ML12120A004
| ML12120A004 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/2012 |
| From: | Jordan A Dominion Energy Kewaunee |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Feintuch K | |
| References | |
| 12-319 | |
| Download: ML12120A004 (38) | |
Text
Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.
N490 Hwy 42, Kewaunee, WI 54216 DomifioW Web Address: wwfw.dom.corn April 29, 2012
~O3' ATTN: Document Control Desk Serial No.12-319 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC/CDS/R2 11555 Rockville Pike Docket No.: 50-305 Rockville, MD 20852-2738 License No.: DPR-43 DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC.
KEWAUNEE POWER STATION INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM FOURTH TEN-YEAR INTERVAL 10 CFR 50.55a REQUEST NO. RR-2-3 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii), Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.
(DEK) hereby requests NRC approval of the attached proposed 10 CFR 50.55a request (RR-2-3) for the Fourth Ten-year Interval of the Inservice Inspection Program for Kewaunee Power Station (KPS). This 10 CFR 50.55a request proposes a temporary deviation from the requirements of ASME Section XI, Appendix IX, Article IX-1000, Paragraph (c)(2) which prohibits the use of clamping devices on "... portions of a piping system that forms the containment boundary" and ASME Section XI, Appendix IX, Article IX-6000(a) which states that the area immediately adjacent to the clamping device shall be examined using a volumetric method.
KPS is currently in a refueling outage. The reactor has been refueled and the reactor vessel has been reassembled. The plant is currently in MODE 5 - Cold Shutdown with the residual heat removal system in operation. Per KPS Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.7, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled," one RHR loop is required to be operable and in operation; and either one additional RHR loop shall be operable, or the secondary side water level of at least one steam generator shall be greater than or equal to 5%. Recently a leak was discovered at a socket weld in a 3/4-inch line that is common to both RHR loops. The leak cannot be repaired without removing both RHR loops from service.
DEK is proposing to perform a temporary alternate repair of the RHR piping by installing a leak-limiting device to preserve containment integrity and structural integrity prior to making a MODE change from MODE 5 to MODE 4. This temporary alternate repair will remain in place until the unit achieves MODE 4. After the unit reaches MODE 4, core cooling is provided by reactor coolant pumps circulating water through the core and to the steam generators. In this condition, with core cooling being provided by the steam generators, the leak will be isolated, and the defect will be repaired by welding. The repair will be pursued expeditiously. It is estimated that it will take approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reaching MODE 4 to isolate the portion of the RHR system with the leak, eliminating the need for the leak-limiting device.
Serial No.12-319 10 CFR 50.55a Request RR-2-3 Page 2 of 3 The alternative to conducting the proposed temporary alternative repair under ASME Section XI, Appendix IX is to return the plant to the refueling mode, remove the reactor head, remove the upper core internals and offload the core into the spent fuel pool.
DEK believes that this option would result in an undue hardship and unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety, and is therefore justified under 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii).
The details of 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. RR-2-3 are provided in Attachment 1 to this letter. A copy of the temporary modification package that will be used to perform the alternate repair is provided in Enclosure 1.
If you have questions or require additional information, please feel free to contact Mr.
Craig Sly at 804-273-2784.
Very truly yours, Site Vic P sident - Kewaunee Power Station
Attachment:
- 1. Kewaunee Power Station Fourth Ten-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. RR-2-3
Enclosure:
- 1. Temporary Modification Package 2012-11
References:
None Commitments made by this letter:
- 1. Prior to making the change from MODE 5 to MODE 4, the situation will be re-evaluated if the magnitude of leakage is found to be higher than expected or if the leak rate increases rather than decreases after the sealant is applied. The System Integrity Program (SIP) allows for less than 6 gallons per hour (gph) for combined external leakage from the Safety Injection (SI) system, Internal Containment Spray (ICS) system and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system. A review of historical data over the previous nine refueling outages indicates the total external leak rate
Serial No.12-319 10 CFR 50.55a Request RR-2-3 Page 3 of 3 has not exceeded 0.07 gph. Based on this a limit of 5.5 gph of leakage will be established for the weld leak near RHR-600. At a leak rate above 5.5 gph external system leakage must be evaluated for operability.
- 2. Following installation of the device, a VT-2 examination will be performed and repeated a minimum of once every twelve hours, and leakage will be quantified a minimum of once every twelve hours, until a MODE change from MODE 5 to MODE 4 is made and the resulting portion of residual heat removal piping needed to facilitate repair is isolated and depressurized.
- 3. The sealant injection pressure and volume will be controlled by work instructions and procedures to ensure the sealant is not injected into the RHR system piping.
cc:
Regional Administrator, Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2443 Warrenville Road Suite 210 Lisle, IL 60532-4352 Mr. Karl D. Feintuch Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 08-H4A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Kewaunee Power Station
Serial No.12-319 ATTACHMENT 1 KEWAUNEE POWER STATION FOURTH TEN-YEAR INTERVAL INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM 10 CFR 50.55a REQUEST NO. RR-2-3 KEWAUNEE POWER STATION DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC.
Serial No.12-319 10 CFR 50.55a Request RR-2-3 Page 1 of 7 Kewaunee Power Station Fourth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Inspection Program 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. RR-2-3 Proposed Alternative In Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii)
Hardship or Unusual Difficulty Without Compensating Increase in Level of Quality or Safety
- 1. ASME CODE COMPONENTS AFFECTED ASME Code,Section XI Code Class 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system 3/4-inch Sockolet to Valve RHR-600.
Pipe is 3/4-inch schedule 40, ASTM A312, type 304.
Fitting is 0.750-inch on 10-inch Sockolet, 3000 Ib, ASTM A182 F 304. Code of record is USAS B31.1 - 1967.
RHR design temperature and pressure: 400 OF and 600 psig. (The estimated pressure and temperature of the RHR loops during MODE 5 is approximately 350 psig and less than 200'F.)
- 2. APPLICABLE CODE EDITION AND ADDENDA ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1998 Edition, 2000 Addenda
- 3. APPLICABLE CODE REQUIREMENTS ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1998 Edition, 2000 Addenda, IWA-4133 states that mechanical clamping devices used to replace piping pressure boundary shall meet the requirements of ASME Section X1, Appendix IX.
o ASME Section XI, Appendix IX, Article IX-1000(c)(2) states that clamping devices shall not be used on portions of a piping system that forms the containment boundary.
o ASME Section X1, Appendix IX, Article IX-6000(a) requires a plan for monitoring defect growth in the area immediately adjacent to the clamping device.
Serial No.12-319 10 CFR 50.55a Request RR-2-3 Page 2 of 7
- 4. REASON FOR REQUEST Currently, Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) is in MODE 5-Cold Shutdown, and has declared both trains of residual heat removal (RHR) inoperable due to a through-wall leak on a 3/4-inch socket weld connection of ASME Code Class 2 piping in the common RHR pump A and B discharge piping. The RHR system is currently providing flow to the reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg for the MODE 5 lineup.
KPS TS 3.4.7, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled," is applicable during MODE 5 with the RCS loops filled.
TS LCO 3.4.7 requires one RHR loop to be Operable and in operation. In addition, TS LCO 3.4.7 requires one additional RHR loop be operable (but not necessarily in operation) or the secondary side water level of at least one steam generator shall be greater than or equal to 5%.
Currently both loops of RHR are declared inoperable due to the through-wall leak at the 3/4-inch socket weld.
Both loops of RHR are available to provide decay heat removal. Additionally, if both RHR loops become unavailable, one SG is available to provide decay heat removal as well as feed and bleed with the Safety Injection system (SI).
In order to implement a permanent weld repair (ASME Code repair) for the 3/4-inch socket weld, both RHR cooldown loops must be removed from service and isolated from containment.
In order to remove both RHR cooldown loops from service one of two options must be performed.
The first option is to return the plant to the refueling mode, remove the reactor head, remove the upper core internals, and offload the core into the spent fuel pool. Then, the RHR system could be isolated and drained to allow weld repair of the socket weld connection. This option would require maneuvering the plant from its current operating condition in MODE 5 with one steam generator (SG) available to provide an alternate method for decay heat removal to a "no-MODE" condition.
