ML11234A258

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Issuance of Amendment Regarding Technical Specification 3.8.1, (Alternating Current) AC Sources - Operating Surveillance Requirements Notes
ML11234A258
Person / Time
Site: Watts Bar Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 11/22/2011
From: John Lamb
Watts Bar Special Projects Branch
To: James Shea
Tennessee Valley Authority
Lamb J
References
TAC ME6980
Download: ML11234A258 (31)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555*0001 November 22, 2011 Mr. Joseph Shea Corporate Manager, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 3R Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1-ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, "AC [ALTERNATING CURRENT] SOURCES - OPERATING" SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTES (TAC NO. ME6980)

Dear Mr. Shea:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 89 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated August 10, 2011.

The amendment revises several surveillance requirements notes in TS 3.8.1, "AC [Alternating current] Sources - Operating," to allow performance of the surveillances on WBN Unit 2 6.9 kilovolt shutdown boards and associated diesel generators while WBN Unit 1 is operating in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Jo n

. Lamb, Senior Project Manager W

Bar Special Projects Branch Di. ion of Operating Reactor Licensing o Ice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-390

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 89 to NPF-90
2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555*0001 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-390 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 89 License No. NPF-90

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated August 10, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 89, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be implemented no later than 30 days from the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

~J- ". \\LQ (01 Stephen J. Campbell, Chief Watts Bar Special Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to License No. NPF-90 and the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: November 22,2011

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 89 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90 DOCKET NO. 50-390 Replace page 3 of Operating License No. NPF-90 with the attached page 3.

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a marginal line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3.8-8 3.8-8 3.8-9 3.8-9 3.8-10 3.8-10 3.8-12 3.8-12 3.8-13 3.8-13 3.8-14 3.8-14 3.8-15 3.8-15

- 3 (4)

TVA, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive.

possess. and use in amounts as required, any byproduct. source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form.

for sample analysis. instrument calibration. or other activity associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5)

TVA. pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70. to possess.

but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C.

This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules. regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect, and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below.

(1)

Maximum Power Level TVA is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3459 megawatts thermal.

(2)

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 89 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3)

Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) (Section 18.2 of SER Supplements 5 and 15)

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, TVA shall accomplish the necessary activities, provide acceptable responses, and implement all proposed corrective actions related to having the Watts Bar Unit 1 SPDS operational.

(4)

Vehicle Bomb Control Program (Section 13.6.9 of SSER 20)

During the period of the exemption granted in paragraph 2.D.(3) of this license. in implementing the power ascension phase of the approved initial test program, TVA shall not exceed 50% power until the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) and (8) are fully implemented. TVA shall submit a letter under oath or affirmation when the requirements of 73.55(c)(7) and (8) have been fully implemented.

Amendment No. 89

3.8.1 AC Sources"Operating SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.7 Verify each DG starts from standby condition and achieves in s; 10 seconds, voltage 2 6800 V, and frequency 2 58.8 Hz. Verify after DG fast start from standby conditions that the DG achieves steady state voltage ~ 6800 V and s; 7260 V, and frequency <!:

58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz.

184 days SR 3.8.1.8

""--""--------------NOTE-------------------

For the 1A-A and 1 B-B Shutdown Boards, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2.

However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify automatic and manual transfer of each 6.9 kV shutdown board power supply from the normal offsite circuit to each alternate offsite circuit.

18 months (continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-8 Ar.:tendl1ent No. 89

3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3,8.1.9 SURVEILLANCE

NOTES---------------------------

1, For DGs 1A-A and 18-8, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

2.

If performed with the DG synchronized with offsite power, it shall be performed at a power factor ~ 0.8 and s 0.9.

Verify each DG rejects a load greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load, and:

a.

Fo"owing load rejection, the frequency is s 66.75 Hz;

b.

Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the voltage is ~ 6555 V and s 7260 V; and

c.

Within 4 seconds following load rejection, the frequency is ~ 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz.

FREQUENCY 18 months SR 3.8.1.10

N OT E ------------------------------

For DGs 1A-A and 18-8, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satiSfy this SR.

Verify each DG operating at a power factor ~ 0.8 and s 0.9 does not trip and voltage is maintained s 8880 V during and following a load rejection of ~ 3960 kW and s 4400 kW and ~ 2970 kVAR and s 3300 kVAR.

18 months (continued)

Watts 8ar-Unit 1 3.8-9

~~nendnent No. 89

3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.11 SURVEILLANCE

NOTE---------------------------

For DGs 1 A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal:

a.

De-energization of emergency buses;

b.

Load shedding from emergency buses;

c.

DG auto-starts from standby condition and:

1.

energizes permanently connected loads in :s: 10 seconds,

2.

energizes auto-connected shutdown loads through automatic load sequencer,

3.

maintains steady state voltage

?: 6800 V and :s: 7260 V,

4.

maintains steady state frequency

?: 58.8 Hz and :s: 61.2 Hz, and

5.

supplies permanently connected and auto-connected shutdown loads for

?: 5 minutes.

FREQUENCY 18 months (continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-10

.Amendment No. 89

AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.13 SURVEILLANCE

NOTE ---------------------------

For DGs 1A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

FREQUENCY Verify each DG's automatic trips are bypassed on automatic or emergency start signal except:

a.

Engine overspeed; and

b.

Generator differential current.

18 months SR 3.8,1,14

N OT ES----------------------------

1.

Momentary transients outside the load and power factor ranges do not invalidate this test.

