Text

2011 Duane Arnold Energy Center Initial License Examination Administered Scenarios
	ML11321A340
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	06/30/2011
From:	Chuck Zoia; Operations Branch III
To:	;
References
	Download: ML11321A340 (57)
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Scenario Event Description ES-D1 DAEC 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Facility: DAEC Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2011 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO -

RO -

BOP -

Initial Conditions:

100% Reactor Power

RCIC TS LCO 3.5.3.A. - Day 1 of 14 day LCO Turnover:

RCIC was operating in CST-CST for baseline vibration testing. An Engineer accidently bumped the mechanical overspeed lever and RCIC tripped. A visual inspection determined no damage to RCIC and the trip is ready to be reset and nd placed in standby IAW OI-150, Section 3.3. The 2 Assistant and the System Engineer are standing by in the RCIC room to observe the reset.

Once RCIC is back in Standby, continue the to raise power with Control Rods.

RE direction is to pull two steps of rods, then wait for conditioning.

Critical Tasks: 1. With a Primary System discharging into secondary containment, insert a manual scram before any parameter reaches the Max Safe Operating Limit.

2. With a Primary System discharging into secondary containment and the same parameter exceeding the Max Safe Operating Limit in more than one area perform an Emergency Depressurization.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A N - BOP Reset RCIC and place in Standby Readiness N - SRO 2 N/A R - RO Raise reactor power with control rods.

R - SRO 3 SW21D C - BOP D Well Water Pump trip C - SRO AOP 408 4 RR17B C - RO B Reactor Recirc Pump speed controller fails upscale C- SRO TS-SRO AOP 255.2 TS 3.4.1 5 RP02B C-ALL RPS A EPA Breaker Trip TS-SRO AOP 358 TS 3.3.8.2., TS 3.6.1.3 and others (in script) 6 HP05, 08 M-ALL Unisolable HPCI steam leak in secondary containment, Startup ED06C XFMR Lockout EOP-1, EOP-2, EOP-ED 7 STRC01 C-BOP RCIC Fails to auto start C-SRO 8 Override C-BOP One ADS SRV fails to open DI-AD-19 C-SRO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description ES-D1 DAEC 2011 NRC Scenario 3 DAEC 2011 NRC Scenario #3 The scenario begins with reactor power at 90%. RCIC was operating in CST-CST for baseline vibration testing. An Engineer accidently bumped the mechanical overspeed lever and RCIC tripped. A visual inspection determined no damage to RCIC and the trip is ready to be reset and placed in standby IAW OI-150, Section 3.3.

Once RCIC is placed in standby, the crew will continue to raise reactor power with control rods. Then the B Recirc Pump flow controller will fail upscale and the operators will lock up the scoop tube IAW the AOP and take additional AOP actions. The SRO will address Technical Specifications (TS) for the speed mismatch and take actions if required.

An EPA breaker will trip on A RPS resulting in 1/2 scram. The crew will enter the AOP, transfer RPS to the alternate supply and the 1/2 scram will be reset. The SRO will address TS for the EPA trip.

The Main Turbine will experience high vibration and the crew will be required to lower reactor power. This results in lowering vibration on the Main Turbine. A leak will develop on the HPCI steam line in Secondary Containment and will not be isolable. Area temperatures will rise requiring EOP entry and a reactor scram (CRITICAL TASK 1.0). Additionally, as RPV level lowers RCIC will fail to initiate at its auto setpoint and must be placed in service manually for RPV level control.

As area temperatures continue to rise, an Emergency Depressurization(ED) must be performed when the max safe operating limit is exceeded in more than one area (CRITICAL TASK 2.0). During the ED, one ADS SRV will fail to open and another SRV must be opened.

The scenario ends with the ED completed and RPV level at >170 inches.

QF-1030-19 Rev. 12 EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG)

SITE: DAEC RESET RCIC MECHANICAL TRIP, REACTOR POWER ADJUSTMENT, WELL WATER PUMP TRIP, RECIRC FLOW CTRL UPSCALE FAILURE, RPS EPA BKR TRIP, ESG NRC 11-03 REV 0 UNISOLABLE HPCI LEAK, RCIC AUTO START FAILURE, ONE ADS SRV FAILS TO OPEN PROGRAM: OPERATIONS #:

COURSE: INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR #:

TOTAL TIME: 90 MINUTES Developed by:

Instructor Date Validated by:

SME/Instructor Date Reviewed by:

Operations Manager Date Approved by:

Training Supervisor-Operations Date Page 1 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Goal of The goal of this scenario is to evaluate ILT students during the NRC Training: Exam with 3 man crew.

Learning There are no formal learning objectives Objectives:

Prerequisites: None Simulator Simulator Booth Instructor Training Phone Talker Resources:

Simulator Floor Instructor

References:

None None Commitments:

Evaluation Dynamic Simulator Method:

Operating None Experience:

Initiating Event with Core Damage Frequency:

N/A due to exam security Important Components:

Related PRA N/A due to exam security Information:

Important Operator Actions with Task Number:

N/A due to exam security Page 2 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario begins with reactor power at 90%. RCIC was operating in CST-CST for baseline vibration testing. An Engineer accidently bumped the Mechanical Trip arm and RCIC tripped. A visual inspection determined no damage to RCIC and the trip is ready to be reset and placed in standby IAW OI-150, Section 3.3.

Once RCIC is placed in standby, the crew will continue to raise reactor power with control rods.

Then the B Recirc Pump flow controller will fail upscale and the operators will lock up the scoop tube IAW the AOP and take additional AOP actions. The SRO will address Technical Specifications (TS) for the speed mismatch and take actions if required.

An EPA breaker will trip on A RPS resulting in 1/2 scram. The crew will enter the AOP, transfer RPS to the alternate supply and the 1/2 scram will be reset. The SRO will address TS for the EPA trip.

A leak will develop on the HPCI steam line in Secondary Containment and will not be isolable.

Area temperatures will rise requiring EOP entry and a reactor scram (CRITICAL TASK 1.0).

Additionally, as RPV level lowers RCIC will fail to initiate at its auto setpoint and must be placed in service manually for RPV level control. As area temperatures continue to rise, an Emergency Depressurization(ED) must be performed when the max safe operating limit is exceeded in more than one area (CRITICAL TASK 2.0). During the ED, one ADS SRV will fail to open and another SRV must be opened.

The scenario ends with the ED completed and RPV level at >170 inches.

Page 3 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO OUTLINE:

BOOTH INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS 1 SIMULATOR SET UP: (perform set up per the Simulator Setup Checklist, including entering actions items per the Simulator Input Summary.)

Start Sim View / Data Capture Program for EXAM ONLY 1.1 General Instructions

a. Restore the IC for ILT Scenario 3 from the Thumb Drive that it is stored on.

b. If the thumb drive is not available, then reset to IC 20 and set the Malfunctions, Remotes, Overrides, and Triggers as per the tables below.

c. Reduce power to 90% with Recirc

d. Set up RCIC in CST to CST mode and INSERT MALFUNCTION RC01

e. Verify Pull Sheet setup matches current step and rod position

f. Place SPMET1 on a computer terminal (IAW AOP 903). Use the terminal over by the MIDAS computer.

g. Markup the following procedure:

AOP 903, Severe Thunderstorm Watch Section complete

1C04C A-5 ARP o Step 3.1 circled & slashed o Step 3.1 a & b circled & slashed o Step 3.2 N/A to step 3.3 o Step 3.3 is circled

h. Markup Pull Sheets with present rod positions

i. Provide RCIC OI 150 Attachment 4 Lineup as the last page of this scenario 1.2 EVENT TRIGGER DEFINITIONS:

Trigger Trigger Logic Statement Trigger Word Description No.

