ML12030A136

2011 Dresden Nuclear Power Station Initial License Examination Administered Scenarios

ML12030A136
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden, Indian Point
Issue date:	03/29/2011
From:	Bielby M Operations Branch III
To:	Exelon Generation Co
Shared Package
ML11104A072	List: ML11103A132 ML12021A022 ML12021A023 ML12030A136
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Download: ML12030A136 (73)

Text

Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-1 CONTROL ROD RPIS FAILURE SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP ISOLATION CONDENSER INADVERTENT INITIATION SWAP RFP DUE TO OIL LEAK EARTHQUAKE / TORUS LEAK / MANUAL SCRAM EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZE DUE TO LOWERING TORUS LEVEL Rev. 00 09/10 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Station: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-1 Class ID: 10-01 (2011-301)

Evaluators Operators

/ crew position

/ ATC

/ BOP Initial Conditions:

/ CRS Initial Power = 75%

Turnover:

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

RDFAILF5 I

ATC CRD - RPIS failure for rod F-05. T 2

Q22 C

BOP SERV WATER - Pump Trip.

3 ICSPDFT I

BOP ISO COND - Inadvertent Initiation. T 4

NONE C

ATC RFP - 2B RFP Develops an Oil Leak / Must Swap.

5 CSBRKSEV M

TEAM MANUAL SCRAM - Earthquake Causes Plant Damage and Subsequent Torus Leak.

6 CSBRKSEV M

TEAM EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZE - Torus ECCS Suction Line Break / ED due to Lowering Torus Level.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec

Scenario Objective Evaluate the operators in using the Emergency Depressurization DEOP contingency procedure.

Scenario Summary Initial Conditions:

1. Unit is at 75% power.

2. The following equipment is OOS:

a. None

3. LCOs:

a. None Scenario Sequence Control rod F-05 loses all RPIS indication. The Team will insert the control rod, reference Tech Specs and direct taking it OOS.

The 2B Service Water pump trips on overload. The Team will start a standby pump.

The Isolation Condenser initiates due to setpoint drift. The Team will stop operation of the Isolation Condenser and reference Tech Specs.

The Team receives a report from the field that 2B RFP has an oil leak. The Team starts 2C RFP and secures 2B RFP.

Due to an earthquake, an ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level. Per DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, the Team should:

Scram the reactor.

Prevent HPCI operation.

Perform an emergency depressurization. (One ADSV fails to open. The Team will augment emergency depressurization with other systems.)

Event One - Control Rod RPIS Failure Control rod F-05 will lose all RPIS indication.

Malfunctions required: 1 (Loss of Control Rod F-05 RPIS indication)

Success Path:

Inserts Control Rod F-05 and references Tech Specs

Event Two - Service Water Pump Trip 2B Service Water pump trips on overload.

Malfunctions required: 1 (2B Service Water pump trip)

Success Path:

The Team starts a standby pump.

Event Three - Isolation Condenser Inadvertent Initiation The Isolation Condenser initiates due to setpoint drift.

Malfunctions required: 1 (Isolation Condenser initiation setpoint drift)

Success Path:

The Team will stop operation of the Isolation Condenser and reference Tech Specs.

Event Four - 2B RFP develops an oil leak, must swap Report from the field of an oil leak on 2B RFP.

Malfunctions required: 1 2B RFP oil leak Success Path:

The Team starts 2C RFP and secures 2B RFP.

Event Five and Six - Torus Leak The crew should recognize and respond to a lowering torus water level. If the Team does not prevent HPCI operation, a spurious HPCI initiation will occur while Torus level is dropping.

Malfunctions required: 2 (Torus Leak)

(ADSV fail to open)

Success Path:

Perform manual Reactor scram.

Prevent HPCI operation.

Emergency Depressurize.

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1

If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-JA-150-08, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. a. Initialize simulator in an IC which allows establishing the following: (Jump Drive IC 156 can be used)

1) Reactor power at ~75%.

2) Generator at ~680 MWe.

b. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed, to maintain DP within limits.

c. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.

d. Advance the chart recorders.

3 Verify the following simulator conditions:

a. 2B and 3B Service Water pumps running.

b. 2A and 2B RFPs running with 2C RFP in STBY on Bus 22.

c. Verify Zinc Injection label in place for lined up to 2A RFP.

4 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. None NOTE: Perform the above setup prior to running the setup CAEP file.

5 Run the initial setup CAEP file: ILT-N-1.cae 6

Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks Time Critical Tasks PRA Key Operator Actions Required Actions Optional Actions

Event One - Control Rod RPIS Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 1

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the direction of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 1, RPIS failure for control rod F-05.

ROLE PLAY:

Respond as Support Groups notified.

ATC Reports and responds to DANs 902-5 A-3 ROD DRIFT, and B-3 ROD WORTH MIN BLOCK.

Views Full Core Display and identifies CRD with Rod Drift light.

Selects Control Rod F-05 and reports no indication on Four Rod Display.

ATC Recognizes loss of control rod F-05 position indication on Full Core Display, Four Rod Display, RWM, and/or Process Computer.

CRS Enters DOA 0300-06, RPIS Failure, and directs its actions.

ATC Performs subsequent actions of DOA 0300-06, RPIS Failure:

May insert Rod F-05 to 00 prior to entering DOA 0300-06.

Enters substitute position of 48 for F-05.

Inserts control rod F-05 one notch.

Determines no control rod position indication at alternate position.

Selects rod F-05.

Drives rod F-05 to fully inserted position.

Calls WEC to electrically or hydraulically isolate the control rod F-05 HCU.

May enter a substitute position and take OOS on the RWM per DOP 0400-02, Rod Worth Minimizer.

CRS References appropriate plant licensing documents and determines:

TS 3.1.3, condition C, required actions:

C.1 Fully insert inoperable control rod within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />; AND, C.2. Disarm the associated CRD within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Directs electrically or hydraulically isolating control rod F-05 HCU.

ROLE PLAY As QNE acknowledge reports. If concurrence is requested for any action, report I concur with (insert requested action here)

BOP Monitors panel, provides assistance as directed.

TEAM May enter DOA 0300-12, Mispositioned Control Rod.

Notifies the Shift Manager, QNE, Work Week Manager, Fin team, IMD, OR EMD.

Event One - Control Rod RPIS Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ROLE PLAY:

When NLO directed to disarm control rod F-05, report: Ill disarm F-05 after I receive a pre-job brief (it is not intended for this to be completed).

ATC Records failed RPIS indication per DOS 0300-06, CRD Abnormality Record.

Event 1 Completion Criteria:

DOA 0300-06 actions have been taken, Technical Specifications have been referenced, AND/OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Event Two - Service Water Pump Trip Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 2

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 2, which trips the 2B Service Water Pump.

ROLE PLAY:

EO at Service Water Pump just started (wait 2 min.):

Report: The Service Water Pump is operating normally and 2B Service Water Pump shows no sign of damage.

EO at 2B Service Water Pump at Bus 24 (wait 2 min.):

Report: 2B Service Water Pump Breaker is open and it has overcurrent targets up.

EMD Acknowledges need to go to Bus 24 and troubleshoot overcurrent flag at 2B Service Water Pump breaker.

3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

After a standby Service Water Pump is started, activate trigger 3, which returns the Remote for stopping the DFP to normal.

BOP Announces 2B Service Water Pump trip.

Refers to DAN 923-1 C-3, U2 OR U3 SERV WATER PP TRIP.

Starts an available Service Water Pump.

Refers to DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip and:

Directs an EO to the Cribhouse to check the Service Water Pump just started and inspect 2B Service Water Pump.

Direct an EO to check the breaker of 2B Service Water Pump.

Places 2B Service Water Pump control switch in Pull to Lock.

Notifies Ops Shift Supervisor.

Requests EMD to troubleshoot.

CRS Notifies Shift Manager and EMD.

Enters DOA 3900-01, Loss of Cooling by Service Water System.

Enters DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip.

ATC Assists as directed.

Event 2 Completion Criteria:

An available Service Water pump is started, AND / OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Event Three - Isolation Condenser Inadvertent Initiation Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 4

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the direction of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 4, which drifts the Isolation Condenser Initiation setpoint.

ROLE PLAY:

Respond as Support Groups notified.

BOP Reports and responds to DANs:

902-3 B-4, ISOL CONDR VLVS OFF NORM.

902-3 C-4, ISOL CONDR TEMP HI.

902-4 A-15, ISOL CONDR CH A/B INITIATION.

Determines Isolation Condenser in operation due to MO 2-1301-3 valve open.

TEAM Determines Isolation Condenser initiation spurious due to RPV pressure in normal band.

CRS Directs removing the Isolation Condenser from service.

BOP Places MO 2-1301-3 in PTL.

When MO 2-1301-3 indicates closed, reports that the Isolation Condenser is removed from service.

ATC Monitors reactor water level, pressure, and power.

TEAM May enter DGA 07, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition.

CRS References appropriate plant licensing documents and determines:

TS 3.5.3, condition A. required actions:

A.1 Verify by administrative means High Pressure Coolant Injection System is OPERABLE immediately, AND, A.2 Restore IC System to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

TS 3.3.5.2, condition A. required actions: (May wait for IMD investigation)

A.1 Declare IC System inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; AND, A.2 Place channel(s) in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

TEAM Notifies Security to limit access to area under Isolation Condenser vent.

Notifies Radiation Protection to survey under the Isolation Condenser vent.

Event 3 Completion Criteria:

Isolation Condenser removed from operation, Technical Specifications have been referenced, AND/OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Event Four - 2B RFP develops an oil leak, requiring it to be secured Trigger Position Actions or Behavior Role Play:

Call the control room as the U-2 NLO and report, While I was on rounds, I found 2B RFP has an oil leak on a line to the speed changer. It cannot be stopped.

If asked the oil is contained on the bed plate and I plugged the drain before the oil reached it.

If asked to quantify the leak, I cant tell.

If asked, The oil level is below the sight glass.

If asked, I recommend securing 2B RFP as soon as possible.

If asked, Zinc injection is lined up to 2A RFP".