DEK believes that this option would result in an undue hardship and unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety of the plant. This option would require the following actions/conditions:
" RCS cooldown from current plant conditions, thus losing the SG decay heat removal capability, and entry to MODE 6 - Refueling.
- The reactor head would have to be disassembled and detensioned.
Serial No.12-319 10 CFR 50.55a Request RR-2-3 Page 3 of 7
" The RCS would have to be drained to 6-inches below the reactor vessel flange resulting in the SGs no longer being available for decay heat removal, a reduction in reactor system integrity, and a shorter time-to-boil if decay heat removal were lost.
The reactor head would have to be removed and the reactor cavity flooded to 23 feet.
The reactor core would have to be offloaded to the spent fuel pool.
" The estimated duration of this evolution from the start of cooldown to core offload is 5 days.
- The estimated radiation dose for this overall reactor disassembly, core offload, and subsequent reload and reactor reassembly evolution is approximately 8 REM based on actual exposure measured during the same activities conducted during the current ongoing refueling outage.
The second option is to perform a temporary alternate repair of the RHR piping by installing a leak-limiting strong-back clamp to ensure structural integrity prior to making a MODE change from MODE 5 to MODE 4. This temporary alternate repair will remain in place until the unit achieves MODE 4. After the unit reaches MODE 4, core cooling is provided by the reactor coolant pumps circulating water through the core and to the steam generators. With core cooling being provided by the steam generators, both loops of RHR can be secured, the leak isolated, the defect removed and the pipe repaired by welding. Once in MODE 4, TS 3.6.1, "Containment Integrity," LCO 3.6.1, requires that the containment is Operable. Containment integrity will be maintained by the leak-limiting device as well. The code repair will be pursued expeditiously. It is estimated that it will take approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reaching MODE 4 to isolate the portion of the RHR system with the leak, eliminating the need for the leak-limiting device.
The mechanical clamping device that will be used will comply with the applicable Code requirements outlined in ASME Section XI, Appendix IX, with the exception that it will be located on piping that is considered a containment boundary.
ASME Section XI, Appendix IX, Article IX-1000, Paragraph (c)(2) prohibits the use of clamping devices on
"... portions of a piping system that forms the containment boundary." Therefore, in order to use the device, DEK requires approval of an alternative to allow a temporary deviation from the requirements of Appendix IX, Article IX-1 000, Paragraph (c)(2) for the period of time that it will take to for the plant to reach MODE 4 and to complete the Code repair.
Serial No.12-319 10 CFR 50.55a Request RR-2-3 Page 4 of 7 Based on the discussion above, DEK requests NRC approval of an alternative to the repair requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1998 Edition, 2000 Addenda IWA-4133.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii), DEK is requesting approval to temporarily deviate from the requirements of Appendix IX, Article IX-1 000, Paragraph (c)(2) which prohibits the use of clamping devices on "... portions of a piping system that forms the containment boundary" and ASME Section Xl, Appendix IX, Article IX-6000(a) which states that the area immediately adjacent to the clamping device shall be examined using a volumetric method. This requested deviation is based on DEKs conclusion that compliance would result in hardship and unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.
- 5. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE AND BASIS FOR USE The proposed alternative would allow use of a leak-limiting strong-back device on a piping system that forms part of the containment boundary. The device accomplishes two functions; limiting the leakage from the defect, and maintaining the structural integrity of the piping. The proposed alternative uses a leak-limiting device to ensure containment integrity, since this region of the RHR piping is a portion of the containment boundary.
A sealant will be injected into a leak-limiting enclosure to provide a temporary pressure boundary for the RHR system. The sealant, X-36, has a low concentration of halogens/chlorides, therefore it is safe for use on stainless steel. The sealant injection pressure and volume will be controlled by work instructions and procedures to ensure the sealant is not injected into the RHR system piping. The leak-limiting device is mechanically fastened with clamps and bolts to the 10-inch diameter RHR pipe and the 3/4-inch diameter pipe is fastened to the leak sealant enclosure with set screws. As an added measure of safety, a full circumferential structural fillet weld will be added at the interface of the 3/4-inch diameter pipe and the leak sealant enclosure. This weld will prevent a catastrophic separation of the 3/4-inch line above the leaking sockolet.
RHR-600 is an outside Containment isolation valve for containment penetration 10, a Class 6 penetration. Penetration Class 6 is a system required to operate post-accident.
The design and operational criteria for penetration Class 6 isolation valves are governed by the functional requirements of the system. The isolation valves at penetration 10 are not subject to the requirements of 10 CFR50 Appendix J (reference 5).
The requirements for containment isolation will be satisfied by the leak sealant enclosure. The enclosure is designed to RHR temperature and pressure requirements
Serial No.12-319 10 CFR 50.55a Request RR-2-3 Page 5 of 7 and ASME Section Xl, Appendix IX, Mechanical Clamping Devices for Class 2 and 3 Piping Pressure Boundary. The piping remains seismically qualified and the enclosure will prevent system leakage, or maintain leakage within the Current Licensing Basis.
ASME Section XI, Appendix IX, Article IX-2000 states that, if the defect size cannot be directly determined, a conservative bound of the size shall be determined and documented. ASME Section XI, Article IX-6000 states that the area immediately adjacent to the clamping device shall be examined using a volumetric method. Visual examination identifies the existing leak size as a pinhole and has placed the defect at the toe of the socket weld to the 3/4-inch branch line to valve RHR-600. There is no other visual indication of degradation to the piping wall thickness. Therefore, DEK is requesting a deviation from Article IX-6000(a) in that no volumetric inspection in the area of the clamp will be performed on the 10 inch pipe or on the 3/4-inch pipe. The installation of the leak-limiting device also precludes volumetric inspection of the defect.
Therefore, the defect can be conservatively characterized as residing within the socket weld and any growth would be limited to the weld itself, effectively limiting the impact of the defect to that of a circumferential crack. The proposed alternative, as a conservative measure to account for nondestructive examination limitations of the sockolet, includes two aspects; installation of a leak-limiting strong-back device which will be welded to the 3/4-inch diameter pipe, and a VT-2 examination a minimum of once every twelve hours. The device will conservatively maintain structural integrity of the affected components during the duration of the proposed alternatives.
Application of the leak-limiting strong-back clamping device to maintain containment integrity and the structural integrity of the 3/4-inch line will ensure that the plant can transition from MODE 5 to MODE 4 and perform a Code repair.
The strong-back clamping device has been designed to accommodate thrust loads resulting from a complete failure of the welded connection of concern. A review of the piping stress analysis has been performed to ensure that the additional mass does not adversely affect the qualification of the existing system.
Following installation of the device, a VT-2 examination will be performed and repeated a minimum of once every twelve hours until a MODE change from MODE 5 to MODE 4 is satisfactorily completed and the resulting portion of residual heat removal piping needed to facilitate repair is isolated and depressurized. Prior to making the change from MODE 5 to MODE 4, the situation will be re-evaluated if the magnitude of leakage is found to be higher than expected or if the leak rate increases rather than decreases after the sealant is applied.
Serial No.12-319 10 CFR 50.55a Request RR-2-3 Page 6 of 7 The System Integrity Program (SIP) allows for less than 6 gallons per hour (gph) for combined external leakage from the Safety Injection (SI) system, Internal Containment Spray (ICS) system and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system.
A review of historical data over the previous nine refueling outages indicates the total external leak rate has not exceeded 0.07 gph. Based on this a limit of 5.5 gph of leakage will be established for the weld leak near RHR-600. At a leak rate above 5.5 gph external system leakage must be evaluated for operability. After installing the device, a MODE change from MODE 5 to MODE 4 will be made, the affected piping will be depressurized and isolated, and the Code repair will commence.
This approach will provide the safest and most expeditious method to complete a Code repair of the socket weld given the current condition of the plant.
- 6. DURATION OF PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES This alternative would be applicable for Kewaunee Power Station during the current refueling outage while in MODE 5 and until the plant reaches MODE 4 and the Code repair of the Residual Heat Removal System 3/4-inch Sockolet to Valve RHR-600 is completed. It is estimated that it will take approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reaching Mode 4 to isolate the portion of the RHR system with the leak, eliminating the need for the leak-limiting device.
