ML120100560

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Regulatory Conference Supporting Documentation for Apparent Violations EA-11-241 and EA-11-243, Attachment 3, Root Cause Evaluation-Plant Trip During Panel ED-11-2 Maintenance, Rev 2, Part 7.3 of 7
ML120100560
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/05/2012
From:
Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML1200100495 List:
References
EA-11-241, EA-11-243, PNP 2012-06 CR-PLP-2011-4822
Download: ML120100560 (49)
v • d • e


Text

Entergy PSA EA - PSA-SDP - D11-2-11-07 Rev. 1 En g ineeri ng O Enter Analysis Attachment 10 - Page 4 of 5 Table 4 . 0-2: Pipe-Flo Model Flow Elements Based on T-202 Data Loss Coefficient "CV-0749" Inserted in Pipeline 210 Loss Coefficient "CV-0727" Inserted in Pipeline 180 Differential Pressure (psid) Equivalent K Differential Pressure (psid) Equivalent K 83.7 87.4 68.9 75.1 This approach allows the model to calculate the head loss through the open flow control valve component for flow rates other than those measured in the test.

4.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8C Flow Control Valve Modeling Flow rate data was recorded from the P-8C AFW pump to both E-50A and E-50B for the duration of the event as shown in Table 2.3-1. To model these flow rates, Pipe-Flo flow control valves were inserted in the model at node 34 (CV-0737A) and node 29 (CV-0736A). The Pipe-Flo flow control valves establish a differential pressure in the model pipeline to match the user entered flow rate.

5.0 CONCLUSION

Using the inputs and boundary conditions presented above, four Pipe-Flo model cases were developed.

Each case represents a time segment from event initiation to the estimated time steam to the P-8B turbine was isolated. Boundary conditions and Pipe-Flo analysis results are presented in Table 5.0-1. The Pipe-Flo calculated values are for flow rates from P-8B and total flow to each steam generator.

Table 5 . 0-1: AFW System Flow Rates Following D11-2 Failure Event T-2 P-8B P-8B P-8C P-8C Total Total T-2 (system) E-50A E-50B Flow Flow Flow Flow Flow Flow Time Pressure Pressure Pressure Rate to Rate to Rate to Temp. Rate to Rate to Rate to (psig) (psig) (psig) E-50A E-50B E-50A E-50B E-50A E-50B (gpm) (gpm) (gpm) (gpm) (gpm) (gprn) 15:06- 9 9 87 15:20 948.3 945 178.7 187.2 163.4 162.5 342.1 349.7 15:21- 9 9 87 923.4 955.7 254.3 113.5 164.8 159.8 419.1 273.3 15:29 15:30- 9 9 87 15:39 896.9 969.4 342.7 23.4 152.1 161.7 494.8 185.1 15:40- 9 9 87 859.9 958.2 379.4 0 0 163.4 379.4 163.4 16:03

A Entergy PSA EA -PSA-SDP - D11 11-07 Rev. 1 En g in ee ri ng Enter Analysis Attachment 10 - Page 5 of 5

6.0 REFERENCES

[1] EA-PSA-PIPEFLO-AFW-08-06 Rev. 0, "Pipe-Flo Professional 2007a Hydraulic Model of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and Software Quality Assurance Documentation".

[2] M-398 Sh. 20, "Level Setting Diagram Condensate Storage Tank T-2".

[3] Test Report , Palisades Special Test T-202, "Auxiliary Feedwater P-8A and P-8C System Flow Characteristics ", Test Performed on December 2, 1986, report dated 3/5/87 ( 7613/2206).

[4] EA-EC82841-02, Revision 0, "Auxiliary Feedwater System Capacity".

7.0 APPENDICES Att. 10 - App. A. pdf

[A] Pipe-Flo Lineup Report and Flo-Sheet for Case 15:06 - 15:20 (7 pages) 9 Att. 10 - App. B. pdf

[B] Pipe-Flo Lineup Report and Flo-Sheet for Case 15:21 - 15:29 (7 pages)

Att. 10 - App. C. pdf

[C] Pipe-Flo Lineup Report and Flo-Sheet for Case 15:30 - 15:39 (7 pages) szk-Att. 10 - App. D. pdf

[D] Pipe-Flo Lineup Report and Flo-Sheet for Case 15:40 - 16:03 (7 pages)

System: EA-PSA-SDP-D1 1-2-11-07 11/15/11 10:39 am Lineup: 1506-1520 rev: 11/15/11 10:34 am Company: Entergy Project: EA-PSA-SDP-D1 1-2-11-07 System created: 01 /29/08 7:04 am by: sjm with Design file: standard Atm pressure: 14.7 psi a Total System Volume: 19974 gallons Pressure drop cal culations: Darcy-Weisbach method, laminar cutoff Re = 2100 Calculated: 7 iterations Avg Deviation: 0.000 205 %

Specifications Specification Material / Schedule Roughness Sizing Design Limits AFWS @ 120 deg Steel A53-B36.10 / 40 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g AFWS @ 120 deg{sch40} Steel A53-B36.10 / 40 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g AFWS @ 120 deg{sch80} Steel A53-836.10 / 80 0.00181 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g FPS Header Pipe Stainless Pipe IPS / 40S 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g Fluid Zones Fluid Zone Fluid Temp Pressure Density Viscosity Pv / Pc or k F psi g Ib/ft3 cP psi a AFWS @ 87 deg Water 87 0 62.32 0.7884 0.6355 / 3198 FPS_FEED_AFW Water 85 0 62.32 0.807 0.5962 / 3198 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix A pg 1

11/15/11 10:39 am Pipelines Pipeline From To Status Flow Velocity dP HL US gpm ft/sec psi ft 005 sch40 to Bypass -CST(N-002) -Node 01 783.9 8.713 (0.316) 0.029 010 CST OUT CST -CST(N-002) 783.9 9.657 (1.058) 0.553 015 Bypass -Node 01 -Node 02 272.4 3.027 (1.239) 0.456 020 -Node 01 -Node 02 511.5 5.686 (1.239) 0.456 030 CST To AFW P -Node 02 -Node 03 783.9 8.713 (0.291) 0.027 040 CST To P8A&B -Node 03 -Node 04 425.9 4.734 0.132 1.525 045 -Node 04 -Node 05 168.8 1.876 0.073 0.169 050 -Node 04 -Node 05 257.1 2.858 0.073 0.169 060 -Node 05 -Node 06 425.9 4.734 0.139 0.322 065 From FireSys -Node FpS 07 -Node 06 X Closed --- ---

070 To P-8A&B -Node 06 -Node 07 425.9 4.734 (1.474) 0.592 080 P-8A IN -Node 07 P-8A Deg X Closed --- ---

100 P-8A Out P-8A Deg -Node 10 X Closed --- ---

1010 P-41 Discharge -P-41 -Node FPS 01 X Closed --- ---

1030 FPS Header 1 -Node FPS 02 -Node FPS 03 X Closed --- ---

1040 FPS Header 2 -Node FPS 03 -Node FPS 04 X Closed --- --- ---

105 P8A RECIRC -Node 10 -Node A Recirc X Closed --- --- ---

1050 FPS Header 3 -Node FPS 04 -Node FPS 05 X Closed --- --- ---

1060 FPS Vert -Node FPS 05 -Node FPS 06 X Closed --- --- ---

1070 UdrGrnd from FPS -Node FPS 06 -Node FpS 07 X Closed --- --- ---

1090 FPS P-9B Disch --P-9B -Node FPS 08 X Closed --- --- ---

110 P-8A to Tee -Node 10 -Node 11 0 0 4.2 0 1110 P-9A Disch -P-9A -Node FPS 09 X Closed --- ---

120 P-8B IN -Node 07 P-8B Nom 425.9 4.734 (1.473) 0.426 140 P-8B Out P-8B Nom -Node 14 425.9 5.247 1.574 3.019 145 P-8B RECIRC -Node 14 -Node B Recirc 60.04 6.529 995.3 2294 150 P-813 to Tee -Node 14 -Node 11 365.9 4.507 4.381 0.419 160 8A&B To SG'S -Node 11 -Node 15 365.9 4.507 (2.001) 0.624 170 8A&B To SG'S -Node 15 -Node 16 365.9 4.507 8.685 0.828 180 8A&B To E50B -Node 16 -Node 17 187.2 5.228 18.7 41.24 190 8A&B To E50B -Node 17 -Node 18 187.2 4.721 2.15 1.47 200 To E-50B -Node 18 -NODE 19(E-50B 349.7 8.82 28.72 14.56 210 8A&B To E50A -Node 16 -Node 20 178.7 4.991 15.15 33.53 220 8A&B To E50A -Node 20 -Node 21 178.7 4.508 4.471 1.327 230 To E-50A -Node 21 -Node 22(E-50A 342.1 8.629 26.8 15.13 240 To P-8C -Node 03 -Node 23 358 3.979 1.577 5.535 250 P-8C IN -Node 23 P-8C Nom 358 3.979 (3.609) 0.526 270 P-8C Out P-8C Nom -Node 26 358 4.41 0.873 2.148 275 P-8C RECIRC -Node 26 -Node C Recirc 32.08 3.489 1124 2587 280 P-8C TO TEE -Node 26 -Node 27 325.9 4.015 0.806 1.194 290 P8C TO E50B -Node 27 -Node 28 162.5 2.002 0.237 0.797 300 -Node 28 -Node 29 162.5 2.002 (0.24) 0.026 310 CV-0736A -Node 29 -Node 30 162.5 4.099 9.293 20.91 315 CV-0736 -Node 28 --Node 30 X Closed --- --- ---

320 MO-0748/0755 -Node 30 -Node 31 162.5 4.099 4.372 0.399 330 CK-FW703 -Node 31 -Node 32 162.5 1.806 9.457 0.326 340 To E-50B TEE -Node 32 -Node 18 162.5 4.099 0.062 0.143 350 P-8C To E50A -Node 27 -Node 33 163.4 2.013 0.352 0.814 360 -Node 33 -Node 34 163.4 2.013 0.009 0.02 370 CV-0737A -Node 34 -Node 35 163.4 4.122 7.16 16.55 375 CV-0737 -Node 33 -Node 35 X Closed --- --- ---