ATC Acknowledges report from the field and relays it to the CRS.

CRS May enter DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control.

Directs ATC to start 2C RFP and secure 2B RFP.

ATC Starts 2C RFP per DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control, OR DOP 3200-03, Startup Of Second Or Third Reactor Feed Pump Or Shifting To Alternate Reactor Feed Pump.

Places RFPs Standby Selector switch, STBY PP SELECT in OFF position.

Closes MO 2-3201C, Opens 2C RFP RECIRC VLV PCV 2-3201C by placing control switch in OPEN.

Verifies reactor water level is stable.

Verifies sufficient system pressures.

If previously closed, places MO 2-3201C, 2C PP DISCH VLV control switch to OPEN position.

Starts 2C RFP.

Verifies reactor water level is stable.

Verify RFP Auxiliary Oil Pump AUTO stops.

WHEN MO 2-3201C, 2C PP DISCH VLV, is fully open (the RED valve position indicating light is extinguished), THEN places 2C RFP RECIRC VLV PCV 2-3201A control switch in AUTO.

Directs NLO to perform checks on 2C RFP.

Event Four - 2B RFP develops an oil leak, requiring it to be secured Trigger Position Actions or Behavior ATC Secures 2B RFP per DOP 3200-05, Reactor Feed Pump Shutdown.

Places RFPs standby selector switch, STBY PP SELECT, in OFF.

Verifies the 2B AUX OIL PP control switch in AUTO.

Opens 2B RFP recirculation valve, by placing 2B RFP RECIRC VLV PCV 2-3201B control switch in OPEN position.

Verifies reactor water level is stable.

Closes MO 2-3201B, 2B RFP DISCH VLV.

Verifies reactor water level remains stable.

Stops 2B RFP.

As the RFP slows down, verifies the associated auxiliary oil pump automatically starts.

Close 2B RFP recirculation valve, by placing 2B RFP RECIRC VLV control switch in AUTO position.

Direct a NLO to verify the 2B RFP has come to rest.

WHEN 2B RFP has come to rest, THEN opens MO 2-3201B, 2B RFP DISCH VLV.

Directs NLO to perform remaining in plant steps for securing 2B RFP.

Role Play:

NLO to verify 2B RFP is at rest: Wait 1 min, then report, 2B RFP is at rest.

Acknowledge request to perform procedural steps for 2C and 2B RFPs. After a few minutes, report that the steps are completed.

CRS Directs 2B RFP Aux Oil PP secured to stop leak.

ATC Places 2B RFP Aux Oil PP in PTL.

Role Play:

If asked after 2B RFP Aux Oil PP is placed in PTL: Report, the oil leak on 2B RFP has stopped.

Event 4 Completion Criteria:

2C RFP started and 2B RFP secured AND/OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Event Five and Six-An ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 5

Simulator Operator:

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 5 which starts an ECCS suction line break in the torus basement.

Note:

It takes about 20 minutes for torus level to reach 11 feet. At the discretion of the lead examiner, use the cues in this event to jump ahead in time to expedite level drop if desired.

Role Play:

After inserting the above trigger call the Control Room, as Security and report there has been a confirmed earthquake felt throughout the plant.

BOP Reports the following alarms:

923 A-3 (B-2), U2 E(W) RBFD SUMP LVL HI-HI 902-4 C-23, Torus Narrow Range Wtr Lvl Lo Checks the torus narrow range level indicator. Reports level dropping.

Directs NLO to perform DOS 1600-02, Torus Level Verification Using Local Sight Glass.

Directs NLO to investigate leakage to torus basement.

Verifies proper operation of the RBFD Sump pumps. (Will require resetting the Group 2 isolation at both the 902-5 panel and the 923-4 panel for the sump pumps to operate if a Group 2 Isolation occurs).

Role Play:

As the NLO sent to verify Torus level locally using sight glass (wait 4 min), then report:

Local Torus level is (use value from variable ppc232, unless it is <20, then report it is below the sightglass).

As the NLO sent to investigate leakage (wait 2 min) or if not sent, then as the NLO on his round, report: there is a large rupture from a pipe attached between the Torus shell and the Torus suction ring header near the East LPCI Corner room. The Torus basement floor is covered with water. There is no valve on the line.

As the NLO sent to report LPCI corner status (wait 2 min), then report: there is no water in either LPCI corner room.

As Maintenance sent to determine if the leak can be stopped (wait 3 min), then report:

Maintenance cannot stop the leak.

As the NLO sent to check the seismic monitor, report: the seismic monitor has been activated (red light lit).

If contacted as any outside agencies, regarding the earthquake, confirm there has been an earthquake in the area but there is no more information at this time.

CRS May enter DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in Plant.

May reference DOA 0010-03, Earthquakes.

Event Five and Six-An ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in Plant, as directed:

Makes PA announcement.

Directs NLO to investigate leakage to torus basement.

Notifies Radiation Protection and Security as time permits.

Cue: (if desired for time compression)

When torus level is < 14.5 feet and/or at the discretion of the lead examiner, cue the crew that we are taking a time jump and that both torus wide range level meters indicate 12.5 feet and are dropping at about 6 inches every 5 minutes.

CRS Enters and directs performance of DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control:

May attempt to add water to the Torus per DOP 1600-02.

Directs BOP to prevent HPCI from operating before torus level reaches 12 feet.

May direct scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

Directs Team to perform a manual reactor scram before torus level reaches 11 feet.

ATC /

BOP Performs scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.

o IF FCL > 93%, THEN reduce FCL to < 93% by inserting CRAM rods per DGP 03-04 OR in sequence rods per DGP 03-04.

o Reduce power with Recirc flow to 56 Mlbm/hr core flow.

o Start the motor suction pump AND turning gear oil pump.

o Trip hydrogen addition.

ATC /

BOP Performs manual scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.

Depresses BOTH Scram buttons.

Places RX MODE SW in SHUTDOWN.

o Verifies Recirc pumps run back to minimum.

o Inserts SRMs and IRMs.

o Controls reactor water level +25 to +35 inches or as directed by the Unit Supervisor.

o Verifies turbine tripped.

o Verifies generator tripped.

o Verifies aux power transfers.

BOP Performs the following actions per DEOP 200-01, Primary Containment Control, as directed:

May attempt to add water to the torus by opening the HPCI 14 valve.

Monitors/Reports DEOP 200-01 entry parameters.

Prevents HPCI from operating.

Event Five and Six-An ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS May decide to anticipate RPV Blowdown:

Directs opening turbine bypass valves.

BOP Opens turbine bypass valves. (If directed to anticipating Blowdown)

CRS Enters DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control, and directs:

If Reactor Building Ventilation isolates when unit is scrammed, directs restarting Reactor Building Ventilation.

BOP Performs DEOP 300-01, Secondary Control, as directed:

Time permitting, restarts Reactor Building Ventilation (if it isolates when the reactor is scrammed).

Cue: (if time compression was used above) 10 minutes after the initial time compression cue was given and/or at the discretion of the lead examiner, cue the crew that both the Torus wide range level meters indicate 11.5 feet and are dropping at a rate of about 1 foot per 10 minutes.

CRS When informed that torus level is approaching 11 feet:

Enters DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, and directs:

Initiation of Isolation Condenser to maximum flow.

Verification that SP/L >6 feet.

Opening all ADS valves.

Verification relief valves are open.

Due to less than 5 ADSVs open, directs other Emergency Depressurization systems initiated:

Directs turbine bypass valves opened. (May already be open for anticipation of Emergency Depressurization)

BOP Performs DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, actions as directed:

Initiates Isolation Condenser to maximum flow Verifies that SP/L >6 feet.

Opens ADS valves.

Verifies all relief valves are open. Determines and announces E ADSV did not open.

BOP Opens turbine bypass valves. (May already be open due to anticipating Blowdown)

Event Five and Six-An ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Events 5 and 6 / Scenario Completion Criteria:

Reactor Scrammed, HPCI operation prevented, RPV depressurization in progress, AND/OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Critical Tasks:

(PC-3.1)

With the Reactor at power and it is determined that suppression pool water level cannot be held above 11 feet wide range, Manually Scram the Reactor.

(PC-3.2)

When suppression pool level cannot be maintained above top elevation of the HPCI Exhaust (12), TRIP AND PREVENT HPCI operation irrespective of adequate core cooling.

(PC-3.3)

When it is determined that suppression pool water level cannot be held above 11 feet wide range, INITIATE emergency depressurization

REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-3 B-4 ISOL CONDR VLVS OFF NORM DAN 902-3 C-4 ISOL CONDR TEMP HI DAN 902-4 A-15 ISOL CONDR CH A/B INITIATION DAN 902-4 C-23 TORUS NARROW RANGE WTR LVL LO DAN 902-5 A-3 ROD DRIFT ALARM DAN 902-5 B-3 ROD WORTH MIN BLOCK DAN 902-5 C-3 ROD OUT BLOCK DAN 923-1 C-3 U2 OR U3 SERV WATER PP TRIP DAN 923-4 A-3 (B-2)

U2 E(W) RBFD SUMP LVL HI-HI DEOP 0100-00 RPV CONTROL DEOP 0200-01 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL DEOP 0300-01 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL DEOP 0400-02 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION DGA 07 UNPREDICTED REACTIVITY ADDITION DGP 02-03 REACTOR SCRAM DGP 03-04 CONTROL ROD MOVEMENTS DOA 0010-03 EARTHQUAKES DOA 0040-02 LOCALIZED FLOODING IN PLANT DOA 0300-06 RPIS FAILURE DOA 0300-12 MISPOSITIONED CONTROL ROD DOA 0600-01 TRANSIENT LEVEL CONTROL DOA 3900-01 LOSS OF COOLING BY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DOA 6500-10 4KV CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOP 0400-02 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER DOP 3200-03 STARTUP OF SECOND OR THIRD REACTOR FEED PUMP OR SHIFTING TO ALTERNATE REACTOR FEED PUMP DOS 0300-06 CRD ABNORMALITY RECORD DOS 1600-02 TORUS LEVEL VERIFICATION USING LOCAL SIGHT GLASS T.S. 3.1.3 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY T.S. 3.5.3 IC SYSTEM