15 RPDIS1SHUTDOWN(1) >= 1 Mode Switch Taken to shutdown 17 ZAOFWLI4561 <= .03 GEMAC Level <160 30 ZDITCPRSPTDECR >= 1 Pressure Set Decrease Push Button Depress Page 4 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3

1.3 MALFUNCTIONS

Time Malf. No. Malfunction Title Delay Ramp ET Initial Final Value Value Setup SW13A HPCI Room Cooler Flow Blockage 13 0 100 Setup SW13B HPCI Room Cooler Flow Blockage 13 0 100 Setup RC01 RCIC Mechanical Overspeed Trip Active Active Setup STRC01 Trip OVRD-RCIC Fails to Auto Active Active Start Setup MS31C Group 6 Isolation Fail to Close- Active Active MO-2238 Setup MS31D Group 6 Isolation Fail to Close- Active active MO-2239 Setup STEHC02 Trip Override-B EHC Pump 1P97B active active Fails to Auto Start As Dir SW21D Well Water Pump Trip - Pump D, 1 Inactive Active 1P58D As Dir RR17B Recirc MG Flow Controller Fails, 5 minutes 3 AS IS 100%

50 seconds Auto/Man Modes MG B As Dir RP02B RPS EPA Breaker Trip- RPS B 5 Inactive Active EPA Breaker As Dir HP05 HPCI Steam Supply Line 10 13 0 15 Break/HPCI Room minutes As Dir HP08 HPCI Steam Supply Line 10 15 0 10 Break/Torus Room minutes AUTO ED06C SU Transformer Loss 17 Inactive Active As Dir TC02A EHC Hydraulic Pump Trip-Pump A 30 Inactive Active

1.4 OVERRIDES

Time Override No. Override Title Delay Ramp ET Initial Final Value Value Setup DI-AD-019 HS-4406 ADS PSV4406, AUTO AUTO D MSL,1140(Auto Open)

Setup DI-HP-013 HS-2238STM LINE ISOL AUTO AUTO MOV-2238 Setup DI-HP-014 HS-2238STM LINE ISOL AUTO AUTO MOV-2239 1.5 REMOTE FUNCTIONS:

Time Remote Remote Title Delay Ramp ET Initial Final No. Value Value Setup RP04 RPS Alternate Power Supply 1Y16 or 1Y26 1Y26 1Y26 Setup RP01C C RPS EPA Breaker (Trip/Reset) TRIP RESET Setup FP09 HPCI Deluge Man Isolation Valve CLOSE CLOSE V-33-82(Open,Close)

Page 5 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 FLOOR INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Simulator Pre-brief:

2.1 Individual position assignments 2.2 Simulator training changes since last module (N/A) 2.3 Simulator hardware and software modifications/problems that may impact training Page 6 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 TURNOVER INFORMATION Day of week and shift Today Day Shift Weather conditions Hot, Humid A Severe Thunderstorm Watch is in effect for the next 31/2 hours. All AOP 903 actions are complete.

(Plant power levels) 90%

MWT 1715 MWE 575 CORE FLOW 46.8 Thermal Limit Problems/Power Evolutions Plant Risk Status CDF 1.78 E-005 Color Yellow Existing LCOs, date of next surveillance RCIC - TS 3.5.3.A. - Day 1 of 14 day LCO STPs in progress or major maintenance None Equipment to be taken out of or returned to service this shift/maintenance on major plant equipment RCIC Continuation of Load Line adjustment. Will need to pull all step 34 rods to position 20, then will need to stop there for RE Guidance.

Comments, evolutions, problems, core damage frequency, etc.

RCIC was operating in CST-CST for baseline vibration testing. and RCIC tripped 40 minutes ago. ARP 1C04C (A-5) actions were addressed to Step 3.3. Then an investigation was performed the cause of the trip and condition of RCIC. The investigation determined that an Engineer accidently bumped the linkage for the Mechanical Overspeed Trip. The RCIC inspection determined no damage and ARP steps can continue beginning at Step 3.3. The 2nd Assistant and the System Engineer are standing by in the RCIC room to observe the reset.

The RCIC Vacuum Pump 30 minute run time has been met. Torus Cooling and ESW were secured after RCIC tripped. A RCIC surveillance test will be run on the next shift.

A Load Line Adjustment is progress. When RCIC has been placed in Standby, continue the Load Line Adjustment. The directions are to pull step 34 rods to position 20 (symmetrical). Call the RE after all the step 34 rods are at position 20. He will provide further guidance then.

C Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker is inoperable and unavailable.

Page 7 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Shift Turnover COMPLETE TURNOVER: Get familiar with plant conditions.

Provide Shift Turnovers to the SRO

SRO will provide beginning of shift brief to coordinate the tasks that and ROs.

were identified on the shift turnover.

a. Review applicable current Plant Status

b. Review relevant At-Power Risk status

c. Review current LCOs not met and Action Requirements

d. Verify crew performs walk down of control boards and reviews turnover checklists EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event at examiners direction page 8 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Booth Instructor: There are no actions SRO Event #1 necessary to start this event.

Directs continuation of actions in ARP 1C04C A-5.

Reset RCIC and place in RO Standby Booth Instructor respond as plant Readiness personnel and respond as necessary: Monitors reactor power, pressure and level during the RCIC return to service evolution BOP

Continues actions in ARP 1C04C A-5, Step 3.3 which directs actions in OI-150 Section 7.2 as follows.

IF a manual turbine trip is desired, depress MANUAL TURBINE TRIP pushbutton HS-2460 on 1C04.

Verify the following valves closed by observing proper valve indication at 1C04:

Valve

Description:

MO-2405 TURBINE STOP VALVE

MO-2512 RCIC INJECT

MO-2510 MIN FLOW BYPASS

Close MO-2515 TEST BYPASS valve, if open.

After level has been restored to >119.5 inches, perform the following steps:

Booth Instructor:

Depress RCIC INITIATION SEALED IN RESET pushbutton HS-2482 When contacted to perform the steps to at 1C04, if necessary, and observe the amber RCIC INITIATION reset the mechanical overspeed on RCIC SEAL IN indicator is off.

DELETE MALFUNCTION RC01 and

Close MO-2404, TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE. Verify 1P-227 report the steps are completed VACUUM PUMP is running.

Verify the following valves open as a result of closing MO-2404

TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY:

page 9 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE

Valve Description

CV-2436 CLOSED RADWASTE DISCH ISOL

CV-2410 RCIC STEAM LINE DRAIN ISOL

CV-2411 RCIC STEAM LINE DRAIN ISOL

Close MO-2426 LUBE OIL COOLER SUPPLY by placing the handswitch in the CLOSE position and observing proper valve position indication.

Correct the cause of the turbine trip.

Role Play: If asked, the RCIC Drain Trap Bypass Valve V-24-62 is closed.

After approximately 30 minutes, stop 1P-227 VACUUM PUMP by placing handswitch HS-2415 in the STOP position.

Restore the RCIC System to STANDBY/READINESS per Sections 3.3 and 3.4 as follows.

EXAMINER NOTE:

The operator continues in Section 3.4.

The first step is to complete Att.4. IAW OI-150, Section 3.3 and 3.4 resets RCIC and places in standby as follows:

The lineup is attached to the end of this scenario.

Verify Turbine Steam Supply, MO2404 is CLOSED.

Place and hold HS-2405 TURBINE STOP VALVE MOTOR Once the attachment is completed, the CONTROL MO-2405 in CLOSE until the Motor Control indicates full next event may begin. closed.

PROCEDURE NOTE If the RCIC Turbine Trip was due to a mechanical overspeed condition, neither the MO-2405 valve nor motor operator will open until reset locally at the RCIC Turbine. If the trip condition is not cleared, the valve for MO-2405 will not open, regardless of motor operator position.

If the turbine trip was due to mechanical overspeed, perform the following to manually reset the mechanical trip linkage (see drawing in Appendix 2):

page 10 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE nd Contacts 2 Assistant to perform the next two steps

1. Move the spring loaded emergency connecting rod against the spring force, moving the emergency head lever away from the emergency tappet and tappet nut. ___________

2. Ensure the emergency tappet moves in the downward direction and the tappet nut locates in the trip reset position on the head bracket to hold the emergency connecting rod in position under spring tension.

Place and hold HS-2405 in the OPEN position until the Motor Operator Control indicates full open.

Verify Turbine Stop Valve MO-2405 indicates full open.