380 MO-0754/0759 -Node 35 -Node 36 163.4 4.122 5.732 0.792 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix A pg 2

11/15/11 10:39 am Pipelines Pipeline From To Status Flow Velocity dP HL US gpm ft/sec psi ft 390 -Node 36 -Node 37 163.4 2.013 8.078 0.067 400 CK-FW704 -Node 37 -Node 38 163.4 1.816 2.185 0.113 410 To E-50A TEE -Node 38 -Node 21 163.4 4.122 0.069 0.161 430 -NODE 19(E-50B -Node E-50B Limit 349.7 15.19 3.496 7.832 440 -Node 22(E-50A 908 Limit 342.1 14.86 3.343 7.478 700 Header B8-1 -Node SWS 001x -Node 23 X Closed ---

Pipe{001} -Lakel -P-41 X Closed ---

Pipe{002} -Lake 2 -P-9B X Closed ---

Pipe(003) -Lake 3 --P-9A X Closed ---

PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, AppendixA pg 3

11/15/11 10:39 am Nodes Node Elev Status Pressure Grade ft psi g ft

-CST(N-002) 587 10.96 612.3

-Node 01 586.24 11.27 612.3

-Node 02 582.92 12.51 611.8

--Node 03 582.22 12.8 611.8

-Node 04 581 12.67 610.3

-Node 05 581 12.6 610.1

-Node 06 581 12.46 609.8

-Node 07 577 13.93 609.2

-Node 10 573.79 1009 2906

-Node 11 583.5 1005 2906

-Node 14 573.79 1009 2907

-Node 15 578.25 1007 2906

-Node 16 597.5 998.1 2905

-Node 17 599.5 979.4 2864

-Node 18 603 977.2 2862

-NODE 19(E-50B 654.83 948.5 2848

-Node 20 599 982.9 2871

-Node 21 608.01 978.4 2870

-Node 22(E-50A 654.83 951.6 2855

-Node 23 580.33 11.23 606.3

-Node 26 571.33 1137 3200

-Node 27 572 1136 3199

-Node 28 571.75 1136 3198

-Node 30 571.75 991.1 2863

-Node 31 581.46 986.7 2863

-Node 32 603 977.3 2862

-Node 33 572 1136 3198

-Node 35 572 994.5 2871

-Node 36 584.46 988.8 2871

-Node 37 603.07 980.7 2870

-Node 38 608.01 978.5 2870 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix A Pg 4

11/15/11 10:39 am Pumps Pump Flow Status Total head dP Speed NPSHa Suction Discharge Suction Discharge US gpm ft psi rpm ft psi g psi g ft ft P-8B Nom 425.9 (2301) (995.3) 3475 68.22 15.41 1011 573.17 573.17 P-8C Nom 358 (2596) (1123) 3600 66.82 14.84 1138 571.46 571.46 Controls Control Set Value Elev Flow Status dP HL Inlet Outlet ft US gpm psi ft psi g psi g

-Node 29 FCV: 162.5 571.17 162.5 135.8 313.9 1136 1000

-Node 34 FCV: 163.4 572 163.4 134.2 310.2 1136 1002 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix A pg 5

. 11/15/11 10:39 am Tanks Tank Surface Pressure Level Bottom Elevation Status Flow Pressure Grade psi g ft ft US gF psi g ft CST 9.9 0 590 -783.f 9.9 612.9 Connecting pipelines Flow ( US gpm) Pressure (psi g) Grade (ft) 010 CST OUT @ 0 ft 783.9 9.9 612.9 Demands Demand Set Value Flow Rate Pressure Elev Status Grade US gpm psi g ft ft

-Node B Recirc Boundary pressure 60.04 13.8 581 612.9

-Node C Recirc Boundary pressure 32.08 12.9 583 612.8

-Node E-50B Boundary pressure 349.7 945 655.08 2840 908 Boundary pressure 342.1 948.3 655.08 2847 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix A pg 6

Lineu : 1506-1520 Darc -Weisbach PIPE-FLO 2007 System: EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 Flow: US gpm Date: 11/15/11 10:40 am Pressure: psi g Company: Entergy Size: in Project: EA-PSA-SDP-D1 1-2-11-07 Elevation: ft by. sjm Velocity: ft/sec Attachment 10, Appendix A Length: ft Volume: gallons

List Report System: EA-PSA-SDP-D1 1-2-11-07 11/15/11 10:40 am Lineup: 1521-1529 rev: 11/15/11 10:34 am Company: Entergy Project: EA-PSA-SDP-D1 1-2-11-07 System created: 01/29/08 7:04 am by: sjm with Design file: standard Atm pressure: 14.7 psi a Total System Volume: 19974 gallons Pressure drop cal culations: Darcy-Weisbach method, laminar cutoff Re = 2100 Calculated: 7 iterations Avg Deviation: 0.0002108 %

Specifications Specification Material / Schedule Roughness Sizing Design Limits AFWS @ 120 deg Steel A53-B36.10 / 40 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g AFWS @ 120 deg{sch40} Steel A53-B36.10 / 40 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g AFWS @ 120 deg{sch80} Steel A53-B36.10 / 80 0.00181 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g FPS Header Pipe Stainless Pipe IPS / 40S 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g Fluid Zones Fluid Zone Fluid Temp Pressure Density Viscosity Pv / Pc or k F psi g Ib/ft3 cP psi a AFWS @ 87 deg Water 87 0 62.32 0.7884 0.6355 / 3198 FPS_FEED_AFW Water 85 0 62.32 0.807 0.5962 / 3198 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix B pg 1

List Report 11/15/11 10:40 am Pipelines Pipeline From To Status Flow Velocity dP HL US gpm ft/sec psi ft 005 sch40 to Bypass -CST(N-002) --Node 01 784.3 8.717 (0.316) 0.029 010 CST OUT CST -CST(N-002) 784.3 9.662 (1.058) 0.554 015 Bypass -Node 01 -Node 02 272.5 3.029 (1.239) 0.457 020 -Node 01 -Node 02 511.8 5.688 (1.239) 0.457 030 CST To AFWP -Node 02 -Node 03 784.3 8.717 (0.291) 0.027 040 CST To P8A&B -Node 03 -Node 04 427.7 4.754 0.137 1.537 045 -Node 04 -Node 05 169.5 1.884 0.074 0.17 050 -Node 04 -Node 05 258.2 2.87 0.074 0.17 060 -Node 05 -Node 06 427.7 4.754 0.14 0.324 065 From FireSys -Node FpS 07 -Node 06 X Closed --- --- ---

070 To P-8A&B -Node 06 -Node 07 427.7 4.754 (1.472) 0.597 080 P-8A IN -Node 07 P-8A Deg X Closed --- ---

100 P-8A Out P-8A Deg -Node 10 X Closed --- ---

1010 P-41 Discharge -P-41 -Node FPS 01 X Closed --- ---

1030 FPS Header 1 -Node FPS 02 -Node FPS 03 X Closed --- ---

1040 FPS Header 2 -Node FPS 03 -Node FPS 04 X Closed --- ---

105 P8A RECIRC -Node 10 -Node A Recirc X Closed --- ---

1050 FPS Header 3 -Node FPS 04 -Node FPS 05 X Closed --- ---

1060 FPS Vert -Node FPS 05 -Node FPS 06 X Closed --- ---

1070 UdrGrnd from FPS -Node FPS 06 -Node FpS 07 X Closed --- ---

1090 FPS P-9B Disch -P-9B -Node FPS 08 X Closed --- --- --

110 P-8A to Tee -Node 10 -Node 11 0 0 4.2 0 1110 P-9A Disch -P-9A -Node FPS 09 X Closed --- ---

120 P-8B IN -Node 07 P-8B Nom 427.7 4.754 (1.471) 0.429 140 P-8B Out P-8B Nom -Node 14 427.7 5.269 1.585 3.043 145 P-8B RECIRC -Node 14 -Node B Recirc 59.9 6.514 990.7 2283 150 P-8B to Tee -Node 14 -Node 11 367.8 4.531 4.383 0.423 160 8A&B To SG'S -Node 11 -Node 15 367.8 4.531 (1.998) 0.631 170 8A&B To SG'S -Node 15 -Node 16 367.8 4.531 8.689 0.837 180 8A&B To E50B -Node 16 -Node 17 113.5 3.17 7.433 15.18 190 8A&B To E50B -Node 17 -Node 18 113.5 2.863 1.752 0.549 200 To E-50B -Node 18 -NODE 19(E-50B 273.3 6.894 26.32 9.01 210 8A&B To E50A -Node 16 -Node 20 254.3 7.102 29.98 67.81 220 8A&B To E50A -Node 20 -Node 21 254.3 6.414 5.051 2.667 230 To E-50A -Node 21 -Node 22(E-50A 419.1 10.57 29.99 22.51 240 To P-8C -Node 03 -Node 23 356.6 3.964 1.559 5.495 250 P-8C IN -Node 23 P-8C Nom 356.6 3.964 (3.61) 0.522 270 P-8C Out P-8C Nom -Node 26 356.6 4.394 0.866 2.132 275 P-8C RECIRC -Node 26 -Node C Recirc 32.04 3.484 1121 2579 280 P-8C TO TEE -Node 26 -Node 27 324.6 3.999 0.802 1.185 290 P8C TO E50B -Node 27 -Node 28 159.8 1.969 0.225 0.771 300 -Node 28 --Node 29 159.8 1.969 (0.24) 0.025 310 CV-0736A -Node 29 -Node 30 159.8 4.031 8.995 20.22 315 CV-0736 -Node 28 -Node 30 X Closed --- ---

320 MO-0748/0755 -Node 30 -Node 31 159.8 4.031 4.367 0.386 330 CK-FW703 -Node 31 -Node 32 159.8 1.776 9.453 0.315 340 To E-50B TEE -Node 32 -Node 18 159.8 4.031 0.06 0.138 350 P-8C To E50A -Node 27 -Node 33 164.8 2.03 0.358 0.828 360 -Node 33 -Node 34 164.8 2.03 0.009 0.021 370 CV-0737A -Node 34 -Node 35 164.8 4.157 7.283 16.84 375 CV-0737 -Node 33 -Node 35 X Closed --- --- ---