- 7. PRECEDENTS Dominion is currently aware of three (3) situations (see references 1, 2, 3 and 4) where similar alternatives have been approved to facilitate repair of ASME Section XI piping the forms that containment boundary.
- 8. REFERENCES
- 1. Letter from M. L Marchi (WPSC) to NRC, "Relief Request RR-2-1 to Allow Continued Plant Operation with Two Pin Hole Leaks in a 3/4 inch ASME Code Class 2 Chemical Injection Weldment," dated August 12, 1996.
[ADAMS Accession No. ML111810480]
- 2. NRC SER, "Kewaunee Power Station - Approval of a Relief Request from the requirements of 10CFR50.55a for Repair of 3/4-inch ASME Code Class 2 Chemical Injection Weldment (TAC No. M96273)," dated September 13,1996.
Serial No.12-319 10 CFR 50.55a Request RR-2-3 Page 7 of 7
- 3. Letter from M. L. Marshall (NRC) to J. A. Stall (Florida Power and Light Co.),
"Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 4 -
Safety Evaluation for Relief Request Regarding Mechanical Clamping Device on Pressure Boundary Piping (TAC No.
MC7338)," dated August 15, 2005. [ADAMS Accession No. ML052090182]
- 4. Letter from R. J. Laufer (NRC) to M. Kansler (Entergy), James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant -
Relief Request for Temporary Non-Code Repair of a Shutdown Cooling Pipe (TAC No. MC7544)," dated August 9, 2005. [ADAMS Accession No. ML052070047]
- 5. Letter from Darrell G. Eisenhut, NRC Director Division of Licensing, to C.W.
Geisler, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, "Exemption to Certain 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Requirements," dated September 30, 1982.
Serial No.12-319 ENCLOSURE 1 KEWAUNEE POWER STATION FOURTH TEN-YEAR INTERVAL INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM 10 CFR 50.55a REQUEST NO. RR-2-3 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION PACKAGE 2012-11 KEWAUNEE POWER STATION DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC.
Temporary Modification CMA A-D20 ATAHMN 3i Pae of 40 Dominion Site Unit Year Temporary Modification Number Revision Number Work Order(s)
KPS 1
2012 2012-11 1
Ai-V10894606 KW100894787 I High Risk?
[:1 YES 0 NO Provide information as required and attach additional sheets as necessary for each item.
Part A. TM Description (To be completed by Requestor/OriginatorlEngineering)
- 1. Title RHR-600 Leak Repair
- 2.
Expiration Date [Not to exceed one refuel cycle (unless approved by site VP)]
KR32 (Remove prior to entering Mode 3)
- 3. Affected Systemrs/Components/QA Class RHR (System 34)/RHR-600/SR
- 4. Reason (e.g., awaiting parts, testing, calibration, repairs, temporary power supply)
The 3/4" socket weld upstream of RHR-600 has a pinhole leak. Contingent upon receiving a NRC Relief Request, this TM performs a temporary repair of the leak by injecting leak sealant into an enclosure around the leaking fitting to stop or minimize the leak to within allowable limits. This TM will be installed in Mode 5 and removed prior to entering Mode 3.
REV 1 revised the section regarding Monitoring Requirements (IX-6000) to be consistent with the NRC relief request requirements. Also provided clarification to the system pressure requirements.
- 5. Description (e.g., specific details on the aspects of the modification): Work Order reference(s), and instrument index as applicable, and locations (e.g., racks, cubicles, building,area, elevation, and rooms to identify in detail the location of the modification).
Attach sketches as necessary.
See following pages
- 6. Documents/Drawings/Procedures to be Updated
- a. Vendor procedure for sealant injection b.
Q.
- 7. List any Mode Restrictions This TM can remain installed in Modes 4 and 5. It must be removed and the system restored prior to entering Mode 3.
8, Action Plan for Removal - Close-out Document (REA/DCPiDCy R'Wrder, Procedure changes)
Repair leaking weld and remove TM per WO # KW100894787 Form Ne,.
142 Mtv 2011)
Temporary Modification CMAAT A
H 3
P 2.- o Dominion
- 9. Installation Instructions for TM Install leak sealant enclosure and inject leak sealant per approved procedure.
- 10. Required System Testing Following TM Installation Verify any leakage is within acceptance criteria specified in WO 100894696
- 11. Removal Instructions for TM Per WO KW100894787
- 12. Required System Testing Following TM Removal Permanent repair of the leaking fitting will follow removal of the TM. Therefore, there are no removal test requirements for this TM.
- 13. Requested By (Name - Please Print)
BY (Signature)
- 15. Date Part B. Design Engineering Reviews/Screening Evaluations Attached
- 1. CM-AA-RSK-1001, Engineering Risk Assessment, Attachments YES NO 2 and3 3 YES
[] NO
- 2. DNES-AA-GN-1002, Document Impact Summary, Attachment 1
[
YES D NO
- 3. DNES-AA-GN-1003, Design Effects and Considerations, 0
YES E]
NO
- 4. DNAP-3004, Dominion Program for 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 - Changes, Tests, and Experiments (KPS only - perform ONE IS REQUIRED GNP-04.04.01 for Applicability and Pre-Screening prior to DNAP-3004)
ZYES
[j NO 50.59/72.48 Screen, Attachment 4 DYES
[
NO 50.59/72.48 Evaluation, Attachment 6
- 5. Additional Attachments a.
bd d.
- 6. Summary: Descriptions & Conclusions Resulting from Reviews/Evaluations Performed in Step 3.1.8 and Above RSK-1001: The TMV is medium risk AA-GN-1 002: A procedure for leak sealant injection is required AA-GN-1 003: Components within the ISI boundary are affected.
50.59: The TM screens out of 50.59-
- 7. Additional Reviews and/or Comments - Provide Details Below I Forn No. 730749 (May 2011)
- 1iDominion-Temporary Modification CMAA-D 0
ATAHMN 3
Pag 3 of 11 None
- 8. Pr pared By rinn9 ýign)
,-)
- 9. Date
- 10. Independent/Design Authority Rvew (as a'licable) 11.Date (Print & Si
)
/
)
/
Additional reviewst6r implenenting Orgrization, Training, etc. as necessary in accordance with Section 3.3
- 12. Name (Print & Sign)/Department
- 13. Date
- a.
1.
- b.
2.
- c.
3.
- d.
4.
- 14. Engineering Supervisor
- 15. Engineering Supervisor
- 16. Date (Name - Please Print)
Part C. Operations Review (To be completed by Shift Manager/Designee)
- 1. Are controlled Station drawings affected by the TM and are
,- YES El NO Z NA they attached?
- 2. Necessary Station personnel are informed of the TM?
N YES
[]NO DNA
- 3. Temporary procedure changes and Temporary procedures I-YeS No NA4k are Implemented to support the TM?
- 4. Evaluated need for check valves and/or other anti-siphon LI YES LI NO protection, if TM utilizes piping or hoses?
- 5. Limiting conditions and special requirements indentified.
N YES i] NO LI NA Note: NRC Relief Request is required before TM installation
- 6. TM verified not to violate Technical Specifications, not to create a hazard to Station safety or personnel, or conflict with N YES EI NO LI NA existing Station conditions?
Note: NRC Relief Request is required before TM installation
- 7. TM Tags generated in accordance with applicable Site 0 YES E] NO EJNA Tagging procedure and any special instructions included on the tags?
YES_
NO NA
- 8. TM Log updated?
LI YES LINO DNA
- 9. Engineering Post Installation Walkdown Requested?
L YES NNO L-NA
- 10. Quarterly walkdown required?
es YE NA
- 11. PRA risk impact has been assessed and, if determined to-[
be applicable, has been entered into the Risk Monitor and/or LI YES LI NO L] NA Shutdown Risk Assessment?
