ML12166A112
| ML12166A112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/2012 |
| From: | Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| ES-201, ES-201-1 50-250/11-302, 50-251/11-302 | |
| Download: ML12166A112 (106) | |
Text
cr1 fl70r0-ciinl _f n1-fcrm c-mc iinc camination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-i Target Chief Date*
Task Description (Reference)
Examiners Initials
-180 1.
Examination administration date confirmed (Cia; C.2.a and b)
-120 2.
NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e)
-120 3.
Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) /2/I
-120 4.
Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) 4/2.9/,t
[-90]
[5.
Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 3)]
j
{-75}
6.
Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-1s, ES-401-1/2, ES-401-3, nd ES-401-4, as applicable (C.1.eandf; C.3.d)
{-70}
{7.
Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}
{-45}
8.
Pe 2
xaminations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6, and any Form ES-201-3 updates), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d)
-30 9.
Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398s) due (C.1.l; C.2.g; ES-202)
-14 10.
Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.i.l; C.2.i; ES-202)
/21/u
-14 11.
Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review (C.2.h; C.3.f)
-14 12.
Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g)
-7 13.
Written examinations and operating tests approved by NRC supervisor (C.2.i; C.3.h)
-7 14.
Final applications reviewed; 1 or 2 (if >10) applications audited to confirm qualifications I eligibility; and examination approval and waiver letters sent (C.2.i; Attachment 5; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204)
-7 15.
Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee (C.3.k)
-7 16.
Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to NRC examiners (C.3.i)
- Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee.
[Applies only] (Does not apply) to examinations prepared by the NRC.
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Date of Examination:
Developed by: Written
- Facility NRC II Operating
- Facility LVNRC D N-I
ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility.
/2, 7
L Date of Examination: 2o(/
Initials Item Task Descnption
1.
a.
Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.
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R b.
Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I
Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all KJA categories are appropriately sampled.
c.
Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
d.
Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate.
A 4 2.
a.
Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications,
/ J i
S and major transients.
M b.
Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U
and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L
without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using A
at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T
from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
0 c.
To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative R
and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
3.
a.
Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks
/
W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form I
(2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T
(3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
b.
Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
c.
Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
4.
a.
Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.
b.
Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
N c.
Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.
d.
Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.
A e.
Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
L
f.
Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO).
- a. Author Da
- b. Facility Reviewer (*)
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- c. NRC Chief Examiner(#)
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- d. NRC Supervisor 1ALLd}.fJ[bAAAvJA.t7 Note:
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in C umn c1; chief examiner concurrence required.
Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines ES-201, Page 26 of 28
3ND p kLLD 1
/c4t& --i ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist F.ta Form ES-201-2 Facfiity: Turkey Point Date of Examination:
1 2/05/1 1 Initials Item Task Description 1.
a.
Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.
w
R b.
Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I
Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled.
c.
Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
d.
Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate.
2.
a.
Using Form ES-301 -5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S
and major transients.
M b.
Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U
and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L
without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using A
at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated 13 T
from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
0 c.
To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative R
and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
3.
a.
Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W
distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form I
(2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T
(3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria qf on the form.
b.
Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified gu_ij V fj (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
c.
Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
4.
a.
Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.
T b.
Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
N c.
Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.
J çf d.
Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.
A e.
Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
f.
Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO).
jU1,
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re Da
- a. Author Robert Heidecker
- iif, ii
- b. Facility Reviewer (*)
Sean Bloom jj 12th i
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
Edwin Lea 44, -,
- d. NRC Supervisor rUfluCbdleRJ Note:
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines ES-201, Page 26 of 28
Ladmowtedge that [have aGque spedálizeddbc4 the NR HGnSk examinations dadu1.d for the w(s) of12/Wit - 1Z(Ithof me date of my signature. tgree eial ifl notnowlngly 1ivuJ9e any kiformaton tboit these e arninatione to ay persons who haie not been authorzai by tie NRC ctiefexaminer, I underatand that am notto iistruct, evakjaI, or provide pertonnancefeedback to tho3e appHGant aclieduled o be adw,klistered these licensing e nations from This date 1mtd complellor ofexan*a1on edni1n1st,4on. eoept 55 Specifically notd eIw and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a shnulator boQth cperar or oommunk*tor is aeptable if1t Indlviduaidoes notselect the traigiing tonter or provide direct or indirect1eedbd). FurUarmwe I an are ofthe physical secutity masur and requirements (as docu,entsd in the facirity IicenseWs procures) and irndem(and that fe1atlon of the ccq4tlona of this agreement may result ifl canc&(atJor of the examinations aridlor enforcement action against vn Of the lacdlity censee. 4 imndiet5ly report l lacHlty management or the NRC chief minar any kidloations or sigqest1ona that examination Secwlty ny have been compmn*ed.:
2.
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.dürjngthwweek(s) çf /From the datet entt into tjt c!y agr ant unUl the COTnpi(j cf examinaUon admkstrtion did not:
tjttict eaiae, or pmvide performance fee1back to thoo açiaiwt Wf cnte(ed these hoens!ng exsnik1ation except as eecif1cally rIote iow end eiithozlzed by the NRC.
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ES-201 Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Form ES-201-3 ILC-27 Examination Security Agreement 1.
Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 12105111 - 12116111 as of the date of my signature.
I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner.
I understandthat I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee.
I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
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2.
Post-Examination V
To the best of my knowtg I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered V
during the week(s) of From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not V
instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE! RESPONSIBILITY SIGNATURE (1)
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NOTES:
ES-201 Turkey PointNuclear Plaflt F6rm ES2U14 CLC-27 Examination Security Agreement
- 1.
Pre-Examination I acknfedgethat I hPe acquired specaIlzed kn4edgeabouttbe NRC Hóénskg examiliaffons urtheweek(s) f 12 i1iaWof dateof my signane I agree that I will notcingIy divulge any kifommticin abe ib5onoto any personswho have not been r
bythe NRC examiner I understancfthat lam not to Inabuci. evakzate or prvide prforrnancefeediadcto those applicants scheduled to be adtered these licensing examinations from tins date w completion ofexarohation ddrnirzisbeticn, ewept as spedtloally noted below and authorized by NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acdeptable If the indMdual does not select the trainln contentor prove direct or indirectfeedback). Fu ftecmoe 1am aware ofthe pbicaI s measures and requirements (as docwneatad kithefadlity licensees procedures) and understand thatviolation ofthe conditions of this agreement may resultin cancellation ofthe mcamfrtatlonsand/oran enfonementaction agrainstme or the facr licensee. I wilt irnmediate1yeportte facility management or the NRC chiefeiinev any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
2.
Post-Examinatign PRINTED NAME soTlrLJ RESPONSIBIUW NA1URE (l)-
DATE To the best of ray ae I did not dM1geto any unauthorized pemonsny iz*rthon concerning the NRC licensing examinations edninisiered.
cluxirig the vimek(s)
From the date that I entered Into this security agreement until the completion of nination edmThfraon, I did not irzstroc eIuate or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing emminations, eept as specifically nfed beloa-artd authorized by the NRC SIGNATURE (2)
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ES-201 Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Form £S-201-3 ILC-27 Examination Security Agreement 1.
Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the weeks) of 12105111
- 12116111 as of the date of my signature. I agree that will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner I understand that I am not.to instruct; evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the indMdual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conltions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations andlor an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee.
I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
2.
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To the best of my knowJ 1 did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of________
From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration. 1 did not instruct, evaluate, or prvide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted.
below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE I RESPONSIBILflY SIGNATURE (1)
DATE nSIGNATURE (2)
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ES-201 Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Form ES-201-3 ILC-27 Examination Security Agreement 1.
Pre-Examination I acknowledge that 1 have acquired speciahzed knowledge about the. NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 12105111 - 12116!l1 as of the date of my signature.
I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner.
I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted.below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the trainingcontent or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may cesult in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee.
I will immediately report to faciUty management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
2.
Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of
. From the date that I entered pto this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAIflE JOB TITLE! RESPONSIBILITY SIGNATURE (1)
DATE SIGNATURE (2)
DATE NOTE
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ES-201 Turkey Point Nuclear Plant ILC-27 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3 1.
Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of the date of my signature.
I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner.
I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g.,
acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee.
I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
2.
Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of I A-i.34j From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
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ES-201 Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Form ES-201-3 ILC-27 Examination Security Agreement 1.
Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 12105111 - 12116111 as of the date of my signature. lagree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner.
I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administFation, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the indMdual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or art enforcement action against me or the facility licensee.
I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
2.
Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I ic,pot divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of I2,h-/ -WFrom the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provile performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as seciflcally noted below and authorized by the NRC.
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NOTES:
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ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 12105/2011 Examination Level:
2011-302 Administrative Topic (see Note)
Type Code*
Describe activity to be performed Perform a Dilution Calculation for a Unit Power Change A.1.a from 80-100%
M,R Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 RO 3.9 SRO 4.2 A 1 b Evaluate Overtime Requirements M,R Conduct of Operations 2.1.5 RO 2.9 SRO 3.9 A.2 Prepare an ECO for the 3A Component Cooling Water Pump N, R 2.2.13 RO 4.1 SRO 4.3 Equipment Control Evaluate conditions for restart of Refueling Preshuffle A.3 M R In the spent fuel pit Radiation Control 2.3.12 RO 3.2 SRO 3.7 A.4 N/A NOT SELECTED FOR RO EXAM Emergency Procedures/Plan NOTE:
All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
Page 1 of 2
2011 TURKEY POINT ADMIN JPM
SUMMARY
A.l.a
- Calculate the Dilution Required for Unit 3 Power Change from 80-100%: Given a set of Unit 3 plant conditions, the applicant use the Unit 3 Curve Book and 0-OP-046, CVCS Boron Concentration Control, to calculate the dilution required for Unit 3 power change from 80-100%. MODIFIED BANK JPM
- 01028022100 (used on the 2009 PTN NRC Exam). The initial conditions (core burnup, initial boron concentration, initial rod height, and initial power level) were modified. [2.1.25
- Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.]
A.1.b
- Evaluate Overtime Requirements: The applicant uses 0-ADM-200, Conduct of Operations, and AD-AA-101-1004, Work Hour Controls, to determine the overtime requirements for two proposed work schedules. MODIFIED BANK JPM [2.1.5
- Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.]
A.2
- Prepare an ECO for the 3A Component Cooling Water Pump: The applicant use 0-ADM-212, In-Plant Equipment Clearance Orders and 0-ADM-212.1, Operations In-Plant Equipment Clearance Orders, plant drawings, and other procedures to prepare the clearance. NEWJPM. [2.2.13
- Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.]
A.3 Evaluate conditions for restart of Refueling Preshuffle in the spent fuel pit.
The applicant uses Attachment 2 of 3-NOP-040.3, Fuel Handling and insert shuffle in the Spent Fuel Pit, to assess plant conditions and identifies if the refueling preshuffle can be restarted.
New JPM. [2.3.12 RO 3.2 SRO 3.7]
A.4 - NOT SELECTED Page 2 of2
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline F,
j Form ES-301 -1 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 12/0512011 Examination Level:
RO E SRO L1 Operating Test Number:
2011-302 Administrative Topic (see Note)
Type Code*
Describe activity to be performed A 1 a Perform a Dilution Calculation for a Unit Power Change M, R from 80-100%
Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 RD 3.9 SRO4.2 A 1 b Evaluate Overtime Requirements M,R Conduct of Operations 2.1.5 RD 2.9 SRO 3.9 A 2 Determine Contingency Actions M,P,R Equipment Control 2.1.2 SRO 4.4 Evaluate conditions for restart for Refueling Preshuffle in the A.3 M R spent fuel pit.