EXAM ILT-N-1 QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES 6

Total malfunctions (5-8) 1 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 3 Critical tasks (2-3)

Computer Aided Exercise Programs

1. NRC Exam ILT 10-1

1. SCENARIO ILT-N-1.cae

1. Written by DREFV

1. Rev 00

1. Date 09/10

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Prevents the 2/3 DFP from starting.

irf w14 true imf ser1792 off

1. Binds 'E' ADSV full closed.

imf ads3ebn 0.0

1. EVENT TRIGGERS

1. Event Trigger 1 Fails all control rod F-05 RPIS indications.

trgset 1 "0" imf rdfailf5 (1)l2 imf cr043s (1) badl2

1. Event Trigger 2 inserts a trip of the 2B service water pump. (takes several seconds to occur) trgset 2 "0"l2 imf q22 (2)l2

1. Event Trigger 3 Returns the Remote for stopping the 2/3 DFP back to normal.

trgset 3 "0"l4 irf w14 (3) false"l4 imf ser1792 (3 2) normall4

1. Event Trigger 4 Drifts the Iso Cond Initiation setpoint.

trgset 4 "0"l4 imf icspdft (4) 0.0l6

1. Event Trigger 5 Inserts an ECCS suction line break.

trgset 5 "0"l6 trg 5 "ramp wamwlps 200.0 201.0 1:00:00"l6 imf csbrksev (5) 100.0l6 imf csppbbrk (5 4:00) 100.0l8

1. END

Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 695 MWe, Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.881 Action limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at 913 MWe Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.819 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements None LCO Started:

LCO Expires:

TS Cause:

Unit 1 Plant Status Today U1 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Transfer House has grating removed. Currently roped off with pump installed to pump to U1 Oil Seperator Pit as required. Outside operator monitor and pump as necessary.

Today Chem Cleaning ventilation status:

HV-1A/EF-1A are secured due to HV-1A inlet and outlet dampers being shut with fan on, IR# 913157, WO 1239746.

HV-1B/EF-1B are secured due to HV-1B throwing its belts. WO 1156150.

HVAC -1 ON.

HV-2 running.

Switchyard Status Today 138 KV Bus 1 Feed To TR 22 Combi Units has low oil in the 'C' phase, ComEd WO #276162 Today HVO: Exercise CAUTION while in the 345 KV Yard due to excavation being performed in the area.

Marv Evans reports holes being dug near manual switch disconnects 345KV Blue Bus. Plywood will be installed over the holes if access is needed, but be aware there are holes under the plywood.

SSC called from the 345KV yard reporting that the cable trough covers are removed to prep for upcoming work. Be careful.

Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities

• • • • Shift 1 Activities ****

• • • • Shift 2 Activities ****

Load was dropped last shift per TSO. Load pickup expected next shift.

Maintain current load.

• • • • Shift 3 Activities ****

Today

• • • • Unit 2 Procedures In-Progress **** Do Not Delete ****

Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-2 LOWER REACTOR POWER USING RECIRCULATION FLOW SPURIOUS HPCI INITIATION INDIVIDUAL RECIRC PUMP CONTROLLER SIGNAL FAILS DOWNSCALE SWAP REACTOR BUILDING SUPPLY FANS FWLC CONTROLLER SETPOINT DRIFTS HIGH STEAM LEAK IN THE DRYWELL / MANUAL SCRAM LOSS OF BUS 23-1 AND 28 / EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 00 09/10 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Station: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-2 Class ID:

Evaluators Operators

/ crew position 2011-301

/ ATC

/ BOP Initial Conditions:

/ CRS Initial Power = 80%

Turnover:

Lower Reactor Power with Recirc Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

NONE R

ATC RECIRC - Lower Reactor Power using Recirculation Flow.

2 HPINIT I

BOP HPCI - Spurious HPCI Initiation. T 3

RRMBBIAS I ATC RECIRC - Individual Pump Controller Signal Fails Downscale. T 4

None N

BOP HVAC - Swap Reactor Building Supply Fans.

5 RLLMLS I

ATC FW - FWLC Controller Drifts High.

6 I21 M

TEAM Manual Scram - Steam Leak in the Drywell.

7 I21 K23 K40 M

TEAM EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZE - Steam Leak inside the Drywell / Loss of Bus 23-1 & 28 / ED due to Exceeding Primary Containment Pressure.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec

Scenario Objective Evaluate the Teams ability to operate the plant with a Drywell Steam Leak requiring Emergency Depressurization.

Scenario Summary

1. Unit is at 80% power.

2. The following equipment is OOS:

a. None

3. LCOs:

a. None Scenario Sequence The Team continues reactor power reduction using recirculation flow.

A spurious HPCI initiation occurs. The team will take action to stop HPCI and address Tech Spec requirements.

The 2B Recirc Pump Speed Controller fails downscale. The NSO will lockout 2B Recirc Pump scoop tube.

(May lockout both recirc scoop tubes)

The Team swaps Reactor Building Supply Fans.

The FWLC setpoint drifts high. The Team will take manual control of the FWLC system.

A small steam leak in the Drywell begins. The Team will scram the reactor due to the rising Drywell pressure.

Shortly after the reactor scram, the leak will increase enough that Containment sprays are required. When the Team attempts to spray the Drywell, Bus 23-1 and 28 trip resulting in a loss of one Division of Drywell Spray.

The leak worsens and Primary Containment pressure will exceed the PSP limit and require the Team to Emergency Depressurize.

The Team continues reactor power reduction using recirculation flow.

Event One - Lower Reactor Power Using Recirculation Flow Malfunctions required: 0 (None)

Success Path:

The Team continues reactor power reduction using recirculation flow.

A Spurious HPCI Initiation occurs.

Event Two - Spurious HPCI Initiation Malfunctions required: 1 Spurious HPCI Initiation Success Path:

The Team isolates the HPCI steam supply.

The 2B Recirc Speed Controller fails downscale.

Event Three - 2B Recirc Speed Controller Failure Malfunctions required: 1 (2B Recirc Speed Controller output fails down)

Success Path:

Locks out 2B (Or both) scoop tube(s).

Performs DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirc System Flow Control Failure.

Event Four - Swap Reactor Building Supply Fans When directed, swaps Reactor Building Supply Fans.

Malfunctions required: 0 (None)

Success Path:

Swaps Reactor Building Supply Fans.

The FWLC setpoint will drift high.

Event Five - FWLC Setpoint Drifts High Malfunctions required: 1 (FWLC setpoint failure)

Success Path:

The Team performs DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control, and takes manual control of FWLC.

A small steam leak develops in the Drywell.

Event Six - Steam Leak in the Drywell / Manual Scram Malfunctions required: 1 (Steam Leak in the Drywell)

Success Path:

Performs a manual scram.

Event Seven - Loss of Bus 23-1 and 28 / Emergency Depressurization The steam leak in the Drywell increases enough to require Containment sprays. When the Team attempts to spray the Drywell, Bus 23-1 and 28 trip on overcurrent. The leak worsens and Primary Containment pressure exceeds the PSP limit. The Team performs an Emergency Depressurization.

Malfunctions required: 2 (Steam leak in the Drywell).

(Bus 23-1 and 28 overcurrent trips).

Success Path:

The Team performs an Emergency Depressurization.

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1

If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-JA-150-08, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

a. Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.

b. Provide the Team with a copy of DGP 03-01, Power Changes, marked up for load drop through inserting control rods to reduce FCL prior to reducing recirc flow.

c. Provide a marked up CRSP for the rod insertion including a REMA for routine load drop.

d. Provide the Team with a clean copy of DOP 5750-02, Reactor Building Ventilation.

2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. Initialize simulator in an IC which allows establishing the following: (Jump Drive IC 156 can be used)

1) Adjust control rods to establish FCL @ ~95%.

2) Adjust Recirc flow to establish ~730 MWe.

b. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed to establish DP high in normal band in preparation for load drop.

c. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.

d. Advance the chart recorders.

3 Verify the following simulator conditions:

a. 2B Recirc M/A Controller Bias RRMBBIAS is at 0.0 to -0.01. Adjust the bias pot as necessary.

b. 2A and 2B Reactor Building Vent Fans running with 2C Reactor Building Vent Fan off.

c. TR 86 LTC in AUTO.

NOTE: Do NOT 4

Run the initial setup CAEP file: ILT-N-2.cae run the initial setup CAEP file until the above setup is completed.

NOTE: Some analog overrides do not load correctly from a CAEP file. (See SWR #8652) Therefore it is necessary to setup override RRMBBIAS manually.

a. Open the ACTION Program and perform the following:

1) Select tab OVERRIDE AI

2) Locate override RRMBBIAS and open it.

3) Set Ramp Start Value to -0.001

4) Set Ramp time to 4:00

5) Set Delay Time to 0:00

6) Set Analog Value to -0.1

7) Set Event Trigger to 3

8) Click Insert.

5 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. None

6 Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks Required Actions Optional Actions

Event One - Lower Reactor Power Using Recirculation Flow Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior The turnover directs the crew to reduce load using recirc flow to 58 Mlbm/hr core flow.

NOTE:

1 If the team announces that they will adjust gains, inform them an extra NSO will perform the adjustment. Then:

FLOOR INSTRUCTOR / SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

Tell the team you are time compressing.

Direct the SIMULATOR OPERATOR to activate trigger 1 and verify gains within limits.

Inform the team the gains are adjusted.

(NOTE: trigger 1 can be toggled OFF, then back ON as many times as necessary to adjust gains)

CRS Directs NSO to reduce load to 58 Mlbm/hr core flow using recirculation flow.

ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 03-01, Power Changes, and DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation, as directed:

Uses MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTLR, 2(3)-262-22, potentiometer to reduce flow AND control reactor power.

Notifies CRS when at 58 Mlbm/hr core flow.

BOP Monitors Panels.

Core Flow dropped to 58 Mlbm/hr, Event 1 Completion Criteria:

AND / OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Event Two - Spurious HPCI Initiation Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 2

SIMULATOR OPERATOR At the discretion of the Lead examiner, activate trigger 2, which causes a Spurious HPCI Initiation.