- 12. The affected Unit shall not exceed the operating mode of: 4 or 5 FQrri No. 75049 (Mav Ml)
A AT 2
A T 3
Pge Dominion-
- 13. Concurrent or Independent Verification: NA
- 14. Functional Check or Visual Inspection: Per WO KW1 00894696
- 15. The opposite Unit shall not exceed the operating mode of: NA
- 17. Date NA
- 18. Shift Manager/Designee (Print & Sign)
- 19. Date Part D. FSRC Review (as applicable, Refer to LI-AA-600)
NOTE: If the TM is used to move radioactive fluids or gases, the Manager Radiological Protection or Radiological Protection alternate must be a member of FSRC NOTE: TMs which could affect Nuclear Safety must be reviewed by FSRC
- 1. Is FSRC Signature Required?
E YES L] NO
- 2. FSRC Authorized Duration ftg 3 2- (Aýýas(
6,e alPlnlcA/d ~r/er/l/4~/
- 3. FSRC Chairman Approval (Print & Sign)
- 4. Date Part E. TM Installation (To be completed by applicable personnel)
- 1. Shift Manager Approval for TM Installation (Print & Sign)
- 12. Date
- 3. Shift Manager Comments (includes any additional requirements in accordance with Section 3.4, "Implementation") - Provide Details Below
- 4. Installation Completed By (Name -
- 5. Installation Completed By
- 6. Date Please Print)
(Signature)
- 7. Independently Verified By (Name -
- 8. Independently verified By
- 9. Date Please Print) (as applicable)
(Signature) (as applicable)
Notify the Shift Manager that TM is installed and the required post installation testing can be performed.
- 10. Instructions Used for Post Installation Testing 11.. Testing Performed By
- 12. Testing Performed By (Signature)
- 13. Date (Name - Please Print)
Form, No. 730749 (May 2011)
Temporary Modification CMAATC-0 ATAHMN 3
Pag 6
of Il Dominion
- 14. Post Installation Testing Satisfactorily?
DYES LINO
- 15. Required Administrative Controls Established?
LI YES L] NO
- 16. Is Engineering Post Installation Walkdown Required?
NOTE: Responsible Engineering signature is in accordance with LI YES Li NO Step 3.4.6
- 17. Responsible Engineer (Print & Sign) (Engineering walkdown completed)
- 18. Date
- 19. Shift Manager (Name - Please Print)
- 20. Shift Manager (Signature)
- 21. Date Part F. TM Restoration (To be completed by applicable personnel)
- 1. Shift Manager Approval for TM Removal (Print & Sign)
- 2. Date
- 3. Shift Manger Comments (includes any additional requirements in accordance with Section 3.7, "TM Removal") - Provide Details Below
- 4. TM Restoration Completed By (Name -
- 5. TM Restoration Completed By
- 6. Date Please Print)
(Signature)
- 7. Independently Verified By
- 8. Independently verified By
- 9. Date (Name - Please Print)
(Signature)
Notify the Shift Manager that TM has been removed and the required restoration testing can be performed
- 10. Instructions Used for TM Restoration Testing
- 11. Testing Performed By
- 12. Testing Performed By
- 13. Date (Name - Please Print)
(Signature)
- 14. Shift Manager (Print & Sign) 1 15. Date Part G. Post Restoration Review (Completed by Shift Manager/Designee following restoration)
- 1. Post restoration testing completed satisfactorily?
[]YES N
NO
- 2. All Documentation satisfactorily completed?
[]YES N
NO
- 3. Temporary drawings removed from Control Room/any other El YES
[] NO location?
- 4. Procedures changed to eliminate TM? (Review Part A)
Ej YES N
NO Form No. 730749 (May 2011)
Temporary Modification CM-A-DC20 ATAHMN 3
Pag.6 of1 Dominion-
- 5. Necessary Station Personal notified?
E] YES n] NO
- 6. TM Tags removed?
D] YES EL NO
- 7. TM Log updated?
[] YES DNO
- 8. Shift Manager (Print & Sign)
- 9. Date Part H. Monthly Audit INITIAL DATE COMMENTS ON AUDIT 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Form No. 730749 (May 2011)
3 Pg 7 o.
1 iiV Dominion Part A, DESCRIPTION RHR-600 is a 3" SR sample valve located off RHR line 1 0-AC-601 R1 1. A leak repair enclosure, which incorporates a strongback design, will be installed to seal the leak and also prevent the piping/valve from separating from the 10" RHR 1A HX discharge line in event of complete weld failure.
This is a short duration TM, which allows the unit to enter Mode 4 from Mode 5 for permanent repair of the fitting leak. Upon entry into Mode 4, the A train of RHR can be removed from service and the leaking weld repaired.
Quality Classification RHR-600 and associated pipe and tubing is SR [1]. All parts used for the leak sealant enclosure are SR.
ASME B&PV Code RHR-600 and adjoining pipe is classified as ASME Section Xl Class 2 [2]. ASME Section Xl, Appendix IX provides direction on the use of mechanical clamping devices on Class 2 and 3 piping pressure boundary. The requirements of this appendix will be used to demonstrate the acceptability of this repair on the leaking fitting.
Note that Article IX-1000 prohibits the use of a clamping device on portions of a system that forms the containment boundary. RHR-600 is credited with maintaining containment boundary and therefore the leak sealant injection portion of this TM cannot be performed without a NRC Relief Request.
Auxiliary Cooling (AC) System Temperature and Pressure The design pressure and temperature of the piping, AC-601 R-1 1, is 600 psig and 400 'F [5].
The leak sealant enclosure will be designed to these conditions.
The TM will be installed and the leak sealant injected in Mode 5. RCS pressure will be maintained greater than 340 psig. The operating pressure will be used to determine the injection pressure for the leak compound. This will assist in preventing injection of sealant into the system. The maximum RCS temperature for this mode is 1950 F [7]. During sealant injection, the RHR heat exchanger outlet temperature will be maintained between 150 - 200 OF.
The X-36 sealant is rated for injection from a temperature of 140°F up to 400 OF [15], and is therefore suitable for this application.
Overview The leak repair will be completed using a hub clamp assembly designed and fabricated by TEAM Industrial Services, Inc. This assembly incorporates a leak sealant enclosure into a strongback clamp design. Two #10-24 set screws, tightened to 36 in-lbs, are included in the hub assembly. These set screws tighten onto the W" pipe between the leaking sockolet fitting and RHR-600 and will prevent ejection of the W" pipe and RHR-600 in the event of a full circumferential failure of the leaking 3/4" sockolet weld. As an added measure of safety, the hub clamp will also be attached to the 3/4" pipe using a full circumferential structural 3/16" fillet weld.
Form No. 730749 (May 2011)
- EA-D 1 24 ATCMN 3
Pag 8
of 11 dW Dominion This weld, in conjunction with the set screws, is more than adequate to restrain the 520 lbf separation thrust [12] and ensures that no catastrophic separation of the 3/4" line above the leaking sockolet can occur.
The leak sealant enclosure is made of stainless steel and, along with the X-36 sealant, provides the pressure boundary up to the design temperature and pressure of the AC pipe, which is 600 psig and 4000F. The studs, which secure the leak sealant enclosure, are tightened to 126 ft-lbs
[12].
General Design Requirements (IX-3100)
Defect Characterization: The defect is characterized as a pinhole leak in the fillet weld of the 3/4" sockolet upstream of RHR-600. The leak is documented in CRs 472654 and 472226. The apparent failure mode of the leak will be determined by follow-up analysis. Since more accurate data on the defect size or potential for propagation is not available, this TM assumes catastrophic failure as characterized by full circumferential failure of the W" sockolet weld. This failure will not result in ejection of any pipe or RHR-600 because of the restraint provided by the hub clamp installed for leak sealant injection.
Material compatibility [12]: The hub clamp is constructed of SA240 Gr 304/316 material. Studs and all-thread material are SA1 93 Gr B8, hex nuts are SAl 94 Gr 8, and set screws are ANSI B18.3 stainless steel. All materials are acceptable for use with borated water in the AC system.
TEAM Industrial Services compound X-36 will be injected into the enclosure to provide temporary repair of the system pressure boundary. Sealant X-36 has a low concentration of Halogens/Chlorides and is acceptable for use on stainless steel [8].