Radiation Control 2.3.12 RD 3.2 SRO 3.7 Given a set of conditions, determine the EAL and complete the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form F-439 A.4 M, R within the required time Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.41 RD 2.9 SRO 4.6 NOTE:
All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RD applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RD retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
.1 I
Page 1 of 2
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS A.1.a
- Review a Dilution Calculation for a Unit 3 Power Change from 80-100%: Given a set of Unit 3 plant conditions, the applicant uses the Unit 3 Curve Book and 0-OP-046, CVCS Boron Concentration Control to ensure the accuracy of a dilution calculation for a Unit 3 power change from 80-100%.
MODIFIED BANK JPM -01028022100 (used on the 2009 PTN NRC Exam). The initial conditions (core burnup, initial boron concentration, initial power level, and induced errors) were modified. [2.1.25
- Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.]
A.1.b
- Evaluate Overtime Requirements: The applicant uses 0-ADM-200, Conduct of Operations, and AD-AA-101-1004, Work Hour Controls, to determine the overtime requirements for two proposed work schedules. MODIFIED BANK JPM [2.1.5
- Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.]
A.2 - Determine Contingency Actions: The candidate must assess plant conditions and determine the appropriate enclosure from 0-ADM-051, Outage Risk Assessment and Control. Additionally the operator must determine the actions for loss of a charging pump in reduced inventory. [2.1.2 SRO 4.4]
A.3 A.3 Evaluate conditions for restart of Refueling Preshuffle in the spent fuel pit.
The applicant uses Attachment 2 of 3-NOP-040.3, Fuel Handling and insert shuffle in the Spent Fuel Pit, to assess plant conditions and identifies if the refueling preshuffle can be restarted.
NewJPM. [2.3.12 RO 3.2 SRO 3.7]
A.4
- Classify an Event and Complete a Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form F-439: The applicant first classifies an event using 0-EPIP-20101, Duties of Emergency Coordinator, then uses 0-EPIP-20134, Offsite Notifications and Protective Action Recommendations, to complete a Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form F-439. MODIFIED BANK JPM -1001013400 [2.4.41
- Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.]
Page 2 of 2
I ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 12105/11 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-UD Operating Test No.: 2011-302 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-l); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including I ESF)
Safety System I JPM Title Type Code*
Function
- a. Recover Misaligned Control Rod D S 1
- b. Recover from a Loss of Offsite Power D S 6
- c. Preparation for OMS Operation A
N EN 3
- e. Manually Initiate Containment Spray and Control Room Ventilation Isolation A, EN, M, S 5
- g. Test Source Range Nuclear Instrument M
L 5 7
015A4.02RO3.9SR03.9
- h. Respond to Component Cooling Water System Malfunctions A D 5 8
008 A2.01 RO 3.3 SRO 3.6 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-l); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. Locally Trip the Reactor and Main Turbine D E 1
- j. Preparations for Initiating Containment Vent Alternate Air Pressurization N
R 5
103 A1.01 RO3.7SRO4.1
- k. Instrument Air Dryer Operations During Loss of IA.
A N 8
@ All RO and SRO-l Control Room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the Control Room.
Page 1 of 3
- Type Codes Criteria for RD I SRO-l / SRO-U (A)Iternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 I 8 I 4
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 /
1 /
1 (EN)gineered safety feature
- I I 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 /
1 I 1
(N)ew or (M)odifled from bank including 1 (A) 2 /
2 /
1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 I 3 /
2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA (S)imulator Page2of3
TURKEY POINT 2011 NRC EXAM JPM
SUMMARY
a.
Recover Misaligned Control Rod
- The applicant uses 3-ONOP-028.1 RCC Misalignment, to restore the control rods to a normal configuration. BANK JPM
- 01028016301 b.
Recover from a Loss of Offsite Power The applicant uses 3-ONOP-004. 1, System Restoration Following a Loss of Offsite Power, to parallel the Unit 3 Startup Transformer to the 3A 4KV Bus, being supplied by the 3A EDG.
BANK JPM
- 01005014303 c.
Preparation for OMS Operation
- The applicant uses 3-NOP-041.04, Overpressure Mitigating System, to prepare for operation of the OMS. When cycling the second PZR PORV, the PORV will fail to close. The operator will then diagnose that the associated PORV block valve leaks, requiring the operator to manually initiate a Safety Injection. This is the alternate path portion of this JPM.
NEW JPM.
d.
Start 3A RCP in MODE 3 The applicant uses 3-NOP-041 alA, 3A Reactor Coolant Pump Operations, to start 3a RCP in MODE 3. The alternate path portion of this JPM occurs after the RCP Start with high starting current. The applicant is required to secure 3A RCP. MODIFIED BANK JPM.
e.
Manually Initiate Containment Spray and Control Room Ventilation Isolation The applicant uses 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Attachment 3, to manually initiate Containment Spray, isolate all Phase B penetrations, and manually align Control Room Ventilation. The alternate path portion of this JPM occurs during the failure of automatic actuation of Containment Spray, Phase B isolation, and Control Room Ventilation. Manual actuation and alignment is required. MODIFIED BANK JPM.
f.
Loss of B SO Auto MFRV Control The applicant uses prompt actions in accordance with Control Room alarm response to re-establish Main Feed Regulating Valve control in manual. Level is to stabilized to the program level of 60% without tripping the Reactor or Turbine.
BANK JPM 01074011303.
g.
Test the Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation
- The applicant uses 3-OSP-059.1, Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation Analog Channel Operational Test, to test SR Channel N-32. MODIFIED BANK JPM 0105901 7200 SEQO5OA.
h.
Respond to Component Cooling Water System Malfunctions The applicant uses 3-ONOP-30, Component Cooling Water Malfunction, to respond to a bearing failure of a running CCW pump. The alternate path portion of this JPM occurs when CCW pumps cannot be started. The Reactor must be tripped. Letdown and Excess Letdown must be isolated. BANK JPM.
i.
Locally Trip the Reactor and Main Turbine The applicant takes actions to locally trip the Reactor lAW 4-EOP-FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.
BANK JPM.
j.
Preparations for Initiating Containment Vent Alternate Air Pressurization The applicant uses 3-NOP-094, Containment Post Accident Monitoring Systems, to lineup air for subsequent pressurization of Containment. NEW JPM.
k.
Instrument Air Dryer Operations During Loss of l.A.
- The applicant uses 3-ONOP-013, Loss of Instrument Air, to locally operate the 3A Instrument Air Dryer. The alternate path portions of this JPM consist of 1) identifying excessive purging, requiring a transition to the RNO column; and 2) failure of a valve to operate while in the RNO column, requiring the operator to take a contingency action.
NEW JPM Page 3 of 3
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 12105111 Exam Level: RO fl SRO-l SRO-U Operating Test No.: 2011-302 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including I ESF)
Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*
Function
- a. N/A N/A N/A
- b. N/A N/A N/A
- e. N/A N/A N/A
- f. N/A N/A N/A
- g. N/A N/A N/A
- h. Respond to Component Cooling Water System Malfunctions A D 8
008 A2.01 RO 3.3 SRO 3.6 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. Locally Trip the Reactor and Main Turbine D E 1
- j. Preparations for Initiating Containment Vent Alternate Air Pressurization N
R 5
103A1.01 RO3.7SR04.1
- k. N/A N/A N/A
@ All RO and SRO-l Control Room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the Control Room.
Page 1 of 2
- Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-l I SRO-U (A)Iternate path 4-6 I 4-6 I 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 I 8 I 4
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 I 1 I 1
(EN)gineered safety feature
- I
/ 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown 1 I 1 I 1
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A) 2 I 2 I 1
(P)revious 2 exams 3 I 3 I 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA (S)imulator TURKEY POINT 2011 NRC EXAM JPM
SUMMARY
c.
Preparation for OMS Operation
- The applicant uses 3-NOP-041.04, Overpressure Mitigating System, to prepare for operation of the OMS. When cycling the second PZR PORV, the PORV will fail to close. The operator will then diagnose that the associated PORV block valve leaks, requiring the operator to manually initiate a Safety Injection. This is the alternate path portion of this JPM. NEW JPM.
d.
Start 3A RCP in MODE 3 The applicant uses 3-NOP-041.O1A, 3A Reactor Coolant Pump Operations, to start 3a RCP in MODE 3. The alternate path portion of this JPM occurs after the RCP Start with high starting current. The applicant is required to secure 3A RCP. MODIFIED BANK JPM.
h.
Respond to Component Cooling Water System Malfunctions The applicant uses 3-ONOP-30, Component Cooling Water Malfunction, to respond to a bearing failure of a running COW pump. The alternate path portion of this JPM occurs when CCW pumps cannot be started. The Reactor must be tripped. Letdown and Excess Letdown must be isolated.
BANK JPM.
i.
Locally Trip the Reactor and Main Turbine The applicant takes actions to locally trip the Reactor lAW 4-EOP-FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.
BANK JPM.
j.
Instrument Air Dryer Operations During Loss of LA.
- The applicant uses 3-ONOP-013, Loss of Instrument Air, to locally operate the 3A Instrument Air Dryer. The alternate path portions of this JPM consist of 1) identifying excessive purging, requiring a transition to the RNO column; and 2) failure of a valve to operate while in the RNO column, requiring the operator to take a contingency action.
NEW JPM Page 2 of 2
ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Fij Form ES-301-3 Facility:
Date of Examination:
Operating Test Number:
Initials
- 1. General Criteria a
b*
a.
The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution).
b.
There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered
/
c2,3 during this examination, fP I) c.
The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s). (see Section D.1.a.)
d.
Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits.
e.
It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level.
- 2. Walk-Through Criteria
a.
Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:
initial conditions initiating cues references and tools, including associated procedures reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee operationally important specific performance criteria that include:
detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature
system response and other examiner cues
statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant
criteria for successful completion of the task
identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards
restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable b.
Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.
- 3. Simulator Criteria The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached.
Printed Name I Signature Date a.
Author 14icAecIi/
1 / V 4
ii//ii b.
Facility Reviewer(*)
,L....
c.
NRC Chief Examiner(#) 6 cli.n Lip j d.
NRC Supervisor fr1LdA. Jy/
NOTE:
The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.
Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
ES-301, Page 24 of 27
ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist F
. j Form ES-301-4 Facility:
Date of Exam:
Scenario Numbers:
/
I Operating Test No.:
QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES htials a
b*
1.
The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.
2.
The scenarios consist mostly of related events.
- Ef 3.
Each event description consists of the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position) the event termination point (if applicable) 4.
No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario dlJif
./
without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
I V
5.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
6.
Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
7.
If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints.
hf Cues are given.
8.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
i:I.
9.
The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios.
10.
Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.
All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-301.
11.
All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301 -6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).
IVW
12.
Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).
13.
The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position.
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
Actual Attributes 1.
Total malfunctions (58) 1
/
s j
2.
Malfunctions after EOP entry (12)
/ 2- /
it(
3.
Abnormal events (24)
I Sf /
4.
Major transients (12) 1
/ / /
1 41
32% narrow range. C. Continue dumping steam. Continue at 450 gpm AFW flow until one S/G is greater than 50% narrow range and then control flow as necessaiy to maintain 50-60% level. D. Stop dumping steam. Continue at 450 gpm AFW flow. If cooldown continues, then reduce AFW flow to just above 345 gpm until at least one S/G is > 6% narrow range.
- 2. Stem Focus: The l bullet needs to be more precise with respect to which units or equipment is experiencing the loss of offsite power. Is Unit 4 affected? Is the LOOP only on Unit 3? Ensure that the 2 bullet under the current conditions agrees with whatever the 1 st bullet is changed to.
- 3. Stem Focus: The stem question can be shortened to WOOTF identifies the required actions in accordance with 3-EOP-ES-0. 1?