Verify RCIC MO-2405 TURBINE TRIP (1C04C, A-5) annunciator is clear.

PROCEDURE NOTE Following a Turbine run, oil level may require an hour, after turbine shutdown, to return to standby/shutdown conditions.

If the RCIC turbine trip is being reset during RCIC testing or other maintenance evolutions, the CRS may decide to mark the following step N/A.

Unless directed by the CRS, continue with Section 3.4, FINAL RETURN TO STANDBY READINESS (otherwise, mark this step N/A).

Complete the RCIC System Control Panel Lineup (Attachment 4).

EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event at examiners direction page 11 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Booth Instructor: respond as plant Event #2 personnel and respond as necessary: SRO Load Line Give crew Reactivity brief to withdraw control rods.

Adjustment RO

Withdraws control rods in Step 34 to position 20.

Monitors Reactor Power, Pressure and Level during power change BOP

Provides Peer Check to RO during reactivity change

Monitors Balance of plant equipment EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event at examiners direction page 12 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE Event #3 Booth Instructor: When directed by the CREW D Well Water Chief Examiner: Responds to Annunciator 1C23C (F-1) - D Well Water Pump High/Low Pump trip INSERT EVENT TRIGGER 1 Flow This inserts SW21D, the D Well Water trip.

SRO Booth Instructor: respond as plant

Enters AOP 408 WELL WATER SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION personnel and respond as necessary:

Directs starting of additional Well Water pump and restores system parameters Role Play: When contacted by control

Directs monitoring of Drywell pressure & temperature room, acknowledge request to check out

Notifies Duty Manager D well house. Report back after 5 minutes that a ground fault is indicated on the VSD and nothing else abnormal was RO observed at the well house.

Monitors reactor power pressure and level

Monitors Drywell pressure & temperature BOP Examiner Note: May use QRC to start Per AOP 408 immediate actions:

ESW pumps

Ensures an ESW pump(s) is running to provide cooling to the Control Building Chillers and to reduce demand on the Well Water System.

Starts a standby Well Water Pump, and adjusts flow at the back panel.

May take the running Well Water Pump controller to zero EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event at examiners direction page 13 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE Event #4 Booth Instructor, at the direction of the Crew B Reactor Chief Examiner: Diagnoses event: Rising APRM power and B Recirc Pump speed Recirc Pump INSERT EVENT TRIGGER: 3 speed controller RR17B to 100 over 5 minutes 50 sec SRO fails.

This will cause the B Recirc M-G speed Directs entry to AOP 255.2:

controller to ramp up slowly

Take any necessary steps to bring the reactor power/reactivity transient Booth Instructor respond as plant under control, including, but not limited to:

personnel and respond as necessary:

o Lockup of the Scoop Tube Lockup Respond that you will look at the MOORE controller logic for speed control and get

Determines IF the recirc pump speed mismatch will put them out of back to them soon. compliance with the LPCI Loop Select limits using STP 3.4.2-01, Daily Jet Pump Operability Test, Sect. 7.1, Recirc Pump Speed Mismatch Report that you will call in a licensed Check.

operator to take manual control of the locked up recirc scoop tube but it will be

TS SR 3.4.1.1 states that the speed of the faster pump shall be about an hour. 122% of the speed of the slower pump when operating at 69.4%

RTP.

Go along with what the crew wants to do, and tell them that ERT will take over the

Based on the calculation, the SRO will determine if he is in repairs of the B speed control problem. compliance with TS 3.4.1 Condition C. If not, then has 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to restore the mismatch within limits, or Trip one of the recirc pumps.

Examiner Note: Depending on when the

Plot the current position on the power to flow map.

scoop tube is locked up will determine .

whether or not the TS loop speed

IF the Recirc Flow is outside of the Mismatch limits, crew will discuss mismatch requirements for the Recirc how they will restore the mismatch to within its limits.

Pumps will be exceeded

Either raise the speed of the unlocked Recirc Pump to match the locked Recirc Pump. OR

Send a licensed operator to the Recirc M-G Set room and take manual control of the locked Recirc Pump and lower it to within the limits.

Event #4 (cont)

RO Determines that power is going up by itself, and that the B Recirc M-G speed controller is ramping up by itself. Takes the following actions to stop the run away:

page 14 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE

Lock the scoop tube of the B recirc M-G speed controller Acknowledge/Respond to 1C04A, C-5,

Enter AOP 255.2, Power/Reactivity Abnormal Change.

BOP Monitors balance of plant equipment and parameters EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event at examiners direction page 15 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE Event #5 Booth Instructor: When directed by the CREW RPS EPA Chief Examiner:

Recognizes 1/2 scram on B side - Multiple Annunciators including, Breaker Trip INSERT EVENT TRIGGER 5

Annunciator 1C05B (B-2) - B RPS Auto Scram

Diagnoses Loss of RPS This inserts RP02B, which will trip the B RPS MG Set.

SRO

Enters AOP 358 Loss of RPS AC Power Booth Instructor: respond as plant

Directs operator to investigate the trip.

personnel and respond as necessary:

Refers to TS 3.3.8.2. Condition A - 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to remove in service power supply (condition met with EPA tripped)

Enters TS 3.6.1.3 Condition A - 4 hr LCO for Primary Cont. Isolation Valves Role Play: When contacted by control NOTE: The affected valves are already in their required (closed) position room to investigate, wait 2 minutes and due to the loss off RPS. The action has been met.

report that:

Enters TRM 3.3.4 Condition A - for Reactor Water conductivity

The B RPS MG set is running monitoring

B1 EPA has tripped free - no lights,

Enters TS 3.4.5, Conditions A & B & C - RCS Leak Detection smells bad (acrid), no fire or smoke Instrumentation, since all DW sumps are incapable of being pumped.

Role Play: When contacted by the control

Enters TS 3.6.4.3 Condition A - SBGT IF the Group 3 isolation is reset.

room to check the bus, Call as the CRS

Directs transferring RPS to alternate power supply after 2 minutes (state time compression is

Contacts Duty Manager being used) and state that the electricians

Directs OI 358 RPS Appendix 4, RPS POWER SUPPLY TRANSFER report that a fault is not suspected on the HALF SCRAM RECOVERY CHECKLIST.

RPS bus.

Directs placing S583B, CV4371A Group 3 override switch in override open at 1C35. (Defeat 11)

ROLE PLAY: If required, as the in-plant operator report that alternate RPS is BOP aligned to 1B42

Places S583B, CV4371A Group 3 override switch in override open at 1C35.

Event #5 (cont) Transfers B RPS to alternate power supply per AOP 358 as follows:

IF: an alternate RPS power supply is available as indicated by Booth Instructor: Move to next event observing B-MG or ALT XFMR white light ON at 1C17 when the operator is addressing the

THEN: place handswitch C71B-S1B RPS ALTERNATE POWER RWCU isolation TRANSFER switch to B-MG OR ALT position as required and verify selected position white light remains on.

page 16 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE BOP (cont)

May open the Cleanup Demin Bypass, MO-2723 due to the loss of RWCU

Perform OI 358 RPS Appendix 4, RPS POWER SUPPLY TRANSFER HALF SCRAM RECOVERY CHECKLIST as follows.

At Panel 1C36, reset the fuel pool exhaust radiation monitor RIS-4131A[B].

At Panel 1C36, reset the carbon bed vault radiation monitor RM-4138.

May Reset Group 3 isolation (back panel)

RO Resets the 1/2 scram per ARP 1C-05B B2 - Step 4.1.b (OR P&L in OI 358) -

Resets the half scram when the failure has been repaired and/or the trip signal has cleared.

Turn the REACTOR SCRAM RESET switch C71A-S5 first to Group 1 Booth Instructor: Move to next and 4 [Group 2 and 3] then to Group 2 and 3 [Group 1 and 4] to reset the scram signal.

event when the operator is Verify the following:

addressing the RWCU isolation

The eight white SCRAM GROUP indicating lights are ON.

"A" RPS MANUAL SCRAM (1C05A, A-3) annunciator is reset.