Defect size: The defect size assumed for the design of the sealant enclosure is a full circumferential failure of the leaking 3/4" pipe socket weld. Per Reference 12, the leak sealant enclosure is adequately designed for this application. These calculations establish the enclosure size and construction, as well as maximum sealant injection pressure and volume necessary to provide the system pressure boundary. Identifying maximum sealant injection volume prevents over-injection and intrusion of the sealant into plant systems.
Additional supports: The installation of the enclosure adds a 71 lb point load [12] to line 10-AC-601 R1 1 between hangers RHR-H9 and RHR-H55 [3]. This load increase is less than 5% of the weight of the supported pipe and is considered within design tolerance. Therefore, no further evaluation of this load addition is required [4].
By virtue of their relatively light weight and their being secured to the 3/4" and 10" pipe, the leak sealant enclosure does not adversely affect the seismic qualification of the pipe or adjacent equipment Clamping Device (IX-3200)
As described above, the hub clamp is constructed of SA240 Gr 304/316 material. Studs and all-thread material are SA193 Gr B8, hex nuts are SA194 Gr 8, and set screws are ANSI B18.3 stainless steel. The leak sealant enclosure is designed to meet Table IX-3200-1 Level A stress limits as well as meet the, bounding pressure and temperature requirements of the Auxiliary Cooling System [12].
Form No. 730749 (May 2011)
Temporary Modification CMA A-D20 ATAHMN 3
Pae.
o1 ii uDominion Piping System (IX-3300)
Leak Sealant
Enclosure:
The leak sealant enclosure will be secured rigidly to the 10-inch pipe using a strongback design. The friction between the clamp and the pipe is significant compared to the seismic forces of the relatively light weight clamp and enclosure. The clamp and enclosure are fabricated from SA-204 Gr 304/316 stainless steel and are well stiffened to resist the self weight seismic forces.
Vibration: The pipe in question is at the outlet to the RHR heat exchanger and is well supported near the repair area. Vibration is not considered to be the apparent cause of the defect in the weld. Consequently, vibration was not considered in the design of the leak sealant enclosure.
Piping Evaluation/Stress: The proposed leak sealant enclosure introduces a relatively small load to the pipe configuration due to the enclosure's weight of approximately 71 lbs and the additional seismic forces associated with the clamps weight multiplied by seismic accelerations. Seismic forces on this configuration will be resisted by the frictional force of the pipe clamp around the 10-inch pipe. The clamp's load will be shared by two supports located 6 to 8 feet horizontally from the sample line's connection to this pipe. Refer to KPS Drawing M-962-2 for the piping and hanger configuration. The existing pipe stress analysis, KPS Calculation RHR-34-004, indicates the stresses for the total span between the supports are relatively small on the order of less than half of the allowable stresses. Considering that the weight of the clamp is less than 5% of the weight of this span of 10 inch diameter pipe, and that the combined pipe stresses are low, it is reasonable to conclude that installing this clamp would not have an adverse affect on the integrity of this piping system including design basis loading conditions. In addition, KPS procedure NEP-04.16, "Piping Configuration Reconciliation to Comply with IEB 79-14" does not require re-analysis of piping systems for weight additions of less than 5%.
Joint stiffness: There is no appreciable change in the stiffness of the RHR piping system due to the addition of the leak sealant enclosure.
Constraining effects: The clamp holding the leak sealant enclosure is a single clamp band with a 3/16" filet weld at the 3/4" pipe interface. The clamp will not constrain the pipe significantly during thermal expansion.
Defect growth: The friction resistance of the pipe clamp and the rigid connection of the leak sealant enclosure stabilizes the 3/4 inch pipe and valve, reducing stress. Therefore the defect is not expected to grow during the very short timeframe this TM will be installed.
Monitoring Requirement (IX-6000)
Compliance with the monitoring requirements of IX-6000 shall be described in relief request No. RR-2-3 (Ref. letter to NRC dated 4/29112, Serial No.12-319).
Sealant Injection The sealant will be injected at a pressure based on the system operating pressure. Thus, the system pressure will prevent the sealant from entering the system piping. The allowed quantity Form No. 730749 (May 2011)
r ATAHE-
.o iW Dominion of sealant to be injected is calculated to be 6.272 in3 [121. This volume will be procedurally controlled via GMP-206, Leak Sealant Injection Repair of Steel Components.
Sealant will be injected to stop the leak up to maximum predetermined amount of sealant. The acceptance criteria for post-injection leakage from the joint and all other SIP (System Integrity Program) leakage is less than 6 gal/hr.
Containment Isolation The leak enclosure will be located on piping outside of containment that is between the containment and the outside isolation valve. Therefore, the leak enclosure will need to [9]:
- 1. Meet Safety Class 2 design requirements.
- 2. withstand containment design temperatures
- 3. withstand internal pressure from containment structural integrity test
- 4. meet seismic Category I design requirements
- 5. be protected against a high energy line break outside of containment when need for containment isolation.
- 6. maintain leakage within the Current Licensing Basis [13]
RHR-600 is an outside Containment isolation valve for Containment Penetration 10, a Class 6 penetration. Penetration Class 6 is a system required to operate post-accident. The design and operational criteria for penetration Class 6 isolation valves are governed by the functional requirements of the system. The isolation valves at Penetration 10 are not relied upon to prevent the escape of Containment air to the atmosphere [14].
The requirements for Containment Isolation are satisfied since the enclosure will satisfy the design requirements of the RHR system. The leak sealant enclosure will be designed in accordance with ASME Section XI, Appendix IX, Mechanical Clamping Devices for Class 2 and 3 Piping Pressure Boundary. The piping remains seismically qualified and the enclosure will remain intact during a seismic event. The leak sealant enclosure will prevent system leakage, or minimize leakage to a value that results in meeting the leakage requirements of the System Integrity Program for combined allowable leakage from the Safety Injection, RHR and Internal Containment Spray systems.
Operations The leak seal enclosure is located near RHR-600. The installation of this TM does not restrict operation of the valve or require any modification to the valve itself.'
References
- 1.
XK-100-18, Rev. BA
- 2.
ISIXK-100-18, Rev. AC
- 3.
M-962-2, Rev. A
- 4.
ANSI/ASME Code Reconciliation For Replacement Material, Parts, And Components, Kewaunee Power Station, Revision 3, July 6, 2010 Form No. 730749 (May 2011)
3 P
1 o0 FDominion-
- 5.
XK-100-371, Rev. 5
- 6.
- 7.
OP-KW-GOP-102, Rev. 13
- 8.
Consumable Material Evaluation (CME) 10000005744
- 9.
ANSI N271-1976, Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systems.
- 10. KPS Calculation RHR-34-004, Pipe Stress Report (Rhr-34-004) For Residual Heat Removal Piping System Analytical Part No. Rhr-34-004, Rev. 1, 19900228, CA706184
- 11.
CEM-0049 and Addendum O0A, Rev 000, Evaluation Of Compensatory Measure Taken In Response To Identified Leakage At 3/4" Drain Line Valve 2-RH-33 Off Line 14"-RH-1 18-602
- 12. TEAM Industrial Services Engineering Order 91511 dated 04/28/2012
- 13. System Integrity Program, Rev. 6
- 14. Darrell G. Eisenhut, NRC Director Division of Licensing, to C.W. Giesler, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Exemption to Certain 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Requirements, dated September 30, 1982.