1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Qz SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 2 H 2 x x B E OO8AA1.03 1. Stem Focus: The stem does not provide the status of the RCPs. Therefore, the exact Tcold temperature requirement is not clear. Provide RCP status. 2. Stem Focus: The 4 th bullet lists Tavg even though 3-EOP-E-0 lists requirements for Tcold. Change to Tcold. 3. Stem Focus: Because the stem doesnt provide the current S/G pressures, it is not clear whether the S/G Atm Dumps [in AUTO 1092 psig setpoint] are already open or still closed. Provide S/G, steam header pressure. 4. Stem Focus: The stem does not provide the status of the pressurizer, i.e., can the block valve closed and what is pressurizer pressure. Consequently, it is not clear whether E-1 is/is not required. Provide status of pressurizer. 5. QK/A: The K)A requires testing the applicants ability to operate (or monitor) the steam dumps (in manual) to maintain steam header pressure. Each of the 4 choices should provide specific pushbuttons and/or knob manipulations without the amplifying information related to lowering (vs maintaining) Tavg. This way, the applicants ability to operate the system will also be tested. In other words, if the applicant must choose which way to turn a potentiometer or knob, then his/her knowledge of Tavg requirements is also being tested. Note: This question must test some aspect of the emergency/ abnormal (Tier I Group 1) stuck open PORV event. The question can be answered by knowing two things:
- 1) condenser (steam dump) is not available below 20 Hg and 2) no load Tavg is 547 F. Since E-0 has temperature requirements, then the proposed Tavg question may be acceptable. May be acceptable since the S/G atm dumps are essentially bypassing the turbine so to speak.
2. LCD (1-5) 009 EK3.20 1. Q=K/A: Need to change this K/A because it is too hard to hit at the RO level. Chief examiner randomly re-selected 009 EK3.21 to replace this K/A. The proposed question does not test the applicants knowledge associated with the reasons for the Tech Spec leakage limits. The applicant doesnt have to know the reasons for the TS leakage limits to get to the right answer. Because a small break LOCA event is so much larger than an event associated with exceeding the Tech Spec leakage limits, it appears that the K/A is disjointed. (How can one write a question associated with a small break LOCA that deals with the reason forTS leakage limits?) 2. Stem Focus: The 7 th bullet is not required to elicit the correct response. 3. Cue: The 11 th bullet ontainment sump level annunciator) and the wording of the 13 bullet (containment pressure rising steadily) are strong cue that the correct answer is D. Feed Reg Valve position (before and after) might be a better way to discriminate between between an RCS leak and a SGTR without cueing the applicant. LOK (F/H)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws Stem Focus Cues T/F 3
H Cred. Dist.
- 4. Job Content Flaws 2
Partial x Job-Link Minutia
- 5. Other 6.
- /
units 7. Back-Q= ward K/A SRO B/M/N U/E/S Only x N 8. Explanation E 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 4 F 2 x x x B U 011 EA2.10 1. QK)A: The question does not test a large break LOCA event because the stem provides RCS Tavg at 535 F, which is indicative of a small break LOCA. Additionally, the proposed question tests the applicants ability to determine when RCP5 are / are not manually tripped. The purpose of tripping RCPs is to (hopefully) preserve inventory, this is not the same thing as VERIFYING adequate core cooling exists. The intent of the K/A is to test the applicants ability to analyze parameters and either determine or interpret whether the core cooling is adequate, i.e Suggest changing the question to test the applicants ability to use CET5 to determine when core cooling is in jeopardy, e.g., red path or orange path. 2. Cues: The stem sentence after the bullets [While reviewing the FOLDOUT PAGE the reactor operator verifies....J cues the applicants that the answer to the question is found on a foldout page. Suggest adding a 9 th bullet that only states No HHSI pumps can be started. 3. Stem Focus: The bullet [subcooling is lowering] can be confusing with respect to the word lowering. Is the RCS becoming more subcooled or is the amount of subcooling diminishing? 4. Stem Focus: Pressurizer pressure and level are not provided in the stem. 5. Stem Focus: The reason (2 part of each choice) is not needed to elicit the correct response. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 5 F 2 x x x N EIU 015 AK3.07 1 Partial: Choice C [maintain an adequate inventory to start a required natural circ cool down] can also be successfully argued as correct because Page 22 of BD-EOP-ES-0.1, states thatS/G level must be restored in the narrow range to ensure an adequate heat sink. 2. Cred Dist: Thel st part of B and D is not plausible because no containment parameters are provided in the stem. 3. Stem Focus: Change the stem question to WOOTF identifies the required S/G level control band and the reason for the band in accordance with BD-EOP-ES-O. 1, Reactor Trip Response Basis Document? 4. Stem Focus: The stem does not describe whether the loss of offsite power was limited to Unit 3. 5. Stem Focus: The 2 nd part of Choice B has a typo precluded vs preclude. 6 H 2 x B EIU 022 AKI.01 1. Cred Dist: Choices C and D are not plausible because EOP ECA-0.1 doesnt have any cool down guidance. Additionally, the 2 part of C [keeping the valves closed ensures RCP seal integrity] doesnt ensure seal integrity; it prevents thermal shock, which may (or may not) damage the seals. Suggest testing whether the valves should remain closed or slowly re-opened and some other piece of knowledge. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 7 H 2 X X N E 025 AA1.02 Question appears to match K/A. 1. Cred Dist: Distractor C is not plausible. Locally unlock and close accumulator breakers will do nothing if the outlet valves are not opened. 2. Stem Focus: Why is pressurizer level so low in the initial conditions? The procedure has the operator verify level is greater than 12%. It should be this way in the initial conditions and then in the current conditions it should state 10% and slowly lowering or something similar. 3. Stem Focus: Distractor B should state manually align high head safety injection pumps to RCS cold legs. 4. Stem Focus: The stem of the question should state WOOTF mitigation... lAW 3-ONOP-041.7.... NEW (GWL) 8 H 2 X X B E 027 AK 2.03 Question kind of matches the K/A. 1. Cred Dist: Distractor A is not plausible. 444J does not ever operate 3-456. This should be 3-455. Furthermore, with the word immediate in the stem this will still NOT be a correct response. The distractor should state Pressurizer PORV 3-455 will open. 2. Stem Focus: Both pressurizer spray valves will open 3. Stem Focus: Why start the question stem with an If. Just state the operator inadvertently sets the contra! for 444J to the setpoint of.. BANK question used on 2008 NRC exam. (which exam is not listed) (GWL) 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. IPartial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KJA Only 9 F 2 X X M E 029 EK2.06 Question appears to match K/A. 1. Partial: There is a subset issue with A, BC, and D. Add only to the end of all distractors. 2. Job-Link: Not sure that this is correct. Some Westinghouse protection schemes have the shunt trip coil trip on the bypass breakers energize when the manual trip is initiated. I agree that the drawing provided does not show this. Is this a controlled document? Need to verify that this is correct. If I remember correctly the push button was to ensure the shunt trip coil was tested. Modified Bank 2008 McGuire Exam (GWL) 10 H 2 X X B E 038 EKI.02 Question appears to match the K/A. 1. Cred Dist: Distracter B is not plausible. Turn on pzr heaters to minimize RCS leakage? Why would anyone pick this? If heaters are on pressure will rise and leakage will increase. 2. Partial: Distracter D could be argued as correct. If I lower Subcooling, that will lower RCS pressure and that will decrease RCS to SG leakage. I know this is not the answer in the background document, but it is a fact and could be argued on an appeal. BANK 2007 Farley NRC exam. (GWL) 11 F 2 X N E/U WE12 G2.1.30 Question appears to match the K/A. 1. Cred Dist: Does the ASP contain fuses? If not, distracters C and D are not plausible. Try, Attempt to close MSIVs by taking switch to Local (already aligned in the closed position) and take switch to local and go to close on switch. Add in accordance with EOP-ECA-2.1. NEW (GWL) 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 12 H 2 X X B E 054 AK3.02 Question kind of matches the K/A.
- 1. Cred Dist: Matching of steam flow and feed flow are in three of the four distracters.
2. Partial: A may be correct (or at least may not be a totally incorrect answer).
- 3. Cred Dist: Distracter C does not seem to be plausible. How could reducing turbine load prevent automatic controls from overshooting, if fact it could cause the controls to overshoot?
Which automatic controls are we talking about? (SG FRVs, the auto turbine runback has already failed. BANK 2008 South Texas (GWL) 13 F 2 X N U 055 EA2.03 Question appears to match the K/A.
- 1. Cred Dist: Distractors C and D are not plausible. Powering up 3A and 3B from unit 4 diesels with unit 4 also without power is not plausible; typically DG5 are designed to power the respective buses and the ESE loads. They would not be expected to provide all four ESF buses. (Unit 3 A and B, Unit 4 A and B).
NEW (GWL) 14 H 3 B S 056AA2.54 No comments BANK 2005 Davis Besse 15 H 2 X N U 057 G2.4.50 Question kind of matches the K/A. (Actions are based on ONOP not alarm response procedure). 1. Cred Dist: Distractors B and D are not plausible as written. Why would an automatic turbine trip occur? The procedure states that if 3P08 is de-energized for greater than 10 minutes, then make preparations to trip the plant. Nothing is automatic (unless SIG levels Hi/Lo are exceeded). NEW 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/MIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 16 F 2 X N E 062 AA1.03 Question appears to match the K/A. (Good job a matching a tough K/A.)
- 1. Cred Dist: Distracter B is not plausible.
If the pump is running at minimum speed, and the oil cooler outlet temp reaches 195, how can I reduce speed to minimum? Need to fix this distracter. NEW 17 1-1 2 x x N E/U 065 G2.4.21 1. This is a tough K/A because of the instrument air topic. 2. QK/A: The intent of the K/A may not be met with the proposed test item (discuss with the licensee) because of the Emergency Procedures/ E-plan topic. The proposed question tests knowledge of the instrument air abnormal procedure. This K/A may need to be re-selected. Discuss wl Licensee. 3. Stem Focus: Suggest the following fill-in-the-blank statement to streamline and make more precisely fit the wording of the RNO column in ONOP-013 and to provide meaning for the dash in Choices A and B. IF Auxiliary Building instrument air pressure cannot be maintained greater than 65 psig when an RCS cooldown is in progress, THEN_____________ as necessary to maintain the cooldown/heatup limitations. A. Cycle MOV-3-749A/B, RHR Hx 3A/B CCW outlet valves B. Start and stop RHR pumps 18 H 3 x N E EO5EK2.1 1. Stem Focus: A bullet should be added to the stem stating that all RCP5 have been stopped to align with Step 3 (prior to Step
- 4) in 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
2. Stem Focus: Re-word the stem question as In accordance with 3-EOP-FR-H. 1, WOOTF identifies 1) the MINIMUM required actions to initiate Feedwater to the S/Gs AFTER the Safety Injection Signal has been reset and 2) whether any feed water flow restrictions are required? 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 19 F 2 x x N U 003 AK1.02 1. QKJA: The K/A requires testing the applicants knowledge of
- 1) how a Tavg/Tref mismatch (following a dropped control rod) affects rod control in automatic and 2) the operational implications of this if it were to occur. For example, assuming rods are in AUTO, which way will they move and the implications of them moving this way, i.e., Axial Flux and some other plausible distracter.