"B" RPS MANUAL SCRAM (1C05B, A-3) annunciator is reset.

Annunciator 1C05A, E-4 is reset.

Annunciator 1C05B, E-4 is reset.

Momentarily press the PCIS DIV 1 RESET and DIV 2 RESET pushbutton switches A71B-S32 and A71B-S33 and verify the following annunciators are reset:

PCIS GROUP 1 ISOLATION INITIATED (1C05B, A-8)

PCIS GROUP 2 ISOLATION INITIATED (1C05B, B-8)

PCIS GROUP "4" ISOLATION INITIATED (1C05B, D-8)

PCIS GROUP "5" ISOLATION INITIATED (1C05B, E-8)

EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event when the 1/2 scram is reset and the operator is addressing the RWCU isolation page 17 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE page 18 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE Events 6, 7 & 8 Booth Instructor: When directed by the CREW Chief Examiner: Respond to Annunciator:

Unisolable INSERT EVENT TRIGGER: 13 HPCI leak in

1C07A (A-11), HVAC Panel 1C23 Trouble secondary This starts the HPCI Steam Line leak and

1C04B (B-4), Steam Leak detection High Ambient temperature containment, subsequent failure to isolate, also blocks the HPCI room cooler tubes.

1C23A & B (C-2) HPCI Room Cooler Outlet Air HI/LO Temp one ADS SRV Verify Event Trigger 17 goes active when

Diagnoses HPCI failed to isolate on valid isolation signal fails to open GEMAC level reaches bottom peg. This S/U XFMR inserts a loss of the S/U XFMR. SRO Lockout, RCIC Booth Instructor: respond as plant

Directs ARP 1C23A & B (C-2) Actions Auto-Start personnel and respond as necessary:

Failure

Directs dispatching an operator to the HPCI room to check cooler

Directs checking back panel indication to verify temperatures Role Play: If sent to investigate in the HPCI room, report back the door is hot

Directs closing HPCI Steam Isolation Valves MO-2238 and MO-2239 and you will not enter the room

Enters EOP 3 - Secondary Containment - due to HPCI Room Booth Instructor: Temperature exceeding Max Norm Value of 175°F VERIFY EVENT TRIGGER 15 goes active

Directs operating available coolers in affected area 3 minutes after the mode switch is placed

Directs operating Main Plant Exhaust and Supply fans in shutdown

Directs entry to EOP-1 VERIFY EVENT TRIGGER 30 goes active

Directs reactor scram IAW EOP-3 (CRITICAL TASK #1) when the EHC Pressure Set PB is depressed

Directs entry to IPOI-5

Directs an RPV level Band of 170 to 211 inches (RCIC will be required because of SU XFMR Loss)

Directs Emergency Depressurization. Open 4 SRVs (CRITICAL TASK #2)

RO

Monitors critical plant parameters Booth Instructor:

As directed, Inserts manual scram (CRITICAL TASK #1)

Events #6 & 7

Takes IPOI 5 Reactor Scram Actions When HPCI Room achieves Max Safe (cont.) Temperature, STOP HP05 from getting

Initiates a backup manual reactor scram.

page 19 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE larger. Manual change HP05 to maintain

Place THE MODE SWITCH in the SHUTDOWN position.

HPCI above Max Safe.

Verify all control rods fully inserted by one or both of the following means:

When Torus Room achieves Max Safe

Verifies the Refuel One Rod Select Permissive:

Temperature, STOP HP08 from getting larger. Manual change HP08 to maintain o Position THE MODE SWITCH to REFUEL.

Torus above Max Safe. o Turn Rod Select Power off and then on.

o Verify the white Refuel Select Permissive light is lit.

o Return THE MODE SWITCH to SHUTDOWN.

On the FULL CORE DISPLAY, verify the green FULL IN light for each rod is on.

RO/BOP

Dispatches an operator to the HPCI room to check cooler

Checks back panel indication to verify temperatures

Maintains RPV level as directed using CRD and RCIC

Diagnoses RCIC auto start failure and places RCIC in service manually

Diagnoses S/U XFMR Lockout BOP

Attempts to close HPCI valves MO-2238 and MO-2239

Reports to CRS that the valves failed to close

Monitors reactor pressure and maintains in the band directed by the SRO When Directed attempts to open 4 ADS SRVs to emergency depressurize and recognizes that only 3 opened. Then takes action to open an additional LLS SRV (CRITICAL TASK #2)

Informs SRO when 4 SRVs are open

Monitors and controls RPV level as he depressurization occurs page 20 of 23

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #3 SCENARIO TIMELINE Scenario Termination Criteria ED complete and RPV level >170 inches Event Classification SAE - FS1 - RCS Barrier Potential Loss and Primary Containment Barrier Loss

- - END OF SCENARIO ***

page 21 of 23

SEG Validation Checklist 2011 NRC Exam Scenario #3 Correct IC or plant status identified.

Shift turnover forms filled out (both CRS/OSM and NSOE) if required.

Additional documents are prepared (STPs, Work Orders, LCO Paperwork).

Tasks and Objectives have been verified to be correct.

Plant PRA initiating events, important equipment and important tasks are identified.

SOMS tags identified and included in setup instructions.

Special setup instructions identified; handswitch manipulations, procedure markups, alarm borders, 3D case available, computer points substituted, etc.

Setup files correctly called out.

Malfunction list is accurate.

Override list is accurate.

Remote function list is accurate.

Event triggers are accurate.

Time/Notes section is accurate and includes all reasonable cues that may be given to initiate an action. Cues are unambiguous and provide a definitive moment to take action.

Instructor Activity section is accurate and complete:

Actions are clearly defined for Booth or Floor instructor.

Role-playing is clearly noted.

The sequence of events is completely and concisely narrated even if it takes no instructor action.

Automatic actions that require verification are noted.

Reasonable alternate paths are considered and included.

Event trigger activation is distinguished from narrative text (Bold font)

Noun descriptions of actions that occur on event trigger initiation are complete, for example set ET 3 to TRUE which activates malfunction SW21C resulting in a loss of the C Well Water Pump.

Other simulator control actions are clearly distinguished from narrative text, for example after drywell temperature reaches 280 deg. F SNAP the simulator to IC 0.

Student and Instructor copies of worksheets or other training activities are verified correct and electronically attached to the file if appropriate.

Page 22 of 23

SEG Validation Checklist 2011 NRC Exam Scenario #3 Expected Student Response Section is accurate and complete:

Critical tasks are accurate and clearly identified. Probable critical tasks are also listed with logical connection to the scenario; for example If the crew fails to get all the rods inserted before ED the critical task becomes (N/A as appropriate)

Tasks are clearly noted and properly numbered as appropriate.

Knowledge objectives are clearly noted and properly numbered as appropriate.

Expected as well as probable student responses are listed with logical connection to the scenario. (N/A as appropriate)

Actions are appropriately delineated by position(s); OSM, CRS, STA, RO, NSOE, Fire Brigade Leader, At the Controls Operator, etcetera. (N/A as appropriate)

Success paths are procedurally driven unless specific training not requiring procedures is desired and delineated. Procedural discrepancies are identified and corrected before training is given.

Responses for all communications to simulated personnel outside the Control Room are included, based on procedural guidance and standard operating practices.

Actions are listed using a logical order; by position and chronology. (N/A as appropriate)

Operating Experience, Human Performance Tools and Operator Fundamentals topics are included when appropriate.

Crew Performance Criteria follow the same chronology as the student responses, are complete and accurate. (For ESGs only)

For Walkthrough and Training Mode Scenarios with pre-planned pauses, sufficient information is presented to allow the instructor to meet the goal of the training.

Turnover information (as required) is correct:

Day and shift are appropriate.

Weather conditions do not conflict with malfunctions.

Power levels are correct.

Thermal limit problems and power evolutions are realistic and include a reason for any downpower.

Existing LCOs include start date, remaining time and actions.

Plant Risk Assessment (CDF and Color).

STPs are appropriate for day and shift.

Core Damage Frequency has been properly calculated and listed to 3 decimal places.