BOP Announces initiation of HPCI.

TEAM Determines and announces HPCI injection not needed.

BOP May place HPCI Flow Controller to MAN and adjust demand to 0 to stop injection.

CRS Directs ANSO to shutdown HPCI either per DOP 2300-04, High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) Shutdown, or its Hard Card.

BOP Shuts HPCI down as directed:

Places MO 2-2301-4 valve control switch in Pull-To-Lock.

Places MO 2-2301-14 valve control switch in Pull-To-Lock.

Places HPCI on the turning gear.

NOTE If the HPCI Trip push button is used to stop HPCI, releasing the push button allows HPCI to restart.

CRS May enter DGA 07, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition.

Notifies Shift Manager and IMD of Event.

ROLE PLAY Respond as individual notified.

QNE to evaluate effect of transient on the RX: wait 2 min, and then report RX parameters are within their limits.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

CRS References Technical Specifications and determines:

TS 3.5.1 Action G applies. Verify Isolation Condenser is OPERABLE immediately AND restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

Actions taken to shutdown HPCI, Event 2 Completion Criteria:

Tech Specs addressed, AND / OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Event Three - 2B Recirc Speed Controller Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 3

When the BOP is NOT near the 902-4 panel and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 3, which will cause 2B Recirc Speed Controller to slowly fail downscale.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

ATC Determines and announces Recirculation Flow transient occurring by observing any of the following:

o Decrease in Recirc Loop Flow as indicated on FR 2-260-7.

o Decrease in Rx Power indicated on WI 2-6040-59.

o Decrease in Core Flow and DP on DPR/FR 2-263-110.

o Decrease in Total Stm Flow on UR 2-640-27.

o Decrease in Rx Pressure on P/FR 2-640-28.

o Decrease in Total Feedwater Flow on UR 2-640-26.

o Decrease in Power Level on RR 2-750-10A/D, & RR 2-750-10B/C.

o Alarm 902-4 E-6, 2A/B RECIRC PPS SPEED MISMATCH.

CRS Enters DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirc System Flow Control Failure.

May enter DGA 07, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition.

NOTE:

The operator should lockout 2B Recirc M-G scoop tube. The operators may lockout BOTH scoop tubes although ONLY 2B Recirc M-G is changing speed.

ATC Performs the following actions per DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirc System Flow Control Failure:

Places 2B M-G Set Scoop Tube Power Lockout Reset Switch in the Lockout position.

May also place 2A M-G Set Scoop Tube Power Lockout Reset Switch in the Lockout position.

Verifies Core thermal power <2957 MWt.

Verifies Recirc Pump NOT operating in the instability region of the MG Set voltage regulator AND uncontrolled pump flow AND speed oscillations are NOT occurring.

Verifies NOT operating in the unstable region of the Power / Flow Map.

Event Three - 2B Recirc Speed Controller Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ATC Completes actions of Recirc M-G Lockout in DOP 0202-12, Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set Scoop Tube Operation.

Verifies alarm is received on annunciator 902-4 C-5 (1), 2B (2A) RECIRC M-G SCOOP TUBE PWR FAILURE.

Places 2B (& 2A) recirc pump speed control transfer stations in manual (MAN) at panel 902-4:

2B (& 2A) RECIRC PP SPEED CONTLR, 2-262-25B (& 2A)

Verify MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTLR, 2-262-22, is in manual (MAN).

At the recirc pump speed control transfer station with the locked out scoop tube, rotate the potentiometer counterclockwise to set speed demand to minimum (30%):

2B (& 2A) RECIRC PP SPEED CONTLR, 2-262-25B (& 2A)

At panel 902-4, place an Equipment Status Tag on 2B (& 2A) M-G SET SCOOP TUBE POWER LOCKOUT RESET switch stating the reason the recirc MG set scoop tube is locked out.

BOP Assist ATC as directed.

CRS Verifies actions of DOA 0202-03 and DOP 0202-12 are carried out.

May reference DOA 0500-01, Inadvertent Entry into the Unstable Region of the Power to Flow Map.

TEAM Performs DOS 0202-02. Jet Pump Operability and Degradation, step I.5 to verify Recirc Loop flow mismatch within limits.

NOTE:

The operators may lockout the scoop tube(s) before the Tech Spec limit (Jet pump loop flow mismatch 10% of rated core flow when operating at < 70% of rated core flow) is reached. If that occurs, the Examiners can pose a follow up question to the CRS on requirements if the Jet pump loop flow mismatch is exceeded.

CRS References Technical Specifications and determines:

TS 3.4.1 Action B.1 may apply. If Jet pump loop flow mismatch is exceeded, declare the recirculation loop with lower flow to be "not in operation within 2 hrs.

2A (& 2B) Recirc Scoop Tubes locked out, Event 3 Completion Criteria:

AND/OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Event Four - Swap Reactor Building Supply Fans Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior At the direction of the Lead Examiner, call as the Shift Manager and direct the Team to start 2C Reactor Building Vent Fan and secure 2B Reactor Building Vent Fan.

ROLE PLAY:

NLO stationed at Reactor Building Vent Fans: If asked, report that the Reactor Building Vent Fans operated as expected.

CRS Directs starting 2C Reactor Building Vent Fan and securing 2B Reactor Building Vent Fan per DOP 5750-02, Reactor Building Ventilation.

BOP Performs DOP 5750-02, Reactor Building Ventilation, as follows.

Places switch 2B RBX vent fan C/S in TRIP.

IMMEDIATELY places switch for 2C RBX vent fan C/S in CLOSE.

ATC Monitors panel, provides assistance as directed.

Reactor Building Vent Fans swapped, Event 4 Completion Criteria:

AND/OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Event Five - FWLC Controller Setpoint Drifts High Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 4

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 4, which causes the FWLC setpoint to drift high.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

Support Personnel: respond that you will assist as directed.

ROLE PLAY:

TEAM Determines RPV level is increasing.

CRS Enters DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control.

Directs ATC to control RPV level manually.

ATC Places FWLC in MAN and manually controls RPV level.

BOP Assists as directed.

TEAM May enter DGA 07, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition.

CRS Contacts support personnel for assistance.

When RPV water level is stabilized, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, delete the FWLC malfunction and report, as the Shift Manager, that IMD has replaced a FWLC card, and the team is directed to transfer the FWRVs to Master Auto from Master Manual.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

CRS Directs the team to transfer FWRVs to Master Auto from Master Manual, per DOP 0600-06.

TEAM Places FWRVs to Master Auto from Master Manual, per DOP 0600-06.

Match Master Control Station setpoint to actual RPV water level.

Place Master Control Station in Auto.

Adjust Master Control Station setpoint to desired RPV water level.

Place Rx Lo Flow Control Station in Auto.

RPV level stabilized, Event 5 Completion Criteria:

AND/OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Event Six - Small Steam Leak in Drywell / Manual Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 5

At the discretion of the Lead examiner, activate trigger 5, which causes a small Main Steam line leak to develop in the Drywell.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

U-3 NSO to report Drywell pressure status: Report U-3 Drywell pressure is 1.2 psig and steady.

Role Play:

TEAM Recognizes and announces that Drywell pressure is slowly rising.

ATC Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-01, Slow Leak, as directed:

Maintain Level with FWLCS (immediate action).

Monitors leakage rate, reactor water level, and Drywell pressure.

Inserts manual reactor scram prior to 1.5 psig DW pressure BOP Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak, as directed:

Notifies Shift Supervisor and Rad Protection.

Monitors for EP conditions.

Directs search for leak.

Shutdown H2 Addition.

Makes PA announcement.

Verify Crib House inlet temperature is <95oF.

Initiates Torus cooling per Hard Card.

NLO to check Drywell CAM: (wait 2 min.)

Role Play:

Report, The Drywell CAM is trending up.

NLO to search for leak Report, I am on my way out to check for leaks.

NLO to check Cribhouse inlet temperature: (wait 5 min.)

Report, Cribhouse inlet temp is 70oF.

CRS Enters and directs performance of DOA 0040-01, Slow Leak.

Set Scram contingency of 1.5 psig DW pressure.

May enter DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, and direct taking scram preparatory actions.

Prior to reaching the Drywell Pressure scram setpoint, directs a manual reactor scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

ATC /

BOP Performs scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.

Starts MSP and TGOP.

Trips H2 addition.

Event Six - Small Steam Leak in Drywell / Manual Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed:

Presses scram pushbuttons Places mode switch in shutdown Check rods inserted.

Verifies Recirc Pumps run back.

Maintains RPV/L between +25 and +35 inches or as directed by Unit Supervisor.

Inserts SRM/IRMs.

BOP Verifies Turbine and Generator tripped.

Check auxiliary power transferred to RAT.

May start maximum Torus cooling per DGP 02-03 Hardcard.

TEAM Verifies the following as time allows:

Group Isolations Automatic start of ECCS systems Automatic start of EDGs.

CRS Enters DEOP 100, RPV Control, due to high Drywell Pressure and/or low Reactor water level.

Reactor scrammed.

Event 6 Completion Criteria:

AND/OR, Or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Event Seven - Loss Of Bus 23-1 and 28 / Emergency Depressurization Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 6

At the discretion of the Lead Evaluator, activate trigger 6, which increases the steam leak in the DW enough to require initiating Drywell sprays.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

TEAM Recognizes and announces that Drywell pressure is rising rapidly.

CRS Enters DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, when Drywell pressure reaches 2 psig and performs/directs:

Verifying of Torus water level <27.5 ft.

Initiation of Torus sprays.

Monitoring of Drywell temperature (Drywell sprays may be initiated for temperature control)

Monitoring Torus Temperature.

Monitors Torus level.

EO to check operation of the EDGs after auto start: Wait 3 minutes and then report the EDGs are operating normally.

ROLE PLAY:

CRS Per DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, when Drywell pressure reaches 9 psig directs:

Verifying Recirc Pumps and Drywell Coolers tripped.