The proposed question doesnt test applicants knowledge of how the Tavg/Tref mismatch will affect rod control. The procedure (ONOP-28.3) requires placing rods to manual, but how would rods be affected in AUTO? 2. Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices B and D (rods are left in AUTO) is not plausible because ceasing rod movement after a dropped control rod is the fail-safe answer if one doesnt know what to do. 20 F 2 x x x M E 005 AA2.03 1. Cue: The correct answer (Choice A) is the only one with a Tech Spec number and is in all caps. Suggest re-wording as perform OST-??, to calculate Shutdown Margin 2. Cred Dist: Choice B is not plausible (align all the good rods with the ones that are stuck at 196 steps), especially since the stuck rods are further out of the core. 3. Stem Focus: The last portion of Choice C (..or enter the applicable action statement.. ) is not necessary to eliminate this choice. 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIMIN UIE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 21 H 2 x x x N E 024 G2.2.42 1. Partial: Choice C can be argued as correct since 45 gpm is greater than 16 gpm and because the ARP 097 B17 does not specify a procedure to use for emergency boration. 2. Cred Dist: Choice C is not plausible since it is the only one with a procedure reference. 3. Stem Focus: The last portion of all four choices can be eliminated, see suggestion: A. No action required. B. Immediately initiate boration 16 gpm. C. (See comments #1 & 2 above; need another distracter) D. Be in Hot Standby within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. 4. Stem Focus: The ARP referenced in the stem has the number B 812 and the ARP lists this window as B 17; ensure this is consistent with all other annunciators listed in the stem on the entire exam. 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 22 H 2 x x B E 032 AK3.01 Note: Per Tech Spec Table 3.3-1, Function 4.a, the source range neutron flux trip is required during applicable mode 2# ( # sign indicates below P-6; however the version of Tech specs provided on the reference material discs does not include the # symbol; instead it says 23. (typo?) 1. Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choice C (only intermediate and power range flux low trips are required) is not plausible because the 4 th bullet in the stem states that Reactor power is in the source range only. 2. Stem Focus: The choices are not symmetrical because 3 of the choices allow the startup to continue. Suggest modifying the 4 th bullet to provide ACTUAL NI readings from ALL NIs. Modify the 2 bullet to provide RCS average temperature. (This way the applicants will have to analyze plant status to determine the mode and whether the plant is below P
- 6) The choices could be modified in the following format (or similar):
A. The startup may continue because the gamma-metrics are available B. The startup may continue because the plant is above P-6 C. The startup may NOT continue because the plant is below P-6 D. The startup may NOT continue because the plant is above P-6 3. Ensure no overlap w/ Q#23 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE I Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 23 H 2 x B E 033AA1.01 1. The 2 part of Choices A and C is not plausible because the stem does not include any other alarms or instrument indications other than the N-35 values. Add another pre-existing alarm to the stem to add plausibility to whether the reactor trip breakers have opened. 2. Stem Focus: The 3 rd bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response. 3. Ensure no overlap w/ Q#22 24 F 2 x x B E 061 AK2.01 1. Stem Focus: The proposed question is negatively worded, i.e., WOOTF is NOT.... This is normally not allowed on the NRC written exams lAW NUREG 1021, Appendix B, page 11 of 26. Re-work the question to test WOOTF is.... 2. Stem Focus: The way the stem refers to the alarm window location (i.e.,..on Panel X...) is not consistent with the protocol for listing annunciators in this exam.. should be X4/1 or similar. 3. Cue: The only rad monitor listed inside containment is the correct choice. Additionally, Choice C is longer than the other choices. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/MIN U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 25 F 2 x x N U 067 G2.1.30 Note: The surveillance procedure in which the local valves are used to start the diesel pump was not provided with the reference material. 1. Cred Dist: Choices A and B are not plausible because they do not include the mechanism used to start the diesel (simulating low pressure?). IF the surveillance provides the methodology and guidance to simulate a low pressure condition THEN Choices A and B should also include enough of the surveillance guidance and methodology to make these choices plausible. Only closing a drain valve OR opening a DDFP (acronym?) sensing line isolation valve is not described in enough detail to become equivalent with pushing the CRANK button in Choices C and D. 2. Cred Dist: Choice D is not plausible because the stem does not ask for the minimum required actions. Also, an applicant can read the words EMERGENCY/MANUAL listed in the stem question and reason that Choice D doesnt have the word MANUAL. 3. Stem Focus: The 2 nd bullet is not grammatically correct; should read Unit 3 Transformer IS on fire (not are). 4. Stem Focus: Discuss whether any of the bullets are necessary. It appears the question can be streamlined to test the applicants knowledge of how to locally start the diesel fire pump without all the bullets. 26 F 2 x B U E13EA1.2 Cred Dist: Choices A and B (open 3B atmospheric dump) are not plausible because the pressure in S/G 3C is much higher than the pressure in S/G 3B. Also, the entry condition for 3-EOP-FR-H.2 is any SIG pressure greater than 1130 psig. WOOTF identifies the lowest S/G pressure that requires entry to 3-EOP-FR-H.2 and a required action in this procedure? A. 1100 psig; try to dump steam using the S/G steam supply to the AFW pump B. 1130 psig; try to dump steam using the SIG steam supply to the AFW pump C. 1100 psig; use blowdown for the affected SIG D. 1130 psig; use blowdown for the affected SIG 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 27 F 2 x x x B E E16EK3.2 Job-Link: Step 1 of 3-EOP-FR-Z.3 requires the operator to verify that the containment purge (supply and exhaust) valves are closed. The RNO for this step directs the operator to pull fuses (i.e., DE-energize) for any open valves behind VPB. The stem question asks the applicants to provide a reason why these valves are RE-energized? This appears to conflict with 3-EOP-ER-Z.3. IF the reason for pulling the fuses is to de energize the associated ESFAS isolation logic (which would allow power to be restored to the valve actuators), THEN the stem question may be misleading. Discuss w/ licensee. 2. Cred Dist: The 2 nd part of Choices B and C (reduce containment pressure) is not plausible in the context of required actions for a high containment RADIATION condition. Additionally, the stem does not provide any value for containment pressure. 3. Partial: (Noble gases are Helium, Neon, Argon, Krypton, Xenon, and Radon) An applicant may be able to successfully argue that Choice D is also correct if the term noble gases is interpreted as a generic term pertaining to any radioactive gas. The iodine in containment (after a severe accident) consists of 91% elemental iodine ÷ 5% particulate iodine ÷ 4% methyl iodine. The design of the filter is 90% efficiency for elemental iodine; 95% efficiency for particulate iodine; and 30% efficiency for methyl iodine. (See page 39 of 117 in reference material LP 6902129). Discuss whether the filter will remove radioactive gases. If so, suggest changing this portion of the distracters. 4. Stem Focus: The bullet in the stem is not necessary to elicit the correct response. 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 28 H 2 x x E 003A3.O1 1. Stem Focus: The stem can be streamlined as follows: Unit 3 is operating at 100% power with all controls in automatic. WOOTF completes the following statement? IF the pneumatic supply to HCV-3-121, Charging Flow to Regen Hx is lost, THEN HCV-3-l2lwill fall to the fully______ position and the RCP Seal Injection flow rate will_______ 2.
- /units: Verify the ID number and title of this valve matches the controller label in the main control room.
29 H 2 x B E 004A1.07 1. Stem Focus: The second part of all four choices should include the word letdown before the word flow. The choices should ideally include the flow indicator name/number to be precise as to flow. The same comment for the pressure indicator name/number referred to in the 2 part of each choice. 2. Stem Focus: Remove the phrase along with from each of the choices. 3. Stem Focus: The stem does not specify which charging pump is in service. 4. Stem Focus: The stem should include the noun name for each valve. 5. Stem Focus: May want to consider fill-in-the-blank style. Design restrictions on demineralizer operation require the letdown flow rate to be maintained below________ IF the Low Pressure Letdown Valve, PCV-4-145, falls to the full open position, the demineralizer flow rate be exceeded. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 30 H 2 x x x N E 005 K6.03 1. Job-link and/or Partial: IF a tube leak malfunction is applied in the simulator, which downstream temperature indicator will rise? An applicant could potentially argue that there is no correct answer because the magnitude of the tube leak is not specified. Also, the stem wording is asking the applicant for the initial effect, which is undefined. 2. Cred Dist: Choice A is not plausible because IF CCW were to leak into the RHR, THEN it would cause RHR temperature to lower. 3. Stem Focus: Re-word the stem question as: WOOTF identifies (1) a symptom of the tube leak and (2) how the temperature indication on )(X-XXX will be affected? As a possible alternative to the proposed question, test the applicants knowledge of an interlock associated with operating the HCV-3-758 since this is technically a part of the heat exchanger system, i.e., the outlet TCV. OR the CCW TCV. 31 F 2 x x N E 006 K3.02 1. Difficult K/A to hit. 2. Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that Choice B is also correct because the stem does not include sufficient detail to predict if fuel damage occurs or not. There may be multiple and/or redundant systems which still could preclude fuel failure even when MOV-4-843A and B are misaligned closed. In order to hit the K/A, suggest testing the applicants knowledge of how many subsystems the ECCS is comprised (Three) and one of the 1 OCER5O.46 design criteria that wont be met when all three of these systems fail. 3. Stem focus: The 2 part of each choice can be streamlined to fuel clad damage will/will not occur. 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO B/MIN U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 32 H 2 x x M E 007 K3.01 1. Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that Choice D is also correct because there is not enough information in the stem to predict whether containment temperature/radiation will / will not rise to adverse values. 2. Stem focus: The word conditions in the 2 nd part of each choice should be defined. Suggest replacing the 2 part of the question to test the applicants knowledge of one of the containment annunciators that will alarm as a result of the PRT rupture disc failure. Run the scenario on the simulator and observe a rupture disc failure. S 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 33 F 1 X M U 008K4.02 Cred Dist and/or LOD=1: The 1 st part of Choices A and D are not plausible because a head tank will always compensate for level prior to any make-up valve. At a minimum, any make up valve will have some kind of control band and associated dead band for maintaining tank level. These bands can never be as quick to respond as a head tank which is coupled to the piping systems. This renders A(1)and D(1)to be not plausible. The following is a suggestion for a question and should be refined to final form. Suggest the following: RCS/CCW Leak in Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger of 100 gpm. CCW Head Tank Level is 80% and slowly rising. R-3-17A/B is in alarm. WOOTF states (1) the position of RCV-3-609, Head Tank Vent Valve, based on the above conditions, AND (2) the plant or operator response to these conditions? A. (1) closed (2) MOV-3-626 RCP Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger Return, is currently closed based on the stated conditions. B. (1) closed (2) MO V-3-626 RCP Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger Return, will NOT auto close due to current conditions. C. (1) open (2) When CCW Head Tank Level reaches 100%, MOV-3-626, RCP Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger Return, auto closes. D. (1) open (2) IA W 3-ARP-097. CR.l-Refer to 3-NOP-030, CCW, to contml level. 34 H 2 B 010 K6.01 No comments. Note: K1 statement requires testing the applicants knowledge of either 1) physical connections and/or 2) cause-effect relationship between Containment Cooling and service water/cooling system. At Turkey Point, the normal containment cooling units reject heat to the CCW system. To apply this K/A statement at Turkey Point, the CCW system is essentially the service water/cooling system. See CL feedback item 401.51. 1. Cred Dist: Choice D is not plausible because if all of the coolers are isolated, it does not make sense that all the coolers would be running; especially when only three are normally running. Choice C is not plausible for similar reasons. That is, why would it make sense to have all NCC5 stop, yet allow CCW flow to continue through them after a phase A? 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 35 F 2 B ? 012K4.02 This question was on the last NRC exam. Ask the licensee how the random selection of ALL bank questions that met this K/A was performed, i.e., what was the methodology? [Note: ALL bank questions constitute ALL questions in the banks that meet this KA, not just the questions that are mapped to this K/A.J Another option would be for the licensee to modify or replace the question. 36 H 2 X B U 013A3.01 1. Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices B and D are not plausible because the stem states that the channel was placed in trip. Suggest changing the last bullet in the stem to only state that the actions of 3-ONOP-049.1 were completed. This will require the applicant to know whether they are required to place the channel in trip or bypass, thus adding an acceptable amount of plausibility to Choices B and D. 37 H 2 X B U 022K1.01 42 H 2 B S 062K2.01 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 38 F 2 x N E 026A1.02 1. Partial: An applicant may (successfully) argue that there is no correct answer because the condition, namely temperature, is not sufficient to make a determination for securing sprays. Pressure must also be less than 14 psig. Some minor revision to the stem can likely address this concern. 39 F 2 B S 039K4.05 No comments. 40 H 2 x x x M E 059A4.11 1. Cred. Dist: Choice D is not plausible because the name/description can be used to eliminate it. 2. Cue: Underlining Main Feedwater Regulating Valves in the question statement is a cue that Choice D is not correct. 