380 MO-0754/0759 -Node 35 -Node 36 164.8 4.157 5.738 0.805 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix B pg 2

11/15/11 10:40 am Pipelines Pipeline From To Status Flow Velocity dP HL US gpm ft/sec psi ft 390 -Node 36 -Node 37 164.8 2.03 8.079 0.068 400 CK-FW704 -Node 37 -Node 38 164.8 1.832 2.186 0.115 410 To E-50A TEE --Node 38 -Node 21 164.8 4.157 0.071 0.163 430 -NODE 19(E-50B -Node E-50B 273.3 11.87 2.18 4.789 440 -Node 22(E-50A 908 Limit 419.1 18.2 4.959 11.21 700 Header B8-1 -Node SWS 001x -Node 23 X Closed ---

Pipe{001} -Lakel -P-41 X Closed ---

Pipe{002} -Lake 2 -P-9B X Closed ---

Pipe{003} -Lake 3 -P-9A X Closed ---

PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix B pg 3

List Report I 11/15/11 10:40 am Nodes Node Elev Status Pressure Grade ft psi g ft

-CST(N-002) 587 10.96 612.3

-Node 01 586.24 11.27 612.3

-Node 02 582.92 12.51 611.8

-Node 03 582.22 12.8 611.8

-Node 04 581 12.67 610.3

-Node 05 581 12.59 610.1

-Node 06 581 12.45 609.8

-Node 07 577 13.93 609.2

-Node 10 573.79 1004 2895

-Node 11 583.5 1000 2895

-Node 14 573.79 1004 2896

-Node 15 578.25 1002 2895

-Node 16 597.5 993.4 2894

-Node 17 599.5 985.9 2879

-Node 18 603 984.2 2878

-NODE 19(E-50B 654.83 957.9 2869

-Node 20 599 963.4 2826

-Node 21 608.01 958.3 2824

-Node 22(E-50A 654.83 928.4 2801

-Node 23 580.33 11.24 606.3

-Node 26 571.33 1134 3192

-Node 27 572 1133 3191

-Node 28 571.75 1133 3190

-Node 30 571.75 998.1 2879

-Node 31 581.46 993.7 2879

-Node 32 603 984.3 2879

-Node 33 572 1132 3190

-Node 35 572 974.4 2825

-Node 36 584.46 968.7 2824

-Node 37 603.07 960.6 2824

-Node 38 608.01 958.4 2824 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix B pg 4

' ** 11/15/11 10:40 am Pumps Pump Flow Status Total head dP Speed NPSHa Suction Discharge Suction Discharge US gpm ft psi rpm ft psi g psi g ft ft P-8B Nom 427.7 (2290) (990.6) 3475 68.2 15.4 1006 573.17 573.17 P-8C Nom 356.6 (2589) (1120) 3600 66.86 14.86 1134 571.46 571.46 Controls Control Set Value Elev Flow Status dP HL Inlet Outlet ft US gpm psi ft psi g psi g

-Node 29 FCV: 159.8 571.17 159.8 125.8 290.7 1133 1007

-Node 34 FCV: 164.8 572 164.8 150.7 348.5 1132 981.7 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix B pg 5

List Report 11/15/11 10:40 am Tanks Tank Surface Pressure Level Bottom Elevation Status Flow Pressure Grade psi g ft ft US gi psi g ft CST 9.9 0 590 -784.; 9.9 612.9 Connecting pipelines Flow (US gpm) Pressure (psi g) Grade (ft) 010 CST OUT @ O ft 784.3 9.9 612.9 Demands Demand Set Value Flow Rate Pressure Elev Status Grade US gpm psi g ft ft

-Node B Recirc Boundary pressure 59.9 13.8 581 612.9

-Node C Recirc Boundary pressure 32.04 12.9 583 612.8

-Node E-50B Boundary pressure 273.3 955.7 655.08 2864 908 Boundary pressure 419.1 923.4 655.08 2790 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix B pg 6

Lineu : 1521-1529 Darc -Weisbach PIPE-FLO 2007 System: EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 Flow: US gpm Date: 11/15/11 10:40 am Pressure: psi g Company: Entergy Size: in Project: EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 Elevation: ft by. sjm Velocity: ft/sec Attachment 10, Appendix B Length: ft Volume: gallons

System : EA-PSA- SDP-D 11 11-07 11/15/11 10:41 am Lineup : 1530-1539 rev: 11/15/11 10:34 am Company: Entergy Project: EA-PSA-SDP-D 11-2-11-07 System created : 01/29/08 7:04 am by: sjm with Design file : standard Atm pressure : 14.7 psi a Total System Volume: 19974 gallons Pressure drop cal culations: Darcy-Weisbach method, laminar cutoff Re = 2100 Calculated: 7 iterations Avg Deviation: 0.0003269 %

Specifications Specification Material / Schedule Roughness Sizing Design Limits AFWS @ 120 deg Steel A53-636.10 / 40 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g AFWS @ 120 deg{sch40} Steel A53-836.10 / 40 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g AFWS @ 120 deg{sch80} Steel A53-636.10 / 80 0.00181 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g FPS Header Pipe Stainless Pipe IPS / 40S 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g Fluid Zones Fluid Zone Fluid Temp Pressure Density Viscosity Pv / Pc or k F psi g Ib/ft3 cP psi a AFWS @ 87 deg Water 87 0 62.32 0.7884 0.6355 / 3198 FPS_FEED_AFW Water 85 0 62.32 0.807 0.5962 / 3198 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix C pg 1

11/15/11 10:41 am Pipelines Pipeline From To Status Flow Velocity dP HL US gpm ft/sec psi ft 005 sch40 to Bypass -CST(N-002) -Node 01 771.6 8.576 (0.317) 0.028 010 CST OUT CST -CST(N-002) 771.6 9.505 (1.066) 0.536 015 Bypass -Node 01 -Node 02 268.1 2.98 (1.245) 0.442 020 -Node 01 -Node 02 503.5 5.596 (1.245) 0.442 030 CST To AFWP -Node 02 -Node 03 771.6 8.576 (0.292) 0.026 040 CST To P8A&B -Node 03 -Node 04 426.2 4.737 0.133 1.527 045 -Node 04 -Node 05 168.9 1.877 0.073 0.169 050 -Node 04 -Node 05 257.3 2.86 0.073 0.169 060 -Node 05 -Node 06 426.2 4.737 0.139 0.322 065 From FireSys -Node FpS 07 -Node 06 X Closed --- --- ---

070 To P-8A&B -Node 06 -Node 07 426.2 4.737 (1.474) 0.593 080 P-8A IN -Node 07 P-8A Deg X Closed --- --- ---

100 P-8A Out P-8A Deg -Node 10 X Closed --- --- ---

1010 P-41 Discharge -P-41 -Node FPS 01 X Closed --- --- ---

1030 FPS Header 1 -Node FPS 02 -Node FPS 03 X Closed --- --- ---

1040 FPS Header 2 -Node FPS 03 -Node FPS 04 X Closed --- --- ---

105 P8A RECIRC -Node 10 -Node A Recirc X Closed --- --- ---

1050 FPS Header 3 -Node FPS 04 -Node FPS 05 X Closed --- --- ---

1060 FPS Vert -Node FPS 05 -Node FPS 06 X Closed --- --- ---

1070 UdrGrnd from FPS -Node FPS 06 -Node FpS 07 X Closed --- --- ---

1090 FPS P-9B Disch -P-9B -Node FPS 08 X Closed --- --- ---

110 P-8A to Tee -Node 10 -Node 11 0 0 4.2 0 1110 P-9A Disch -P-9A -Node FPS 09 X Closed --- --- ---

120 P-8B IN -Node 07 P-8B Nom 426.2 4.737 (1.472) 0.426 140 P-8B Out P-8B Nom -Node 14 426.2 5.25 1.575 3.022 145 P-8B RECIRC -Node 14 -Node B Recirc 60.02 6.527 994.7 2292 150 P-8B to Tee -Node 14 -Node 11 366.2 4.511 4.382 0.419 160 8A&B To SG'S -Node 11 -Node 15 366.2 4.511 (2) 0.625 170 8A&B To SG'S -Node 15 -Node 16 366.2 4.511 8.686 0.829 180 8A&B To E50B -Node 16 -Node 17 23.44 0.655 1.147 0.653 190 8A&B To E50B -Node 17 -Node 18 23.44 0.591 1.525 0.026 200 To E-50B -Node 18 -NODE 19(E-50B 185.1 4.67 24.25 4.236 210 8A&B To E50A -Node 16 -Node 20 342.7 9.573 53.89 123.1 220 8A&B To E50A -Node 20 -Node 21 342.7 8.645 5.983 4.822 230 To E-50A -Node 21 -Node 22(E-50A Limit 494.8 12.48 33.74 31.18 240 To P-8C -Node 03 -Node 23 345.4 3.84 1.418 5.169 250 P-8C IN -Node 23 P-8C Nom 345.4 3.84 (3.624) 0.491 270 P-8C Out P-8C Nom -Node 26 345.4 4.255 0.809 2.002 275 P-8C RECIRC -Node 26 -Node C Recirc 31.63 3.44 1093 2514 280 P-8C TO TEE -Node 26 -Node 27 313.8 3.866 0.769 1.109 290 P8C TO E50B -Node 27 -Node 28 161.7 1.992 0.233 0.789 300 -Node 28 -Node 29 161.7 1.992 (0.24) 0.026 310 CV-0736A -Node 29 -Node 30 161.7 4.079 9.204 20.7 315 CV-0736 -Node 28 -Node 30 X Closed --- --- ---

320 MO-0748/0755 -Node 30 -Node 31 161.7 4.079 4.371 0.395 330 CK-FW703 -Node 31 -Node 32 161.7 1.797 9.456 0.322 340 To E-50B TEE -Node 32 -Node 18 161.7 4.079 0.061 0.142 350 P-8C To E50A -Node 27 -Node 33 152.1 1.874 0.305 0.706 360 -Node 33 -Node 34 152.1 1.874 0.008 0.018 370 CV-0737A -Node 34 -Node 35 152.1 3.837 6.204 14.34 375 CV-0737 -Node 33 -Node 35 X Closed --- --- ---