2.

For performance of this test in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4, three DGs must be maintained operable and in a standby condition.

3, Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify each DG operating at a power factor ~ 0.8 and s 0.9 operates for ~ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s:

a.

For ~ 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> loaded ~ 4620 kW and s 4840 kW and ~ 3465 kVAR and s 3630 kVAR; and

b.

For the remaining hours of the test loaded

~ 3960 kW and s 4400 kW and ~ 2970 kVAR and s 3300 kVAR.

18 months (continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1 3,8-12 Amendment 14,89

3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.15

NOTE ----------------------------

This Surveillance shall be performed within 5 minutes of shutting down the DG after the DG has operated

2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> loaded;
:: 3960 kW and:::; 4400 kW.

Momentary transients outside of load range do not invalidate this test.

Verify each DG starts and achieves, in :::; 10 seconds, voltage;::: 6800 V, and frequency;::: 58.8 Hz. Verify after DG fast start from standby conditions that the DG achieves steady state voltage:::. 6800 V and :::;

7260 V, and frequency:::. 58.8 Hz and:::; 61.2 Hz.

18 months SR 3.8.1.16

NOTE------------------------------

For DGs 1A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify each DG:

a.

Synchronizes with offsite power source while loaded with emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power;

b.

Transfers loads to offsite power source; and

c.

Returns to ready-to-Ioad operation.

18 months (continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-13 Amendment No. 89

3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.17

NOT E------------------------------

This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR Verify, with each Unit 1 DG operating in test mode and connected to its bus, an actual or simulated ESF actuation signal overrides the test mode by:

a.

Returning DG to ready-to-Ioad operation; and

b.

Automatically energizing the emergency load from offsite power.

18 months SR 3.8.1.18

NOTE---------------------------

For DGs 1A-A and 1B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR Verify the time delay setting for each sequenced load block is within limits for each accident condition and non-accident condition load sequence.

18 months

( continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-14 AIaendrnent No. 89

3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.19

NOTE-------------------------------

For DGs 1 A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

18 months Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal in conjunction with an actual or simulated ESF actuation signal:

a.

De-energization of emergency buses;

b.

Load shedding from emergency buses;

c.

DGs of the same power train auto-start from standby condition and:

1.

energizes permanently connected loads in s 10 seconds,

2.

energizes auto-connected emergency loads through load sequencer,

3.

achieves steady state voltage:

~ 6800 V and s 7260 V,

4.

achieves steady state frequency

~ 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz, and

5.

supplies permanently connected and auto-connected emergency loads for 25 minutes.

SR 3.8.1.20 Verify during idle operation that any automatic or 18 months emergency start signal disables the idle start circuitry and commands the engine to full speed.

(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-15 Amendment No. 89

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATIS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-390

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated August 10, 2011 (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Agencywide Documents and Management Systems Accession No. ML11227A256), Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1 and Appendix A, Technical Specifications (TSs), of the Facility Operating License. The proposed change would revise several surveillance requirements (SRs) notes in TS 3.8.1, "AC [Alternating Current] Sources - Operating," to allow performance of the surveillances on WBN Unit 2 6.9 kilovolt (kV) shutdown boards and associated diesel generators (DGs) while WBN Unit 1 is operating in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4. The change modifies SR Notes associated with SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1.9, SR 3.8.1.10, SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.13, SR 3.8.1.16, SR 3.8.1.18, and SR 3.8.1.19.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 Regulations and Guidance The onsite standby ac power systems at WBN are designed to comply with the following applicable regulations and requirements:

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50), Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, "Electric power systems," specifies that an onsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety.

As stated in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18, "Inspection and testing of electric power systems," electric power systems important to safety shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of important areas and features.

- 2 As stated in 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications," licensee's TSs are required to have SRs relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operations are within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) will be met. The SRs may include mode restrictions based on the safety aspects of conducting the surveillances in excluded reactor modes.

As stated in 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants," that preventive maintenance activities must not reduce the overall availability of the structures, systems and components (SSCs).

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.6, Revision 0, "Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems," describes an acceptable degree of independence between redundant standby (onsite) power sources and between their distribution systems.

RG 1.9, "Selection, Design, Qualification, and Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Units Used as Class 1 E Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants,"

provides guidance regarding selection and testing of a DG set.

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 308-1971, "Criteria for Class 1 E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," provides criteria for the determination of Class 1 E power system design features and the requirements for their testing, surveillance, and documentation.

2.2 Important Precedents The NRC approved modification of mode restriction notes for Surveillances in TS 3.8.1 is the following precedents:

(1)

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1,2 and 3, - Issuance of Amendments on Technical Specifications 3.8.1 and 3.8.4 - Alternating Current (AC) and Direct Current (DC) Electric Power Sources (TAC Nos. MB9150, MB9151 and MB9152), dated September 29, 2005 (ML052720578).

(2)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments - Technical Specifications 3.8.1 and 3.8.4 - AC and DC Sources (TAC Nos. MB9476 and MB9477),

dated September 28, 2004 (ML042790160).

(3)

Wolf Creek Generating Station - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Technical Specifications 3.8.1 and 3.8.4 - AC and DC Sources (TAC No. MB8763),

dated July 12, 2004 (ML041980406).

(4)

Callaway Plant, Unit 1-lssuance of Amendment Regarding Technical Specifications 3.8.1 and 3.8.4 - AC and DC Sources (TAC No. MB9664), dated June 14, 2004 (ML041740120).

