ML120100558
| ML120100558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/2012 |
| From: | Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML1200100495 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-11-241, EA-11-243, PNP 2012-06 CR-PLP-2011-4822 | |
| Download: ML120100558 (38) | |
Text
Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP -D1 1 11-07 Rev. 1 En ineerin g
g Analysis 5 - Page 1 of 20 5:
Thermal-Hydraulic Analyses 1.0 PURPOSE....................................
2 2.0 CONCLUSION.............................................
2 3.0 INPUT..........................................
2 3 1 MAAP 4 0 6 Model
..........................................................................................................................2 3.2 Event-Specific Plant Data...............................................................................................................2 3.3 Condensate Storage Tank..............................................................................................................4 3.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs).................................................................................................4 3.5 Auxiliary Feedwater........................................................................................................................4 3.6 Charging.........................................................................................................................................5 4.0 ASSUMPTIONS.................................................................................................
6 4.1 Major Assumptions
......................................................................................................................... 6 4.2 Minor Assumptions.........................................................................................................................
7 5.0 ANALYSIS......................................................................................................................................... 7 5.1 D11-2 SDP Case7..........................................................................................................................7 5.2 D11-2 SDP Case11......................................................................................................................10 5.3 D11-2 SDP Case17......................................................................................................................16 6.0 WATER
SUMMARY
.........................................................................................................................19
7.0 REFERENCES
20 8 0 APPENDICES
.................................................................................................................................. 20
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g Analysis 5 - Page 2 of 20 1.0 PURPOSE The 09/25/2011 dc panel ED-11-2 fault isolated letdown flow and increased charging flow. This resulted in rising pressurizer level and represented a potential challenge to pressurizer safety relief valves. Steam and/or water release from pressurizer safety relief valves could result in a stuck open relief valve and subsequent above-core, vapor-space loss of coolant accident.
This evaluation investigates the integrated plant response to a stuck open safety relief valve within the context of the loss of dc event. Theis attachment evaluation is a margin evaluation of employing the charging pumps as a makeup source. The results are provided as information, only.
The current event tree success criteria require HPSI as the makeup source. No changes to this criterion have been made.provides a basis for the event tree structure and success criteria used in the logic model.
This evaluation uses the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) model for Palisades.
2.0 CONCLUSION
Thermal-hydraulic analysis in this evaluation demonstrates the success criteria for above-core, vapor-space LOCAs can be satisfied with two charging pumps providing makeup..
As long as secondary side cooling is available for decay heat removal, the transient does not require high pressure safety injection to preclude core damage, apart from additional failures that once-through-cooling would be required to mitigate the event.
Long term heat removal via the steam generators or transition to shutdown cooling could then become a success path, even when a SRV sticks open - provided inventory makeup is available.
For example, charging with safety injection refueling water tank (SIRWT) inventory, conserved by terminating sprays, or via HPSI in recirculation mode would maintain adequate core cooling.
3.0 INPUT 3.1 MAAP 4.0.6 Model The baseline model is developed and documented in the MAAP 4.0.6 model parameter file [1] and thermal hydraulic analyses [2]. The baseline model is used as the starting point for this evaluation.
MAAP is a computer code that simulates the response of light water reactor power plants during severe accidents. Given a set of initiating events and operator actions, MAAP predicts plant response as a function of time.
Plant response under severe accident scenarios is complex and is best evaluated in an integrated manner. The primary system and containment responses are sensitive to the calculated pressures, temperatures, flows, and event timings. These parameters also affect operator action timings, the radionuclide release timings, and the mitigating system performance assessments.
Proper plant-specific characterization of the severe accident progression is important to the realistic representation of the plant and highly desirable for a PRA assessment.
3.2 Event-Specific Plant Data The timeline in Attachment 01 considered the best available information, including PI data, PPC data, control room recorder data, operator logs, procedures filled-out during the event, and interviews and discussions with operations.
Inputs to this evaluation are based on and consistent with the results of the timeline construction, to the greatest extent possible. Specific data sources are given below.
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g Analysis 5 - Page 3 of 20 3.2.1 Process Information (PI) Data Event-specific plant data for various plant parameters are obtained from the PI data archive. PI is software quality assurance (SQA) category "C" (important to business) per Entergy SQA procedure EN-IT-104. The plant process computer (PPC) provides data to the PI system. PPC is SQA category "B" (regulatory commitments). Most PPC points are calibrated via technical specification surveillance procedure or by preventive maintenance and controlled calibration sheets.
Part of the PI server system runs on the PPC. This portion monitors selected points every second to test against the exception threshold change value.
If the change value is exceeded, the data is passed to the PI server and recorded. The PI server also compares the new value against previous values to see if it still fits on a line within the compression limit. If yes, the data is discarded, otherwise it is added to the archive. For pump starts, the compression limit is simply a change in state (on-off or start-stopped),
if 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> have passed without an archive update, one is made regardless. PI provides generally accurate long term values and greater amounts of data when events are changing rapidly.
Since the event resulted in the loss of two preferred ac buses, various PPC/Pl data points were unavailable and not recorded in the PPC/Pl systems.
This evaluation uses PI data both directly and in support of other data sources for:
steam generator level steam generator pressure auxiliary feedwater flow pressurizer level pressurizer pressure charging flow primary coolant system average temperature 3.2.2 Control Room Recorder Data Event-specific plant data for various plant parameters are obtained from control room recorder data.
Certain Yokagawa-type control room indicators have the ability to record and store data. Plant instrumentation and control engineers collected post-event data from these recorders and provided both display screen shots and data to the PRA group.
