496, fails low TS SRO 6 RCSO9C C RO/SRO RCP C rising vibration requires pump trip TS SRO 7 LT:495 Leachngto Second SG C Level Transmitter fails low causing Reactor Trip w/o SI 8 SGNO5C M ALL SG C SGTR on entry to EPP-004 9 JPB445D C RO/SRO JPB446D A and 8 SI Train failure to actuate Automatically (SI manual actuation Switch 1 is not available) xci i036 10 DSGO4A C BOP/SRO
- B Sequencer skips load block 3 starting of B ESW ii SGNO5A C BOP SG A SGTR prior to initiation of RCS cooldown (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 1 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 1
SUMMARY
The A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan is under clearance for motor replacement. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage. Radiation monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB has failed low and thunderstorms are in the area. Power ascension is on hold for the next 12 hours due to SG chemistry limits exceeding the 5% power chemistry hold point requirements. Crew directions are to hold present Primary plant conditions until the chemistry limits are satisfied. Reactor Engineering is developing a Reactivity plan for the 12 hour chemistry hold. Maintain current plant conditions with Reactor Power 3-4%. Event 1: Upon taking the shift the crew will start the standby Cooling Tower Makeup pump lAW OP-141 section 8.2, complete the valve alignment and secure the running pump. Event 2: Reactor Vessel Flange leak of 5 gpm. Annunciator ALB-10-5-5, Reactor vessel flange leakoff high temp will alarm when MCB temperature indicator TI-401 reaches 140°F (approximately 1 minute after leak starts). The crew may also notice Pressurizer level slowly decreasing or an increase in Charging flow. Responding to the annunciator will direct the operator to shut 1 RC-46, Head Flange Seal leakoff Line Isolation to stop leakage from the inner Reactor head seal. With the condition clear the crew may not enter AOP-01 6. If AOP-01 6 were entered, the actions for AOP-01 6 are included for the response. The SRO should evaluate the following Tech Spec for the time the leak exceeded 10 9pm: T.S. 3.4.6.2: Reactor Coolant System operational leakage shall be limited to:
- d. 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System (Modes 1,2,3, and 4)
Action:
- b. With any Reactor Coolant System operational leakage greater than anyone of the above limits, excluding primary-to-secondary leakage, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
Event 3: Trip of AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan with back up auto start failure. The failure will cause annunciator ALB-029 4-5 Containment Fan Coolers AH-39 Low Flow-O/L to alarm. The crew should identify that the standby fan did not auto start and start the standby fan. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 2 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 1
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 4: Letdown Temperature Controller failure. This failure will cause temperature controller TK-144 output to decrease to zero. Without cooling to the letdown heat exchanger, temperatures observed on TI-i 43 will increase. At 135°F annunciator ALB 07-3-2, Demin Flow Diversion High Temp will alarm. The crew should respond lAW the alarm procedure. The RO should identify that the divert valve to the VCT has failed to respond. The RO should report the failure to the SRO. The SRO should direct manually bypassing the CVCS Demineralizers, and should also provide directions to the RO to restore letdown temperature to normal utilizing MANUAL control of TK-i44. The SRO should provide a temperature band to the RO lAW OMM-001, Conduct of Operations, for operation of components in manual. The SRO can find this temperature band guidance in OP-107. With TK-144 controller not in auto the temperature band should be from 110 120°F. The CVCS Demineralizers will remain bypassed pending an evaluation for continued resin use. Event 5: Controlling Steam Generator Level Channel on SG C, LT-496, failing low. The BOP should respond to multiple C Steam Generator alarms on ALB-014 and take manual control of the C FRV Bypass valve in accordance with the alarm response procedures and 0MM-aOl, Conduct of Operations. The SRO should evaluate the following Tech Specs for failure of LT-496: T.S. 3.3.1: As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE Total No. Channels Minimum Functional Unit of Channels Channels Mode Action 13 Steam Generator Water 3/stm. gen. 2lstm. gen. in 2/stm. gen. each 1,2 6 Level - - Low-low any operating operating stm. gen. stm. gen.
- 14. Steam Generator Water Level -Low
- 2 stm. gen. 1 stm. gen. 1 stm. gen. level 1, 2 6 Coincident With Steam! level and level coincident and 2 stm./feed Feedwater Flow Mismatch 2 stm./feed- with 1 water tlow water tlow stmifeedwater mismatch in same mismatch in flow mismatch in stm. gen. or 2 each stm. gen. same stm. gen. stm. gen. level and 1 stm/feedwater flow mismatch in same stm. gen.
ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1 .1 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 3 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 T.S. 3.3.2: The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4. Total No. Channels Minimum Functional Unit of Channels aflin Channels Mode Action
- 5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation
- b. Steam Generator Water 4/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. 3/stm. gen. 1,2 19 Level - - High-High (P-14) in any stm. gen. in each stm. gen.
- 6. Auxiliary Feedwater
- c. Steam Generator Water Level - - Low-Low
- 1) Start Motor 3/atm. gen. 2lstm. gen. 2lstm. gen. 1,2,3 19 in any stm. in each stm.
Driven Pumps gen. gen. 3/stm.gen. 2/stm.gen. 2/stm.gen. 1,2,3 19
- 2) Start Turbine in any stm. gen. in each atm. gen.
Driven Pump Action 19 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up t o 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.
The OWP is not required to be implemented in order to continue with the scenario. If the crew allows SG levels to decrease to < 30% they will be required to perform a manual Reactor Trip. Event 6: RCP C vibration will begin to increase. The crew will respond to ALB-01 0-3-5, RCP-C Trouble and identify the C RCP vibration probe readings are increasing and in alarm. The crew should enter AOP-01 8, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions and perform the immediate actions. Vibrations will continue to increase and exceed AOP-01 8 RCP trip criteria. Since power is <P-8, the crew should secure the C RCP without performing a manual Reactor trip. The SRO should evaluate the following Tech Spec for securing the C RCP: T.S. 3.4.1 .1: All Reactor Coolant loops must be in operation (Modes 1 and 2) ACTION: With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 4of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 1
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 7: Second SG C level transmftter failure low causes Reactor Trip. Crew will enter PATH-i perform the immediate actions then transition to EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response (Safety Injection will not be required at this time.) Event 8: Major SGTR. When the crew enters EOP-EPP-004, Reactor Trip Recovery, a 420 gpm SGTR on the C SG will be ramped in over a 2 minute period. The crew should identify decreasing Pressurizer level and pressure. They should identify that C SG level is increasing in an uncontrolled manner. Event 9: A and B SI Train failure to actuate automatically (SI manual actuation Switch 1 is also failed). The crew will soon be faced with RCS pressure reaching the ESFAS setpoint of < 1850 psig or determine that Pressurizer level cannot be maintained >5% (EPP-004 fold out criteria for SI activation). The automatic SI actuation relays are failed. When the crew attempts to manually actuate a Safety Injection using switch 1 (at the center console) it will not function requiring the crew to use the second switch for manual actuation. When SI is activated the crew will transition back to PATH-i. PATH-i action: The crew will stop feed flow by shutting the C SG isolation valves based on foldout criteria for Rupture SG AFW isolation. C SG level will be increasing in an uncontrolled manner or Narrow range level may have increased to >25%. When the crew reaches PATH-i step 13, stabilize and maintain temperature between 555°F and 559°F using Table 1, a second SG rupture will occur. The A SG rupture will be another 420 gpm break with a 2 minute ramp. This will allow the crew to reach step 16 and transition to PATH-2. Event 10: B Sequencer skips load block 3 starting of B ESW. During SI actuation the EDG sequencers will run. The B sequencer will skip loading the B ESW pump. The BOP should identify that the B ESW pump is not operating while monitoring the B Emergency Sequencer operation. The RO should NOT start the B ESW pump prior to the sequencer reaching manual load block 9. Before the crew starts the B ESW pump an autostart signal will be generated on low pressure and the pump will autostart. This autostart will cause multiple Service Water alarms. A follow-up question to the RO and SRO about what happened to the ESW system during the event may be warranted if the crew does not identify what happened during the event. Event ii: Second SGTR. When the crew transitions to PATH-2 the A SGTR will become apparent. The crew should identify the A SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner. Once identified PATH-2 foldout C for multiple tube rupture criteria has the CRS return to step 1. PATH-2 step 10 will require the crew to identify the lowest ruptured steam generator pressure to find the required target core exit temperature then initiate a rapid cooldown. The crew should identify the lowest ruptured SG pressure then initiate the cooldown. The scenario ends when the crew has determined the target temperature and has been reached and the plant is being stabilized (at step i2.c). Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 5 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Manually actuate Safety Injection prior to an automatic SI actuation signal from low Pressurizer pressure (1850 psig)
Pressurizer pressure and level will be lowering to where an automatic SI should occur at 1850 psig. The crew will have to respond to these conditions soon after implementing EPP-004. The crew should actuate a manual SI based on OPS NGGC-1 000 Section 9.2 Conservative Decision Making, Expectations #2: If degrading plant conditions are recognized in sufficient time, crews are expected to take manual actions prior to reaching the automatic setpoint for prescribed ESF and RPS actuations. The determination of whether to manually initiate an anticipated automatic action would include consideration of parameter trends and applicable plant parameter values approaching the setpoint. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is Pressurizer Pressure < 1850 psig without a Manual SI actuation.
- 2. Isolation of ruptured C Steam Generator feed water flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG, prior to commencing max rate cool down In this scenario the C Steam Generator is ruptured and must be isolated to minimize radiological releases and to maintain pressure in the ruptured steam generator greater than the pressure in at least one intact steam generator following cooldown of the RCS in subsequent steps. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is isolation must be completed prior to the crew opening the Steam dumps or SG PORVs to perform a max rate cool down.
- 3. Isolation of ruptured A Steam Generator feed water flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG, prior to commencing max rate cool down In this scenario the A steam generator also ruptures following actions to isolate the C steam generator and must be isolated to minimize radiological releases and to maintain pressure in the ruptured steam generator greater than the pressure in at least one intact steam generator following cooldown of the RCS in subsequent steps. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is isolation must be completed prior to the crew opening the Steam dumps or SG PORVs to perform a max rate cool down.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 6 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2012 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 1 Reset to IC-i 61 password sandwich Goto RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Post conditions for status board from lC-27 Mode 2 <5% Reactor power Startup on HOLD for briefing Provide a marked up copy of GP-005 Rev 70 through Step 95 Control Bank D at 97 steps RCS boron 1594 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON SG level maintained with A MFW pump and FW Reg Bypass Vlvs in Auto RCS temp 558.8°F, stable on Steam Dumps RCS temp band from step 52 is 555°F 561°F Main Turbine at 1800 rpm Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 for failure of MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB in OWP book Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Hang STAR placard on Rod Control In/Out Switch Hang STAR placard on Steam Dump controller M/A station Set CRT screen 3 to QP POAH Update the status board: PZR PORV 444B, TS 3.4.4, actions met block valve shut. Rad Monitor MSL C RM-O1MS-3593SB TS 3.3.6.a OOS at 0800 on 2-12-2012 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 7 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 Scenario #1 CAEP file I Description of 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Initial conditions were established from lC-27 Mode 2 <5% Reactor power Startup on HOLD for briefing GP-005 Rev 70 Step 95 10-27 initial conditions for status board information RCS boron 1594 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON SG level maintained with A MFW pump and FW Reg Bypass Vlvs in Auto RCS temp 558.8° F, stable on Steam Dumps RCS temp band from step 52 is 555°F 561°F - Main Turbine at 1800 rpm Simulator Setup Instructions PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage Hang Off-Normal placard on 1 RC-1 13, PORV Block valve Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan Hang STAR placard on Rod Control In/Out switch Hang STAR placard on Steam Dump controller M/A station
!Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 for failure of MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB in OWP book Hang restricted access signs on MOR entry swing gates I Set CRT screen 3 to QP POAH SCENARIO 1 CAEP PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage, PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT I Place CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan idi xb2i072 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS ilo xb20072g (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF ilo xb20072r (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF Rad Monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB failed low I Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 in OWP book Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 8 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 EVENTS !Event 1: Start the Standby Cooling Tower Makeup (CTMU) Pump and secure the running CTMU Pump Normal BOP/SRO !Event 2: Trigger 2 Reactor Vessel Flange Leak 5gpm, RO shuts 1 RC-46 Component RO / SRO Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 SRO Tech Spec SRO - imf rcsl0 (200:00:0000:00:00) 5 00:02:00 Event 3: AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip on low flow with back up auto start failure NOTE: This low flow trip will not be actuated for 15 seconds after the trigger is put in NOTE: This malfunction is deleted after the standby fan is manually started with conditional trigger 13 If the malfunction is not deleted the standby fan will trip on low flow in 15 seconds Component- BOP/SRO Tech Spec 3.6.1.5 SRO-imf jfb7579 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_SET, FAIL_R imf z2715t1c (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS !Event 4: Trigger 4 Letdown Temp Controller fails LOW & Divert valve fails to bypass demins Instrument RO / SRO imf tt:144 (400:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0 00:00:00 imf jtbl43b (400:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS lEvent 5: Trigger 5 SG C Level Channel LT-496 fails LOW, OWP-RP-06 Instrument BOP / SRO Tech Specs 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3.6 SRO-imf lt:496 (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0 00:00:30 !Event 6: Trigger 6- RCP C Rising vibration requires pump trip lAW AOP-018 Vibrations go to 30 mils with a 3 minute ramp Component RO / SRO Tech Spec 3.4.1.1 SRO imf rcso9c (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) 30.0 00:03:00
!Event 7: Trigger 7 Second SG C Level Channel LT-495 fails LOW, Reactor Trip imf It:495 (700:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0 00:00:00 !Event 8: Trigger 8 SG C SGTR on entry to EPP-004 Major-RO/BOP/SRO imf sgno5c (8 00:00:00 00:00:00) 420 00:02:00 0 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 9 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 !Event 9: Preloaded, no trigger A and B SI Train Auto failure to actuate (SI manual actuation switch 1 is not available) Tech Spec SRO imf JPB445D (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAILURE_TO_INIT imf JPB446D (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAILURE_TO_INIT idi xci 036 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS !Event 10: Preloaded, no trigger B Sequencer skips load block 3 for starting B ESW Component RO / SRO imf dsgo4a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 42 !Event ii: Trigger ii SG A SGTR while checking for RCS Temp control in PATH-i Component RO / SRO imf sgn05a (11 00:00:00 00:00:00) 420 00:02:00 0 Trigger 13 is a Conditional trigger that deletes the malfunction to prevent AH-39B tripping in 15 seconds trg 13 AH 39B start Trg= 13 dmf jfb7579 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 10 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N.Q Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 63 Event
Description:
Start CTMU Pump 1&2X Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator: announce: CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift. END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator: annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN. After the crew has taken the shift the BOP will place CTMU Lead Evaluator: pump 1&2X in service and secure CTMU Pump 1X. Before inserting the first failure wait for the CTMU pump alignment to be completed AND the BOP to return to the at Evaluator Note: the controls area. A copy of OP-141 Section 8.2 is on pages 50 and 51. SRO Directs BOP to place the standby CTMU Pump in service Obtains a copy of OP-141 Reviews Section 8.2, Placing the Standby CTMU Pump in Service
- Contacts Outside AO for Attachment 6 actions BOP o CTMU Pumps Seal Bearing PreLube Tank Filled to within normal range.
o Lube oil level on the upper bearing of the CTMU Pump 1&2X greater than 1/3 the height of the associated gauge glass. I printed out a copy of OP-141 and have the procedure in hand. Attachment 6 is complete. Communicator: CTMU Pumps Seal Bearing PreLube Tank is filled to normal range and the lube oil level on the upper bearing of the CTMU Pump 1&2X is filled to >2/3 full. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 11 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: JiEQ Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 63 Event
Description:
Start CTMU Pump 1&2X Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Informs AO that they are about to start CTMU Pump 1&2X and to observe the actions of Section 8.2.2 step 2 (page 25)
. 3MP-36 Prelubricating Water Supply valve 1&2X opens and Seal and Lube Pump 1 &2X starts.
BOP
. CTMU Pump 1 &2X starts after sufficient seal water flow has been provided for 60 seconds.
. 3MP-38 Lube Water Supply Valve 1&2X opens and 3MP-36 Prelubricating Water Supply 1 &2X shuts.
Communicator: Acknowledge directions CTMU Panel alarms: Transient Annunciators CTMP-1-1 CHAN A CLG TWR MU BYP FLOW LO / HI associated with CTMU pump start: CTMP-2-1 CHAN B CLG TWR MU BYP FLOW LO / HI CTMP-3-3 CLG TWR MU PUMP 1 & 2 DISCH PRESS HIGH Makes plant PA announcement prior to starting the 1 &2X CTMU pump. BOP Takes MCB CTMU 1 &2X switch to START (starts the pump) Acknowledges transient annunciators I resets when clear Communicator: Report good start of CTMU Pump Directs AO to perform step 4 VENT the discharge pressure gauge (P1-1960 or P1-1961) for the pump just placed in service by UNCAPPING and CYCLING BOP open then shut the applicable valve: (valve not opened can be marked N/A)
- a. For P1-1961 (1&2X CTMU pump), 3MP-7-DV1
- b. Install the cap that was removed Acknowledge request and report back in 1 minute that Communicator:
step 4 is complete Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 12 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page i of 2 Event
Description:
Start CTMU Pump 1&2X Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior WHEN two pump operation is no longer desired, THEN PLACE CTMU Pump 1X control switch to STOP and observe the following: Stops CTMU Pump 1X and observes
- a. CTMU Pump 1X stops.
BOP b. Seal and Lube Pump 1X stops.
- c. Lube Water Supply Valve lx shuts (1 MP-28).
BOP may contact AO to ensure steps b and c have occurred. Seal and Lube Pump 1X has stopped. Communicator: Lube Water Supply Valve 1X (1MP-28) has shut. Checks that adjusting 1 MP-61, CTMU Level Control Valve or 1 MP-73, CTMU and CT Blowwdown Cross Tie Valve is not BOP needed. Directs AO to Lock 1 MP-73 then places CTMU Pump 1 X control switch to AUTO. Informs CRS and Contacts System Engineer. Communicator: 1 MP-73 is throttled and locked Contacts System Engineer the standby CTMU pump is SRO running When the BOP has completed the pump start, returns to the MCB at the controls area, informs the CRS that the 1&2X CTMU Pump is running and 1X is secured, continue with the scenario. Evaluator Cue: Cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 2: Event 2 Reactor Vessel Flange Leak. NOTE: The high temperature alarm will take 1 minute after inserting the trigger. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 13 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page IA of Event
Description:
Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 2: Simulator Operator: Reactor Vessel Flange Leak
. ALB-1O-5-5, Reactor Vessel Flange Leakoff High Temp Indications Available:
. Tl-401, Reactor Vessel Flange Leakoff Temp increasing Responding to the annunciator will direct the operator to shut 1RC-46, Head Flange Seal leakoff Line Isolation to Evaluator Note:
stop leakage from the inner Reactor head seal. With the condition clear the crew may not enter AOP-016. APP RO Responds to alarm and evaluates APP-ALB-O1O-5-5 ALB-O1O
. CONFIRM alarm using:
o Tl-401 o Reports TI-401 96 reading or trending high.
. VERIFY Automatic Functions: None PERFORM Corrective Actions:
o CHECK containment temperature trend for high containment temperature resulting from a nearby steam/RCS leak (NONE) o Shut 1 RC-46, Head Flange Seal Leakoff Line Isolation to stop leakage from inner Reactor head seal o Monitors Tl-401 indications and identifies temperature is decreasing RO Informs SRO Reactor Vessel Flange leakage is isolated
. Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist
. Contacts WCC to coordinate Containment entry per AP-545 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page l4of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jj Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 15 of 63 Event
Description:
Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any Tech Spec evaluation can be conducted with a follow Evaluator Note: up question after the scenario. Enters Reactor Coolant System TS 3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System operational leakage shall be limited to:
- d. 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System.
ACTION B. With any Reactor Coolant System operational leakage greater than anyone of the above SRO limits, excluding primary-to-secondary leakage, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 15 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fjQ Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page of 63 Event
Description:
Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following write up is if AOP-016 is used for the Evaluator Note: response to the Reactor Vessel Flange Leak. Identifies entry conditions met for AOP-01 6, Excessive Primary Crew Plant Leakage NOTE- AOP-016 contains NO Immediate Actions Enters AOP-016 AOP-016 SRO Makes a plant PA announcement for AOP entry CHECK RHR in operation (NO) CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability (YES) MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5% (YES) SRO CHECK Containment Ventilation monitors clear (YES) Radiation monitors normal (YES) Evacuate personnel from area (NO) NOTIFY Chemistry to stop any primary sampling activities BOP (Calls Chemistry) Communicator: Acknowledge request to stop primary sampling activities. PERFORM a qualitative RCS flow balance ESTIMATE leak rate considering the following parameters:
. PRZ level rate of change (55 gal/% at 683°F)
. Charging flow RO
- Total seal injection flow
- Letdown flow
- Total seal return flow (Estimate = 3-5 gpm flow to RCDT)
Operate Letdown as necessary to maintain Charging on scale (NO changes required) Determines it is not necessary to more accurately quantify SRO leakage_using_either OST-1 026 or OST-1 226 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page l6of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fj Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 17 of 63 Event
Description:
Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any Tech Spec evaluation can be conducted with a follow Evaluator Note: up question after the scenario. Enters Reactor Coolant System TS 3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System operational leakage shall be limited to:
- d. 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System.
ACTION B. With any Reactor Coolant System SRO operational leakage greater than anyone of the above limits, excluding primary-to-secondary leakage, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Leak location identified from MCB indications SRO
- From RV Flange BOP NOTIFY HP of reactor vessel flange leakage Communicator: Acknowledge RCs leakage is coming from reactor vessel flange.
Transitions to Attachment 6: Leakage From RV Flange
- Consult with Operation Management to determine leak isolation and recovery actions SRO Exit AOP-01 6 Contacts WCC to coordinate Containment entry per AP-545 Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist After Tech Spec is identified and a request for support has Evaluator Cue: been completed, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 3 Event 3 AH-39 Containment Fan trip Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 17 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page j of Event
Description:
AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip With back up auto start failure (C RCP cooling fan) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3: Simulator Operator: AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit Fan trip Indications Available . ALB-029-4-5 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-39 LOW FLOW O/L -
. Increasing C RCP stator winding temperatures BOP RESPONDS to alarms and ENTERS APP-ALB-029-4-5
- CONFIRM alarm using:
o AH-39 fans running indication (NO) o Damper position indication (YES)
. VERIFY Automatic Functions:
o Running fan trips (YES) o Backup fan starts (NO) (BOP starts the standby fan when BOP directed by SRO, may utilize OP-i 69 section 5.2) PERFORM Corrective Actions: o CHECK standby fan STARTS AND lead fan STOPS. o DISPATCH an operator to check status of the following breakers:
- iDi -1 A, AH-39 (iA-NNS) CNMT Fan Cooler
- iEi-7C, AH-39 (1B-NNS) CNMT Fan Cooler Directs BOP to start standby Air Handler (this may take place SRO prior to getting the report of the breaker condition)
Three minutes after being dispatched to check the breaker for 1D1-1A, AH-39 (1A-NNS) CNMT Fan cooler breaker, report that: Communicator: The indications on the Static Trip Unit show that an Overload Condition occurred for AH-39 A fan. There are no abnormalities on the AH-39B breaker. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 18 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 19 of 63 Event
Description:
AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip With back up auto start failure (C RCP cooling fan) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior o IF any breaker has tripped on OVERLOAD or SHORT CIRCUIT as indicated on the Static Trip Unit, THEN PERFORM the following: (Directs AO to perform based on report from communicator) BOP
- DEPRESS the breaker Alarm Reset.
- RACK OUT the breaker using OP-i 56.02, AC Electrical Distribution.
- VERIFY cause of the over current trip is determined prior to returning the breaker to service.
Acknowledge request to perform directed actions Communicator: at 1D1-1A Simulator Operator: Rack out breaker 1 Dl -1 A for AH-39 Run AMS file AH39ARackedOut This will override the switch to STOP and turn off the RED and GREEN MCB switch lights. Have communicator report back after running file. RO Monitors RCP C parameters on ERFIS and or OSI P1 Reviews/prepares OMM-00i, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of AH-39. Contacts WCC and EMs for assistance with repairs. When breaker racking is completed, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 4 Evaluator Cue: Event 4 Letdown Temperature Controller fails LOW! Diversion Valve fails to bypass demineralizers Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 19 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 20 of Event
Description:
Letdown Temperature Control Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed by the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 4: Simulator Operator: Letdown Temperature Controller fails LOW! Diversion Valve fails to bypass demineralizers
. ALB-007-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP
. ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL SYSTEMS Indications Available:
. TK-144 output decreases to 0
. Tl-144.l HX Out Temp decreases to 0
. TI-i 43 temperature increasing Changes in Letdown temperature can have an affect on the demineralizers resins. During high input temperature a boron Evaluator Note: release can occur (effects similar to a boration) and during low input temperatures a boron absorption can occur (effects similar to a dilution).
RO Responds to alarm and enters APP-ALB-007-3-2.
- CONFIRM alarm using:
RO o Tl-143, LP Letdown Temperature. o Reports Tl-143 reading or trending high.
. VERIFY Automatic Functions:
o Manually positions 1CS-50, Letdown to VCT/Demin, to divert flow to the VCT. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 20 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 4fl Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 21 of Event
Description:
Letdown Temperature Control Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. PERFORM Corrective actions:
o VERIFY that 1CS-50 diverts flow to the VCT, bypassing the BTRS and Purification Demineralizers. o PERFORM the following as needed to lower letdown temperature: RO
- VERIFY proper charging flow is established. (YES)
- LOWER letdown flow. (N/A CCW Problem) o IF CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger appears low, THEN:
- TAKE manual control of TK-144.
- OPEN 1CC-337, to raise CCW flow.
. Provide a temperature band lAW OMM-001 for operation of components in manual. OP-107 page 31 with TK-144 controller in auto directions is to maintain temperature from 110 120°F. (NOTE this is not the only procedure that provides temperature guidance)
SRO
- The CVCS Demineralizers will remain bypassed pending an evaluation.
- Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist
. Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for assistance.
If contacted as WCC, System Engineer or Chemistry: Communicator: Maintain flow bypassing the demineralizers until a resin damage assessment is completed After crew has restored CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 5. Evaluator Cue: Event 5 Controlling C Steam Generator Level Transmitter, LT-496, fails low Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 21 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 22 of 63 Event
Description:
SG C Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5: Simulator Operator: SG C Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)
. ALB-01 4-3-1 B SG C NR LEVEL! SP HI I LO DEV Indications Available:
- ALB-01 4-6-4B SG C LOW LOW LEVEL
- ALB-017-1-1 SG LEVEL ATWS PANEL TROUBLE RO RESPONDS to multiple C SG alarms The APP-ALB-01 4-3-lB and 14-6-4B actions are similar.
Evaluator Note: lAW OPS-NGGC-1 000, the operator may take MANUAL control of a malfunctioning controller before being directed by a procedure or the SRO.
- CONFIRM alarm using:
o Ll-494 SA, Ll-495 SB, or LI-496 SA, Steam Generator C BOP level indicators. o Reports Ll-496 reading or failed low.
- VERIFY Automatic Functions: NONE
- PERFORM Corrective Actions:
o CHECK Steam Flow (Fl-494, Fl-495) AND Feed Flow (Fl 496, 497) for deviation. (YES) a IF FCV-499, SG C Bypass valve auto level controller, is NOT sufficiently correcting level, THEN: (YES)
- SWITCH to MANUAL.
- RESTORE level to normal (57% NR).
- Provides level band and trip guidance for C SG level while in manual control lAW OMM-OO1, Attachment 13 a SG Level Control Band 52% to 62%
SRO a Trip limit Low 30% Trip limit High 73%
- Refer to OWP-RP-07 to remove channel from service.
- Dispatch AO to investigate Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 22 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page of 63 Event
Description:
SG C Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OWP-RP-07 has been included as Attachment 1 on page 53 of this scenario guide Evaluator Note: Failed channel does NOT have to be removed from service to continue the scenario. Enters Instrumentation TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 13, 14 ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing SRO of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1 3.3.2 Functional Unit 5.b, 6.c Action 19 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up t o 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 23 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 4 of Event
Description:
SO C Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. Requests extra operator for dedicated feedwater operation
. Direct operator and l&C to perform OWP-RP-07 SRO . Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist.
. Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of Work Request
. Contacts support personnel for repairs.
Acknowledge request and reports from SRO. IF an extra operator is requested, state that no one is
. available right now and someone will be sent when Communicator:
available. IF asked to report to MCR to perform OWP-RP-07 state that you will report as soon as possible. It is not required to implement the OWP prior to continuing Simulator Operator: with the scenario. After Tech Spec evaluation is performed, cue the Simulator Evaluator Cue: Operator to insert Trigger 6. Event 6 C RCP high vibration Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 24 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page of Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 6: C RCP high vibration
. ALB-O1O-3-5, RCP-C TROUBLE Indications Available:
- C RCP vibration monitors increasing and red high vibration lights lit RO Responds to alarm ALB-OiO-3-5.
Crew may review ALB-O1O-3-5 but will likely go directly to Evaluator Note: AOP-018 when high vibration is recognized. ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-Oi 8, Reactor Coolant AOP-O1 8 SRO Pump Abnormal Operations. Makes PA announcement for AOP entry. RO Perform AOP-Oi 8 Immediate Action Immediate Action Check any CSIP running. (YES) SRO Inform SM to refer to PEP-i 10 and enter the EAL Matrix. SRO Proceeds to Section 3.2, RCP High Vibration. The answer to the following question may be YES at this time but the limit will be exceeded in short order. This is a continuous action step that should be implemented when Evaluator Note: the limit is exceeded. The scenario guide is therefore written as if the limit is exceeded when the step is read. Attachment 1 is on next 2 pages for evaluator use. SRO Check all RCPs operating within limits of Att 1. (NO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 25 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f4 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 26 of 63 Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior p REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS I Attachment I Sheet I of 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Thp ljmits NOTE False indications such as step changes or spikes on both the upper and lower thrust bearings are signs that the instrumentaUori transent may not be valid, Validation of the temperatures should be performed by observing positive indications of any of the following:
- Simultaneous temperature [ncreases in upper and lower thrust bearing and upper guide bearing (may indicate loss of CCW cooling or oil viscosity problems common to the upper reservoIr)
- VibratIon levels Increasing along with increasing bearing temperatures.
- High or low RCP oil level alarms along with increasing bearing temperatures
- 01. ANY of the following Motor Bearing temperatures exceeding 19(YF: Ai]
ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Mtr Upper Thrust Bcg Temp TRCQ4I7A TRCQ427A TRCQ437A Mtr Lower Thrust Brg Temp TRCO4 178 TRC04278 TRCO437B Mtr Upper Radial Brg Temp TRCO418A TRCO42SA TRCO43BA Mtr Lower Radial Brg Temp TRC0419 TRC0429 TRC0439 02, ANY of the following Pump temperatures exceeding 23OF [Ai] ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Pump Radial Brg Temp TRCO 131 TRCO12S TRCO 125 Seal Water Inlet Temp TR00132 TRCO129 TRCOI26
- 03. RCP Stator Winding temperature exceeding 3OOF:
ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Motor Stator Wlndg Temp TRCO4I 86 TRC04288 TRC04388 AOP-018 Rev40 Page27ot59 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 26 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page of 63 Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS Attachment I Sheet 2 of 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Umts NOTE
- ALB-511-2B, RCP THERM BAR HDR LOW FLOW, indicates loss of CCW to all RCP thermal barriers.
- The ASI System will actuate in 2 minutes arid 45 seconds from timer initlation If 2 minutes and 45 seconds have not elapsed WAIT for initiation.
- 04. Loss of all RCP seal irjection (including ASI) when ANY of the following conditions exist:
- CCW flow is lost to the associated RCP Thermal Barrier HX
- RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 400GF AND CCW HX outlet temperature is greater than i05F
- RCS temperature is less than 4OQF AND CCW HX outlet temperature is greater than i25F
- 05. RCP vibration in excess of the following: [A.13
- 2Omilsshaft
- 15 mils shaft and increasing greater than 1 mu/hr
- 5 mils frame
- For A and C RCPs ONLY: 3 mils frame and increasing greater than 02 mu/hr
- For B RCP ONLY: 35 mils frame and increasing greater than 0.2 mds/hr
- 06. RCP Motor current fluctuations of 40 amps peak-to-peak:
ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Motor Current IRCO16O. 1RCO16I 1RC0162
- 07. Loss of CW to an RCP or RCP Motor when:
- An RCP has operated for 10 minutes without CCW flow to either motor oil cooler
[A.2]
- Isolation of CCW to an RCP is necessary to stop excessive ccw System leakage
-- END OF ATTACHMENT 1 --
AOP-018 Rev.40 Page28ot59 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 27 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page of Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Check reactor power> P-8. (NO) RO Check more than one RCP affected. (NO) The SRO may conduct a brief on Attachment 7 before the Evaluator Note: RCP is stopped. RNO Actions: RO Perform the following:
- STOP the affected RCP. (RCP C)
. REFER TO Attachment 7, Operation With Two RCPs.
[ RACTORCOOL4Iff PUMP ANOMAL COPOlrON$ 3 Athchtit 7 PQ Opeation Wth Two RCPs The óg ie pica ane at can te ezpecte after one r.nnn RC. wi ctcr pet a 4% t Moe of Core L AME CTfl .OOP j OT}- OOS PRZ resure PRZ ve a 4%, lowers o cer o 4D% QDf t 7%, siars 51L
- o,ers31%.
rec4wrs to lowers to 53 t,oo+rs to f7% Loop iec a 7F re to 75 ers to De3 Pec pcwer a%, lwr to reto 4% Co rods c15 i sep ;r r ou as reo-ess3r iia rrai neo,an j Ta The eodeM or r core e. The ese rise rvetl rt the fecreo oop SG s that psctor to occur thrn eiret eft n liri rrisnua oorWo to rot the loiei the rsay b4 thsmthe.
- GOTOStep11.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 28 of 63
ALjQendix D Orjerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page of Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK all RCPs RUNNING. (NO) RNO Actions: (N/A) PERFORM the following:
- a. IF RCP A is secured, then shut 1 RC-107, PRZ Spray Loop A (N/A)
- b. IF RCP B is secured, then shut 1RC-103, PRZ Spray Loop B (N/A)
- c. VERIFY SG levels being maintained between 52%
BOP and 62%.
- d. MONITOR rod insertion limits (Refer to Section F curve RO from Curve Book
- e. INITIATE a plant shutdown using ONE of the following:
- GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power SRO Operation to Hot Standby
. AOP-038, Rapid Downpower CONFIRM the vibration alarm VALID by checking BOTH of the following:
- a. The Green vibration monitor OK light is LIT. (YES)
- b. Either of the following conditions exist:
RO
- Shaft AND frame vibration are proportionally rising (YES)
- Vertical AND Horizontal vibration are proportionally rising (YES)
CHECK the following parameters normal for the affected RCP (reference OSI Pt for AOP-O1 8):
. All parameters listed in Attachment 6, ERFIS Points for Reactor Coolant Pumps RO
. Seal liP Upper
. Oil Reservoir level
- Lower Oil Reservoir level
- RCS Loop Flow Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 29 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 30 of 63 Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. CONSULT with the Responsible Engineer for recommended follow-up actions.
- Contacts WOO for assistance / generation of Work SRO Request
. Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist REFER TO the following Tech Specs 3.4.1.1 All Reactor Coolant Loops shall be in operation-MODES 1 and 2 SRO
. With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
Note: The SRO may not be checking Tech Specs after the RCP trip due to the concerns of plant control and shutting the plant down, If required, ask a follow up question about the RCP Tech Spec after the scenario ends. Evaluator Cue: After the SRO has evaluated Tech Specs, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 7. Event 7 Second C SG Level Transmitter Failure I Reactor Trip. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 30 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 31 of Event
Description:
2 C SG Level Transmitter Failure I Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 7: Simulator Operator: 2 C SG level transmitter fails low (LT-495) causing an automatic Reactor ITurbine Trip
. ALB-012-5-2 REACTOR TRIP STEAM GEN-C Indications Available:
. Multiple System Annunciators RO RESPONDS to automatic Reactor Trip PATH-i SRO ENTERS and directs actions of PATH-i RO/BOP PERFORM immediate actions of PATH-i VERIFY Reactor Trip:
- AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:
- CHECK for any of the following:
Immediate Actions RO o Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES) o Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)
- ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)
NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES) VERIFY Turbine Trip: Immediate
- CHECK for any of the following:
Actions BOP o ALL turbine throttle valves SHUT (YES) o ALL turbine governor valves SHUT (YES) VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses Immediate Actions BOP
- 1 A-SA and 1 B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDGs (YES, off-site power)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 31 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page of Event
Description:
2 C SG Level Transmitter Failure! Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK SI Actuation:
. CHECK for any of the following LIT:
o SI Actuated bypass permissive light (NO) Irnrnecate RO
- ALB-11-2-2
- ALB-11-5-1
- ALB-1 1 3
- ALB-12-i-4 Immediate
- SI actuation REQUIRED (NO)
Actions RO
. GO TO EPP-004, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, step 1 Obtains PATH-i and verifies completion of RO and BOP SRO immediate actions then transitions to EOP-004 After the CRS completes the immediate action review using the path board and transitions to EPP-004 cue the va.uator ue.
Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 8 C SG Tube Rupture Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 32 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 Page 33 of 63 Event
Description:
C SGTR on entry into EPP-004 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 8: Simulator Operator: 420 gpm C SG Tube Rupture Ramped in over 2 minutes EPP-004 SRO EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response Foldout Applies designates foldout items to the RD and BOP SRO Implement FRPs as required (None apply) Evaluate EAL Matrix (informs SM) Check RCS Temperature SRO Check RCPs ANY RUNNING (YES A and B RCP)) Check SG blowdown isolation valves SHUT (BOP-YES) Stabilize AND Maintain Temperature Between 555°F AND 559° F using Table 1. (NOTE: Must secure MSIVs) TABLE 1 RCS IPATURI CONTROL GUIDKLINES FOLLQWtNG RI TRIP
. Cuid*a is applicable until another procedure disect othrw+/-.
. no RCPs running. use wide range cold leg teeperatura.
ICS T2PZRATURE TREND LESS ThAN CRRATU ThAN STANLE AT OR 557SF AND 557? AND TRENDING TO DECREASING INCREASING 557! Stop dueplug
- condenser e Control feed steeR available flow sn atean transfer dunp to BO rar . Control feed atean duap to establish and flow STEAM PRESSURE naintain RCS node using teaperature
. WAintain total O?-126, between 555!
feed flow Section 5.3 AND 559! OPRAXOR. greater than. AND dup stea* ACTION 210 EPPU to condenser until level greater than OR 25% 40%] in at least one
- Dump stes on intact SO using intact SO POlls a cooldown continues,
- Control feed T1 abut floe to ESIVa AND naiatAin SO WfPASS valves levels Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 33 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: {Q Scenario # 1 Event # 8 Page 4 of Event
Description:
C SGTR on entry into EPP-004 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior C SG Tube Rupture will become apparent with Pressurizer Level and Pressure decreasing and Charging flow rapidly increasing. The crew will determine that EPP Evaluator Note: 004 Safety Injection foldout criteria based on Pressurizer level cannot be maintained > 5% is met and perform a Manual Safety Injection and transition BACK to PATH-i step i. Identifies that plant parameters have changed and performs a crew update. Per foldout criteria Pressurizer Level will not be RO able to be maintained >5% and recommends a manual Safety Injection. (SI may actuate in auto! man based on approaching ESF actuation setpoint of 1850 psig.) EPP-004 FOLDOUT SI ACTUATION CRITERIA IF any of the following occurs, THEN actuate SI AND GO TO PATH-i:
. RCS subcooling LESS THAN 10°F C 20°F M
. PRZ level CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 5%
RO AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA
. IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN switch the AFW water supply to the ESW system using OP 137, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 8.1.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 34 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: flQ Scenario # 1 Event # 9 Page 35 of A and B SI Train failure to actuate Automatically Event
Description:
(SI manual actuation Switch 1 is not available) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs a MANUAL SI in accordance with Foldout criteria. Initiates a MANUAL SI.
. Actuation switch above Rod Control Fails Critical o Ensures CRS is aware of problem RO Task
- Attempts SI Actuation from second switch a SI actuates (critical to actuate SI prior to Pressurizer pressure reducing to < 1860 psig.)
SRO Transitions back to PATH-i. Reviews immediate actions with crew Reactor Trip (YES) Turbine Trip (YES) PATH-i SRO Power to AC Emergency buses (YES) SI Actuated
- Both Trains Actuated (YES)
Initiate monitoring of the CSFS Trees (Yellow on Heat Sink and SRO I nventroy) Evaluate the EAL Matrix Foldout A Applies. SRO
. Delegates foldout items to RO and BOP The crew should identify that the C SG is ruptured and when Narrow range level is > 25% they should isolate AFW to the ruptured generator based on Foldout A criteria.
Evaluator Note: The RO should be monitorIng SI flow and RCS pressure and when RCP trip criteria is met he/she should secure the running RCPs Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 35 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NEQ Scenario # 1 Event # 9 Page 3,6 of 63 A and B SI Train failure to actuate Automatically Event
Description:
(SI manual actuation Switch 1 is not available Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PATH-i Foldout A RCP Trip Criteria RO . SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM
. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1400 PSIG When conditions are met RO should inform the SRO that trip criteria is met SRO Directs RO to secure all RCPs when RCP Trip Criteria is met PATH-i Foldout A Ruptured SG AFW Isolation Criteria BOP . CHECK any SG level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES C and A)
- Narrow range level > 25% [40%] (YES)
SRO Directs BOP to isolate Feed flow to Ruptured SG(s) Isolate Feed flow by shutting the MDAFW AND TDAFW isolation valves to rupture SG(s). Critical BOP (*Critical to isolate Feedwater flow AND Steam Flow to Task ruptured SGs prior to opening either the Steam Dumps or SG PORVs to commence a max rate cool down) RO Verify All CSIPs AND RHR pumps RUNNING (YES) RO Check SI Flow: SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES) RO RCS pressure - < 230 PSIG (NO) Check Main Steam Isolation: BOP Main steam isolation ACTUATED (NO not required) Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RO PSIG (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 36 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 9 Page Z of A and B SI Train failure to actuate Automatically Event
Description:
(SI manual actuation Switch 1 is not available) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check AFW Status: Verify AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH BOP - ESTABLISHED (YES) BOP LEVEL IN AT LEAST ONE SG > 25% (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 37 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: !i Scenario # 1 Event # 10 Page of Event
Description:
Sequencer fails to start the B ESW pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The Sequencer fails to start B ESW Pump. The RO may Evaluator Note: identify this failure before the BOP is directed to check sequencer operation. The B ESW pump will auto start on low system pressure Evaluator Note: prior to the sequencer reaching Load Block 9 (LB9). Verify Sequencer Operations AND Alignment Of Components: BOP Check sequencer manual loading permissive (LB-9) ACTUATED (YES identifies B ESW pump has not started) Energize AC buses lAl AND 1B1 BOP Emergency Bus A-SA to XFMR Al Breaker Al A-SA (SHUTS) Emergency Bus B-SB to XFMR Bi Breaker Bi A-SB (SHUTS) The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes PATH-i Guide Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies both operator Evaluator Note: positions because the time frame for completion of PATH-i Guide Attachment 6 is not predictable. To follow the BOP actions PATH-i Guide Attachment 6 is included starting on page 56 of this scenario. Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals using Path-i Guide Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification, while continuina with this Drocedure. Directs AO to place 1A and 1 B Air Compressor in the local BOP control mode per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 22 Acknowledge the request to place 1 A and 1 B Air Communicator Compressor in the local control mode. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario i Rev. FINAL Page 38 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: j4Q Scenario # 1 Event# 10 Page of Event
Description:
Sequencer fails to start the B ESW pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed to place the 1 A and 1 B Air Compressor in Simulator Operator the local control mode: Run APP\air\acs_toJocal When the APP for 1 A and 1 B Air Compressor has Communicator completed running call the MCR and inform them that the air compressors are running in local control. Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS RO signals using PATH-i Guide, Attachment 6 When step 13 is reached (Control RCS Temperature) Evaluator Note: contact Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 11. Event 11, SG A SGTR prior to initiation of RCS cooldown. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 39 of 63
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 40 of Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 11: Simulator Operator: A SGTR 420 gpm ramped over 2 minutes. RO/BOP Control RCS Temperature: Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1. Z*L 1 RC ?EWflAtUR COROt GJIflZLI)lSS GLtMWThG RA 1Z?
- Gtidance & *V$Uab1.. until a zt1e poednre direct# otrw.
1! no RP tunnln. r us* w14e t*me o4 loS tenp**etue cS izurmz rREe tUS 1IEAN GRS*TR 7tM $1LS
- 557E MW Mm DflG lO flZcUASl$G ZNcZZSING 31 I
- Stop duRping * .I endenee
- Coottol fee4
*t** vei1*bZ. flow ad tr*fev duap to
- cota1 c4 t** dump to e*t*b1ib end flow srEm PRES$UR* aiaj
*4e usln
. ait*jn total GP28. between 5SP feed fio aotion $. MW 55V OVflA?0 teeter tfan MW duzp te*
ACflQN 210 ZIPH to oodmnect tmtjl level teatee th**i - - Z% (0i n at lenet one
- p stea*
on iot*ct S uein inteot SG I0RVs
- oold*n oondnuee e Centtol ec4 K. ehut Vlo* to SlVe MW nint*in S#
flPASS vel leMcl: Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555 °F AND 559 F RO CHECK PRZ PORVs SHUT. (YES) RO CHECK block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 40 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 4.1 of Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO PRZ spray valves SHUT. (YES) BOP IDENTIFY any faulted SG:
- CHECK for any of the following:
o ANY SG pressures DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO) o ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO) BOP IDENTIFY any Ruptured SG:
. CHECK for any of the following
. Secondary Radiation Normal:
0 Condenser vacuum pump effluent radiation NORMAL (NO) o SG blowdown radiation NORMAL (NO) 0 Main steamline radiation NORMAL (YES/NO) The crew may not recognize that A SG is also increasing in an uncontrolled manner. If this is the case then they will Evaluator Note: enter PATH-2 due to C and will then use the Multiple Tube Rupture Foldout Criteria to isolate the A SG. Check any SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner BOP (YES C and also A) Check feed flow to ruptured SG(s) isolated (YES/NO) if BOP identified may need to isolate A SG. SRO GO TO PATH-2, entry point J Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 41 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 4 of 63 Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT C applies. Assigns foldout items FO1DOUT C
- ALTEINATE MtNWWWOPEWSHULcR1TER1A
- RCS presuce d ceases to less than 1300 PSIG flf veny utemate mnak,w tion QRmedk, bioek valves SHUT
- RCS pressure nceases to ç at then 2200 P51G. jjffj verj terrntta mtolllow entahon inrntflo* teoek ,alvas OPEN any of the tollowlng occws
- rcs uss m to o pi e 20F lS0P1M
- level CAN 4f CE MAINTAINED GREATER ThAN 10% P0%I fl!!1 perfotre the fo*m a, CSIP suctIon aliqned to VCT, j]jQ realIgn to RWST.
tI, Shut chargln tIne Isolation velvea AND open BIT valves, Vedly notrnal min aolation valves SHUT -
- d. reeesssry to (eatoe cond4ons. ]fI restan standby C SIP.
OATH) occurs alter entry poeit S (Step 20), THEN GO TO EPPO2O, RO GTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOlANT: 5ThVLED RECOVERY Ste I
- QGRCTR IF any ol the fotIowng occurs, flj GO TO PP4)13. FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR lOLATION, Step I (unless faulted SQ ,s needed fo RCS cooktown),
- Any SQ pressure - DECREASES IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER MIX) THAT 51.3 HAS BEEN ISOLATEB
- Any SQ COMPLETELY DEPRESSUR1ZED QTHAT SQ HAS T BEElv ISOLATED
- COLD LEG RECRCi1LATtON SWITCHOVER CRIThRIA IF tWIST level decreases to less than 234% (24 Low-Low alarm) IHU* GO TO tPP-010, 7RANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATtON, Step (.
- AFW SUPPLY SWTICHOVER CR1TERIA IF CST level decreases to tes* then 10%, tHEN switch the AFW waler supply to ile ESW system uwnq OP-137, AUXILIAtV!EDWATER SYSTEW, SectIon 81.
- RHR RESTART CRITERIA
) 1105 pressure decreases to less than 230 PSIG la an uncontrolled manner, jj restart RHR pumps to supply water to the RCS.
- MLILTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CR IF any intact SQ level increases In an uncontrolled manner tR any intact Se has abnormal radiatIon leveI, THEN stop 1105 depressurization and cooldown AND GO RETURN TO Step I If A SG has not yet been identified by the crew as ruptured then Foldout C Multiple Tube Rupture Criteria Evaluator Note:
should be used to isolate that SG. When A SG is identified, the SRO will return to the beginning of Path-2. IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required. SRO (None required at this time) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 42 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 43 of 63 Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) L Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is Procedure Note: initiated. RO CHECK RCP Trip Criteria: ANY RCPs RUNNING (YES A and B) Check all of the following
. SI flow > 200 GPM (YES)
. RCS pressure < 1400 psig (NO)
Stop all RCPs (RO should not secure A and B RCP) BOP IDENTIFY any ruptured SG:
- CHECK for any of the following:
o SG level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES C & A)
. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
Procedure Caution: . If the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, one steam supply valve from an intact SG must be maintained open. BOP ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured SG: ADJUST ruptured SG PORV controller setpoint to 88% (1145 PSIG) AND place in auto. (Adjusts controller to 88%)
. CHECK ruptured SG PORV SHUT. (YES)
. SHUT ruptured SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump Critca1 (Shuts MS-72) (*Critical to shut prior to opening either the Task. BOP Steam Dumps or SG PORVs to commence a max rate cool down)
. VERIFY blowdown isolation valves from ruptured SG SHUT (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 43 of 63
Aoendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fj Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page of 2 Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SHUT ruptured SG main steam drain isolation before MSIV: o SG A: 1 MS-231 (Shuts 1 MS-231) (*Critical to shut prior Critical BOP to opening either the Steam Dumps or SG PORVs to Task commence a max rate cool down) o SG C: 1 MS-301 (Shuts 1 MS-301) (*Critical to shut prior to opening either the Steam Dumps or SC PORVs to commence a max rate cool down)
. SHUT ruptured SG MSIV and BYPASS valve.
BOP (MSIV for SG C & A Bypass valve already shut) SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 7 AND GO TO Step 7. If ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT needed for RCS Procedure Caution: cooldown, THEN feed flow to that SG should remain isolated. MONITOR Ruptured SG Level:
. RUPTURED SG FAULTED (NO)
BOP
. Level GREATER THAN 25% (YES)
. Check feed flow to ruptured SG(s) ISOLATED (YES)
SRO Observe Caution prior to Step 8 and go to Step 8 The steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to the Procedure Caution: TDAFW pump should be shut OR isolated before continuing (unless this prevents feeding SGs to be used for cooldown). CHECK Ruptured SG(s) Pressure GREATER THAN 260 BOP PSIG [350 PSIG] (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 44 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fi9 Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 4 of Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Block Low Steam Pressure SI:
. Pressure LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (YES)
. Block low steam pressure SI.
After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main Procedure Note: steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded. SRO Prepare For RCS Cooldown:
. At least one intact SO AVAILABLE FOR RCS 000LDOWN (YES B)
. GOTOStep1O.e.
. Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured SO pressure Lowest ruptured SG pressure:
Required CET Temperature: IF RCPs are NOT running, an invalid RED or ORANGE condition for RCS INTEGRITY CSF-4 may occur during the Procedure Caution: . . following steps. Disregard ruptured SG wide range cold leg temperature until Step 40 completed. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 45 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRO Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 46 of 63 h1d 2 ( Event
Description:
SG A SGTR Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Initiate RCS Cooldown: Check all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser: NOTE: IF the MSIVs are OPEN then use Steam Dumps IF MSIVs are closed the crew will use SG PORVs
. Check any intact SG MSIV OPEN (YES B MSIV)
. Check condenser available (C-9) light (BPLB 3-3) LIT (YES)
- Steam dump control system AVAILABLE (YES)
- Place steam dump pressure controller in manual AND decrease output to 0% (places controller in manual and output to 0%)
. Place steam dump mode select switch to STEAM PRESS (places switch to STEAM PRESS)
. Check RCS temp < 553° F (YES/NO) a NO Dump steam from intact SGs to condenser to decrease RCS temperature to 553°F (Dumps steam) a YES Momentarily place both steam dump interlock bypass switches to INTLK BYP. (Places switches to INTLK BYP)
BOP
. Verify LOW-LOW STEAM DUMP (P-12) BYPASSED status light ILLUMINTATED (YES)
Dump steam from intact SGs at maximum rate to condenser at BOP maximum rate. IF B SG MSIV is NOT OPEN (may auto shut) THEN to initiate a maximum rate RCS cooldown: BOP OPEN B SG PORV or Locally operate B SG PORV or use the TDAFW pump Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 46 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 41 of Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO . GOTOStepl2. The crew will continue with the procedure while the CD is Evaluator Note: in progress. When the CET temperature is < the target then the crew should terminate the CD and continue Monitor Core Exit TCs While Continuing With This Procedure:
. Core exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (NO)
RO . WHEN core exit TCs less REQUIRED TEMPERATURE THEN do Steps 12.b AND c. o 12.b Stop RCS cooldown. o 12.c Maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature. Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 RO GPM.
. If an AFW isolation to an intact SG occurs, the signal may be reset to allow restoration of AFW. (An AFW isolation will occur if a main steam line isolation signal is present AND one SG pressure decreases 100 PSIG below the other two SGs.)
Procedure Caution:
. If the steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to TDAFW pump reopens due to decreasing SG level, it must be restored to the shut position. (Two out of three SG levels decreasing below 25% will open both steam supply vales to the TDAFW pump.)
RO Any intact SG level > 25% (YES) BOP AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH Available (YES) Control feed flow to maintain intact SG levels between 25% BOP and 50% Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 47 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: !iflQ Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 48 of 63 Event
Description:
SG A SGTR(2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any intact SG level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED BOP MANNER (NO) Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves: Verify power to PORV block valves AVAILABLE (YES) RO Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES) Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES) Reset SI (Takes manual SI reset switch to reset and verifies SI RO lights indicate that SI is reset) Informs SRO that SI has been reset Acknowledges SI reset SRO Informs crew that they will need to manually realign Safeguards Equipment following a Loss Of Offsite Power. Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. RO (Resets Phase A ONLY Phase B is not actuated) Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT: Open the following valves: RO 1 IA-81 9 (locates valve controls and OPENS valve) 1S1-287 (locates valve controls and OPENS valve) Check RHR Pump Status: Check RHR pump suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES) RO - RCS pressure >230 psig (YES) Stop RHR pumps (locates switches for both RHR pumps and takes them to Stop) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 48 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page of Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check If RCS cooldown Should Be Stopped: Core exit TCs < REQUIRED TEMPERATURE SRO Stop RCS cooldown Maintain core exit TCs < required temperature. Terminate Scenario when Core exit TC are at required temperature (or to the extent desired by the Lead Evaluator). Lead Evaluator: Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions. When directed by the Lead Examiner place the Simulator Simulator Operator: in FREEZE. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 49 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 50 of Event
Description:
OP-141 Section 8.2 Start Standby CTMU Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
&2. P1acng the Surndby CTMU Pump n Servfce &2t initial Condkoris
- 1. Operations desires to switch the running and standby pumps, or to run both CTMU pumps, 8,22 Procedural Steps NOTE: The faliowing steps describe starting Cooling Tower Makeup (CTMU)
Pump i&2X and secunng CTMU Pump DC To start. 1X arid secure 1&2X, use the component and valve numbers in parentheses. I, PERFORM Attachment 6.
- 2. PLACE TMU Pump 12X(iX) controt switch to START AND OBSERVE the following:
a 3MP-36 (iMP-2) Prelubricating Water Supply valve 1&2X (lx) opens and Seal and Lube Pump l&2X( IX) sta1s,
- b. CTMU Pump 1&2X (1X) StartS after sufficient seal water flow has been provided for 60 seconds..