3. Stem Focus: Since one S/G is <50% and the others are >50% per the initial conditions, recommend Choice A give the band required per procedure (15-50%) or <50%. With one SIG at 45%, would not expect operators to raise level to 50%, which is the max level per procedure. 41 H 2 x x B U 061 K.5.01 Cred Dist: Because Choices C and D are subsets of each other (density decrease and outsurge are equivalent in some cases) an applicant can eliminate both of these choices. Stem Focus: The wording of Choice C is disjointed, i.e., density decrease in pressurizer level. Instead, this choice should specify a density decrease of water in the pressurizer or RCS vice a density decrease in pressurizer level. I. Stem Focus: Question statement is confusing in that it requests the initial impact on pressurizer level, but specifies if the pump speed continues to lower. Suggest modifying the initial condition to state that pump speed is lowering and remove the part of the question statement that discusses pump speed. No comments 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. IPartial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 43 F 2 N S 063K1.03 No comments 44 H 2 x B E 064A2.07 1. Partial: An applicant can (successfully) argue that there is no fully correct answer because being under-excited will not cause a reverse power trip of the EDG breaker if 1000 kw of real load exists. 45 F 2 x B E 073A1.01 1. Stem Focus: Is this a Control Room Ventilation Isolation or Recirculation? The lesson plans call it Recirculation. 46 F 2 N 5 076 2.2.12 No comments 47 F 2 x B U 078A4.01 1. Q=K/A: The question does not test the applicants ability to operate or monitor the instrument air system pressure gauges because the choices A and C can be eliminated using the knowledge that at 8% power, a turbine trip does not require a reactor trip. Furthermore, choice D can be eliminated based on the RPS trip setpoint for high pzr pressure. Therefore, the applicant can deduce the correct answer (Choice B) without having any knowledge of the instrument air system. Suggest modifying the question to specifically require knowledge of the instrument air system pressure parameters. 48 H 2 B S 103K1.02 No comments 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0 SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 49 H 1 x N U 004A2.23 1. Cred Dist and/or LOD=1: The 1 fill-in-the-blank statement [If not corrected.] in combination with the only stem condition (high differential pressure across a filter) make the 1 part of Choices A and C (Labyrinth Seal DIP going high) not plausible, i.e., the stem does not include any information related to another issue that could potentially lead to a high labyrinth seal AP. The 1 fill-in-the-blank statement lends itself strongly to the common sense remedy of changing the filter. The 2 nd part of Choices A and B (closing HCV-4-121) and are not plausible because not plausible distracters with a clogged seal injection filter. 50 H 2 x B E 010K6.03 1. Stem Focus: The wording of the stem question (sequence of events) doesnt match Choices C and D because the l item in Choices C and D is a non-event (spray valve position remains unchanged). 2. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet is not clear that the spray valve failed AFTER the mixing evolution was already in progress. Use the word subsequently. 3. Stem Focus: The word proper in the stem question is not needed to elicit the correct response. Suggest re-working the question to test the applicants knowledge of whether PCV-3-455B will close (or will not close) and whether the reactor will (or will not trip). 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD-r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 I Back-0=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link unitsj ward K/A Only 51 F 2 x B E 012K5.O1 Note: The operational implication of DNB with respect to RPS is the OPT trip and its variable setpoint. The proposed question tests the applicants knowledge of how the OPAT setpoint varies as Pzr pressure varies. 1. Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement has a question mark at the end (instead of a period). 2. Stem Focus: Make the fill-in-the-blank statement into two sentences. Suggest the following... (alternative for 2 sentence shown also.) The RPS trip provides core protection from a departure from nucleate boiling (DNB). The trip setpoint value is automatically reduced when RCS pressure A. OPAT;rises B. OPA7 lowers C. OTATrises D. OTAT;lowers 52 F 2 x M U 013K2.O1 1. 0= K/A: The proposed question does not test the applicants knowledge of the power supply to the sequencer. Suggest re-working the question in the following format: WOOTF identifies the power supply to 3A Diesel Generator Sequencer and an operational implication when this power supply is lost? A. 3P07; one of the AFW auto start signals is lost B. ????; ???? C. ????; ???? D. ????; ???? 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO BIM/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 53 H 2 x N U 026A3.02 1. Cred Dist: The 2 ,d part of Choices A and C (temperature lowers) is not plausible because when a piece of equipment is not running and then started, its temperature ALWAYS rises. 2. Partial: Choice D may also be correct. Discuss WI licensee how the CCW flow will be higher following a Phase B isolation signal. Suggest the following: [A LB LOCA has occurred on Unit 4 and containment pressure has reached 40 psig.] The CCW flow rate to a Containment Spray Pump Heat Exchanger is pre-adjusted to . (12 gpm) The CSP A/B COOLING WA TER LO FLOW annunciator (H 7/5) set point is . (7.7gpm) 54 H x x x B E 062 G2.2.37 Cue: The 2 bullet provides information which is not needed to elicit the correct response, that is, that the 3C Inverler normally powers 3P06. (This is a normal alignment that the applicant should know.) The fill-in-the-blank statement also includes 3P06, which can be replaced with the Vital AC Distribution Panel 2. Stem Focus: Add another bullet that states all Vital AC systems on both units are in their normal alignment (to clarify any questions that the applicants may have during the exam). 3. LOD = 1: Because the Tech Spec is being provided to the applicants, the correct answer (Choice B) is borderline direct lookup. Assuming that the 3P06 Panel has transferred to the CVT following the loss of the 3C Inverter, suggest the following: The associated Vital AC Panel is currently being powered from (CVT or Spare Inverter). Tech Spec 3.8.3.1, Onsite Power Distribution, limiting conditions for operation (are/are not) currently met. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD I (F/H) (1-5) Stem ICues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focusj Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 55 x U 063 K3.02 1. LOD = 1: The answer to the question (Choice A, breaker indicating lights off and manual operation only) can be (correctly) deduced without any plant specific knowledge, i.e., generic fundamentals knowledge (alone) can be used (for any large breaker) to identify that the breaker indicating lights and operation require DC power. The question must test some plant specific knowledge. The 1 portion of the question may be an answer determined solely using GFES; however, the 2 part should require plant specific knowledge. In this case, the correct answer can be determined solely using knowledge of components/breakers. 56 H 2 x x B U 002 K5.11 1. Cred Dist: The it part of Choices B and D (RCS Loop Ts lower) is not plausible because the amount of steam flow has risen. 2. Stem Focus: The 1 st fill-in-the-blank statement is not clear with respect to whether its asking about ONLY the RCS Loop B.. OR whether its asking about the difference between the three loops AT5. 3. Stem Focus: The first sentence (Unit 3 is at 100% power should be its own paragraph. Split out the two fill-in-the-blank statements so that theyre on two different lines. 4. Ensure there is no overlap between this question and the scenario events. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 57 F 2 x x B E 014 A4.01 1 Stem Focus: Provide the Tavg channels and their associated (individual) values in the stem. Also provide the 1 st stage turbine pressure value. 2. Stem Focus: The choices can be streamlined to test the applicants ability to predict whether the rods will initially step in at 68 spm (or 40 spm) AND the expected final values for the Tavg channel indications. 3. Job-link: IF the control room crew were moving rods in MANUAL in accordance with procedures, THEN they would be required first to match Tavg/Tref. Is the question proposing that the operator made a mistake? Inadvertently? Discuss w/ the licensee. 4. Stem Focus: The last portion of the stem question ( prior to matching Tavg and Tref ) is not necessary to elicit the correct response. Re-word to say WOOTF predicts the effect of placing the Rod Control Bank Selectro Switch to the AUTO position.? 5. Stem Focus: The stem abbreviation for average RCS temperature is different in the 4 th bullet and the stem question. 58 F 2 x x B E 017 K4.01 Q=K/A: Although the 1 portion of the question (pressure instrument used to calculate subcooling) is testing the K/A, the 2 portion of the question (how RCS subcooling compares with CET subcooling) is not a design feature or interlock associated with the in-core temperature monitoring system. Re-work the 2 part of the question to test the applicants knowledge of which temperature instruments are used by OSPDS. 2. Stem Focus: The 2 fill-in-the-blank statement is not precisely worded to determine which two indications the applicants are being asked to compare. List the exact instrument numbers for where the applicant is observing RCS subcooling and CET Subcooling. 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 59 H 2 x x x x M E 029 K3.02 1. Q=KIA: The K/A requires testing the applicants knowledge of the requirements associated with containment entry when the purge system has a malfunction. It appears that the question can be answered solely using knowledge associated of which fan(s) remain running. The K/A should test some aspect of 0-ADM-009 or some containment entry interlock associated with the loss of purge. 2. Job-Link and/or Partial: What procedure requires the containment purge for this entry? The 2 bullet states that the Shift Manager has determined that the purge is required; however, which procedure lists the requirement to suspend the containment entry? An applicant could potentially argue that there is no correct answer IF there is no requirement that the entry has to be suspended when the purge is not operating. 3. Stem Focus: The four choices are not symmetrical, i.e., Choice D is the only one that lists containment entry may proceed. 4. Stem Focus: Provide the annunciator alarm in the stem (for when R-3-12 failed high). 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 60 F 2 x x x x N U 1. Cred Dist: Choices C and D is not plausible as the FIRST required action because an applicant can safely guess that getting people out of the spent fuel building (for their safety) is paramount. Is the threat to control room operators (bubbles and rising rad) the plausibility intent? 2. Q=K/A: The wording of the K/A allows testing the applicants ability to monitor AUTOMATIC operation of the cooling system when there is either a spent fuel leak/rupture OR when there is a pool leak/rupture. If there is a convenient way to test the applicants ability to monitor fuel pool level following a fuel pit liner leak, then this is permissible. [Collector channels are located at the bottom of each wall on both fuel pits to check for leakage through the stainless steel fuel pit liner. At scheduled intervals the valves shown are opened to check for leakage. Leakage is monitored by Fl-3/4-6540.] Note, siphoning can also be AUTOMATIC. 3. Stem Focus: Provide actual fuel pool level (instead of saying that level remains stable in the band). 4. Stem Focus: Provide actual fuel pool temperature and trend. 5. Job-link: Which procedure lists the allowances for resetting tripped breakers? Discuss the requirements with the licensee. 61 H 2 x B E 035K6.01 1. Cred Dist: Choices B and C (S/C pressure lowers after an MSIV closes) may not be plausible since closing a main steam isolation valve results in much less steam flow and higher pressure. Suggest running this 21% power scenario on the simulator and using the data to re-work the question to test the applicants knowledge of how another parameter will respond following the MSIV closure. For example, feed regulating valve position/response. 62 H 2 M S 041A4.04 No comments. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KJA Only 63 H 2 x x x x M E 045 A1.05 1. Stem Focus: The wording (and premise) of the stem question is confusing, i.e., the meaning of the phrase ...without the Turbine directly initiating a Reactor Trip? is vague and subject to interpretation. The writers intent (we think) was to describe a situation when the RPS trip on a turbine trip fails to occur but other RPS trips still function correctly. However, the way the stem is worded, the applicants may interpret this as an ATWS. Suggest enlarging the stem to include BEFORE and AFTER sections, including key parameters such as rod status, etc. Utilize a timeline if necessary. 2. Cred Dist: The 1 st portion ofA and B (Tavg INITIALLY drops) is not plausible because the stem implies that an ATWS may have occurred. 3. Partial: An applicant could successfully argue that Choice D is also correct since the stem implies that an ATWS may have occurred and lacks other parameters which would eliminate a safety valve opening. 4. Minutia: IF the applicant is being expected to predict how a plant simulator will respond, i.e., whether the PORVs (alone) will be able to handle the pressure spike, THEN this is minutia because of the lack of information provided in the stem. Suggest re-working the question to test the applicants ability to monitor RCS temperature and pressure trends AFTER an normal manual turbine trip (from 100% power). This could be a situation where the secondary plant (MSR5?) continued to draw steam such that either an extremely low Tavg or SI actuation was imminent and the operator was required to close the MSIVs, etc. 64 H 2 x N E 055 G2.2.44 1. Stem Focus: To correct a grammatical error and streamline, the portion of the stem question should be re-worded as follows: WOOTF identifies (1) the required IMMEDIATE operator action in accordance with 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# [OK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 65 F 2 x x U 068A2.02 1 Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices B and D is not plausible because preliminary mixing does not affect release flows. Additionally, the words LOW non-representative sample in the 2 d fill-in-the-blank statement do not lend themselves to selecting Choices B and D. 2. Stem Focus: The word recircs in the l fill-in-the-blank statement is slang. 66 F 2 x B U G2.1.15
- 1. Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices B and C (SIs only required to be reviewed on the first day back to work) is not plausible because a new SI could have been created on dayshift while the operator was sleeping at home.