Verifies the Drywell spray initiation curve prior to the operator manually opening any of the Drywell spray valves. Then directs the Operator to initiate Drywell Sprays.

Initiation of Drywell sprays.

BOP Performs DEOP 0200-1, Primary Containment Control, actions as directed:

Monitors Drywell temperature and pressure and attempts to initiate torus sprays and drywell sprays pre Hard Card LPCI/CCSW OPERATION, as directed.

7 Verify trigger 7 automatically activates when MO 1501-27A begins to open. This trips Bus 23-1 and 28 on overcurrent. As a result, Div. I of Drywell sprays cannot be initiated.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

ATC /

BOP Initiates Drywell Sprays Notices and reports the loss of ECCS equipment powered from Bus 23-1.

Reports the loss of Bus 23-1 and 28.

Reports the B LOOP of Drywell Spray is initiated, but A LOOP could not be initiated.

US Directs Operators to investigate the loss of Bus 23-1 and 28. Directs entry into DGA-12 for Partial Loss of AC Power.

Event Seven - Loss Of Bus 23-1 and 28 / Emergency Depressurization Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Refers to DAN 902-8 F-5, 4KV Bus 23-1 Overcurrent.

As directed, Performs DGA-12, Partial or Complete Loss of AC power:

Takes actions per DGA 12 for any faulted buses.

Recognizes the loss of Bus 28.

Dispatches EO to Bus 23-1 to investigate the loss of Bus 23-1.

May enter DOA 6500-01, 4kV Breaker Trip.

If team crossties Bus 28 and 29 and Bus 29 trips, allow the team to re-energize Bus 29 from Bus 24-1.

NOTE:

EO to bus 23-1: Wait 2 min. then report The feed breaker to Bus 23-1 from Bus 23 has an overcurrent flag up on it and will not reset.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to Bus 28: Wait 2 min. then report Bus 28 has an overcurrent flag up and will not reset If contacted as EMD Foreman: Respond, I will report to Bus 23-1.

ROLE PLAY:

NOTE: EMD personnel will not report back.

DO NOT REPORT BACK ON ATTEMPTS TO OPEN DW SPRAY VALVE UNTIL after Torus bottom pressure is > 20 #.

ATC /

BOP May dispatch an Operator to attempt to manually open A LOOP of drywell spray.

EO to open A LOOP of drywell spray: Wait 2 min, then report The handwheel for MO 2-1501-28A will not engage.

ROLE PLAY:

8 After the Team has attempted to put on Drywell Sprays and at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator, activate trigger 8, which increases the Main Steam line leak enough to require the Team to Emergency Depressurize due to exceeding PSP curve.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

CRS May anticipate Emergency Depressurization and direct opening turbine bypass valves.

BOP If directed, opens turbine bypass valves.

Event Seven - Loss Of Bus 23-1 and 28 / Emergency Depressurization Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Recognizes that Emergency Depressurization per DEOP 0400-02 is necessary due to one of the below:

o Drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 281oF.

o Exceeding the PSP.

Enters DEOP 400-02, Emergency Depressurization, and directs:

If Drywell pressure >2 psig, prevention of injection from LPCI/CS pumps not needed for core cooling.

Initiation of Iso Condenser to maximum flow.

Verification of Torus level > 6ft.

Opening all ADS valves.

Verifying all relief valves open.

BOP Performs DEOP 400-02, Emergency Depressurization, as directed.

If Drywell pressure is greater than +2 psig, prevents injection from LPCI/CS pumps not needed for Core cooling per Hard Card, LPCI INJ/CC CONTROL/SHUTDOWN.

Initiates Iso Condenser to maximum flow per Hard Card, ISOLATION CONDENSER.

Verifies Torus level >6 feet.

Opens all ADS valves Verifies all relief valves open.

Emergency depressurization in progress.

Event 7 / Scenario Completion Criteria:

AND/OR Or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.

Critical Tasks (RPV-5.1)

When drywell pressure exceeds the suppression chamber spray initiation pressure or before containment pressure exceeds the Pressure Suppression Pressure, INITIATE drywell/containment sprays, while in the safe region of the drywell spray initiation limit or above the containment spray initiation pressure.

(PC-6.1)

When suppression chamber pressure cannot be maintained below the pressure suppression pressure limit, INITIATE emergency depressurization before drywell design pressure is exceeded.

REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-3 C-5(1) 2B(A) RECIRC M-G SCOOP TUBE PWR FAILURE DAN 902-3 D-12 HPCI PP FLOW LOW DAN 902-4 E-6 2A/B RECIRC PPS SPEED MISMATCH DAN 902-8 F-5 4KV BUS 23-1 OVERCURRENT DEOP 0100 RPV CONTROL DEOP 0200-01 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL DEOP 0400-02 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION DGA 07 UNPREDICTED REACTIVITY ADDITION DGA 12 PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF AC POWER DGP 02-03 REACTOR SCRAM DGP 03-01 POWER CHANGES DOA 0040-01 SLOW LEAK DOA 0202-03 REACTOR RECIRC SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL FAILURE DOA 0500-01 INADVERTENT ENTRY INTO THE UNSTABLE REGION OF THE POWER TO FLOW MAP DOA 0600-01 TRANSIENT LEVEL CONTROL DOA 6500-10 4KV CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOP 0202-03 REACTOR RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION DOP 0202-12 RECIRCULATION PUMP MOTOR GENERATOR SET SCOOP TUBE OPERATION DOP 0400-02 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER DOP 0600-06 FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE (FWRV) OPERATION DOP 2300-04 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM (HPCI) SHUTDOWN DOP 4700-03 U2/3 IA CROSS-CONNECT OPERATION DOP 5750-02 REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION DOS 0202-02 JET PUMP OPERABILITY AND DEGRADATION TS 3.5.1 ECCS OPERATING TS 3.4.1 RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING

ILT-N-2 Quantitative Attributes 6

Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

CAEP Files

1. ILT-N-2.cae

1. For ILT Class 10-1 NRC Exam

1. Written by DREFV

1. Rev 00

1. Date 09/10

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Sets APRM Master Gain pot to 1.0 irf niagain 1.0

1. EVENT TRIGGERS

1. Event Trigger 1 sets gain for all 6 APRMs.

trgset 1 "0" trg 1 "irf niagainf true"

1. Event Trigger 2 Inserts a spurious HPCI initiation.

trgset 2 "0"l2 imf hpinit (2)l2

1. Event Trigger 3 Drifts the 2B Recirc PP speed controller bias to cause speed to drop.

trgset 3 "0"l2 ior rrmbbias (3) -0.1 4:00l2

1. Event Trigger 4 Drifts the FWLCS setpoint.

trgset 4 "0"l4 irf rllmls (4) 40.0 5:00l4

1. Event Trigger 5 Inserts a steam leak upstream of the restrictors.

trgset 5 "0"l4 imf i21 (5) 0.002 5:00 0.0025l4

1. Event Trigger 6 Increases DW MSL leak to 0.4%.

trgset 6 "0"l6 trg 6 "mmf i21 0.4"l6

1. Event Trigger 7 Activates when DW Spray valve MO 1501-27A starts to open.

1. Trips Bus 23-1 and Bus 28 on overcurrent.

trgset 7 "lpv27a.gt. 0.01"l6 imf k23 (7)l6 imf k40 (7)l8

1. Event Trigger 8 Increases the steam leak from 2.0% to 6.0% over 5 minutes.

trgset 8 "0"l8 trg 8 "mmf i21 6.0 5:00 2.0"l8

1. END

Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 730 MWe, Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.881 Action limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at 913 MWe Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.819 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements None LCO Started:

LCO Expires:

TS Cause:

Unit 1 Plant Status Today U1 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Transfer House has grating removed. Currently roped off with pump installed to pump to U1 Oil Seperator Pit as required. Outside operator monitor and pump as necessary.

Today Chem Cleaning ventilation status:

HV-1A/EF-1A are secured due to HV-1A inlet and outlet dampers being shut with fan on, IR# 913157, WO 1239746.

HV-1B/EF-1B are secured due to HV-1B throwing its belts. WO 1156150.

HVAC -1 ON.

HV-2 running.

Switchyard Status Today 138 KV Bus 1 Feed To TR 22 Combi Units has low oil in the 'C' phase, ComEd WO #276162 Today HVO: Exercise CAUTION while in the 345 kV Yard due to excavation being performed in the area.

Marv Evans reports holes being dug near manual switch disconnects 345kV Blue Bus. Plywood will be installed over the holes if access is needed, but be aware there are holes under the plywood.

SSC called from the 345Kv yard reporting that the cable trough covers are removed to prep for upcoming work. Be careful.

Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities

• • • • Shift 1 Activities ****

• • • • Shift 2 Activities ****

Load was dropped last shift for the TSO. The TSO requests load dropped at beginning of shift. Drop power to 58 Mlbm/hr core flow using recirc flow. Do not secure additional RFPs or Condensate/booster pumps. Load is expected to be picked up early next shift.

When directed by the Shift Manager, swap Reactor Building Supply Fans to support Maintenance. Start 2C and secure 2B Reactor Building Supply Fans.

• • • • Shift 3 Activities ****

Today

• • • • Unit 2 Procedures In-Progress **** Do Not Delete ****

DGP 03-01, Power Changes.

Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-3 SHUTDOWN U2 EDG FOLLOWING SURVEILLANCE TESTING SPURIOUS ERV OPENING INDICATED FLOW TO CRD FLOW CONTROLLER FAILS HIGH B MED RANGE LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILS LOW WITH A PARTIAL HALF SCRAM CRD PUMP TRIP LOSS OF SERVICE WATER / MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM LOSS OF RPV WATER LEVEL INDICATION / RPV FLOODING Rev. 00 09/10 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Station: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-3 Class ID:

Evaluators Operators

/ crew position 10-01 (2011-301)

/ ATC

/ BOP Initial Conditions:

/ CRS Initial Power = 5%

Turnover:

Shutdown the U2 EDG per DOS 6600-01 Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

NONE N

BOP EDG - Shutdown the U2 EDG Following Surveillance Testing.