NOTE: 3MP-36 (1 MP-29) Prelubricating Water Supply Valve 1 &2X (IX) may shut before the 3MP-38 (1 MP28) Lube Water Supply Valve l&2X (1X)opens, due to design interlocks, This allows the Seal and Lube Pump 1&2X (IX) to run without a suction source and the CTMU Pump 1&2X (1X) to run without seat flaw for a few seconds. This is an expected condition and will not harm the Seat and Lube Pump or CTMIJ Pump.
- c. 3MP-38 (1 MP-28) Lube Water Supply Valve 1 &2X (1X) opens and 3MP36 (iMP.29) Prelubricating Water Supply l&2X (IX) shuts.
- 3. IF necessary, THEN RESET the CTMIJ pump Vibration switch, I CPi4l . Rev, 38 Pgé 2% at 81 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 50 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page of 63 Event
Description:
OP-141 Section 8.2 Start Standby CTMU Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 82.2 Procedural Steps (continued)
- 4. VENT the discharge pressure gauge tPl- 9150 orPI1 961) for the pump ust placed in service by UNCAPPING and CYCLING open then shut the appicable valve (valve not opened can be marked N1A)
- a. For P1-1960 (IX OTMU pump). 1MP-4-DV-I
- b. For P1-1961 {I&2X CTMU pump), 3MP-7-OVI
- c. Install the cap that was removed
- 5. IF the Seal Water Booster Pump 1 &2X (IX) has been drained for maintenance, THEN PERFORM the fot,.*ing, Otherwise, this step is N/A.
- a. OPEN 3MP-43 (1MP34), Booster 182X (IX) Cyclone Separator Cram Valve, until Seal Water Booster Pump pressure is steady or a solid stream of water is observed.
- b. RETURN 3MP-43 (IMP-34) open until appmx I gpm flow is observed.
- 5. WHEN two pump operation is no longer desired, THEN PLACE CTMU Pump IX (I&2X) control switch to STOP and observe the foltowng:
a CIMU Pump IX (IIX) stops b.. Seal and Lube Pump 1X (1 &2X) stop& c Lube Water Supply Valve IX (1&2X) shuI.
- 7. IF necessary, THEN ADJUST IMP-61 {LCV-1931), CTMU Level Control Valve, to maintain desired Cooling Tower basin level and Cooling Tower blowdown flow.
- 8. IF necessary, THEN UNLOCK AND THROTTLE 1MP-73. CT Make-up and C.T.
5lowdcn Cross Tie Valve, to maintain desired CTMUIBlowdown Crosstie fiow
- 9. LOCK I MP-73 n throttled posthon when desired flow s established.
tO. PLACE TMU Puma 1X(1&2X) control swtch to AUTO. jOP-141 Rev2S Fae25of Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 51 of 63
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS aQIl NRC SCENARIQ 1 Attachment 1 OWP-RP-07
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HAftRISZO11NRQSCENARIO1 Attachment 1 OWP-RP-07 5 or 5; LtL 21 2 :n LO ro r i T!5 ro atb opnp th hez r roibIt oror ptr w1 pq sw (L545: R. f5 5& Lo Low i1 R trip 1151 555 Lo 55 .5S arb ?X Trp 1151 / sa tsiC o z. flL 1/5 ?L E Piw /____ is L9P L . e2t1o4I Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 54 of 63
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2Q11 NRC SQNARIQ 1. Attachment 1 OW P- RP-07 zt II Zpebi.z.ty t iAtL 4 to to too 1:2 4 Ct [ i I:.: of I 04] Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 56of 63
Appendix D PATH-i GUIDE Attachment 6 Form ES-D-i PATH-i GUIDE I Attachment 6 Sheet 1 of 7 Safeguards Actuation Verification LI 1 Verify Two CSIPs RUNNING LI 2. Verify Two RHR Pumps RUNNING LI 3. Verify Two CCW Pumps RUNNING LI 4 Verify All ESW ESW Booster Pumps RUNNING - LI 5 Verify Si Valves PROPERLY ALIGNED (Refer to Attachment t) LI 6. Verify CNMT Phase A Isolation Valves SHUT (Refer to OMM-004. POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 4) EOP-GUIDE-i I Rev 33 I Page 79 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 57 of 63
Appendix D PATH-i GUIDE Attachment 6 Form ES-D-i Attachment I Sheet 2 of 7 Safeguards Actua&n Venfkabon C] 7. Verify 80 Blewdown SO Sample Isolation Valves In Tablet- SHUT rable i sc E1cdwn Atd Saap1e Iaoiation Vaive PrGcens Outside CNNT Iieide CNKT Line (MLB-IASA) (8-18-$) SO A Samp1 211 ISP-214!214 SO B Sap1e ISF222 1SP-21g/221 SO C Sazple 15?- 227 1SP-2241226 SO A 1owdown 1D-1I SC 1awdowu 1D3O IiO2O SO C 31owdown 1B1-49
- 8. iF Main Steam Line Isolation Actuated OR is Reqtwed Oy My Of The Following.
))iN Verify MSIVs Q MSIV Bypass Valves SHUT -
C
- Steam line pressure LESS fl4AN (J
[]* CNMT pressure GREATER THAN 311 PSIG
- 9. j CNMT Spray Actuation Signal Actuated OR Is Required, j] Verify The Following:
(Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 9.) C]
- CNMT spray pumps RUNNING E]
- CNMT spray valves PROPERLY AliGNED
[] s Phase B isolation valves SHUT C]
- AU POPs STOPPED
.OPPE-i .Rev33. PeOn19J Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 58 of 63
Appendix D PATH-i GUIDE Attachment 6 Form ES-D-i Ahachtent 6 Sheet3ofl Safeguards Actuation Venticahon Li 10. Verify l3oth Main FW Pumps TRIPPED Li 11, Verify FW !solalion Valves SHUT (Refer to OMM0O4, POST TRIPISAFEGUAROS REVIEW, Attachment 6.) Li 12, Verily both MDAFW pumps RUNNING 13, IF any of the kflowkig conditions exis*, ThEN verify the TDAFW pump - RUNNING Li
- Undervoltage on either 9 KV emergency bus Li Level in two SOs LESS THAN 25%
Li e Manual actuation to control SO level 14, Verify AFW Valves PROPERLY ALIGNED Li
- no AFW Isolation Signal, fl,4 verify isolation and flow control valves -
OPEN
-I NOTE An AFW Isolation signal signal requires a Main Steam line Isolation coincident with one SO pressure 100 P510 below the other two SOs.
Li iIE AFW Isolation Signal present, THEN verify MDAFW and TDAFW isolation and flow control vahes to affected SO SHUT Li 15. Verify Both EDGs RUNNING Li 16. Verity CNMT Fan Coolers ONE FAN PER UNIT RUNNING 1N SLOW SPEED EQP-GUIDE-1 I Rev. 33 Pqe 81 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 59 of 63
Appendix D PATH-i GUIDE Attachment 6 Form ES-D-1 Attachment 6 Sheel4 of 7 Safeguards Actuation Verification LI 17. Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves SHUT (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIP!SAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 7) LI 18. Verify Control Room Ventilation ALIGNED FOR EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION (Refer to OMM004, POST TRIP1SAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 5.)
- 19. Verify Essential Service Chilled Water System Operation; LI
- Verify both WC-2 chillers RUNNING LI
- Verify both P4 pumps RUNNING LI (Refer to AOP-026, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERViCE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM for loss of any WC2 cNIIer)
- 20. Verity CSIP Fan Coolers RUNNING LI AH-9ASA LI AH-913S8 LI AH-1OASA LI AH-1OBSB NOFE Security systems are normally powered by bus 1A1. Backup power will be available for approximately 30 MINUTES after bus 1A1 is de-energized.
rTtM. rflr1 LI 21. VerityACbusesiAlANDlBl-ENERGIZED LI 22. Place air compressor IA AND in the LOCAL CONTROL Mode. (Refer to AttachmentS.) EOP-GUIDE-1 Rev. 33 I Paqe 82 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 60 of 63
Appendix D PATH-i GUIDE Attachment 6 Form ES-D-i Attachment S Sheet Sot 7 Safeguards Actuation Verification CAUTION urn calculated dose rate in the vicinity of MCC 1A35-SA and MCC 1835-SB 0 23. Dispatch An Operator To Unlock ANt) Turn ON The Breakers For The CSIP Suction AND Discharge Cross-Connect Valves: (Refer to Attachment it) NUt 1*354* 14CC 11545 VALVE CflCLZ VALVE CUBICLE 1CS17O 4* ICS-171 40 ICS-169 41 ICS-168 1CS-218 140 1CSi20 90 ICS-219 148 1cS-Z1i lac
- 24. Check f C CSIP Should Be Placed In Service:
C
- liE two charging pumps can 1421 be verifed to be running, AND C CSIP is available, THEN place C CSIP in setvice in place of the non-meting CS1P using OP-flU, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, Section 85 orBf.
EOP-GUIDE-1 I. Rev. 33 I Pane 83 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 61 of 63
Appendix D PATH-i GUIDE Attachment 6 Form ES-D-i Attachment 6 Sheet 6 of 7 Safeguards Actuation VerWicalion NOTE
- Fuel pool levels AND temperatures should be monitored approximately every Ito 2 HOURS
- Following the intal check of fuel pod levels and temperature, monTtoring may be assumed by the ptant operations staff (inctuding the TSC or
- Only fuel pools containing fuel are required to be monitored 25, Check Status Of Fuel Pools:
Li a. Start the spent fuel pump room ventilation system using OPI70, TUEL HANDLING BULDING HVAC, Section 5.3. Li b. OntemperatureUsing
- c. Monitor fuel pool levels AND temperatures:
- 0. Refer to .AOP-041, SPENT FUEL POOL EVENT Attachments 7,8,9,10 and II for SFP parameter monitoring methods.
ID a Refer to Curves H..X.24, HX2S and HX26 for SFP time to 2O& F. Li
- Levels GREATER ThAN LO ALARM (284 FT, 0 IN)
- 0. Temperatures LESS THAN HI TEMP ALARM (106 F)
EoPç.,IDEi Rev3 .1. .. Paqe84of9i Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 62 of 63
Appendix D PATH-i GUIDE Attachment 6 Form ES-D-i Attachment 6 Sheet 7 of 7 Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE IE control room ventilation was previously aligned to an emergency outside air intake for post-accident operations, THEN follow-up actions will be required to restore the alignment
- 26. Consult Plant Operations Staff Regarding Alignment Of The Control Room Ventilation System:
. Site Emergency Co-ordinator- Control Room
[]. Site Emergency Co-ordinator- Technical Support Center (Refer to PEP-230. CONTROL ROOM OPERATlONS)
- END -
EOP-GUIDE-1 Rev 33 I Page 85 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 63 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 05000400/2012301 Examiners: Operators: SRO: OAC: BOP: Initial Conditions: IC-5: 50% Power, BOL
- A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan under clearance for motor replacement
- TDAFW Pump Out of Service due to damaged over speed trip device, due back in 24 hours, awaiting parts from vendor
- PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13 is SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage Turnover:
- The previous shift started MFW Pump A following replacement of a bearing and has completed GP-005, Step 136.e.
Resume raising power at 4 DEH units/minute. Critical Tasks:
- Insert negative reactivity via rod insertion or emergency boration prior to the Reactor Trip breakers being manually opened.
- Manually Start at least one high head ECCS pump before RCS pressure lowers below 1400 psig.
- During a Small Break LOCA, Trip the RCPs prior to the RCS pressure stabilizing at 1100 psig.
Event No. 1 1 Malt. No. N/A Event Type* N BOP/SRO [ Raise power Event Description RRO/SRO 2 SWSO7A C RO/SRO Normal Service Water Pump A shaft shear TS SRO 3 PT:475 I - BOP/SRO A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 fails to 0% TS SRO 4 NISO8D I RO/SRO PRNIS Channel N-44 fails hi TS SRO 5 XD1I121 C BOP, SRO MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) TSSRO 6 TUR24A C BOP/SRO EHC pump shaft shear with standby auto start failure jmsehpas 7 RCSO1A M ALL Small Break LOCA requiring a Reactor Trip 8 RPSO1 B M ALL ATWS Reactor Trip breakers fail to open auto or manual CVCO5A When Reactor Trip Breakers open the A CSIP trips 9 DSGO4A C RO/SRO During the Safety Injection the B Sequencer skips load block 1 which starts B CSIP (no CSIPs are running) 10 ZRPK63OA C BOP/SRO Phase A Isolation Valvesl SP-948/1 SP-949, RCS LOOPS B&C ZRPK63OB HOT LEG CNMT ISOL and 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, CNMT SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE fail to close (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 1 of 75
I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARFUS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
The plant is operating at 50.5% power at the BOL. The A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan is under clearance for motor replacement. The TDAFW Pump has been under clearance for 6 hours due to a damaged overspeed trip device and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours. LCO 3.7.1.2 action a has been entered. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13 is SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage. Radiation monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB has failed low. Thunderstorms are in the area. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to a power change of >10% (YELLOW risk is a qualitative risk assessment per WCM-001). Event 1: Raise Power The crew has been directed to raise power lAW GP-005, step 136.e at 4 DEH units/minute. Once the up power has been observed to the extent desired then Event 2 can be initiated. Event 2: Normal Service Water Pump A has a shaft shear. This will result in multiple NSW alarms and the crew should enter AOP-022. Once immediate actions are complete the crew should use the AOP to start up the standby NSW pump and verify proper system operation. When both ESW pumps start on low header pressure it will affect Containment internal pressure. The SRO should evaluate T.S. 3.6.1.4 for Containment Low internal pressure (i.e. too much vacuum). Event 3: Failure of A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%. Requires the BOP to place the A SG level control to manual and control level. The SRO should provide level band and trip guidance lAW OMM-001. The crew will take the channel out of service using OWP-ESF-02, SG Steam Pressure Loop 1 (it is possible that some may use OWP-RP-08, SF/FF LOOP 1, to accomplish the Steam Flow channel swap. However OWP-ESF-02 is more appropriate, and should be used to remove the steam pressure channelfrom service). The SRO should evaluate T.S. 3.3.2 action 19, T.S. 3.3.1 Action 6 and T.S. 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Action a. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 2 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
. HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
(continued) T.S. 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. Total No. Channels Minimum Functional Unit of Channels Channels Mode on
- 14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low 2 stm. gen. 1 stm. gen. 1 stm. gen. level 1,2 6 Coincident With Steaml level and level coincident and 2 stm./feed Feedwater Flow Mismatch 2 stm./feed- with 1 water flow water flow stmifeedwater mismatch in same mismatch in flow mismatch in atm. gen. or 2 each stm. gen. same stm. gen. stm. gen. level and 1 stm./feedwater flow mismatch in same stm. gen.
Action 6: With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 3 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 . HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
(continued) TS 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4. MIN [MUM TOTAL NO, CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FIJNCLIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip.
Feodwatur isolation. Control Room Jsoiaton. Start Diesel Generators Contai nment Ventilatori Isolation. Phase A Lontainment Isolation. Start Auxiliary Feedwater System Motor-Druwn Pumps, Start Containment Fan Coolers, Start Emergency Service Water Pumps, Start Emergency Service Water Rouster Pumps) a Manual InitOition 1. 2, 3. 4 U. Automatic Actuation Logic an 1 1, 2. 3, 4 Actuation Relays
- c. Contairment Pressure--High-i 3 2 2 i. 2. 3. 4 19
- d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low 3 2 2 1, 2. 3# 19
- e. Steam Line Pressure--Low 3/steam 2/steam 2/steam line 1, 2, 3#
Hne line in any steam 1 inc ACTION 9 - With the nomber c OPERABLE channel a one icas than the Iota 1 tJuober of Channels, tperation nay pryteed provided the 1oi1Owinc 000ditiCnS are satisreu
- a. The invperable channel 15 placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The iinimun Channels OPERABLE requlrenlent is rnet however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to hours for surveillance testing oI other channels per Specification 4,32,i, TS 3.3.3.6 The Accident Monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE Action a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels except In Core Thermocouples and Reactor Vessel Level less than the Total Required Number of Channels requirements shown in Table 3.3-10 restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. (Evaluate only, still have required number)
The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 4 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
- HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 4: PRNIS Channel N-44 fails high. This will cause rods to start stepping in and the crew should enter AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System. The crew should perform the immediate actions of AOP-001 and place Rod Control in MANUAL. The SRO will evaluate Tech. Spec 3.3.1 for any impact due to the failed instrument. The crew will perform the follow up actions of AOP-001. T.S. 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. LIIN IMUN TOTAL NO, CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OP CHANNELS TO TRIP 1 ACTION I. Manual Reactor Trip 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3,4,5 9
- 2. Power Range, Neutron flux
- a. High Setpoint 4 2 3 1, 2 2
- b. Low Setpaint 4 2 3 14f, 2 2
- 3. Power Range, Neutron flux 4 2 3 i, 2 2 High Postive Rate
- 4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, 4 2 3 1, 2 High Negative Rate ACtIN 2 With the riwnber of OP[RABLE Cflannls one less than the Tota Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATIO4 may proceed provided the rslloing conditions rice satisfied:
- a. The inoDerable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 5 hours.
b ihe Mininjni Channels OPERA8LE reouirerrnt is iet; hcever, the noperable channel may be bypassed for p to 4 hoLirs for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.31.1, and
- e. Either, ThERtAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 7S of RATED THER4AL POWER and the Power Range neutron Flux Trip Setont is reduced to less than or equal to S5 of RATED ThERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or. the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Seocification 42.42.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 5 of 75
- Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 5: A trip of MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker. This will cause a loss of both fans on AH-3. The crew will use the APPs and OPs to shift to B Train coolers (AH-1 and AH-4). The SRO should review Tech Spec 3.6.2.3, Containment Systems Containment Cooling System Action: a. T.S. 3.6.2.3 Four containment fan coolers (AH-1, AH-2, AH-3, and AH-4) shall be OPERABLE with one of two fans in each cooler capable of operation at low speed. Train SA consists of AH-2 and AH-3. Train SB consists of AH-1 and AH-4. Action: a. With one train of the above required containment fan coolers inoperable and both Containment Spray Systems OPERABLE, restore the inoperable train of fan coolers to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Event 6: DEH pump shaft shear and auto start failure of the standby DEH pump. The running pump will continue to run until the crew identifies the shaft shear by responding to annunciator ALB-020-4-2B EH Fluid Low Press. With DEH pressure decreasing the crew should dispatch an Aux Operator to investigate and manually start the standby DEH pump. If DEH pressure decreases to < 1500 psig the standby pump should auto start but a relay failure will prevent the pump from auto starting. Event 7: Small Break LOCA Loop 1 Cold Leg break Major requiring a Reactor trip and either a Manual OR Automatic SI initiation. Following the Reactor Trip the A CSIP trips. Event 8: ATWS Reactor Trip breakers fail to open auto or manual. The crew should recognize that the Reactor has failed to trip and enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. The Reactor Trip breakers will be opened locally one minute after a field operator has been dispatched to perform those actions. Once the crew has inserted negative reactivity via rod insertion (Auto or manual) or initiated the emergency Boration (Critical to insert negative reactivity) and have verified that the Reactor is tripped in FRP-S.i, they should exit FRP-S.1 and return to PATH-i. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 6 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 9: B Load Sequencer will skip starting the B CSIP in load block 1.
- The crew should manually start CSIP B to establish HHSI.
- While in PATH-i trip RCPs once RCP Trip Foldout Criteria is met.
Event 10: Phase A Isolation Valves 1 SP-948/1 SP-949, RCS LOOPS B&C HOT LEG CNMT ISOL and 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, CNMT SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE fail to close. The BOP should close at least one isolation valve in any un-isolated Phase A line in the process of performing GUIDE-i, Attachment 6 and prior to the end of the scenario. The crew will continue in PATH-i until the transition to EPP-009, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, is made. The scenario ends in EPP-009 after the first SG pressure reduction has been completed. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 7of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 . HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Insert negative reactivity via rod insertion or initiate emergency boration prior to the Reactor Trip breakers being manually opened.
Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods:
- Insert RCCAs
- De-energize the control rod drive MG sets
- Establish emergency boration flow to the RCS.
Failure to insert negative reactivity results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. This constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is negative reactivity addition prior to the Reactor Trip Breakers being opened locally.
- 2. Manually Start at least one high head ECCS pump before RCS pressure lowers below 1400 psig.
In this scenario the A CSIP has tripped and the B CSIP has did not automatically start from sequencer actuation. The operator must manually start the B CSIP which was currently in standby. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is starting the B CSIP before RCS pressure lowers below 1400 psig.
- 3. During a Small Break LOCA Trip the RCPs prior to RCS pressure stabilizing at 1100 psig.
In this scenario PATH-i foldout A will apply following the completion of the immediate actions. The RCP trip criteria is BOTH of the following: SI flow> 200 gpm and RCS pressure < 1400 psig. These plant parameters are to be monitored continuously and when those conditions are met the operator must secure the operating RCPs. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is tripping RCPs if SI flow> 200 gpm prior to RCS pressure lowering to 1100 psig. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 8 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 . HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2012 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 2 Reset to IC-i 62 password sandwich Goto RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Post conditions for status board from IC-5 Power has been ramped up to allow the starting of the 2 nd MFW Pump and BOTH Heater Drain Pumps then stabilized Mode 1 50% Reactor power Startup on HOLD for briefing Provide a marked up copy of GP-005 Rev 70 through Step 136.e Control Bank D at 154 steps RCS boron 1843 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON RCS temp 573°F, stable Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan Hang CIT on 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MCB switch Place an off normal placard on 1 MS-T, TDAFW pump due to damaged overspeed trip device Place off normal placard on 1 RC-1 13, PZR PORV 444B block valve Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 9 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
- HARRiS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 Scenario # 2 CAEP file Description of 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Initial conditions were established from 10-5
!Raise power to 52.5% and start the 2 nd MEW Pump and both HD Pumps then stabilize Mode 1 50.5% Reactor power Startup on HOLD for briefing GP005 Rev 70 Step 136.e IC-5 initial conditions for status board information Control Bank D at 155 steps RCS boron 1851 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON SG level maintained with A MEW pump and FW Reg Vlvs in Auto RCS temp 573°F, stable Main Turbine 398 MWe !Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan !Hang CIT on 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 !Place protected train placard on A and B MDAEW pump MCB switch !Place an off normal placard on 1 MS-T, TDAFW pump due to damaged overspeed trip device !Place off normal placard on 1 RC-1 13, PZR PORV 444B block valve !Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates SCENARIO 2 CAEP PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage, PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT While in RUN, shut 1 RC-1 13 TDAFW pump Out Of Service due to damaged overspeed trip device Place CIT on 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 MOB switch Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MOB switch irt mssO34 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN irt mssO35 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN Trip the TDAEW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfwolc (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true Place CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan idi xb2i072 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS ilo xb20072g (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF ilo xb2oO72r (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 10 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 Events Event 1: No trigger Raise power Reactivity RO / SRO Normal-BOP/SRO Event 2: Trigger 2 Normal Service Water Pump A sheared shaft Component RO I SRO imf sws07a (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) TRUE Scenario # 2 CAEP file (continued) I Event 3: Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Instrument BOP I SRO TSSRO imf Pt:475 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0 00:00:30 Event 4: Trigger 4 PRNIS Channel N-44 fails HIGH Instrument RO I SRO imf nis08d (400:00:00 00:00:00) 200.0 00:00:00 - Event 5: Trigger 5 MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) Component BOP / SRO Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 SRO idi xdlil2l (500:00:0000:00:00) TRIP, NORM Event 6: Trigger 6- A EHC Pump Shaft Shear Component BOPISRO imf tur24a (600:00:00 00:00:00) TRUE imf jmsehpas (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Event 7: Trigger 7- RCS Small Break LOCA Loop 1 Cold MajorROIBOP/SRO imf rcsola (700:00:00 00:00:00) .2 00:02:00 0 Event 8: Preload, NO Trigger ATWS Reactor Trip breakers fail to open auto or manual I Crew enters FRP-S.1 BOP trips Turbine and starts AFW pumps MajorRO/BOP/SRO imf rpsolb (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 3 3 Event 9: Preloaded, NO Trigger B Sequencer skips load block for starting B CSIP Component RO I SRO imf dsgo4a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 2 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 11 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 Event 10: Preloaded, NO Trigger Failure of A & B train Phase A Isolation slave relays Component BOP / SRO imf zrpk63oa (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk63ob (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Event 15, Remove Reactor Trip Breaker failure and clear ATWS condition When Reactor trips the A CSIP will also trip TRG= 15 dmf rpsol b 3 3 imf rpsola (15 00:00:05 00:00:00) BOTH_BREAKER Component RO / SRO imf cvc05a (15 00:00:00 00:00:00) true Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 12 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NflQ Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 13 of Event
Description:
Power Increase OP-107.O1 Section 5.3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to
. place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator: announce:
CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift. END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator: annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN. Provides direction per GP-005, Step 136.e PROCEED with GP-005 SRO - the load increase by depressing the GO pushbutton. BOP Informs RO/SRO that turbine load increase is being initiated. BOP Depresses GO pushbutton. RO At 55 to 60% Reactor power, CHECK the following:
. ALB-13/5-3, POWER RANGE UPPER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.
. ALB-13/5-4, POWER RANGE ER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.
. IF either alarm is illuminated, THEN REFER to the APP for appropriate action.
VERIFY Main Feed Pump Recirculation Valves 1 FW-8 and BOP 1 FW-39 are shut when total Main Feed Pump flow is greater than 8600 KPPH. BOP Monitors turbine and feedwater system response. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 13 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fiEQ Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 1.4 of 75 Event
Description:
Power Increase OP-i 07.01 Section 5.3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew may elect to start a dilution before the power
, change is initiated. OP-107.O1 is a Continuous Use Evaluator ote.
procedure. The dilution steps are provided for evaluator use. DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added. This RO may be done by experience or via the reactivity plan associated with the Simulator IC. SETS FIS-1 14, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to RD obtain the desired quantity. SET total makeup flow as follows:
. IF performing DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1 CS-i 51, FK-i 14 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal RD to 90 gpm.
. IF performing ALT DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-1 14 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.
VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the RD STOP position. RD VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit. PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL RD OR the ALT DIL position. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 14 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page i of Event
Description:
Power Increase OP-107.O1 Section 5.3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows: Procedure Note: e PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.
- ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.
- Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.
OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and the RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm. RO START the makeup system as follows:
- TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.
- VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.
RO VERIFY Tavg and rod motion responds as desired. VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired RO quantity has been added. RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch: RO
- Is in the STOP position.
- The green light is lit.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 15 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jjQ Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 16 of Event
Description:
Power Increase OP-107.O1 Section 5.3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO. START the makeup system as follows:
. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily.
. VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.
CREW Continue Power Increase When the evaluators have completed their evaluation of the power change, cue Simulator Operator to insert Lead Evaluator: Tn er 2 Event 2 Normal Service Water Pump A sheared shaft Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 16 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fQ Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 75 Event
Description:
NSW Pump A shaft shear AOP-022 Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 2: Simulator Operator: NSW Pump A sheared shaft (NSWO7A).
. ALB-02-5-5, SERV WTR HEADER A HIGH-LOW FLOW;
. ALB-02-5-6, SERV WTR HEADER B HIGH-LOW FLOW;
. ALB-02-6-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR A LOW PRESS; Indications Available . ALB-02-7-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR B LOW PRESS;
. ALB-02-7-2, SERV WTR PUMPS DISCHARGE LOW PRESS;
. P1-9302.1, NSW Pump DISCH HEADER PRESS reads 0 psig Responds to ALB-02 alarms reports low NSW header RO pressure with pump running indication. (Identifies and reports to SRO that A NSW Pump shaft shear has occurred)
The ESW Pumps will auto start on low header pressure.
. ALB-028-5-1, CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM; Evaluator Note: should be received due to increase cooling with both ESW pumps in service. The SRO should evaluate T.S.