The 2 part of Choices B and D is not plausible because the Shift Manager works rotating shifts; therefore, the applicant can (correctly) guess that the Operations Manager creates special instructions on dayshift. Using the thoughts listed above, an applicant can deduce the correct answer (Choice A) without knowing the requirements of O-ADM-202. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link! units ward K/A Only 67 F 2 x x B U G2.1.27
- 1. Cred Dist and/or Partial: Because Choice C (arming circuit not timed out) is a subset of Choice A (system not armed), an applicant can eliminate both of these choices without knowing how the system works.
- 2. Cred Dist: Because the stem question asks for some of the expected responses of the AMSAC, an applicant can (correctly) eliminate Choices C and A because these responses are not a response, i.e., doesnt actuate.
- 3. Stem Focus: Choices B and D have the same portion (Start AEW pumps); therefore, this can be eliminated from both Choices.
Suggest the following: WOOTF completes both statements with respect to the A TWS Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC)? The AMSAC initiation logic is designed such that it_______ Once actuated AMSAC will__________ A. Energizes to actuate; trip the CRD MG sets B. De-energizes to actuate; initiate a main turbine trip C. Energizes to actuate; initiate a main turbine trip D. De-energizes to actuate; trip the CRD MG sets 68 H 2 x x B U G2.1.28 1. Cred Dist: The 2 nd part of Choices A and B is not plausible because the current IA header pressure (70 psig) is too far below the plant normal IA pressure band. 2. Stem Focus: The reason in the l portion of each choice is not required to elicit the correct response. 3. Discuss with Chief Examiner how far apart (physically) the two valves (CV-3-1605 and CV-4-1605) are. Want to understand how the l valve closes before the 2 valve. 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 69 F 2 x B E
- 1. Stem Focus: All of the bullets can be eliminated and the question can be streamlined as follows:
In accordance with Tech Spec Safety Limit 2. 1.2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure, the reactor coolant system pressure shall not exceed_______ IF this limit is exceeded when the unit is in Mode 3, THEN, the RCS pressure must be reduced to within its limit within 70 F 2 x B U G2.2.43
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices A and B are not plausible because the l portion is too broad of a statement which is (correctly) dismissed as being too broad, i.e., it says anything with any system..
Suggest keeping the 2 part of the choices, but replacing the l part with something that tests the applicants knowledge of how the defeated alarms are marked/designated. 71 H 2 x M E G2.3.11 Stem Focus: To clarify grammatically and to minimize applicant questions to the proctors during the exam, re-word the question as follows: WOOTF identifies the PREFERRED method of providing feedwater to the S/Gs during the cooldown, including the reason, in accordance with 3-EOP-E-3? A. Standby Feedwater System; the volume of contaminated secondary water released to the environment (post tube rupture) will be less. B. Standby Feedwater System; the amount of radioactivity released via an unmonitored pathway (during the cooldown) will be less. C. Normal Feedwater System; the volume of contaminated secondary water released to the environment (post tube rupture) will be less. D. Normal Feedwater System; the amount of radioactivity released via an unmonitored pathway (during the cooldown) will be less. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 72 F 2 x M E G2.3.12 1. Stem Focus: The first part of the stem question could be confused to mean that no refueling is in progress, that is, the core is offloaded. 2. Stem Focus: The last part of Choice A (.during fuel movement activities) is not needed to elicit the correct response. 3. Stem Focus: The last part of Choice D (...for current conditions..) is not needed to elicit the correct response. 4. Re-word as: Unit 3 is in a refueling outage and fuel assemblies are being moved from the core to the spent fuel pool. WOOTF subsequent plant conditions will require the control room operator to evacuate non-essential personnel from the Unit 3 Containment? A. Containment integrity is lost B. Unit 3 containment purge supply fan (3V9) trips C. Source range N-31 falls low D. Containment Air Particulate Monitor Channel (R-11)red LED light illuminates 73 F 2 x N E G2.4.22
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice A (heat sink protects RCS boundary) is not plausible. Suggest the following:
WOOTF identifies a plant parameter that is required to determine the status of the Heat Sink safety function in accordance with 3-EOP-F-O, Critical Safety Function Status Trees? A. TotalFW flow B. Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures C. Subcooling D. RCS Cold Leg Temperatures 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. IPartial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 74 F 2 x x M E G2.4.3
- 1. #/units: Each of the choices should include the exact instrument ID number/name thats on the control board label. The exact name of the control board label should be included in each choice.
- 2. Stem Focus: Re-word the stem question to be precise: WOOTF identifies a control board instrument required by TS 3.3.3.3, Accident Monitoring Instrument, and the required color of the instrument label?
- 3. Discuss w/ the licensee the plausibility of blue given the choice of colors listed in O-ADM-209, Enclosure 3.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 75 H 2 x x x N U G2.4.9 Note: The proposed question appropriately hits the K/A (even though a specific EOP procedure is not being tested) because the EOPs typically dont apply for refueling conditions. However, a loss of RHR during a time when the containment is not isolated is a significant accident mitigation strategy for the plant. Therefore, testing the applicants knowledge of the ONOP (instead of the EOPs) is appropriate. 1. Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices A and B [leave a CCW pump running] is not plausible because the stem states that all running CCW pumps are showing signs of cavitation; therefore, the pumps may have already been damaged. There are no examples of this protocol [leaving a pump running after its been cavitating] in any other Turkey Point procedures. Suggest testing the applicants knowledge of how often the heatup rate is required to be calculated and how soon the containment is required to be manually isolated (both in accordance with 3-ONOP-50). 2. Job-Link: The lowering CCW surge tank level and pump cavitation may not be operationally valid since the containment is open and none of the system walk downs identified any leakage. The CCW system has to be leaking somewhere and, during this plant mode of operation, the cause of the lowering surge tank level and pump cavitation could be determined. 3. Stem Focus: The stem should include indications that the loss of CCW has affected RHR (which invokes the ONOP-50 entry), for example, the value and trend on the RHR Temperature Recorder, TR-3-604 should be provided in the stem. 4. Stem Focus: The 3 rd bullet (time to boil) should have a procedure reference phrase in accordance with Whatever procedure was used to determine the time-to-boil. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 76 H 2 x x N U 008AA2.30 1. SRO Only: Plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs are RO knowledge items. (major Westinghouse EOP5 are E0, El, E2, E3, ECA-0.0, and Red/Orange Functional Restoration Procedures, see page 7 of 16 in SRO Clarification Guidance document) CETs> 1200 F is a plant parameter that requires entry to a RED CSFST. Therefore, choices A and C can be eliminated solely using RO knowledge.
- 2. Cred Dist: Given the two remaining choices (see item #1 above) of B and D, an applicant can eliminate D since the RCP status was not provided in the stem the overall mitigative strategy for Loss of Heat Sink (Hi) was already implemented to turn OFF the RCP5. Therefore, an applicant can (correctly) assume that H.l was entered (based on initial conditions), and the status of the RCP5 is none running, based on the lack of the initial status in the stem for the RCPs.
By combining comment #1 and comment #2, the question can be answered solely with RO knowledge associated with 1) CETs> 1200 °F requires entry to RED path and 2) overall mitigative strategy of H.l was to turn off the RCP5 (heat input). The applicant can answer the 2 part by RO knowledge that the overall mitigative strategy of C.1 is to max steam the S/G to cool down, which allows ECCS accumulator injection.
- 3. Job-Link:
IF S/G levels are ALL 35%, how can CETs be 1200 F and rising? IF the premise is that the hot legs have flashed, then the stem should include the observed effects, i.e., pressurizer level high and a bubble in the vessel, etc.
- 4. Stem focus: The stem does not provide the initial conditions of the RCPs, CET average temperature (for plausibility), and subcooling.
x x 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q ISRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/AOnly 77 H 2 x x x N U 011 G2.4.9 1. Cred Dist: The 2 part of B and D are not plausible because there is an RHR Pump Room flood level alarm and the crew just manually tripped the 3A RHR Pump. An applicant who does not know the procedures can correctly eliminate B and D based on sump high level and crew action to stop the RHR pump. Also, an operator would not try to start another RHR pump with PZR level at 10% and lowering quickly. Venting the RHR system does not remedy a high sump level. 2. SRO-only: An applicant can eliminate Choice C based on RO knowledge of AOP entry conditions. 3. Stem Focus: The exact label name should be provided for Ll 462, Ll-3-6421, Ll-6423, as it appears on the control board. 4. Stem Focus: The title of 3-ONOP-50 is missing in the last bullet. The last bullet should include the word manually before the word tripped. 5. Stem Focus: The initial conditions are missing the initial status of RHR, i.e., which pump/loop was running, etc. 6. Stem Focus: The stem states that a reference is being provided; however, the test item data sheet lists no reference provided. Suggest testing the SRO applicants knowledge of 1) whether ONOP 41.8 Attachment 2 is (or is NOT) required and 2) another piece of information, for example, minimum required e-plan classification, etc. 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 78 H 2 x x N E 025 G2.4.21 1. Stem Focus: The stem question is asking for one piece of information BEFORE the RHR pump trips and another piece of information AFTER the RHR pump trips. This may not be clear to the applicants so suggest the following (or similar) wording: In accordance with ADM-051, Outage Risk Assessment and Contro WOOTF is 1) the enclosure that identifies the required Unit 3 contingency actions for decay heat remova4 given the initial plant status, and 2) the required safe shutdown function color code for decay heat removal AFTER the 3A RHR Pump tripped? 2. Cred Dist: The it part of the question can be deduced using RO knowledge of RCS Loops Filled (or Not Available) using the initial conditions provided in the stem. However, the stem does not provide any information to make choices B and D plausible with respect to the RCS Loops not being available. The stem should include a bullet to make the 1 part of B and D plausible. Note: the 2 part of the question tests the SRO applicants knowledge of the enclosure requirements associated with color coding of decay heat removal status. (SRO-only met) 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q SRO BIMIN U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 79 L 2 x X N U 056AA2.53 1. Q=K/A: The topic is a loss of offsite power. The 2 part of the K/A (interpreting the status of the relays) is not being tested with respect to a loss of offsite power condition. The 2 part of the question only tests the applicants recall of the frequency of OSP-203.1. The 2 d part of the question can be asked by covering up everything else in the stem, i.e., Whats the frequency of OSP-203.1? Consequently, the SRO applicants ability to interpret the status of the relays is not being tested. 2. Cue: The NOTE in the stem states that the surveillance is satisfied using the Train A Safeguards test, which makes the question able to be answered using RO knowledge because typically the RO performs portions of the 18 month surveillance. The question could be re-worked to test the applicants ability analyze or interpret the safety bus undervoltage relays during a loss of offsite power OR...another way to remedy is to require the SRO applicants to analyze an actual surveillance interval and determine the required actions when the surveillance interval was exceeded. As written, the question does not test the applicants ability to interpret the status of the relays at the SRO level. Another option to hit the first portion of the K/A, and to remedy comment #1 (above): the question could test the applicants ability to apply Tech Spec 3.3.2 for Function 7.a: WOOTF identifies when the loss of voltage relays actuate (setpoint) and the required actions in accordance with Tech Spec 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, if the relays setpoint is (inoperable)? A. Amber light lit; TS Action? B. 4KV Bus 3A Lo Voltage (alarm designator TS Action? 038 G2.2.44 Note: This K/A was initially 065 G2.24; however, the licensee was unable to write a discriminating question at the SRO level; therefore, the new K/A (038 G2.2.44) was re-selected. Because the intent of the author meets the SRO-only requirements, and because the question can be easily repaired, it is graded as an enhancement even though the following criteria for unsat seems to be met. 1. Cred Dist: The 2 part of C and D is not plausible because the ONLY path to ECA-3.2 is THROUGH ECA-3.1. [For example, ECA-3.3 is a plausible choice because E-3 Step 23 has guidance when to directly transition to ECA-3.3, SGTR w/o Pzr Press Ctl.] E-3 never provides guidance to transition to ECS-3.2; therefore, choices C and D are not plausible. One option to fix this test item is to test the SRO applicants knowledge (in the 2 part of the question) of WHERE the steps are located that the crew will use to perform the cool down, based on the given conditions in the stem, ECA-3.1 or ECA-3.2. ANOTHER option to fix this test item is to add one more bullet to the stem pertaining to something about pressurizer spray valves and then CHANGE the 2 part of C and D to ECA-3.3. 2. Cue: The 2 fill-in-the-blank statement has a phrase for RCS cooldown and depressurization, which cues the applicant to the overall mitigative SGTR strategy (vs testing the applicants knowledge of procedure content.) 3.