- 15. TEAM email, 04/29/2012 Form No. 730749 (May 2011)
i Industrial Services Registration# F-003143 Engineering Department Tel: (281) 388-5695 Faw (281) 388-5690 ROUTING SLIP & COVER SHEET FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED JOBS Branch Work Order_#: 203-04270 Customer: Domion Energy Status: Priority Caller: Chad Preston Safety Review #: 91511 Engr Order #: 91511 Data Taken By:
Designed By:
Verified By:
Shop Received By:
Name:
Heather Hodges Heather Hodges Andrew Campbell Signature:
4-Ih Dae Time:
06:00 13:08 14:15
--I QC Received By:
d-I Specifications:
Design Pressure:
Service:
TotalWegt Sealant Type:
Do Not Paint Note:
600 psi Reactor Coolant 70.85 X36 w/ G-Fiber Design Temperature:
Torque Value:
Void:
400 OF 126 ft-lb 6.27 in 3 BC (A3)
ASME SECTION XI, APPENDIX IX QC FINAL INSPECTION REQUIRED Nuclear - Safety Related MTRs and COCs Required PMI Required Bill of Materials:
==
Description:==
Clamp Hub Strongback 5/8"-11UNC STUDS 1/2"-13UNC ALLTHREADS 5/8" HEX NUTS 1/2" HEX NUTS
- 10-24UNC SET SCREWS SEALANT____
Material:
Qty Material:
Qty:
SA 240 GR 304 / 316 ISA 240 GR 304 / 316 2
1 SA 193 GR B8/8M SA 193 GR B8/8M 4]4 SA 194 GR 8/8M SA 194 GR 8 /8M ANSI B18.3 STAINLESS STEEL X-36 8
8 12 S1 TUBE Rev 313/2010
,r, tit pyig'.j I bAIMIT FIRST - Q4UALITY ALWAYS" 03/4" 5/8" STUDS T(4) PLACES TORQUE: 126 FT*LB 311 (2) PLACES I
I NOTES:
- 1.
APPROVED TO MANUFACTURE
- 2.
1/4" X 0.12" TUBING GROOVES IN HUB FACE
- 3.
3/16" X 0.09" TUBING GROOVES IN BORE
- 4.
INSTALL STAINLESS TUBING
- 5.
DRILL & TAP (2) 1/4-NPT INJECTION PORTS IN CAVITY
- 6.
MAX INJECTION PRESSURE: 1000 PSI + STATIC
- 7.
(2) HALVES REQUIRED
- 8.
ALL DIMENSIONS ARE TYPICAL UNLESS NOTED
- 9.
D/T (2) #1 0-24UNC CUP TIP SET SCREWS IN 1.07" BORE, TQ: 36 IN*LBS
- 10.
NUCLEAR SAFTEY RELATED - DO NOT PAINT
- 11.
ASME SECTION XI, APPENDIX IX
- 12.
1e REGISTRATION # F-003143
[DIPR Industrial Services. Ing PE 6
IN3 BC ENGINEERING ORDER# 91511EM DRAWING # N/A TECO PART #
N/A WPS: N/A DRAWN BY: HH 4/28/2012 UNLESS OTHERMSE SPECUED MAC HNED SURFACES BREAK SHARP CORNERS
.005 TOLERANCES' FRACTIONAL 11/32 ANGULAR ti/n 1P.O PALCE DECIMAL tOO.
TRE PLACE DECMEL SO.,0 NT. 71 LBS VOL '6-7g261NA3 BC DOMINION HUB CLAMP SIZE A
REV 0
CHECKED BY: AC 4/28/2012 ALL OOENSONS N INCHES 'SCALE: 1:4 SHEET 1 OF 2
-07 "SAFETY FIRST - QUALITY ALWAYS" A ECO# 12489 1 4/28/2012 5/8" ON 3 1 I
5/8"
-o
-0 Q
0 3/4" (4) PLACES r 3/8" 2"
R5 3/8" 13" NOTES:
- 1.
(1) REQUIRED
- 2.
SEND (4) 5/8-11 UNC X 24" LONG ALLTHREADS
- 3.
SEND (8) 5/8 HEAVY HEX NUTS
[EAM Industrial Services, Inc.
REGISTRATION # F-003143 PERIMETER VOL 0ý INA3 BC ENGINEERING ORDER# 91511 EM DRAWING # N/A TECO PART #
N/A WPS: N/A DRAWN BY: HH 4/28/2012 CHECKED BY: AC 4/28/2012 UNLESS OTHERWLESPECMIED MACHINED SURFACES BREAK SHARP CORNERS.00 TOLERANCES:
FRACTIONAL
+/-1/32 ANGULAR V1/2 TWO PAUCE DECIMAAL S0.0, THREE PLACE DECIMAL ENDS ALL DIMENSIONS IN INCHES WT. 71 LBSkOL 6.27 `66INA3 BC DOMINION HUB CLAMP SIZE A
REV 0
SCALE: 1:4 ISHELE 2 OF 2
Industrial Services, Inc.
Sheet 1 of 1 Registration # F-003143 MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS L-Non-Critical/Nuclear LI Critical/Nuclear Drawn By: HH Date: 04/28/2012 Engineering Order No.: 91511EM Checked By: AC Date: 04/28/2012 Enclosures Material Specification MTR COC NR PIPE FITTING ROLLED PLATE BLOCK / PLATE / SIDEBARS SA 240 GR 304 / 316 X
ENDPLATES STRONGBACK BARS SA 240 GR 304 1 316 X
S.B. EARS/FINGERS Fasteners STUDS ENCLOSURE SA 193 GR B8 / 8M X
STUDS STRONGBACK SA 193 GR B818M X
NUTS ENCLOSURE SA 194 GR 8 / 8M X
NUTS STRONGBACK SA 194 GR 8 / 8M X
SET SCREWS Stainless Steel ANSI B 18.3 X
HTS FLANGE TEE RUN (if fabricated)
BRANCH (if fabricated)
FITTING WELD-O-LET VALVE FES Miscellaneous
.4-
+
.1-t 4-t
+
05/26/2009
TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC.
ENGINEERING DATA COVER SHEET Rev. 12/16104
- 1 PRESSURE TEMPERATURE Design:
Design:
ýIAService:
rA o~d~4 Operating:
Operating:.
0 Line Material:,.
3 ci -3 Line Size:
Flange Rating:
Quantity:
Sealant Selection:
Material Requested:
/0- 3/7 " I 1_____,,,._._-__/_-_°_
'o-y 30' ss Package Requirements:
,()heck all that are immediately needed)
(Check one only)
S Drawings For irimedlate Manufacture Calculations Wait for Approval of Package I Price' Price (if so 0 ballpark or iby engineering)
Price Only I No CalculationsfDrawings DAte.and Time Required:
Fax/Emall Prints and Calculations:
john.p.schroeder@dom.com To Customer Name:
Fax No: _,_-__,__F__
To Buto rac y
~
o
-~E-mail:
Mli-el S ben e#
E] Notify Branch Supervisor after faxing -
Name:
Phone No: _______
o_
El Immediately EU Next Business Day Special Requirements:
Strongback needed for separation /vibration U] Stress Relief Required by Customer U] If Lifting Lugs are required, where should they be located?
[] PE Stamp I Are there specific requirements / codes for this customer?
EU MTRs and COCs EU Other EU NDE DESCRIPTION OF ITEM TO BE BUILT (HTS ONLY) STYLE OF FITTING (HTS ONLY) 0 Hot Tap Fitting:
U Split Tee El Line Stop Fitting:
Ul Full Encirclement Reinforcing Saddle (0 with Nozzle?)
(Saddle is non-pressure retaining)
Ul Hi-Stop Fitting:
U Bolt-on U Other.
[- Weld-o-let
] Sadidle / Scarfed Nozzle Tap Size:
Existing Line Schedule:
Requested Nozzle Schedule:
A TE' M Quality System Supplement Corporate FORM 104.2 Rev: 5 Page I of 2 I
NUCLEAR AUTHORIZATION / CONTRACT REVIEW CHECKLIST (NACL)
TMS Division
- PART A: Used for material only orders and in conjunction with PART B for service related work.
Limit 3jobs per Team Job # / CJ #. All three jobs must be within the same service line.
Submitted by:
7
.',-Branch:
3 Date:
Z-2-Iz Utility: /QA ;Aiu A Plant / Location:
,4,,
'1
Contact:
/'*k'
/? e/-
Phone #:
'Z O-3 9'- 533&
Customer Condact/Work Order/PO#:
Team Job #:cQ, 3oq7 Z?
Personnel:
,1.
- 2. &,,A__.V..
- 3. Jt.
-&,_ 4.
Shift: *,'ILr*/Vt*
Additional Personnel:
Pre-Job Check List: A new form must be completed each day, by each shift and prior to any work being performedt
- 1.
All Pre-Job Steps must be initialed by the Team Industrial Services, Inc. technician who is leading activities at the work site prior to any work being performed.