3.6.1.4 AOP-022 SRO Enters AOP-022, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER. Immediate CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING CSIP MORE THAN Action RO - 1-minute: (NO) SRO GOTO Step 2. Immediate CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING EDG MORE THAN Action SRO - 1-minute: (NO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 17 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page j of Z Event
Description:
NSW Pump A shaft shear AOP-022 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior There are several points in the AOP where an AO may be dispatched to check for leaks and proper operation of equipment. Communicator: Report no leaks and no problems at the breaker. When dispatched to the pump, report that the shaft has sheared on the A NSW pump and then request that the SRO contact Maintenance for assistance. Step 3: GO TO the appropriate step as indicated by the parameter LOST: SRO . ESW Header (NO)
. NSW Header (YES) o NSW Pump failure (YES) go to Section 3.0 / Step 6 SRO Proceeds to Step 6 CHECK loss of NSW Header due to NSW Pump FAILED or RO LOSS OF FLOW (YES).-
. START standby NSW Pump as follows:
o VERIFY discharge valve for affected pump is CLOSING by placing affected pump control switch to STOP. (places A NSW pump control switch to STOP) o START standby NSW Pump in priming mode by momentarily placing standby NSW Pump control switch to START. (takes B NSW pump control switch to START) o WHEN discharge valve for affected pump is fully SHUT, THEN PLACE and HOLD control switch for running pump to START to fully OPEN pump discharge valve. (WHEN discharge valve on A NSW pump is fully shut places B NSW pump switch to START and waits for discharge valve to fully open) RO
- CHECK ANY NSW Pump - RUNNING. (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 18 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fQ Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 19 of 75 Event
Description:
NSW Pump A shaft shear AOP-022 Time Position Appicants Actions or Behavior SRO . GO TO Section 3.2 (page 30). SRO Proceeds to Section 3.2, Step 1. CHECK Turbine trip required by ANY of the following SRO conditions EXIST: (NO) o No NSW Pump can be operated o Non-isolable leak exists in the NSW system o Major isolable leak exists on the Turbine Building NSW Header AND time does not permit a controlled plant shutdown SRO OBSERVE Note prior to Step 13 AND GO TO Step 13. Steps 13 through 19 address leaks on NSW turbine building header. Leaks on individual components supplied Procedure Note: by the Turbine Building header are addressed by Steps 20 and 21. CHECK for minor isolable leak on Turbine Building header CREW ANY EXISTING. (NO) SRO GO TO Step 20. CHECK for leak in an individual component ANY EXISTING. CREW - (NO) SRO GO TO Step 22. CREW CHECK for leak on WPB header ANY EXISTING. (NO) SRO GO TO Step 24. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 19 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 20 of 75 Event
Description:
NSW Pump A shaft shear AOP-022 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK that NSW Pump(s) MALFUNCTIONED. (YES) PERFORM the following for affected NSW Pump(s): SRO
- CHECK NSW Pump breaker(s) MALFUNCTIONED. (NO)
. GOTOStep25.b.
RO/BOP . CHECK adequate pump suction inventory EXISTS: (YES) o Ll-9300.i, Service Water PMP A CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9300) o LI-9302, Service Water PMP B CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9302) o LI-i 931, Cooling Tower Basin Level, GREATER THAN 31 inches Locally VERIFY the following for the affected NSW Pump per OP-i 39, Service Water System: CREW o Proper cooling and seal water supply to NSW Pumps. o Proper operation of NSW strainer backwash. When contacted acknowledge request for verifications and Communicator: report back about 2 minutes later that cooling, seal water supply and strainer backwash are all normal.
. Locally CHECK NSW Pump(s) for signs of damage (shaft CREW shear or other obvious problems). (YES MCB indications and local AO report)
Dispatch AO to investigate Generator H2 and Seal Oil Trouble BOP Annunciator Acknowledge request. Report back in 2 minutes that the alarm Communicator: is due to High Hydrogen Pressure. Inform the BOP that you are going to acknowledge the annunciator. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 20 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nfl Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 21 of 75 Event
Description:
NSW Pump A shaft shear AOP-022 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: Clear the H2 panel alarm irf genOOl depressed SRO INITIATE appropriate corrective action for the loss of NSW.
. Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for failure of the A NSW Pump
. Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of Work Request Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a follow Evaluator Note:
up question after the scenario. Enters Containment System TS 3.6.1.4 Internal Pressure SRO ACTION With containment internal pressure outside of the limits above, restore the internal pressure to within the limit within 1 hour Simulator Operator: If requested to Rack out A NSW pump breaker iii swsO57 racked out After assistance is requested or when AOP-022 is exited, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 3 Lead Eva uator. Event 3 Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 21 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: JJ.EQ Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 22 of 7 Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3: Simulator Operator: Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%
. ALB-014-1-2, Loop A Hi Steam Line AP Low-Pi
. ALB-014-1-4, Loop A Hi Steam Line Press Rate Alert
. ALB-014-4-2A, Loop A Low Stm Line Press Alert Indications Available
. P1-475 SA failing to 0 psig
. SG FF/SF mismatch
. SG level lowering APP BOP/RO RESPONDS to alarms and evaluates APP-ALB-014.
ALB-O1 4 lAW OPS-NGGC-1 000, the operator may take MANUAL Evaluator Note: control of a malfunctioning controller before being directed by a procedure.
. CONFIRM alarm using:
o P1-474.1 SB, P1-484.1 SB, and P1-494 SB, Steam BOP Generator A pressure. o Reports P1-475 reading or failing low.
. VERIFY Automatic Functions: NONE o Takes manual control of FK-478 (1 FW-1 33) A SG Main FW Reg Valve and stabilizes A SG level PERFORM Corrective Actions:
o Dispatch an operator to investigate for feed line break and steam line rupture (NONE) a Check Containment press, temp, and humidity for evidence of a Containment leak (NO) a CHECK for failed instrument (YES) a IF failed instrument identified then remove the failed instrument from service
- Restores level to normal (57% NR).
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 22 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 23 of 75 Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. Provides level band and trip guidance for A SG level while in manual control lAW OMM-001, Attachment 13 o SG Level Control Band 52% to 62%
SRO o Trip limit Low 30% Trip limit High 73%
. Refer to OWP-ESF-02 to remove channel from service.
. Contacts l&C to have channel removed from service.
. Dispatch AO to investigate BOP Place Turbine in hold (maybe on hold from previous event)
OWP-ESF-02 has been included as Attachment 1 (Pg 60 of
- 75) at the end of this scenario.
Evaluator Note: Failed channel does NOT have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.
- Requests extra operator for dedicated Feedwater operation
. Directs operator and l&C to perform OWP-ESF-02 SRO
- Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure of A SG PT-475 BOP Performs OWP-ESF-02 (sheet 3 of 8) steps 1 and 2 OWP-ESFO2 Sheet3of8 Bistable IStatus Liclht Lineup Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number lnitialNerifled lnitialfVerified Steamline Pressure Channel Ill NOTE: SG A level channels associated with Loop I SFIFF Mismatch RPS signals must remain OPERABLE (L61474B & LP1475B not tripped> and SO A level must be maintained above low level setpoint to preclude a SF/FF Mismatch Reactor Trip.
(circle position selected> STM GEN A FW FLOW CHAN 476 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 476 / CHAN 477 (circle position selected) STM GEN A STM FLOW CHAN 474 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 475 / CHAN 475 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 23 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jj Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page ?4 of Z Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a follow-E V al U ator Note up question after the scenario. Enters Instrumentation TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 14 ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing SRO of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
3.3.2 Functional Unit 1 .e, 4.d, 4.e and 6.cj ACTION 19. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels. operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.
Acknowledge request and reports from SRO. IF an extra operator is requested, state someone will be Communicator: sent when available. IF asked to report to MCR to perform OWP-ESF-02, state that you will report as soon as possible. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 24 of 75
Aooendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page of Z Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior It is not required to implement the OWP prior to continuing Simulator Operator: with the scenario. Note: l&C field activities are not required to be completed before continuing with the next event. Evaluator Note: After SG level is under control and the TS has been identified, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 4 Event 4 Power Range NIS Channel 44 fails HIGH Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 25 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jflQ Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 26 of 75 Event
Description:
PR NIS Channel 44 tails HIGH AOP-OO1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 4: Simulator Operator: Power Range NlS Channel 44 failure HIGH Indications Available . Uncontrolled rod motionlbistable trips. RO RESPONDS to alarms/uncontrolled rod motion. ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod AOP-OO1 SRO Control and Indication System. Makes PA announcement for AOP entry RO PERFORMS AOP-001 Immediate Actions. Rods cannot be withdrawn until AOP-OO1 actions have been implemented to clear the overpower rod stop. Evaluator Note: OWP-RP-26 provides the same actions as AOP-OO1 to clear the overpower rod stop. Immediate CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped. Action RO (YES) Immediate Action RO POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN. Immediate Action RO CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES) SRO PROCEEDS to Section 3.2. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 26 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 27 of 75 Event
Description:
PR NIS Channel 44 fails HIGH AOP-OO1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK that instrument channel failure has NOT OCCURRED by observing the following:
. RCS Tavg (YES)
RO
. RCS Tref (YES)
. POWER Range NI channels (NO, NI-44 Failed)
. TURBINE first stage pressure (YES)
RNO Actions: PERFORM the following:
- IF a power supply is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. (NO)
SRO
- IF an individual instrument failed, THEN MAINTAIN manual rod control until corrective action is complete.
(YES)
- IF a Power Range NI Channel failed, THEN PLACE the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer. (YES)
Proceeds to the Detector Current Comparator Drawer and BOP places NI-44 Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS
- Reports completion of task to the SRO.
Manually OPERATE affected control bank to restore the following:
. Equilibrium power and temperature conditions RO
- Rods above the insertion limits of Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.
- Withdraws Control Bank D to restore Tave with Tref.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 27 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fQ Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page of Event
Description:
PR NIS Channel 44 tails HIGH AOP-OO1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY proper operation of the following: (YES) o CVCS demineralizers RO o BTRS o Reactor Makeup Control System CHECK that this section was entered due to control banks SRO MOVING OUT. (NO) GO TO Step 6. CHECK that NEITHER of the following OCCURRED: (NO) SRO o Unexplained RCS Boration a Unplanned RCS dilution CHECK that an automatic Rod Control malfunction SRO OCCURRED. (NO) GO TO Step 9. SRO EXIT this procedure.
. Refer to OWP-RP-26 to remove channel from service.
. Direct operator and I&C to perform OWP-RP-26 SRO
- Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Affachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure of Nl-44
- Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of Work Request Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 28 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 29 of 75 Event
Description:
PR NIS Channel 44 fails HIGH AOP-OO1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a Evaluator Note: follow-up question after the scenario. Enters Instrumentation TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 2, 3, and 4 ACTION 2 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels. STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1. and
- c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is SRO reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or,. the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Specification 4.2.4.2.3.3.1 Reference the below T.S. but it will not apply for this conditions because 3 instruments is the Minimum Number required 3.3.1 Functional Unit 19 b, c, and d.
ACTION 7 With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 29 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page Q of Event
Description:
PR NIS Channel 44 fails HIGH AOP-OO1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge request and reports from SRO. Communicator: IF asked to report to MCR to perform OWP-RP-26 state that you will report as soon as possible. It is not required to implement the OWP prior to continuing Simulator Operator: with the scenario. Note: Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a follow-up question after the scenario. Note: I&C field activities are not required to be completed before continuing with the next event. Note: It is not required for Tave to match Tref or Rod Lead Evaluator: Control to be placed in Automatic before continuing with the next event. After Control Bank 0 have been withdrawn to restore Tave with Tref, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 5 Event 5 MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker trips both fans on AH-3 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 30 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page of 75 Event
Description:
MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5: Simulator Operator: MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trip
. ALB-OO1-6-5, ENGINEERING SAFEGUARD FEATURES SYSTEM TRAIN A BYPASSED OR INOPERABLE Indications Available
. ALB-027-8-2, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-3 FLOW LOW O/L RO Responds to alarm ALB-001 5.
BOP Responds to alarm ALB-027-8-2. Enters APP-ALB-001 5 and APP-ESF-A-4-1. APP SRO (Note APP-ALB-001 5 will direct entry into APP-ESF-A-4-1. ALB-O01 The ESF-A-4-1 light does not have an associated alarm.) Reports alarm condition(s) on Engineered Safeguard Feature RO Bypass Panel A. Refer to APP-ESF-A-4-1 for the window indicated in alarm on RO ESF Bypass Panel A. BOP Reports Containment Fan Cooler AH-3 tripped. BOP should evaluate the HNP Electrical Load list to determine it any additional components are affect by MCC Evaluator Note: 1 A34. No other loads are powered form MCC 1 A34, as shown on Attachment 2 (Pg 68 of 75) at the end of this scenario. BOP Reports no power to 1A34. Dispatches AO to investigate. Requests AO to go to 480V Bus SRO A3 and investigate cause of MCC A34 SA supply breaker trip. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 31 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N5 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 32 of Event
Description:
MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) L Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Report 1 A34 feeder breaker is open the static display Communicator: unit is blank. The SRO should direct the BOP to shift to the Train B coolers (AH-1 and AH-4). The following steps should be Evaluator Note: completed for AH-1 and repeated for AH-4 (in either order) then AH-2 should be stopped. SRO Directs BOP to shift to Train B Fan Coolers. OP-i 69 BOP Enters OP-i 69, Section 5.1 80P Verifies Initial Conditions. Evaluator Note: Procedure note indicates that placing the Containment Normal Purge Exhaust flow controller (FK-7624) in manual and shutting CP-B9, will enhance control on Containment pressure during fan starts. Normal purge may have isolated after Containment pressure rose to
> -0.2 inwg due to AH-3 losing power, making the next step optional.
Places FK-7624, Norm Purge Exh Flow, in MANUAL, and BOP shuts CP-B9, Norm Cont Purge Modulating Valve to control containment pressure during air handler swap. Procedure note indicates that in winter months, the Evaluator Note: operating train should be secured per Section 7.1 prior to starting the idle train, to minimize the potential for entering Tech Spec 3.6.1.4 BOP Places control switch for both fans in AH-i/AH-4 to LO-SPD.
. Procedure Note indicates the next two steps must be Evaluator Note.
completed without delay to avoid coastdown. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 32 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 33 of Event
Description:
MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Place control switches for AH-1/AH-4 to STOP. BOP Place control switches for AH-1/AH-4 to Hl-SPD. BOP Restores FK-7624, Norm Purge Exh Flow, to AUTO QP-169 BOP Transitions to OP-169, Section 7.1 BOP Places control switches for AH-2 fans in STOP
. Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist SRO
- Contacts WOO for assistance / generation of Work Request
- Contacts support personnel for repairs.
Evaluator Note: Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a follow-up question after the scenario. Enters Containment TS 3.6.2.3 Action a. (Restore both trains to operable within 7 days or SRO be in HSB in the following 6 hours) 3.6.1.5 (NA until >120°F) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 33 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event# 5 Page 4 of Event
Description:
MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Annunciators associated with EHC A pump failure (Event 6) will not alarm until approximately 4 minutes have elapsed after initiating the trigger. Thus early cuing of this failure is recommended. After the actions to place the tan coolers are aligned in Lead Evaluator: accordance with SRO directions and the Fan Cooler TS has been evaluated, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 6 Event 6 EHC Pump A Shaft Shear I Standby Pump auto start failure Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 34 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 35 of 75 Event
Description:
EHC Pump A Shaft Shear / Standby Pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 6: Simulator Operator: EHC Pump A shaft shear with standby auto start failure.
. ALB-20-4-2B, EH FLUID LOW PRESS Indications Available
. P1-4221 decreasing Responds to ALB-20-4-2B or indication of degrading EHC BOP pressure on P1-4221.
APP BOP Enters APP-ALB-20-4-2B. ALB-020 CONFIRM alarm using: BOP
- P1-4221 VERIFY Automatic Functions:
BOP
- Standby DEH Pump starts at 1500 psig, as sensed by PS-01 TA-4223V The BOP may immediately start the standby pump or wait Evaluator Note:
until after reading the APP. Starts EHC Pump B and observes pressure returning to BOP normal on P1-4221. Dispatches AO to investigate failure of EHC Pump A. When dispatched to investigate, report there is a shaft Communicator: shear on the A EHC Pump Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 35 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f45Q Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page of z. Event
Description:
EHC Pump A Shaft Shear I Standby Pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective Actions:
- a. IF the Reactor is tripped, THEN GO TO EOPPATH-1.
(NO)
- b. START the standby DEH Pump. (Starts B DEH Pump)
- c. DISPATCH an operator to perform the following:
- 1) MONITOR DEH Pump and PCV operation.
BOP 2) VERIFY OPEN the following: a) 1 EH-1, A EH Pump Suction Vlv b) 1 EH-8, B EH Pump Suction Vlv c) 1 EH-31, Main Hdr Press Switch Isol Vlv
- 3) INVESTIGATE system for leaks.
- 4) IF a leak is found, THEN ISOLATE the leak AND IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY Control Room.
. Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist SRO/RO
- Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of Work Request
- Contacts support personnel for repairs After the actions to place the standby DEH pump in service is completed, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 7 Lead Evaluator:
Event 7 Small break LOCA I ATWS Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 36 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: JJEQ Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page Z of 7 Event
Description:
RCS Small Break LOCA AOP-O1 6 [ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 7: Simulator Operator: (RCS Small Break LOCA)
. Lowering Pressurizer Level
- Increasing Charging flow
. ALB-009-2-2, PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL
. . . DEVIATION Indications Available:
- ALB-O1O-6-5A, 0/TEMP AT BLK ROD C-3 ALERT
- ALB-028-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION SYSTEM
- Rising pressure and temperature in Containment
. Rising Containment sump level Identifies changing plant conditions and provides crew update.
RO Recommends AOP-Oi 6, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, entry. AOP-O1 6 SRO Enters AOP-01 6 (No Immediate Actions) SRO Check RHR in operation (NO) REFER TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification And SRO Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix. The RCS leakage is being ramped and will increase to Examiner Note: beyond the VCT makeup capability (>120 gpm) SRO CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. RO Identifies RCS leakage is exceeding VCT makeup capability Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 37 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fflQ Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 38 of Event
Description:
RCS Small Break LOCA AOP-O1 6 Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RNO actions: SRO Perform the following:
- a. Trip the Reactor, AND GO TO EOP PATH-i If SI Actuation is required, the Reactor and Turbine Procedure Note: should be verified tripped in PATH-i before manually actuating SI.
- a. MANUALLY INITIATE Safety Injection.
SRO
- b. EXIT this procedure Directs manual Reactor Trip and after the Reactor and Turbine SRO are verified tripped actuate Safety Injection.
Attempts to initiate a MANUAL Reactor Trip from center RO section of the Main Control Board (switch is failed). Attempts to initiate a MANUAL Reactor Trip from left section of RO the Main Control Board (switch is failed). Manually Trips Main Turbine when both Rx Trip switches are BOP NOT successful When the Main Turbine is tripped RCS pressure will rapidly increase and one or more Pressurizer PORVs will lift. With RCS break flow occurring, the RCS pressure will Evaluator Note. steadily decrease. SG pressure will also rapidly increase and cause all SG PORVs to OPEN and most of the SG safety valves to lift. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 38 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page of 75 Event
Description:
ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open FRP-S.1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior During the ATWS the crew makes a PA announcement for an operator to contact or report to the MCR for Communicator: instructions to locally trip the Reactor. CALL the MCR as the TB AO and get the instructions. After the TB AO has received instructions to locally trip the Reactor, wait 1 minute then run TRG-15. Trigger 15 Simulator Operator: will delete the ATWS malfunction (RPSO1 B) and trip the Reactor locally. After running TRG-15 call MCR and report that the Rx trip breakers were locally opened. FRP-S.1 is the first transition step from PATH-i and contains immediate action step required to be performed Evaluator Note: from memory. Because of this the SRO may proceed directly to FRP-S.1. Enters PATH-i, Rx WILL NOT trip from RPS or MCB PATH-i SRO switches. Transitions to FRP-S.i, Response to Nuclear Power FRP-S. 1 SRO Generation / ATWS from PATH-i step 1 RNO To maximize core cooling, RCPs should NOT be tripped with reactor power GREATER THAN 5%. (Normal support Procedure Caution: conditions for running RCPs are NOT required for these circumstances. The RCP TRIP CRITERIA for small break LOCA conditions is NOT applicable to this procedure.) Procedure Note: Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 39 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nfl. Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 4Q of Z Event
Description:
ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open FRP-S.1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify Reactor Trip:
. Check for all of the following:
- Check for any of the following:
mmedlate Trip breakers RTA AND BYA OPEN (NO) Action RO .
. Trip breakers RTB AND BYB OPEN (NO)
. Rod bottom lights LIT (NO)
. Neutron flux DECREASING (NO)
RNO actions: IF the reactor will NOT trip (automatically AND after using both manual trip switches), THEN verify negative reactivity inserted CRCAL by any of the following while continuing with this procedure: TASK RO
- Manually insert control rods
. Verify control rods inserting in automatic (Critical to insert negative reactivity before the Reactor Trip Breakers are locally opened)
Verify Turbine Trip:
. Check for any of the following:
Immediate Action BOP . All turbine throttle valves SHUT (YES)
. All turbine governor valves SHUT (YES)
Immediate Verify All AFW Pumps RUNNING (Starts ALL available AFW Action BOP pumps) Check Reactor Trip Status:
- Check Reactor TRIPPED (NO)
Immediate Action SRO RNO Action: Direct an operator to contact OR report to the main control room (to receive instructions to locally trip the reactor). Perform the following: SRO
- Inform STA to initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.
- Inform SM to Evaluate EAL Matrix (Refer to PEP-i 10).
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 40 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 4j of 75 Event
Description:
ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open FRP-S.1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Actuation of the sequencer inhibits operation of the boric acid pumps. (If the sequencer runs on Program A, the pumps can be started manually after LB-9. Otherwise, the i-roceuure ote. sequencer must be reset to restore operation of the pumps) SI flow accomplishes emergency boration. After the reactor is tripped, RCS pressure will rapidly decrease to the Auto SI setpoint (1850 psig). The crew may/may not have time to manually actuate SI; as such, there is no problem with the crew NOT performing a Evaluator Note: manual SI. After the reactor is tripped, the A CSIP will trip on an electrical fault, and the Safeguards Sequencer will fail to start the B CSIP. Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS:
- Check SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (NO)
. Emergency borate from the BAT:
o Start a boric acid pump.
- Perform any of the following (listed in order of preference):
o Open Emergency Boric Acid Addition valve: Critical
- 1 CS-278 RO Task o Open normal boration valves:
- FCV-113A
- FCV-113B
. Verify boric acid flow to CSIP suction AT LEAST 30 GPM
. Verify CSIP flow to RCS AT LEAST 30 GPM (NOTE: This task is only Critical if control rods are not being used. Critical to insert negative reactivity before the Reactor Trip Breakers are locally opened)
RO Check PRZ Pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG. (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 41 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fj.Q Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 42 of 75 Event
Description:
ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open FRP-S.1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Isolate CNMT Ventilation:
- Stop the following fans: (If running) o AH-82A NORMAL PURGE SUPPLY FAN BOP o AH-82B NORMAL PURGE SUPPLY FAN o E-5A CNMT PRE-ENTRY PURGE EXHAUST FAN o E-5B CNMT PRE-ENTRY PURGE EXHAUST FAN Verify the valves and dampers listed in the table SHUT.
(YES) TItAXH A C*peet* itU cp.eta II3-Z S* vActfl KIJE 1C3-6 S VAUU RELIEF CD5I SA VAGIJW( RETJK CW-D52 Th YAUUN RLIE BOP ic A GAL t*G X$t CP6 S3 $OWAL URG XHL IC?-5 SA lORNAL LUR DIScR 1C-3 S OAL PURGE DISGE Ic?-1e SA PR-ENTRY PtJR8 IHLT iC?- 7 S3 PRK- flRT ?RGS INLET CP SA PR HtRT ?URGS DIS ic-i $3 PR! RY PUG DISCS The following actions will be complete IF local AO actions Evaluator Note: have been completed, IF NOT the RNO steps have been previously directed as part of the Immediate Actions Check Trip Status: RO Check Reactor TRIPPED (YES) BOP Check turbine TRIPPED (YES) Check Reactor Subcritical: Check for both of the following: RO
- Power range channels LESS THAN 5% (YES)
- Intermediate range startup rate channels NEGATIVE (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 42 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jjflQ Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page of 75 Event
Description:
ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open FRP-S.1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Go to step 25 Boration should continue to obtain adequate shutdown Procedure Caution: margin during subsequent recovery actions.
. Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.
SRO
. RETURN TO Procedure And Step in Effect.
Evaluator Note: The SRO should return to PATH-i, step 1 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 43 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: flQ Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 44 of z Event
Description:
Sequencer B skips load block 1 start of B CSIP PATH-i Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PATH-i SRO Transitions to PATH-i, Step 1 RO VERIFY Reactor Trip: (YES) BOP Verify Turbine Trip: (YES) BOP Verify Power to AC Emergency Buses: (YES, Off-Site Power) After the reactor is tripped, RCS pressure will rapidly decrease, to the Auto SI setpoint (1850 psig). The crew may/may not have time to manually actuate SI; as such, there is no problem with the crew NOT performing a Evaluator Note: manual SI. After the reactor is tripped, the A CSIP will trip on an electrical fault, and the Safeguards Sequencer will fail to start the B CSIP. SRO Check SI Actuated (YES) Perform The Following:
- Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status SRO Trees
- Directs SM to evaluate EAL Matrix (Refer to PEP-i 10)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 44 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 45 of Event
Description:
Sequencer B skips load block 1 start of B CSIP PATH-i Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Informs Crew Foldout A applies FOLDOUT A
. RCP TRIP CRITERIA BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING OCCUR, THEN STOP ALL RCPs.
. SI FLOW GREATER THAN 200 GPM
. RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN 1400 PSIG
. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA 8 CST LEVEL DECREASES TO LESS THAN 10%, THEN SWITCH THE AFW WATER SUPPLY TO THE ESW SYSTEM USING OP-137, SECTION 81.