- /Units: For the last bullet in the stem, provide the name of the instrument/screen and the exact name listed on the instrument/screen display for RCS Subcooling. Only provide what the operator will actually be provided in the real control room.
4. Stem Focus: Re-word the fill-in-the-blank statements as follows: In order to remain in 4-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, RCS subcooling is required to be greater than IF RCS subcooling is not greater than this value, THEN the crew is required to transition to 80 H 2 x x x 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only x N E 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Ipartial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 81 H 2 x x x M U W/E04EA2.1 Note: The best way to test the SRO applicants knowledge of procedure content (i.e. procedure selection) is to provide the name/number of the procedure choices WITHOUT any accompanying mitigative actions listed in the choices. 1. Cred Dist: Choices A and C are not plausible because RCS pressure is 1540 psig and rising (higher than shutoff head of RHR pumps). Additionally, the alternate low head (RHR) cold leg lineup path (via MOV-3-872) is still available, as well as the piggy back mode, if necessary. Choice C is not plausible because RWST level is not included in the stem. 2. Cue: The 2 parts of each choice cue the SRO applicant and unnecessarily preclude the question from testing the SRO applicants knowledge of the CONTENT of the procedure. [The SRO applicant should know the content of the procedure and the required actions.] 3.
- /units: The acronym PZR should be listed as pressurizer though out the whole exam.
1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 82 H 2 x x x B E 001 AA2.05 Stem Focus: The stem question requires the applicants to identify a procedure; however, none of the choices contain a procedure. (no correct answer) This appears to be a typo or obvious omission. 2. Partial: The link between Tech Spec 3.1.3 BASES and the stem scenario is weak. Tech Spec BASES are associated with rods misaligned beyond TS 3.1.3 limits. Since the stem does not specifically indicate that the rods are misaligned beyond the TS 3.1.3 limits, an applicant could successfully argue no correct answer. Suggest re-working the 2 part of the question to test the applicants ability to apply Tech Spec 3.1.3. 3. Stem Focus: IF control rods are being moved, the stem should indicate the position of the AUTO/MANUAL and Bank Selector Switches. Additionally, the stem does not indicate which direction the rods were positioned. 4. K/A: The K/A may be more appropriate when rods are in AUTO. The proposed question is written with the assumption (?) that rods are in Manual; therefore, uncontrolled rod withdrawal may not be possible. Suggest writing a question that tests the applicants knowledge of whether AUTOMATIC rod movement is/Is not justified and some other SRO knowledge pertaining to reactivity management classification, reporting, Tech specs, etc. 1. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIMIN U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 83 H 3 x x x x N E 069 (WIE14) G2.4.41 1. Cred Dist: Choice C is not plausible because PARS are never REQUIRED actions during a Site Area Emergency (only a recommendation, never a requirement). Word the stem to test the applicants knowledge of the highest required classification and required PARS. The F444 PAR recommendation flowchart states that if a GE doesnt exist, then there are NO RECOMMENDED protective action recommendations. Recommend changing the 2 part of the question (expanding the question) to test the applicants ability to determine which SECTORS are required to be evacuated given the wind speed/direction. 2. Cue and/or #/units: The 5 th bullet (RCS is superheated) should be provided in terms of the available indications in the main control room. 3. Stem Focus: the 3 rd bullet is grammatically incorrect and not clear with respect to whats operating and not operating. Re word to state the equipment that is operating and/or injecting to the RCS. 4. Stem Focus: There should be another bullet (or addition to the 8 th bullet) that specifies whether actual field measurements have/have not been performed. This will clarify that the 150 mR TEDE is a dose PROJECTION. 5. PROPOSED
REFERENCES:
Discuss w/ Chief Examiner which portions of EPIP-201001 and -20134 will be provided to the applicants. Minimize what is being provided. Suggest only providing the flowcharts (not the accompanying bases tables).
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIE Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 84 H
3 x
N E
076 AG2.4.31 Stem Focus: The 2 d and 3
,d bullets are redundant; eliminate one.
2.
Stem Focus: The way the l fill-in-the-blank statement is worded makes it very confusing; i.e., the l statement contains TWO sentences. Suggest the following:
In accordance with 3-ONOP-041.4, title, the average reactor coolant temperature is required to be less than within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
(use 350 °F and 500 °F as the two choices).
3.
Stem Focus: The 2 fill-in-the-blank doesnt specify that the activity is dose equivalent iodine 131. Also, it doesnt tell the applicant to choose the highest REQUIRED emergency classification. Suggest the following:
IF during the shutdown, the reactor coolant activity (dose equivalent iodine) stabilizes at 320 pCi/gm, THEN the highest required emergency classification is a (use the word stabilize in the 2 nd fill-in-the-blank statement to add plausibility to unusual event.)
4.
PROPOSED
REFERENCES:
Discuss WI Chief Examiner which portions of EPIP-201001 and -20134 will be provided to the applicants. Minimize what is being provided. Suggest only providing the flowcharts (not the accompanying bases tables).
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 85 H
2 x
x M
U W/E03 EA2.2 1.
Cred Dist: Choice A (SI Termination) is not plausible because the stem does not provide the status of all the parameters listed on the foldout page (i.e., missing FW flow and PZR level).
Choice D (Pressurized Thermal Shock) is not plausible because the stem does not include how long the Tcold condition has existed since the LOCA occurred and the Tcold trend. Additionally, Choice D is not plausible with 580 psig, saturation temp is about 476 F, not a very large cool down.
2.
Stem Focus: The RWST trend is missing. Also recommend either choosing 255,000 gallons and lowering or 175,000 gallons and lowering to add plausibility to Choice C.
3.
Stem Focus: The l sentence should say that the crew entered 3-EOP-E-1 (instead of Unit 3 entered 3-EOP-E-1).
4.
Stem Focus: The 3 bullet should be separated into two bullets, the AFW bullet should say which pumps are operating, including the S/G feed flow values.
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 86 F
2 x
x N
E 003 A2.03 1.
Stem Focus: Each of the choices contains tripping the reactor; therefore, the choices can be streamlined by eliminating redundant info and rewording the question.
In other words, each of the choices can be boiled down to motor stator (motor bearing) and 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />)
WOOTF completes both statements?
The parameter that will first reach its RCP stopping criteria value listed in 4-ONOP-04. 1, Reactor Coolant Pump Off-Normai is After the reactor is manually trippecl the NRC Operations Center is required to be notified within
,in accordance with 0-ADM-115 Notification of Plant Events.
2.
Job-link: Enclosure 1 (NRC Notification Table, page 1 of 9) of 0-ADM-1 15 was provided with this draft question and the phrase initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by Tech Specs was highlighted as being the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> criteria.
It appears that the correct item should be an event that results in actuation of RPS when the reactor is critical since the notes specify that manual RPS actuation not part of a pre-planned sequence is reportable.
Verify w/ licensee that the question is not associated with the initiation of a plant shutdown.
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 87 H
3 x
N E
005 G2.2.40 Note: This K/A was initially 005 G2.2.4; however, the licensee was unable to write a discriminating question at the SRO level; therefore, the new K/A (005 G2.2.40) was re-selected.
1.
Cred Dist: Choice C (be in Mode 3 by 14:57) is not plausible since the stem says the shutdown was just started at 14:44, i.e.,
Choice C says to trip the reactor only 13 minutes after the shutdown was started.
Because the intent of the author meets the SRO-only requirements, and because the question can be easily repaired, it is graded as an enhancement even though the following criteria for unsat seems to be met.
2.
Cred Dist: There is a chance that an applicant could read Choices C and D to imply that Mode 3 is required (even though Tech Spec 3.0.3 requires going to Cold shutdown),
which is not the authors intent.
Discuss re-wording the choices as follows:
A.
The Unit 3 shutdown can be stopped, but no earlier than 15:51 B.
The Unit 3 shutdown can be stopped, but no earlier than 16:04 C.
Unit 3 must be in Mode 3 by 19:57; Mode 4 by 01:57; and Mode 5 within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> D.
Unit 3 must be in Mode 3 by 20:44; Mode 4 by 02:44; and Mode 5 within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 3.
Ensure that the only reference being provided to the applicants is Tech Spec 3.5.2. (no bases, no 3.0.3, no definitions)
062 G2.2.22 Because the intent of the author meets the SRO-only requirements, and because the question can be easily repaired, it is graded as an enhancement even though the credible distracters criteria seem to be unacceptable.
1.
Cred Dist: Choice A is not plausible because IF 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is a reasonable time to fix the transformer, THEN 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> cant be a reasonable time to fix the transformer.
Since we must provide Tech Spec 3.8 to the applicants, they can readily determine that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is the required time. By knowing the 1 part of the question, the 2 d part of the question (bases knowledge) isnt being tested since they can eliminate the 2 part of A. (IF 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is reasonable
, THEN 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> cant be a reasonable).
2.
Cred Dist: A and B are not plausible because the phrase
[the time period..] is ambiguous with respect to either the 48/24 hours OR the l2hrs/3odays, an applicant can readily eliminate Choices A and B based on the ambiguityof which time perioc! the 2 nd part is referring to.
[Note: Ask the licensee to provide the plausibility justification excerpt listed in 0-ADM-225, Online Risk Assessment, for startup transformers.]
3.
Stem Focus:
In all four choices, the use of should be confined to power (not the time). Word the choices exactly like the Tech specs are worded to avoid confusion and to be grammatically correct.
4.
Partial: There may be no correct answer, i.e., D may not be correct since it says that Unit Three can operate for 30 days.
Ask the licensee whether this 30 day allowance is for Unit FOUR instead of Unit 3.
5.
Stem Focus: The 2 part of the stem question is not an action, it is the basis for the action. The stem question should be worded more precisely to clarify this distinction to the applicants.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF identifies 1) the required Tech Spec actions in accordance with Tech Spec 3.8 AC Sources and 2) the bases for this action in accordance with O-ADM-536, Tech Specs Bases Control Program?