This evaluation uses Yokagawa recorder data both directly and in support of other data sources for:
pressurizer level pressurizer pressure charging flow primary coolant system average and loop temperatures main feewater turbine steam flow main feedwater turbine steam pressure
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Analysis 5 - Page 4 of 20 3.2.3 Operator Logs Event-specific plant data for various parameters and events are obtained from electronic operator round (eSOMS) logs.
This evaluation uses eSOMS logs mainly in support of other data sources.
3.3 Condensate Storage Tank The condensate storage tank (T-2) was 87°F as recorded in the electronic operator rounds (eSOMS) at 0752 on 9-25-2011.
3.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)
Operation of the atmospheric dump valves (CV-0779, CV-0780, CV-0781, and CV-0782 ) via quick open and manual control is unavailable until power is restored to preferred ac bus EY-10.
The loss of dc event resulted in loss of power to the inverter that supplies preferred ac bus EY-1 0. Power can be restored by restoring power to the dc bus and re-energizing the inverter or aligning the bypass regulator to re-energize the preferred ac bus. EY-10 was placed on bypass regulator at 16:46, one hour forty minutes into the event.
For cases where ADVs are restored, valve operation to achieve decay heat removal and plant cooldown in accordance with technical specification limits on cooldown rate is used.
In nearly all the MAAP cases reported herein, the ADV's are modeled as "failed closed".
3.5 Auxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary feedwater pump P-8A does not start on auxiliary feedwater actuation signal due to loss of preferred ac buses EY-10 and EY-30. However, P-8A remains available to be started from the control room or locally. After restoration of power to ED-11-1 and EY-10 or EY-30, P-8A is capable of automatic start should steam generator levels fall to the auxiliary feedwater actuation signal setpoint.
The loss of dc event de-energized left channel dc power. This results in automatic start of P-8B (mechanical governor maintains normal turbine/pump speed) with flow control valves wide open. Steam supply to P-8B was manually isolated at 16:03. P-8B flows to each steam generator are given in 0. Attachment 04 provides an accounting of AFW delivered to the steam generators during the event.
Right channel dc power remained available. Auxiliary feedwater pump P-8C starts on auxiliary feedwater actuation signal given P-8A failure to deliver required flow (due to loss of EY-10, EY-30 and loss of left channel dc). Flow control valves set to 165 gpm to each steam generator. P-8C flow to E-50A was isolated due to overfill concerns at 15:44. P-8C flow to E-50B was isolated at 16:09 due to adequate E-50B level.
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g Analysis 5 - Page 5 of 20 For cases demonstrating event thermal-hydraulics, the following AFW data is used:
Table 3. 5-1:
Total AFW Flow Time (event time )
Time (hours )
Time (minutes )
Flow to E-50A (gpm)
Flow to E-50B (gpm )
Flow to E-50A (Ibm/hr)
Flow to E-50B (Ibm/hr) time 0 (1506) 0 0
342 350 1.697E+05 1.737E+05 1520.0 0.2333 14.0 342 350 1.697E+05 1.737E+05 1520.1 0.2350 14.1 419 273 2.080E+05 1.355E+05 1530.0 0.4000 24.0 419 273 2.080E+05 1.355E+05 1530.1 0.4017 24.1 495 185 2.457E+05 9.182E+04 1540.0 0.5667 34.0 495 185 2.457E+05 9.182E+04 1540.1 0.5683 34.1 379 163 1.881E+05 8.090E+04 1603.0 1.6167 97.0 379 163 1.881E+05 8.090E+04 1603.1 1.6183 97.1 0
156 0
7.743E+04 1609.0 1.7167 103.0 0
0 0
0 1636.0 2.1667 130.0 0
0 0
0 1636.1 2.1683 130.1 0
129 0
6.403E+04 1730.0 3.7333 224.0 0
129 0
6.403E+04 1730.1 3.7350 224.1 56 96 2.779E+04 4.765E+04 end of problem 24.0000 1440.0 56 96 2.779E+04 4.765E+04 3.6 Charging Initial charging flow was 93 gpm. At approximately 36 minutes into the event, charging flow was reduced to 73 gpm.
The loss of dc event resulted in failure of the in-service channel A pressurizer level and heater control circuit. With no power to channel A the control program defaulted to maximum flow from the operating pumps (93 gpm: P-55A - 53 gpm; P-55B - 40 gpm).
At approximately 31 minutes into the event operators switched pressurizer level control to channel B to enable pressurizer spray. With channel 'B' in service charging flow reduced to the minimum flow from operating pumps (73 gpm: P-55A - 33 gpm; P-55B - 40 gpm).
Had channel 'B' been in service at the time of the event, charging flow rate would have been at minimum flow from the operating pumps from time zero.
For cases demonstrating event thermal-hydraulics, the following charging data is used:
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g Analysis 5 - Page 6 of 20 Table 3.6-1:
Total Charging Flow Time (event time)
Time (hours )
Time (minutes )
Flow to PCS (gpm)
Flow to PCS (Ibm/hr) time 0 (1506) 0 0
93 1542.0 0.6000 36 73 1557.0 0.8500 51 0
0 end of problem 24.0000 1440.0 0
0 4.0 ASSUMPTIONS 4.1 Major Assumptions 4.1.1 AFW flow delivery is under predicted.
Basis: AFW flow is limited based on S/G level control. Therefore, the Table 3.5-1 data is automatically throttled to match decay heat.
Bias:
Conservative, as the calculated primary system pressure is greater.
4.1.2 MAAP S/G Modeling Limited Basis: The Palisades MAAP model runs hotter than the RELAP Version 3 Mod 2 model.
Comparisons
[3] between MAAP and RELAP have shown that for station blackout sequences with subsequent once-through -cooling (OTC), that the comparative behavior between the codes for the most part, is very similar.
The single biggest difference is the more rapid steam generator dryout calculated by MAAP. This is considered due to the MAAP S /G modeling limitations.