-3 (5)

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 -Issuance of Amendment Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator Testing (TAC No. ME2869), dated January 25,2011 (ML110100307).

The above license amendments, in part, combine the removal of the MODE restriction Note from some surveillances with the application of the TS Task Force (TSTF)-283, Revision 3, "Revising Notes in Surveillance Requirements to Allow Testing of Alternating Current Sources in Technical Specifications 3.8.1," changes to other surveillances. Removal of the MODE restriction Notes allows the surveillances to be performed in any MODE. Application of the TSTF-283 changes allows the flexibility to perform the surveillances for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY without having to shut down the associated unit.

3.0 BACKGROUND

3.1

System Description

The WBN AC Electrical Power Distribution System sources consist of the offsite power sources (preferred power sources, normal and alternates), and the onsite standby power sources (Train A and Train B DGs). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17, the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.

The onsite Class 1 E AC Distribution System supplies electrical power to four power trains, shared between the two units, with each train powered by an independent Class 1 E 6.9 kV shutdown board. Power trains 1A and 2A comprise load group A, and power trains 1 B and 2B comprise load Group B. Two DGs associated with one load group can provide all safety related functions to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in one unit and safely shut down the opposite unit. Each 6.9 kV shutdown board has two separate and independent offsite sources of power as well as a dedicated onsite DG source.

Offsite power is supplied to the WBN 161 kV transformer yard by two dedicated lines from the WBN Hydro Plant switchyard. From the 161 kV transformer yard, two electrically and physically separated circuits provide AC power, through step-down common station service transformers (CSSTs), to the 6.9 kV shutdown boards. The two offsite AC electrical power sources are designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions.

The 6.9 kV shutdown boards are provided with loss-of-voltage and degraded-voltage relays that initiate transfer from the normal supply, to the standby (DG) power supply. If the standby supply is paralleled with one of the offsite supplies for testing, loss of the standby supply would cause reverse power relays to trip the standby circuit breaker.

The onsite standby power source for each 6.9 kV shutdown board is a dedicated DG. A DG starts automatically on a safety injection (SI) signal or on a 6.9 kV shutdown board degraded voltage or loss-of-voltage. After the DG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective 6.9 kV shutdown board after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of

- 4 6.9 kV shutdown board loss-of-voltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with an SI signal. The DGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the 6.9 kV shutdown board on an SI signal alone. Following the trip of offsite power, a loss-of-voltage signal strips all nonpermanent loads from the 6.9 kV shutdown board. When the DG is tied to the 6.9 kV shutdown board, loads are then sequentially connected to their respective 6.9 kV shutdown boards by the automatic sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG by automatic load application.

For a loss of offsite power during DG testing, the DG will switch to the emergency mode of operation with one exception. The DG will remain in the testing mode if the 6.9kV shutdown board's offsite power feed is through the alternate feeder. In this case, DG overcurrent relays are active to prevent the DG from being overloaded. If an accident signal is initiated during testing of the standby supply, the standby breaker is tripped and the emergency loads are automatically energized by the offsite power supply. Should a LOCA and a loss of offsite power occur when a DG is paralleled with the grid under test, its 6.9 kV shutdown board standby and supply breakers are tripped, load shedding occurs and the DG sequencer will load the accident loads. Only one DG will be in the test mode (Le., operated in parallel with the offsite power supply) at any given time unless the unit is in cold shutdown or not fueled; then, both diesels of the same train may be in test. Therefore, loss of any onsite power generation will not prevent the distribution system from being powered from the offsite circuits.

Overcurrent relaying and loss-of-voltage relaying for the shutdown boards are coordinated so that a faulted or overloaded bus will not be transferred from one preferred power circuit to another because of depressed voltage resulting from the fault or overload. For the range of grid conditions identified as acceptable, loss of power from one offsite power circuit, whether from failure at the transmission grid interface, failure of any part of the preferred power circuit itself, or failure of part of the onsite distribution system, will not cause loss or degradation of the other offsite power circuit. The CSST trips are initiated by any transformer or line failure relay such as fault-pressure, transformer-overcurrent, ground-current, line-protection, or differential relaying.

Initiation of a CSST trip by these protective devices also causes automatic fast transfer of the 6.9 kV shutdown boards normally supplied from that CSST to their alternate supplies.

3.2 Need for Proposed Changes When WBN Unit 1 was granted an operating license in 1996, WBN Unit 2 was not complete and completion of WBN Unit 2 was not contemplated in any committed timeframe. However, substantial portions of the site were completed, consistent with the original design of the site as a two-unit facility. The onsite power system, including DGs and supporting equipment were completed as designed for a two-unit site. In light of TVA's current plan to complete and start up WBN Unit 2, TVA evaluated the TSs to ensure they could still be performed without requiring both units to shut down. TVA determined that, based on the existing operating mode restrictions contained in the existing WBN Unit 1 TS 3.8.1 SR Notes, it would not be possible to perform the affected SRs on the designated WBN Unit 2 DGs without requiring both units to be shut down by TS.

- 5 The proposed changes will allow performance of the preoperational integrated safeguards test of WBN Unit 2 with WBN Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. If NRC grants an Operating License to WBN Unit 2, the proposed changes to the WBN Unit 1 TSs will allow periodic performance of the Surveillances on WBN Unit 2 in MODE 5 or 6 with WBN Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

3.3 Integrated Safeguards Test TVA plans to perform Integrated Safeguards Testing on WBN Unit 2 as part of WBN Unit 2 startup activities.