380 MO-0754/0759 -Node 35 -Node 36 152.1 3.837 5.687 0.689 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix C pg 2

List Report 11/15/11 10:41 am Pipelines Pipeline From To Status Flow Velocity dP HL US gpm ft/sec psi ft 390 -Node 36 -Node 37 152.1 1.874 8.074 0.058 400 CK-FW704 -Node 37 -Node 38 152.1 1.691 2.179 0.098 410 To E-50A TEE -Node 38 -Node 21 152.1 3.837 0.06 0.139 430 -NODE 19(E-50B -Node E-50B 185.1 8.042 1.06 2.202 440 -Node 22(E-50A 908 Limit 494.8 21.49 6.868 15.63 700 Header B8-1 -Node SWS 001x -Node 23 X Closed ---

Pipe{001} -Lake1 -P-41 X Closed ---

Pipe{002} -Lake 2 -P-9B X Closed ---

Pipe{003} -Lake 3 -P-9A X Closed ---

PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix C pg 3

  • 11/15/11 10:41 am Nodes Node Elev Status Pressure Grade ft psi g ft

-CST(N-002) 587 10.97 612.4

--Node 01 586.24 11.28 612.3

-Node 02 582.92 12.53 611.9

-Node 03 582.22 12.82 611.9

-Node 04 581 12.69 610.3

-Node 05 581 12.61 610.2

-Node 06 581 12.47 609.8

-Node 07 577 13.95 609.2

-Node 10 573.79 1008 2905

-Node 11 583.5 1004 2905

-Node 14 573.79 1008 2905

-Node 15 578.25 1006 2904

-Node 16 597.5 997.4 2903

-Node 17 599.5 996.2 2903

-Node 18 603 994.7 2903

-NODE 19(E-50B 654.83 970.5 2898

-Node 20 599 943.5 2780

-Node 21 608.01 937.5 2775

-Node 22(E-50A 654.83 903.8 2744

-Node 23 580.33 11.4 606.7

-Node 26 571.33 1106 3127

-Node 27 572 1105 3126

-Node 28 571.75 1105 3125

-Node 30 571.75 1009 2904

-Node 31 581.46 1004 2903

-Node 32 603 994.8 2903

-Node 33 572 1104 3125

-Node 35 572 953.5 2777

-Node 36 584.46 947.8 2776

-Node 37 603.07 939.7 2776

-Node 38 608.01 937.6 2776 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix C pg 4

-** 11/15/11 10:41 am Pumps Pump Flow Status Total head dP Speed NPSHa Suction Discharge Suction Discharge US gpm ft psi rpm ft psi g psi g ft ft P-8B Nom 426.2 (2299) (994.6) 3475 68.25 15.42 1010 573.17 573.17 P-8C Nom 345.4 (2523) (1091) 3600 67.26 15.03 1106 571.46 571.46 Controls Control Set Value Elev Flow Status dP HL Inlet Outlet ft US gpm psi ft psi g psi g

-Node 29 FCV: 161.7 571.17 161.7 86.94 201 1105 1018

-Node 34 FCV: 152.1 572 152.1 144.7 334.6 1104 959.7 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix C pg 5

List Report 11/15/ 11 10:41 am Tanks Tank Surface Pressure Level Bottom Elevation Status Flow Pressure Grade psi g ft ft US gpm psi g ft CST 9.9 0 590 -771.6 9.9 612.9 Connecting pipelines Flow (US gpm) Pressure (psi g) Grade (ft) 010 CST OUT @ O ft 771.6 9.9 612.9 Demands Demand Set Value Flow Rate Pressure Elev Status Grade US gpm psi g ft ft

-Node B Recirc Boundary pressure 60.02 13.8 581 612.9

-Node C Recirc Boundary pressure 31.63 12.9 583 612.8

-Node E-50B Boundary pressure 185.1 969.4 655.08 2896 908 Boundary pressure 494.8 896.9 655.08 2729 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix C pg 6

Lineu : 1530-1539 Darcy-Weisbach PIPE-FLO 2007 System: EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 Flow: US gpm Date: 11/15/11 10:41 am Pressure: psi g Company: Entergy Size: in Project: EA-PSA-SDP-D1 1-2-11-07 Elevation: ft by: sjm Velocity: ft/sec Attachment 10, Appendix C Length: ft Volume: gallons

System: EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 11/15/11 10:41 am Lineup: 1540-1603 rev: 11/15/11 10:34 am Company: Entergy Project: EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 System created: 01/29/08 7:04 am by: sjm with Design file: standard Atm pressure: 14.7 psi a Total System Volume: 19974 gallons Pressure drop calculations: Darcy-Weisbach method, laminar cutoff Re = 2100 Calculated: 7 iterations Avg Deviation: 0.004 365 %

Specifications Specification Material / Schedule Roughness Sizing Design Limits AFWS @ 120 deg Steel A53-B36.10 / 40 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g AFWS @ 120 deg{sch40} Steel A53-B36.10 / 40 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g AFWS @ 120 deg{sch80} Steel A53-B36.10 / 80 0.00181 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g FPS Header Pipe Stainless Pipe IPS / 40S 0.0018 in 8 ft/sec 0 to 12 ft/sec Valves: standard C: 140 0 to 1200 psi g Fluid Zones Fluid Zone Fluid Temp Pressure Density Viscosity Pv / Pc or k F psi g Ib/ft3 cP psi a AFWS @ 87 deg Water 87 0 62.32 0.7884 0.6355 / 3198 FPS_FEED_AFW Water 85 0 62.32 0.807 0.5962 / 3198 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix D pg 1

11/15/11 10:41 am Pipelines Pipeline From To Status Flow Velocity dP HL US gpm ft/sec psi ft 005 sch40 to Bypass -CST(N-002) -Node 01 634.6 7.053 (0.32) 0.019 010 CST OUT CST -CST(N-002) 634.6 7.817 (1.14) 0.364 015 Bypass -Node 01 -Node 02 220.4 2.45 (1.306) 0.3 020 --Node 01 -Node 02 414.1 4.603 (1.306) 0.3 030 CST To AFWP -Node 02 --Node 03 634.6 7.053 (0.295) 0.018 040 CST To P8A&B -Node 03 -Node 04 438.5 4.874 0.17 1.613 045 -Node 04 -Node 05 173.7 1.931 0.077 0.179 050 -Node 04 -Node 05 264.7 2.943 0.077 0.179 060 -Node 05 -Node 06 438.5 4.874 0.148 0.341 065 From FireSys -Node FpS 07 -Node 06 X Closed --- ---

070 To P-8A&B -Node 06 -Node 07 438.5 4.874 (1.459) 0.627 080 P-8A IN -Node 07 P-8A Deg X Closed --- --- ---

100 P-8A Out P-8A Deg -Node 10 X Closed --- --- ---

1010 P-41 Discharge -P-41 -Node FPS 01 X Closed --- --- ---

1030 FPS Header 1 -Node FPS 02 -Node FPS 03 X Closed --- --- ---

1040 FPS Header 2 -Node FPS 03 -Node FPS 04 X Closed --- --- ---

105 P8A RECIRC -Node 10 -Node A Recirc X Closed --- --- ---

1050 FPS Header 3 -Node FPS 04 -Node FPS 05 X Closed --- --- ---

1060 FPS Vert -Node FPS 05 -Node FPS 06 X Closed --- --- ---

1070 UdrGrnd from FPS -Node FPS 06 -Node FpS 07 X Closed --- --- ---

1090 FPS P-9B Disch -P-9B -Node FPS 08 X Closed --- --- --- ---

110 P-8A to Tee -Node 10 -Node 11 0 0 4.2 0 1110 P-9A Disch -P-9A -Node FPS 09 X Closed --- ---

120 P-8B IN -Node 07 P-8B Nom 438.5 4.874 (1.462) 0.451 140 P-8B Out P-8B Nom -Node 14 438.5 5.402 1.651 3.198 145 P-8B RECIRC -Node 14 -Node B Recirc 59.02 6.418 961.9 2217 150 P-8B to Tee -Node 14 -Node 11 379.4 4.675 4.395 0.45 160 8A&B To SGS -Node 11 -Node 15 379.4 4.675 (1.981) 0.671 170 8A&B To SGS -Node 15 -Node 16 379.4 4.675 8.712 0.89 180 8A&B To E50B -Node 16 -Node 17 0 0 0.865 0 190 8A&B To E50B -Node 17 -Node 18 X Closed --- --- ---

200 To E-50B -Node 18 -NODE 19(E-50B 163.4 4.121 23.86 3.33 210 8A&B To E50A -Node 16 -Node 20 379.4 10.6 65.9 150.9 220 8A&B To E50A -Node 20 -Node 21 379.4 9.572 6.451 5.902 230 To E-50A -Node 21 -Node 22(E-50A 379.4 9.572 28.27 18.53 240 To P-8C -Node 03 -Node 23 196.1 2.18 (0.058) 1.755 250 P-8C IN -Node 23 P-8C Nom 196.1 2.18 (3.767) 0.161 270 P-8C Out P-8C Nom -Node 26 196.1 2.416 0.226 0.652 275 P-8C RECIRC -Node 26 -Node C Recirc 32.71 3.557 1168 2689 280 P-8C TO TEE -Node 26 -Node 27 163.4 2.013 0.424 0.311 290 P8C TO E50B -Node 27 -Node 28 163.4 2.013 0.24 0.806 300 -Node 28 -Node 29 163.4 2.013 (0.24) 0.026 310 CV-0736A -Node 29 -Node 30 163.4 4.122 9.394 21.14 315 CV-0736 -Node 28 -Node 30 X Closed --- --- ---

320 MO-0748/0755 -Node 30 -Node 31 163.4 4.122 4.374 0.404 330 CK-FW703 -Node 31 -Node 32 163.4 1.816 9.459 0.329 340 To E-50B TEE -Node 32 -Node 18 163.4 4.122 0.063 0.145 350 P-8C To E50A -Node 27 -Node 33 0 0 0 0 360 -Node 33 -Node 34 0 0 0 0 370 CV-0737A -Node 34 -Node 35 0 0 0 0 375 CV-0737 -Node 33 -Node 35 X Closed --- --- ---