Below, the MAAP hot core node temperature peaks at about 1200°K. No peak is exhibited from the RELAP results.
Bias:
Conservative, as the MAAP results produce higher pressures and temperatures for above core breaks.
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Analysis 5 - Page 7 of 20 4.2 Minor Assumptions 4.2.1 The onset of core damage has been defined as the time when peak core temperature reaches 1800 F.
Basis:
The onset of core damage should be developed consistent with the desire to be as realistic as possible and consistent with current best practice.
If the MAAP code is used to predict core response, it is recommended that core damage be defined as the time when peak core temperature reaches 1800°F.
This is based on the characteristics of the MAAP code and the guidance provided in the MAAP4 applications guide. A peak core temperature of 1800°F is also consistent with the general guidelines for the definition of core damage provided in the EPRI Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) Applications Guide [4].
Bias:
This is considered conservative per Assumption 4.1.2 and given that the fuel design limit is 2200°F.
4.2.2 Quench Tank Model Disabled Basis: The PORV discharge model to the quench tank was disabled, to improve code execution time.
Bias:
This is considered neutral as it results in a slightly higher early containment heat load and somewhat slows the PCS blowdown transient.
5.0 ANALYSIS Illustrative and/or important MAAP cases are described below. Not all MAAP cases are explicitly discussed. The case name (prefix of the input file name) indentifies the specific MAAP run. The purpose, description and conclusion of each run are provided; selected plots follow.
Two basic types of cases are analyzed:
n Cases utilizing event-specific timing and/or plant response n
Cases utilizing bounding timing and/or plant response.
The first set of cases is meant to envelope the actual event to ensure the actual plant response is bounded by the second set of cases. No cases have been performed to precisely match actual event plant response in all respects. Various model conservatisms add margin to the bounding case results.
Following each case the selected plot results are presented following by the specific MAAP input file is listed.
5.1 D11-2 SDP Case7 5.1.1 D11-2 SDP Case7 Purpose The purpose of this case is to evaluate the 9/25/11 baseline event incorporating time line data, operating plant equipment, etc. in order to determine the time to refill T-2.
In this case, with charging secured in 51 minutes core heat is removed by AFW with steaming through the safeties.
Table 5.1.1 provides an overview of the case inputs and boundary conditions. Appendix A includes the specific input file.
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gy Analysis 5 - Page 8 of 20 Table 5.1.1 MAAP CASE
SUMMARY
Purpose :
Determine the time to Refill T-2.
Description :
- AFW initially operable for -97 minutes.
Tripped for -27 minutes restored in -2.17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />.
See Table 3.5-1.
ADVs assumed disabled (locked closed) for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
P-55A and P-55B available for 51 minutes and secured.
See Table 3.5-2 T-2 refill not credited.
Other:
No PCS Break(s)
D11-2 SDP Case7
- HPSI Tripped (t=0)
LPSI Tripped (t=0)
PCPs tripped in 11 minutes Fans/Coolers Tripped (t=0)
Containment Sprays Tripped (t=0)
PZR Sprays Tripped (t=0)
PZR Heaters Tripped (t=0)
Main Feedwater Isolated (t=0)
MSIVs Forced Closed (t=0)
Conclusion :
If T-2 can be refilled within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, core damage will be averted.
Figure 5.1.1-1
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g Analysis 5 - Page 10 of 20 5.1.2 D11-2 SDP Case7 Results Figure 5.1.1-1 indicates the rise in the peak core node temperature begins in about 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.
Figure 5.1.1-2 show the condensate storage tank (T-2) emptying in approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />, and Figure 5.1.1-3 presents charging flow termination.
5.2 D11-2 SDP Case11 5.2.1 D11-2 SDP Casel1 Purpose The purpose of this case is to evaluate the 9/25/11 baseline event incorporating time line data, operating plant equipment, etc. This case reports on the water inventory given a stuck open PZR valve, and unsecured charging flow for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
Table 5.2.1 provides an overview of the case inputs and boundary conditions.
Appendix A includes the specific input file.
Table 5.2.1 MAAP CASE
SUMMARY
To evaluate the 9/25/11 baseline event incorporating time line data, Purpose :
operating plant equipment, etc.
Charging, 80 gpm flow, unsecured (t=0) with a Stuck Open PZR Safety (t=1.15 hrs).
Description :
- AFW initially operable for -97 minutes.
Tripped for -27 minutes restored in -2.17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />.
See Table 3.5-1.
ADVs assumed disabled (locked closed) for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
T-2 refill not credited.
1 Containment Air Cooler credited.
Problem run time 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
Other:
Forced PCS Break Simulating Stuck Open PZR Safety (1.15 hrs)
D11-2 SDP Case11
- HPSI Tripped (t=0)
LPSI Tripped (t=0)
PCPs tripped in 11 minutes Containment Sprays Tripped (t=0)
PZR Sprays Tripped (t=0)
PZR Heaters Tripped (t=0)
Main Feedwater Isolated (t=0)
MSIVs Forced Closed (t=0)
In case 11, the PZR safeties begin to pass water in -1.15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> at which time a stuck open PZR safety is modeled. Assuming containment sprays Conclusion :
are promptly secured, safety injection refueling water tank inventory (T-
- 58) and condensate storage tank (T-2) water will last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- Moreover, I CAC alone can remove containment heat.
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g Analysis 5 - Page 11 of 20 Figure 5.2.1-1 Peak Core Temperature (mass averaged over node material ) [dl 1-2_sdp_case-11 d95]
180E+03 1 60E+03 1 40E+03 1 20E+03 C 1.00E-03 8.00E+02 6.00E+02 !_.