The objectives of the WBN Unit 2 Integrated Safeguards Test are to:

  • Demonstrate proper automatic actuation, alignment and operation, including bus stripping and load sequencing of the 2A-A and 2B-B DGs and the Train 2A-A and 2B-B load group components controlled by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) with and without offsite power, Demonstrate electrical independence between redundant load groups by verification of the actuated train com ponents,
  • Demonstrate operability and reliability of the 2A-A and 2B-B DGs including proper starting and dynamic load response to loss of loads and to load sequencing, and Demonstrate the onsite power supply for safety related loads will automatically and manually transfer to onsite standby diesel units from normal or alternate power supply and manually from DG units back to normal or alternate supply.

The test will include the following activities:

Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) test,

  • SI with Offsite Power Available test, and
  • Coincident LOOP/Sl/Containment Isolation test.

As part of the preparations for the Integrated Safeguards Test, the load group (Train) under test will be aligned for normal at-power configuration where possible. For those components that cannot be placed in service in a normal configuration, the components will be tested in a configuration that will allow simulation and actuation. For example, Pressurizer Heater breakers will be placed in test and jumpers applied to bypass the Pressurizer level and reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure interlocks to allow the breaker to operate from the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) output relay and from a LOOP condition. In addition, ESF equipment will be configured for at-power alignment. For example, WBN Unit 2 SI pumps will be aligned in standby and WBN Unit 2 centrifugal charging pumps (high-head injection) will be placed in service in a recirculation mode for the appropriate portions of the test.

-6 The testing of the 2A-A and 2B-B DGs as part of the Integrated Safeguards Test (and testing of the 1 A-A and 1B-B DGs during performance of the affected SRs) will be accomplished by alignment of the single train to the test configuration. This configuration includes disabling the common emergency start circuit of the DG under test that would normally start other DGs not being tested. This common emergency start circuit is a non-Class 1 E circuit that does not render any DGs inoperable when disabled. Each DG retains its ESF signal and its loss of voltage circuitry that will automatically start any DG, should that event occur on the associated shutdown board.

The Integrated Safeguards Test will initiate the accident signal or cause a LOOP to a train of electrical distribution boards. The components required to respond to the simulated accident event will be monitored, recorded, and verified to meet acceptance criteria.

Time measurements will be recorded to ensure the required loads sequence onto the electrical boards in the required time, as well as diesel starting and energizing of the associated shutdown board.

The LOOP portion of the Integrated Safeguards Test will be initiated by simulating loss of the offsite power source. This is accomplished by opening the CSST load breaker feeding the 6.9 kV Shutdown Board under test. The electrical board senses the loss of power, initiates the opening of the normal feeder breaker, causing the affected DG to start and close onto the affected Shutdown Board. Once the electrical board is energized to proper voltage and frequency, electrical loads are automatically sequenced back onto the electrical board as designed. These loads will be checked for proper response and response time.

For the SI with offsite power available portion of the test, a simulated accident Signal will be actuated to the SSPS to cause all components in the tested train to respond as-designed.

These components will be verified to actuate to the as-designed position and, upon reset of the accident signal, the components will be verified to have remained in the safeguards state. In addition, the WBN Unit 2 ESF pumps will initially be in recirculation, if running, and a simulated accident signal actuating the RCS Cold Leg injection flow path will be injected to provide near-accident condition loading.

For the coincident LOOP/SIIContainment Isolation test, the affected train will be tested under simulated accident signals combining the LOOP with coincident SI and Containment Isolation Phase B. This will test the LOOP circuitry coincidentally with the ability to sequence on the accident loads with the loss of power, and test the components required to respond to the containment isolation signal. The components required to respond to the containment isolation signal include the Containment Spray system, Air Return Fans, cooling water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps, and control air to containment. All loads will be monitored for proper response and again for response times to ensure all loads sequence on to the DG at the design times.

This test will measure the designed loading of the DG to ensure overloading will not occur during designed-basis accidents.

The performance of the Integrated Safeguards Test as part of the WBN Unit 2 startup test program will establish the initial completion of the applicable WBN Unit 2 TS SRs. Subsequent to the completion of the Integrated Safeguards Test, the affected WBN Unit 2 SRs will be next

- 7 performed at the first WBN Unit 2 refueling outage consistent with the frequency for those SRs.

The SRs will be met by performing plant surveillance instructions that are similar in detail and controls to the procedures used to perform the Integrated Safeguards Test. In addition, following the performance of the Integrated Safeguards Test during the WBN Unit 2 startup test program and consistent with the changes to the SR Notes, TVA will perform the affected surveillances for WBN Unit 1 equipment only during WBN Unit 1 refueling outages.

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.1 Introduction OPERABILITY requirements for the onsite and offsite AC sources during plant operation (i.e.,

for MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4) are specified in TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating." TS 3.8.1 includes SRs for monitoring of the offsite sources and testing of the DGs. The surveillance tests required per SR 3.8.1.8 (automatic and manual transfer capability of offsite circuits test),

SR 3.8.1.9 (single largest load reject test), SR 3.8.1.10 (full load rejection test),

SR 3.8.1.11 (LOOP test), SR 3.8.1.13 (protective-trip bypass test), SR 3.8.1.16 (synchronizing test), SR 3.8.1.18 (load sequencing test), and SR 3.8.1.19 (SI signal with LOOP test) must be performed while the plant is in a shutdown condition (i.e., MODE 5 or 6) as enforced through the associated Notes. With the plant in MODE 5 or 6, TS 3.8.2 only requires two DGs associated with one train to be OPERABLE. Therefore, the DG being tested is, subject to work control processes, not a DG that is being maintained or credited as an OPERABLE DG for satisfying TS 3.8.2.