2 ADS3CBN ADS3CSD C

BOP ERV - Spurious ERV Opening. T 3

RDFCFHI C

ATC CRD - Indicated Flow to CRD Flow Controller Fails High.

4 B15 NVM100BP I

ATC NBI - B Med Range Level Inst Fails Low with Partial Half Scram. T 5

RDPPATRP C

ATC CRD - CRD Pump 2A Trip.

6 Q31 M

TEAM Manual Scram - Loss of all Service Water.

7 AT5 NVM100BP NVML29AP NVML29BP NVML112P M

TEAM FLOODING - Loss of RPV Level Indication Due to Loss of Instrument Power And Transmitter Failures

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec

Scenario Objective Evaluate the crews ability to perform during a loss of RPV water level instrumentation.

Scenario Summary

1. Unit is at 5% power.

2. Startup in progress. On hold for Steam Tunnel Entry.

3. The following equipment is OOS:

a. None

4. LCOs:

a. TS 3.8.1 for EDG 2 surveillance.

Scenario Sequence The Team shuts down the U2 EDG following surveillance completion.

An ERV spuriously opens due to an electrical failure. Pulling its fuses closes the ERV.

The indicated flow to the CRD Flow Controller fails high. This causes the controller demand to the CRD FCV to fail low. If the team does not recognize the failure quickly and restore CRD cooling flow, the ROD DRVE HI TEMP alarm comes up. The Team takes manual control of the CRD Flow Controller to restore system parameters to normal.

Medium Range B RPV level instrument fails low. A partial half scram occurs requiring the Team to insert a manual half scram on the B RPS channel. The SRO will reference Tech Specs for failed level instrument and partial half scram.

2A CRD pump begins to degrade as evidenced by changing CRD system parameters and an accumulator charging water low pressure alarm. When sent to check, the NLO reports that the 2A CRD pump is making a loud grinding noise. The NSO will swap CRD pumps, placing 2B CRD pump in service. If the operators do not swap CRD pumps in a timely manner, 2A CRD pump eventually trips.

A large leak occurs downstream of the Service Water strainers. The Team performs a manual Reactor scram due to loss of cooling to critical plant equipment.

After the Team has the plant stabilized, RPV level indication will fail. The following failures are simulated:

ATS feed from MCC 29-1 trips causing loss of MR A and FZ B.

Common sensing leg leak for the 2202-5 instrument rack (MR B, NR A & WR) causing them to ramp downscale.

Bailey System NR B circuit card fails causing it to ramp upscale.

The Team will perform RPV flooding. LPCI injections valves will fail to open from the control room. The Team sends an operator to open one of them locally.

The crew shuts down the U2 EDG following surveillance testing.

Event One - Shutdown U2 EDG Following Surveillance Testing Malfunctions required: 0 None.

Success Path:

Performs DOS 6600-01, Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests An ERV spuriously opens.

Event Two - Spurious ERV Opening Malfunctions Required: 1 (ERV fails open)

Success Path:

Performs DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, and pulls the ERVs control power fuses.

Indicated flow to the CRD Flow Controller fails high. This causes the controller demand to the CRD FCV to fail low.

Event Three - Indicated Flow to CRD Flow Controller Fails High Malfunctions required: 1 (Indicated flow to the CRD Flow Controller fails high)

Success Path:

The crew takes manual control of the CRD Flow Controller.

Event Four - B Med Range Level Instrument Fails Low with a Partial Half Scram B Medium Range Level Instrument fails low and a partial half scram occurs.

Malfunctions required: 2 (Failure of Medium Range B level Instrument)

(Partial Half Scram on the B channel)

Success Path:

Manually inserts a B RPS channel half scram.

References the Tech Specs for an inoperable level instrument and the partial half scram.

2A CRD pump begins to degrade as evidenced by changing CRD system parameters and an accumulator charging water low pressure alarm. When sent to check, the NLO reports that the 2A CRD pump is making a loud grinding noise. The NSO will swap CRD pumps, placing 2B CRD pump in service. If the operators do not swap CRD pumps in a timely manner, 2A CRD pump eventually trips.

Event Five - Loss of CRD Pump Malfunctions required: 1 CRD pump binding (Trip if NSO does not swap pumps in a timely manner)

Success Path:

NSO swaps running CRD pumps.

A large leak occurs at the discharge of the Service Water strainers.

Event Six - Loss of Service Water / Manual Reactor Scram Malfunctions required: 1 (Service Water Leak)

Success Path:

Manually scram the Reactor.

The Team recognizes and responds to loss of RPV level indication. LPCI injections valves fail to open from the control room.

Event Seven - Loss of RPV Water Level Indication / RPV Flooding Malfunctions required: 2 Failure Of RPV Level Indication LPCI injection valves fail to open Success Path:

The Team performs RPV Flooding.

The Team sends an operator to locally open the LPCI injection valves.

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1

If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-JA-150-08, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

a. Inform the crew that the QNE (Floor Instructor) is present in the Control Room.

b. Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.

c. Provide the crew with a copy of applicable procedure(s) marked up and completed through the appropriate steps:

1) DGP 01-01, Unit Startup, marked up for Reactor at 5% power.

2) DOP 0400-01, Reactor Manual Control System Operation.

3) DOP 0400-02, Rod Worth Minimizer.

4) DOP 5600-06, Unit 2 Turbine Startup.

5) DOS 6600-01, Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests (Ready to shutdown U2 EDG) 2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. Initialize simulator in an IC with ~5% power (IC 149 on the jump drive can be used) and perform the following before continuing below:

1) Verify control rod sequence XI.1.0 with step 21 withdrawn through control rod E-09.

2) Verify Reactor power ~5%.

3) Verify TR 86 LTC in MANUAL.

b. Run the initial setup CAEP file: ILT-N-3.cae

c. Verify Torus to Drywell dP within limits (vent Torus as needed).

d. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed, to maintain DP within limits.

e. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.

f.

Advance the chart recorders.

3 Verify all the following completed (completed in snapped IC 149 setup):

a. Verify CRD drive water pressure ~260 psid.

b. Verify 2A CRD pump running.

c. Start and load U2 EDG per DOS 6600-01:

1) At the instructor station, set the U2 EDG droop to 55. (irf t02 true)

2) At the instructor station, acknowledge the local U2 EDG annunciator panel. (irf t20 acknowledge)

3) Reset the U2 EDG Trouble alarm on the 902-8 panel.

4) Place the U2 EDG control switch to START.

5) Turn the Synchroscope for the U2 EDG output breaker ON.

6) Adjust the U2 EDG voltage and frequency for synchronization.

7) Close the U2 EDG output breaker.

8) Adjust the U2 EDG load and frequency to the values directed by DOS 6600-01.

9) Turn the Synchroscope for the U2 EDG output breaker OFF.

4 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. None 5

Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks Time Critical Tasks PRA Key Operator Actions Required Actions Optional Actions

Event One - Shutdown U2 EDG Following Surveillance Testing Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 2

3 NLO to set U2 EDG droop to 5: Wait 1 min, activate trigger 2 which sets the droop to 5 and forces up alarm 902-8 A-7, U2 Diesel Gen Trouble.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

Verify trigger 3 activates automatically when alarm 902-8 A-7 comes in. This returns the alarm to normal after 10 seconds.

Then report The U2 EDG droop is set to 5.

NLO to check the lubrication oil level with the dipstick: wait 1 min, and then report the U2 EDG oil level is midway between the FULL and LOW marks.

Role Play:

For other operator direction, respond as needed.

CRS Directs the BOP to Shutdown U2 EDG per DOS 6600-01, Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests.

BOP Performs DOS 6600-01, Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests.

Reduces the D/G load to less than 100 kW using the GOVERNOR control switch.

Opens the circuit breaker from the D/G 2 to 4 kV Bus 24-1 and records time.

Directs the NLO at the D/G governor to set the droop setting to 5 and reset the local annunciator.

Resets annunciator 902-8 A-7, U2 DIESEL GEN TROUBLE.

Adjusts D/G speed to 60 Hz with the GOVERNOR control switch.

Adjusts D/G voltage to 4160 volts with the VOLTAGE REG control switch.

Moves the D/G control switch to the STOP position momentarily, then moves the switch to the AUTO position and records time.

When the NSO moves the D/G control switch to the AUTO position, notify him that as the U3 ANSO, you have been directed to complete the surveillance.

Floor Instructor Role Play:

When the U2 D/G stops, acknowledge, announce and reset expected alarms:

902-7 G-8, U2 Diesel Gen Clg Wtr PP Trip/Lockout.

902-8 A-7, U2 Diesel Gen Trouble.

U2 EDG shutdown, (Or in the cooldown period Event 1 Completion Criteria:

AND/OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Event Two - Spurious ERV Opening.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 4

5 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 4, which causes E ERV to spuriously open due to an electrical failure.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

As the NLO sent to pull control power fuses for the E ERV (wait 3 min) activate trigger 5, which removes control power fuses for the E ERV, then call the control room on the phone and report: I have pulled the E ERV fuses.

As the QNE called to evaluate core parameters (wait 2 min) then report: core parameters are within limits.

BOP Determines/announces that E ERV is open. Performs DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, immediate actions:

Places the E ERV control switch to OFF.

ATC Verifies FWLCS has stabilized level.

CRS Enters DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, and directs actions.

BOP Determines that E ERV is still open and performs subsequent actions of DOA 0250-01:

Cycles E ERV control switch to MAN and OFF twice.

Cycles the ADS INHIBIT switch from NORMAL to INHIBIT to NORMAL several times.

Directs E ERV control power fuses pulled.

If torus temp is greater than circulating water inlet temperature, starts torus cooling as directed.

If > 95° and DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, entry is required.

Monitors Turbine Bypass Valve Operation.

May check hydrogen addition operation.

May monitor torus temp per DOS 1600-20, Suppression Pool Temp Monitoring.

Resets the acoustic monitor.

CRS May direct scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

May enter DEOP 200-01, Primary Containment Control, for high Torus level.

If Torus temperature reaches 95°F, then enters DEOP 200-1, Primary Containment Control, and performs/directs:

Monitoring of PC/P Initiation of torus cooling. (May already be started per DOA 0250-01)

Monitoring of Torus level.