RHR RESTART rpTFcL& E RCS PRESSURE DECREASES IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER TO LESS THAN SRO 230 PSIG, THEN RESTART RHR PUMPS TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE RCS
. Al TFPNATF MINIFI flW OPENI5HUT CRITERIA
. IF RCS PRESSURE DECREASES TO LESS THAN 1800 PSIG, THEN VERIFY ALTERNATE MINIFLOW ISOLATION VALVES OR MINIFLOW BLOCK VALVES SHUT
. IF RCS PRESSURE INCREASES TO GREATER THAN 2200 P51G. THEN VERIFY ALTERNATE MINIFLOW ISOLATION VALVES AND MINIFLOW BLOCK VALVES OPEN
. RUPTURED SG AFW ISOLATiON CRITERIA 8 BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING OCCUR TO ANY SO, THEN STOP FEED FLOW BY SHUUING ISOLATION VALVES (PREFERRED) OR FLOW CONTROL VALVES TO AFFECTED SO:
. ANY SO LEVEL INCREASES IN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR HAS ABNORMAL SECONDARY RADIATION
. NARROW RANGE LEVEL GREATER THAN 25% (40%I The following actions should be taken lAW PATH-i Foldout A criteria during the scenario:
. When RCP trip criteria is met per Foldout A the crew should have the B CSIP running, identify the Evaluator Note:
condition and then trip all running RCPs
. Verify Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves CLOSE or CLOSE the Miniflow Block Valves when RCS Pressure lowers to less than 1800 PSIG.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 45 of 75
Arendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 46 of 75 Event
Description:
Sequencer B skips load block 1 start of B CSIP PATH-i Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps RUNNING. (NO) (Manually start B CSIP prior to RCS pressure lowering below 1400 psig) Checks Safeguards Sequencer has reached Load Block 9 Critical (Manual Load Permissive) Task RO Starts B CSIP Reports to SRO (at appropriate time) B CSIP was manually started Reports RHR Pumps running (YES) Check SI Flow: RO SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES) RO RCS pressure GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES) The crew may manually initiate Main Steam Isolation because Containment Pressure is rising towards the automatic setpoint. Evaluator Note: MSLI will be required when Cnmt Pressure increases to >3 psig. The SRO should direct either the RO or BOP to actuate MSLI prior to reaching 3 psig. Check Main Steam Isolation: RO/BOP Main Steam Line Isolation (MSLI) ACTUATED. (NO) Main Steam Line Isolation (MSLI) REQUIRED. (YES) SRO Directs Main Steam Isolation Actuates Main Steam Isolation and verifies MSIV, MSIV BOP Bypass valves and MSIV Before Seat Drains are shut Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 R PSIG. (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 46 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: JiBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 4Z of 7 Event
Description:
Sequencer B skips load block 1 start of B CSIP PATH-i Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check AFW Status: RO/BOP AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (YES) Identifies Foldout A RCP Trip Criteria is MET SI flow> 200 GPM RCS pressure < 1400 psig Critical RO Informs SRO that RCP trip criteria is met Task Secures ALL RCPs (Critical to secure all RCPs with SI flow> 200 gpm and before RCS pressure stabilizes at 1100 psig) Verify Sequencer Operations AND Alignment Of Components: BOP Check sequencer manual loading permissive (LB-9) ACTUATED (YES) BOP Energize AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment lAW PATH-i Attachment 6 without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position Evaluator Note because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable. PATH-i, Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification has been included as Attachment 3 (Pg 69 of 75) at the end of this scenario. PATH-i Verify Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS Aft. 6 BOP Signals Using Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing with this Procedure. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 47 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 48 of 75 Phase A isolation Valves 1 SP-9481949, 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, Event
Description:
1SP-16I1SP-939, and 1SP-916/1SP-918 Fail to CLOSE PATH 1 Attachment 6 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 6: Identifies valves mis-positioned and closes at least one of the valves in each of the following combinations
. 1SP-948/1SP-949, RCS LOOPS B&C HOT LEG CNMT BOP ISOL (Att. 6)
- 1 ED-94/i ED-95, CNMT SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE AND closes at least one set of the following:
- 1 SP-i 6/1 SP-939, RCS LEAK DET SAMPLE ISOL
- 1SP-916/1SP-918, RCS LEAK DET SAMPLE ISOL Per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 22:
BOP Directs AO to place 1 A and 1 B Air Compressor in the local (Att. 6) control mode, referring to Path-i Guide Attachment 5 Acknowledge the request to place 1 A and 1 B Air Communicator Compressor in the local control mode per PATH-i Guide Attachment 5. When directed to place the i A and 1 B Air Compressor in the local control mode: Run APP\air\acsto_Iocal Simulator Operator When the APP for i A and 1 B Air Compressor has completed running call the MCR and inform them that the air compressors are running in local control. Per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 23: BOP Directs AO to locally unlock AND turn ON the breakers for the (Att. 6) CSIP suction AND discharge cross-connect valves, referring to PATH-i Guide Attachment 11. Acknowledge request to unlock and turn on the breakers Communicator: for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves per PATH-i Guide Attachment ii Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 48 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: JjQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page of 75 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When requested to unlock and turn on CSIP suction and
- discharge cross-connect valves: Run APP\cvc\Path-l Att. 6 Simulator Operator:
When the APP has completed running inform MCR that PATH-i Attachment 11 is complete. Control RCS Temperature: Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize RCS temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1. TAL RCS TWKRATUIR CO)TROL GUIDRUNES FOU.OWINO U TRIP
- Gu4Ane te pp1ieabie until another roednra 4iraote othezwis
- IX no RCPa nming nee wi4a raa o1d 1a tmperature RCS TEKPRRATJRE TREND LESS TM4 GREATU T5AN STAELR AT OR 5S7 AND 532# AND TRENDINI TO casIii
- Stop 4uping
- condnse ConuoZ fe atea areila1ia flo an4 BOP/RO transfer thrap to a Control fsa rtce duap t talish en4 flow ST!A PRESSURE maintai ICS sod using tpsrature C )jflt4j tta OPI26. 55P fae flow Section 5.3 AND 559F OPERAT* gzeater than AND duwp steaw ACTION 210 PLR to roanser until level rsetar than OR 25% f40%1 in at least one
- Puap tsea on intant SO using intact SO PORVa
* .11 conidova continuaw
- Control fee4 1iN that flo* to NSIV, AND aaintain S PASE valves tevels Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 49 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 50 of 7 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies RCS cooldown continues and shuts MSIVs CREW NOTE: MSIVs may have been shut from MSLI If PRZ pressure is below 2260 PSIG AND increasing, PRZ spray valves may be OPEN due to controller demand. (With the spray valve controllers and master PRZ pressure Procedure Note: controller in AUTOMATIC, this response is the result of the PRZ master controller being a proportional-integral controller.) Check PRZ PORVs AND Spray Valves: Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES) RO Check PZR PORV block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES) PRZ spray valves SHUT. (YES) Identify any faulted SG: Check for any of the following: RO/BOP
- Any SG pressures DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)
- Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)
Identify any ruptured SG: Check for all of the following:
- Condenser Vacuum Pump Effluent radiation CREW NORMAL. (YES)
- SG Blowdown radiation NORMAL. (YES)
- Main Steamline radiation NORMAL. (YES)
RO/BOP Any SG with an uncontrolled level increase (NO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 50 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nfl Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 51 of 75 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Intact Check for all of the following:
- CNMT pressure NORMAL (NO)
SRO
- CNMT wide range sump level NORMAL (NO)
- CNMT area radiation monitors NORMAL (NO)
GO TO Step 44 [Entry Point C] Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required. SRO (None required) Informs Crew Foldout A and B applies FDOUtA
- RCPTRIPCRITERIA IE bc4 f th oficwi occur. flj kp fl RP:
4 fkwi GREATER THAN 201] GPM
- RCS pesre iES$ THAN 1400 PSK3
- AW %1JPVL( SWITCHOVER CRITERIA f CST 1e4 d tçjess than l0% JJjENstch Ie AFW wpy th ESW syn s*ng OP-17, AUXLIARY FEEDWATER SYSTI(, Stø 8i
- RRII RESTARt C1TERIA F RCS 2] PSIG in rn THEN RHR xxnps spy waI e RC
- ALTATE FLOW OPUSI1tCRflA
- F RCS psur uease t less than 1q00 PSG, ThEN vdy mit mti,tb
óatian (N mIni1w bk* Wes SHUT SRO IF Inccur ti y SG THEN fd kw by sNth1g the 4iun s (pd) ( fcw SG
- My SO lew frieacs ui Hed nw*r B Ila% .bnxm
- amww rge leve4 GREATER THAN 25% 180%
FX0OUtB
- SECONDARY 4TE(TTY CRItERIA IF q f the urs. THEN GO TO EPP014, AULTEf) STEAM GENERATOR 1SOLAT1CW. Step .
My SO 1)ECREASES N N UNCONTROLLED MANNER AND THAT SO AS NQIBEEN SOtATEfl
- Any SG-COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED AM) THAT SO HAS NOT BEEN [SOtATED
- PA1H4 TRAMSfflON CRITtfA newrany SO hae abnafm ediatk
- COLt) LEG FCQftATION SWflt)NVFR CRITERIA fl GO TO Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 51 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: BQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 52 of 75 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew should review foldout criteria. Evaluator Note: The crew identify and use Adverse Values identified in brackets in the EOP procedures [] when Containment Pressure exceeds 3 PSIG Maintain RCP Seal Injection flow between 8 GPM AND RO 13 GPM. Check Intact SG Levels: Any level GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES) dependant on timing same results BOP Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% AND 50% [40% AND 50%]. BOP Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1 B1 ENERGIZED. (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 52 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fi.EQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page of 7 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check PZR PORV block valves: Verify AC buses 1 Al AND 1 Bi Energized (YES) RO Check PORVs Shut (YES) Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES) IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts SRO after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint. Check SI Termination Criteria: RCS subcooling GREATER THAN (YES/NO) RO dependant on timing same results
. l0°F[40°F]C
- 20°F[50°F]M IF Subcooling > 10°F then the check is performed, Evaluator Note:
otherwise the following is N/A) Check secondary heat sink by observing any of the following
. Level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 25%
BOP [40%J (YES)
. Total feed flow to intact SGs GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (YES)
WHEN the SI termination criteria are met, THEN GO TO SRO EPP-008, SI TERMINATION, Step 1. Check CNMT Spray Status: RO Check any CNMT Spray Pump RUNNING. (NO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 53 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 54 of 75 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Source Range Detector Status:
. Intermediate range flux LESS THAN 5x10 11 AMPS RO (YES)
. Verify source range detectors ENERGIZED
- Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale Check RHR Pump status:
- Check RHR pump suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)
RO . RCS Pressure greater than 230 PSIG (YES)
. RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES/NO)
- Yes Stop RHR pumps, NO leave RHR pumps on.
Dependant on timing The evaluation/trend of RCS pressure in the next several steps is dependent on how long it took the crew to reach Evaluators Note: these steps (Decay Heat/Break Flow/ECCS flow). Pressure should be stable or decreasing at this point. Check RCS And SG Pressures: Check for both of the following: RO
. All SG Pressures STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)
. RCS pressure STABLE OR DECREASING. (YES)
If the evaluation/trend of RCS pressure in the previous Evaluators Note: step was increasing the SRO will return to PATH-i Entry Point C (Pg 51 of 75) and wait for the plant to stabilize. Establish CCW Flow To The RHR Heat Exchangers: Verify both CCW Pumps running (YES) Open the following valves: (CCW Return From RHR HX RO Trains A and B)
. 1CC-i 47 (locates MCB switch and opens valve)
- 1 CC-i 67 (locates MCB switch and opens valve)
RO Verify CCW flow to the RHR Heat Exchangers (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 54 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 55 of Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Perform one of the following to establish two independent CCW systems: (SHUTS one Train of valves listed below) Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:
. 1CC-99 RO
- 1CC-128 OR Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:
- 1CC-113
. 1CC-127 Check EDG status:
Check AC emergency buses 1 A-SA AND 1 B-SB BOP/RO ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES)
. Check Bus voltages (Normal)
. Verify breakers 105 and 125 closed (YES)
BOP/RO Check any EDG running unloaded (YES) Reset SI (takes both SI reset switches to RESET and RO observes status light change from SI active to SI reset) Shutdown any unloaded EDGs using OP-i 55, Diesel BOP Generator Emergency Power System, Section 7.0 Evaluator Note: See next page for copy of PATH-i Attachment 3 Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status: RHR system CAPABLE OF COLD LEG SRO RECIRCULATION (Path-i Guide Affachment 3) (YES) Check Auxiliary AND Radwaste Processing Building radiation NORMAL (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 55 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page of 7 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position j Applicants Actions or Behavior PATH-i GUII)E Attachment 3 Sheetiofi MANUAL AIJONMENr FOR COU) LEG REC1RCULATION Component codleq water to the RHR heat exchangers s j required to be avate in order to establish Itow from the recircillaticri surnp&
- 1. At least one trn o the fd&wing components must be capabe of estabftshnq flow tmm the redrcufation sunips, Each component must satisty the conditions n the associated iabe AND rrist NOT otherAse be known to be failecL Li TramnA nditici for Ccponent Reeiroiation A1igeat RW PUN? A lowr Availablo 1RR 1. R lRJ-Z (KCS loop A to IWR pump A) either talve SflJT lSt-300 (cwr ump to RILR pump A) Poster Ailbl 1SI31 tCNH? unp to RW p*mp A) For ilaile 1SI321 (RST to R2 p A) Power Available lSI4O (Low ead SI ttain A to o4 lag) lalva - GflN C) Trainfl:
Cooditioto fot copouat Rae ireIatiQu AIIgent RRR PUN? B Power Available jRK39 1RRO (RCS loop B o RR pump ) Sithar valve tStIOl (CWV auiip to Ifl pnp 5) Power Available 151-fl (ON1 aomp to RER pimp B) Powet Available 1St-3fl (R.WST to IIR pp ) Paver Available lSE-4l (Low aeed SI train B to eol1 lag) Valve -
- END LOP-GUIDE-I I Rev. 33 paoe 76 ol 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 56 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fjQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 57 of 75 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Status Check for both of the following: RO . RCS pressure LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)
. Any RHR HX header flow GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (NO)
GO TO EPP-009, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND SRO DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 1 EPP-009 SRO EPP-009, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization PROCEDURE NOTE: Foldout applies SRO Reviews FOLDOUT Criteria (None will require action) RO Reset SI (already performed) Manually realign safeguards equipment if a loss of off-site SRO power occurs. Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation signals RO Locates MCB Phase A switch and resets Phase A (no need to reset Phase B it was not actuated) Establish Instrument Air and Nitrogen to CNMT Open the following valves: RO
. 1 IA-81 9 (locates MCB switches and opens valve)
. 1 SI-287(locates MCB switches and opens valve)
Monitor AC Buses: Check AC emergency buses 1 A-SA AND 1 B-SB BOP/RO ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER:
- Check bus voltages
. Check breakers 105 AND 125 CLOSED (YES)
SRO GOTOStep5e Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 57 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 58 of Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BO P/RO Check all non-emergency AC buses ENERGIZED (YES) PRZ heaters should NOT be energized until PRZ water Procedure Caution: level indicates greater than minimum recommended by plant operations staff to ensure heaters are covered. Secure PRZ Heaters:
- Place backup heaters in the OFF position
- Verify control heaters OFF RO
- Consult plant operations staff for a recommended minimum indicated PRZ water level that will ensure heaters are covered. (Refer to ERG Executive Volume, Generic Issue: Evaluations by the Plant Engineering Staff.)
Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:
- Check RHR pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)
RO
- RCS pressure GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)
- RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES/NO)
- Yes Stop RHR pumps, NO leave RHR pumps on.
Dependant on timing Check Intact SG Levels:
- Any level GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)
BOP
- Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% and 50% [40% and 50%].
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 58 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 59 of 75 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA PATH-i (Continued) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main Procedure Note: steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded. Check PRZ Pressure:
. Pressure less than 2000 PSIG (YES)
RO . Block low steam pressure SI Locates Low Steam Line Pressure SI MOB block switch and places switch to block verifies block on status lights Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown: SRO Maintain Cooldown rate in RCS cold lefls <100°F/HR Check RHR system OPERATING IN SHUTDOWN RO - COOLING MODE (NO) SRO GO TO Step lOf Check all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser: Check any intact SG MSIV OPEN (NO) BOP Dump steam from intact SGs using any of the following (listed in order of preference):
- SG PORVs NOTE: Must recouple RCS with SGs which means PORVs must be opened and SG pressure reduced.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when the crew demonstrates the ability to establish a cooldown rate. Lead Evaluator: Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions. Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner place the Simulator in FREEZE. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 59 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
. KARR1S2Oll-NRCCENARlQ2 -
Attachment 1 OW P-ES F-02 OWP-ESF-02 Sheet 1018 EIR Number: W/O Number: I OWP-ESF-02 Clearance Number: 2 System: ESFAS
- 3. Component: SG Steam Pressure Loop I
- 4. Scope: LCO Action required clue to inoperable 5(3 A Pressure Protection Channels H, 111, or IV (PT-474, PT-475, or PT-476)
- 5. AppHcabte Requirements: 3.3.1 3.3.2, 3.3.3.5a and 3.3.3.6
- 6. Precautions: (1) Ensure only one channel is in TEST at a time. (2) See NOTE on Sheets 3 and 5. (3) The ERFIS Continuous calorimetric may be inoperable.
7- Component lineups completed per attached sheet (s) Signature Date
- a. Testing required on redundant equipment while component is inoperable:
None
- 9. Testing/Action required to restore operability. (N/A if tracked on EIR)
MST-10007 for Channel II MST-101J08 for Channel Ill MST-10009 for Channel IV Signature Date
- 10. Component lineups restored per attached sheet(s)
Signature Date
- 11. Remarks:
- 12. Reviewed by:
Superintendent- Shift Operations Date After receiving the tinal review signature, this OWP becomes a QA Record and should be submitted to Document Services. OWP-ESF Rev. 21 Page9of5l Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 60 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I4ARRIS 201 1 NRC SCENARIO 2 Attachment 1 OW P-ES F-02 OWP-ES?-02 Sheet 2 of 8 Bistable istatus Lmht Lineup
- Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number lnitialNerified InitiaWeilfied Steamne Pressure Channel II PlC CabInet 2 on Card 02-846 NOTE: Concurrent venflcatlort LS preferred while tripping bislabfes 881 (PB1474A Lo Steamilne Pressure MSIS & SIAS) tEST I NORMAL 882 (P614740 Hi Steamflne Pressure Rate MSIS) TEST I NORMAL 1 583 (P6/47461 P1 > P2 for AFW Isolation) TEST 1 NORMAL I 584 (P6147462 P2> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST / NORMAL I PlC Cabinet 2 on Card 02-848 883 (P6149461 P1 > P3 for AFW Isolation) TEST / NORMAL I 554 (P6/49462 P3> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST 1 NORMAL I STMLNALOPRESSPB47$A (Window 1-2) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED I STMLN A HP RATE PB 4740 Window 4-2) 1 ENERGIZED I DEENERG1ZED /
STMLN S HI 01FF P647461 tWindoW 7-2) ENERGIZED 1 DE-ENERGIZED I STMLN CHI 01FF PB 49451 tWindOw 9-2) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED I STMLN AHI 01FF P847362 (Window 10-2) ENERGiZED I DE-ENERGIZED / STMLN AHI 01FF PB 49462 (Window 12-2) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED flSComputer(1ising DRFunçj PMSO4T4 Deleted flom Restored to Processing Processing I OWP-ESF Rev 21 Page 10 of 51 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 61 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRCSCNAR[)2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OWP-ESF-02 Sheet 3o18 Bistable ?Status Ught Lineup Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component 10 or Number Initial/Verified Initial/Verified Steamline Pressure Channel III NOTE: SG A level channels associated vith Loop 1 SFIFF Mismatch RPS signals must remain OPERABLE (LB/4743 & LP!475B not tripped) and SG A level must be maintained above low level setpoint to preclude a SFJFF Mismatch Reactor Trip (circle position selected) STM GEN A FW FLOW CHAN 476 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 476 / CHAN 477 (circle position selected) STM GEN A STM FLOW CHAN 474 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 475 / CHAN 475 PlC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-8&4 NOTE: This switch may be re-positioned for troubleshooting. It is not required to be in TEST to meet Tech Specs. Operating this switch first aids in troubleshooting by maintaining system conditions the same as they were when the trouble occurred. 5W3 (P-0475 Master Test Switch) TEST I NORMAL PlC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-851 [1OTE: Concurrent verification is preferred while tripping bistables. BS1 (PB1475A La Steam line Pressure MSIS & SIAS) TEST / NORMAL BS2 (PB1475C Hi Steamline Pressure Rate MSIS) TEST / NORMAL BS3 (PB147581 P1 > P2 for AFW Isolation) TEST / NORMAL 6S4 (PB/475B2 P2> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST I NORMAL OWP-ESF Rev. 21 Page ii of 51 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 62 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
. HARRIS 2011 NRG SCENARIO 2 -
Attachment 1 OW P- ESF-02 CWP-ESF-02 Sheet 4 at 8 Bistable fStatus Lioht Lineup Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number InitialNerifled lnitialNerified Steamline Pressure Channel HI (continued) PlC Cabinet 3 on Card c3-855 BS3 (P8/49561 P1 > P3 for AFW Isolation) TEST NORMAL 6S4 (P8149562 P3> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST / NORMAL PlC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-845 BSI (FB/4788 SF1FF Mismatch Rx Trip) TEST / NORMAL I PlC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-848 BS1 (F8/478C SFIFF Alarm) TEST I NORMAL I Trip Status Light Box-i STMLN A LO PRESS PB 475A (Window 1-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED / STh1LN A HP RATE PB 475C (Window 4-3) ENERGiZED I DE-ENERGIZED / STMLN B HI DIFF PB 47581 (Window 7-3) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED / STMLN C HI 01FF PB 49561 (Window 9-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HI DIFF PB 47582 (Window 10-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED / STMLN A HI DIFF P849582 (Window 12-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED / Trip Status Light Box-2 SG A FW < STM FB 4736 (Window 1-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED I On ERFIS Computer (Using DR Function) Deleted from Restored to PMS0475 Processing / Processing / j OWP-ESF I Rev. 21 Page 12 of 51 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 63 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 - HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OWP-ESF-02 Sheet 5o16 gffljjfl Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number lnmauventied Initiat/Verifled Stearnilne Pressure Channel IV NOTE: 50 A level channels assodated with Loop I SF/FE Mismatch RPS signals must remain OPERABLE (LB/474B & LP/475B not tripped) and SO A level must be maintained above low level setpolnt to pre dude a SF/FE Mismatch Reactor Trip (circle position selected STM GEN A PM FLOW CHAN 476 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 477 CHAN 477 (circle position selected) STM GEN A STM FLOW CHAN 474 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN / CHAN 475 PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-863 NOTE: This sWitch niay be re-pósrtioned t&fr6Ubeshdotin it i riot required to tiC in TEST to meet tech Specs.. Operating this switch first aids in troubleshooting by maintaining system conditIons me same as they were when the trouble occurred. SWS (P-0476 Master Test Switch) TEST / NORMAL SF Rev. 21 Page 13of51 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 64 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 [-IARR[S2011 NRC SCENARIO2 Attachment 1 OW P-ES F-02 OWPESF-02 Sheet6of3 Bistable /Status Light Uncap Steamline Pressure Channel IV (continued) Position tar Maintenance Restored Position Component 10 or Number initiaWerified InitiatNenlied NOTE: Concurrent verification is preferred while tripping bistables, 851 (P81476A La Steamline Pressure MSIS & SIAS) TEST 1 NORMAL 852 (P8/476C HI Steamline Pressure Rate MSIS) TEST NORMAL 1 CAUTION If 8S3 (P8/47681) or 884 (PS147682) are being placed to TEST (tripped condition) to satisfy Tech Spec Table 3.34, Action 19, removal of any ONE of the foilowing cards will remove the channel from the topped condition; thus no longer meeting the action statement to be n the tripped condition: (Reference NCR 350586)
- PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4548
- PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-333
- PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-848 853 (P6/47661 P1 P2 for AFW Isolation) TEST NORMAL 854 (P8/47652 P2> P1 for ArW Isolation) TEST / NORMAL INSTRUCTION
- 1. DIRECT l&C to perform continuity testing of 853 and 884 above using the Restoration section of MST-10009:
- 833 continuity check complete /
- 684 continuity check complete /
[OWP-Esr I Rev, 21 Page 14 ofSl Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 65 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
- HARRIS 2011 N-RCSCgNARIQ2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OWR-ESF-O2 Sheet 7 of 8 8stabte /Status Lht Uneup Steamline Pressure Channel IV (continued)
Position for Maintenance Rtored Position Component 10 or Number Initialiverified inmatrVenfed CAUTION 11 6S3 (P8/49661) or OS-4 (PS1496B2) are berng p4aced to TEST (tripped condition) to satisfy Tech Spec Table 333, Action 9. removal of any ONE of the to1Iowlri cards will remove the Channel from the tripped condition: thus no longer meeting the action statement to be n the tripped condition: (Reterence NCR 350566)
- PlC Cabinet 4 on card 45.tS
- PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-833
- PlC Cabinet 4 on Card G4-.838 PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4843 853 (P8/49681 P1 > P3 for AFW lsoIation) TEST I NORMAL 554 (P6149662 P3> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST / NORMAI INSTRUCTION 2, DIRECT l&C to perform ContinuitV testing of 853 and 854 above using the Restoration section or MST-10009:
- 8S3 continuity check complete
- 654 continuity check complete WP-ESF Rev 21 Page 16 of 511 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 66 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARR[S2QflNRGSGENARIO2 - Attachment 1 OW P- ESF-02 OW P-ESF-02 Sheet 8 sf8 stabIe iStatus Liaht Lneup Position for Maintenance Restored Postton Component ID or Number InitialNeritted lnitiallVentied SteamLine Pressure Channel IV (continued) PtC Cabinet 4 on Card C4828 581 (F51478A SFIFF Mismatch Rx Trip) TEST I NORMAL PlC Cabinet on Card C4-831 551 (FB/418D SFIFF Alarm) TEST / NORMAL / nip Status Light Box-I STMLN A LO PRESS PB 47$A (Window 1-4) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HP RATE PB 476C (Window 4-4) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED I STMLN B HI 01FF PB 47681 (Window 7-4) ENERGiZED I DE-ENERGIZED / STMLN C HI 04FF PB 49651 (Window 9-4) ENERGIZED I OE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HI 01FF PB 47682 (WfldOW 10-4) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HI 01FF PB 49662 (Window 124) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED / Trip Status Light Box-2 SGAFW<STMFB4I8A (Window 1-4) ENERGIZED DEENERGIZED / On ERSIS ComputerUsn DR FunctIon) Deleted from Restored to PMS0476 Processing I Processing / j OWP-ESF Rev. 21 Page 16 of SI Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 67of 75
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- ELI Its It 1511511111 11151 1.1 lIlt 1551151 Cl)
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GUIDE PAThI Attachment 6 Sheetiof7 Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE General guidance for verification of safeguards equipment is contained in Attachment B of this pmcedure U 1. Verity Two CSIPs RUNNING U 2. Verify Two RHR Pumps RUNNING U 3. Verify Two CCW Pumps RUNNING - U & Verify JI ESW Mf ESW Booster Pumps RUNNING - U 5. Verify SI Valves PROPERLY AIJGNED (Refer to Attachment t) U 6. Verify CNMT Phase A Isolation Valves SHUT - (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 4.) EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev 33 I Pane 79 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 69 of 75
Attachment 6 Sheet 2 of 7 Safeguards Actuation Verificahon Li 7. Verify SG l3kwdown SG Sample isolalion Valves In Table 1 SHUT Tab1 1 SG Blowdova Ad S&p1e Io1tion Va1ve Oitside cNlff Inside CNT Line (ML)-tASA) (NLa1BSB) S A Sample i?2i7 tS2lU216 SG B Sample 222 1S319i22i
$G Sample 1SP227 1S?224I226 SG A Bloweiows 1fl1I SG B Biowdoini 1BD3O IBD20 SG C Blowdovt lBD49 1Bn39
& IF Main Steam Line Isolalion Actuated OR is Required By Any Of The Following, THEN Verify MSIVs MSIV Bypass Valves SHUT Li
- Steam line pressure LESS THAN fO1 PSIG Li
- CNMT pressure GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG
- 9. iF CNMT Spray Actuation Signal Actuated OR is Required, jJ1Et Verify The Following, (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 9.)
Li
- CNMT spray pumps RUNNING Li - CNMTsprayvaivesPROPERLYAUGNED Li e Phase B isolation valves SHUT Li All RCPs STOPPED EOP-G4J IDE-I I Rev 33 1 Pane 80 ol 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 70 of 75
Attachment 5 Sheet 3 of 7 Safeguards Actuation Verification U 10. Venfy Both Main FW Pumps TRIPPED U 11, Verify FW Isolation Valves SHUT (Refer to OMM004, POST TRIPISAFEGUARD$ REVIEW, Attachment 6) U 11 Verify both MDAFW pumps RUNNING
- 13. E any of the bIIo4ng c nditions exist, THEN verify the TDAFW pump RUNNING U
- Undervoltage on either &9 KV emergency bus U
- level in tvo SGs LESS THAN 25%
ID e Manual actuation to control SG level
- 14. Verify AFW Valves PROPERLY AUGNED U
- IF no AFW Isolation Signal. THEN verify solalion and flow control valves -
OPEN NOTE An AFW Isolation signal signal requires a Main Steam tine Lsdalion coincident with one SG pressure 100 PSIG below the other two SGs. U
- AFW Isdation Signal present, 111Q4 verify MDAFW and TDAFW isolation and flow control valves to affected SG SHUT U 15, VenfyBothlEDGs-RUNNING U 16. Verify CNMT Fan Coolers ONE FAN PER UNIT RUNNING IN SLOW SPEED EOP-GUIDE-1 Rev. 33 1 Pace 81 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 71 of 75
Attachment 6 Sheet4of7 Safeguards Actuation Verification LI 17 Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves SHUT (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGtJARDS REVIEW, Attachment 7.) LI 18 Verify Contrd Room Ventilation ALIGNED FOR EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGIJARDS REViEW, Attachment 5.)
- 19. Verify Essential Seivice Chilled Water System Operation:
LI
- Verify both WC-2 chillers RUNNING LI
- Verify both P4 pumps RUNNING LI (Refer to AOP-026, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM for loss of any WC-2 chiller.)
- 20. Verify CSIP Fan Coolers RUNNING LI AH-9ASA LI AH-9 B SB LI AH-1OASA LI AH-1OBSB NOTE Security systems are normally powered by bus 1A1. Backup power will be avallabie for approximately 30 MINUTES after bus IA1 is de-energized.