- 2.
The Owner Representative must initial Step 8 prior to any work being performed.
3, All TISI emolovees on the lob must sign Step #9 prior to any work being verformed, Steps:
Yes No Initial Date Comments:
- 1. Has JSA been completed?
-T-V //
- 2.
Has Tech. Support been contacted? (Critical Job Review)
J8-El "1 /:f CJ#: f/67
- 3.
Have Team personnel READ and do they UNDERSTAND the Owner Engineering Control?7 0l
-j
- 4. Have Team personnel verified procedure(s) to be used?
7, 71"
/
Procedure#: 33 3 o
- 5. Have Teamn personnel READ and UNDERSTOOD the Owner WO. Scope?
IIW.O.
- 16 1-1ilLO~
- 6.
Have Team personnel been briefed on Owner W.O. Scope and received copy of W.O.?
El C I' if
- 7.
Have Team personnel had a Rad. Protection Brief?
I
[El <q/Z '
"____I__9
- 8.
Has Owner Representative verified all Steps have been performed?
- Owner Rep. to Inital.,
- 9.
Signatures of all Team Personnel:
PART B: Used in conjunction with PART A for all service related work. PART B is not required for material only orders.
For Technical Support Use Only Number of Jobs reviewed:
I]
2[]
3[]
Comments:
Reviewed by:
Signature:
Date:
Service Line:/ -
Leak Severity:
/
Notifications: Safety Related:
Yes &]
No []
Quality Assurance: Yes a No []
Line Size: /O 1 y
Service: f'd*c4Cf' C~c~iA*
Health Physics:
Yes [
No []
Unit:
Exp. Rate:
-579MR Procedure #:
Rev. #:
Op. Temp:
/66' a Op. Press: &5-S,;%
. Materials & Equipment Design Temp:
400 Design Press:
606Q(9 Sealant Type: K-35 Y
/t/,&
Lot#
Equip. ID#:
&'9/f-600 Sealant Type: <_,-4,b,"r J/,&(_I Lot#:
Comments/Description of Job:
Fabrication Data rtAe5u..
.¢ Mill Tests: Yes [] No L I
See. III: Yes El No X Has the Customer expressed mechanical integrity concerns for the component?
Yes R] No [I Plant Rep. (print): *,
4,,,
1 -y-q Initials:
=Design Calcs.: Yes ;
No EI Engr. Dwgs.: Yes F No []
Initials: -S, TISI Tech. (print):
P sitive Material Identification:
Yes.2q No n
Quality System Supplement Corporate FORM 104.2 Rev: 5 Page 2 of 2 NUCLEAR AUTHORIZATION I CONTRACT REVIEW CHECKLIST (NACL)
TMS Division Job #2 Information Requirements Ndý ice Line:
Leak Severity:
N ifications: Safety Related:
Yes [] No []
LQuality Assurance: Yes E] No []
Line e:
Service:
"qealth Physics:
Yes [] No E]
Unit:
Exp. Rate:
Procedure #:
I Rev. #:
Op. Temp:
Op. Press:
Mate *als & Equipment Design Temp:
Design Press:
Sealant Type:
Lot #:
Equip. ID #:
Sealant Type:
Lot #:
Comments/Description of lob:
Fabrication Da Mill Tests: Yes El No El Sec. III: Ye`
No El Has the Customer expressed mechanical integr concerns for the component?
Yes [] No []
Plant Rep. (print):
Initials:
Design Caics.: Yes [] No E]
Engr. Dwgs.: Yes []N o El TISI Tech. (print):
Initials:
Positive Material Identification:
Yes [] No []
JOb :#A3Info6mation
'Requirements iki*ce Line:
Leak Severity:
tifications: Safety Related:
Yes El No E]
Quality Assurance: Yes [] No []
Line Si Service:
Health Physics:
Yes El No []
Unit:
Exp. Rate:
Procedure #:
Rev. #:
Op. Temp:
Op. Press:
!N!erials & Equipment Design Temp:
Design Press:
Sealant Type:
Lot #:
Equip. ID #:
Sealant Type:
Lot #:
Comments/Description of Job:
M Fabrication Da
,MillTests:Yesr-No[--]
, Sec. III: ý No [
Has the Customer expressed mechanical integrity coerns for the component?
Yes [] No [
Plant Rep. (print):
Initials:
Design Calcs.: Yes [] No El [Engr. Dwgs.: Yes [
N\\o E]
TISI Tech. (print):
Initials:
ýPositive Material Identification:
Yes [] No []
Post Job Steps:
- 1.
All Post-Job Steps must be initialed by the Team Industrial Services, Inc. technician who is leading activities at the work site.
- 2.
Post-Job must be signed by customer representative.
Steps:
Yes No Initial Date Comments:
Complete sign-off ofjob package.
[r]
,. P
!*,*![z Complete sign-off of Team's procedure.
[1 r-.('
//ioi Complete Work Records and have Owner sigrL 0( (]
t/.*
i 2
Plant Representative (print):
Signature:
ure:-*¢
" 14 TISI Technician (print):
j-Signature:
Additional Comments:
S
DS 136 TEE COUPLET AND/OR WELD-O-LET
[ZIsCRIEWED/SOCKET L]SMLS. BUTT. WELD FITTING GIVEN BY:
I.
I DATE:
ý,- z9-a
(, I, e'o t--
I UNIT:
Rýý - 6 &o DS 136 TEE COUPLET AND/OR WELD-O-LET I--]SCREWED/SOCKET
[-*]SMLS. BUTT WELD F*TTING CHKD. BY: I.ý-
I DATE:
(1
- (
SURfACE CONDMON:
LINE SIZE:
I I
/
'J "
SEVERITY OF LEAK:
I LON 1
~SHIP TO:I
=
I DIMENSIONAL DATA I I
LTR.
Al BI c 1 Dl A2 B2 C2 D2 E2 A3 B3 C3 D3 E3 W3.
DIM.
10 7cSo 1,9 S 10- 75-0 S50 C31 D3
/, iOS-o 10A F
- 1. -a W4 1; ýo G1 7-.oo G2 Za-o HI
- 3. eao H2
..Z5"o J2 K
/
LOCATION OF BLOW:
JMWELDED OBSTRUCTIONS MVEW A-Al K
,112 91J -
o.J-,p j67Z--,/f O..,7f l.
[COPYRIGHT 2000. Team Industrial Services. 10/2/00 1
Designer HH Date 04128/2012 TEAM Industrial Services Sheet 1 of 7 Checker AC Date 04/28/2012 REGISTRATION # F-003143 91511EM Split Circular Endplate Analysis
References:
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, Part D, (Table for Maximum Allowable Stresses, 2010 Edition)
Formulas for Stress and Strain by Roark and Young, Fifth Edition, Table 24, Case 31 5IMpLy Supported ci~ge Fr FdgeoEa 1
0" Data:
Design Pressure Design Temperature Split Endplate OD Cover Wall Thickness Split Endplate Thickness Opening Hole Diameter (Conservative)
Maximum Allowable Stress Inside Radius P := 600-psi T := 400.deg OD := 4.0.in twall := 0.75-in tendpl := 0.625.in HD := O-in Sallow := 18300.psi IRD:= [OD-2(twai)]
2 IR = 1.25-in Modulus of Elasticity Poisson's Ratio Maximum Allowable Deflection Joint Efficiency External Corrosion Allowance Internal Corrosion Allowance OD := OD - 2.ExtCA twail := twall - ExtCA - IntCA tendpI := tendpl - ExtCA - IntCA 8
E:= 0.279-10 -psi v := 0.30 Ymax := 0.05-in JE:=I ExtCA:= 0.in IntCA := 0.in OD = 4.in twall = 0.75.in tendpi = 0.625.in Analysis:
Solving for Modulus of Rigidity E
G.