Maintenance is realistic for plant conditions.

Comments, evolutions, problems, etc, includes extra personnel (licensed/non-licensed if necessary), any condition that affects the flow of the scenario and any condition that does not fit in another category.

SME/Instructor Date SME/Instructor Date Page 23 of 23

SEG Validation Checklist 2011 NRC Exam Scenario #3 Crew: Instructors:

OSM ____________________________ Booth ________________________________

CRS ____________________________ Floor __________________________

STA __________________________________ Extra ________________________________

1C05 ____________________________

1C03 ____________________________

BOP ____________________________

Crew Comment:

Resolution:

Crew Comment:

Resolution:

NOTE: Following approval of SEGs, this page may be discarded.

SEG Validation Checklist 2011 NRC Exam Scenario #3 Crew Comment:

Resolution:

Crew Comment:

Resolution:

Crew Comment:

Resolution:

NOTE: Following approval of SEGs, this page may be discarded.

SEG Validation Checklist 2011 NRC Exam Scenario #3

Scenario Event Description ES-D1 DAEC 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Facility: DAEC Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 2011 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO -

RO -

BOP -

Initial Conditions:

Plant shutdown for refueling outage in progress

Currently in IPOI-3, Section 5.0 Step (8)

Step 31 of the Pull Sheet, 2 Rods at position 30

Reactor Power 59%

Turnover:

Perform STP 3.3.1.1 MSIV Function Test

Continue lowering power as directed with control rods

Secure the second Feedwater and Condensate pumps at 50% power Critical Tasks: 1. Following a LOOP, manually start the B SBDG to re-power the Essential Bus.

2. Recover RPV level prior to an Emergency Depressurization required.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A N - BOP MSIV Trip/Close Functional test N - SRO 2 Override TS-SRO MSIV fails closed DI-MS-058 TS 3.6.1.3 3 N/A R-RO Lower power with Control Rods R-SRO 4 NM08C C - RO C APRM Upscale, 1/2 Scram C- SRO TS Briefly in TS 3.3.1.1 5 Overrides C-BOP A RHR pump start, fails to trip on overcurrent An1c03b(2) C-SRO TS 6 ED08A C - ALL Loss of Bus 1A1 TS AOP304.1, AOP 264 TS - 3.4.1 7 FW02B C-RO Loss of Condensate/Feedwater - Reactor Scram - RPS PB RP05A C-SRO Failure OVERRIDE S IPOI-5, EOP-1 8 ED01A,B,C M - ALL Loss of Offsite Power, A SBDG Output breaker will not close, B RR15B SBDG fails to Auto-Start, Small Recirc Break DG02A STDG02 EOP-1, EOP-2 9 RC05 C - BOP RCIC Fails, HPCI Controller fails in auto HP03 C - SRO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description ES-D1 DAEC 2011 NRC Scenario 4 DAEC 2011 NRC Scenario #4 The scenario begins with the reactor at 60% power and a shutdown in progress.

The crew will perform the MSIV Trip/Close Functional Test. During the test, one MSIV will fail closed. The SRO will address Technical Specifications (TS) for the valve failure.

The crew will continue the shutdown by inserting control rods. While moving control rods, an APRM will fail upscale and the crew will take procedural actions to bypass the APRM and reset the 1/2 scram. Then, a RHR pump will spuriously start and its minimum flow valve will fail to open. The SRO will address TS and direct removing the pump from service. Once TS are addressed, a loss of Non Essential 4160v Bus 1A1 will occur. The crew will take actions IAW the AOP and address the resultant Recirc Pump trip and also swap bus power supplies. The SRO will address TS for single loop operation.

Then, the condensate pumps will trip causing a loss of Feedwater. The crew will insert a manual scram and the SRO will enter IPO-5 due to the scram and EOP-1 due to low RPV level. After the initial scram actions are performed, a LOOP will occur with a small drywell leak. The output breaker on the A SBDG will fail to close and cannot be closed. The B SBDG will fail to start and must be started manually to power an Essential Bus (CRITICAL TASK 1.0). As the operators attempt to recover RPV level, RCIC will fail and the HPCI flow controller must be operated in manual to permit level recovery before an Emergency Depressurization is required (CRITICAL TASK 2.0).

The scenario may be terminated when the B essential bus is recovered and RPV level is >170inches.

QF-1030-19 Rev. 12 EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG)

SITE: DAEC MSIV TRIP/CLOSE FUNCTIONAL TEST, MSIV FAILS CLOSED, LOWER POWER WITH CONTROL RODS, APRM UPSCALE, RHR PUMP START/FAILS TO TRIP ON OVERCURRENT, LOSS OF 4160V BUS 1A1, LOSS ESG NRC 11-04 REV 0 OF CONDENSATE, RPS PB FAILURE, LOOP, SBDG FAIL TO START, SMALL RECIRC LEAK, HPCI/RCIC FAILURES PROGRAM: OPERATIONS #:

COURSE: INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR #:

TOTAL TIME: 90 MINUTES Developed by:

Instructor Date Validated by:

SME/Instructor Date Reviewed by:

Operations Manager Date Approved by:

Training Supervisor-Operations Date Page 1 of 24

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #4 GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Goal of The goal of this scenario is to evaluate ILT students during the NRC Training: Exam with 3 man crew.

Learning There are no formal learning objectives Objectives:

Prerequisites: None Simulator Simulator Booth Instructor Training Phone Talker Resources:

Simulator Floor Instructor

References:

None None Commitments:

Evaluation Dynamic Simulator Method:

Operating None Experience:

Initiating Event with Core Damage Frequency:

N/A due to exam security Important Components:

Related PRA N/A due to exam security Information:

Important Operator Actions with Task Number:

N/A due to exam security Page 2 of 24

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario begins with the reactor at ~60% power and a shutdown in progress. The crew will perform the MSIV Trip/Close Functional Test. During the test, one MSIV will fail closed. The SRO will address Technical Specifications (TS) for the valve failure.

The crew will continue the shutdown by inserting control rods. While moving control rods, an APRM will fail upscale and the crew will take procedural actions to bypass the APRM and reset the 1/2 scram. Then, a RHR pump will spuriously start, with indications of pump overload on the motor ammeter. The pump will fail to trip. The SRO will address TS and direct removing the pump from service. Once TS are addressed, a loss of Non Essential 4160v Bus 1A1 will occur.

The crew will take actions IAW the AOP and address the resultant Recirc Pump trip and also swap bus power supplies. The SRO will address TS for single loop operation.

Then, the condensate pumps will trip causing a loss of Feedwater. The crew will insert a manual scram and the SRO will enter IPOI-5 due to the scram and EOP-1 due to low RPV level. After the initial scram actions are performed, a LOOP will occur with a small drywell leak.

The output breaker on the A SBDG will fail to close and cannot be closed. The B SBDG will fail to start and must be started manually to power an Essential Bus (CRITICAL TASK 1.0). As the operators attempt to recover RPV level, RCIC inverter will fail, which prevents RCIC from injecting and the HPCI flow controller will fail in AUTOMATIC, so it must be operated in manual to permit level recovery BEFORE an Emergency Depressurization is required (CRITICAL TASK 2.0).

The scenario may be terminated when the B essential bus is recovered and RPV level is

>170inches.

Page 3 of 24

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO OUTLINE:

BOOTH INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS 1 SIMULATOR SET UP: (perform set up per the Simulator Setup Checklist, including entering actions items per the Simulator Input Summary.)

Start Sim View / Data Capture Program for EXAM ONLY 1.1 General Instructions

a. Restore the IC for ILT Scenario 4 from the Thumb Drive that it is stored on.

b. If the thumb drive is not available, then reset to IC 13, Raise power using control rods to approx. 59% and set the Malfunctions, Remotes, Overrides, and Triggers as per the tables below.

c. Verify Pull Sheet setup matches current step and rod position (BOL pull sheet)

d. Place SPMET1 on a computer terminal (IAW AOP 903).

e. Mark up the following procedures:

AOP 903, marked up so all actions are complete for severe thunderstorm watch

IPOI-3, Section 5.0, Step 1 - Leave blank, 6a is N/A, Steps 6b through 6.4 are N/A, Step 7 is complete

OI 646, Step 1 is N/A, Steps (2)(d)1 & 2 are N/A then complete through Step (6)

STP 3.3.1.1 MSIV Trip/Close Functional Test 1.2 EVENT TRIGGER DEFINITIONS:

Trigger Trigger Logic Statement Trigger Word Description No.