The proposed changes would allow shutdown board and DG testing to be performed during MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 - when four DGs are required to be OPERABLE per TS 3.8.1, so that the DG under test would also be required to be OPERABLE. Any condition associated with the testing that would make the DG not OPERABLE, would require declaring the DG inoperable and entering Required Actions for the inoperable DG. For example, prior to performance of the DG testing, a check for water in the cylinders would require entering the Required Action under LCO 3.8.1. In addition, as part of the preplanned activities, the voltage regulator potentiometer will be rotated (swiped), as part of a preventive maintenance item, and will render the DG inoperable until subsequent voltage checks verify the potentiometer is set correctly.

The WBN electrical system design allows testing of a DG operating in parallel with the offsite source while maintaining TS Operability. The DG control circuitry design trips the output breaker of any DG that is in its test mode and is operating in parallel with offsite power whenever an SI signal is actuated. Tripping open the DG breaker satisfies a control logic interlock within the accident response circuits, so that an SI signal will realign the DG to its "emergency start" mode and override the manual controls used in its 'test' mode. Also, opening the DG breaker when LOOP conditions exist ensures that the associated 6.9 kV shutdown board is deenergized and that its undervoltage relays will pickup to initiate load-shedding. After this occurs, the DG operates identically to the way it would have operated if it had been in its standby alignment when the SI signal was actuated. Once the DG is in its emergency start mode and loads have been stripped from its shutdown board, control circuits associated with the load shedding logic and DG voltage/speed status signals close the DG breaker to reenergize the 6.9 kV shutdown board. These circuits also start the load sequencer to connect

- 8 emergency loads to the shutdown board at preset time intervals. Therefore, parallel operation does not adversely affect the capability of the DG to respond to an SI signal.

The length of time that the DG is paralleled to the offsite circuit can be on the order of minutes up to 24 continuous hours or longer, such as required for the endurance and margin test per SR 3.8.1.14. In addition, SR 3.8.1.3 requires synchronizing the DG to the bus while the bus is being supplied with offsite power and running the machine loaded to a minimum required load for at least 60 minutes. Testing per SR 3.8.1.3 is allowed to be performed during any plant MODE including during plant operation, as it is required to be done monthly. Testing per SR 3.8.1.14 is also allowed to be performed in any plant MODE (on one DG at a time), as was approved in WBN Unit 1 License Amendment 12, dated October 19,1998 (ML020780221).

Furthermore, the removal of the SR Notes concerning MODE restrictions is addressed in NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants." Although this amendment proposes to revise, not delete, the SR Notes, it would result in the removal of the MODE restriction from the WBN Unit 2 Shutdown Boards and DGs. Therefore, consistent with the NUREG, the following criteria are given consideration prior to the removal of the MODE restrictions:

The MODE restrictions may be deleted, if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:

a. Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable,
b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems, and
c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an abnormal operating occurrence (AOO) with attendant challenge to plant safety systems.

4.2 Proposed Changes The following proposed changes to WBN Unit 1 TS SRs 3.8.1.8, 3.8.1.9, 3.8.1.10, and 3.8.1.13 will allow performance of the preoperational integrated safeguards test of WBN Unit 2 with WBN Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2. The changes would be effected by revising each applicable Surveillance Note to only apply to the WBN Unit 1 shutdown boards and DGs, as follows:

(1)

SR 3.8.1.8 currently contains the following Note, in part:

"This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2."

For the proposed change to this SR, this sentence of the Note would be revised to:

- 9 "For the 1A-A and 1 B-B Shutdown Boards, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2."

(2)

SR 3.8.1.9 currently contains the following Note, in part:

"This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2."

For the proposed change to this SR, this sentence of the Note would be revised to:

"For DGs 1A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2."

(3)

SR 3.8.1.10 currently contains the following Note, in part:

"This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2."

For the proposed change to this SR, this sentence of the Note would be revised to:

"For DGs 1A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2."

(4)

SR 3.8.1.13 currently contains the following Note, in part:

"This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2."

For the proposed change to this SR, this sentence of the Note would be revised to:

"For DGs 1A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2."

The above changes, if approved, will allow these Surveillances to be performed on WBN Unit 2 while WBN Unit 1 is in MODE 1 or 2.

The following proposed changes to WBN Unit 1 TS SRs 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.16, 3.8.1.18, and 3.8.1.19 will allow performance of the preoperational integrated safeguards test of WBN Unit 2 with WBN Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. The changes would be effected by revising each applicable Surveillance Note to only apply to WBN Unit 1, as follows:

(1)

SR 3.8.1.11 currently contains the following Note, in part:

"This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4."

For the proposed change to this SR, this sentence of the Note would be revised to:

"For DGs 1 A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4."

(2)

SR 3.8.1.16 currently contains the following Note, in part:

"This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4."

- 10 For the proposed change to this SR, this sentence of the Note would be revised to:

"For DGs 1 A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4."

(3)

SR 3.8.1.18 currently contains the following Note, in part:

"This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4."

For the proposed change to this SR, this sentence of the Note would be revised to:

"For DGs 1 A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4."