380 MO-0754/0759 -Node 35 -Node 36 0 0 5.389 0 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix D pg 2

11/15/11 10:41 am Pipelines Pipeline From To Status Flow Velocity dP HL US gpm ft/sec psi ft 390 -Node 36 -Node 37 0 0 8.049 0 400 CK-FW704 -Node 37 -Node 38 0 0 2.137 0 410 To E-50A TEE -Node 38 -Node 21 0 0 0 0 430 -NODE 19(E-50B -Node E-50B 163.4 7.097 0.85 1.716 440 -Node 22(E-50A 908 Limit 379.4 16.48 4.086 9.197 700 Header B8-1 -Node SWS 001x -Node 23 X Closed ---

Pipe{001} -Lakel -P-41 X Closed ---

Pipe{002} -Lake 2 --P-9B X Closed ---

Pipe{003} -Lake 3 --P-9A X Closed ---

PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix D pg 3

11/15/11 10:41 am Nodes Node Elev Status Pressure Grade ft psi g ft

-CST(N-002) 587 11.04 612.5

-Node 01 586.24 11.36 612.5

--Node 02 582.92 12.67 612.2

-'Node 03 582.22 12.96 612.2

-Node 04 581 12.79 610.6

-Node 05 581 12.71 610.4

-Node 06 581 12.57 610.1

-Node 07 577 14.03 609.4

-Node 10 573.79 975.5 2829

-Node 11 583.5 971.3 2829

-Node 14 573.79 975.7 2830

-Node 15 578.25 973.3 2828

-Node 16 597.5 964.6 2828

--Node 17 599.5 963.7 2828

-Node 18 603 982.9 2875

-NODE 19(E-50B 654.83 959.1 2872

-Node 20 599 898.7 2677

-Node 21 608.01 892.3 2671

-Node 22(E-50A 654.83 864 2652

-Node 23 580.33 13.02 610.4

-Node 26 571.33 1181 3301

-Node 27 572 1180 3301

-Node 28 571.75 1180 3300

-Node 30 571.75 996.8 2876

-Node 31 581.46 992.4 2876

-Node 32 603 983 2876

-Node 33 572 1180 3301

-Node 35 572 907.8 2671

-Node 36 584.46 902.4 2671

-Node 37 603.07 894.4 2671

-Node 38 608.01 892.3 2671 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix D pg 4

11/15/11 10:41 am Pumps Pump Flow Status Total head dP Speed NPSHa Suction Discharge Suction Discharge US gpm ft psi rpm ft psi g psi g ft ft P-8B Nom 438.5 (2224) (961.9) 3475 68.41 15.49 977.4 573.17 573.17 P-8C Nom 196.1 (2692) (1164) 3600 71.33 16.79 1181 571.46 571.46 Controls Control Set Value Elev Flow Status dP HL Inlet Outlet ft US gpm psi ft psi g psi g

-Node 29 FCV: 163.4 571.17 163.4 174.2 402.7 1180 1006

-Node 34 FCV: 0 572 0 --- --- 1180 907.8 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix D pg 5

11/15/11 10:41 am Tanks Tank Surface Pressure Level Bottom Elevation Status Flow Pressure Grade psi g ft ft US gpm psi g ft CST 9.9 0 590 -634.6 9.9 612.9 Connecting pipelines Flow ( US gpm) Pressure (psi g) Grade (ft) 010 CST OUT @ O ft 634.6 9.9 612.9 Demands Demand Set Value Flow Rate Pressure Elev Status Grade US gpm psi g ft ft

-Node B Recirc Boundary pressure 59.02 13.8 581 612.9

-Node C Recirc Boundary pressure 32.71 12.9 583 612.8

-Node E-50B Boundary pressure 163.4 958.2 655.08 2870 908 Boundary pressure 379.4 859.9 655.08 2643 PIPE-FLO 2007 Attachment 10, Appendix D pg 6

Lineu : 1540-1603 Darc -Weisbach PIPE-FLO 2007 System: EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 Flow: US gpm Date: 11/15/11 10:41 am Pressure: psi g Company: Entergy Size: in Project: EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 Elevation: ft by: sjm Velocity: ft/sec Attachment 10, Appendix D Length: ft Volume: gallons

Entergy PSA EA - PSA-SDP - D11-2-11-07 Rev. I En g ineerin g v Ente^gy Analysis Attachment 11 - Page 1 of 2 Attachment 11 Review of NRC Timeline and Affected Equipment List By letter dated November 29 [1], the NRC published an event timeline and a list of major affected equipment for the 09/25/2011 dc panel ED-11-2 fault event.

The timeline and effected equipment list are reviewed against the current best available information in the annotated documents appended below.

Review Process The review was performed by the PRA group Ops representative, who also developed and independently verified the event timeline and associated plant parameters. The PRA group Ops representative is a former Palisades SRO and has served as a Palisades Shift Manager and Operations Superintendent.

The timeline was developed using process information (PI) data, plant process computer data (PPC),

operator logs (eSOMS), and control room recorder instrumentation. The timeline was verified by extensive on-shift crew interviews/discussions, the Ops reconstruction meeting, and crew peer check of indicated event times, parameters, and crew motivation/awareness.

Review Findings The human error analysis for controlling pressurizer level has a significant impact on the overall risk result. Gaining control of pressurizer level soon enough avoids challenging pressurizer safety relief valves. This eliminates the potential for a stuck open relief valve LOCH.

An important input to the NRC analysis is the belief that the time available to complete the action was equal to the time actually taken to complete action. This limits the analysis to one attempt to complete the action and results in no margin for error recovery.

Our analysis shows much more time was available. The action in our analysis is throttling (terminating) charging flow. This action takes several minutes (2 minutes). Timeline analysis shows the time available to complete the action was 40 minutes. This provides sufficient time to take the action, assess the success/failure of the action and still recover if unsuccessful.

The NRC belief may have been based on the assumption charging was providing 133 gpm to the PCS for an extended period of time - up to the point of challenging the pressurizer safeties. This may be artifact of erroneous or out-of-context information that was collected in the initial event response evaluation: early in the event investigation all three charging pumps were thought to be running.

Our evaluation of the event response and timeline determined only charging pumps P-55A and P-55B were operating during the event. Pump P-55C never ran during the event response. Charging was never higher than 93 gpm (P-55A and P-55B at maximum flow) and reduced to 73 gpm (P-55A and P-55B at minimum flow) at 15:37 when channel B pressurizer level control was placed in service. Charging was reduced to 0 gpm when charging pumps were tripped at 15:57.

In addition, NRC believes the condition diagnosis and action execution to be moderately complex, based on the NRC discussion of factors influencing the human error analysis. However, operators were aware of the condition early in the event and the diagnosis of what to do given indicated high pressurizer level is not complex. In addition, the action to trip charging pumps is simple, straightforward and not complex.

Entergy PSA EA - PSA-SDP - D11 11-07 Rev. 1 Engineerin g M Entmgy Analysis Attachment 11 - Page 2 of 2 Palisades Event Timeline (NRC Att. 3)

Appendix 11-1: Annotated NRC Event Timeline Major Affected Equip. (NRC Att. 7)

Appendix 11-2: Annotated NRC List of Affected Major Equipment.

References

[1] Letter from U.S. NRC (Steven West) to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Anthony Vitale),

Subject:

Palisades Nuclear Plant - NRC Special Inspection Team (SIT) Report 05000255/2011014 Preliminary Yellow Finding, Dated: November 29, 2011.

PALISADES EVENT TIMELINE HISTORICAL SEQUENCE of EVENTS The timeline developed was created independently by the inspectors, with best estimates based on all available information. Items that are approximate times are preceded with "-" prior to the listed time. During the development of this timeline all times were referenced back to the control room clock, which was the official time and differed from the plant process computer and sequence event recorder times. The term "days" refers to activities that were conducted on the dayshift. The times listed below are based on the 24-hour clock.

October 2010 RFO21 During Refueling Outage 21, 10 breakers were replaced by maintenance personnel inside electrical Panel D11-2, associated with the left train 125-Volt DC system (reference Figure 2, Attachment 4).

Thursday, September 22, 2011 Days Maintenance personnel began work on work order (WO) 248834-01 to troubleshoot the inoperative green indication lights for Door MZ-50, the emergency air lock.

All interlocks, indication lights, and limit switches were found to be satisfactory; more troubleshooting was planned for this door indication light issue.

Friday, September 23, 2011 Days Maintenance personnel completed WO 291123-01 to troubleshoot Breaker 72-123 in Panel D11-2. Maintenance personnel identified that there was no load side voltage phase to phase (this feeds power to the Door MZ-50 indicating lights).

15:26 Maintenance personnel completed WO 291123-03 to successfully replace Breaker 72-123. Restoration activities included re-installing cover panels inside Panel D11-2.

16:07 Control room alarms were received by reactor operators (ROs) for the "Generator Field Forcing/Over-Excitation" cycling; and for red indication lights flickering for the "Voltage Regulator Control Switch" and "Turbine Generator Exciter Field Breaker Control" alarms. Breaker 72-121, Main Generator Voltage Regulator Control Power, experienced an intermittent connection during these restoration activities of Panel D11-2.

16:17 The ROs experienced a loss of indication for multiple containment isolation valves (CIVs) due to an intermittent loss of power from Breaker 72 - 119. The ROs entered Technical Specification Action Conditions (TSAC) for Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.7 (30-day TSAC for CIV indication ) and LCO 3. 6.3 for all valves (4-hour TSAC to administratively lock the valves closed).

16:35 The ROs entered Off-Normal Procedure (ONP) ONP-7.1, "Loss of Instrument Air."

The DC power for a junction box common to all three instrument air compressors was a load associated with Breaker 72-119. The intermittent loss of power affected the instrument air compressors standby start feature (the instrument air compressors internal "sleep mode" feature remained available to automatically start the air Attachment 3

compressors). The feedwater (FW) purity air compressor continued to supply the necessary air to equipment through a control valve that failed open upon the intermittent loss of power and cross-connected the two systems, as designed.

The running instrument air Compressor C-2A was automatically placed in sleep mode while higher pressure air was supplied by feedwater purity air Compressor C-903B.

-21:30 Maintenance personnel commenced a new troubleshooting plan and identified:

no voltage on the load side of Breaker 72-119; misalignments on Breakers 72-119, 72-120, 72-121, and 72-123; and, a 1/16-inch air gap between the horizontal positive bus bar and the line side positive connection on Breaker 72-119.

Maintenance personnel also discovered that: the positive feed wire to DC Panel D11-2, was 2°degrees Fahrenheit (°F) hotter than the negative wire; the bus had a slight ground; and, each breaker's positive horizontal bus bars were hotter than the negative horizontal bus bars.

22:23 The ROs exited ONP-7.1 when instrument air Compressors C-2A, C-2B and C-2C were identified as available for manual start.

Saturday, September 24, 2011 Days Licensee personnel continued with troubleshooting activities, challenge boards, work package reviews, and Temporary Modification (TM) EC 31973 development for Breaker 72-121, due to Friday's events.

Sunday, September 25, 2011 05:00 Nightshift maintenance personnel held a pre-job brief for TM EC 31973 to discuss implementation of WO 291209-01 to implement the TM. The electrical superintendent made the decision not to have the nightshift electricians begin work.

-07:00 Turnover between electrical superintendent and mechanical superintendent (acting maintenance manager) discussed the upcoming evolution to commence work on WO 291209-01 to implement the TM and for work on Breakers 72-119, 72-120, 72-121, and 72-123. The turnover highlighted the steps of insulating the bus tie stabs and conducting the evolution in the prescribed sequence for breaker removal to keep positive control over the bus tie stabs.

-08:00 Turnover between electrical superintendent and electrical front line supervisor (FLS) discussed the upcoming evolution to commence work on WO 291209-01 to implement the TM and for work on Breakers 72-119, 72-120, 72-121, and 72-123. The turnover highlighted the steps of insulating the bus tie stabs and conducting the evolution in the prescribed sequence for breaker removal to keep positive control over the horizontal bus tie stabs.

-08:30 A pre-job brief for performing work on WO 291209-01 was held.

11:03 Dayshift maintenance personnel installed TM EC 31973 to power breaker loads from Breaker 72-121, Main Generator Voltage Regulator Control Power, from the spare Breaker 72-127.

1109 based on Ops Log entry.

2 Attachment 3

-12:45 Dayshift maintenance personnel performed an informal prejob brief for implementing WO 291194-01, WO 291210-01, and WO 291123-03 for work on Breakers 72-119, 72-120, 72-121, and 72-123. The workers and management observers then proceeded to Panel D11-2 for fieldwork.

14:14 The Duty Station Manager (DSM) updated plant management on the breaker work via an email that stated: "Breaker 72- 119 (top breaker in panel ) was removed, Breaker 72- 120 (spare breaker) removed , and an approximately 1/1 6-inch gap was found between the copper bus bar and breaker stab was identified as well as minor indications of arcing in this area, and the bus bar hole showed evidence of cross-threading."

15:03 Palisades Plant Status:

  • Reactor power was approximately 98.5 percent;
  • SG `A' Pressure was 970.26 pounds per square inch absolute (psia);
  • SG 'B' Level was 63.96 percent;
  • SG `B' Pressure was 983.44 psia;
  • Pressurizer level was 57.86 percent;
  • Pressurizer pressure was 2063.35 psia;
  • Primary coolant system (PCS) average temperature was 559.84°F; and,
  • Letdown flow from the PCS was 43.45 gpm.

15:06 Reactor and Turbine Trip occurred. During the work inside 125-Volt DC Panel D11-2, while removing a section of bus bar, the bar rotated and contact was established between the positive and negative horizontal bus bars, which caused an electrical fault.

15:06 Electrical fault on Panel D11-2 caused the shunt trip Breaker 72-01 to open (reference Figure 2 of Attachment 4).

15:06 Opening of the shunt trip Breaker 72-01 de-energized the left train 125-Volt DC, D-1 OL, and D-1 OR.

15:06 Loss of D-1 OL and D-1 OR de-energized 120-Volt preferred alternating current (AC) busses Y-10 and Y-30.

15:06 Inverter input Breaker 72-37 tripped.

15:06 The loss of two out of the four preferred AC busses caused a loss of power to two reactor protection system (RPS) channels (RPS is a two-out-of-four logic).

15:06 The RPS trip signal caused RPS Breakers 3 and 4 to actuate resulting in a reactor trip (a two-out-of-four RPS logic).

15:06 Reactor trip initiated a turbine trip.

15:06 The ROs entered EOP-1.0, "Standard Post-Trip Actions."

15:06 All controls rods verified inserted into the core by ROs (only the control room supervisor plant process computer lost power , all other RO stations were available, in addition, left train indications to PPC were lost due to the loss of the left train 125 -Volt DC).

3 Attachment 3

15:06 Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) initiated the right channel based on a two-out-of-four logic made-up for the loss of 120-Volt preferred AC busses Y-1 0 and Y-30 (low SG pressure sensed).

15:06 The right channel MSIS signal initiated closure of the right train Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). The left train MSIV closed due to the closure of the first MSIV Both MSIVs closed due to the MSIS. MFRVs also closed. CV-0703 due to MSIS, CV-0701 due to loss of EY-10 and EY-30.

15:06 Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) occurred based on a two-out-of-four logic made-up for the loss of 120 -Volt preferred AC busses Y-1 0 and Y-30 ( sensed low pressurizer pressure ). Right channel initiated and started the following pumps: High pressure safety injection (HPSI) `A'; low pressure safety injection (LPSI) 'A'; Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump 8C; and, charging Pumps `A' and `B'.

AFW pump P-8C is not associated with SIAS. P-8C did start due to AFAS.

Charging pump P-55A was already in service, i.e. it didn't start. Also, bus 1 E was shed due to SIAS, which deenerged half of the PZR heaters.

15:06 The LPSI Wand HPSI `A' pumps do NOT inject due to the PCS pressure being greater than the pumps' shutoff head.

15:06 Containment High Radiation (CHR) signal received based on a two-out-of-four logic made-up from loss of 120-Volt preferred AC busses Y-10 and Y-30. This initiated the following: both trains of control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) in emergency mode; only the right train ('B') started, since the left train (`A') had no power, primary coolant pump (PCP) bleedoff and letdown isolation control Valve CV-2099 closed; and both SG bottom blowdown line control Valves CV-767 and CV-768 closed.

There are actually 2 valves, the PCP CBO valve is CV-2099, the letdown isolation valve is CV-2009.

15:06 Containment Isolation Signal (CIS) initiated based on a two-out-of-four logic made-up for loss of 120-Volt preferred AC busses Y-10 and Y-30. This closed all of the right channel containment isolation valves (CIVs), which included the letdown control valves on the pressurizer.

This should read "... included CVCS letdown containment isolation valve CV-2009 located in the CVCS letdown line downstream of the letdown orifice stop valves", i.e. not "on the pressurizer". The Left channel containment isolation valves also closed due to loss of dc, and the letdown orifice stop valves closed due to loss of PZR level control channel A.

15:06 Containment high pressure alarm occurred, but not an actuation signal. The alarm was seen on the left channel based on a two-out-of-four logic, but since the downstream relays in this logic had no power, a containment high pressure actuation signal was not initiated. The right channel did not receive any signals.

4 Attachment 3

15:06 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump P-8B started due to its steam supply control Valve CV-0522B failing open on loss of DC power (powered by Panel D11-1) and the AFW Actuation Signal (AFAS), which overrode the low suction pressure trip signal caused by the loss of the left train 125-Volt DC system.

P-8B started due to the loss of dc to solenoid valves SV-0522G and SV-0522H. The AFAS signal was not available to P-8A or P-8B due to the loss of D-11-1.

15:06 The AFAS was received due to a loss of 120-Volt preferred AC busses Y-10 and Y-30 (sensed low SG water level), which made up the two-out-of-four logic. The AFW Pump P-8A did not start due to the loss of power to the control circuits associated with the low suction pressure trip P-8A did not start due to the AFAS signal to the P-8A/P-8B train being powered from D-11-1. The low suction pressure trip logic was met, but the signal was not applied due to the loss of D-11-1. Also, P-8B flow control valves failed full-open due to loss of control power.

15:06 The ROs verified that safety-related AC busses 1 D and 1 C (safety-related 2400-Volt) were available due to loss of AC Bus 1 E (nonsafety 2400-Volt).

The NCOs verified buses 1 C and 1 D available per EOP-1.0, but not "due to the loss of 1 E". Bus 1 E was load shed as expected due to the SIAS.

15:06 Busses 1 A (nonsafety 4160-Volt) and 1 F (nonsafety 2400-Volt) did not fast transfer to station transformer (received fast transfer signal with loss of power; however, the loss of the left train 125-Volt DC prevented the fast transfer from occurring).

This should read " Busses 1 A ( nonsafety 4160-Volt) and 1 F ( nonsafety 4160-Volt ) did not fast transfer to startup transformers...".

Also, bus 1A remained energized from the grid via the main transformer and station power transformer 1-1. Bus 1 F remained energized from the grid via station power transformer 1-3.

15:06 The PCPs 'A' and `C' started a slow coastdown due to the loss of power from Bus 1A (bus still had some energy due to main generator not being fully disconnected immediately). PCPs `B' and 'D' continued to run.

P-50A and P-50C remained powered from the grid via the main transformer, station power transformer 1-1 and Bus 1A, and were not coasting down until the generator breakers opened, at which time they started coasting down and tripped (-1517).

15:06 The FW Purity Air Compressor C-903B was lost due to the loss of Bus 1 E (at the time Compressor C-903B was supplying air to the instrument air header, due to the September 23, 2011, event). Instrument air Compressor C-2A was in "sleep mode" and auto started upon a lowering instrument air header pressure.

5 Attachment 3

Inoperable Technical Specification (TS) Related Equipment and TSACs entered by ROs:

  • Preferred AC Bus No. 1, Y-1 0, TSAC 3.8.9 (B);
  • Preferred AC Bus No. 3, Y-30, TSAC 3.8.9 (B);
  • Inverter No. 3, D-08, TSAC 3.8.7 (A.1);
  • Inverter No. 1, D-06, TSAC 3.8.7 (A.1);
  • Left train 125-Volt DC busses D-10L and D-1 OR, TSAC 3.8.9 (C);
  • Four atmospheric steam dump valves (ASDVs) lost power due to the master controller being powered from Bus Y-10 and lost the quick-open capability (relay lost power with loss of Y-10), TSAC 3.7.4 (A.1 and A.2); and,

15:07 The AFW Pump P-8C started due to AFAS (one minute later due to time delay built in to logic).

-15:16 This time should be 1537. The ROs manually switched (per their ONP) pressurizer pressure and level indication instruments over to Channel 'A' (should read "... over to Channel B") due to the loss of indication from the loss of power on Channel `B' (should read "...loss of power on Channel A") and actual increased level and pressure seen in the pressurizer. With the failure of the controller, the pressurizer control systems were at maximum charging, no letdown (letdown orifice valves were isolated), and no pressurizer spray. Charging Pumps `A' and `B' were running because the pumps started on the SIAS.

"Maximum charging" is 133 gpm (3 pumps in service with P-55A at max speed (53 gpm)). Actual charging at this time is 93 gpm (2 pumps in service with P-55A at max speed). Only P-55B started on SIAS as previously noted, P-55A was already in service.

Once level control B channel was placed in service P-55A speed lowered to minimum (33 gpm), so the charging rate was then 73 gpm, not 93 gpm, and the orifice isolation valves all opened, letting down -108 gpm to the quench tank until they were closed by the operator 5 minutes later. Also, bus 1 D PZR heaters were all energized at this time.

-15:16 This time should be 1537. Pressurizer spray was able to operate with swapping of controllers . Primary system pressure is stable at -2063 psia.

PCS pressure was 2033 at 1516, and not yet controlled.

15:17 The turbine-side RO in control room manually jumpered main generator output breakers to the "open" position (Breakers 25F7 and 25H9).

This resulted in P-50A and P-50C rapidly coasting down and stopping.

6 Attachment 3

-15:20 Main feedwater Pumps `A' and 'B' were tripped by the ROs and their respective turbines were tripped. Condensate Pump `A' was tripped by the ROs. Condensate Pump 'B' was functioning.

K-7B MFP P-1 B turbine was tripped by the RO, but K-7A MFP P-1A turbine did not trip automatically and could not be tripped from the control room due to loss of dc. An NPO was directed to trip them locally. Also, the steam supply to K-7A and K-7B was isolated when the MSIVs closed at 1506.

15:27 The ROs Entered EOP-9.0, "Functional Recovery," due to the loss of two preferred AC busses upon completion of EOP-1.0.

15:27 Plant Status:

  • Reactor power was 0 percent;
  • SG `A' Level was 65.15 percent;
  • SG `A' Pressure was 925.42 psia;
  • SG `B' Level was 55.56 percent; (48.45%)
  • SG `B' Pressure was 969.67 psia; (956.5 psia)
  • Pressurizer level was approximately 66.3 percent; (62%)
  • Pressurizer pressure was approximately 2140 psia; (2094 psia) (Note 2140 is >

the `2063 and stable' previously stated at time 1516, corroborating that the spray valves had not yet opened.)

  • The PCS average temperature was 536.27°F; and
  • Charging flow to the pressurizer was 133 gpm (approximate indication).

Max charging possible would be 93 gpm with P-55A and P-55B in service. P-55C did not run during the event.

-15:30 The ROs entered ONP-2.3, "Loss of DC."

15:31 An AO was dispatched to the field to respond to a fire alarm in the AFW pump room.

The AO was also directed to manually close CV-0522B (AFW `B ' steam supply control valve ) for isolation of TDAFW Pump P-8B . Level in SG `A' was approximately 67 percent and level in SG ` B' was approximately 58.6 percent . This rendered the left train of AFW INOPERABLE and the ROs entered TSAC 3.7.5.

15:37 Pressurizer pressure increased to a maximum of 2206 psia (indicated on PTR-0122).This was below the first pressurizer code safety valve setting of 2500 psia (The pressurizer power operated relief valves were isolated at Palisades during normal operations).

This is when the PZR pressure and level controllers were switched to channel B in service, see previous 1516 entry.

15:37 The ROs entered ONP -24.1, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus No . 1 (Y-10)."

The ROs entered ONP-24 . 3, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus No . 3 (Y-30)."

7 Attachment 3

15:42 Letdown heat exchanger inlet safety relief Valve RV-2006, was isolated after not re-seating correctly during the event.

RV-2006 opened when the PZR level controller was switched to channel B due to the letdown orifice stop valves opening at 1537, and was isolated per ARP-4 due to downstream letdown containment isolation valve CV-2009 being closed (CHR/loss of dc), not due to not seating correctly.

15:49 Bus 1 E (nonsafety 2400-Volt AC that was lost during event) was restored by maintenance and operations personnel in field (load shed on SIAS).

Operators restored bus 1 E from the control room (normal restoration, nothing was done in the field) and associated PZR heaters were reenergized.

-15:51 Main Steam Safety Valve(s) maintained secondary side pressures, which subsequently maintained PCS temperature, from the start of the event.

The excess AFW supplied by P-8B also contributed significantly to the PCS temperature control/lowering (especially in E-50A) until P-8B was isolated. After initially opening/closing, the E-50A MSSVs remained closed until 1615.

15:53 The plant process computer (PPC) for control room supervisor was restored.

15:55 Pressurizer level reached greater than 62.8 percent, which was the TS limit. The ROs entered TSAC 3.4.9(A.1) and (A.2) to reduce levels to less than the limit. Pressurizer level was approximately 81 percent at this time.

PZR level was logged as >62.8% at 1555, but actually reached 62.8% at 1528.

15:57 In EOP-9.0, Attachment 5, "Safety Injection Throttling Criteria," was met so the ROs throttled reduced flow on the charging pumps in an attempt to lower the PCS level in the pressurizer; however, the letdown system was still isolated.

At this time charging flow was "reduced " to 0 gpm, i.e. there was no further PCS inventory addition.

15:57 Plant Status:

  • SG 'A' Level was 97.02 percent;
  • SG 'A' Pressure was 853 . 33 psia;
  • SG `B' Level was 63.96 percent;
  • SG `B' Pressure was 965 . 86 psia;
  • Pressurizer level was 81 . 17 percent ; (79.7%)
  • Pressurizer pressure was 2046 . 04 psia ; and, (2068 psia)
  • The PCS average temperature was 532 .77°F. (527°F) 15:57 120-Volt Preferred AC Bus No. 3 (Y-30) was OPERABLE on the bypass regulator.

Bus 1 E (nonsafety 2400 Volt AC) was lost with these actions.

Bus 1 E load shed due to Left channel SIAS initiating.

8 Attachment 3

15:57 Busses D-10L and D-10R, 125-Volt DC Left Train, were OPERABLE due to Y-30 being restored and the shunt trip Breaker 72-01 re-closed. Upon restoration generator field Breaker 341 automatically opened and instrument air Compressor C-2A tripped for an unknown reason.

D-10L and D-10R being operable is not dependent on Y-30 restoration. Instrument air compressor C-2A tripped due to its breaker trip circuit being energized when dc power was restored.

15:57 The SG 'A' reaches a maximum level of -97.02 percent (per PPC).

16:02 Charging Pump `B' (P-55B) suction relief Valve RV-2096 lifted and did not properly re-seat. This caused volume control tank water to fill up the equipment drain tank and spill-over onto the floor in pump Cubicle 'B' (backed-up floor drain).

RV-2096 was reported to be lifting at 1602, but had been for some time (possibly since 1506). The water filling the EDT was from the BASTs, not the VCT. The BA pumps were running, keeping the VCT outlet check valve closed, so charging makeup to the PCS was from the BASTs.

-16:02 Main steam safety valve(s) continue to lift to maintain secondary side pressures, which subsequently maintained PCS temperature.

MSSVs on E-50B continue lifting (partially open), but not on E-50A (pressure remained below the full closure value since -1516). The major heat removal contributor is excess AFW. PCS temperature at this time begins rising due to CV-0522B having been closed, stopping P-8B.

16:15 Pressurizer level reached a maximum of approximately 98 percent.

MSSVs on both SGs open, stopping the PCS temperature rise and PZR level peaks at 101.5%. MSSVs remain partially open, controlling PCS temperature until the ASDVs are put in service.

16:21 Procedure ONP-7.1, "Loss of Instrument Air," entered since instrument air compressor C-2A tripped at 15:57 upon restoration of the 125-Volt DC left train. Instrument air Compressors C-2B and C-2C were placed in service by the AOs.

Air compressors were started by a control room operator and verified operating normally by auxiliary operators.

16:30 Operators in the field manually isolated charging Pump P-55B, by closing the discharge and suction isolation valves. This was necessary due to an abundance of water in the cubicle from the improperly seated relief Valve RV-2096.

16:34 The HPSI and LPSI Pumps `A' were secured due to SIAS throttling criteria being met (were never injecting but started on SIAS signal).

16:44 The SG ` B' level reached a maximum of approximately 69.06 percent.

9 Attachment 3

16:44 Plant Status:

  • SG 'A' level was 90.45 percent;
  • SG `A' pressure was 932 . 45 psia;
  • SG 'B' level was 69.06 percent;
  • SG `B' pressure was 930.70 psia ; ( 949.6 psia)
  • Pressurizer level was 91 . 94 percent ; (97.3%)
  • Pressurizer pressure was 1864 . 13 psia; and,
  • The PCS average temperature was 539.48°F.

16:46 120-Volt preferred AC Bus No . 1 (Y-10 ) was OPERABLE on bypass regulator.

120-Volt Preferred AC Bus No . 3 (Y-30) was taken off of the bypass regulator and powered from the inverter.

16:46 All four ASDVs were OPERABLE with the return of 120-Volt Preferred AC power source No. 1, Y-1 0 (power restored to controller).

At this time operators started using ASDVs for heat removal, and the MSSVs closed and remained closed.

17:20 Procedure ONP-4.1, "Spurious Containment Isolation," was entered due to loss of preferred AC busses Y-10 and Y-30 causing a CIS.

ONP-4 .1 was entered at this time to reset the CHR-CIS which occurred at 1506.

17:46 The ROs exited EOP-9.0 with restoration of the preferred AC busses and entered GOP-8, "Power Reduction and Plant Shutdown to Mode 2 or Mode 3 <_525°F."

The above should read "... > 525°F", not <525°F.

18:00 Once the ROs exited EOP-9.0, the criteria was met to reset the SIAS.

18:00 Cooling was restored to Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Heat Exchanger (lost during loss of power). The temperature in the SFP at 15:00 was 83.4°F and the temperature of the pool at the time of restoration of the heat exchanger was 87.4°F.

18:52 The AFW Pump P-8B was declared OPERABLE when steam supply control Valve CV-0522B was re-opened and controller placed in AUTO.

19:09 The ROs exited ONP-24.1, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus No. 1," with restoration of Y-10 and associated loads.

19:11 The ROs exited ONP-24.3, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus No. 3," with restoration of Y-30 and associated loads.

19:12 The ROs declared Inverter No. 3, D-08, OPERABLE which enabled the exit of TSAC 3 .0.3 with busses Y-1 0, Y-30 , and Inverter D-08 restored.

19:12 The ROs exited ONP-7.1, "Loss of Instrument Air," when power was returned to the right channel controller.

10 Attachment 3

19:23 Battery Charger No. 1 D-15 was still INOPERABLE and TSAC 3.8.4(A.2) was entered by the ROs.

19:23 Main Station Battery left Channel D-01 was still INOPERABLE and TSAC 3.8.4(B.1) and 3.8.6(A.1 and A.2) were entered by the ROs due to not being connected to a charger.

19:33 The ROs connected battery Charger No. 3, D-17, to the 125-Volt DC bus to charge main station battery left channel D-01.

20:16 Main station battery left channel D-01 met the TSAC requirement 3.8.6 (A.1) and its terminal voltage was greater than 125-Volt; however the ROs were still in TSAC 3.8.6(A.2).

23:48 The ROs restored pressurizer level to less than 62.8 percent (TS limit) which enabled the exiting of TSAC 3.4.9 (A.1 and A.2).

Monday, September 26, 2011 01:23 WO 291210-03 started to remove Breaker 72-122 to use those bus tie stabs to replace the ones on Breaker 72-119 that were damaged during the event.

01:56 Charging Pump P-55B was declared OPERABLE by the ROs after leaking suction relief Valve RV-2096 was verified to function and water was cleaned up in cubicle.

03:00 Breakers 72-119 and 72-120 were installed and restored.

04:41 Main station battery left channel D-01 was declared OPERABLE by the ROs and TSACs 3. 8.4 and 3 . 8.6 were exited.

06:40 Power was restored back to Breaker 72-119 loads and thermography was completed satisfactorily on all of the restored breakers, with no anomalies identified.

11:58 Charging Pump P-55B was started to initiate double charging and letdown to aid in PCS cooldown and transition to Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown).

16:09 The ROs exited ONP-4.1, "Spurious Containment Isolation."

16:30 The ROs commenced a PCS cooldown with turbine bypass valve.

23:06 Reactor entered Mode 4.

Tuesday, September 27, 2011 04:30 Shutdown cooling was placed in-service per GOP-9 and GOP-14 when PCS pressure was less than 265 psia and PCS temperature was less than 300°F.

06:33 Reactor entered Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).

11 Attachment 3

Friday, September 30, 2011 20:05 Revision 1 of the operability evaluation for the 125-Volt DC system was accepted by operations.

21:31 Reactor entered Mode 4.

Saturday, October 1, 2011 02:48 Reactor entered Mode 3.

23:30 Reactor entered Mode 2.

Sunday, October 2, 2011 01:35 Initial criticality achieved with Group 3 rods at 99.3 inches.

02:26 Achieved the Point of Adding Heat.

03:27 The MSIVs were opened with no issues on operation of valves.

07:37 AFW Pump P-8C was secured with no issues.

08:24 Reactor entered Mode 1.

10:20 Generator output breakers closed.

Monday, October 3, 2011 11:50 Reactor power was at 100 percent.

12 Attachment 3

LIST OF MAJOR AFFECTED EQUIPMENT REVIEW OF DE-ENERGIZED EQUIPMENT ON 9/25/11 PLANT TRIP This is a preliminary review of equipment response to the plant trip on 9/25/11. The initial set of components lost on 9/25 is D11-1, D11-2, D-1 OR, D-1OL. The loss of D-1 OR and D-1OL led to the loss of Y-10 and Y-30, which led to the plant trip. This table identifies the loss of major components. Other components may have been lost, but did not have a significant impact on mitigating the event in the short term. The instrument air system was in an abnormal lineup at the time, with Feedwater Purity Air cross-tied to plant air. 'A' Channel of Pressurizer Pressure and Level control systems were in-service.

Affected Component Actual Component State Additional Information Following Transient Loss of DC Power SV-0522G & De-energized Fails open `B' AFW pump SV-0522H, Air Control to steam supply valve CV-0522B Steam Supply Valve for 'B' AFW pump CV-1212, Service Air Header Failed closed Loss of Service Air Isolation 25F7, Main Generator Output Did not auto trip (stayed closed) Required to relay terminals to Breaker be jumpered in control room panel to Open Main Generator Field Breaker, Did not open (should open on Locally tripped open 341 turbine trip) The field breaker opened automatically when dc power was restored.

Bus 1A, Non-Safety 4160V De-energized and did not fast Lost control power for all transfer to Station breakers and indicating lights Transformer (from Start-up Transformer) Should read "...did not transfer from station power xfmr 1-1 to startup transformer 1-1."

Bus 1 F, Non-Safety 4160V De-energized and did not fast Lost control power for all transfer to Station breakers and indicating lights Transformer (from Start-up Transformer) Should read "...did not transfer from station power xfmr 1-3 to startup transformer 1-1."

Load Center -11 (480V AC Lost control power for all Local manual control available Attachment 7

Affected Component Actual Component State Additional Information Following Transient Loss of DC Power Safety-related) breakers (with loss of DC bus)

Load Center -19 (480V AC Lost control power for all Local manual control available Safety-related) breakers (with loss of DC bus)

Load Center -17 (480V AC Lost control power for all Local manual control available Safety-related) breakers (with loss of DC bus)

Load Center -77 (480V AC Lost control power for all Local manual control available Safety-related) breakers (with loss of DC bus)

CV-2009, Letdown Failed closed Caused Letdown Heat Containment Isolation Valve Exchanger Inlet Relief Valve, RV-2006, to lift RV-2006 did not lift until PZR level control channel B was placed in service.

CV-2083, Primary Failed closed Controlled Bleedoff instead Coolant Pumps (P- went to Primary System Drain 50A/B/C/D) Tank via Relief Valve, RV-Controlled Bleedoff Control 2082 Valve Instrument Air Compressors, Lost standby start feature, Manual Start capability C-2A/B/C internal "sleep mode" feature available still available The "sleep mode" provides an auto start feature for compressors whose breakers are closed.

CV-1212, Service Air Header Failed closed Service Air was not needed Isolation Valve during this event CV-1221, Feedwater Purity Air Failed open Feedwater Purity Air System Cross-Tie to Plant Air Valve fed air to the Instrument Air System loads The FWP air supply to plant loads was not available from event initiation (bus 1 E de-energized on SIAS) until bus 1 E was reenergized.

EK-02, Alarms on Control Lost alarm scheme due to loss Room panel C-11A (Radiation of power Control Room HVAC panel)

EK-21, Left Channel alarms on Lost alarm scheme due to loss Safety Injection Signal of power Attachment 7

Affected Component Actual Component State Additional Information Following Transient Loss of DC Power sequencer display EK-24, alarms on Isophase Lost alarm scheme due to loss Bus Panel of power EK-33, alarms on Control Lost alarm scheme due to loss Room panel C-106 (Cooling of power Tower Master Supervisory and Control Cabinet)

EK-35, alarms on Control Lost alarm scheme due to loss Room panel C-126 of power (Circulation Water and Iodine Removal Panel)

Various Containment Isolation Failed closed and lost position and Radwaste Valves indication due to loss of DC power Attachment 7

Affected Component Actual Component State Additional Information Following Transient Loss of Y-10 and Y-30 Safety Injection Actuation 2 out of 4 channels received Right Channel logic was Signal actuation signal which meets met - Left Channel lost circuit logic start criteria power to its relays when Y-30 was lost, therefore Charging Pump P-55C was unavailable.

P-55C did not automatically start, but it was available to be manually started throughout the event.

Containment High Radiation 2 out of 4 channels received Right Channel logic was met Signal actuation signal which meets - Left Channel lost power to its circuit logic start criteria relays when Y-1 0 was lost Containment High Pressure Alarmed in Control Room Left Channel created alarm -

Alarm no actuation initiated due to relays losing power when Y-10 was lost Main Steam Isolation Signal 2 out of 4 channels received Right Channel logic was met actuation signal which meets - Left Channel lost power to its circuit logic start criteria relays when Y-30 was lost

'A' Channel of Pressurizer Lost power with loss of AC Pressurizer pressure control Pressure Control (in Control systems responded by the Room) Heaters going to maximum capacity and the Spray not actuating

`A' Channel of Pressurizer Lost power with loss of AC Pressurizer level control Level Control (in Control systems responded by having Room) maximum Charging flow from the available charging pumps and minimum Letdown capability by closing the Letdown Isolation Valves Attachment 7

Affected Component Actual Component State Additional Information Following Transient Loss of Y-10 and Y-30 Auxiliary Feedwater 2 out of 3 channels received `A' AFW Pump P-8A did not Pumps P-8A/B receive low trip signal which meets circuit have power, suction pressure trip logic trip criteria AFW Pump P-8B was running The low suction pressure at full capacity due to AFAS trip logic was met, but the that overrode the low suction pumps did not receive the pressure trip and was trip signal due to panel manually isolated during the D-11-1 being de- event by operators energized. P-8A did have power available. It did not start on AFAS, but could have been started manually from the control room or locally.

HIC-0780A/B & HIC- Lost power with loss of AC Could not manually or 0781 B, automatically control Atmospheric Steam ASDVs (valves were not Dump Valve available for use during the Controllers (in Control Room) event)

The ASDVs were available once preferred bus EY-10 was reenergized.

Attachment 7

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