88 H
2 x
x 1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- /
Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only x
N E
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues 7/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 89 F
2 x
x x
M U
073 A2.02 1.
Cred Dist: Choices A and B are not plausible because ONOP-67 was written to prescribe guidance when R-14 fails.
It is not plausible that this procedure would have no required actions. Furthermore, because the stem is worded in accordance with ONOP-67 determine required action, if any
- an applicant can readily eliminate choices A and B (continue the release) since these choices arent worded to say ONOP-67 has no required actions. (E--which isnt plausible).
2.
Cred Dist: Choice B is not plausible because the l portion (continue release based on initial sample) and 2 d portion (ensure samples performed every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) conflict with each other.
In other words, IF the release can continue based on the initial sample results, THEN why would two independent samples (again) be required during the release?
3.
Cred Dist: Because the ROs typically know that a release can be made when a rad monitor is inoperable, this makes the 2 nd part of A and C not plausible.
4.
Stem focus: The stem is missing a bullet which states that the initial sample results (prior to the release) were acceptable in accordance with 0-NCOP-004, Prep of Gas Release Permits.
[provide a copy of this to Bruno.J 5.
Job-Link: Verify w/ licensee that R-14 downscale condition wont automatically isolate a WGDT release. (most process rad monitors auto function occurs on High alarm or downscale condition)
Suggest the following (and associated re-wording of the stem):
A.
Release may continue; some other SRO knowledge B.
Release may continue; some other SRO knowledge C. Release must be immediately terminated; some other SRO knowledge D.
Release must be immediately terminated; some other SRO knowledge
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
I
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred. IPartial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. j Link units ward K/A Only 90 H
2 x
x M
U 076 A2.01 1.
SRO-only: The proposed question can be answered using RO knowledge. First, the Reactor/Turbine trip criteria (listed in foldout page in ONOP-19) is RO knowledge, which can be used to eliminate Choice A.
Secondly, the TPCW Heat exchanger allowable/normal ICW flow rates and the system knowledge that ICW issue does/does not require entry to ONOP for TPCW Malfunction is RO knowledge, which can be used to eliminate Choice C.
Thirdly, the knowledge associated with the overall mitigation strategies delineated in with ONOP-19 (ICW), ONOP-il (Screen Wash), and ONOP-08 (TPCW) is RO knowledge and can be used to deduce the correct answer B.
2.
Stem Focus: The TPCW supply header temperature is missing from the stem. This is an important parameter.
3.
Stem Focus: The exact actions (valves) which were manipulated in the last bullet need to be included in the stem to ensure the applicants know exactly what was adjusted.
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 91 H
2 x
x x
x N
E 014 A2.02 Note: This K/A was initially 028 A2.02; however, the hydrogen control function was not applicable at Turkey Point; therefore, the new K/A (014 A2.02) was re-selected.
1.
Job-Link: SD 006/SYS. 028B states that (to improve reliability of the RPI system power supply) a static transfer switch, integrally mounted with the inverter, (automatically?) transfers load to the CVT in the event of an inverter failure. The premise of the proposed question is a MANUAL transfer to the CVT (even though the system AUTOMATICALLY transfers).
Because the intent of the author meets the SRO-only requirements, and because the question can be easily repaired, it is graded as an enhancement even though the credible distracters criteria seem to be unacceptable.
2.
Cred Dist: Because all actions listed in Tech spec 3.1.3.2 are greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action statements, the Tech Spec must be provided as a reference to the applicants. Consequently, the 2 part of Choices A and B are not plausible since none of the action statements are 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Suggest changing the 2 part of Choices A and B to:
Determine the position of the non-indicating rod(s) indirectly by the movable incore detectors at least once/8 hours and w/l 1 hr after any motion of the non-indicating md that exceeds 24 steps.
3.
SRO-only: 3-ONOP-28.2, Step 5.7 states:
IF two or more RPIs per bank are inoperable in Mode I or 2, THEN within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, commence power reduction to Mode 3, Hot Standby, using 3-GOP-I 03, Power Operation to Hot Standby, AND be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Because this is part of the ONOPs overall mitigative strategy, an applicant can eliminate Choices A and B using RO knowledge without knowing anything about Tech Spec 3.1.3.2.
4.
Stem focus: The 3 bullet is not specific as to which breaker tripped open. Was it breaker #49? Breaker # CB-1?
5.
Stem focus: The l part of the question can be simplified by testing the applicants knowledge of which indications will be lost (analog or step counters).
It is not necessary to include the method to restore power since the question has two parts.
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q= ISRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/AjOnly 92 F
2 x
x x
N E
068 A2.04 Note: This K)A was initially 068 A2.03; however, the licensee was unable to write a discriminating question at the SRO level; therefore, the new K/A (068 A2.04) was re-selected.
1.
Partial:
B can be argued as correct because of the phrase may have exceeded. Ask the licensee if their NPDES permit includes tritium (most NPDES permits involve thermal pollution).
IF the NPDES permit includes tritium limitations, THEN an applicant can successfully argue that B is also correct.
2.
Partial: An applicant can argue that there is not enough information provided to answer the question because of the phrase may have exceedec! in each of the four choices.
IF the operator promptly stops the monitor tank pump A, THEN the release may not have exceeded any ODCM limits.
Because the intent of the author meets the SRO-only requirements, and because the question can be easily repaired, it is graded as an enhancement even though the credible distracters criteria seem to be unacceptable.
3.
Cred Dist: B and D are not plausible because the 2 nd parts of these choices include Co-60 and tritium. Since NPDES permits normally dont restrict radioactive isotopes at nuclear plants, the Co-60 and tritium make these choices not plausible. Suggest only listing ODCM and NPDES (eliminate the Co-60 and tritirum).
4.
Stem Focus: The stem question must be worded to elicit the REQUIRED actions (not should).
5.
Stem Focus: The 2 part of the question is vague because of the term regulatory impact in the stem. The stem question needs to be more precise to test applicants knowledge of ODCM, ADM-1 15, or 0-NCOP-003 requirements.
6.
Cue: The last part of the 2 bullet (is received from R-18, Waste Disposal System Liquid Effluent Monitor.. ) is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
7.
Reference disc does not include copy of liquid release permit 0-NCOP-003.
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 93 H
2 x
N E
017 G2.4.3 Note: This K/A was initially 071 G2.4.3; however, the licensee was unable to write a discriminating question at the SRO level; therefore, the new K/A (017 G2.4.3) was re-selected.
1.
Stem Focus: Streamline the four choices to the following:
A.
Action Statement 31; Startup may NOT continue B.
Action Statement 32; Startup may NOT continue C.
Action Statement 31; Startup may continue D.
Action Statement 32; Startup may continue 94 F
2 x
x N
U G2.1.36 1.
SRO-only: The correct answer (C) can be deduced using systems knowledge that the R-3-1 1 and R-3-12 rad monitors utilize a one-inch stainless steel tube, which taps off of the containment HVAC supply header, to supply the required flow past the R-11 and R-12 detectors. [Without airflow past the detectors, they will not sense a containment radiation condition.]
Because the last sub-bullet states R-3-1 I and R-3-12
ACTUAL STA TUS: R-3-1 I and R-3-12 are available without Normal Containment Coolers running the applicant can answer the question without testing any SRO knowledge associated with procedures/limitations involved in core alterations.
2.
SRO-only: Choice A is above-the-line (TS) knowledge of TS 3.9.4; Choice B is above-the-line knowledge of TS 3.9.2.
Choice D is no action required. Choice C (correct answer) is TS 3.9.13 (knowledge that at least one train of rad monitors to initiate a required control room isolation is available..
3.
Stem Focus: The l bullet states that Unit 3 is operating. This should be changed to Unit 3 is in Mode 6.
,r U
1 Cred Dist: A and 8 are not plausible because only a licensed senior reactor operator can (ever) direct an RO to move rods.
(10CFR55.4 requirement) 2.
Partial: C can also be argued correct because the Test Director could potentially be the Management Designee.
3.
Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement is too long and needs to be split into two sentences since it involves two separate thoughts associated with ADM-217.
4.
Stem Focus: The 2 portion of the fill-in-the-blank statement is grammatically incorrect (the Shift Manager shall received
).
5.
Stem Focus:
If you put your hand over the top of the stem (i.e.,
cover up all the bullets), you can still answer the question by solely using the fill-in-the-blank portion of the stem. Delete the top portion by simply stating that an infrequently performed test is in progress.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 95 F
2 x
N U
G2.2.35 1.
SRO-only: The l part of the question (which Mode OMS is required to be operable) is RO knowledge. The 2 part of the question can be (correctly) answered by knowing the purpose of OMS; i.e., OMS protects RCS from over-pressurization due to start of idle RCP or HHSI pump injection into a water solid RCS.
Knowledge of the Tech Spec basis (in this case) overlaps the purpose/function of the system. The way the choices are worded, the TS basis knowledge isnt required; only whether they are isolated or unisolated is required to answer the question.
2.
QK/A: The K/A should test the applicants ability to determine which TS mode the plant is in. Instead, the question asks for which mode OMS is required to be operable. Ideally, the stem should provide temp/press/Ken, etc and ask for the mode of operation and some other SRO knowledge item.
96 F
2 x
x x
N G2.2.7
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIE Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIMIN UIE/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 97 F
2 x
x N
E G2.3.5 1.
Cue: The word HIGHEST in the 2
,d part of the stem question is a cue to the correct answer. Instead, use the words minimum required permission.
2.
Stem Focus: 3-NOP-053 is applicable to both parts of the stem question; therefore, put the procedure number/title at the end of the stem question.
3.
Stem focus: try to put the name/number of each rad monitor under the stem question to streamline each of the choices to only numbers.
98 F
2 x
x M
E G2.3.4 1.
Partial: Choice D can also be argued as correct because the OSC Rad Protection Supervisor signature is required on 0-EPIP-20111, Attachment 2, Emergency Exposure Authorization Form.
The OSC Rad Protection Supervisor is the same thing as the OSC Health Physics Supervisor.
2.
Stem focus: The stem can be boiled down to two fill-in-the-blank statements:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with 0-EP-20111, Re-ent,y?
The is responsible for authorizing emergency exposures that exceed 10 CFR 20 limits.
The emergency exposure limit for performance of actions that mitigate the escalation of the event, rescue persons from a non-life threatening situation, or minimize exposures or minimize effluent releases is
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem ICues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focusj Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 99 H
2 x
x N
E G2.4.29 1.
Partial: This question is too subjective for two reasons:
- 1) Since the steam supply valve to AFW from the wptured generator is still open, the SRO may decide to say that a release is in progress. On the other hand, the SRO may decide that a release is NOT in progress if the AFW pumps are not running.
- 2) The decision of whether to clear owner controlled areas outside the protected area is a judgment call, which depends on how much dose the personnel will receive during the evacuation.
None of this information is provided in the stem.
2.
Stem focus: The stem question is poorly worded to elicit the answer to the question of whether the owner controlled area outside the protected area is / is not required to be evacuated.
(status of evacuation plan is poorly worded).
100 F
1 x
N U
G2.4.40 1.
LOD = 1: This question will not discriminate because Choices B, C, and D are all OFFSITE ACTION decisions whereas Choice A has little or no consequence during an emergency event.
2.
Stem Focus: The choices contain capitalized words that should be lower case.
ES-403 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist z.-I4_
rii Facility:&/. L? tT Date of Exam:
U4 Exam Level: RO LL SRO Initials Item Description a
b c
1.
Clean answer sheets copied before grading R
t I 2.
Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented 3.
Applicants scores checked for addition errors (reviewers spot check> 25% of examinations)
/ t I
4.
Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail
4 5.
All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades J
are justified
6.
Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of_questions_missed_by_half_or more of_the_applicants Printed Name/Signature Date
!/i:
1
- a. Grader
- b. Facility Reviewer(*)
4//A
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (*)
//2i
- d. NRC Supervisor (*)
W,f1A4I,J tga
(*)
The facility reviewers signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.