(4)

SR 3.8.1.19 currently contains the following Note, in part:

"This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4."

For the proposed change to this SR, this sentence of the Note would be revised to:

"For DGs 1A-A and 1 B-B, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4."

The above changes, if approved, will allow these Surveillances to be performed on WBN Unit 2 while WBN Unit 1 is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

The specified frequency for all of the above SRs is 18 months.

4.3 Staff Evaluation 4.3.1 SR 3.8.1.8 This SR verifies the automatic and manual transfer capability of each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board power supply from the normal offsite circuit to each alternate circuit.

The intent of the Note in SR 3.8.1.8 is to ensure no surveillance related manipulation or perturbation of the electrical distribution system should be allowed that could challenge continued steady state operations of a unit in MODE 1 or 2.

The performance of this test does not render the 6.9 kV Shutdown Board inoperable while transferring power sources from the normal feeder to the alternate feeder then back to the normal feeder.

The performance of the surveillance will not initiate a perturbation in an electrical distribution system that could challenge a plant safety related system, or challenge steady state conditions to the unit online. Perturbations to the WBN Unit 1 electrical distribution subsystems are

- 11 prevented by ensuring the WBN Unit 1 Shutdown Boards are powered from another offsite power source prior to opening the normal feeder breaker to a WBN Unit 2 Shutdown Board.

Failure of this surveillance will not challenge or cause an operational transient or challenge to plant safety systems for the unit online. The ability of the 6.9kV Shutdown Board to transfer to the DG will not be inhibited should the ability of the electrical board to automatically or manually transfer to the alternate feeder breaker not be functional. The LOOP circuits will still automatically strip the board and allow the diesel starting and loading sequence to occur providing power to the ESF systems as designed.

4.3.2 SR 3.8.1.9 This SR requires the performance of the single largest load reject test for each DG. Note 1 to SR 3.8.1.9 states that this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. The intent of the Note is to ensure no surveillance related manipulation or perturbation of the electrical distribution system should be allowed that could challenge continued steady state operations and, as a result, plant safety systems of a unit in MODE 1 or 2.

SR 3.8.1.9 is performed as a part of each DG LOOP testing, which also includes other DG performance and ESF testing. The test of each WBN Unit 2 DG will be performed with the DG aligned to a WBN Unit 2 Shutdown Board that is isolated from offsite power. The load that is used to simulate the largest load rejected is an Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) pump.

At a predetermined point in the surveillance, the DG is loaded to a value consistent with accident loading. The ERCW pump in service on the associated 6.9 kV shutdown board will have its handswitch placed in Stop Pull-To-Lock (opens the pump breaker). The surveillance contains acceptance criteria that monitor DG response to verify the capability to absorb the change in load and provide the proper voltage and frequency response following the loss of load.

As this Surveillance is performed on a WBN Unit 2 DG aligned to a WBN Unit 2 Shutdown Board that is isolated from offsite power, there is no possibility of a perturbation of the WBN Unit 1 electrical distribution system.

The performance of this test does not result in the inoperability of the DG or of the component removed from service during the test.

The performance of the surveillance will not initiate any perturbation in any electrical distribution system that could challenge a plant safety related system, or challenge steady state conditions to the unit online.

Failure of this surveillance will not challenge or cause any operational transient nor challenge to plant safety systems for the unit online.

4.3.3 SR 3.8.1.10 SR 3.8.1.10 requires the performance of the full load reject test for each DG. The Note to SR 3.8.1.10 states that this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. The intent of

- 12 the Note is to ensure no surveillance related manipulation or perturbation of the electrical distribution system should be allowed that could challenge continued steady state operations and, as a result, plant safety systems of a unit in MODE 1 or 2.

SR 3.8.1.10 is performed as a part of each DG LOOP testing, which also includes other DG performance and ESF testing. The test of each WBN Unit 2 DG will be performed with the DG aligned to a WBN Unit 2 Shutdown Board that is isolated from offsite power. The tested WBN Unit 2 DG is loaded to normal rated load and power factor and allowed to reach stable temperatures. Upon opening the DG output breaker, the acceptance criteria are monitored to verify the capability of the DG to reject full load and not trip.

Performance of this surveillance on WBN Unit 2 with WBN Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2 will not result in the inoperability of a safety system or component, other than the Shutdown Board, which will be de-energized for approximately 1 minute before power is restored. Should an actual accident signal be generated during the performance of this surveillance, the DG output breaker will open and the DG will be returned to a standby alignment ready to load as designed.

Performance of this test will not cause a perturbation of a WBN Unit 1 electrical distribution subsystem that could result in a challenge to a safety system or challenge steady state operation to the online unit.

Failure of this surveillance will not result in a challenge to steady state operations to the unit online. The DG breaker will be able to function manually should it be necessary either from the control room or locally at the breaker compartment.

4.3.4 SR 3.8.1.11 SR 3.8.1.11 requires the performance of the LOOP test for each DG. The Note to SR 3.8.1.11 states that this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. The intent of the Note is to ensure no surveillance related manipulation or perturbation of the electrical distribution system should be allowed that could challenge continued steady state operations and, as a result, plant safety systems of WBN Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9, this surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the LOOP, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time with all required loads sequencing onto the electrical board under test.