LI 21 Verify AC buses IAI 4.4j 181 - ENERGIZED LI 21 Place air compressor IA AND 1 B in the LOCAL CONTROL Mode. (Refer to Attachment 5.) EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev. 33 I Pane 82 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 72 of 75
Attachment 6 Sheet S of 7 Saleguards Actuation Verticatioa CAUTION The maximum calculated dose rate n the victy of MCC 1A3&SA and MCC 1835-SB is between 10 MREMfl-{R and 150 MREMIHR, U 23, Dispatch An Operator To Unlock AND Turn ON The Breakers For The CSIP Suction AND bistharge Cross-Conned Valves: (Re do Attachment It) KCC Lk35SA MCC lB35SB VALVE CU!ICLE VALVE CUBICLE ICS17O 4A IGS-171 4D 1cs169 a 1c5-168 1D 1S-218 i4 1CS22G 9D lCS2l9 14Z 1CS217 tic 24, Check if C CSIP Should Be Placed in Sevice: U
- IF two charging pumps can !4f3J be vented to be running. AND C CSIP is avaiIabte THEN place C CSIP in service in place of the rion-runring CSIP using OP-WI, tHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM. Section 8.5 or 87 EOP-GUIDE-4 Rev 33 1 Pe 83 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 73 of 75
Attachment 6 Sheet 6 of? Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE
- Fuel pod levels AND temperatures should be monitored approiomately every ito 2 HOURS.
- Following the inItil check & fuel pod levels and temperature, monitoring responsibluties may be assumed by the plant operations staff (including the TSC or STA),
- Only hid pods containkj fuel are required to be monitored, 25, Check Status Of Fuel Pools El a. Start the spent fuel pump room ventilation system usrng OP170, FUEL HANDUNG BUILDING HVAC, Section &3, pool n9
- c. Monitor fuel pool levels AND temperatures:
El . Refer to AOP-041, SPENT FUEL POOL EVENT Attachments 7, 8,9,10 and 11 for SEP parameter monitoring methods. El . Refer to Cuives K.X24, F+X25 and H-X26 tar SEP time to 20 F, El
- Levels GREATER THAN LO ALARM (284. FT. 0 IN)
C]. Temperatures LESS THAN HI TEMP ALARM (105° F) FOP-GUIDE-I Rev, 33 1 Pane 84 of 9? Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 74of 75
Attachment 6 Sheet 7 ofT Safeguards Actuation Verificalion NOTE IF control room venti[ation was. previously aligned to an emergency outside air intake for post-accident operations, THEN follow-up actions will be required to restore the alignment 26 Consult Plant Operations Staff Regarding Alignment Of The Control Room Ventiblion System: LI s Site Emergency Co-ordinator Control Room LI
- Site Emergency Co-ordinator Technical Spport Center (Refer to PEP-230, CONTROL ROOM OPERATlONS)
-END EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev 33 I Pane 85 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 75 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 4 OpTestNo.: 05000400/2012301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions: lC-19, MOL, 95% power (ramped down from 100% at 4 DEH units/mm) The TDAFW Pump is under clearance due to over speed trip device damage. The pump has been out of service for 64 hours and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 20 hours. LCO 3.7.1 .2 action a has been entered
. A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan under clearance for motor replacement
. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13 is SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage Turnover:
. A Normal shutdown is in progress which has been directed by plant management, at 4 DEH Units / minute to support being in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours Critical Tasks:
. Manually actuate main steamline isolation prior to all SGs depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner to<loopsig
. Align Containment Spray System for operation pnor to Containment pressure exceeding 35 psig Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N/A R RO/SRO Lower Power at 4 DEH Units / mm N BOP/SRO 2 CFW17A C BOP/SRO Main Feedwater Pump 1A Recirculation Valve (1 FW-8) fails OPEN N/A N/A Re-commence power reduction at 4 DEH Units / mm 4 EPSO2 C ALL Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill. Crew performs Immediate Actions and TS SRO enters AOP-024.
5 CVCO1 C R0/SRO 1CS-1 1 fails closed. Letdown relief opens TSSRO 6 N/A N RO/SRO Place excess letdown in service 7 CRFO3A C RO/SRO One Control rods drops TS SRO 8 CRFO3B C R0/SRO Second Control rod drops / manual Rx Trip required 9 MSSO1A M ALL A S/G develops a large Steam Line break inside Containment with auto (or manual) Safety Injection. 10 ZRPK627A Main Steam Line actuation fails to automatically isolate (manually C BOP/SRO ZRPK627B isolate MSIVs) 11 ZRPK643B 1A Containment Spray pump starts and trips on 0/C, 1 B Containment Spray pump does not auto start and MOV 1 CT-88 ZRPK644B does not open. (FRP-J.1 Orange Path entry is not required if the crew C R0/SRO ZRPK645B manually starts the 1 B CT pump and opens the associated valves CNSO2A from the MCB.) 12 MSSO5A 1A MSIV does not auto close. BOP will have to direct local manual C BOP/SRO closure of the 1A MSIV per RNO actions (EPP-014). (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 1 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 . HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4
SUMMARY
Power level is approximately 95%. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 64 hours and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 20 hours. LCO 3.7.1 .2 action a has been entered. A Normal shutdown is in progress which has been directed by plant management, at 4 DEH Units I minute to support being in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours. The A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan is out of service for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage. Radiation monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB has failed low and thunderstorms are in the area. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to a power reduction of >10% (YELLOW risk is a qualitative risk assessment per WCM-001). GP-006 is currently in progress with step 8 completed. Event 1: Power Reduction the first evolution for the crew is to commence a power reduction at 4 DEH Units / mm. It is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate as necessary to lower power, and the BOP will operate the DEH Main Turbine controls as necessary to reduce turbine load. Once the power decrease has been observed to the extent desired by the Lead Evaluator Event 2 can be inserted. Event 2: Main Feedwater Pump 1A Recirculation Valve (1 FW-8) fails OPEN If the valve - position change is not observed visually Feed Reg valve response will cause SG levels to slowly lower and return to normal in response to the level deviations. Alarms may not actuate for this event (power dependant). The crew should diagnose that the A FW recirc valve has failed OPEN based on Feedwater discharge pressure and plant response. The BOP may close the valve when the incorrect position is observed. The SRO should enter AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions, and work through to manually close or verify the valve closed from the control room. Event 3: Re-commence power reduction. Event 4: The Lead Evaluator will direct when to insert an overcurrent problem of Instrument Bus S-Ill which will result in the loss of the 7.5kVA Inverter. This will require entry into AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. This procedure has immediate actions that must be carried out by the RO. The loss of the Inverter will also cause an auto start of the A ESW pump due to a loss of PT-9101A and a loss of the running ESCWS Chiller due to loss of FT 9209A. After the AC is sent for inspection of bus the report will be that the problem is isolated to the Inverter and that the bus does not have a problem. The Instrument Bus can be restored by transferring to the alternate power supply. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs. The crew may or may not start the standby Chiller per OP-148. The Chiller start will be dependent on how quickly the crew moves through AOP-024. Auto rod control should be re-established. Tech Specs that should be evaluated for the loss of the Instrument Bus:
- T.S. 3.7.4, At least two independent emergency service water loops shall be OPERABLE.
- T.S. 3.7.13 At least two independent Essential Services Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.
- T.S. 3.8.1 .1 AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 2 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4
- T.S. 3.8.3.1 Electrical buses shall be energized in the specified manner with tie breakers open between redundant buses within the unit.
Event 5: 1 CS-i 1 fails closed! letdown relief opens after alternate power is restored to Instrument Bus Ill and rod control is restored to AUTO a failure of an instrument air line to 1CS-ii will occur causing the valve to fail closed. This common CVCS letdown isolation valve closure will cause letdown flow to the PRT. With normal letdown flow isolated the crew will need to place Excess Letdown in service. Tech Specs that should be evaluated for the failure of 1CS-il
- PLP-106 lists 1CS-1 1 as a Containment Isolation Valve (the valve is inoperable)
- Tech Spec 3.6.3 applies Each containment isolation valve specified in the Technical Specification Equipment List Program, plant procedure PLP-106, shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to required isolation times.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With one or more of the containment isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:
- a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
- b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
- c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
Event 6: Establish Excess Letdown the crew will be required to re-establish inventory control by initiating Excess Letdown as directed by APP-ALB-07, 3-1 lAW OP-i 07 section 8.2. Event 7: Control Rod Drop with Rod Control in AUTO, one control rod will drop requiring entry into AOP-00i. The crew will perform the immediate actions associated with one dropped rod and place Rod Control to Manual. The SRO will contact the Manager of Operations and Reactor Engineering. Surveillance requirement 4.1.1.1.1 .a requires performing a shutdown margin calculation upon detecting an inoperable control rod. The SRO will review the associated Tech Specs for the dropped rod. After the crew resets the negative rate trip alarms OR at the direction of the Lead Examiner event 8 can be initiated. Tech Specs associated with a dropped rod: 3.1.1.1, Boration Control Shutdown Margin Modes 1 & 2 3.1 .3.1, Movable Control Assemblies Group Height 3.1.3.5, Shutdown Rod Inserfion Limit 3.1 .3.6, Control Rod Insertion Limits 3.2.1, Axial Flux Difference 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 3 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 Event 8: Second Control Rod drops. The second control rod dropping will require re-entry into AOP-00i requiring implementation of a manual Reactor Trip and entry into PATH-i. Event 9: A S/G Steam Line break inside Containment requiring Safety Injection. After completing the immediate actions of PATH-i the crew will transition to EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response. While implementing EPP-004 a large steam break from the A SG inside containment will occur. This will require a Safety Injection (either manual or auto). The Safety Injection will require the crew to transition out of EPP-004 and re-enter PATH-i. Event 10: Automatic Main Steamline Isolation failure requires the crew to identify the failure and take actions to manually isolate the MSIVs. Event ii: A Containment Spray (CT) pump trip and the B CT pump start failure and discharge valve (1 CT-88) failure to auto open. If the B CT pump is not started prior to Containment reaching the High 3 setpoint of 10 psig an Orange Path condition will exist. When the Orange Path condition occurs the crew would be required to transition to FRP- J.i, Response to High Containment Pressure. Event 12: A MSIV failure to close Automatic or Manual Main Steamline Isolation does not occur on the A SG. The crew should identify that the A MSIV did not close when attempting manual isolation during event 10. Since the MSIV did not close and a steam break accident is occurring the SRO will transition from PATH-i to EPP-0i4, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The BOP will direct the RAB AO to locally close the MSIV by isolating and venting Instrument Air lAW EPP-0i4 step 2 RNO directions. The attempts to shut the valve locally will fail. The scenario terminates after the crew completes EPP-014 and transitions to EOP-EPP-008, SI Termination. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page4of75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Manually actuate main steamline isolation prior to all SGs depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner to <100 psig.
Manually actuate main steamline isolation to prevent an uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cool down of the RCS. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is preventing all SG pressures from degrading to < 100 psig.
- 2. Align Containment Spray System for operation prior to containment pressure exceeding 35 psig Manually start and align one Containment Spray pump before an extreme (red path) challenge develops to the Containment CSF (45 psig in Containment). Failure to manually actuate Containment Spray under the postulated conditions constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component. In this scenario the A Containment Spray pump trips due to an over current and the B Containment Spray pump fails to auto start on the Hi-3 containment pressure (>10 psig in Containment). In addition the B train discharge valve 1 CT-88 must be repositioned to align the system flow path.
Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is preventing Containment pressure from exceeding 35 psig. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 5of75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2012 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario #4 Reset to IC-i 64 password sandwich Goto RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Post conditions for status board from lC-19 Mode 1, 95% Reactor power, power reduction in progress Provide a marked up copy of GP-006 Rev. 58 through section 5.2 step 8 Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Control Bank D at 210 steps RCS boron 1052 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON SG level maintained with A and B MEW pump and FW Reg Vlvs in Auto RCS temp 587.4°F Simulator Setup Instructions TDAEW pump under clearance due to damaged overspeed trip device Hang CITs on 1 MS-70, 1 MS-72 and Trip Place an Off normal placard on Throttle Valve 1 MS-T Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MCB switch Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 for failure of MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB in OWP book Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Update the status board: PZR PORV 444B, TS 3.4.4, actions met block valve shut. Rad Monitor MSL C RM-O1MS-3593SB TS 3.3.6.a OOS at 0800 on 2-12-2012 TDAFW Pump, TS 3.7.1.2 action a has been OOS for 64 hours Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 6 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 Scenario # 4 CAEP file Description of 2012 NRC Scenario 4 I Initial Conditions were established from IC-26 Mode 1 88% power steady state conditions Provide a marked up copy of GP-006 Rev 57 through section 5.2 step 8 Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Control Bank D at 195 steps RCS boron 1067 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON RCS temp 585.4° F, stable Main Turbine 847 MWe, 104 MVars I Simulator Setup Instructions PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage, PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13 is shut Hang CIT on 1 RC-1 13, PORV Block valve TDAFW pump under clearance Hang CIT on TDAFW pump Under clearance due to damaged overspeed trip device Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MCB switch Place off normal placard on 1 MS-T Rad Monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB failed low Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 in OWP book I Status board update for TDAFW pump TS 3.7.1.2, PORV PORV 444B TS 3.4.4, Rad Monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB TS 3.3.3.6 Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates SCENARIO 4 CAEP TDAFW pump Out Of Service due to damaged overspeed trip device Place CIT on 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 MCB switch I Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MCB switch irf mssO34 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN irt mssO35 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN Trip the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfw0lc (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true Place CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan idi xb2i072 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS ilo xb20072g (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF ilo xb2oO72r (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page7of75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 . HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 EVENTS Event 1: No trigger Lower power lAW GP-006 from 89% power until Lead Examiners stops Reactivity RO I SRO Normal-BOP/SRO Event 2: MFW Pump A Recirc valve opens Entry conditions for AOP-0i0 Component- BOP/SRO imf cfwl7a (200:00:0000:00:00)10000:00:000 Deletes MFW Pump A recirc valve failed open when switch taken to shut This is a conditional trigger and does not need to be ran trg 14 1FW-8 shut trg= 14 dmf cfwi7a Event 3: Re-commence power reduction at 4 DEH Units I mm I Event 4: Trigger 4 Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill. Crew performs Immediate Actions and enters AOP-024 Component- RO/BOP/SRO Tech Spec SRO - imf epso2 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) iA-Sill Event 5: 1 CS-il fails closed and letdown relief opens requires crew to place Excess Letdown in service Component RO / SRO Tech Spec SRO - imf cvc0l (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) CLOSED Event 6: Establish Excess Letdown Normal RO / SRO Event 7: One control rod drops P6 Crew performs immediate actions of AOP-00l place rod control in manual Component RO / SRO imf crf03a (7 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 24 I Event 8: Second control rod drops N5 I Crew performs immediate actions of AOP-00i which is to actuate a manual Rx Trip after second rod drops imf crfo3b (8 00:00:00 00:00:00) 220 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 8 of 75
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 Event 9: A Steam Generator develops a large Steam Break inside Containment requires Safety Injection Major ALL imf mss0la (9 00:00:00 00:00:00) 4.2e+006 00:09:00 0 I Event 10: Main Steam Line actuation fails to automatically isolate must manually shut MSIVs (preloaded no trigger) Component BOP I SRO imf ZRPK627A (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf ZRPK627B (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Event 11: A Containment Spray pump starts and trips on overcurrent (preloaded no trigger) B Containment Spray pump fails to auto start and the discharge valve MOV 1 CT-88 fails to open NOTE: Crew determines they meet entry conditions of FRP-J.1 (Orange Path) FRP-J.1 met after implementation of FRPs and When Containment Pressure increases to > 10 psig and neither CT pumps are running Component RO / SRO imf cnso2a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true imf zrpk643b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk644b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk645b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS I Event 12: A MSIV fails to shut (preloaded no trigger) I Component BOP I SRO imf mss05a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 3600.0 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 9 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Dp Test No.: NES Scenario # 4 Event # j Page j Event
Description:
Continue Power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator: announce: CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift. END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator: annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN. Performs a crew alignment brief and proceeds with the plant SRO shutdown. GP-006 SRO GP-006, Section 5.2 Step 8 WHEN Turbine load is less than 95%, THEN VERIFY the 3A and 3B Feedwater Vents have been opened per OP-i 36 BOP Section 7.2
- Contacts TB AC to perform task Acknowledge request and report back 2 minutes later Communicator: that the 3A and 3B Feedwater Heater Vents have been opened lAW OP-i 36, Section 7.2 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 10 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: !!BQ Scenario # Event # j. Page 11 j Event
Description:
Continue Power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- DIRECTS BOP (or may perform) to contact the Load Dispatcher that the load reduction is about to commence.
SRO
- DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 DEH Units /
mm. (May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.)
. Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control BOP . DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button.
. Verifies all available Pressurizer Backup Heaters are energized.
There is no procedural guidance directing when the Evaluator Note: boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to placing the Turbine in GO.
. Verifies the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)
. DEPRESS the ENTER push-button.
BOP
- DEPRESS the REF push-button.
. Verifies the desired load (120 MW per step 5.2.5.e) in the DEMAND display.
- DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push button should illuminate.
The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will Procedure Note: illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 11 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fiBQ Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page i2 2! Event
Description:
Continue Power reduction Time osition Applicants Actions or Behavior
. DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through Shift Update Turbine in GO.
. VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display BOP decreases.
. VERIFY Generator load is decreasing.
. MONITORS primary systems response.
INITIATES boration, as necessary (with SRO concurrence) per RO OP-i 07.01. When crew starts boration for downpower cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 2 (MFW Pump A recirc valve 1 FW-8 fails OPEN). Lead Evaluator: Event 2 The BOP should identify SG level trends and respond to the SG level changes. The BOP should be able to identify 1 FW-8 is OPEN and report to the SRO. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 12 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NE& Scenario# Event# 2 Page 13 of Event
Description:
Main FW Pump 1A Recirc Valve (1 FW-8) fails OPEN Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 2 1 FW-8, MFW Pump A Recirculation Valve, fails OPEN Simulator Operator: NOTE: VERIFY that when 1 FW-8 switch is taken to shut malfunction 1CFW17A deletes, IF IT DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY DELETE THE MALFUNCTION.
. All SG NR levels decrease, then start to return to program level as FRVs respond to level deviation Indications Available: The following alarms may come in:
. ALB-014-1(2)(3)-1B SG A(B)(C) NR LEVELISP HI/LO DEV
. ALB-014-8-5 COMPUTER ALARM SG
. RESPONDS to changing SG NR levels and identifies BOP 1 FW-8 is open
. Notifies SRO THE BOP may take MANUAL control of 1 FW-8 and close it Evaluators Note: prior to entering AOP-010. Actions would be acceptable based on OPS-NGGC-1 000 approaching a SG low level trip setpoint (25%).
CREW Identifies AOP-O1 0 entry condtions CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (NO) Immediate BOP RNO-GOTO Step 5. Action Announces immediate actions complete Enters AOP-O1O AOP-O1O SRO Makes PA announcement Steps 1 3 are immediate actions (completed) SRO Dispatch AC to investigate Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 13 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: JBQ Scenario# Event # Page 14 of 75 Event
Description:
Main FW Pump 1A Recirc Valve (1 FW-8) tails OPEN Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK DEH controlling Turbine SRO Valves PROPERLY. (YES) GOTO Step 7. MAINTAIN ALL of the following:
. At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (YES)
BOP
- Main Feedwater flow to ALL Steam Generators (YES)
. ALL Steam Generator levels greater than 30% (YES)
CHECK Feedwater Regulator Valves operating properly in AUTO: BOP
- Response to SG levels (YES)
- Valve position indication (YES)
- Response to feed flow/steam flow mismatch (YES)
Loss of Main Control Room annunciators concurrent with a Procedure Note: turbine runback of greater than 25%, requires a change of event classification per the HNP EmerQencv Plan. SRO CHECK Main Control Room annunciators AVAILABLE. (YES) CHECK the following Pump status: BOP
- ALL Feedwater Train Pumps RUNNING (YES)
*__BOTH_Heater_Drain_Pumps_RUNNING_(YES)
SRO GO TO the applicable section: All Condensate/Feedwater flow malfunctions (other than pump trips) Section 3.1 BOP CHECK the following Recirc and Dump Valves operating properly in MODU: Main Feedwater Pumps (NO) IF ANY valve has failed OPEN OR is NOT controlling properly, THEN: ATTEMPT to control the valve from the MCB, if BOP available. (when valve is placed to shut the valve will close) Reports to SRO that 1 FW-8 has shut Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 14 of 75
Appendix U Operator Action Form ES-D-2 pTesiNo.: UC Scenario# 2 Page 15 of 75 Event
Description:
Main FW Pump 1A Recirc Valve (1 FW-8) fails OPEN Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Notifies TB AC to investigate 1 FW-8 failure 2 mm after being called to investigate 1 FW-8 report back Communicator: that valve is shut and locally you can see nothing wrong Contacts WCC for Work Request and EIR. SRO Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist Following stabilization of the plant, if the SRO asks for Lead Evaluator: direction from Ops Management direct the SRO to continue with plant power reduction at 4 DEH Units/mm. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 15 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni Scenario # Event # 3 Page j Event
Description:
Re-commence power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP-i 07.01 RO OP-i 07.01, Section 5.2 and then 5.1
. DETERMINE the Reactor Coolant Boron concentration from Chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.
. DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration RO increase required.
. DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the reactivity plan associated with the IC.
FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths Evaluator Note: position. If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-1 13 and FIS-1 14, Procedure Caution: located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value. SET FIS-1 13, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the RO desired quantity. Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in Procedure Note: service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 16 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NH Scenario # Event # 2 Page 11 2t Event
Description:
Re-commence power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. SET controller 1 CS-283, FK-1 13 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in RO the STOP position.
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.
- PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.
When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:
. PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note: pressure.
. ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.
. Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.
OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron RO concentration to less than 10 ppm.
. MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.
Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning Procedure Note: control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 17 of 75
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 p Yest No.: &enarlo # Event# 2 - Page i Qt Z Event
Description:
Re-commence power reduction Time Position H Applicants Actions or Behavior START the makeup system as follows:
. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily.
. VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.
The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated Procedure Caution: reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.
. VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.
o IF rod control is in AUTO,
- THEN VERIFY the control rods are RO responding properly.
. VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.
. PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.
Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but none will be applicable since the system just came out of Automatic. Evaluator Note: The only steps included here are the ones with verifiable action.
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:
o Is in the STOP position. o The GREEN light is LIT.
- PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.
RO
- START the makeup system as follows:
o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily. o VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 18 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OTest No.: iBQ Scenario # Event # 4 Page j 75 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Lead Evaluator: When adequate evaluation of the power reduction is complete direct Simulator Operator to actuate Trigger 4 (Loss of Instrument Bus Ill). Evaluator Note: A Reactor Trip could occur from complications during the loss of the Instrument Bus. The scenario has been validated assuming the Instrument Bus alternate power is restored. If a Trip occurs, allow the crew to restore power to the bus ASAP.
. When directed by the Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger-4 Simulator Operator:
Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply S-Ill Multiple alarms associated with Loss of Inst Bus S-Ill Indications Available:
. Key Indicator is Row 3 of Trip Status Light Box LIT ENTERS AOP-024, LOSS OF UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER AOP-024 SRO SUPPLY Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Immediate
- CHECK Instrument Bus SIll ENERGIZED. (NO)
RO Action PLACE Rod Control in MANUAL. PERFORM the following:
- PLACE Main FW Regulator Valves in MANUAL.
Immediate
- VERIFY Main FW Regulator Bypass Valves in BOP Action MANUAL.
- CONTROL SG levels between 52% and 62%
(OMM-001 Att. 13 trip limits 30% and 73%) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 19 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op TesfNo.: Sceirio # Event # Page Q of 75 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW Dispatch operator to investigate Inverter S-Ill When dispatched to investigate UPS Panel Sill, wait 1-2 minutes and then report that you dont see any physical damage to the inverter. There isnt any smell or smoke from the cabinets. The only thing to report is that the Red Communicator: OVERCURRENT I-IL light is LIT. The shift i&C Tech came back here after he heard the plant announcement. He has checked the Inverter and he is saying that the problem is isolated to ONLY the Inverter the Bus is OK and alternate power can be applied. Loss of electrical power may require initiation of the Procedure Note: SHNPP Emergency Plan.
. REFER TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL SRO Network at entry point X.
. DETERMINE the affected bus (S-Ill) and GO TO appropriate section (Section 3.1)
. PLACE the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to RO BYPASS at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer.
. RESTORE Tavg as necessary (using manual rod control)
SRO CHECK the plant in Modes 1 through 4. (YES) Procedure Note: SG PORVs may be controlled locally if needed Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 20 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBc. Scenario # Event # 4 Page 21 of 75 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Manually CONTROL the following based on the Instrument Bus lost: (for S-Ill)
. Rod Control CREW
- CSGPORV
- Main FW Reg Valves
. Main FW Reg Bypass Valves GO TO the applicable step based on the Instrument Bus lost.
SRO (step 7) VERIFY PAZ Level Controller Selector Switch in CHAN RO 459/460. (YES) If power is lost to instrument bus SIll (A Train), the associated ESW header pressure instrument will read low and the ESW pump will start on sensed low pressure. ESW Procedure Note: Screen Wash will be inoperable due to loss of the ESW Screen Wash Pump discharge header pressure permissive for starting the screen, causing the associated EDG to be inoperable. Tech Specs 3.7.4 and 3.8.1.1 will apply. This event will also cause an ESW Pump to start. This start will increase the cooling to Containment and will Evaluator Note: cause an alarm ALB-028 5-1 CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM due to low pressure in Containment. The BOP should report a 1 hour TS action based on Containment Pressure TS 3.6.1.4 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 21 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # _ Event # Page 22 ci Z Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge report and establishes Containment vacuum control band (0 to -1 is typical) Tech Spec
.6j..4 Peary cntain2ent intainal rsw- shell he aai*tained bae.n tO inch water aue and L6 sig.
SRO APPUcatLrrt WJOES l, 24 3 and 4 C1tON 1th the ntainetnt internal re*sure ut,id of the 1tiit a., th ntarnal pressure to 1thn the Baits within 1. hour be In at least 4CT SlMCW within tn. next 6 h4uri and In COLD Si4OTD within tn. following lO houri. Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a follow-Evaluator Note: up question after the scenario. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 22 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 O Test Na.: i scenario # 4 Event# 4 Page 23 of 75 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior REFER TO the following Tech Specs: 3.7.4 At ieast tso independent eroergency service water loops shall be OPERABlE. eLjjjJJ!: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. lhth only one emergerocy service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANOB within the next 6 hours and in COLD 5HOTDi within the following 30 hours.
- 3.8.1.1, AC Sources Operating LCO Requires performing OST-1023 within 1 hour CTlC;
- a. th re .rste circit of 3.6. a ,roieraOle.
orrn .nt I
,:oe rer R hcj.irs Urevrter: and
- 3.8.3.1 action b and c, Onsite Power Distribution 2 hour SRO LCO The fo11win eleczicl buu hatl e energtz In titi ec1le wmer with tie brek,rs opin h.t.eqn rtdurodant buses witMn th unit
.. ua-vot A.C. Vital 1DP1S-Sfl .neiçized froi its associated imert*r cnnscta4 to 12-volt LC. us aPsa Action b and c b With i* US-volt LC. vit* us sot eerfze4 tra Its assoclatogi iroirta ,w,erçjzt th Ui-volt A.C vitil witi1n howi or In at lut HaT tTheoay witMn the i.xt S hcwi and In S*rD1 within the fol1owtn 10 hqj C. With ai* USsoTt AC. vital bus Mt *n*1Iz*d fta Its associat.
iiv-t cnrieti4 to It, associated 0C. bus. rrnerize the 118-volt A. C. vital bus througfl Its auociategi Invaitar conn.ct to Its associated O.C. bus within t4 hours or e In at heat Hat TmGBY within the next 6 hourS anti in C01, S4iffXdI within the toflawirtq 30 houri.