1 ZDIMSHS4418B(1) >= 1 When CV 4418 is taken to test 10 RPDIS1SHUTDOWN(1) >= 1 When Mode Switch taken to shutdown 12 ZDIDGDG2(4) >= 1 When B SBDG started 14 RCNT >= 400 RCIC Turbine at 400 rpm 16 HPNT >= 400 HPCI Turbine at 400 rpm 22 ZDIRHHS2014(1) >= 1 A RHR Hand Switch Taken to Stop Schedule Files Needed:

Setup schedule file to Delete:

Malfunction AN1C03B(2) - (A-02) A RHR Pump 1P229A Trip OR Motor Overload

Override AO-RH 1P-229A RHR Pump Ammeter when EVENT TRIGGER 22 goes TRUE.

Page 4 of 24

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #4

1.3 MALFUNCTIONS

Time Malf. No. Malfunction Title Delay Ramp ET Initial Final Value Value Setup DG02A 1G31 A Diesel Gen Breaker Auto- Active Active Close Circuit Failure in Auto-DG A Setup STDG02 Trip Override-B SBDG 1G21 Fails Active Active to start As Dir ED08A 4.16kv/480V Bus Fault-Bus-1A1 5 Inactive Active As Dir NM08C APRM Channel Fails-APRM C 8 3 AS IS 100 seconds As Dir FW02B Condensate Pump Trip- Pump B 7 Inactive Active As Dir RP05A RPS Scram Circuit (ATWS) Auto 9 Inactive Active Scram Failure As Dir ED01A Loss of Off Site Power Sources - 1 minute 10 Inactive Active BKR M As Dir ED01B Loss of Off Site Power Sources - 1 minute 10 Inactive Active BKR J As Dir ED01C Loss of Off Site Power Sources - 1 minute 10 Inactive Active BKR K As Dir RR15B Recirc Loop RUPT Design Basis 4 minutes 12 0 10 LOCA-LOOP B As Dir RC05 RCIC Inverter trouble 1 minute 14 Inactive Active As Dir HP03 HPCI Flow Controller fails 1 minute 16 0 0 As Dir AN1C03B(2) (A-02) A RHR Pump 1P229A Trip 18 Crywolf ON OR Motor Overload NOTE: Delete this on schedule file when ET 22 True As Dir AN1C03B(2) (A-02) A RHR Pump 1P229A Trip 30 CRYWOLF ON OR Motor Overload (NEW)

OVERRIDES:

Time Override No. Override Title Delay Ramp ET Initial Final Value Value Setup DI-DG-002 152-311 DSL GEN 1G31 Output NAT NAT Breaker Setup DI-RP-029 C71AS3B Reactor manual Scram OFF OFF System B Setup DI-RP-028 C71AS3A Reactor manual Scram OFF OFF System A As Dir DI-MS-058 HS-4418B C INBD MSIV TST CV-4418 1 NORM TEST As Dir DI-RH-092 HS-2014 RHR Pump 1P-229A 18 NASP START NOTE: Delete 2 seconds after inserting Page 5 of 24

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #4 Time Override No. Override Title Delay Ramp ET Initial Final Value Value As Dir AO-RH-001 1P-229A RHR Pump Ammeter 1 sec 18 0 100 NOTE: Delete this on schedule file when ET 22 True DO-RH-157 HS-2014(1) RHR PP 1P-229A LITES 30 ON OFF (GREEN)

DO-RH-158 HS-2014(2) RHR PP 1P-229A LITES 30 ON OFF (WHITE)

DO-RH-159 HS-2014(3) RHR PP 1P-229A LITES 30 OFF OFF (RED)

DO-RH-160 HS-2014(4) RHR PP 1P-229A LITES 30 OFF OFF (AMBER)

DI-RH-092 HS-2014 RHR PUMP 1P-229A 30 NASP STOP (NEW)

Page 6 of 24

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #4 1.5 REMOTE FUNCTIONS:

Time Remote Remote Title Delay Ramp ET Initial Final No. Value Value As Dir MC03 COOLING TOWER A OUTLET 25 100 0 INLET VALVE MO-4249 As Dir MC04 COOLING TOWER A OUTLET 25 100 0 INLET VALVE MO-4250 FLOOR INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Simulator Pre-brief:

2.1 Individual position assignments 2.2 Simulator training changes since last module (N/A) 2.3 Simulator hardware and software modifications/problems that may impact training Page 7 of 24

2011 NRC ILT Scenario #4 TURNOVER INFORMATION Day of week and shift Today Day Shift Weather conditions Warm, Humid A Severe Thunderstorm Watch is in effect for the next 31/2 hours. All AOP 903 actions are complete.

(Plant power levels) 58%

MWT 1108 MWE 344 CORE FLOW 38.1 mlbm/hr Thermal Limit Problems/Power Evolutions Plant Risk Status CDF Baseline Color Green Existing LCOs, date of next surveillance: None STPs in progress or major maintenance: None Equipment to be taken out of or returned to service this shift/maintenance on major plant equipment As the IPOI directs Comments, evolutions, problems, core damage frequency, etc.

Plant shutdown is in progress for upcoming refueling outage C Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker is inoperable and unavailable.

Currently in IPOI-3, Section 5.0 Step (8)

Step 31 of the Pull Sheet, with Rods at position 30 Perform the following in the sequence listed:

1. Perform STP 3.3.1.1 MSIV Function Test

2. Continue lowering power with control rods by inserting Step 31 rods to position 14 at 3 to 5 mwe/minute then contact the RE for further guidance.

3. Secure the A train Feedwater and Condensate pumps at 50% power Containment purge will be commenced after the first condensate and feed pump are secured Page 8 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Shift Turnover COMPLETE TURNOVER: Get familiar with plant conditions.

Provide Shift Turnovers to the SRO

SRO will provide beginning of shift brief to coordinate the tasks that and ROs.

were identified on the shift turnover.

a. Review applicable current Plant Status

b. Review relevant At-Power Risk status

c. Review current LCOs not met and Action Requirements

d. Verify crew performs walk down of control boards and reviews turnover checklists EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event at examiners direction page 9 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Events 1 & 2 Role Play: It will be necessary to role play SRO the personnel in the back panels for

Briefs Crew and verifies the prerequisites are met MSIV trip verifying the relay contacts are open at

Directs the BOP to perform STP 3.3.1.1-17 MSIV trip closure closure 1C15 and 1C17. functional test functional test STP 3.3.1.1-17 BOP INBD MSIV Booth Operator: Reviews STP, then performs the following:

Failure FUNCTIONAL TEST OF A MSL MSIVs (CV-4412 and CV-4413)

Verify TRIGGER 1 goes TRUE when the C Inboard MSIV handswitch is

Verifies RPS Trip channel A1 - B Line MSIV 90% open relay is repositioned. energized at 1C15

Verifies RPS Trip channel B1 - C Line MSIV 90% open relay is energized at 1C17 EXAMINER CUE; If asked, tell the

At 1C15, verify relay C71A-K11A contacts are open candidate the relay contacts for C71A-

Ensures station personal are stationed at 1C15 and 1C17 for the K11A are open STP.

At 1C03, take A INBD MSIV TEST CV-4412 handswitch HS-4412B to TEST and release.