During this surveillance test, the WBN Unit 1 Shutdown Boards are aligned to an offsite power source other than the one involved in the test. This test results in the WBN Unit 2 6.9 kV shutdown board losing power. Upon sensing the loss of voltage, relays actuate a start signal to the DG associated with the electrical board being tested. All feeder breakers on that board, except the DG feeder, will be tripped open and locked open. Load breakers on the board designed to strip will open. The DG will energize the distribution board followed by sequential loading of the appropriate loads.

- 13 Performance of this Surveillance will not result in inoperability of components or systems required for WBN Unit 1, except while preparations are being made to run the DG. The test will only require de-energizing the associated WBN Unit 2 6.9 kV shutdown board for the time required to signal the DG to start and reenergize the board.

Performance of this Surveillance will not cause any perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could cause a challenge to either steady state operations or a challenge to a unit online, or to plant safety systems.

Performance of this Surveillance will not cause an AOO resulting in a challenge to a safety system.

4.3.5 SR 3.8.1.13 SR 3.8.1.13 requires verification that each DG automatic protective trips are bypassed on automatic or emergency start signals. The Note to SR 3.8.1.13 states that this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2.

The intent of the Note is to ensure no surveillance related manipulation or perturbation of the electrical distribution system should be allowed that could challenge continued steady state operations and, as a result, plant safety systems of a unit in MODE 1 or 2.

During this surveillance test, the WBN Unit 1 Shutdown Boards are aligned to an offsite power source other than the one involved in the test. This Surveillance may be performed anytime the DG has been started from an accident signal or LOOP. Whenever the DG is under emergency start, only the emergency trips (engine overspeed and generator differential) remain active.

These tests are accomplished by placing jumpers, actuating relays, and devices that are removed from service upon an emergency start. Upon actuation of each device, the DG is monitored for tripping and an appropriate alarm is generated for the DG in test. With no trip, the device is reset, alarm(s) cleared, and the test proceeds to the next device to be tested.

The performance of this test does not render any safety system inoperable, because the design of the system is to remove the non-emergency trip devices from service during the performance of the DG safety related function.

The performance of the surveillance will not initiate any perturbation in any electrical distribution system that could challenge a plant safety related system, or challenge steady state conditions to the unit online.

Failure of this surveillance will not challenge or cause any operational transient nor challenge to plant safety systems for the unit online.

4.3.6 SR 3.8.1.16 SR 3.8.1.16 requires verification that each DG can synchronize to the offsite power source while loaded with emergency loads upon a restoration of offsite power, transfer loads to the offsite power source, and return to ready-to-Ioad operation.

- 14 The Note to SR 3.8.1.16 states that this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or

4. The intent of the Note is to ensure no surveillance related manipulation or perturbation of the electrical distribution system should be allowed that could challenge continued steady state operations and, as a result, plant safety systems of a unit in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

During this surveillance test, the WBN Unit 1 shutdown boards are aligned to an offsite power source other than the one involved in the test. The action of realigning the offsite power sources to the WBN Unit 1 Shutdown Boards is considered a routine plant action and poses minimal likelihood of inducing an electrical transient. Once the WBN Unit 1 shutdown boards are realigned to the other offsite power source, performance of the surveillance on the WBN Unit 2 DGs does not result in a perturbation on the WBN Unit 1 electrical distribution subsystem.

To accomplish this test, a WBN Unit 2 DG is loaded with the ESF loads started with a simulated accident signal initiated from WBN Unit 2. Following the initiation of the test and verification of the designed components actuating to the safeguard state, the accident signal can be reset.

This allows the loads to be transferred back to the 6.9 kV shutdown board powered from offsite, removed from service, and restored to the standby alignment.

Performance of this surveillance does not render any safety systems inoperable, except while preparations are being made to run the DG.

Performance of this surveillance will not cause any perturbations of the electrical distribution systems for WBN Unit 1 that could challenge steady state operation or challenge any safety systems.

Performance of the SR or failure of the SR will not cause or result in an AOO resulting in a challenge to plant safety systems.

4.3.7 SR3.8.1.18 SR 3.8.1.18 requires verification that time delay setting for each sequenced load block is within limits. The Note to SR 3.8.1.18 states that this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4. The intent of the Note is to ensure no surveillance related manipulation or perturbation of the electrical distribution system should be allowed that could challenge continued steady state operations and, as a result, plant safety systems of a unit in MODE 1, 2, 30r4.

This surveillance demonstrates proper loading of a WBN Unit 2 DG connected to a WBN Unit 2 Shutdown Board during a LOOP actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF actuation signal. This test is performed in conjunction with SR 3.8.1.19.

During this surveillance test, the WBN Unit 1 Shutdown Boards are aligned to an offsite power source other than the one involved in the test. The action of realigning the offsite power sources to the WBN Unit 1 Shutdown Boards is considered a routine plant action and poses minimal likelihood of inducing an electrical transient. Once the WBN Unit 1 Shutdown Boards are realigned to the other offsite power source, performance of the surveillance on the

- 15 WBN Unit 2 DGs does not result in a perturbation on the WBN Unit 1 electrical distribution subsystem.

Performance of this surveillance does not render any safety systems inoperable, except while preparations are being made to run the DG.

Failure of this test sequence will not cause or initiate any challenge to a safety system of the online unit. The individual time delay relays will not cause any safety related challenges to the online unit.

4.3.8 SR 3.8.1.19 SR 3.8.1.19 requires performance of the LOOP/ESF test for each DG. The Note to SR 3.8.1.19 states that this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1,*2, 3, or 4. The intent of the Note is to ensure no surveillance related manipulation or perturbation of the electrical distribution system should be allowed that could challenge continued steady state operations and, as a result, plant safety systems of a unit in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9, this surveillance demonstrates the as-designed operation of the standby power sources during a LOOP coincident with an ESF actuation. This test verifies actions encountered from this combination of signals, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG.

It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time with all required loads sequencing onto the electrical board under test.

During this surveillance test, the WBN Unit 1 shutdown boards are aligned to an offsite power source other than the one involved in the test. The action of realigning the offsite power sources to the WBN Unit 1 shutdown boards is considered a routine plant action and poses minimal likelihood of inducing an electrical transient. Once the WBN Unit 1 shutdown boards are realigned to the other offsite power source, performance of the surveillance on the WBN Unit 2 DGs does not result in a perturbation on the WBN Unit 1 electrical distribution subsystem.

This test results in the WBN Unit 2 6.9 kV shutdown board losing power. Upon senSing the loss of voltage, feeder breakers on that board will be tripped open and locked open. Load breakers will open on the board for loads designed to strip. The DG will energize the distribution board followed by sequential loading of the appropriate loads (approximately 10 seconds after losing power to the board).

During the brief period before the shutdown board is re-energized, certain components in common systems (e.g., ERCW, Component Cooling, Emergency Gas Treatment, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment, Control Room Emergency Ventilation) will be de-energized. Therefore, prior to performance of the surveillance, a planned safety assessment will take into consideration and protect the nontested common equipment to ensure the safety-related functions of these common systems are maintained for both plants at all times.

- 16 Performance of this surveillance will not cause any perturbations of the electrical distribution systems for WBN Unit 1 that could challenge steady state operation or challenge any safety systems.

Performance of the SR or failure of the SR will not cause or result in an AOO resulting in a challenge to plant safety systems.

4.4 NRC Staff Summary 4.4.1 Changes to the TS Bases Changes to TS Bases will be made by TVA in accordance with WBN Unit 1 TS Administrative Controls, Section 5.6, qTechnical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program."

4.4.2 Summary The design of the onsite and offsite electric power systems for WBN Unit 1 to permit the functioning of SSCs that are important to safety is not being changed by the proposed amendment. Further, the amendment does not change the testing, only the modes in which the testing is conducted. Therefore, WBN Unit 1 continues to meet GDC 17.

The ability to inspect and test the safety-related electric power systems for WBN Unit 1, which must be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing, is not being changed by the amendment. Therefore, WBN Unit 1 continues to meet GDC 18.

For the reasons discussed in Sections 4.3.1 through 4.3.8 above, the NRC staff concludes that (1) proposed changes to SRs 3.8.1.8, 3.8.1.9, 3.8.1.10, and 3.8.1.13 in order to remove the MODE 1 and 2 surveillance testing restrictions for WBN Unit 2, revising each applicable Surveillance Note to only apply to the WBN Unit 1 shutdown boards and DGs, and (2) proposed changes to SRs 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.16, 3.8.1.18, and 3.8.1.19 in order to remove the MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 surveillance testing restrictions for WBN Unit 2 DGs, revising each applicable Surveillance Note to only apply to WBN Unit 1. Therefore, based on this, the NRC staff also concludes that the proposed changes to TS 3.8.1 meet 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3).

Based on the evaluation given above and because the proposed amendments to TS 3.8.1 meet GDC-17, GDC-18, and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), the NRC staff also concludes that the proposed amendment to SRs 3.8.1.8,3.8.1.9,3.8.1.10,3.8.1.11,3.8.1.13, 3.8.1.16, 3.8.1.18, and 3.8.1.19 are acceptable.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

-17

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (76 FR 58306). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: John G. Lamb Date: November 22, 2011

Letter to Joseph Shea from John G. Lamb dated November 22, 2011.

SUBJECT:

WATIS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, "AC [ALTERNATING CURRENT] SOURCES - OPERATING" SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTES NRC DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC LPWB r/f RidsNrrDirsltsb Resource RidsNrrDorlDpr Resource RidsNrrDorlLp_WB Resource RidsNrrPMWattsBar1 Resource RidsNrrLABClayton Resource RidsNrrDeEeeb Resource RidsOgcRp Resource RidsRgn2MailCenter Resource RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCTR Resource

November 22, 2011 Mr. Joseph Shea Corporate Manager, Nuclear licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 3R Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

WAnS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 -ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, !lAC [ALTERNATING CURRENT] SOURCES - OPERATING" SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTES (TAC NO. ME6980)

Dear Mr. Shea:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 89 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated August 10, 2011.

The amendment revises several surveillance requirements notes in TS 3.8.1, "AC [Alternating current] Sources - Operating," to allow performance of the surveillances on WBN Unit 2 6.9 kilovolt shutdown boards and associated diesel generators while WBN Unit 1 is operating in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, IRA!

John G. Lamb, Senior Project Manager Watts Bar Special Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor licenSing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-390

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 89 to NPF-90
2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv NRC Distribution: See next page ADAMS Accession No. ML11234A258 OFFICE NRR/LPWB/PM NRRlLPWB/LA DE/EEEB/BC DIRSIITSB/BC OGC/NLO w.l comment NRRlLPWB/BC NAME JLamb BClayton RMathew REfliott LSubin SCampbell (BBavol for)

DATE 10/26/11 10/26/11 10/12/11 10/20/11 11/02/11 11/22111 OFFICIAL AGENCY RECORD

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