Verifying initiation of drywell and torus H2/O2 monitors.

ATC Performs scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.

o Scram preparatory conditions already exist.

BOP Determines/announces that E ERV closed when fuses pulled.

Event Two - Spurious ERV Opening.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Declares E ERV inoperable.

Determines following Technical Specifications apply:

3.4.3, Safety and Relief Valves, Condition A.1: Restore the relief valve to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition H.1: Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

3.6.1.8, Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker, SR 3.6.1.8.2:

Perform a functional test of each required vacuum breaker within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

CRS Directs performance of Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker testing.

TEAM May enter and perform DGA 7, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition The failed ERV is closed, Event 2 Completion Criteria:

Technical Specification determination completed, AND/OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Event Three - Indicated Flow to CRD Flow Controller Fails High Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 6

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 6, which causes the indicated flow to the CRD Flow Controller to fail high. This causes the controller demand to the CRD FCV to fail low.

Simulator Operator:

NOTE: If the team does not recognize the failure quickly and restore CRD cooling flow, the ROD DRIVE HI TEMP alarm comes up after ~ 5 min.

7 8

If CRD Temperature variable rdgtemp(21) reaches 250.0 deg. F, verify the following automatic triggers:

Simulator Operator:

Trigger 7: automatically activates when variable rdgtemp(21) is >250.0 deg. F.

Forces up alarm 902-5 F-3, ROD DRIVE HI TEMP.

Trigger 8: automatically activates alarm 902-5 F-3 is up and variable rdgtemp(21) is

<245.0 deg. F. Returns alarm 902-5 F-3, ROD DRIVE HI TEMP, TO NORMAL.

ATC From panel monitoring or alarm 902-5 F-3, ROD DRIVE HI TEMP, notices and announces loss of CRD system flow.

Diagnoses failure of the CRD Flow Controller.

Performs DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, actions as directed by the CRS.

Restores CRD system flows and pressures to normal.

Places CRD Flow Controller in manual and adjusting as needed.

CRS Directs entering and performing actions of DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure.

Notifies Shift Manager and IMD of CRD Flow Controller failure.

NLO to check CRD FCV operation: (wait 2 min)

Role Play; Report, the CRD FCV appears to be operating normally and is at position is:

(Use position displayed on Instructor Station drawing RD2; report as percent).

NLO to check CRD system flow locally (FI 2-302-56); (wait 1 min)

Report CRD system flow indicates >100 gpm (pegged high).

NLO to check drive water flow locally (FI 2-302-64): (wait 1 min)

Report, CRD drive water flow indicates (same as control room meter).

NLO to check cooling water flow locally (FI 2-302-65): (wait 1 min)

Report, CRD cooling water flow indicates (same as control room meter).

NLO to check CRD pumps locally: (wait 1 min)

Report, CRD Pumps appear to be operating normally.

Respond as groups notified.

BOP Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event Three - Indicated Flow to CRD Flow Controller Fails High Event 3 Completion Criteria Team has taken manual control of the CRD Flow Controller, AND/OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Event Four - B Med Range Level Instrument Fails Low with a Partial Half Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 9

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 9, which fails B medium range downscale and inserts B RPS partial half scram.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

ATC Notices and reports the B Medium Range level instrument trending down.

Announces:

The partial half scram condition on the B RPS channel.

Scram Solenoid Group lights B2 and B3 did NOT extinguish.

Refers to DOA 0500-02, Partial 1/2 or Full Scram Actuation. (May insert the manual half scram as an immediate action of DOA 0500-02 then refer to the procedure).

Depresses RPS Channel B Manual Scram pushbutton.

Acknowledges appropriate annunciators.

As the EO sent to the ATS Panel (wait 2 min AND the 902-4 G-20 alarm is up), then report: The B medium range level instrument MTU LIS 2-263-140B is reading full downscale and its gross failure light is lit.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

As the EO sent to the MCC 28-1 circuit 15 and/or 125vdc Bus 2A-1 Dist Panel, circuit 27 (wait 3 min), then report: The breaker is NOT tripped and looks normal.

IF asked: The Yarway LI-2(3)-263-59A on the 2202-5 rack is indicating 30 inches and steady.

ATC /

BOP Refers to DAN 902-4 G-20:

Dispatches an operator to inspect the Div 1 ATS panel 2202-73A Notifies the Unit Supervisor of inspection results.

CRS Announces entry into DOA 0500-02, Partial 1/2 or Full Scram Actuation and performs/directs:

Directs NSO to insert manual scram on RPS Channel A.

May refer to DOP 0010-10, Unit 2(3) Technical Specification Instrumentation Operability Manual.

CRS References Technical Specifications and determines:

TS 3.3.1.1 Action A1 or A2 apply.

TS 3.3.3.1 Action A1. Restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

TS 3.3.6.1 Condition A1. Place channel in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

TS 3.3.6.2 Condition A1. Place channel in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Event Four - B Med Range Level Instrument Fails Low with a Partial Half Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Half Scram inserted, and Event 4 Completion Criteria:

Appropriate Tech Specs referenced, AND/OR At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Event Five - Loss of CRD Pump Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 10 11 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 10. This will cause a simulated binding of the 2A CRD pump over a nine minute period, and finally trip the pump on overcurrent if amps get too high and the crew has not swapped the pump yet.

Simulator Operator:

Verify trigger 11 automatically activates when the 2A CRD pump breaker opens. This stops the pump binding simulation.

As the NLO, if asked, wait 2 min. and then report: The 2A CRD pump is making a loud metallic grinding noise, I cannot see any oil in the pump, smoke is starting to come from the pump, and it is very hot.

Role Play:

NSO may follow DOP 0300-01 and have the NLO vent the pump. Wait 1 min, then report:

2B CRD pump has been vented.

ATC Announces alarm 902-5 F-2, ACCUMULATOR CHARGING WTR PRESS LO, and /

or degrading CRD system parameters.

Carries out actions of DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure:

Stops any rod motion or power changes.

Starts 2B CRD pump.

Secures 2A CRD pump.

Verifies normal CRD system pressures and flow.

Identifies and reports increasing CRD pump amps.

As the NLO, if asked, report: 2B CRD pump is operating normally.

Role Play:

CRS Enters DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, due to failure of 2A CRD pump.

TEAM May reference/perform DOP 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Start Up and Operation, for swap of CRD pumps.

BOP Monitors panels and assists as directed.

If the Team swaps CRD pumps before the 2A CRD pump trips, the following actions do NOT apply:

Note:

ATC Announces 2A CRD pump trip.

Per immediate action of DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, starts the standby CRD pump.

CRS Enters DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip, due to trip of 2A CRD pump.

Event Five - Loss of CRD Pump Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 2B CRD pump has been started and the immediate actions of DOA 300-01 are complete, Event 5 Completion Criteria:

AND / OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Event Six - Loss of Service Water / Manual Reactor Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 12 Simulator Operator At the discretion of the Lead Evaluator, activate trigger 12. This inserts a large leak on the discharge side of the Service Water strainers. The leak results in a loss of Service Water sufficient enough to cause loss of plant equipment.

BOP Announces following alarms as they come up:

923-1 G-4, U2/3 DIESEL FIRE PP RUNNING.

923-1 D-3, U2/3 SERV WTR HDR PRESS LO.

Many other alarms will come in as equipment loses cooling.

CRS Enters DOA 3900-01, Loss of Cooling by Service Water System.

Notifies Shift Manager and EMD.

BOP Performs DOA 3900-01, LOSS OF COOLING BY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM May start available Service Water Pumps.

Directs an EO to the Cribhouse to check the Service Water System.

May direct NLO to isolate the leak.

Role Play EO to check Service Water System (wait 2 min.):

Report: "There is a very large leak downstream of the Service Water Strainers".

EO to isolate the Service Water System leak:

Report: "The leak cannot be isolated".

CRS Due to loss of cooling to equipment, directs a manual reactor scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

ATC Performs a manual reactor scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram:

Depresses BOTH Scram buttons.

Places RX MODE SW in SHUTDOWN.

Inserts SRMs.

Controls reactor water level +25 to +35 inches or as directed by the Unit Supervisor.

CRS Enters DEOP 0100, RPV Control, due to RPV low level and directs:

Verifying Isolations and Actuations.

Maintaining RPV level +8 to +48 inches.

Maintaining RPV Pressure <1060 psig.

CRS Begins to assess the affect the loss of Service Water has on stabilizing the plant.

Event Six - Loss of Service Water / Manual Reactor Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Manual Scram performed, Event 6 Completion Criteria:

Team addresses affect on plant of loss of Service Water, AND / OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Event Seven - Loss of RPV Level Indication / RPV Flooding Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 13 After the team has stabilized the unit following the reactor scram, and at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator, activate trigger 13, which:

Simulator Operator:

Simulates a trip of the MCC 29-1 supply to ATS Panel 2202-73B which causes loss of MR A and FZ B RPV level instruments.

After 2 min, fails the remaining RPV level instruments in a way that simulates a leak in the common sensing leg for the 2202-5 instrument rack (MR B, NR A & WR) causing them to ramp downscale. Bailey System NR B circuit card fails causing it to ramp upscale.

NLO to open/close the CRD 2-0301-25 valve: On Instructor Station drawing RD2, change the CRD 2-0301-25 valve position to the requested position and then report its position.

Simulator Operator / Role Play:

When dispatched to the ATS Panel, wait a few minutes, and then report that all instruments in the top row of panel 2202-73B are downscale and no indicating lights on the top row are lit. All other indications are normal.

Role Play:

NLO sent to MCC 29-1. Wait two minutes then report from MCC 29-1 that the breaker for circuit 4 is tripped.

If sent to 125 VDC Main Bus Dist. Panel 2B-1 to check breaker 17, report that it is closed.

When/if directed to close the ATS Panel supply breaker, wait ~20 seconds, then report that you attempted to reclose the breaker and it immediately tripped again.

BOP Reports annunciator 902-4 H-20, ATS Div 2 2202-73B Trouble, in alarm and references DAN.