4.00E+02 2 00E+02 0 OOE-00 0 00E+00 5. 00E+00 1 00E+01 1.50E - 01 2.00E+01 2. 50E+61 TII;IE HRj Figure 5.2.1-2
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g Analysis 5 - Page 12 of 20 J Figure 5.2.1-3 Figure 5.2.1-4
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g Analysis 5 - Page 13 of 20 Figure 5.2.1-5 FiaurP 5 9 1-F
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g Analysis 5 - Page 15 of 20 Figure 5.2.1-9 Finure
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g ee gy Analysis 5 - Page 16 of 20 5.2.2 D11-2 SDP Case11 Results Figure 5.2-1 shows the rise in the peak core node temperature given a stuck open pressurizer safety valve at approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The peak temperature of 1650°F remained less than the success criteria limit of 1800°F.
Figure 5.2.1-2 displays the primary coolant system pressure (PCS).
Figure 5.2.1-3 presents the unsecured charging flow dropping from 93 gpm to 73 gpm at 36 minutes into the event.
Figure 5.2.1-4 shows the safety injection refueling water storage tank (SIRWT) dropping about 8 feet during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
Figure 5.2.1-5 demonstrates that 1 containment air cooler (CAC) is sufficient to keep containment pressure less than the 55 psig design value.
Figure 5.2.1-6 indicates that the condensate storage tank (T-2) dropped from about 72 feet to 26 feet during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> duration.
Figures 5.2.1-7 and 5.2.1-8 present displays the E-50A and E-50B steam generator levels, and similarly Figures 5.2.1-9 and 5.2.1-10 report the AFW flow to each generator.
In summary, Case 11 results show that if 2 charging pumps, SIRWT water and AFW are available then HPSI injection is not required.
However, the logic model as described in Section 6.2 conservatively requires HPSI for success in all RAS sequences, to achieve a safe and stable state for the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> mission.
5.3 D11-2 SDP Case17 5.3.1 D11-2 SDP Casel7 Purpose The purpose of this case is to evaluate the 9/25/11 baseline event incorporating time line data, operating plant equipment, etc. This case presents the minimum time to empty the SIRWT. A failed open PZR valve modeled at 1.15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> with all three spray pumps running is considered. The time to emptying the pressuizer may be used as an operator recovery action.
Table 5.3.1 MAAP CASE
SUMMARY
To evaluate the 9/25/11 baseline event incorporating time line data, Purpose :
operating plant equipment, etc.
80 gpm charging flow with a Stuck Open PZR Safety (t=1.15 hrs).
All 3 containment spray pumps are operating to determine the time to SIRWT depletion.
Description :
- No AFW.
ADVs assumed disabled (locked closed) for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
T-2 refill not credited.
Problem run time 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
Other:
Forced PCS Break Simulating Stuck Open PZR Safety (1.15 hrs)
D11-2 SDP Casel7
- HPSI Tripped (t=0)
LPSI Tripped (t=0)
PCPs tripped in 11 minutes PZR Sprays Tripped (t=0)
PZR Heaters Tripped (t=0)
Main Feedwater Isolated (t=0)
MSIVs Forced Closed (t=0)
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g Analysis 5 - Page 17 of 20 In case 17, the PZR safeties begin to pass water in -1.15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> and a Conclusion :
stuck open PZR safety is modeled. Assuming containment sprays are not secured, the SIRWT runs out of water in a little over two hours.
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Analysis 5 - Page 18 of 20 Figure 5.3.1-3 5.3.2 D11-2 SDP Case17 Results Figure 5.3.1-1 shows the time when the SIRWT would empty, given that containment spray pumps are not secured and charging is providing makeup.
Figure 5.3.1-2 plots the containment spray delivery curve.
Figure 5.3.1-3 presents the water flow rate through the pressurizer safety valve starting at approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
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gy Analysis 5 - Page 19 of 20 6.0 WATER
SUMMARY
Water summary results are listed below in Table 6.
Table 6 Case Water Makeup Requirements Case Water Source Refill Time ADV's AFW PZR Safeties Charging Containment Heat Comments Flow Removal 7
Condensate Storage Tank 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> Closed Table 3.5-1 closed Table 3.5-2 Assuming Table 3.5-1 delivery rates.
11 SIRWT Empty
> 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Closed Table 3.5-1 Failed Open 80 gpm 1 CAC Failed open per PCS high pressure demand at 1.15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. Assumes containment sprays initially secured.
11 Condensate Table Failed open per PCS high pressure demand at Storage Tank
> 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Closed 3.5-1 Failed Open 80 gpm 1 CAC 1.15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. Assumes containment sprays initially secured.
17 SIRWT Empty
- 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Closed none Failed Open 80 gpm 3 Spray PZR Safeties failed open at 0.2 hrs, chosen to bound the results.
Three containment spray Pumps pumps are modeled.
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g Analysis 5 - Page 20 of 20
7.0 REFERENCES
[1]
PLP0247-07-0004. 02R1, Revision 1, Palisades Nuclear Plant MAAP 4. 0.6 Parameter Files Notebook, Volumes 1-8, August 2009.
[2]
PLP0247-07-0004.01 R2, Revision 2, Palisades Nuclear Plant Thermal Hydraulic MAAP Calculations, October 2009.
[3]
Letter from Jeff R. Gabor to Brian Brogan, "MAAP4/RELAP5 Comparison Final Report",
PP0495050004-2613, March, 2006.
[4]
Palisades PSA Notebook NB-PSA-ETSC Rev. 2, "Event Trees and Success Criteria".
8.0 APPENDICES Appendix A - MAAP Input Files Appendix A - MAAP Input Files Appendix B - MAAP Attach & Plot Files Appendix B - MAAP Attach & Plot Files. pd
Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2 07 Rev. 0
-Enteirgy Engineering Appendix A - Page 1 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files Appendix A:
MAAP Input Files 1.0 D11-2_SDP_Case-7.inp...............................................................................................................................
2 2.0 D11-2_SDP_Case-11.inp.............................................................................................................................5 3.0 D11-2 SDP Case-17. inp.............................................................................................................................9
Ift Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP - D11-2-11-07 Rev. 0 Enteergy Engineering Appendix A - Page 2 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files 1.0 D11-2 SDP CASE-7.INP SENSITIVITY ON TITLE Loss of Dll-2 Case 7
END TITLE INCLUDE attach.dat INCLUDE attach_chargingl Dl1_2(2).dat INCLUDE sc plots(l).dat PARAMETER CHANGE C
PSGRV
=
2000 PSI
//
Lock the ADV closed TDMFW
=
0.0 HR
//
Time delay between MEW isol actual isol C
Set CST to large value but keep same level C
MWCSTO
=
1.E9 LB C
ACST
=
738220.
FT**2 C
Given MAAP will use the minimum of WAFWXU or the flowrate from the pump head
- curve, C
set the head curve data high.
WVAFW(1)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(2)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(3)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(4)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(5)=
1000.
GPM END START TIME IS 0.
END TIME IS 24.0 HR PRINT INTERVAL IS 1.
HR INITIATORS C
PS BREAK(S)
FAILED HPI FORCED OFF LPI FORCED OFF C
MCP SWITCH OFF OR HI-VIBR TRIP FANS/COOLERS FORCED OFF ESF UPPER/LOWER COMPT.
SPRAYS FORCED OFF C
MOTOR-DRIVEN AUX FEED WATER FORCED OFF PZR SPRAYS FORCED OFF PZR HTRS FORCED OFF MANUAL SCRAM MAIN FW SHUT OFF C
CHARGING PUMPS FORCED OFF S/G MSIV:
FORCED CLOSED PS MAKEUP OFF LETDOWN SWITCH OFF
Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 Rev. 0
- Enter y Engineering Appendix A - Page 3 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files END WHEN REACTOR SCRAM IS TRUE SET TIMER 1
END WHEN TIMER 1
0.000833 HR CHARGING PUMPS SWITCH:
AUTO CHARGING PUMP SWITCH:
MAN ON C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
342 GPM to E-50A and 350 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
l/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
1.697E+05 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
1.737E+05 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.1833 HR MCP SWITCH OFF OR HI-VIBR TRIP END WHEN TIMER 1
0.2350 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
419 GPM to E-50A and 273 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
2.08E+05 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
1.355E+05 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.4017 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
495 GPM to E-50A and 185 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
2.457E+05 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
9.182E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.5683 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
379 GPM to E-50A and 163 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia
Entergy PSA EA - PSA-SDP - D11-2-11-07 Rev. 0
- Enteigy Engineering Appendix A - Page 4 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
l/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
1.881E+05 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
8.09E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.6 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
P-55A and P-55B assumed operating at time 0
C Reduce P-55A flow rate from 53 gpm to 33 gpm WVPM6(1)
=
73.0 GPM WVPM6(2)
=
73.0 GPM WVPM6(3)
=
73.0 GPM WVPM6(4)
=
73.0 GPM WVPM6(5)
=
73.0 GPM C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.85 HR WVPM6(1)
=
0.0 GPM WVPM6(2)
=
0.0 GPM WVPM6(3)
=
0.0 GPM WVPM6(4)
=
0.0 GPM WVPM6(5)
=
0.0 GPM END WHEN TIMER 1
1.6183 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
0 GPM to E-50A and 156 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
0.0 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
7.743E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
1.7167 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
0 GPM to E-50A and 165 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
0.0 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
0.0 LB/HR C
END END
Entergy PSA EA -PSA-SDP -D11 11-07 Rev. 0
-Entergy Engineering Appendix A - Page 5 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files WHEN TIMER 1
2.1683 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
0 GPM to E-50A and 129 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=.1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
0.0 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
6.403E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
3.735 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
56 GPM to E-50A and 96 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
2.779E+04 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
4.765E+04 LB/HR C
END END 2.0 D11 SDP-CASE - 1 UNP SENSITIVITY ON TITLE Loss of D11-2 Case 11 END TITLE INCLUDE attach.dat INCLUDE attach_chargingl Dll-2(2).dat INCLUDE sc plots(1).dat PARAMETER CHANGE C
PSGRV
=
2000 PSI
//
Lock the ADV closed TDMFW
=
0.0 HR
//
Time delay between MFW isol actual isol C
Set CST to large value but keep same level C
MWCSTO
=
1.E9 LB C
ACST
=
738220.
FT**2 C
Given MAAP will use the minimum of WAFWXU or the flowrate from the pump head
- curve, C
set the head curve data high.
WVAFW(1)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(2)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(3)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(4)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(5)=
1000.
GPM C
3 CACs
=
12 Coils
Entergy PSA EA - PSA-SDP - D11-2-11-07 Rev. 0
'-"Enteigy Engineering Appendix A - Page 6 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files C
2 CACs
=
8 Coils C
1 CAC
=
4 Coils C NFN
=
12, number of containment air cooler coils for 3
CACs C
Credit only 1
Fan Cooler NFN
=
4 END START TIME IS 0.
END TIME IS 24.0 HR PRINT INTERVAL IS 1.
HR INITIATORS C
PS BREAK(S)
FAILED HPI FORCED OFF LPI FORCED OFF C
MCP SWITCH OFF OR HI-VIBR TRIP C
FANS/COOLERS FORCED OFF ESF UPPER/LOWER COMPT.
SPRAYS FORCED OFF C
MOTOR-DRIVEN AUX FEED WATER FORCED OFF PZR SPRAYS FORCED OFF PZR HTRS FORCED OFF MANUAL SCRAM MAIN FW SHUT OFF CHARGING PUMPS FORCED OFF S/G MSIV:
FORCED CLOSED PS MAKEUP OFF LETDOWN SWITCH OFF END WHEN REACTOR SCRAM IS TRUE SET TIMER 1
END WHEN TIMER 1
0.000833 HR CHARGING PUMPS SWITCH:
AUTO CHARGING PUMP SWITCH:
MAN ON C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
342 GPM to E-50A and 350 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
1.697E+05 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
1.737E+05 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.1833 HR MCP SWITCH OFF OR HI-VIBR TRIP END
Entergy PSA EA - PSA-SDP - D11-2 07 Rev. 0
- Entffgy Engineering Appendix A - Page 7 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files WHEN TIMER 1
0.2350 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
419 GPM to E-50A and 273 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
2.08E+05 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
1.355E+05 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.4017 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
495 GPM to E-50A and 185 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
2.457E+05 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
9.182E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.5683 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
379 GPM to E-50A and 163 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
1.881E+05 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
8.09E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.6 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
P-55A and P-55B assumed operating at time 0
C Reduce P-55A flow rate from 53 gpm to 33 gpm WVPM6(1)
=
73.0 GPM WVPM6(2)
=
73.0 GPM WVPM6(3)
=
73.0 GPM WVPM6(4)
=
73.0 GPM WVPM6(5)
=
73.0 GPM C
END END 1/60[HR/MIN]
1/60[HR/MIN]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C WHEN TIMER 1
0.85 HR C
WVPM6(l)
=
0.0 GPM C
WVPM6(2)
=
0.0 GPM C
WVPM6(3)
=
0.0 GPM
Entergy PSA EA - PSA-SDP - D11 11-07 Rev. 0
- Entergy Engineering Appendix A - Page 8 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files C
WVPM6(4)
=
0.0 GPM C
WVPM6(5)
=
0.0 GPM C
END WHEN TIMER 1
1.15 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
Set PORV to model Stuck Open PZR Safety C
At 16:15(analysis timeline)the PCS is solid and PZR Safety Lifts C
and passes water.
Event duration 15:06 start and 16:15 safeties lift.
C C
PZR Safety ASRV(3) 0.0097 FT**2 C
The POV is assumed to be always open for a
LOCA C
so the setpoint pressure to open is set to a
low value C
PSETRV(1)
=
10 PSI ASRV(l)
=
0.0097 FT**2 C
Since the PORV discharges to the quench
- tank, C
the quench tank needs to be disabled.
The rupture C
pressure is set to a
low value C
Setting IQT
=
0 disables the quench tank model IQT
=
0 C
END PORV PZR Safety Relief Model END WHEN TIMER 1
1.6183 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
0 GPM to E-50A and 156 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
0.0 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
7.743E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
1.7167 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
0 GPM to E-50A and 165 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
0.0 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
0.0 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
2.1683 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
0 GPM to E-50A and 129 GPM to E-50B
Entergy PSA EA -PSA-SDP-D11 11-07 Rev. 0
- Enter y Engineering Appendix A - Page 9 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
0.0 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
6.403E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
3.735 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
56 GPM to E-50A and 96 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
WAFWXU
=
2.779E+04 LB/HR WAFWXB
=
4.765E+04 LB/HR C
END END 3.0 D11 SDP-CASE - 1 TINP SENSITIVITY ON TITLE Loss of D11-2 Case 17 END TITLE INCLUDE attach.dat INCLUDE attach charging2.dat INCLUDE sc plots(1).dat PARAMETER CHANGE C
PSGRV
=
2000 PSI
//
Lock the ADV closed TDMFW
=
0.0 HR
//
Time delay between MFW isol actual isol C
Set CST to large value but keep same level C
MWCSTO
=
1.E9 LB C
ACST
=
738220.
FT**2 C
Given MAAP will use the minimum of WAFWXU or the flowrate from the pump head
- curve, C
set the head curve data high.
WVAFW(1)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(2)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(3)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(4)=
1000.
GPM WVAFW(5)=
1000.
GPM C
3 CACs
=
12 Coils C
2 CACs
=
8 Coils C
1 CAC
=
4 Coils C
NFN
=
12, number of containment air cooler coils for 3
A Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 Rev. 0
-'Enter&
Engineering Appendix A - Page 10 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files C
Credit only 1
Fan Cooler C
NFN
=
4 C
Credit 3
Spray Pumps NSPAG
=
3 END START TIME IS 0.
END TIME IS 5.0 HR PRINT INTERVAL IS 1.
HR INITIATORS C
PS BREAK(S)
FAILED HPI FORCED OFF LPI FORCED OFF C
MCP SWITCH OFF OR HI-VIBR TRIP FANS/COOLERS FORCED OFF C
ESF UPPER/LOWER COMPT.
SPRAYS FORCED OFF MOTOR-DRIVEN AUX FEED WATER FORCED OFF PZR SPRAYS FORCED OFF PZR HTRS FORCED OFF MANUAL SCRAM MAIN FW SHUT OFF CHARGING PUMPS FORCED OFF S/G MSIV:
FORCED CLOSED PS MAKEUP OFF LETDOWN SWITCH OFF END WHEN REACTOR SCRAM IS TRUE SET TIMER 1
END WHEN TIMER 1
0.000833 HR CHARGING PUMPS SWITCH:
AUTO CHARGING PUMP SWITCH:
MAN ON C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
342 GPM to E-50A and 350 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
C WAFWXU
=
1.697E+05 LB/HR C
WAFWXB
=
1.737E+05 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.1833 HR MCP SWITCH OFF OR HI-VIBR TRIP END WHEN TIMER 1
1.15 HR
Entergy PSA EA - PSA-SDP-D11 11-07 Rev. 0 Entergy Engineering Appendix A - Page 11 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
Set PORV to model Stuck Open PZR Safety C
At 1.93 hours0.00108 days <br />0.0258 hours <br />1.537698e-4 weeks <br />3.53865e-5 months <br /> the PCS is solid and PZR Safety Lifts C
and passes water.
Refer to Case 8.
C C
PZR Safety ASRV(3) 0.0097 FT**2 C
The POV is assumed to be always open for a
LOCA C
so the setpoint pressure to open is set to a
low value C
PSETRV (1)
=
10 PSI ASRV(l)
=
0.0097 FT**2 C
Since the PORV discharges to the quench
- tank, C
the quench tank needs to be disabled.
The rupture C
pressure is set to a
low value C
Setting IQT
=
0 disables the quench tank model IQT
=
0 C
END PORV PZR Safety Relief Model END WHEN TIMER 1
0.2350 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
419 GPM to E-50A and 273 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
C WAFWXU
=
2.08E+05 LB/HR C
WAFWXB
=
1.355E+05 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.4017 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
495 GPM to E-50A and 185 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
C WAFWXU
=
2.457E+05 LB/HR C
WAFWXB
=
9.182E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.5683 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
379 GPM to E-50A and 163 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
C WAFWXU
=
1.881E+05 LB/HR C
WAFWXB
=
8.09E+04 LB/HR
Entergy PSA EA - PSA-SDP - D11-2 07 Rev. 0
-Enter y Engineering Appendix A - Page 12 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
0.6 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
P-55A and P-55B assumed operating at time 0
C Reduce P-55A flow rate from 53 gpm to 33 gpm C WVPM6(l)
=
73.0 GPM C
WVPM6(2)
=
73.0 GPM C
WVPM6(3)
=
73.0 GPM C
WVPM6(4)
=
73.0 GPM C
WVPM6(5)
=
73.0 GPM C
END END C
WHEN TIMER 1
0.85 HR C
WVPM6(l)
=
0.0 GPM C
WVPM6(2)
=
0.0 GPM C
WVPM6(3)
=
0.0 GPM C
WVPM6(4)
=
0.0 GPM C
WVPM6(5)
=
0.0 GPM C
END WHEN TIMER 1
1.6183 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
0 GPM to E-50A and 156 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
C WAFWXU
=
0.0 LB/HR C
WAFWXB
=
7.743E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
1.7167 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
0 GPM to E-50A and 165 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
C WAFWXU
=
0.0 LB/HR C
WAFWXB
=
0.0 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
2.1683 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
0 GPM to E-50A and 129 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
1/60[HR/MIN]
Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2-11-07 Rev. 0
-Entergy Engineering Appendix A - Page 13 of 13 Analysis MAAP Input Files C
1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
C WAFWXU
=
0.0 LB/HR C
WAFWXB
=
6.403E+04 LB/HR C
END END WHEN TIMER 1
3.735 HR C
PARAMETER CHANGE C
56 GPM to E-50A and 96 GPM to E-50B C
TAFW
=
120.
F 900 psia C
specific volume
=
1.61605e-2 FT**3/LB C
1
[LB/HR]
0.0161605
[FT3/LB]
1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
C 1
[LB/HR]
=
0.0020148156
[GAL/MIN]
C WAFWXU
=
2.779E+04 LB/HR C
WAFWXB
=
4.765E+04 LB/HR C
END END 1/60[HR/MIN]
A Entergy PSA EA -PSA-SDP - D11 11-07 Rev. 0
- Enter y Engineering Appendix B - Page 1 of 10 Analysis MAAP Attach & Plot Files Appendix B:
MAAP Attach & Plot Files 1.0 attach.dat.......................................................................................................................................2 2.0 attach_charging2.dat....................................................................................................................2 3.0 attach_chargingl _D11_2 (2).dat...................................................................................................3 4.0 sc_plots ( 1).dat...............................................................................................................................5
Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP - D11 11-07 Rev. 0 v'Entergy Engineering Appendix B - Page 2 of 10 Analysis MAAP Attach & Plot Files 1.0 attach.dat C attach file for all Palisades runs PARAMETER FILE PNP406_060209(1).par 25 ALIAS IEVNT(3)
AS RPV FAILED TIM AS TIME TIMER 2 AS TIME SINCE RPV FAILURE END FUNCTION WHPIGPM = WHPIXX
- 60
- 2.205 / 62.4
- 7.4805 FUNCTION WLPIGPM = WLPI1X
- 60
- 2.205 / 62.4
- 7.4805 FUNCTION TDSEC = TDOLD FUNCTION WRB14GPM = WWRB(14)
- 60
- 2.205 / 62.4
- 7.4805 FUNCTION WRB18GPM = WWRB(18)
- 60
- 2.205 / 62.4
- 7.4805 FUNCTION FUNZJUNC = ZJUNC(18,2) + 0.05 FUNCTION TPEAKSG = TBHTO(1,1) + TPUMXB FUNCTION TAVHLB = 0.25
- TBH(2,1) + 0.5
- TBH(2,2) + 0.25
- TBH(2,3)
FUNCTION TAVHLU = 0.25
- TUH(2,1) + 0.5
- TUH(2,2) + 0.25
- TUH(2,3) plotfil 87 wrb(18),wrb(14),mwrb(4),zwrb(4),mwrb(13),zwrb(13),mwrb(12),
zwrb(12),prb(4),prb(13),prb(12),wwrb(18),wwrb(14),
whpigpm,tpumxb,tpeaksg,TAVH LB,TAVHLU,TSRN(1,1),TBHTO(1,1),
TUHTO(1,1),TBHTB(5,1),TUHTB(5,1) end 2.0 attach_charging2.dat C Charging Data
References:
C FSAR Rev.23, TABLE 9-13 C EMAIL: Steve Mongeau, Entergy, to Alex Huning, ERIN.
C
SUBJECT:
FW: MAAP 4.0.6 Success Criteria Runs, 1/22/09 PARAMETER CHANGE PCHPO = 1605 PSI TDCHP = 5.0 S
WCHPX = 1.e10 LB/HR NCHPG = 1
Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP - D11-2-11-07 Rev. 0
- Enteigy Engineering Appendix B - Page 3 of 10 Analysis MAAP Attach & Plot Files NORCHP = 6 NSCHP=3 NDCHP=2 RECCHP = 6 RSCHP = 3 RDCHP = 2 SNPCHP = 0 WECHP = 0.0 LB/HR TDNCHP = 0.0 S DEGCHP = 6 ZCHPRW = 30.39 FT ZCHPCS = 30.39 FT ZCHPSI = 30.39 FT NP016 = 5 ZHDP6(1) = 5850. FT ZHDP6(2) = 5750. FT ZHDP6(3) = 5000. FT ZHDP6(4) = 3600. FT ZHDP6(5) = 1450. FT WVPM6(1) = 80. GPM WVPM6(2) = 80. GPM WVPM6(3) = 80. GPM WVPM6(4) = 80. GPM WVPM6(5) = 80. GPM ZHDR6(1) = 7.65 FT ZHDR6(1) = 7.65 FT ZHDR6(1) = 7.65 FT ZHDR6(1) = 7.65 FT ZHDR6(1) = 7.65 FT END PARAMETER CHANGE 3.0 attach_chargingl _D11_2 (2).dat C Charging Data
References:
C FSAR Rev.23, TABLE 9-13 C EMAIL: Steve Mongeau, Entergy, to Alex Huning, ERIN.
C
SUBJECT:
FW: MAAP 4.0.6 Success Criteria Runs, 1/22/09
Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-D11-2 07 Rev. 0
-Entergy Engineering Appendix B - Page 4 of 10 Analysis MAAP Attach & Plot Files PARAMETER CHANGE PCHPO = 1605 PSI TDCHP = 5.0 S WCHPX = 1.e10 LB/HR NCHPG = 1 NORCHP = 6 NSCHP = 3 NDCHP=2 RECCHP = 6 RSCHP = 3 RDCHP = 2 SNPCHP = 0 WECHP = 0.0 LB/HR TDNCHP = 0.0 S
DEGCHP = 6 ZCHPRW = 30.39 FT ZCHPCS = 30.39 FT ZCHPSI = 30.39 FT NP016 = 5 ZHDP6(1) = 5850. FT ZHDP6(2) = 5750. FT ZHDP6(3) = 5000. FT ZHDP6(4) = 3600. FT ZHDP6(5) = 1450. FT WVPM6(1) = 80. GPM WVPM6(2) = 80. GPM WVPM6(3) = 80. GPM WVPM6(4) = 80. GPM WVPM6(5) = 80. GPM ZHDR6 (1) = 7.65 FT ZHDR6 (1) = 7.65 FT ZHDR6 (1) = 7.65 FT
Ift Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP - D11 11-07 Rev. 0 Enteigy Engineering Appendix B - Page 5 of 10 Analysis MAAP Attach & Plot Files ZHDR6 (1) = 7.65 FT ZHDR6 (1) = 7.65 FT END PARAMETER CHANGE 4.0 sc_plots ( 1).dat C Volumetric Flow Rates, Charging, HPSI, LPSI (GPM)
C MAAP Uses metric units of [KG/s] for mass flow rate C 1 [KG/S]= 1 [KG/S]
- 3600 [S/HR]
- 2.20462 [LB/KG] = 7936.63 [LB/HR]
C Specific volume assumed constant for water = 0.0161557 [Ft**3/lbm]
C 1 [LB/HR]
- 0.0161557 [FT3/LB]
- 1/0.1336805556[GAL/FT3]
- 1/60[HR/MIN]
C 1 [LB/HR] = 0.002014 [GAL/MIN]
C 1 [KG/S] = 15.9844 [GAL/MIN]
FUNCTION VDOTCHP = WCHPXX
- 15.9844 VDOTHPI = WHPIXX
- 15.9844 VDOTLPI = WLPI1X
- 15.9844 VDOTSPA = WSPAXX
- 15.9844 VDOTSPB = WSPBXX
- 15.9844 VDOTSPC = WSPCXX
- 15.9844 VAFWB = WWFWBS
- 15.9844 VAFWU = WWFWUS
- 15.9844 VMWCST = MWCST
- 0.00101164
- 35.14
- 7.48 ZWCST = MWCST
- 0.00101164/ACST
- 3.28 END FUNCTION C Primary-Secondary Pressure Differential, BROKEN SG PSPDBSG = (PPS - PBS)*0.0001450377377 C Primary-Secondary Pressure Differential, UNBROKEN SG PSPDUSG = (PPS - PUS)*0.0001450377377 C PERCENT STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL - BROKEN S/G C
((($ZWBSC$-6.7612)*21.8723) < 100.0) > (-138.0)
BSGLVL=(23.685 + 21.8723*(ZWBS-7.84)+1.542E-3*((ZWBS-7.84)**2))
PERCENT STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL - UNBROKEN S/G C
((($ZWUSC$-6.7612)*21.8723) < 100.0) > (-138.0)
USGLVL=(23.685 + 21.8723*(ZWUS-7.84)+1.542E-3*((ZWUS-7.84)**2))