2.(1 + v)
G = 10730769.23 1psi Solving for variables OD -
2 "twa.
a:=
2 HD a-- -
2 C:=
2 a= 1.25-in b = 0.625-in c = 0.625-in b := a - c
TEAM Industrial Services Sheet 2 of 7 REGISTRATION # F-003143 91511 EM Solving for Constants K:= 0.42338L-j'
-,)
1.58614. bcD
+ 2.8 5 0 4 6.b 3.17277.(-b f
+ 2.48483 b-+c)
K = 2.485 2-b 4~
.625.tedpl G.(
b 2 2-c
)** T C
'11 '
1+
1 4-4b 2 NF Cj b
2 4
2 4
.625.-
b 2
4 dpj I +.( b)
-" = 2.496
= 2.463 Y2 = 0.406 X, = 4.231 X = 0.292 el= 0.012 C2 = 0.409 b
2 +
2)-7 X:
IT(C _2
+ X
-)(
a C1 1
(C _
1
(-
l).Cosh {2L~
1 C2-:=
b 12)(l Icosh17 Stress at A (maximum)
~t
- = 6.P~c~b.(k _ 1)[Cl.(1 _ _,2.C1
+ C2(1
-Y
.E
+ E tendpi 3,C Deflection at B (maximum)
- y.
24*P-c 2 b 2.-
)
-ý c-! cos^h(^I.7j + C2'coshr Y2'T+ +
E-tendpl3 Minimum Cover Wall Thickness at= 7647.346-psi Sa=low= 18300.psi y = 0.in ymaxr, 00 5 -in P.IR treqd
=(JE-Salow) - (0.6"P) treqd = 0. 04181-in t,,11f = 0.75-in
TEAM Industrial Services Sheet 3 of 7 REGISTRATION # F-003143 91511 EM Line Enclosure Analysis
Purpose:
This analysis will calculate the internal stresses and bolt load of a line enclosure.
References:
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, Part D, (Table for Maximum Allowable Stresses), 2010 Edition Team Industrial Services, Teco Manufacturing, Engineering Department, ISO-9001 Quality Manual, EP8.7 6L M
R2 FY R
Fýj R1 Dimensions Free Body Diagram Data:
Design Pressure Design Temperature Inside Radius R:= JR - IntCA Cover Thickness t := twa, + LntCA Cavity to Stud CL End of Sidebar to Stud CL OD Sidebar Thickness ts :=
2 P = 600-psi T = 400-deg R = 1.25-in t = 0.75.in A:= 0.625-in B := 0.875.in ts = 2.in ExtCA= 0-in IntCA = 0-in R = 1.25.in t = 0.75-in A = 0.625-in Length Between Centerline of Seals Sidebar Length (at Centerline)
- of Studs per Half Hole Size Stud Tensile Area Stud Allowable Stress Enclosure Allowable Stress LS := 3.0-in LB := 3.0-in NS2:= 1 h:= 0.75-in TA:= 0.226-in 2
Ss:= 13800-psi Sallow = 18300-psi External Corrosion Allowance Internal Corrosion Allowance R:ý R + IntCA t
t - ExtCA - IntCA A:= A-IntCA B:= B - ExtCA LB:= LB ExtCA ts := ts - ExtCA B = 0.875-in LB = 3-in ts = 2-in
TEAM Industrial Services Sheet 4 of 7 REGISTRATION # F-003143 91511EM Analysis:
Solving for forces and moments F:= P.R.LS F,
F F = 2250.1bf Fx= 2250.1bf Setting forces in x direction equal to 0 R2 := Fx, R2 = 2250.lbf Fy=F FY = 2250*lbf Setting moments around centerpoint of cavity equal to 0 t
A+ B -
2 BL-= F B
Allowable Bolt Load BLa := TA.Ss.NS2 BL = 2892.857-4bf BLa = 3118.8-1bf BL := if(BL < F,F, BL)
BL = 2892.857"lbf Stresses in Shell (thin walled enclosure)
R O= P.-
t a-= 1000.psi Sidebar Stress R, := BL - F (at Bolt Centerline)
R, = 642.857.1bf ts RI.B. Is 2
O'b2 :=
.(LB - NS2.h).ts 12 3
F 2 (LB - NS2.h)-ts ob2 = 375.psi Ts = 750.psi Results:
Less Than Bolt Load BL = 2892.86-lbf Stresses in Shell (thin walled enclosure) o= 1000.psi Sidebar Stresses (@ bolt centedine) a-b2 = 375-psi Shear Stresses in Sidebar T = 750.psi Allowable BLa= 3118.8-1bf Sa,)ow = 18300.psi Sallow = 18300.psi 0.8.Sallow = 14640.psi
TEAM Industrial Services Sheet 5 of 7 REGISTRATION # F-003143 91511EM Thrust Calculation Due to Unequal Bores Seal Length # 1 Seal Length # 2 Smaller Diameter Injection Pressure Number of Studs Size of Studs Tensile Area of Studs Stud Allowable Stress Allowable Load of Studs Thrust Produced Thrust: tlDl.D2 - d 2.a 4P Number of Studs Required Thrust ND:=
H D1 := 3.5-in D2:= 3.5-in d:= 1.05-in IP := 1000-psi N:= 4 5/8-11 UNC At:= 0.226-in2 SS := 13800-psi H:= At-SS H= 3118.8.lbf Thrust= 11384.099-lbf ND = 3.65 N=4 Force per Stud Thrust F:
N F = 2846.025-1bf Thrust Calculation Due to Separation Diameter Design Pressure Number of Set screws Size of Set Screws Holding Power of Set Screws Thrust due to separation Ts:= (d2).41.p 4
Number of Set Screws Required Ts NDs := T Hs Force per Set Screw Ts Fs:= -
Ns d:= 1.05-in p := 600-psi Ns:= 2
- 10 x 24 UNC (Cup Tip)
Hs:= 262-lbf Ts = 519.541-lbf NDs = 1.983 Fs = 259.77.1bf
TEAM Industrial Services Sheet 6 of 7 REGISTRATION # F-003143 91511EM Thrust and Bending Calculation - Hub Thrust Produced Moment Arm Total Width Number of Studs per Half Cavity Allowable Stress Thickness Provided (After Radius)
Joint Efficiency Force per Half
_ Thrust NS Thrust = 11384.099-1bf X:= 3.375-in B:= OD B=4.in NS:= 2 b := (IR - IntCA).2 Sa,1ow = 18300.psi tp := 2.375.in E:= 1.0 Fs = 5692.049.1bf b = 2.5-in Thickness Required 6-Fs.X tr:= j tr = 2.049.in tp =2.375-in Thrust and Bending Calculation - Flat Bar Thrust Produced Moment Arm Total Width Number of Studs Cavity Allowable Stress Thickness Provided (After Radius)
Joint Efficiency Force per Half Thrust Fs :=
NS Thickness Required 6.Fs.X tr :=
(B - b).E.(Sallow)
Thrust = 11384.099.1 X:= 3.9-in B:= 3.in NS = 2 b:= 0-in Sallow = 18300-psi tp:= 1.625.in E:= 1 Fs = 5692.049-lbf tr= 1.558-in
<tp
=1.625 -in
TEAM Industrial Services Sheet 7 of 7 REGISTRATION # F-003143 91511EM Weight and Void Void Injection Valves NIV:= 2 InjVlv:= NIV.0.19.in 3
2 1t Cavity:= (2.5. in).-. (1.57-inXA])
4 2-1 21T Line:= (1.5.in).-.
(0.75-in) + (1.05-in).-. (0.5650.in) 4 4
Void:= Cavity - Line + InjVlv Void = 6.272-in3 B.C.
Weight (Clamp & Strongback from SolidWorks Models)
Clamp:= 17.96-lb.2 lb allthread := 4.0.087 -b.24.in + 8-0.11-lb in lb Studs:= 4.0.087 -b.8.in+ 8.0.11.tb in lb Sealant:= Void-1.35.0.043.-
.3 in InjValves:= NIV-0.46.lb Strongback:= 20.56.1b Weight:= Clamp + allthread + Sealant + InjValves + Strongback + Studs A ECO # 12489 04/2812012]9 InjVlv = 0.38.in 3
Cavity = 7.707.in 3
Line= 1.815.in 3
Clamp = 35.92.1b allthread = 9.232-1b Studs = 3.664-1b Sealant = 0.364-1b InjValves = 0.92-lb Strongback = 20.56.1b Weight = 70.66.lb