Sends an NLO to inspect ATS panel 2202-73B.

May direct an NLO to MCC 29-1 to check the feed breaker (circuit 4) to ATS.

May direct the closure of the ATS Panel power supply breaker.

TEAM Begins to determine the equipment affected by loss of the ATS feed.

CRS May refer to DOP 6800-05, Power Restoration to Analog Trip System Feeds to check for restoration requirements.

TEAM Determines that RPV level indications are diverging.

TEAM May send operators to local instrument panels.

NLO to Reactor Bldg to get local RPV level indication: wait 2 min, and then report there is steam around all the instrument racks and I am unable to get local RPV level readings.

Role Play:

Event Seven - Loss of RPV Level Indication / RPV Flooding Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Based on diverging RPV level indication, exits DEOP 0100 and enters DEOP 0400-01, RPV Flooding, and performs / directs:

Verifying Torus level above 6 feet.

Opening all 5 ADSVs.

Isolating the following steam lines:

MSIVs.

Main Steam line drains.

IC.

HPCI.

Flooding the RPV to the Main Steam lines.

Directs defeating the RFP trips.

Keeping the RPV flooded to the Main Steam lines with injection flow as low as possible.

14 Operator to defeat RFP trips: wait 2 min, activate Trigger 14 and then report that the RFP trips are defeated Simulator Operator / Role Play:

ATC /

BOP Performs DEOP 0400-01, RPV Flooding, as directed:

Verifies Torus level above 6 feet.

Opens all 5 ADSVs (only 4 open, since fuses pulled for one).

Isolates the following steam lines:

MSIVs.

Main Steam line drains.

IC.

HPCI.

Floods the RPV to the Main Steam lines.

Keeps the RPV flooded to the Main Steam lines with injection flow as low as possible.

ATC /

BOP Slows down RPV injection once ERV tailpipe temperatures drop below saturation and pressure is steady.

CRS Requests IMD to restore RPV level instruments.

RPV has been flooded Event 7 / Scenario Completion Criteria:

AND / OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Critical Tasks (RPV 2.1)

When RPV water level cannot be determined, INITIATE emergency depressurization.

(RPV 2.2)

When reactor water level cannot be determined, INJECT into the RPV to flood up to the Main Steam Lines.

REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-4 G-20 ATS DIV 1 2202-73A TROUBLE DAN 902-5 F-2 ACCUMULATOR CHARGING WTR PRESS LO DAN 902-5 F-3 ROD DRIVE HI TEMP DAN 902-8 A-7 U2 DIESEL GEN TROUBLE DAN 923-1 D-3 U2/3 SERV WTR HDR PRESS LO DAN 923-1 G-4 U2/3 DIESEL FIRE PP RUNNING DEOP 0100 RPV CONTROL DEOP 0400-01 RPV FLOODING DEOP 0500-02 BYPASSING INTERLOCKS AND ISOLATIONS DGP 01-01 UNIT STARTUP DGP 02-03 REACTOR SCRAM DOA 0250-01 RELIEF VALVE FAILURE DOA 0300-01 CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM FAILURE DOA 0500-02 PARTIAL 1/2 OR FULL SCRAM ACTUATION DOA 3900-01 LOSS OF COOLING BY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DOA 6500-10 4KV CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOP 0010-10 UNIT 2(3) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY MANUAL DOP 0300-01 CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM START UP AND OPERATION DOP 6800-05 POWER RESTORATION TO ANALOG TRIP SYSTEM FEEDS DOS 6600-01 DIESEL GENERATOR SURVEILLANCE TESTS TS 3.3.1.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION TS 3.3.3.1 POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION TS 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TS 3.3.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TS 3.4.3 SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES TS 3.5.1 ECCS OPERATINGTS 3.6.1.6LOW SET RELIEF VALVES TS 3.6.1.8.2 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS

ILT-N-3 Quantitative Attributes 8

Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

CAEP File(s):

1. ILT-N-3.cae

1. For ILT Class 10-1 NRC Exam

1. Written by DREFV

1. Rev 00

1. Date 09/10

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Sets APRM Master Gain pot to 1.0l4 irf niagain 1.0

1. Inserts CH B RPS partial half scram.

imf b15

1. IC 149 was snapped with 2/3 DFP remote for locally stopping it TRUE.

1. This puts it back to desired state of FALSE.

irf w14 false

1. IC 149 was snapped with IRM 11/APRM 1 select switch override to IRM 11 inserted.

1. This deletes it.

dor nidichsl1

1. EVENT TRIGGERS

1. Event Trigger 1 sets gain for all 6 APRMs to 1.0l2 trgset 1 "0"l2 trg 1 "irf niagainf true"l2

1. Event Trigger 2 Sets U2 EDG droop to 5 and forces up alarm 902-8 A-7, U2 Diesel Gen Trouble.

trgset 2 "0"l2 irf t02 (2) falsel2 imf ser1589 (2) onl2

1. Event Trigger 3 clears alarm 902-8 A-7.

trgset 3 "sezpoint(1589)"l4 trg 3 "imf ser1589 (0 10) normal"l4

1. Event trigger 4 causes the E ERV setpoint to drift to fail it open.

1. E ERV bind malfunction is set to 25%

Trgset 4 "0"l4 imf ads3esd (4) 75.0l4 imf ads3ebn (4) 25.0l4

1. Event Trigger 5 Deletes e ERV binding malfunction so valve will close and removes fuses for the E ERV.

Trgset 5 "0"l6 trg 5 "dmf ads3ebn"l6 irf adsrfe (5) pulledl6

1. Event Trigger 6 inserts a failure high of the indicated flow to the CRD flow controller.

1. Sets one of the CRD's enthalpy higher, so alarm 902-5 F-3 comes up sooner.

trgset 6 "0"l6 imf rdfcfhi (6)l8 trg 6 "set rdhmech(21) = 190.0"l8

1. Event trigger 7 Activates when CRD temp high is reached.

1. Forces alarm 902-5 F-3 up.

trgset 7 "rdgtemp(21).gt. 250.0"l8 imf ser0973 (7) onl8

1. Event trigger 8 Returns alarm 902-5 F-3 to normal.

trgset 8 "sezpoint(973).and. (rdgtemp(21).lt. 245.0)"l10 trg 8 "imf ser0973 normal"l10

1. Event Trigger 9 fails B medium range downscale.

trgset 9 "0"l10 imf nvm100bp (9) -120.0 4:00l10

1. Event Trigger 10 ramps 2A CRD PP speed lower over 9:00 min.

1. This simulates binding of the pump and will result in the pump tripping on overcurrent.

trgset 10 "0"l12 trg 10 "ramp rdnpump(1) 0.95 0.87 9:00"l12 imf rdppatrp (10 8:58)l12

1. Trigger 11 Stops the 2A CRD PP speed ramp when the pump breaker opens.

trgset 11 "et_array(10).and. (.not. rdrpump(1))"l12 trg 11 "ramp rdnpump(1) 0.87 0.10 2"l12

1. Event Trigger 12 inserts a Service Water strainer leak.

trgset 12 "0"l14 imf q31 (12) 100.0 5:00l14

1. Event Trigger 13 Blows the fuse for the MCC 29-1 feed to ATS panel 2202-73B.

1. This causes a loss of RPV MR A and FZ B.

1. After 2 min, fails RPV MR B level instrument downscale on 5 min. ramp.

1. After 2 min, fails RPV NR A level instrument to downscale on 5 min. ramp.

1. After 2 min, fails RPV NR B level instrument to upscale on 5 min. ramp.

1. After 2 min, fails RPV Wide Range level instrument to downscale on 5 min. ramp.

trgset 13 "0"l14 imf at5 (13)l14 imf nvml57ap (13 2:00) -120.0 5:00l14 imf nvml23ap (13 2:00) -120.0 5:00l16 imf nvml23cp (13 2:00) -120.0 5:00l16 imf nvml29ap (13 2:00) -75.0 5:00l16 imf nvml29bp (13 2:00) 75.0 5:00l16 imf nvml112p (13 2:00) -400.0 5:00l18

1. Event Trigger 14 bypasses the RFP high level trip.

trgset 14 "0"l18 irf fwknife (14) openl18

1. END

Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is in Mode 2 at 5% power Leading Thermal Limit: NA Action limit: NA Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at 913 MWe Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.819 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements U2 EDG LCO Started: 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ago LCO Expires: In 7 days TS 3.8.1 Cause: Monthly Surveillance Unit 1 Plant Status Today U1 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Transfer House has grating removed. Currently roped off with pump installed to pump to U1 Oil Seperator Pit as required. Outside operator monitor and pump as necessary.

Today Chem Cleaning ventilation status:

HV-1A/EF-1A are secured due to HV-1A inlet and outlet dampers being shut with fan on, IR# 913157, WO 1239746.

HV-1B/EF-1B are secured due to HV-1B throwing its belts. WO 1156150.

HVAC -1 ON.

HV-2 running.

Switchyard Status Today TSO notified of oil leaks on 345 Kv BT 2-3 CB (IR 810135) ComEd WO 6396128 Today 138 KV Bus 1 Feed To TR 22 Combi Units has low oil in the 'C' phase, ComEd WO #276162 Today HVO: Exercise CAUTION while in the 345 kV Yard due to excavation being performed in the area.

Marv Evans reports holes being dug near manual switch disconnects 345kV Blue Bus. Plywood will be installed over the holes if access is needed, but be aware there are holes under the plywood.

SSC called from the 345Kv yard reporting that the cable trough covers are removed to prep for upcoming work. Be careful.

Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities

• • • • Shift 1 Activities ****

• • • • Shift 2 Activities ****

Startup in progress. On hold for Steam Tunnel inspection.

After Steam Tunnel Inspection, and when directed by the Shift Manager, resume the startup per DGP 01-01.

U2 EDG loaded run is complete, shutdown U2 EDG immediately following shift change.

• • • • Shift 3 Activities ****

Today

• • • • Unit 2 Procedures In-Progress **** Do Not Delete ****

DGP 01-01

DOS 6600-01