* (optional) 3.6.5, Vacuum Relief System 72 hour LCO PERFORM OST-1 023, Offsite Power Availability Verification CREW Weekly Interval Modes 1 6. -
. Dispatch Outside and RAB AOs.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 23 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # - 4 Event # 4 Page 24 g Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge request to perform OST-1 023. Report back Communicator: -20 minutes after being directed that both portions of OST-1 023 have been completed. Step 9 VERIFY the following sample valves SHUT:
- 1 SP-948, RCS Loops B&C Hot Leg CNMT Isol (YES)
- 1 SP-949, RCS Loops B&C Hot Leg CNMT Isol (YES)
BOP
- 1SP-40, Pressurizer Liquid Sample Isol (YES)
- 1SP-41, Pressurizer Liquid Sample CNMT lsol (YES)
- 1 SP-59, Pressurizer STM Space Sample Isol (YES)
- 1SP-60, Pressurizer STM Space Sample CNMT lsol (YES)
Step 10
- CHECK Letdown in service. (YES)
RO Step 11
. CHECK ALL PRZ heaters in service. (YES)
Step 12 BOP CHECK ANY WC-2 Essential Chiller RUNNING. (NO) Because the crew does not initially know the extent of the problem to the inverter they may elect to start the standby Chiller. If they have knowledge that the Inverter will be restored to alternate power in short order they may decide Evaluator Note: to NOT start the standby Chiller. The Chiller will automatically start when inverter power is restored. If the crew elects to start the B chiller OP-i 48 section 5.1 and 5.2 are included in the back pages of this guide. The guide is written as if the crew WILL start the Chiller. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 24 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test roJNBQ Scenario # Event # 4 Page m Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior START the standby chiller per OP-148, Essential Services BOP Chilled Water System. CONTACT Maintenance to perform the following:
. CHECK the inverter and vital bus for indications of grounds or other faults.
- CORRECT ANY problems found.
DISPATCH an operator to perform the following: CREW . CHECK the affected instrument inverter (7.5 KVA UPS PANEL Sill for ANY of the following: o Red OVERCURRENT I-IL light LIT (NOTE: I-IL stands for Current indicating light) o Obvious signs of damage o (May dispatch shift l&C also) Since the report of the Red Overcurrently I-IL light should Communicator: have been reported by now the MCR may not call the AO again at this step. Direct the TRANSFER of Instrument Bus to the alternate power SRO supply per OP-i 56.02, Section 8.7, AC Electrical Distribution. If requested to go to the MCR for instructions report to the SRO and after given instructions to place the inverter on alternate power have the Simulator Operator carry out the transfer Instrument Bus III to its alternate power supply. Communicator: Prior to establishing Alternate power, Ensure that the ATWS panel Bypass switch is placed in BYPASS per OP-i 56.02 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 25 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: N Scenario # 4 vent # 4 Page 26 of 75 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior A copy of OP-156.02 Section 8.7, Aligning (UPS) Instrument Bus to Alternate Power Supply is on the next pages. The only actions in the MCR Are to place the ATWS panel Bypass switch to BYPASS and then return it to Evaluator Note: normal after alternate power is restored. The MCR must also evaluate bistables prior to re-energizing the Instrument Bus and monitor plant conditions while the bus power is being restored. Run APP eps INSTR_BUS_UPS_lII_ALT. Simulator Operator: NOTE: This APP takes approximately 3 minutes to complete. Once the APP is complete, call the MCR as the AO to Communicator: report that the transfer to alternate power has been completed. Once the transfer to the alternate power supply is Evaluator Note: performed the tripped WC-2 Essential Chiller will automatically restart. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 26 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB cenario # _4.... Event # 4 Page 75 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position J Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.7. Aligning (UPS) Instrument Bus to Alternate Power Supply 8,71. Initial Condition
- A reed exists to align 1.6 IC/A UPS Instrument Bus to Alternate Pcwer Supply..
- 2. Alternate Power Supply s available for the respective Instrument Distribution Panels, 812. Procedural Steps i EVALUATE bistabie status proc to de-energizing an instrument bus to deterthne if a trp cc actuation signal will be generated by this rocedure. MOP.
(C4UTION The msrrurnent bus to be transferred to its alternate power supply must first be dc-energized. A thorough network analysis of plant impact shouid be performed before de-energization.
- 2. REFER to AOP-024. Attachment I througii 4 for a hst of equipment affected when the associated instrument bus s tie-energized and st.thsequently energized. Attachment 10 of this procedure also gives -
sonie xtorrnation. Mc.R Before an Instrument Bus Train (both SI and Sill or both SlI and Sli) is de-energized, both trans of Sold State Logic Output Mode Selector Switch should have been placed in TEST per CR103 to prevent an inadvertent safeguard actuation. This requires the plant to be in MODE S or defueled.
- 3. VERIFY Manager Operations has anproved dc-energizing the nstrument bus(e&) (not applicable for planned bus outages that have followed the normal scheduling process). Reference P&L 40.19.
- 3. VERIFY SC) Il/b ATWS PANEL BYPASS Switch is in BYPASS. MOP.
5, IF an Instrument Bus Train will be de-energized, THEN VERIFY that both trains of SSPS are in TEST per OP-i 03. a (Reference 261) ICP-156.02 I Rev.97 I aoe135of37 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 27 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CpTestNo.: N Scenario# ....4..... vent# - 4 Page 28 Q 75 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.7.2 Procedural Steps (conrinued Secondary Power Supp1 shoud NOT be deonergized for PlC 17 and 18 n the fo1towng Step. Tbese PICs have Secondary Power Suppes from the Appenth R Inverters and should continue to function. 9, At the appropoate PIG, VERIFY the Primary Power Suppy (Upper Power Supply) Off: instrument Process tnstnrnent Cabinet DP1A-SI PICCabI7 n/A DP IBSB PICCab 13 N /A
- 0. At designated Instrument [stnbution Pane4. INSERT AND ROTATE Kirk Key n Afternate Power Sup$v Breaker (Power Panel Supp1y) YES 11 PLACE the appropriate Alternate Power Suppy Breaker n the ON postoci DP-ST. Alternate Supp4y From PP-1A21 1-SA fl/A NI A DP-SW, AJernate Supply From PP-16211-SB YES
- DP-Slfl, Alternate &rppy From PP-1A311-SA
- tDP-Sf\, A4emata Supply From PRI 6311-SB N/A OP-156O2 ev. 97 Daue 137 of 347 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 28 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Senari# _4_ vent 4 4 áge Z. Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.L2 Procedura Steps (continued) E:Th PrC Primary Supply s the Upper Prmer Supply and the PlC Secondary
--Po:er Supply s the Lower Power Supply in the center bay of each PlC NG tfany of the PlC power supptes have tm breakers and must be swtched the AC INPUT breaker is operated t and then the DC OUTPUT breaker operated.
- 12. PLACE the Pnrnarj and Secondwv Power Supplies in ON in the center bays of the appropriate PICs.
nstrument Bus 1 Process Instrument Caboet I N/A lDP1BSlt N/A lDPiASlIl 91 13 IDP-IB-SIV 4 Ufl 14 N/A aI-(lt)T: The Secondary Power Supply is energized for PlC 17 and PlC IS. These
;j.._Cs have Secondary Power Supplies from the Appendix R Inverters and sNxild be functioning.
- 13. At the appropcate PlC, PLACE the Pomary Power Supply (Upper Power Supply) in ON.
Process lnStwrner4t Cabinet lDPiA-SI PlC Gab 17 IDPIB-SII PlC Cab 18 OP-156.C2 I I Pape l3 of Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 29 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 ZDpiéstNo.: N Scenarl# _4_, vent# 4 Page 30 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.72 Procedural Steps (ccninued)
- 14. At the appropriate PlC. CHECK cards to ensure Power Supply LEDs (top LED on each card) are hI.
lnstnJnlent Bus Process lnstmrnsut Cabinet tDP-1A.Sl N/A N/A 17 DPi BSll 2 N/A l N/A lDPi ASIlI 3 YES 13 DP- 1 B-SIV 4 N/A 14 N/A (1Ioif 15. any SC (short circu4) Trip LED is lit, a Work Qrde should be nitated or to remove and rernsert the associated cards, At the aprcpnate PlC Bays I and 3. CHECK the NAL cards to ensure I SC Trip LEDs are NOT lit, Instrument Bus Process Instrument Cabmet IDP1ASl N/A N/A IDP-IB-Sll N/A 2 N/A 10 N/A lDP-1ASllL YES DP1BSlV 4!2 1O?-156.02 Rev,97 ?acIel3S3t2471 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 30 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op test No. N Scenario # _4. Event # 4 Page g 75 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.7.2 Procedural Steps (continued) II 16. new replacement power supplies have a pushbutton next to the OK light that may need to be pushed to restore power after the power supply has been de-energized. For each Instrument Bus that was energized in this section, VERIFY the associated SSPS and ESFAS power supply remained energized as U indicated by the respective Input Channel POWER light (both trains) and the 15 VDC and 48 VDC power supply lights (on respective train Logic Cabinet) being lit. Instrument Bus Power Supply 1DB-lA-Si Bus No. 1 Power trains A and B N/A 15 and 48V Power Supply #1 Train A N/A IDP-1 B-Stl Bus No. 2 Power trains A and 8 N/A 15 and 48V Power Supply #1 Train B N/A IDP-i A-Sill Bus No. 3 Power trains A and B YES 15 and 48V Power Supply #2 Train A YES 1DB-i B-SW Bus No. 4 Power trains A and B N/A 15 and 48V Power Supply #2 Train B N/A R A$f16N) After the instrument Bus has been energized, the affected Trains MCB Block Switches for Low Pressurizer Pressure and Main Steam Line Pressure must be taken to BLOCK before placing the Solid State Logic Output Switch to OPERATE. This is accomplished in OP-I 03. (Reference 2.6.1)
- 17. iF SSPS was required to be verified in test in Step 8.7.2.5 (an entire Train of Instrument Busses is affected),
AND IF desired THEN RESTORE both trains of SSPS from TEST per OP-i 03. (Reference 2.6.1) N/A
- 18. IF conditions allow, THEN PL4CE SC LVL ATWS PANEL BYPASS Switch in NORMAL MR OP-156.02 Rev. 97 Paqe 140 of 347 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 31 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # _j. Event # 4 Page 32 of 75 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8J2 Procedural Steps (continued)
- 9. VERIFY all ERFIS MUX power is abbLe usrng ERFIS MUX PWR.
- 20. PERFORM acplicable portions of Attachment 4 & 5, normal AC Electrical Lineup Checklt for Emergency Bus IA-SA & I BSB, t OP-i56c2 Rev97 I Harris 2U12 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. HNAL Page 32 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario 4 vent # 4 - Pa33 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Loss of power to PlC CAB-4 (fed from Instrument Bus SIV) will result in bistables P-476B, P-486B and P-496B (differential pressure bistables used in AFW isolation logic) being inoperable. Tech Spec Table 3.3-3, Action 19, Procedure Note: requires the associated channels to be placed in a tripped conditions within six hours. These bistables are energized to trip. If power is not restored within six hours, Action 19 cannot be carried out and Tech Spec 3.0.3 will be applicable. IF desired: If the SRO did not evaluate Tech Specs have the COMMUNICATOR call as the MSO and ask for a brief of plant status and what Tech Spec the plant is currently in. Lead Evaluator: OR As with all Tech Spec evaluations to decrease the amount of time the scenario will run a follow up question can be asked at the end of the scenario. RO CHECK the affected Instrument Bus ENERGIZED. (YES) WHEN power is restored to the Instrument Bus, THEN PERFORM the following: BOP VERIFY the Reactor Trip Power Range High Flux Rate alarm at the NlS panel RESET. (NO)
. Resets rate trips on Nl-43 panel (ALB 13-4-2 clears)
RETURN the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to OPERATE at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer. BOP
- Places the Nl-43 NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to the Operate position (ALB 13-5-1 clears)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 33 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # Event # 4 - Page 34 j 75 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK AFW flow control valve controllers reading 100%. (NO) BOP
. Restores AFW flow control valve controllers to 100%
CHECK Steam Dump bypass permissive lights (C7A or C7B) RO indicate the Steam Dumps ARMED. (NO)
. PRZ sprays should be placed in AUTO before returning the PRZ Master Pressure Controller to AUTO.
Procedure Note: . Before restoring the following components to automatic, controller setpoints should be verified at the correct setting to prevent undesired component cycling. RETURN the following to normal control for plant conditions based on the affected Instrument Bus:
. Rod Control (YES)
RO/BOP
- CSGPORV(YES)
. Main FW Reg Valves (YES)
. Main FW Reg Bypass Valves (N/A)
PERFORM a channel check of any RPS and ESF RO instrumentation affected by the loss of power. CHECK RVLIS Train A Plasma Display UPDATING. (YES) SRO CHECK RVLIS Train B Plasma Display UPDATING. (YES) SRO CHECK that power was LOST to SI or Sly. (NO) DISPATCH an operator to RESET WC-2, Essential Service BOP Chiller Power Loss relay. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 34 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op lesiNo.: iQ Scenario # Event # - Page 35 j Z. Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge request wait 1 minute and report that the WC-2, Communicator: Essential Service Chiller Power Loss relay has been reset. CHECK power to the Instrument Bus is being supplied by the SRO NORMAL power supply. (NO alternate source, must wait until normal supply is returned to exit AOP-024) Allow the crew enough time to restore all of the effected plant components that were placed in manual. IF Tavg and Tref are within 1°F the crew will place rod control back into automatic. IF the Tavg and Tref A is >1°F You DO NOT HAVE TO WAIT for Rod Control to be placed back to Evaluator Note: Automatic to continue with Event 5. When ready initiate Event 5, cue the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 5. 1CS-il fails closed and letdown relief opens. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 35 of 75
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNó.: N. Scenario# ,,,,4_ vent# Page 36 g Event
Description:
1CS-li tails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time osition Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 5 Simulator Operator: 1 CS-il Fails CLOSED and letdown relief lifts Annunciator: Indications: APP-ALB-007-3-1, LP LETDOWN RELIEF LINE HIGH TEMP APP-ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CVCS Announces alarm on ALB-007 (3-1 or 5-5) RO
. Dispatches AO to investigate 1 Cs-i 1 Wait 2 minutes after being dispatched to investigate Communicator: 1 CS-il failure, report that there is an air leak from the line supplying 1CS-il.
OPERATOR ACTlONS
- 1. CONHRM ahem using T1-!41, R4ielLneTemø 2, VERiFY A turnarc Fu:ona: Nofle
- 3. PERFORM CorTectle Actlora:
N)TE Due to the phyecai tocatton of the temperature senerir, thia alarm has been Imown to be actuated RO uecause of Hh Letdon or Contanment temperature. PRT parametera ahoukt tie evaluated to determ e the atarm Is actually due 10 ICS- 10 ttltmc.
- a. VALIDATE the alarm hy evaluattnp PRT parameters to emma rt 2CS1 0 w actually thing.
I,, IF iCS-11 Letdown lsotattn, th shut. THEN: (I) SI-lOT lCtdown orifIce isotaedrr valves 1 CS-7, CS-, and ICS-9 (2) REFER TO OPlOT, Chemical and Volume Conaol System, (3) PLACE tetdowu in service. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 36 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Scenatio# _4_. Event# Page Z i Event
Description:
1CS-li fails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior
- Directs placing Turbine in HOLD
- Contacts WCC for Work Request and EIR. Contacts Maintenance to investigate and fills out an Equipment Problem Checklist.
- With CS-il failed closed, direct Excess Letdown to be placed in service lAW OP-i07
- 1 CS-i 1 is a Containment Isolation Valve listed in PLP-i 06 Alt 01166116117 P0t6111 1l0l1 00666 70L06 NO
?ENEWATiON 060. 00,LOTIC*i APPLICA6IE SlOANT NO SCO 70600166 ES5c 66000 00.0001 I 00-25 033611 C 73 061360146 56 . 6,3 6060 6-1261 S661EM 2 105-27 OSLIIIECTCISAMPIING 73 1,6.13 NONE 4-V7241 7,0700
- IMS-20 MS 11106 A O TAMPIINO 0 1,6.3 NONE 505-01221 SYSTEM F 00-7 0000NORMALI70% 50 7.13 CS-Il 100.01111 0131 00361067100.101110 0 713 00-11 S RO 03-0312) -500 I 103.6 0705NCR1MILTDN 11 16 00.11 CS,0131 SOIL 7 05-11 CVSSSNORMALLTDN 0 7.13 03-78, 06-0618) 3-01. 36114115 Evaluates Tech Specs Each conteinn100t o1aton yave specfled ft the Tecbnica 5pti1rn Eqe p2tent Ust Program, p1an procedure P1P1O, shell be ition tiooes less then or squaJ tO rqidred I olaton tines, 14$VES Il 2. l and 4.
ACIiON:
)ith one or nero of the contaimommment ioalatico welve(sl inoperable, raintatn a mest one oation salve OPtRA6L.E In each affected netratlon that IT orid
- a. Pestoro the inoperable valve(s) to PEPJB1 stetus osthn 4 hours or
- 0. solate each affected p netramon othn 4 hours by use of at least usma deacltvagd autemetc salve secured In the msolation position, or c, Isolate each affected penetration otthan 4 hours by use of at least one closed cannel valve or blind flange, or d, Be in at least HOT TANfl5 within the next 6 hours and in COlO SSWIIIO)sJN within the following 3 haw.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 37 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fiflc. Scenario #- 4 vent # 5/ Pag75 Event
Description:
1 CS-il fails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time [ Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Place Turbine in HOLD and informs SRO Reviews Operator Procedure Experience information for placing Excess Letdown in Service RO Determines it will take about 20 30 minutes to get Excess Letdown into service OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control, Section 8.2- Excess OP-107 RO Letdown. PC Verifies Initial Conditions:
. CCW is being supplied to the excess letdown heat exchanger_per OP-145.
. RCP Seal Return is in service per Section 5.2.
Normally Excess Letdown will go to the VCT. However, if plant conditions warrant, the RCDT may be selected. When the Excess Letdown line has been flushed, the VCT position can then be re-selected. Procedure Notes: . . If Excess Letdown is to remain in service for sufficient time for dilution or boration to be necessary then VCT level should be lowered to accommodate the expected level increase before placing Excess Letdown in service Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 38 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: i4B Sceharlo # 4 Event # Fage 39 o 75 Event
Description:
1CS-li fails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time sition Applicants Actions or Behavior Excess Letdown operation during times of BTRS operation may result in damage to the RCP seals (due to increased contaminants and higher pH water). This should not Procedure Caution: prevent any AOP or EOP actions. The Responsible Engineer for RCP or CVCS may provide additional guidance if needed.
. INFORM Radwaste Control Room to monitor Seal Water Filter £P while Excess Letdown is in service.
. PLACE the excess letdown heat exchanger in operation as follows:
o VERIFY 1CC-188, CCW TO EXCESS LETDOWN RO HEAT EXCHANGER, is open. (OPENS) o VERIFY 1CC-202 SB, CCW FM EXCESS LTDN & RCDT HEAT EXCHANGERS, is open. (OPENS) o VERIFY 1CC-i 76, CCW TO EXCESS LTDN & RCDT HEAT EXCHANGERS, is open. (OPENS) Flushing the excess letdown line to the RCDT is required if the boron concentration in the excess letdown line from the RCS isolation valves to 1CS-466 is unknown or differs Procedure Note: from RCS concentration. The volume of this line is 74 gallons. Two volumes (148 gallons) should be adequate to prevent unexpected reactivity changes in the RCS when flow is aligned to the VCT. Evaluator Note: The flush will take -5 minutes to perform 1CS-464, HC-137 EXCESS LTDN FLOW is rated for 1500 Procedure Caution: psid. Anytime that 1CS-464 is exposed to greater than 1500 psid, Ieakby should be expected. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 39 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # vent # Page 4Q f Event
Description:
1 cs-il fails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF excess letdown flow is to be aligned to the RCDT, THEN PERFORM the following: RO . NOTIFY Radwaste Control Room of expected RCDT level change.
. PLACE 1 CS-461, Excess Letdown to OPEN. (OPENS)
. PLACE 1CS-460, Excess Letdown to OPEN. (OPENS)
Communicator: Acknowledge some expected RCDT level change will occur. VERIFY 1CS-464, HC-137 EXCESS LTDN FLOW is shut RO (potentiometer to zero). (Verifies) PLACE 1 CS-466, Excess Letdown to VCT/RCDT, to the RCDT RO position. (takes switch and positions to RCDT) RO PLACE 1 CS-461, Excess Letdown to OPEN. (OPENS) RO PLACE 1CS-460, Excess Letdown to OPEN. (OPENS) Do NOT exceed 174°F outlet temp as indicated on TI-i 39. Procedure Caution: Do NOT exceed 150 psig as indicated on P1-138. ADJUST 1CS-464, HC-137 EXCESS LTDN FLOW as necessary to establish excess letdown flow, and not exceed the RO following parameters: 174°F outlet temperature as indicated on TI-i 39. 150 rjsia as indicated on P1-i 38. Monitors outlet temp as indicated on TI-i 39 and pressure as RO indicated on P1-i 38 to not exceed limits. Completes flush. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 40 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NQ Scenario# 4 venf# - page 41 oi 7 Event
Description:
1CS-il fails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF excess letdown flow is to be aligned to the VCT, THEN PERFORM the following: VERIFY 1CS-464, HC-137 EXCESS LTDN FLOW is shut RO (potentiometer to zero). (Verifies position as 0) PLACE 1 CS-466, Excess Letdown TO VCT/RCDT, to the VCT position. (Places switch to VCT position) Seal Water Flow should be observed on FR-i 54A and FR-1 54B when adjusting 1 CS..464, HC-i 37 EXCESS LTDN FLOW for the following reasons: Procedure Note:
- RCP No 1 seal leakoff flow will be affected, and
- The possibility exists of lifting the 150 psi safety on the excess letdown/No. 1 seal return line.
. Do NOT exceed 174°F outlet temp as indicated on Tl-139.
Procedure Caution: Do NOT exceed 150 psig as indicated on P1-i 38. ADJUST 1CS-464, HC-i37 EXCESS LTDN FLOW as necessary to establish excess letdown flow and not exceed the RO following parameters: 174°F outlet temperature as indicated on TI-i 39. 150 psig as indicated on P1-i 38. Monitors outlet temp as indicated on TI-i 39 and pressure as RO indicated on P1-138 to not exceed limits. Informs SRO that Excess Letdown is in service. After Excess Letdown is placed in service cue the Lead Evaluator: Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 7 Event 7 - One Control Rod Drops Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 41 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NflQ Scenario # Event # Z Page 42 of 75 Event
Description:
One Control Rod Drops Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 7 Control Rod P6 drops
. ALB-13-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM ROD DEV/SEQ NIS Indications PWR RANGE TILTS Available:
. Multiple Rod Control Alarms ALB-13-4-2, 4-5, 7-4, 8-5 RO Recognizes indications of a dropped control rod Perform AOP-OO1 Immediate Actions.
- CHECK that < TWO control rods are dropped (YES)
Immediate RO Actions . Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN
. Check Control Bank motion STOPPED (YES)
Enters AOP-O01, MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL AND AOP-0O1 SRO INDICATION SYSTEM. Makes PA announcement SRO GO TO Section 3.1, Dropped Control Rod Record the time at which the rod dropped SRO Time Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page42of75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # .4_ Event # z Page 43 of Z. Event
Description:
One Control Rod Drops Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ADJUST ONE of the following to equalize Tavg with Tref: RO/BOP
- Turbine load
- Boron concentration CHECK ALL Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets for normal operation, as follows:
- NO blown fuses
. NO other visible malfunctions SRO Contacts AO to investigate Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets Contacts WCC Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist Acknowledge request to investigate Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets looking for blown fuses or other Communicator: visible malfunctions.
NOTE: There is no need to provide a report. DETERMINE if the Westinghouse Rod Control System SRO Troubleshooting Guidelines should be initiated. (Priority E Work Request is required) If ALB-13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is alarming due to a logic error, resetting the alarm before correcting the Procedure Caution: cause could result in dropping rods supplied from the affected power cabinet. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 43 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBc Scenario # Event # z Page 44 Event
Description:
One Control Rod Drops Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK that ALB-1 3-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, RO is CLEARED.
- Surveillance requirement 4.1.1 .1.1 .a requires performing a shutdown margin calculation upon detecting an inoperable control rod. [C.1]
- a. Wtthln 1 hour after detection of n inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is Inoperable. If the inoperable rtroI rod is imovable or uritrippable, the abo reqiired SHUTIfY.IN MARGIN shafl be verified acceptable with an 1ncreaed allowance for the withdrawn worth of the iarnwable or untrippable control rnd(s)
- Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 Action d.3.d will be limiting if there is any chance that the dropped rod cannot be recovered within 6 hours of event initiation.
This Action Statement also requires a power reduction to 75% within two hours of event initiation. The R1 QER 1oei :s ecico Lba or uo Th P, I 1 i ri I- r iie f-31 loenu 1 hojr the etroi T So o:rt Procedure Note: o upt rrp
- It is acceptable to use incore detectors or ERFIS Point from DRPI (or other methods if developed) to meet 4.1 .3.1.1 and the Rod Insertion Limit SRs 4.1.3.5 and 4.1.3.6.
3 The s f ch rcd si etcrres to be ir4r nt by cfyrg :e nol roo iioi t 1est once per :2 U1S Cept Oirr te Clais Ofl 5O c.r et on n; tieq werfy ee ;ru psto:uc 1rst r-ce aer 4 hot.r.
- If ALB 13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is causing multiple control rods to be inoperable, Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 Action c is applicable.
Wi:h rre thai oe rad nopersble, ue to rod oritrl ront tftre oirn or aus erci psohiem n th r3d sytccn edtn for creeter then 35 hoors, be in Ol i$NOY wlthn the roiowmg hers Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 44 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nflc. Scenario # Event # Z Page 4. L. Event
Description:
One Control Rod Drops Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior REVIEW the following Technical Specifications:
- 3.1.1.1, Boration Control Shutdown Margin Modes 1 & 2
- 3.1.3.1, Movable Control Assemblies Group Height SRO
- 3.1.3.5, Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit
- 3.1.3.6, Control Rod Insertion Limits
- 3.2.1, Axial Flux Difference
- 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio NOTIFY the following:
SRO
- Manager Operations
- Reactor Engineering Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 45 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NEQ Scenario # Event # Z Page 4 Event
Description:
One Control Rod Drops Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge any calls from the SRO concerning the dropped Communicator: control rod. RO CHECK Reactor Power AT OR ABOVE P-b (10%). (YES) CHECK ALL negative rate trip alarms at the NIS cabinets RO CLEARED. (NO) Perform RNO Actions Turns over At the Controls to BOP RESET the negative rate trip alarm at the NIS cabinets. BOP (Resets negative rate trip on N 1-41 at the NIS cabinet)
. Annunciator ALB-1 3-4-2 clears After the negative rate trip is reset and the BOP returns to the At The Controls position cue Simulator Operator to Lead Evaluator:
insert Trigger 8 Event 8 Second rod drop requiring manual Reactor Trip Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 46 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: tiBQ Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 47 of 75 Event
Description:
Second Control rod drops I manual Rx Trip required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 8 Simulator Operator:
Second Dropped Control Rod
. . . ALB-0i3-7-3, TWO OR MORE RODS AT BOTTOM Indications Available
. ALB-0i3-7-4, ONE ROD AT BOTTOM RO Recognizes indications of Dropped Rod Enters AOP-OOi, MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL AND AOP-OO1 SRO INDICATION SYSTEM.
immediate Action RO CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped (NO) Immediate TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP PATH-i. RO Action Actuates manual Reactor Trip Enters PATH-i PATH-i SRO Makes PA announcement for EOP entry Immediate EOP PATH-i Immediate Actions Action RO
- Verify Reactor Trip: (YES)
Immediate BOP
- Verify Turbine Trip: (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 47 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: JiBQ Scenario # 4_ Event # 8 Page 4 g Event
Description:
Second Control rod drops I manual Rx Trip required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses:
Immediate Action BOP 0 Check AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND 1 B-SB ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER OR EDGs (YES) Check SI Actuation:
. Any status lights lit: (NO)
Immediate RO . Check SI atuation criteria: (NO) Action . SI actuation required: (NO) SRO GO TO EPP-004 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page48of7S
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 49 of 75 Event
Description:
Second Control rod drops I manual Rx Trip required Time H Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Prior to Event 9 allow crew a few minutes to stabilize the plant and work through several steps of EPP-004 then Evaluator Note: introduce Event 9. Event 9 is a SG Steam Line Break inside Containment ramped in over 9 minutes. EPP-004 SRO EPP-004, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Step 1 Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required. SRO Step 2 Evaluate EAL Network Using Entry Point X Step 3 Check RCPs Any Running (YES) Check RCS Temperature: Check SG blowdown isolation valves SHUT (YES/NO depending on timing) BOP SG (MLB-1A-SA) (MLB-1 B-SB) A 1BD-11 1BD-1 B 1 BD-30 1 BD-20 C 1 BD-49 1 BD-39 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 49 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NE& Scenario # Event # Page 50 of 75 Event
Description:
Second Control rod drops I manual Rx Trip required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Step 4 Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1 ABLB 1: RC$ NRAJJRE CONTROL CTiIDBLINES BOLiOING RE TRIP 0 COidarce ü app1ica1le iueil soother prcoedre directs otherise a 11 so RCPs runsfs, usa wide esoge oold leg tpeatuee, RCS LPBRATWtB TREND LESS TITAN RKATER TITAN STABLE AT JR 5S1F ANT) 5iP AN!) TRENDIN( TO TECRfAS!NG INCREASING 57 F a Stop dpin a j con easer a Control feed BOP ai1abl 3jE atansfer rIo sd steam dlp to a Control feed steam turnp :o stab1tsh aM flow STEA) PRESSU asiatals CS oode usIo teaperarure 0 Naistain total OP126. bateen 5YF feed flow SectIon AND 59F OPERATOR gcearer than ANT) duap staaa ACTION 310 RPPN to condenser utfi level greater than OR 25% at least one f tact a Duap steam SC usia ifltact SC PtRVs a j cooldawn COStiOUSS. a Control fe5 IiN. shut flow to TISIVa AND aintafn SC BtPASS valves 1eve1 After the BOP has adjusted the AFW flows to control RCS temperature then cue the Simulator Operator to insert Lead Evaluator: Trigger 9 Event 9 Steam Line Break Inside Containment Step 5 Check Feed System Status: BOP a. RCS Temperature LESS THAN 564°F (YES)
- b. Verify feed reg valves SHUT (YES)
- c. Check feed flow to SGs > 210 KPPH (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 50 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nfl Scenario # Event # 9 / 10 I 11 Page 51 of 75 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Event 9, A SG Main Steam Line Break inside CNMT, ramped in over 9 minutes. The crew should identify the leak and initiate a manual Safety Injection. The SRO may also direct a manual Steam Line Isolation. The SRO should transition back to PATH-i. The crew should diagnose that there is NOT a LOCA in progress and transition from PATH-i to EPP-0i4, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
. When Containment pressure exceeds 10 psig CNMT Evaluator Note: Spray pumps auto start.
o A Containment Spray Pump starts and immediately trips. o B Containment Spray pump will fail to auto start and associated valves will NOT auto align. The pump and valves can be manually started and aligned.