Verifies CV-4412 goes partially closed, and then opens

Contacts 1C15 person, and verifies:

o Relay coil de-energized and then re-energized o Contact 1-2 and 2-4 opened and then closed

At 1C04, take A OUTBD MSIV CV-4413 handswitch HS-4413B to TEST and release. Notices the A OUTBD MSIV goes closed (slowly)

Verifies CV-4413 goes partially closed, and then opens BOP (cont)

Contacts 1C15 & 1C17 person, and verifies:

page 10 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Events 1 & 2 o Relay coil de-energized and then re-energized (cont) EXAMINER CUE; If asked, tell the FUNCTIONAL TEST OF C MSL MSIVs (CV-4418 and CV-4419) candidate the relay contacts for C71A-

Verifies RPS Trip channel A2 - D Line MSIV 90% open relay is K11B are open energized at 1C15

Verifies RPS Trip channel B1 - A Line MSIV 90% open relay is Booth Operator: energized at 1C17

At 1C17, verify relay C71A-K11B contacts are open If asked whether the relays operated properly for the C INBD MSIV, state that

Ensures station personal are stationed at 1C15 and 1C17 for the the relays K3C and K3F are NOT re- STP.

energized.

At 1C03, take C INBD MSIV TEST CV-4418 handswitch HS-4418B to TEST and release.

Notices that CV-4418 goes fully closed and does not open EXAMINER CUE; If asked, tell the candidate the relay contacts for C71A-

Notifies the CRS the C INBD MSIV is SHUT K11A are open

When directed takes the handswitch for the C Inboard MSIV to CLOSE CRS

Halts the STP Role Play: As Duty Manager,

Refers to TS and determines:

Acknowledge problem with MSIV and tell

TS 3.6.1.3 condition A (isolate affected flowpath, verify isolated)

SRO to continue with the power reduction and an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months LCO, re-verify 31 days and Event Response Team will investigate.

May order the OUTBOARD MSIV CLOSED, may decide to wait for management guidance.

Refers to IPOI-3 Section 6.0 for operation with one main steam line isolated (or OI 683)

May enter AOP 255.2

Contacts Duty Manager EXAMINER NOTE: Continue IAW turnover guidance page 11 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE Event #3 Booth Instructor: respond as plant SRO personnel and respond as necessary: Directs RO to lower reactor power with control rods per RE guidance Insert control rods to continue Examiner Note: One individual will stand RO shutdown in as a Reactivity Management SRO. This

Using RE guidance and Pull Sheet at Step 31, inserts control rods individual will provide NO specific direction

Monitors NI indications for response

Monitors reactor level and pressure BOP Monitors balance of plant equipment EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event at examiners direction but prior to reaching 50% power page 12 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE Event #4 Booth Instructor: At the direction of CREW C APRM evaluator: Responds to the following Annunciators:

Upscale, 1/2 INSERT EVENT TRIGGER 3. 1C05A-A-2, A RPS AUTO SCRAM Scram This inserts the C APRM Upscale. 1C05A-B-2, APRM UPSCALE TRIP OR INOP 1C05A-C-2, APRM UPSCALE Booth Instructor: respond as plant personnel and respond as necessary: SRO Directs bypassing APRM Booth Instructor: Directs reset of 1/2 scram After the 1/2 scram is reset: Discusses Technical Specifications - Briefly in TS 3.3.1.1. Condition A (RPS INSERT EVENT TRIGGER 9. Instrumentation) and TRM 3.3.2. Condition A (Control Rod Block Instrumentation) while unbypassing A APRM until C APRM is bypassed.

This inserts the Auto Scram Failure RO/BOP Bypasses the APRM IAW OI 878.4 as follows:

(1) If an APRM is currently bypassed, perform the following for the bypassed APRM, otherwise N/A this step:

(a) Verify the APRM channel Mode Selector Switch on Panel 1C37 is in OPERATE.

(b) Verify the APRM upscale, inoperative, and if greater than 5%

reactor power, downscale trips on Panel 1C37 are reset.

(c) Verify the IRM/APRM recorders on Panel 1C05 indicate approximately the same average power for the bypassed APRM as they do for the other APRM channels in operation.

(d) Place the APRM BYPASS switch C51B-S3 or C51B-S6 on Panel 1C05 in the neutral (unbypassed) position.

Event #4 (cont)

RO (cont)

(e) Observe that the bypass light on Panel 1C05 and/or that the bypass light on Panel 1C37 is/are OFF.

page 13 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE (2) Verify the two remaining APRM channels in the RPS trip system are operable and not BYPASSED, otherwise comply with Tech Specs for inoperable RPS instrumentation.

(3) Place the APRM BYPASS switch C51B-S3 (C51B-S6) on Panel 1C05 in the A, C, or E (B, D, or F) position for the channel to be bypassed.

(4) Observe that the bypass lights for the bypassed channel on Panel 1C37 and/or Panel 1C05 is/are ON.

Resets the 1/2 scram IAW OI 358 as follows:

(1) Turn the REACTOR SCRAM RESET switch C71A-S5 first to Group 1 and 4 [Group 2 and 3] then to Group 2 and 3 [Group 1 and 4] to reset the scram signal.

Verify the following:

(2) The eight white SCRAM GROUP indicating lights are ON.

(3) "A" RPS MANUAL SCRAM (1C05A, A-3) annunciator is reset.

(4) "B" RPS MANUAL SCRAM (1C05B, A-3) annunciator is reset.

(5) Annunciator 1C05A, E-4 is reset.

(6) Annunciator 1C05B, E-4 is reset.

BOP Monitors balance of plant equipment EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event when the 1/2 scram is reset page 14 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE Event #5 Booth Instructor: When directed by the Crew A RHR Pump Chief Examiner: Diagnoses A RHR Pump start.

Spurious start / Insert Event Trigger 18 Ann: 1C03A (B-6) ADS Core Spray RHR Pump Running Permissive Fails to trip on This starts the A RHR Pump Ann: 1C03B (A-2) A RHR Pump 1P-229A Trip Or Motor Overload overcurrent SRO Role Play:

When informed of RHR pump start and after assessing the situation, When contacted to investigate, directs the BOP to stop the pump acknowledge request as 2nd Assistant and

Directs contacting 2nd Assistant and Aux Operator to investigate Aux Operator.

Refers to TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition A. - 30 days to restore RHR pump to SE Corner Room - nothing abnormal, no operable status one in the room.

May discuss if associated instrumentation is affected. Then refer to TS 1A3 Switchgear Room - nothing 3.3.5.1 - ECCS Instrumentation abnormal, no one in the room.

Enters TS 3.6.2.3. Condition A - 30 day LCO for Torus Cooling RO

Monitors reactor power, level and pressure BOP

Recognizes the A RHR pump is running and amps are high and pump should have tripped

Reports condition to SRO

As directed, secures the RHR pump EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event at examiners direction page 15 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE Event #6 Booth Instructor: When directed by the CREW LOSS OF Chief Examiner: Responds to Annunciator 4160V BUS INSERT EVENT TRIGGER 5 1C08A A2 - BUS 1A1 LOCKOUT TRIP OR LOSS OF VOLTAGE 1A1 This inserts the Bus 1A1 Lockout. SRO

Directs actions IAW ARP Role Play: When contacted to investigate

Enters AOP 304.1 - Loss of Non essential Bus 1A1 loss, Report back in 5 minutes that the bus has a lockout and BKR 1A101 has

Enters AOP 255.2 - Power/reactivity Abnormal Power Change an overcurrent flag

Reviews Power/Flow Map and determines NOT in the Buffer or Exclusion Region Booth Instructor: respond as plant

Enters AOP 264 - Loss of Recirc Pump personnel and respond as necessary:

Contacts Duty Manager

Refers to TS 3.4.1 Condition D - single loop surveillance within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

Depending on how long the event continues may enter AOP 691- High Back Pressure RO

Monitors critical plant parameters

Responds to the Recirc Pump trip IAW AOP 264

For the Recirc Pump that tripped, performs the following:

Verify open A[B] RECIRC PUMP DISCH BYP valve MO-4629[4630].

Close A[B] RECIRC PUMP DISCHARGE valve MO-4627[4628].

After 5 minutes, reopen A[B] RECIRC PUMP DISCHARGE valve MO-4627[4628] (unless the A[B] Pump has to be isolated).

BOP For LOSS of 1A1 ONLY, perform the following:

Crosstie 1B1 and 1B2 by performing the following:

page 16 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE

Momentarily place control switch FEEDER BREAKER 1B101 XFMR 1X11 to LC 1B1 to the TRIP position.