. Main Steam Isolation occurs, but the MSIV on A SG does not close and remains open for the remainder of the scenario.
When directed by the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 9 Simulator Operator: . Steamline Break Inside Containment
. ALB-028-5-1 CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM will unexpectedly clear (in due to earlier ESW Pump start)
. ALB-028-8-5 COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION Indications Available:
SYSTEM
- Rising pressure in containment
- Rising temperature in containment
. Increased SG steam flow Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page5lof75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # .4_. Event # 9 / 10 I 11 Page Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies an ESF actuation setpoint will be exceeded (RCS low Pressure < 1850 psig) and EPP-004 foldout for SI Actuation RO Criteria will be met: PZR Level Can Not be maintained > 5% Informs SRO and then actuates a Manual Safety lnjeótion SRO When SI is initiated, transition back to PATH 1 PATH-i SRO Steps through immediate actions with crew RO Verifies Reactor is Tripped (YES) BOP Verifies Turbine is Tripped (YES) BOP Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses (YES) RO Check SI Actuation (YES) Perform The Following: SRO
- Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.
- Evaluate EAL Matrix.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 52 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # Event # 9 / 10 I 11 Page Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Foldout A Applies: Assigns RO and BOP Foldout A tasks FOLDOUT A RCP TRIP CRITERIA
!E both of the fcllowag occur, flj4 stop alt RCPs:
. SI ltow GREATER THAN 200 GPM
. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1400 P31(3
. MW SUPPLY SWtICBOYER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10% THEN switch the AEW water supply to life ESW system using OP-I 37, AIJXIUARVTEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 81.
a IR RESTART CR[T1IA S RO IF RCS pressure decreases to less than 20 P51(3 in an uncontrolled manner, fl!4 restart RHR pumps to supply water to the RCS a ALTERNATE MINWWW QPfENiSHUT CRITERIA a E RCS pressure decreases to less than 1800 P510, ))! verify alternate nrnifIaw isolation OR imniftow block valves sHUT a IF RCS pressure increases to greater than 2200 PSIG, THEN verify alternate rninillow isolation AND minlflow block valves OPEN a RUPTURED SG AIW iSOLATION CRITERIA IE all of the following occur to any 5(3, ILIEN, stop teed flow by shutting the isolation valves (preferred) OR f1w control valves to that 5G
. My 3(3 level increases in uncontr1led manner OR has abnormal secondary radiation
. Narrow range level GREATER THAN 25% (40%)
RO
- Verify All CSIPs AND RHR pumps RUNNING (YES)
- Check SI Flow:
RO a SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES) o RCS pressure - > 230 PSIG (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 53 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fiH_Q Scenario # Event # 9! 10 I 1 1 Page t Z. Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Si,ray P, Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- Check Main Steam Isolation:
o Main Steam Isolation ACTUATED (NO)
- MSL Isolation Required (YES)
- Actuation fails Critical
- SHUTS all MSIVs BOP Task
- Identifies A MSIV will not shut o Verify all MSIVs and bypass valves SHUT (NO A MSIV remains OPEN)
(Critical to shut B and C MSIV prior to all SGs pressure decreasing to 100 psig) CREW Identifies Containment Adverse Conditions Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG (Maybe NO time dependent due to the size of the steam RO - break pressure will exceed 10 psig. This is a continuous action step. When pressure exceeds 10 psig then the next step applies.) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 54 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NEQ Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 / 11 Page Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Crew may set an early manual actuation setpoint and manually align spray prior to an auto actuation set point being reached. Verify Containment Spray actuated (NO failed) -
. Attempts manual actuation with switches (NO) o Starts A CS pump (immediately trips on Critical Overcurrent) Reports to SRO RO Task o Starts B CS pump and opens CT-88 (discharge) and CT-i 1 (spray additive tank)
(Critical Task to start one Containment Spray pump and align the discharge valve prior to Containment pressure exceeding 35 psig not critical to align CT-il a LOCA is NOT in progress) STOP ALL RCPs (Secures all 3 RCPs)
- Check AFW Status:
BOP o AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES) Verify Sequencer Operations AND Alignment Of Components:
. Check sequencer manual loading permissive (LB-9)
ACTUATED (YES) BOP
- Energize AC buses iAi AND 1B1.
(shuts breakers for 1 Al and 1 Bi)
- Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS Signals using Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification,_while_continuing_with_this_procedure.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page55of7S
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iiB.Q Scenario # .._4_ Event # 9 I 10 I 11 Page Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When contacted to place NB air compressors in Local Control mode, run CAEP :\air\ACs_tojocal.txt. When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors are running in local control mode. Communicator: When contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves, run CAEP
- \cvc\path-1 att 6 csip suction valves power.txt. When the CAEP is complete, report completion to the MCR.
- Control RCS Temperature:
o Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559° F using Table 1. ELE 1 RCS TENPERATURE cowrRoL GU ELIIIES OLLOWN0 RI TRIP - o Ottdance Ia applicable intil another p ce4ute directs othoawlee. ue RCPs ru ing jjj se wide range cold leg reiperature, ERAT1JRE TREND ROS LESS !J4AN OREATER ThAN STAELE AT OR 557° AND 55 AND TRENDING TO DECREASING :NCREASING 557? o Stop duping o j coir o Control feed RO/BOP steam available flow end stete transfer dwap to G Control feed atea dump to establish and flow STEAK PRESSURE naintain RCS node ucing temperature o Haintain total OP22d. between 55? feed flow SectIon 5.3 AND 559E OPERATOR greater than AND dump steam AcT:ON 210 CPPH to condeuser until level greater than OR - 25% 4O%] in at least one o Dump steam on intact SC using intact SG PORVs o cooldown continuea, o Control feed shut flow to HSIVe AND maintain SO RYPASS ialtea Ievel Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page56of75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nfl Scenario # Event # 9 / 10 I 11 Page Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If PRZ pressure is below 2260 PSIG AND increasing, PRZ spray valves may be OPEN due to controller demand. (With the Procedure Note: spray valve controllers and master PRZ pressure controller in AUTOMATIC, this response is the result of the PRZ master controller being a proportional-integral controller.)
. Check PRZ PORVs AND Spray Valves:
o Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES) RO o Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES) o PRZ spray valves SHUT (YES) Identify Any Faulted SG:
- Check for any of the following:
RO/BOP o Any SG with uncontrolled depressurization (YES A SG) o Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO) GO TO EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR SRO ISOLATION, Step 1 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 57 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 9 / 10 I 11 Page 58 f Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EPP-014 SRO EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION
. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
Procedure Caution:
- Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.
SRO Step 1 - Implement FRPs As Required. IF the B CNMT Spray pump is NOT started prior to CNMT Pressure reaching 10 psig an ORANGE PATH condition will exist. IF the crew successfully starts the B CNMT Spray pump they do NOT need to implement FRP-J.1, Response to High Containment Pressure. Based on the Users Guide section 5.2.3 FRP implementation is not required if the condition of the associated Status Tree exists momentarily, clears and is Evaluator Note: improving in response to EOP instructions in effect or actuation of safeguards equipment. IF the crew implements FRP-J.1 they will remain in the FRP until step 1 1 then return to procedure and step in effect (EPP-014). IF the crew implements FRP-J.1 then follow the steps in this guide on next page or skip the FRP-J.1 section and continue with the EPP-014 action section. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 58 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NEQ Scenario # *_4_. Event # 9 / 10 / 11 Page i Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FRP-J.1 SRO FRP-J.1, Response To High Containment Pressure BOP Check Phase A Isolation Valves - SHUT BOP Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves - SHUT Check It CNMT Spray Is Required (YES)
- a. Check CNMT pressure HAS INCREASED TO> 10 PSIG
- b. Check EPP-012 IN EFFECT (NO) GO TO Step e
- e. Verify CNMT spray pumps RUNNING (YES B only)
- f. Verify CNMT spray system valves aligned for injection:
RO
- Verify the following valves OPEN o 1 CT-26 (N/A) o 1 CT-71 (Already Open) o 1CT-50(N/A) o 1CT-88 (should have been opened) o 1CT-11 (should have been opened) o 1CT-12(N/A)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 59 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # .....4_ Event # 9 / 10 / 11 Page Q Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- g. Verify Phase B isolation valves SHUT
. 1 CC-207 (YES)
. 1 CC-208 (YES)
. 1 CC-297 (YES)
RO
- 1 CC-299 (YES)
. 1 CC-249 (YES)
- 100-251 (YES)
- h. Stop all RCPs (ALL OFF)
Verify CNMT Fan Coolers ONE FAN PER UNIT RUNNING IN SLOW SPEED (YES) Check MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:
- a. Verify all MSIVs SHUT (NO A MSIV OPEN)
. Perform the following:
BOP 1) Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 1IA-814
- 2) Locally remove cap AND open drain valve:
1IA-1876
- b. Verify all MSIV bypass valves SHUT (YES)
Dispatches RAB AO to locally shut IA and drain header Acknowledge request to isolate IA and drain header Communicator: NOTE: Do not perform any actions on the Simulator Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 60 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NHQ Scenario # 4_. Event # 9 I 10 I 11 Page j. Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS Procedure Caution:
cooldown. Check if Feed Flow Should Be Isolated To Any SG:
- a. Any SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
- b. Check for any of the following:
o Any SG pressure Decreasing in an BOP uncontrolled manner (YES) o Any SG Completely depressurized (NO) o Isolate feed flow to faulted SGs:
. MFW (Verifies shut)
. AFW (Verifies shut OR shuts)
Check CNMT Spray Pump Status
- a. Check CNMT spray pumps BOTH RUNNING RO (NO) GO TO STEP c
- c. Check CNMT spray pumps ONE RUNNING (YES)
Check ESW Booster Pump Status:
- a. Check all of the following:
- b. ESW booster pump A SA Running (YES)
RO
- Orifice bypass isol valve 1 Sw-i 16 SHUT (YES)
- c. Check all of the following:
. ESW booster pump B-SB - Running (YES)
- Orifice bypass isol valve 1 sw-i 18 SHUT (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 61 of 75
Appendix U Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: tEQ Scenario # A_ Event # 9 / 10 / 1 1 Page 2 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray P Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The Containment Status Tree may continue to display a non-satisfied condition after completion of the procedure. Procedure Note: If this is the case, the appropriate Function Restoration Procedure does not need to be implemented again since all necessary actions have already been performed. SRO RETURN TO Procedure and Step In Effect. EPP-014 SRO EPP-014 (Continued) Step 2 Check MSIVs AND Bypass Valves: o Verify all MSIVs SHUT (NO) MSIV A 1 MS-80 (NO) MSIV B 1 MS-82
- MSIV C 1 MS-84
- Direct RAB AC BOP/RO o Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 1 IA-814 (north of AH-19 1A-SA) o Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: 1 IA-i 876 (located in corridor outside VCT valve gallery)
Verify all MSIV bypass valves SHUT (YES) o MSIVA 1 MS-81 o MSIV B 1 MS-83 o MSIV C 1 MS-85 Acknowledge request to locally shut IA-814 and remove cap Communicator: and open drain valve 1 IA-i 876. DO NOT PERFORM THESE ACTIONS ON THE SIMULATOR Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 62 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 I 1 1 Page 63 of 75 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT. CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Step 3 - Check Any SG NOT Faulted: BOP/RO
. Any SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
Identify Any Faufted SG:
. Check for any of the following:
BOP/RO o Any SG pressure DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES A SG) o Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO) Isolate Faulted SG(s): o Verify faulted SG(s) PORV SHUT (YES) o Verify main FW isolation valves SHUT (YES) o Verify MDAFW AND TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) SHUT
. MDAFW 1 AF-55 SB (YES)
BOP/RO
- TDAFW 1 AF-137 SA (YES) o Shut faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump SHUT (N/A Stm Supply is not from A SG) o Verify MS drain isolation(s) before MSIVs - SHUT:
- SG A: 1MS-231 (YES) o Verify SG blowdown isolation valves SHUT (YES) o Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves SHUT (YES)
BOP/RO Check CST Level - GREATER THAN 10% (YES) A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out Procedure Note: following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 63 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: tiEQ Scenario # Event # 9/ 10 / 11 Page 4 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Secondary Radiation:
. Check for all of the following:
BOP/RO o SG blowdown radiation NORMAL o Main steamline radiation - NORMAL Check SG Levels: BOP/RO . Any level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO) Check If SI Has Been Terminated: Check for all of the following:
- Check BIT outlet valves SHUT OR ISOLATED (NO) o lSl-3 o 1SI-4 BOP/RO
- Check cold leg AND hot leg injection valves SHUT o 1SI-52 o 1SI-86 o 1SI-107 RNO GO TO STEP 12 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 64 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # Event # 9 / 10 / 11 Page 65 of 75 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check SI Termination Criteria:
. Check Subcooling GREATER THAN 10°F [40°F]
- C 20°F [50° F] M (YES)
(Note the C and M above refers to how subcooling is calculated. C is by the Computer, M is Manual)
- Check secondary heat sink by observing any of the BOP/RO following:
o Level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES) a Total feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (YES)
. RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
. PRZ level GREATER THAN 10% [30%] (YES)
Reset SI. RO
- Takes SI reset switches to RESET and verifies SI activated light is off Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of CREW Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-i GUIDE, Attachment 2.)
Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. RO (RESETS BOTH Phase A and Phase B) Reports to SRO reset complete Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT: a Open the following valves: RO
- 1 IA-81 9 (OPENS valve) 1 SI-287(OPENS valve)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 65 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 / 1 1 Page t Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Stop All But One CSIP. RO
- Secures 1 CSIP RO Check RCS Pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
Isolate High Head SI Flow: Check CSIP suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES) Open normal minif low isolation valves
. 1CS-182 (OPENS)
. 1CS-196(OPENS)
. 1CS-210 (OPENS)
. 1CS-214 (OPENS)
RO Shut BIT outlet valves:
. 1SI-3(SHUTS)
. 1SI-4(SHUTS)
Verify cold leg AND hot leg injection vlvs SHUT (YES)
. 1SI-52(YES)
- 1SI.-86 (YES)
. 1SI-107(YES)
Procedure Caution: High head SI flow should be isolated before continuing. Establish Charging Lineup:
- a. Shut charging flow control valve o FK-1 22.1 (takes to manual and SHUTS)
- b. Open charging line isolation valves:
o 1CS-235 (OPENS) o 1CS-238 (OPENS) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 66 of 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBcL Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 / 11 Page Z Qt Z Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Sorav P Start failure. A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: RCS temperature must be stabilized to allow evaluation of PRZ level trend. When 1 RCS cold leg is stable the crew can consider that RCS Evaluator Note: temperature is stable. Monitor RCS HL Temperature STABLE (YES / maybe NO time dependent) RO IF NO then: Manually dump steam and control feed flow to stabilize RCS temperature while continuing with procedure. Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent Procedure Caution: damage to the regenerative heat exchanger. Control Charging Flow To Maintain PRZ Level:
- a. Control charging using charging flow control valve RO FK-122.1
- b. Maintain charging flow < 150 gpm
- c. PRZ Level Can be maintained stable or increasing (YES EPP-008 SRO GO TO EPP-008, SI TERMINATION, Step 1.
Terminate the scenario when the crew transitions to EPP-008. Lead Evaluator: Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions. Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner place the Simulator in FREEZE. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 67 of 75
Appendix D OP-148, Essential Service Form ES-D-2 Chjlled Water System Chiller Start 5 STARTUP 5.1. Startup Train A-SR EB-SB frGm Main Cntra1 Romi r 1.ca Panel 5.1 .1. India I Con d ithrn NOTE.: 5.1 acirg Stary -era:n. hc d :e eo when c Chfl Tcifr .s ri ter LIed ion vrd per Se
- 3. Ste neup Atachfrens an 2 are corpee.
- 4. Ft nc ery rs e Drrt ;1 *I:rnent S
- orre nd in opa.tcrsoui be p-iet to csee stai of th er.
- 5. Eec.r &12 Mariua Chiller eseas been pmieo. if neoesay d
- o crilIertrp,
- 5. The LO eate hate been sevce fr ti,eve hcws (.Se recjt on an Lrnzvicn 4 0 3 r ap a1r of 1s nrI Ccr on Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 68 of 75
Appendix D OP-148, Essential Service Form ES-D-2 Chilled Water System - Chiller Start 5i 2. PTO drz1 Sp NOTE: enever a Tra om neis reerred o in tre ty cf th-s cedire is .r1rp wili r JeLy llc NOTE: ESF. -OC42 evauate ano :hat og-ii, ucfte a e ?ç it n ffe4t cerbI :y ,f t? rces Oh er ynt The rext to l1 igi te %S ruis hciever. f is es red :c tair P!C NNS ioatn va es :he I nd &1 21 b4spe. ISOt.ATE the suppy .rtd em es to the f*dS A un from tan ha w n Se pIaed fr reric by hut the foIlaw aw:
-f-i S C--i6 S3 OLLED ?ATER FROM NESSR FAN LS soi 3A iK. 7 5A) LE VATR FROM N55R FAN cLs oL SA 9 LLE ATE C ES FW2 CR SQL 1CH-14 LLEDWAT O FN CLRS C
- 2. ALIGN :e pIy d eiut vves:o te NNS H wts sscciated :h the tris rni te g4ace n service y cç&rij Ihe oHcwi vshes CK-1 2B) 4U ATR FROM NR AN LS S*rDL A C4iQ7 2A tu1D VATSF ROM NE5S FAN CLRS iSOL
-I A CH-I4 2S) OL1ED A1 D ES2 FNS O C
OU.EDWATEO ESR FAN CLS QL Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 69 of 75
Appendix D OP-148, Essential Service Form ES-D-2 V V Chilled Water System V Chiller Start ii.2 Poe-dir Steps VflLed NOTE Thq V3 aii id c.ibn r w dted ter 1kw znd hiw h d vil n n:ir rnaly et at the WC2 1rc p4
? STATWCCh A3A 4SBCMied wer;ur 4o bFi ei wa:er fow
- 4. t t Lal crrc pares, RESET ihe L CMIIec iatr Fcw alarni the CHILED WATER %O F_OW iIP ND CA10N RESET W rtr< the ch1 r the rL t me olk2wirig IT erIn: wrre tte h1 ci nle cIeer,nc.
THEI PERFORM the 4 blIcwir&: a, Lc; START the cr th 1A-A rinpreQry a.ing the :crm swch OFV the c:al palmel te MAN ostn
. RUNçr1rrpDf 6rinte STOP the il pwn te A-SA 15 cll cr by
.a.ing the :c itch the cca! pane4:o te AJTO posit on.
t t-e L& Con Pare, CHEC that alarm ihs are OT L IF ay .vr 1igr:sI s Ii THEN PERFORM the oIkwing: a, IF the Lcl SeItt wtch hi :he LOCAL positcn, THEN oca y DEPRESS t!e SCP oush-butort o, IF :he Local Se!ec: wIch Is in :h MC HVAC Votiap, THEN the 1ASA _S!Ve cir sch n 1 STOP. IF ay alm tiht s THEN PERFORM the IIciri
; iNmATE rctve actn.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 70 of 75
Appendix D OP-148, Essential Service Form ES-D-2
- Chilled Water System Chiller Start S.2 Prrl Sp rVd)
NOTE: l the un I cJ d* kw M e ei oi ow td er
- he c.ni w auti restart ! start eiss cr 1crs NOTE: An anti-recye fatira ver more an one normal st a U *peic Thi 1i*;Ci Lr* $
ar g: rcm e E.SF seqece NOTE : 7ARt t f Cfrt Sit t it ttd brirg oil pressure up to romiS erang pressure prior o er OPT-I I tie the npure Ci,roi Pom ier:*e surfaces. Thile OT-I2 rescres e potent netsc zo s ongml posicn. i sIb4 tht 4 urc4 ;tin th cr sti i th* potan&neter he chaied sry to uire naral ten ratfe djnie-; per Seion 4 of is p ec.-e. Thwl 1e de:enine y ri I tue ier tnller re lkhi
? START the n iler cng re of a fc:cin:
L At APi, ACir Cll C*v CZ A Bi vrc srich to the START pctsbn arLd reIease. OR
- o. EPES the TT pi-bt$te i the orfro vith the Lcl Se .ec ih In the CAL nos lioft.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 71 of 75
Appendix D OP-i 48, Essential Service Form ES-D-2 Chilled Water System Chiller Start 5.2. Placing Standby Train In Operation NOTE: It necesryto hitt ated irains of-lVftC units when shifting trains of Essential Services ChEed W.aer. NOTE: Th s Sect on is writlen for wappiig from air S ESCW to Ira r A 220W, th nponenis for swapping fron Train A ESCW zo Train S 250W in arenTheses. 5.2.1. Tnitia Corid:itions
. Sertie watcrs being sup ied to the non-cpera:ing cruller C-2 IA-GA.
- WC2 1S-SB).
- 2. One train of 250W -s alreay in operatn.
- 2. Fc no encmeroy stars the prests ecks of Attachment 5 ae ecn
- -erforr ed and an operator shoulo be present b cserie start of chiller.
- 4. Section 3,12, i.1anuaI Chiller Reset performed i necessarj for on-operatng ch. icr.
- 5. The LO. aters have been in serii icr ee hcurs (See Precauton and Limiticn 403 for apioabillty of this niial Ccndiori) 52.1 Procedural Steps NOTE: The Icca alarm indoa:ion for :ow chilled water flaw and low chiLed water temperature wi1 lock in until nanualy reset a: the WC-2 ccntr& panel.
NOTE If earting The chiller compressor s deiaeo follcwing the start of the P4 Pump in the next Step, the compressor oil cc-i Id ccc dcn to the pont that the corr presscir wi trip on low cli pressure.
. AtAE?1, STARTthe non-operai5ng Oh[erWC2 A-SA ssBI CilIed Water Pump P4ASA l3-SB to estabkh chilled water flow n the on-cperang tran.
- 2. At the local Ccnir& panel, RESET the Lci Chilled Water Flow alann isir the CHILLED WATER NO FLOW TRIP ND CATION RESET us-button.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 72 of 75
Appendix D OP-148, Essential Service Form ES-D-2
. Chilled Water System Chiller Start 5.2.2 Procedural Steps (nnued)
- 3. IF atart n The chiIe r the 9rst tThe ollcwing rr aimenane ere me h!..:er be oil ea:er t:uiwa5 tnder clearance, THEN PERFORM the rslIcwinq
- a. ocaily START lime c pio cr the ancy cliller ciesacr by aking the srch on the ccal panel :o i.e iA potn.
. RUN pr or S mint STOP the startdby chiller cornpresor oil purr p ty tk the cDntct1 switch on the ocal panel i the AUTO poiion
- 4. At t:e Loa1Ocmrc Parel, CHECK that all alarm ights ae OT L IF alari ligThsi is lit, THEN PERFORM the Ncwing:
- a. IF the Local Select wich is in the LOCAL position, THEN oy DEPRESS the STOP sh-buttcn.
- b. iF the Local Select switch is in :he M32 HVAC poslion, THEN place the siaicby chiller corrpressor ccnrc swch on AEP-l to STOP.
o IF ary alarm light is si lit, THEN PERFORM the follcwing; DECLARE the rh icr noperable INITIATE correctve acton Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 73 of 75
Appendix D OP-148, Essential Service Form ES-D-2 Chilled Water System Chiller Start 5.21 ProcdurI Steps tc.-t rd: NOTE: )PT-1 2 r Ctroi Pw: wt el a faoes. Ih e OPT- 52 reicre the orte-t orte :o its rigial pc ici, 1i ai ce ir surfct o.nin e eriia c the Dctetoreter have cnaiqed sufcierity to reauire a aiuaI tpera re Ijiiit p Sr 4 af th .. Th w h nin by rcrtcrirg Ierrrature afer hiIIer star in e &wfrg S:ep. STAR1 the ;r by pefcrnrg ONE c :he IIowin:
- a. AtAP-i, PLACE Waier Ci)er Cooesscr WC-2 A-SA SCE ccr- wtcb the SRT ço,ci, AND RELEASE OR
. DEPRESS the outo t the caaf ocnfrth ire th the Ioca ee4ed swtch the tOCL poito.
PLACE :di:iona fet eIaed ai haro ers n eriic.e pror o cTyer 4 ie reet eader. NOTE; ESR 142 evz anz detee tha: Ir owe fie sup1y ard eurr ahes :o the NNS AH uts t not affect oçerabH a of the itc Dh et yem. The ext t Sps .r i the NNS Al jni ho ever, fit le esed :c mainsn the NNS iaton a ies hA he eo .I28 nd 522. ry be skipped. ISOLATE the spp: rd em ei the NNS Al-I ni from the that vas alreazy oFeratr r.y huzng the fc.wr ave CF4LLED WAER FROtf NESSR FAN e D)4 LL WA FOJ NSS N CIRS D C5 DA) DJE WATER CESSR FANS DIR ISDI 4 C H-14 SA CH-1 D*iE WATER TO ESR FAN DIRS SOL Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 74 of 75
Appendix D OP-i 48, Essential Service Form ES-D-2 Chilled Water System Chiller Start
.52.2 PerI 3tp ALIGN NS AH u ri will nin pe- b th ckw -ç CH-125 SE IC44.-V E) LLE WTER FROM NESS N SOL CLRS SOL 5 SA CH-L4 . LLED VATSR ESSR FANS CH-l SE C--i4 SAi O1IiED W.TER. O ESS FAN
*ff,C 11 F 3hr b er 3uort he dby t quri n THEN PERFRM AtIacwnent Ei, NOTE: rvc writhe ;-Hr -diqr ! çiç iii pp SW FC1 WC2 E-S3 -SAON!iEJSER tS?-2E8 SB SA
- 11. STOP .he hllei by rr r f the tov 4t AEP1. PLACE r Ci:4r Cc E-E cnr th tit a+/-d ease DEPRESS M 9TO ph4n 1l irl nel ih elethitth n 1h .OtiL pilon..
A1 SYOP
- 3A ChkflC Purp F-4 3-SB A-SA the In us ecu Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. FINAL Page 75 of 75}}