Momentarily place control switch TIE BREAKER 1B107 LC 1B1/1B2 in the CLOSE position.

Crosstie 1B5 and 1B6 by performing the following:

Momentarily place control switch FEEDER BREAKER 1B501 XFMR 1X51 to LC 1B5 to the TRIP position.

Momentarily place control switch TIE BREAKER 1B505 LC 1B5/1B6 in the CLOSE position.

Place BUS 1A1 TRANSFER switch in MANUAL.

Verify Offgas Closed Cooling Water Pump 1P-105A[B] in service.

Start Offgas Glycol Pump 1P-243A[B].

EXAMINER NOTE: When Duty Manager is contacted to discuss event, go to next event page 17 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE Event #7 Booth Instructor: When directed by the SRO:

Condensate Chief Examiner:

Identifies the loss of FW Pumps Trip, Insert Event Trigger 7

Orders manual reactor scram Reactor Scram This will trip the only running condensate (RPS PBs Fail)

Enters EOP 1 due to <170 RPV water level pump

Orders RPV level and pressure be controlled IAW EOP 1

Directs Defeat 11 to maximize drywell cooling Booth Instructor:

RO:

When the Mode Switch is taken to shutdown and after a 1 minute delay,

Identifies the loss of FW Event Trigger 10 will become active. This

SCRAMS the reactor when directed and carries out IPOI-5 actions results in a LOOP

Scrams the reactor using both RPS Pushbuttons

Places Mode Switch to Shutdown

Verifies all control rods fully inserted by one or both of the following Examiner Note: means:

1 minute after the Mode switch is placed in 1. Verify the Refuel One Rod Select Permissive:

Shutdown, a LOOP will occur. Actions for the LOOP are described in the next event.

Position THE MODE SWITCH to REFUEL.

Turn Rod Select Power off and then on.

Verify the white Refuel Select Permissive light is lit.

Return THE MODE SWITCH to SHUTDOWN.

2. On the FULL CORE DISPLAY, verify the green FULL IN light for each rod is on.

BOP:

Event #7 (cont)

Sends field operator to investigate condensate pump trips

Verifies Turbine Trip and Generator Lockout

Monitors BOP equipment and containment parameters

If Directed, Implements Defeat 11 to maximize drywell cooling as follows:

page 18 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE

At Panel 1C35, place CV-4371A GROUP 3 OVERRIDE keylock switch S583B in OVERRIDE OPEN position and confirm amber light is ON.

Confirm CV-4371A opens by observing valve position indicating lights on 1C35 (red light is ON and the green light is OFF).

EXAMINER NOTE: LOOP with SBDG Complications / LOCA actions are in next section page 19 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE Event #8 & 9 Booth Instructor: LOSS OF POWER EVENT LOOP, A DG Event Trigger 10 will be active 1 minute Crew Output BKR after the mode switch was taken to Responds to Loss of Offsite Power Indications FAILS and will shutdown in the previous event not close. B DG This will result in a LOOP Fails To Start SRO but CAN be

Directs Reactor pressure control using SRVs manually Booth Instructor:

Enters AOP 304.1 LOSS OF 4160V NON-ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL started. After the B EDG is started, Event POWER Trigger 12 will go Active. This will cause the Recirc leak to begin to ramp in on a 4

Enters AOP 301 LOSS OF ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL POWER Small Recirc Directs starting the B DG and verifying it loads the Bus minute ramp.

Leak (CRITICAL TASK #1)

Examiner Note:

Directs RPV level band 170 to 211 using available systems RCIC Inverter Failure, HPCI The Recirc Leak will begin to occur after Ctrl Failure in the B EDG is started. RO Auto Provides RPV level and pressure status BOP Role Play: If directed, acknowledge

May report MSIV closure (Group I Isolation) request to close the A DG output breaker locally (you will not be able to close the

Diagnoses that the A DG started but did not pick up the bus A SBDG output breaker.)

Diagnoses that the A DG is running with no ESW flow and places the A DG in P-T-L.

Diagnoses that the B DG failed to start STARTS B DG and verifies it loads BUS 1A4 (CRITICAL TASK #1)

RECIRC LEAK EVENT and RPV LEVEL RECOVERY CREW:

Responds to annunciator 1C05B-B1 - Primary Containment Pressure Hi/Lo SRO:

page 20 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE

Enters AOP 573 - Primary Containment Control

Directs operators to monitor containment parameters

Enters EOP RPV Control due to RPV low level (was entered earlier when the scram occurred).

IF EOP-1 Alternate Level Control Leg is entered may direct:

Lockout of ADS

Start of CRD pump

Start of SBLC pump Directs Reactor Water level band of 170 to 211 using available systems - (HPCI) (CRITICAL TASK #2)

Directs Defeat 4 - This results DW Cooling Fans in FAST

Enters EOP Primary Containment Control when containment pressure reaches 2 psig.

Directs initiation of Torus Spray prior to Torus Pressure exceeding 11 psig

IF Torus Pressure exceeds 11 psig, directs initiation of Drywell Spray.

RO:

Assists BOP in controlling RPV level and monitoring other critical primary containment plant parameters BOP:

If directed, performs Defeat 4 to maximize drywell cooling

Places Torus Spray in service as follows:

1. Place keylock HS-2005[HS-1932] Outboard Torus Cooling/Spray Valve handswitch in OPEN and verify valve opening

2. Throttle open MO-2006[MO-1933], Torus Spray Valve

Recognizes RCIC Failure and reports status to CRS

As directed starts CRD pump page 21 of 24

2009 NRC ILT Scenario #4 SCENARIO TIMELINE

Places Drywell Spray inservice when directed as follows:

1. Ensures Recirc Pumps are tripped

2. Repositions HS-1903C - Enable Containment Spray Valves to Manual

3. Depending on RPV level may take HS-1903B to 2/3 Core Coverage/LPCI INIT Interlock Override to MANUAL OVERRD

4. Open MO-2000[1902] , Inboard Drywell Spray Valve

5. Throttle open MO-2001[1903], Outboard Drywell Spray Valve.

Diagnoses HPCI controller failure and takes manual control of HPCI to restore RPV level to >170 (CRITICAL TASK #2)

Scenario Termination Criteria RPV level recovered to >170 Alert - FA1 - Drywell pressure 2.0 psig, SA5.1 - single AC Power Source

- - END OF SCENARIO ***

page 22 of 24

SEG Validation Checklist Correct IC or plant status identified.

Shift turnover forms filled out (both CRS/OSM and NSOE) if required.

Additional documents are prepared (STPs, Work Orders, LCO Paperwork).

Tasks and Objectives have been verified to be correct.

Plant PRA initiating events, important equipment and important tasks are identified.

SOMS tags identified and included in setup instructions.

Special setup instructions identified; handswitch manipulations, procedure markups, alarm borders, 3D case available, computer points substituted, etc.

Setup files correctly called out.

Malfunction list is accurate.

Override list is accurate.

Remote function list is accurate.

Event triggers are accurate.

Time/Notes section is accurate and includes all reasonable cues that may be given to initiate an action. Cues are unambiguous and provide a definitive moment to take action.

Instructor Activity section is accurate and complete:

Actions are clearly defined for Booth or Floor instructor.

Role-playing is clearly noted.

The sequence of events is completely and concisely narrated even if it takes no instructor action.

Automatic actions that require verification are noted.

Reasonable alternate paths are considered and included.

Event trigger activation is distinguished from narrative text (Bold font)

Noun descriptions of actions that occur on event trigger initiation are complete, for example set ET 3 to TRUE which activates malfunction SW21C resulting in a loss of the C Well Water Pump.

Other simulator control actions are clearly distinguished from narrative text, for example after drywell temperature reaches 280 deg. F SNAP the simulator to IC 0.

Student and Instructor copies of worksheets or other training activities are verified correct and electronically attached to the file if appropriate.

Page 23 of 24

SEG Validation Checklist Expected Student Response Section is accurate and complete: