ML112310045

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Initial Exam 2011-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
ML112310045
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 08/18/2011
From:
Division of Reactor Safety II
To:
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
50-321/11-301, 50-366/11-301
Download: ML112310045 (109)
v • d • e


Text

Page 1 of 28 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-01 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions. Unit 1 is at 100% RTP. Unit 2 is operating at 5% RTP. 34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup, is in progress (Step 22 Control Rod 14-39) for transferring the mode switch to Run. RWM is inop and bypassed. RAS written.

Turnover: Continue placing Torus Cooling in service, beginning at step 7.2.5.8 of 34SO-E11-010-2, in preparation for upcoming HPCI Surveillance. Once Torus Cooling is in service, withdraw control rods to increase Reactor power to 7% RTP.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A N (BOP) Continue placing Torus Cooling in service at step 7.2.5.8.

2 N/A R (ATC) Withdraw control rods to increase Reactor power to 7%.

3 mf60121104 (ON) C (BOP) RHRSW pump overload - manually trip & swap pumps.

TS (SRO) 4 mfE51_114 C (ATC) RCIC Inadvertent start with Trip pushbutton failure.

diE51A-S17 TS (SRO) mf60231284 5 mf70022416 (ON) C (BOP) Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi - swap Prefilters.

6 svoB21036 C (ATC) One (1) Reactor Pressure ATTS trip unit causes a half scram and mf60211154 TS (SRO) Control Rod 22-27 scrams in due to a blown fuse. The control rod mfC12_26_22-27 fuse is repaired (Time Compress) and the rod is withdrawn.

7 mf65702209 M (ALL) Earthquake requiring scram prior to 98 in Torus.

mf65702227 svoT48140(70/.75) svoT48142(50/10) svoT48143(50/10) svoT48147(50/10) svoT48148(50/10) 8 svoT48140(70/2) C (ALL) Torus break size increases and HPCI is placed to PTL prior to 110 (Critical Task).

Emergency Depress prior to 98 (Critical Task).

9 mfB21_129A C (ATC) 2 Main Turbine Bypass valves failed closed, 1 Main Turbine Bypass mfB21_129E valve will only open 50%. ADS valves (3) fail to open when mfB21_129L Emergency Depress is required (Critical Task) svoN37225 svoN37226 svoN37227

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 28 Event

Description:

Continue placing Torus Cooling in service.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 mins SRO Orders BOP to continue placing Torus Cooling in service beginning at step 7.2.5.8 Simulator Operator, if asked, an SO has been dispatched locally awaiting the start of the RHR pump AND, if asked, a Page Announcement has been performed for the upcoming pump start.

BOP

  • Starts RHR Pump B or D
  • Dispatches an operator to locally check the RHR pump for seal leakage Simulator Operator - as an SO in the RHR B pump diagonal; Inform the BOP that there is no seal leakage on RHR pump B.

BOP The following expected alarms will be received as a result of starting the RHR pump.

  • 650-234, SEC System Auto Initiation Signal Present
  • 602-312, Auto Blowdown CS Or RHR Press Permissive
  • 601-222, RHR Flow Low
  • Informs the SRO that RHR B pump is in Torus cooling Simulator Operator - Continue with the next event at the Chief Examiners request.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 28 Event

Description:

Withdraw control rods to increase Reactor power to 7% RTP.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 min SRO Orders control rods withdrawn per the pull sequence.

ATC

  • Selects the first control rod in the currently latched or next group per the pull sheet and RWM.
  • First rod moved is 14-39 in step 22.
  • Continuously withdraws the rod to the withdraw limit, releasing the switch one notch before the withdraw limit, unless the withdraw limit is 48.
  • Continues withdrawing rods per the pull sheet.
  • Monitors bypass valve position and ensure expected plant response from control withdrawal.

NOTE: May get RMCS/RWM ROD BLOCK or SYS TROUBLE annunciator. This is not abnormal when selecting rods in a different group.

NOTE: Rods need to be withdrawn until reactor power reaches 7%.

NOTE: Alarm, 603-229, APRM Downscale, may intermittently come in during the control rod withdrawal, due to the plant operating at the alarm setpoint of 5%. The crew may flag this alarm.

Simulator Operator enters the next event at the Chief Examiners request

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 28 Event

Description:

RHRSW pump overload - manually trip & swap pumps.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 15 At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator Operator; Min ENTERS (RB-1) malfunction mf60121104 - Window 32 RHRSW PUMP B OVERLOAD (ANNUNCIATOR ON).

ENSURE Event Trigger E11-10 deletes malfunction mf60121104, when RHRSW pump 2B switch is placed to stop.

All

  • Announces alarm to the SRO
  • Determines that the 2B RHRSW pump is still running
  • Informs the SRO that the 2B RHRSW pump failed to trip SRO
  • Directs the BOP to Trip the 2B RHRSW pump and place the 2D RHRSW pump is service BOP
  • Trips RHRSW Pump 2B And Verifies That The Green Light Illuminates
  • Alarm 601-215, RHR HX B Diff Press Low, is received when the RHRSW pump is securred.
  • Alarm 601-215 clears when the 2E11-F068B is closed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 28 Event

Description:

RHRSW pump overload - manually trip & swap pumps.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

  • Determines That The System Does Not Require Filling
  • Depresses the RHR Service Water Lube Valves Pushbutton For Pump Division 2 And waits for One Minute BOP
  • Confirms:
  • May make a Page Announcement of pending RHRSW pump 2D start (Announcing large motor/pump starts may not occur if the operator senses the urgency to start the pump with low dP on the RHR/RHRSW system)
  • Starts the 2D RHRSW Pump and has the ATC log the start
  • Places 2E11-F068B Interlock Override Vlv keylock switch in the NORMAL position
  • Notifies Maintenance (if SRO has not) to investigate RHRSW pump 2B.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 28 Event

Description:

RHRSW pump overload - manually trip & swap pumps.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When dispatched to check RHRSW B loop strainer dP, inform the BOP that the dP is 3 psid.

BOP

  • Dispatches SO to confirm that the in-service RHR Service Water strainer dP is < 8 PSID, and logs Dp in the Control Room Log
  • Informs the SRO that RHR B pump is in Torus cooling SRO
  • Notifies Maintenance (if BOP has not) to investigate RHRSW pump 2B.

NOTE: TS 3.0.6 provides information so that LCO 3.6.2.3 for RHR Suppression Pool Cooling is NOT required to be entered.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, proceeds to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 28 Event

Description:

RCIC Inadvertent start with Trip pushbutton failure Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 6 Mins Simulator Operator: At the direction of the Chief examiner, ACTIVATE: (RB-4) to ENTERS mfE51_114 and diE51A-S17 to off.

ENSURES ET E51-7 activates alarm 602-332 and ET E51-8.

All

  • Receives 650-234, SEC System Auto Initiation Signal Present Alarm, (if not in from RHR in Torus Cooling)
  • Receives 602-332, RCIC Oil Filter Diff Press High, alarm
  • Recognizes that RCIC has started.

ATC

  • Determines RCIC has auto started and that RWL is normal.

SRO

  • Tells operator that RWL is normal
  • Attempts to Trip RCIC by depressing the RCIC Trip pushbutton and recognizes that the Trip pushbutton is failed.
  • Notifies the SRO that the RCIC trip pushbutton has failed and Trips RCIC by ONE of the following methods:
  • Places controller 2E51-R612 to Manual and reduces output to lower RCIC discharge pressure to below reactor pressure.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 28 Event

Description:

RCIC Inadvertent start with Trip pushbutton failure Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Dispatches RO/Maintenance to determine cause of initiation signal and the cause of the Trip pushbutton failure.
  • May attempt to reset the Initiation signal
  • Will close 2E51-F524, Trip and Throttle Vlv, if not already closed.
  • Notifies SRO that RCIC is shutdown.

SRO

  • May have the operator run the Trip and Throttle Valve down to in case RCIC is needed later.
  • Enters TS RAS for RCIC 3.5.3 Condition A, which requires verifying HPCI is operable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and restoring RCIC in 14 days.

ATC

  • Enters 602-332, RCIC Oil Filter Diff Press High
  • May dispatch SO to confirm 2E51-N754 indicator >6 psid NOTE: If SRO orders continued power increase with Reactor Mode switch changed to Run, ask follow-up question about LCO 3.0.4.b.

NOTE: It is intended that RCIC is left in its current condition and not returned to standby. The operator can restart RCIC from its current condition during the major event, if desired.

Simulator Operator, at Chief Examiners direction, starts the major event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 5 Page 9 of 28 Event

Description:

Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi - swap Prefilters Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 7 Simulator Operator at direction of the lead examiner, ACTIVATE: (RB-3)

Mins malfunction mf70022416 - Window 25 INSTRU AIR PREFLTR D103A DIFF PRESS HIGH (ANNUNCIATOR ON)

All The following annunciators are received:

  • 700-225, INSTR AIR PREFLTR D103A DIFF PRESS HIGH BOP
  • Acknowledges 700-225, INSTR AIR PREFLTR D103A DIFF PRESS HIGH, on 2H11-P700 and notifies the SRO of the alarm
  • Dispatches an SO locally to determine Prefilter dP on 2P52-dPIS-N301A, look for air leaks on the filter and to verify that the instrument isolation valve is open.

Simulator Operator: 2 minutes after being dispatched to check Prefilter dP, inform the BOP that 2P52-dpis-N301A indicates 6 psid and that no air leaks exist.

SRO

  • Notifies Maintenance (if BOP has not) to change out the Prefilter cartridge and initiates a condition report.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 28 Event

Description:

Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi - swap Prefilters Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, WHEN the BOP swaps Prefilters, ENSURE EVENT TRIGGER P51-1 & P52-2 ACTIVATES: deleting malfunction mf70022416 -

Window 25 INSTRU AIR PREFLTR D103A DIFF PRESS HIGH (ANNUNCIATOR ON) and simulates correct light arrangement.

BOP At 2H11-P700:

  • Places control switch for Turb Bldg Inst Air PreFltr/Afterfilter 2P52-D103B/2P52-D102B Inlet Isol, 2P52-F002B/2P52-F011B to ON.
  • Places control switch for Turb Bldg Inst Air PreFltr/Afterfilter 2P52-D103A/2P52-D102A Inlet Isol, 2P52-F002A/2P52-F011A to OFF.
  • Notifies the SRO that the Prefilter has been swapped from A to B.
  • 700-225 alarm clears.

Simulator operator proceeds to the next event at the Chief Examiners direction.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 6 Page 11 of 28 Event

Description:

One (1) Reactor Pressure ATTS trip unit causes a half scram and Control Rod 22-27 scrams in due to a blown fuse. The control rod fuse is repaired (Time Compress) and the rod is withdrawn.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 20 min At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator operator, ENTER (RB-2) malfunctions mf60211154, mfC12_26_22-27 and SVOB21036 (final value of 1200 with ramp of 100000).

All The following annunciators are received:

REACTOR VESSEL HIGH PRESSURE TRIP, 603-105 REACTOR AUTO SCRAM SYSTEM A TRIP, 603-117 CRD ACCUMULATOR PRESS LOW OR LEVEL HIGH, 603-148 RMCS / RWM ROD BLOCK OR SYSTEM TROUBLE, 603-239 (when control rod 22-27 is selected)

ROD DRIFT, 603-247 ECCS/RPS DIVISION I TROUBLE, 602-110 ATC

  • Determines that reactor pressure has not changed.
  • Announces to SRO that a half-scram in the A channel has occurred due to an invalid high reactor pressure signal.

Simulator Operator: When dispatched to check the ATTS panel reactor pressure instruments, report ONE MINUTE LATER that 2B21-N678A has a red trip light and gross failure light illuminated.

SRO

  • Dispatches personal to the ATTS panels to determine which reactor pressure instrument has tripped.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 6 Page 12 of 28 Event

Description:

One (1) Reactor Pressure ATTS trip unit causes a half scram and Control Rod 22-27 scrams in due to a blown fuse. The control rod fuse is repaired (Time Compress) and the rod is withdrawn.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: Five minutes after being dispatched to repair the B RPS channel fuse for control rod 22-27, DELETES mfC12_26_22-27; this will cause the scram light for the rod to extinguish.

Using time compression, as maintenance report that control rod 22-27 had a fuse blown, which has been replaced.

SRO Refers to the following Tech Specs:

LCO 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, and determines that 2B21-N678A requires entry into RAS 3.3.1.1.A to place the channel in trip or the A trip system in trip in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> LCO 3.1.6, Rod Pattern Control, A.1, determines the associated control rod must be moved to the correct position within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> OR A.2 declares associated control rod inoperable within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

LCO TS 3.2, Power Distribution Limits, has STA confirm compliance Power Distribution Limits. IF thermal limits are not acceptable, the STA will consult with Reactor Engineering on further actions.

Simulator Operator: After being dispatched to repair ATTS card 2B21-N678A AND AFTER the SRO has determined the Tech Spec RAS, DELETE svoB21036 and mf60211154, THEN REPORT to the SRO that time compression has been used and that 2B21-N678A has been repaired and returned to service.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 28 Event

Description:

One (1) Reactor Pressure ATTS trip unit causes a half scram and Control Rod 22-27 scrams in due to a blown fuse. The control rod fuse is repaired (Time Compress) and the rod is withdrawn.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: The following annunciators and actions may not be taken in the same sequence as listed below.

ATC

  • Confirm scram group A 1 2 3 4 lights for Trip System A on panel 2H11-P603 are extinguished.
  • Determine the cause of the trip.
  • Attempt to correct or bypass the cause of the trip.
  • Using the Process Computer obtains an OD-7 and determines that control rod movement has occurred.

(May request STA to perform OD-7)

(May reset half scram before performing OD-7).

ATC

  • Notifies Rx Engineering or STA to check thermal limits if the SRO has not already contacted them.

ATC

  • At panel 2H11-P603, confirms that one or more Rod Drift lights are illuminated on the full core display.
  • Selects the drifting rod and confirms that RPIS indicates the rod is not at an even reed switch position.
  • Notifies the Shift Supervisor and the STA
  • When directed by the Shift Supervisor, resets the rod drift using the Rod Drift Alarm reset switch on Panel 2H11-P603.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 28 Event

Description:

One (1) Reactor Pressure ATTS trip unit causes a half scram and Control Rod 22-27 scrams in due to a blown fuse. The control rod fuse is repaired (Time Compress) and the rod is withdrawn.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Refers to Attachment 1 of 34AB-C11-004-2 for the proper actions to take.
  • Are >4 rods mispositioned? NO
  • Is the reactor sub-critical? NO
  • Is reactor power < LPSP (21%)? YES
  • Action 1 (since not in compliance with BPWS)
  • Refer to Attachment 2 for restoration steps.

Simulator Operator: As the team gets to the point of needing Attachment 2, provide the team with the marked up copy of Attachment 2 of 34AB-C11-004-2 When contacted as Reactor Engineering with the following question from 34AB-C11-004-2, Contact Reactor Engineering to determine what thermal limits were exceeded during the event AND what recovery actions are necessary. Answer NO thermal limits have been exceeded and the recovery method will be notch withdrawal of the rod to position 24 and then continuous withdrawal to position 48, is allowed.

ATC The simulator operator will provide a marked up copy of attachment 2 (2 pages) of 34AB-C11-004-2.

  • Withdraws the control rod to position 48 using the Rod Movement switch and Rod Out Notch Override switch (RONOR).
  • Performs coupling check on control rod Simulator operator proceeds to the next event at the Chief Examiners direction.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 7 Page 15 of 28 Event

Description:

Earthquake requiring scram prior to 98 in Torus Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, at Chief Examiners direction, ACTIVATE (RB-7)

(Earthquake - malfunctions to (ON):

mf65702209 Window 30 SEISMIC PEAK SHOCK RECORDER HIGH G LEVEL & mf65702227 Window 48 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION TRIGGERED All The following annunciators are received:

  • 657-030, SEISMIC PEAK SHOCK RECORDER HIGH G LEVEL
  • 657-048, SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION TRIGGERED BOP
  • Communicates the alarm to the SRO SRO Dispatches the BOP to Panel 2H11-P657

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 7 Page 16 of 28 Event

Description:

Earthquake requiring scram prior to 98 in Torus Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Informs the SRO of the Seismic alarms and enters ARPs:

34AR-657-030-2 and 34AR-657-048-2 to perform the following actions:

NOTE: Actions for both ARPs are the same, except for checking the power supply.

  • Dispatches Unit 1 RO to panel 1H11-P701 to check for further indication of a seismic event by monitoring Peak Shock Annunciator, 1L51-R620, for 12.7 Hz amber lights (> 0.08g, OBE) and 12.7 Hz red lights (> 0.15g, DBE)

Simulator Operator: After one minute, Notifies Unit 2 Control Room that you were in the Reactor Building and felt the floor vibrating.

BOP

  • May have the Unit 1 RO check the following:
  • May have I & C refer to Seismic Instrumentation Earthquake Response Manual, SX-18271, for guidance in analyzing seismic data.
  • May inform the Shift Manager to evaluate an Emergency Classification SRO Directs the BOP to enter 34AB-Y22-002-0, Naturally occurring Phenomenon, if not already entered.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 28 Event

Description:

Earthquake requiring scram prior to 98 in Torus Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: Immediately after being dispatched to check the Shock recorder on 1H11-P701 panel, inform the team that the following lights are illuminated:

  • 12.7 Hz amber lights (> 0.08g, OBE)

AND

  • 12.7 Hz red lights (> 0.15g, DBE)

(Immediately is appropriate since this indicator is on Unit 1, but right next to the Unit 2 SRO desk. It is not simulated in the Simulator since it is a Unit 1 only instrument.)

SRO

  • Determines that all electrical power is available
  • Contacts Maintenance to inspect Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) for damage
  • Within one hour , dispatches personnel to locally close or confirmed closed the following valves (if not performed by the BOP):
  • 1P11-F3002, Condensate Transfer Pumps and Sample Sink Drain Line to Yard
  • Dispatches personnel to inspect the plant for damage
  • May go ahead and scram the reactor since the reactor is at low power.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 28 Event

Description:

Earthquake requiring scram prior to 98 in Torus Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: These actions are redundant to the SROs and either can perform.

BOP

  • Determines that all electrical power is available
  • Contacts Maintenance to inspect Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) for damage
  • Within one hour , dispatches personnel to locally close or confirmed closed the following valves (if not performed by the SRO):
  • 1P11-F3002, Condensate Transfer Pumps and Sample Sink Drain Line to Yard
  • Dispatches personnel to inspect the plant for damage ATC
  • Enters 34GO-OPS-013-2 and starts making preparations for shutting down.
  • As power is reduced, monitors reactor power.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 7 Page 19 of 28 Event

Description:

Earthquake requiring scram prior to 98 in Torus Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, after 5 minutes and at Chief Examiners direction, ACTIVATE (RB-5)

Torus leak at (3/4) 0.75/min) svoT48140 (70/.75), svoT48142 (50/10), svoT48143 (50/10), svoT48147 (50/10), svoT48148 (50/100)

LOOK ahead at Event 8. This leak will be modified at 142 inches in the Torus and 3 SRVs failed closed.

ALL The following annunciators are received:

  • 657-086, TORUS S-W AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH
  • 657-087, TORUS N-W AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH
  • 657-088, TORUS N-E AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH
  • 657-089, TORUS S-E AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH
  • 657-104, TORUS S-W AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH-HIGH
  • 657-105, TORUS N-W AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH-HIGH
  • 657-106, TORUS N-E AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH-HIGH
  • 657-107, TORUS S-E AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH-HIGH
  • 657-013, TORUS N-E AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH-HIGH-HIGH
  • 657-031, TORUS S-E AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH-HIGH-HIGH
  • 657-049, TORUS N-W AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH-HIGH-HIGH
  • 657-067, TORUS S-W AREA INSTR SUMP LVL HIGH-HIGH-HIGH BOP
  • Reports multiple alarms to SRO indicating a break in the Reactor Building.
  • Directs SO/Maintenance to investigate the leak.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 7 Page 20 of 28 Event

Description:

Earthquake requiring scram prior to 98 in Torus Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO

  • When above alarms are reported, directs operator to monitor Torus water level and then if lowering, enter 34AB-T23-004-2, Torus Water Level.

Simulator Operator: Four minutes after being dispatched to check for leaks in the torus section of the Reactor Building, report to the crew:

A leak has been identified on the 2A Core Spray line between the Torus and the first Core Spray isolation valve.

All

  • 602-235, TORUS WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW, annunciates
  • Recognizes that torus level is decreasing.

SRO

  • Dispatches personnel to determine the location of the Torus leak.
  • If not already directed, directs NPO to enter 34AB-T23-004-2, Torus Water Level, and to monitor Torus water level.
  • Enters the PC EOP Flowchart when Torus level decreases to 146 inches.
  • May determine that water will not be added to the torus until the cause of the low torus level is identified and controlled.
  • Enter SC EOP flowchart for SC area water levels being high.

BOP

  • If NOT already performed, dispatches personnel to the Torus area AND the Reactor Building diagonals to determine the source of the water loss (if the leak location has not already been reported).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 7 Page 21 of 28 Event

Description:

Earthquake requiring scram prior to 98 in Torus Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO

  • IAW the PC flowchart, prior to water level reaching 98 inches, determines that the reactor is required to be shutdown and enters the RC flowchart at point A.
  • Assigns the ATC to perform RC-1.
  • Assigns the BOP operator to perform RC-2 and RC-3.
  • Directs RWL Band of 3 to 50 inches.

ATC

  • Performs RC-1 consisting of:
  • Places the mode switch to shutdown.
  • Confirms all rods are inserted by observing full in lights, SPDS, or the RWM display.
  • Notifies SRO of rod position check.
  • Places SDV isolation valve switch to "isolate" & confirms closed.
  • If not tripped, places the Recirc pumps at minimum speed.
  • Shifts recorders to read IRMS, when required.
  • Ranges IRMS to bring reading on scale.
  • Notifies the SRO when the above actions are complete.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 7 Page 22 of 28 Event

Description:

Earthquake requiring scram prior to 98 in Torus Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs RC-2 actions consisting of:

  • Confirms proper Level Control response:
  • Checks ECCS Injection Systems
  • Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value (will not due to low power)
  • Set down does not auto function (low power), manually reduces FW Master Controller setpoint to approximately 9 inches.
  • When feed flow is less than the capacity of the S/U level control valve

( 1.5 mlbm/hr), then:

  • Places 2C32-R619, FW S/U level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.
  • Will control RWL and with SRO permission will raise RWL to 32 to 42 inches.

BOP Performs RC-3 consisting of:

  • Monitor RPV pressure.
  • Confirm proper operation of pressure control system (TBV, LLS, etc.).
  • If necessary, allow RPV pressure to exceed 1074 psig then cycle any SRV to initiate LLS.
  • Maintain RPV pressure between 1074 and 800 psig.
  • Notify SRO of pressure control system operation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 8 Page 23 of 28 Event

Description:

With Torus level decreasing, HPCI placed to PTL prior to 110 and Emergency Depress prior to 98 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When Torus level reaches 142 inches, NOTIFIES Unit 2 Control Room that you were in the Reactor Building and felt the floor vibrating again.

Simulator Operator, when Torus level decreases to 142 inches, ENSURE Event Trigger T48-1 activates and MODIFIES the Torus leak rate to 2 inches/min svoT48140 (70/2)

Simulator Operator - If an Anticipate Emergency Depress is performed prior to the Emergency Depress, ENTER: (RB-8), svoN37225 and svoN37226 (Failure of #1 & #2 BPVs) are set to 0 to fully close Bypass valves 1 & 2 AND svoN37227 #3 set to 50. Also malfunctions; mfB21_129A, mfB21_129E, and mfB21_129L (Failure of SRVs A, E, and L to Open) have been active since the start of scenario.

SRO IAW PC flowchart, Prior to Torus level decreasing below 110 inches, direct the BOP to Place HPCI Aux Oil Pump to PTL OFF irrespective of adequate core cooling.

BOP Places HPCI Aux Oil Pump to PTL OFF (Critical Task) and notifies the SRO SRO Prior to torus level reaching 98 inches, and if recognized in time, then Anticipates Emergency Depressurization

  • Directs an operator to anticipate emergency depress using the bypass valves, irrespective of cooldown rate.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 8 Page 24 of 28 Event

Description:

With Torus level decreasing, HPCI placed to PTL prior to 110 and Emergency Depress prior to 98 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP/ATC Anticipates emergency depress by performing the following:

  • Select the Control > Bypass Valve screen.
  • Insert a ramp rate of 100, then press OK.
  • Insert a bypass valve position of 100, then press OK.
  • Checks that the Bypass Valve Jack status is active.
  • Recognizes that only 1 Bypass Valve opens.
  • Reports to the SRO that only 1 Bypass Valve opens.

SRO Prior to torus level decreasing below 98 inches:

  • Directs ATC to emergency depress the reactor by opening 7 ADS valves

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-01 Event No.: 9 Page 25 of 28 Event

Description:

ADS valves (3) fail to open when Emergency Depress is required Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF NOT ALREADY PERFORMED Simulator Operator - If an Anticipate Emergency Depress is performed prior to the Emergency Depress, ENTER:

(RB-8), svoN37225 and svoN37226 (Failure of #1 & #2 BPVs) are set to 0 to fully close Bypass valves 1 & 2 AND svoN37227 #3 set to 50. Also malfunctions; mfB21_129A, mfB21_129E, and mfB21_129L (Failure of SRVs A, E, and L to Open) have been active since the start of scenario.

ATC

  • Places 7 ADS valves control switches to OPEN.
  • Determines that three ADS valves did not open. (May initially only discover 2 failed valves, if one of the failed valves has lifted earlier in the scenario and the amber light is still lit, but SPDS will show ONLY 4 valves open.)
  • Either informs SRO or continues opening SRVs until *7 SRVs are open, then notifies SRO of *7 SRVs open and failure of 3 SRVs to open. (*Critical Task)
  • NOTE: The critical task will be met when five SRVs have been opened.

NOTE: If anticipate depress was performed and reactor pressure is below approximately 300psig, the SRV amber lights will not illuminate for SRV position confirmation. The operator can verify that the SRVs have opened by observing SRV tailpipe temperature increase.

SRO

  • If the Operator notifies the SRO that 3 SRVs will not open and that only 4 are open, the SRO directs the operator to open 3 more SRVs or to Open SRVs until 7 are open.

NOTE: At low reactor pressure, the SRV amber lights may not illuminate and the SRO may direct all SRV switches to be placed in the OPEN position.

With Chief Examiners Permission the Scenario will be terminated when Reactor pressure is within 50 psig of Torus pressure or as directed by the Chief Examiner.

Page 26 of 28 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-01 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initiating Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 5% RTP. 34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup, is in progress for transferring the mode switch to Run.

Turnover Continue placing Torus Cooling in service, beginning at step 7.2.5.8 of 34SO-E11-010-2, in preparation for upcoming HPCI Surveillance. Once Torus Cooling is in service, withdraw control rods to increase Reactor power to 7%

RTP.

Summary:

  • Event 1: 2A RHR Loop will be placed into service.
  • Event 2: The ATC will withdraw control rods to increase Reactor power to 7%.
  • Event 3: Component/TS; RHRSW pump overload requiring manually tripping & starting another RHRSW pump in the B Loop of RHR.
  • Event 4: Component; One (1) Reactor Pressure ATTS trip unit causes a half scram and a control rod to scram in due to a blown fuse. The control rod fuse is repaired (Time Compress) and the rod is withdrawn.
  • Event 5: Component; Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi - swap Prefilters.

The operator will dispatch an SO locally to determine dP. Report back will require BOP swapping Prefilters to restore normal system flow/pressure. (OE)

  • Event 6: Component/TS; RCIC will experience an inadvertent start with Trip pushbutton failing to trip RCIC. Operator will shutdown RCIC by either; closing T&TV, isolating steam to RCIC or placing flow controller in manual and lowering speed to prevent injection.
  • Event 7: Major; The plant experiences an Earthquake causing Torus water level to start lowering.
  • Event 8: Component; The Torus level decreasing rate worsens requiring the HPCI system to be placed to PTL to prevent Primary Containment damage. (Critical Task) This will require the RCIC or Feedwater Systems to be placed into service for reactor water level control. Torus water level will continue to decrease requiring the SS to direct the ATC operator to manually scram the reactor and open all ADS valves to Emergency Depressurize the RPV, prior to Torus level reaching 98 inches. (Critical Task)
  • Event 9: Three (3) ADS valves fail to open when Emergency Depress is required. The ATC will open an additional (3) valves to establish seven (7) SRVs open. (Critical Task)

Page 27 of 28 Critical Tasks NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-01 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Critical Tasks

  • Remove HPCI System from service prior to Torus water level reaching 110 to preclude damage to Primary Containment. (Event 8)
  • Scram and Emergency Depressurize the reactor prior to Torus water level reaching 98. (Event 8)
  • Open 3 additional SRVs to establish 7 SRVs open to complete Emergency Depress (at least 1 more SRV opened to meet the Minimum Number for Emergency Depress of 5 open). (Event 9)

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items

1. Total Malfunctions 5-8 7 1. RHRSW pump overload (Event 3)
2. Reactor Pressure ATTS trip unit fails with a rod scramming in (Event 4)
3. Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi (Event 5)
4. RCIC Inadvertent start with Trip pushbutton failure (Event 6)
5. Earthquake (Event 7)
6. Torus break size increases (Event 8)
7. ADS valves (3) fail to open when Emergency Depress is required (Event 9)
2. Malfunctions After 1-2 2 1. Torus break size increases (Event 8)

EOP Entry 2. ADS valves (3) fail to open when Emergency Depress is required (Event 9)

3. Abnormal Events 2-4 3 1. RHRSW pump overload (Event 3)
2. Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi (Event 5)
3. RCIC Inadvertent start with Trip pushbutton failure (Event 6)
4. Major Transients 1-2 1 1. Earthquake (Event 7)
5. EOPs entered, 1-2 2 1. RC EOP Flow Chart (Event 7) requiring substantive 2. PC EOP Flow Chart (Event 7) actions
6. EOPs contingencies 0-2 1 1. CP 1 flow chart (Event 9) requiring substantive actions
7. Critical Tasks 2-3 3 1. Place HPCI System prior to Torus water level reaching 110 (Event 8)
2. Scram and Emergency Depressurize the reactor prior to Torus water level 98. (Event 8)
3. Open a TOTAL of 5 SRVs for ED. (Event 9)

HLT 6 NRC FINAL Operating Exam Scenario 1 SHIFT TURNOVER UNIT 1 STATUS Power: 100% RTP Activities in progress: None UNIT 2 STATUS Power: Unit 2 is operating at 5% RTP. 34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup, is in progress for transferring the mode switch to Run.

RWM is inop and bypassed. RAS written.

The following equipment is RWM inoperable:

Scheduled evolutions: Continue placing Torus Cooling in service, beginning at step 7.2.5.8 of 34SO-E11-010-2, in preparation for upcoming HPCI Surveillance. Once Torus Cooling is in service, withdraw control rods (Step 22 Control Rod 14-39) to increase Reactor power to 7% RTP.

Surveillances due this None shift:

Active clearances: None Rod Configuration: See Rod Withdrawal Sheets

Page 1 of 26 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-02 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions. Unit 1 is at 100% RTP. Unit 2 is 75% RTP. HPCI is inop following a system outage and 2D LLS valve is inop for LLS Function only.

Turnover: Unisolate HPCI and place in Standby per step 7.1.40.1 of 34SO-E41-001-2. An extra SSS is currently preparing for a brief to perform the HPCI surveillance.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A N (BOP) Unisolate HPCI and place in Standby starting at step 7.1.40.1.

2 aiC11-R600 C (ATC) CRD Flow Controller fails in Auto requiring manual operation to re-establish CRD flow.

3 mf60131136 C (BOP) 2A Loop of Core Spray experiences high discharge pressure (valve aoE21R600A TS (SRO) leakage). When 2E21-F004A is reopened, the valve breaker trips loE21-F004AG1 when control switch placed to open.

loE21-F004AR2 4 mfB21_130F C (ATC) 2F LLS SRV cycles open/close until fuses are pulled. (Critical Task)

TS (SRO) 5 mf65031532 C (BOP) RFPT 2B Bearing oil pressure low requiring manual tripping of RFPT which results in entering the Immediate Exit Region of the P/F Map.

6 N/A R (ATC) The ATC inserts control rods to exit the Region of Potential Instabilities.

7 mfG31_242 M (ALL) Leak in Drywell causes High Drywell pressure scram 8 mfE11_202B C (BOP) RHR LOCA logic failure - manual actions are required for proper RHR operation. (Critical Task) 9 diE11-F016A C (ATC) RHR 2E11-F016A/B stuck closed requiring swapping to other loop diE11-F016B of DW spray (Critical Task)

ET-E11-4 ET-E11-5

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 26 Event

Description:

Unisolate HPCI and place in Standby starting at step 7.1.40.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 mins SRO Directs BOP to unisolate HPCI and place in standby IAW 34SO-E41-001-2, HPCI System, starting at step 7.1.40.1.

NOTE: The BOP will perform the following at 2H11-P601 panel.

BOP

  • Confirms closed 2E41-F002, Inbd Steam Isol Valve
  • Fully Opens 2E41-F002 when turbine steam inlet pressure (2E41-R602) is within 50 psig of reactor pressure on 2B21-R623A or B (P601 panel), then places control switch to stop position.
  • 601-217, HPCI Isolation Vlv F002/F003 Not Fully Open will clear
  • Closes 2E41-F054, Steam Line Drain Valve when annunciator 601-110, HPCI Turbine Inlet Drain Pot Level High is clear NOTE: 601-110 may not alarm.

Simulator Operator enters the next event at the Chief Examiners request.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 26 Event

Description:

CRD Flow Controller fails in Auto requiring manual operation to re-establish CRD flow.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 min At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator Operator ENTERS (RB-1) override, aiC11-R600 to final value of 0 with a 1000 ramp rate.

ATC

  • Receives 603-140, CRD Hyd Temp High, alarm.
  • Determines that the CRD Flow Control Valve A has closed.
  • Determines 2C11-R600, CRD Flow Controller, output is at minimum and has failed downscale.
  • Notifies SRO that the CRD Flow Controller has failed downscale.

ATC

  • Enters:
  • 603-140, CRD Hyd Temp High
  • Increases output of controller until CRD flow is approximately 50 gpm.

SRO

  • Dispatches a SO to monitor CRD drive temperatures.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 26 Event

Description:

CRD Flow Controller fails in Auto requiring manual operation to re-establish CRD flow.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, if asked, AFTER 3 minutes from being dispatched, report to the SRO, as an SO, that 2C11-R600 FCV does NOT have any air leaks and appears to be functioning properly.

Simulator Operator, if asked, AFTER 5 minutes from being dispatched, report to the SRO, as I&C, that 2C11-R600 FCV appears to be functioning properly with a zero signal going to the FCV and the FCV is closed.

Simulator Operator, if asked to swap FCV, AFTER 5 minutes from being dispatched, report to the SRO, as I&C, that 2C11-R600 FCV is receiving a zero signal from the controller and it appears the flow controller is malfunction.

Simulator Operator, after 5 minutes from being dispatched, report to the SRO, as I&C, that 2C11-R600 controller has malfunctioned and will need repair.

When requested and if the CRD Hyd Temp High alarm (603-140) is still illuminated, Simulator Operator, as SO checking CRD Temps, reports that 2 CRD drives are >250°F. 30-11 at 260°F, 22-35 at 265°F and some others are slowly increasing.

If CRD Hyd Temp High alarm (603-140) is NOT illuminated, Simulator Operator, as SO checking CRD Temps, reports that 2 CRD drives had been

>250°F but are now below 250°F and trending down.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 26 Event

Description:

CRD Flow Controller fails in Auto requiring manual operation to re-establish CRD flow.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ONCE Event 3 is complete, DELETE aiC11-R600 override and notify the SRO that 2C11-R600 is now repaired.

SRO

ATC

  • Confirms system parameters are normal
  • Confirms 603-140, CRD Hyd Temp High, alarm is clear
  • Reports to SRO that CRD flow controller has been restored to normal configuration.

Simulator Operator enters the next event at the Chief Examiners request.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 26 Event

Description:

2A Loop of Core Spray experiences high discharge pressure (valve leakage).

When 2E21-F004A is reopened, the valve breaker trips when control switch placed to open.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator Operator enters (RB-2) malfunction mf60131136 Window 28 Core Spray A Disch Pipe Press High (ON) and aoE21-R600A to 465 psig. ENSURE Event Trigger ET-E21-1 activates when 2E21-F004A is placed to open position.

BOP

  • Confirm validity of alarm using Disch Press indicator, 2E21-R600A

(~465 psig)

  • Confirm the following valves are CLOSED
  • Notifies SRO of alarm 601-316 and that the lights for 2E21-F004A are extinguished.

SRO

  • Directs operator to enter 601-316 ARP

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 26 Event

Description:

2A Loop of Core Spray experiences high discharge pressure (valve leakage).

When 2E21-F004A is reopened, the valve breaker trips when control switch placed to open.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, wait 4 minutes, then as an SO, report that the breaker for 2E21-F004A will NOT reset.

If asked/directed to manually break 2E21-F004A off the closed seat, report this valve will NOT move with the handwheel.

SRO Enters TS 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, and determines:

TS 3.5.1.A requires the ECCS pump to restored to operable status in 7 days and TS 3.5.1.C requires HPCI to be restored in 14 days (RAS written) and TS 3.5.1.D requires either HPCI or the ECCS pump to be restored to operable status in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

NOTE: If addressed, 2E21-F004A is NOT a PCIV and TS 3.6.1 for PCIVs.

Simulator Operator, ENSURE Event Trigger ET-E21-2 activates when 2E21-F015A is placed to open position. This will clear CS A Disch Press High alarm & return 2E21-R600A to normal.

BOP

  • IAW ARP 601-328, may perform the following:
  • Confirms 601-328 clears
  • When pressure is approximately 100 psig, closes 2E21-F015A.
  • Monitors Core Spray A Loop pressure for subsequent increases.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 26 Event

Description:

2A Loop of Core Spray experiences high discharge pressure (valve leakage).

When 2E21-F004A is reopened, the valve breaker trips when control switch placed to open.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: If pressure is NOT relieved, then a follow-up question on PCIV leakage TS 3.6.1.3.D may be appropriate.

NOTE: If pressure IS relieved on Core Spray Loop A, and pressure is NOT monitored, then a follow-up question on a high pressure condition of the inner system piping may be appropriate.

NOTE: When Event 3 is complete, go back to Event 2 and Simulator Operator will report information concerning 2C11-R600 Flow Controller.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, proceeds to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 26 Event

Description:

SRV ADS valve cycles open/close until fuses are pulled.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator operator, INSTRUCT the BOP Mins operator by phone to stay on the line until told to hang up, THEN ENTER (RB-3) malfunction mfB21_130F, 2F LLS valve intermittently cycling open and close. ENSURE Event Trigger ET-B21-12 ACTIVATES. This SRV will cycle such that it is open for 15 seconds, then stays closed for 45 seconds, then repeats this cycle for 5 minutes or until fuses for SRV 2F are pulled.

ATC

  • Enters a RAS for TS LCO 3.6.1.6.A for 2 or more LLS valves inop, which requires the unit to be in mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and mode 4 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
  • Directs operators to verify that the SRV 2F is closed, after the fuses are pulled.

ATC

  • Determines SRV 2F is cycling open then close
  • Cycles the SRV 2F Control Switch several times
  • May depress the ADS Logic A Timer Reset pushbutton (2B21-S2A)
  • May depress the ADS Logic B Timer Reset pushbutton (2B21-S2B)
  • Depresses the LLS Channel A / C Reset pushbutton (2B21-S15A)
  • Depresses the LLS Channel B / D Reset pushbutton (2B21-S15B)
  • Informs SRO that SRV 2F is cycling and the fuses will have to be pulled for the valve
  • Notifies the SSS to pull the fuses for SRV 2F

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 26 Event

Description:

SRV ADS valve cycles open/close until fuses are pulled.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, assuming that a request was made to pull fuses for SRV 2F, wait 4 minutes, then ENTER (RB-6), rfB21_305, to simulate pulling the fuses for SRV 2F, then DELETE mfB21_130F, 2F LLS Valve.

Then, Notify the crew that the fuses have been pulled for SRV 2F.

ATC

  • Confirms that SRV 2F is closed by monitoring on or more of the following:
  • SRV tailpipe temperature decrease (Directs BOP to P614 panel)
  • Torus level stabilizing
  • Torus Temp stabilizing
  • Rx and Generator power returns to the pre-event level
  • Resets the SRV leak detection by placing the Leak Detection Logic A Reset keylock switch and Leak Detection Logic B Reset keylock switch to Reset position and back to Normal position
  • Confirm that the Amber SRV indicating lights have Extinguished
  • Informs the SRO that SRV 2F is closed.

SRO/ATC Informs the crew that operability of the suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breakers must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per 34SV-T48-002-2, Suppression Chamber To Drywell Vacuum Breaker System Operability.

Notifies Chemistry and initiates a CR to initiate increased monitoring of vessel moisture content carryover per 64CH-SAM-025-0.

At this time, Torus temperature will still be below 95°F, therefore RHR is NOT required to be placed into Torus Cooling. The SRO may elect to place Torus Cooling in service, since steam was admitted to the Torus. The following steps are written if the SRO elects to place Torus Cooling in service.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 4 Page 11 of 26 Event

Description:

SRV ADS valve cycles open/close until fuses are pulled.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: The operator may place torus cooling in service by using the Placard that's available or using the appropriate section of the procedure.

These steps assume the Placard is used. The A or B loop of RHR may be used. The following steps are written assuming "B" loop and "B" pump is used. If "A" loop is used, substitute "A" for "B" for valves and if "B" pump is not used substitute "A", "C", or "D" for "B" pump.

BOP

  • Overrides 2E11-F068B Low Discharge Pressure Interlock
  • Places 2E11-F068B Low Discharge Pressure Interlock switch to normal position.
  • IF desired to start a SECOND RHRSW pump,
  • Throttles 2E11-F068B to achieve max flow rate (not to exceed 4400 GPM).
  • Starts second RHRSW Pump.
  • Positions 2E11-F068B to obtain < 8800 gpm AND < 450 psig

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 4 Page 12 of 26 Event

Description:

SRV ADS valve cycles open/close until fuses are pulled.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

  • Places RHR B Loop in Torus cooling per the placard by performing the following steps:
  • Starts RHR Loop B pump
  • Receives annunciator "SEC System Auto Initiation Signal Present."
  • Notifies the SRO that RHR "B" loop is in service
  • May place the second pump in service.

Simulator operator proceeds to the next event at the Chief Examiners direction.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 26 Event

Description:

RFPT 2A Bearing oil pressure low requiring manual tripping of RFPT Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator Get the ATC on the phone and instruct to remain on the line until told to hang up, THEN at direction of the Chief Examiner, ACTIVATE: (RB-4) mf65031532 Window 10: RFPT 2A Hyd Oil Press Low (ON).

BOP

  • Confirms at least one of the following pumps are running:
  • Dispatches SO locally to determine RFPT 2A oil pressures.

Simulator Operator, As the SO, wait 2 minutes after being dispatched OR prior to the crew starting a power reduction, ONLY report that 2A RFPT RFP bearing oil pressure is 1.5 psig and decreasing slowly.

SRO

  • Directs the ATC to reduce power in an attempt to lessen the plant transient and then directs BOP to trip the 2A RFPT.
  • Directs BOP to verify #2 Speed Limiter Runback occurs

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 5 Page 14 of 26 Event

Description:

RFPT 2A Bearing oil pressure low requiring manual tripping of RFPT Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

  • With RFPT oil pressure < 4 psig,
  • 650-325, RFPT 2A TRIP, alarms
  • 656-039, RFP C005A DISCH FLOW LOW, alarms
  • Verifies #2 Speed Limiter Runback occurs
  • Directs SO to close the following:
  • 2N21-F161A and 2N21-F161D, Gland Seal Injection Inlet and Leakoff Intermediate Outlet Isolation Valves.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR; the NEXT Event will start with tripping of 2A RFPT.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 26 Event

Description:

Inserting control rods to exit RPI Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 15 ALL Recognize annunciator Recirc A(B) Flow Limit Mins.

ATC Responds to annunciators 602-134 & 602-234, Recirc A & B Flow Limit

  • Confirms Recirc pump A (B) speed has runback to by observing percent speed or RPMs.
  • Evaluate for Loop Flow Mismatch by observing there is NOT > 7.7 Mlbm/hr difference between the two loop flows.
  • Determines which speed limiter is enforcing by observing #2 Speed Limiter (33% speed on the speed meter).
  • Determines Region of Potential Instabilities is entered and requests STA's direction. Time:_____________

SIMULATOR OPERATOR: As the STA, when the operator asks for direction, instructs the operator to insert control rods to insert limits until Reactor Power is 30%.

SRO

  • Within 15 minutes of entering the Immediate Exit Region of the Power to Flow map, directs operator to exit the region by inserting control rods. Time:_____________
  • Ensures the plant has exited the Immediate Exit Region of the Power to Flow map within one hour. Time:_____________
  • As time allows, contacts Georgia Control Center (GCC).
  • If asked, allows ATC to exceed 10 MWe per minute during inserting control rods.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 26 Event

Description:

Inserting control rods to exit RPI Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR: As the STA, when the SS directs crew entry into 34GO-OPS-005-2, Power Changes, calls the SS and informs him that you will perform the computer feedwater flow cross over corrections.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR: When contacted as the GCC, acknowledge the communication.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR: If requested, inform operator to drive control rods continuously to insert limits.

ATC

  • During rod insertion, rod steps will be performed in reverse sequential order, starting at the highest numbered step. (** rod steps are not required to be performed sequentially, but must be positioned to their RWM insert limit prior to inserting lower numbered groups).
  • Selects Rod
  • Verifies Rod moves using Rod display information and Rx and Generator power decreasing.
  • Releases Rod movement switch so that the control rod stops 1 position before the insert limit unless the insert limit is 00.
  • Initials Rod movement Sheet.
  • Verifier, if available, Initials Rod movement sheet.
  • If required, adjusts 2C11-F003 to get 220 - 280 psid drive water dP.
  • Notifies the SRO when they are out of the region of potential instabilities.

NOTE: RBM Downscale alarm may alarm during this movement due to the significant rod worth of these rods. It is allowed to flag the RBM Downscale and Rod Block alarm.

Simulator Operator At the direction of the Chief examiner, enter next malfunction to start the major event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 26 Event

Description:

Leak in Drywell causes High Drywell pressure scram Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, at the direction of the Chief Examiners, ACTIVATES:

(RB-5), mfG31_242 RWCU Non-Isol Leak in Drywell (final 0.5, ramp 1000).

ALL Recognizes increasing Containment Pressure from the following alarms:

  • 603-106, Primary Cnmt High Pressure Trip
  • 603-115, Primary Cnmt Pressure High
  • 602-210, Drywell Pressure High NOTE: The SRO may direct the BOP to vent the Drywell, but there will NOT be time to complete the task before the LOCA signal is received.

SRO

  • Assigns the ATC to perform RC-1.
  • Assigns the BOP operator to perform RC-2 and RC-3.
  • Enters RC & PC EOP flow charts
  • Assigns a RWL band between 3 and 50

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 26 Event

Description:

Leak in Drywell causes High Drywell pressure scram Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, WHEN the reactor is scrammed, ENSURE C71-3 MODIFIES mfG31_242 Final to 0.15 with a ramp of 1000.

ATC

  • Performs RC-1 consisting of:
  • Places the mode switch to shutdown.
  • Confirms all rods are inserted by observing full in lights, SPDS, or the RWM display.
  • Notifies SRO of rod position check.
  • Places SDV isolation valve switch to "isolate" & confirms closed.
  • If not tripped, places the Recirc pumps at minimum speed.
  • Shifts recorders to read IRMS, when required.
  • Ranges IRMS to bring reading on scale.
  • Notifies the SRO when the above actions are complete.

BOP

  • Performs RC-2 actions consisting of:
  • Confirms proper Level Control response:
  • Checks ECCS Injection Systems and secure as necessary.
  • Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value.
  • IF set down does not auto function, then manually reduces FW Master Controller setpoint to approximately 9 inches.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 7 Page 19 of 26 Event

Description:

Leak in Drywell causes High Drywell pressure scram Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

  • Controls HPCI operation for level control by performing one or more of the following:
  • Adjusts 2E41-R612, HPCI Flow Control, to the desired injection rate
  • Transfers the flow controller to manual and adjust its speed demand output to obtain the desired pump flow

BOP

  • When feed flow is less than the capacity of the S/U level control valve

( 1.5 mlbm/hr), then:

  • Places 2C32-R619, FW S/U level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.
  • May attempt to restart the CRD pumps
  • Controls RWL with the HPCI/FW System. Notifies SS if RWL gets outside assigned band.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 7 Page 20 of 26 Event

Description:

Leak in Drywell causes High Drywell pressure scram Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: SRVs actuate in LLS at 1120 psig and then control pressure between 850 - 990 psig.

BOP

  • Performs RC-3 consisting of:
  • Monitors RPV pressure.
  • If necessary, allows RPV pressure to exceed 1074 psig then cycles any SRV to initiate LLS.
  • If necessary, verifies LLS actuates at 1120 psig
  • Maintains RPV pressure between 1074 and 800 psig.
  • Notifies SRO of pressure control system operation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 8 Page 21 of 26 Event

Description:

LOCA RHR signal failure - manual actions are required.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: mfE11_202B (LOCA Signal failure) inserted at beginning.

SRO

BOP

  • Notifies SRO of RHR pump logic failure and starts (Critical Task) the 4 RHR pumps.

SRO

  • Per the PC flowchart, verifies Torus level is <285 inches and directs an operator to place Torus Sprays in service.

ATC

  • Places Cnmt Spray Vlv Cntl switch in the Manual position.

(not required, since LOCA signal failed, but procedurally okay)

  • Verifies RHR pump(s) in loop A (B) running.
  • Notifies SS that RHR is in Torus Sprays (The flow is only 700gpm, so it may be difficult to see flow indication from a distance.)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 9 Page 22 of 26 Event

Description:

RHR 2E11-F016A/B stuck closed requiring swapping to other loop of DW spray Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, ENSURE Event Triggers E11-4 & E11-5 is ACTIVATED when the operator positions 2E11-F016A or B to open.

SRO

  • When Torus pressure exceeds 11 psig, verifies that Torus Level is <215 inches, in the safe area of Graph 8 (DWSIL) and Directs an operator to:
  • Place the DW cooling fans to Off
  • Shutdown Recirc pumps (if running)
  • Places the following DW cooling fans control switches in the OFF position:
  • 2T47-B008B, Drywell Cooling Pedestal/Annular Area Unit
  • 2T47-B008A, Drywell Cooling Pedestal/Annular Area Unit
  • Notifies the SRO that the fans are Off.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-02 Event No.: 9 Page 23 of 26 Event

Description:

RHR 2E11-F016A/B stuck closed requiring swapping to other loop of DW spray Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Places Cnmt Spray Vlv Cntl switch in the Manual position.

(not required, since LOCA signal failed, but procedurally okay)

  • Starts RHR pump(s) in loop A (B), if not already running.
  • Opens 2E11-F016A or B (ONE WILL NOT OPEN AND OPERATOR TRANSITIONS TO THE OTHER LOOP)
  • Confirms Drywell pressure is reducing
  • Notifies SRO that RHR is in Drywell Sprays SRO

ATC

  • Confirms analyzers are running by either red analyzer lights illuminated or values indicated on the Primary Display of SPDS
  • If analyzers red light is off, depresses Channel A and Channel B Reset pushbuttons on 2H11-P700 panel.
  • Notifies SRO H2/O2 Analyzers are running.

With Chief Examiners Permission, the scenario should be terminated when the crew has sprayed the Drywell with the other Loop of RHR.

NOTE: SIMULATOR OPERATOR, after last scenario for the day, removes Caution Tag on 2D LLS Valve, P602 panel.

Page 24 of 26 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-02 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initiating Conditions: Unit 2 is 75% RTP. HPCI is inop and 2D LLS valve is inop for LLS Function only.

Turnover Unisolate HPCI and place in Standby per step 7.1.40 of 34SO-E41-001-2. An extra SSS is currently preparing for a brief to perform the HPCI surveillance.

Summary:

  • Event 1: Unisolate HPCI and place in Standby starting at step 7.1.40 of System Operating procedure.
  • Event 2: Component; After HPCI is placed to Standby, the CRD Flow Controller fails closed causing a loss of normal CRD flow. The ATC will place the controller in manual and restore CRD flow.
  • Event 3: Component/TS; 2A Loop of Core Spray experiences high discharge pressure (valve leakage). When 2E21-F004A control switch is placed to open, the valve breaker trips causing the 2A CS Loop to be inop.
  • Event 4: Component; SRV 2F LLS valve cycles open and close until the fuses are pulled.

(Critical Task)

  • Event 5: Component; RFPT Bearing oil pressure low will be received. BOP will manually start the standby AC oil pump. Local report of oil leak and low oil pressure will require the RFPT to be manually tripped.
  • Event 6: Reactivity; The ATC inserts control rods to exit the Region of Potential Instabilities.
  • Event 7: Major; The plant experiences a Recirc pipe leak in Drywell causing a High Drywell pressure scram.
  • Event 8: Component; RHR LOCA logic failure requiring manual actions to place RHR in service. (Critical Task)
  • Event 9: When Torus pressure exceeds 11 psig, the operator will have to swap to the other loop of RHR to spray the Drywell, since one RHR DW spray valve will not open. The first DW spray valve attempted will not open but the other loop of RHR DW spray valve will work. (Critical Task)

Page 25 of 26 Critical Tasks NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-02 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Critical Tasks

  • SRV 2F LLS valve cycles open and close until the fuses are pulled. (Event 4)
  • RHR LOCA logic failure requiring manual actions for proper RHR Loop operation, when any mode of RHR operation is desired. (Event 8)
  • RHR 2E11-F016A/B stuck closed requiring the operator to swap to other loop of RHR to spray the DW. (Event 9)

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items

1. Total Malfunctions 5-8 7 1. CRD Flow Controller fails closed (Event 2)
2. Core Spray 2A Loop high discharge pressure &

2E21-F004A breaker trips (Event 3)

3. 2F LLS SRV cycles open/close (Event 4)
4. RFPT 2B Bearing oil pressure low (Event 5)
5. Leak in Drywell causes High Drywell pressure scram (Event 7)
6. RHR LOCA logic failure (Event 8)
7. RHR 2E11-F016A/B stuck closed (Event 9)
2. Malfunctions After 1-2 2 1. RHR LOCA logic failure (Event 8)

EOP Entry 2. RHR 2E11-F016A/B stuck closed (Event 9)

3. Abnormal Events 2-4 4 1. CRD Flow Controller fails closed (Event 2)
2. Core Spray 2A Loop high discharge pressure &

2E21-F004A breaker trips (Event 3)

3. 2F LLS SRV cycles open/close (Event 4)
4. RFPT 2B Bearing oil pressure low (Event 5)
4. Major Transients 1-2 1 1. Leak in Drywell (Event 7)
5. EOPs entered, 1-2 2 1. RC EOP Flow Chart (Event 7) requiring substantive 2. PC EOP Flow Chart (Event 7) actions
6. EOPs contingencies 0-2 0 None requiring substantive actions
7. Critical Tasks 2-3 3 1. SRV 2F LLS valve cycles open and close until the fuses are pulled. (Event 4)
2. RHR LOCA logic failure requiring manual actions for proper RHR Loop operation, when any mode of RHR operation is desired. (Event 8)
3. RHR 2E11-F016A/B stuck closed requiring the operator to swap to other loop of RHR to spray the DW. (Event 9)

HLT 6 NRC FINAL Operating Exam Scenario 2 SHIFT TURNOVER UNIT 1 STATUS Power: 100% RTP Activities in progress: None UNIT 2 STATUS Power: Unit 2 is 75% RTP.

The following equipment is HPCI due to system outage.

inoperable: 2D LLS valve is inop for LLS Function only (RAS written).

Scheduled evolutions: Unisolate HPCI and place in Standby per step 7.1.40.1 of 34SO-E41-001-2. An extra SSS is currently preparing for a brief to perform the HPCI surveillance.

Surveillances due this 34SV-E41-002-2, HPCI Pump Operability shift:

Active clearances: None Rod Configuration: See RWM

Page 1 of 27 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-03 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions. Unit 1 is 100% RTP. Unit 2 is 66% RTP shutting down for an upcoming outage.

Turnover: Lower reactor power using Recirc Flow to remove 2A RFPT from service and leave rotating at approximately 1000 rpm.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A R (ATC) Reduce reactor power to achieve <7 mlbm/hr for RFPT removal.

2 N/A N (BOP) Remove 2A RFPT from service.

3 mfC11_30A I (ATC) CRD pump trips due to low suction pressure instrument failure. Must mf60311334 start standby pump to restore system flow & pressure.

4 mfB21_131 I (ATC) ADS Inadvertent initiation/Inhibit used. (Critical Task)

TS (SRO) 5 mfB21_229A C (BOP) Small leak on the A FW line in the DW requiring SBGT to vent TS (SRO) DW.

6 mf65702234 C (BOP) Hi dP & Low flow on SBGT train requiring swapping to other SBGT.

mf65402051 TS (SRO) 7 mfB21_229A M (ALL) A FW line break increases in DW requiring a reactor shutdown.

diN21-F006A diC11B-S4A diC11B-S4B mfR22_244A mfR22_244B 8 diN21-F006A C (BOP) 2N21-F006A fails to close requiring all Cond/FW isolated (Critical Task) 9 diE51-F013 C (ATC) RCIC F013 stuck closed (Loss of High pressure feed), OPEN 7 ADS rfE51_234 Valves prior to RWL reaching -185 (Critical Task)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 27 Event

Description:

Reduce reactor power to achieve <7 mlbm/hr for RFPT removal.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 15 SRO

  • Directs ATC to decrease reactor power to 60%, to achieve a Feedwater Mins flow <7 mlbm/hr for RFPT removal, by decreasing Recirc flow.

Power decreases should be made as recommended by the STA/Reactor Engineering at a rate not to exceed 10 MWe/min.

ATC

  • Decreases reactor power with Recirc flow IAW 34GO-OPS-005-2 and 34SO-B31-001-2 by depressing either the Master Recirc Flow Control Lower Medium/Lower Slow pushbuttons or the individual pump Speed Control Lower Medium/Lower Slow pushbuttons.
  • Monitors power decrease by observing APRM and generator output indications.

ATC

WHEN changing Recirc pumps speed while in Two Loop operation maintain pump speeds to limit recirculation loop jet pump mismatch within the following limits:

  • <10% of rated core flow (7.7 E6 lbm/hr) WHEN operating

< 70% of rated core flow; AND

  • <5% of rated core flow (3.85 E6 lbm/hr) WHEN operating at

> 70% of rated core flow.

May get the (603-202) RBM Upscale and (603-238) Rod Out Block alarm, if a peripheral control rod is not selected. This is expected and the operator may select a peripheral rod at this time.

May also get Alarm 650-135, Heater Trouble alarm. This is expected at this power level.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 27 Event

Description:

Remove 2A RFPT from service and leave at approximately 1000 rpm.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 SRO

BOP

  • Confirms Feedwater Flow is less than 7 Mlbm / hr.
  • Confirm RFPT 2A AND RFPT 2B are in Automatic control on 2C32-R600, Master Controller.
  • Place 2C32-R601A, RFP A M/A Station, in Manual, by depressing the

'M' pushbutton until it illuminates, panel 2H11-P603.

  • Slowly decrease RFPT 2A speed until RFP 2B is controlling reactor vessel level.
  • 656-039, RFP A Low Flow, will alarm and is expected.
  • Slowly decrease RFPT 2A speed until no speed decrease is observed and place the RFPT A TMR switch to SS and confirm SPEED SETTER yellow light illuminates.
  • Slowly lower RFPT 2A Speed Setter switch until RFPT speed is at 1000 rpm, at 2H11-P650.
  • Dispatches SO to confirm open OR opens RFPT 2A drain valves on Local panel 2H21-P244.

Simulator Operator, if dispatched to confirm RFPT 2A drains, after 5 minutes, report all drain valves per step 7.2.1.7 are open.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, enters the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 27 Event

Description:

CRD pump trips due to low suction pressure instrument failure. Must start standby pump to restore system flow & pressure.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator Operator enters (RB-1)

Mins malfunction mf60311334 CRD A Suction Pressure Low alarm. ENSURE Event Trigger ET C11-2 ACTIVATES when CRD A Suction Pressure Low alarms.

ATC

  • Recognizes the following occurs:
  • 603-146, CRD Pump A Suction Pressure Low, alarms
  • 603-128, CRD Pump 2A Breaker Trip, alarms
  • CRD pump 2A is tripped
  • 603-140, CRD HYD Temp High, alarms
  • 603-148, CRD Accumulator Press Low or Level High alarms ~ 1.5 minutes later (will not alarm if CRD 2B is started expeditiously).

SRO/ATC

  • Dispatches SO/Maint to determine the cause of the low suction pressure condition for CRD pump 2A.

SRO

NOTE: The Abnormal procedure requires charging water header to be restored within 20 minutes.

ATC

  • Manually starts CRD pump 2B
  • Alarm 603-139, Charging Water Pressure High, may come in and then clear on pump start
  • Increases system flow to ~50 gpm
  • Notifies SRO CRD pump 2B is in service SRO/ATC

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 27 Event

Description:

CRD pump trips due to low suction pressure instrument failure. Must start standby pump to restore system flow & pressure.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, if dispatched to check Accumulator pressures, wait until after CRD pump 2B is started AND ALL Accumulator alarms are clear, THEN report all accumulator pressure are > 980 psig.

SRO May review TS 3.1.5 for inop accumulators and since all accumulator pressures are > 980 psig, does NOT declare any accumulators inop.

Simulator Operator reports that:

  • If the CRD High Temp Alarm is still lit, report that 1 CRD drive (26-35) is

> 250°F

  • If the CRD High Temp Alarm is NOT lit, report that all temps are < 250°F
  • Suction pressure for CRD pump 2A is 22 psig and there is no apparent problem with the suction line-up or suction filter.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, proceeds to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 4 Page 6 of 27 Event

Description:

ADS Inadvertent initiation/Inhibit used Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator Operator, phone the BOP and Mins instruct the BOP operator to stay on the line until told to hang up, THEN enters (RB-2) malfunction mfB21_131 Inadvertent ADS Initiation.

All

  • Identifies ADS is about to initiate and observe the following alarms:
  • Auto Blow down Timers Initiated
  • Auto Blow down Relays Energized ATC
  • Acknowledges the alarms and reports them to the SRO.

SRO

  • May observe the ADS timer on SPDS begin counting down.

NOTE: The SRO may direct the ATC to inhibit ADS prior to pulling the 34AB-E10-001-2, Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS/RCIC.

ATC

  • Monitors plant parameters to determine extent of ECCS/RCIC actuations.

SRO

  • Places ADS Inhibit switches to INHIBIT prior to the valves opening to prevent exceeding >100°F cooldown rate. (Critical Task)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 27 Event

Description:

ADS Inadvertent initiation/Inhibit used Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO

  • Dispatches Maintenance to determine problem with ADS logic SRO
  • While determining the extent of ADS failures, enters TS 3.3.5.1-1 4.c and:
  • Declares all ADS valves inoperable if the ADS instrumentation is not repaired in one hour IAW 3.3.5.1.G.

OR as a more conservative approach;

  • With all ADS valves inop, be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and <150 psig Rx press in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Simulator operator proceeds to the next event at the Chief Examiners direction.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 5 Page 8 of 27 Event

Description:

Small leak on the A FW line in the DW requiring SBGT to vent DW Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 Simulator Operator, at the direction of the lead examiner, ENTERS: (RB-3)

Mins malfunction mfB21_229A final value of 0.05 and ramp of 1000.

ALL

  • 603-115, Primary Cnmt Pressure High
  • 657-025, Multipoint Temperature RCDR 2T47-R626 Temp High SRO
  • Directs the BOP to:
  • Enter 657-025 ARP
  • Monitor Drywell pressure
  • Vent the DW with SBGT, when DW pressure approaches 0.65 psig

NOTE: The operator may place Drywell venting in service by using the Placard that's available or using the appropriate section of the procedure. These steps assume the Placard is used. The 2A or 2B SBGT Train may be used. The following steps are written assuming "2A" Train is used. If "2B" Train is used, substitute "2B" for "2A" for valves and the alarm numbers in parenthesis.

Simulator Operator, ENSURE ET-T46-13 & ET-T46-14 have ACTIVATED.

BOP

  • Confirms Temperature is elevated on 2T47-R626 recorder
  • Enters 34SO-T48-002-2, Containment Atmosphere Dilution System or uses placard to vent the Drywell.
  • Places 2A SBGT Fan control switch to RUN
  • Alarm 657-091 (654-076), SBGT 2A (2B) Switch Not In Auto, will be received
  • Confirms SBGT 2A (B) Heater red light illuminates

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 5 Page 9 of 27 Event

Description:

Small leak on the A FW line in the DW requiring SBGT to vent DW Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

  • The following alarms will be received:
  • 657-008, Drywell Vent Exhaust Bypass Valves Open
  • 657-042, DRWL/Torus N2 M/U 2 Inch Isol Valves Open
  • 654-017, Torus Vent Exhaust Bypass Valves Open
  • 654-035, DRWL/Torus N2 M/U 2 Inch Isol Valves Open
  • Monitors DW pressure.

SRO

  • If 602-210, Drywell Press High alarm is received, may direct the operator to fast vent the Drywell IAW 34SO-T48-002-2.

BOP/ATC

  • If directed, enters 34SO-T48-002-2, to fast vent and confirms the following alarms are NOT illuminated
  • SBGT/DRYWELL AND TORUS RADIATION HIGH (601-402)
  • FISSION PRODUCT PARTIC RADN HIGH/INOP (602-406)
  • FISSION PRODUCT IODINE RADN HIGH/INOP (602-412)
  • FISSION PRODUCT GAS HIGH/INOP (602-418)
  • CONTAINMENT RADIATION HIGH/INOP (602-436)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 27 Event

Description:

Small leak on the A FW line in the DW requiring SBGT to vent DW Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC/BOP

  • Enters 34AB-T23-002-2 and attempts to identify the location of the pipe break including:
  • Instrumentation lines
  • Recirc Pump seals
  • SRV Tailpipe Vacuum Breakers malfunctioning

Simulator Operator, after 3 minutes as the operator checking DW leakage, reports that DW Equipment drain leakage is stable at 1.7 gpm and that Floor drain leakage has increased from 0.8 gpm to 10.1 gpm.

SRO

  • Enters Tech Specs 3.4.4, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition A and Condition B to reduce leakage to within limits in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Simulator operator proceeds to the next event at the Chief Examiners direction.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 6 Page 11 of 27 Event

Description:

Hi dP on SBGT train requiring swapping to other SBGT Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, at the direction of the Chief Examiner, ENTERS: (RB-4) malfunction mf65702234 2A SBGT Filter Diff Pressure High alarm and override 2T46-R603A OR mf65402051 2B SBGT Filter Diff Pressure High alarm and override 2T46-R603B. THE MALFUNCTION WILL BE DECIDED BY WHICH SBGT FAN IS FIRST STARTED USING ET-T46-13 & ET-T46-14.

NOTE: The operator may start either 2A or 2B SBGT Train. The following steps are written assuming "2A" Train is used. If "2B" Train is used, substitute "2B" for "2A" for valves and the alarm numbers in parenthesis.

ALL

  • Alarms received:
  • 650-224, P657 System Trouble (650-214, P654 System Trouble)
  • 657-055, 2A SBGT Filter Diff Press High (654-046, 2B SBGT Filter Diff Press High)

BOP

  • Enters 657-055 (654-046)
  • Notifies SRO of high differential pressure on SBGT 2A (2B)
  • Since Filter differential pressure is > 5.7 WG and continued SBGT operation is required, determines SBGT 2B (2A) fan is required to be started and 2A needs to be secured. (SRO may direct)
  • Places 2B SBGT Fan control switch to RUN
  • Confirms SBGT B (A) Heater red light illuminates.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 6 Page 12 of 27 Event

Description:

Hi dP on SBGT train requiring swapping to other SBGT Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

  • Secures SBGT 2A (2B)
  • Place SBGT 2A (2B) in the AUTO position
  • Depress SBGT A (B) Fan/Htr Auto-Start Reset pushbutton
  • Confirm Green HTR OFF light illuminates
  • Confirm that annunciator P657-093 (P654-078) is NOT in the alarm condition
  • As time permits, refers To 34SO-T46-001-2 AND place SBGT in Standby per subsection 7.1, Standby - Ready For Auto Start SRO
  • Based on the alarms received and indications,
  • Notifies Maintenance of high dP
  • Addresses Tech Specs:

NOTE: If time does not permit, the examiner may have to ask the SRO for the SBGT 2A Tech Spec after the scenario is over.

At the direction of the Chief examiner, enter next malfunction to start the major event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 7 Page 13 of 27 Event

Description:

A FW line leak worsens in DW requiring shutdown.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, at Chief Examiners direction, MODIFY malfunction Mins mfB21_229A to Final value of 60 with ramp of 1000. When the Mode switch is placed to shutdown, ENSURE Event Trigger C71-1 inserts Main Condenser Inleakage to 100%. Malfunctions mfR22_244A & 244B, 4160 V Bus 2A & 2B fails to transfer, will already be active.

ALL

  • Recognizes rapidly increasing Containment Pressure from the following alarms:
  • 603-106, Primary Cnmt High Pressure Trip
  • 603-115, Primary Cnmt Pressure High
  • 602-210, Drywell Pressure High SRO
  • Directs ATC to perform RC-1 placard
  • Directs BOP to perform RC-2 & RC-3 placards
  • Enters RC & PC EOP Flowchart
  • Enters CP-1 when a loss of all high pressure feed systems occurs ATC
  • Performs RC-1 consisting of:

(Placard)

  • Places the mode switch to shutdown.
  • Confirms all rods are inserted by observing full in lights, SPDS, or the RWM display.
  • Informs the SRO that all rods are fully inserted.
  • Places SDV isolation valve switch to "isolate" & confirms closed.
  • If not tripped, places the Recirc pumps at minimum speed.
  • Shifts recorders to read IRMS, when required.
  • Ranges IRMS to bring reading on scale.
  • Notifies SRO when RC-1 complete.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 7 Page 14 of 27 Event

Description:

A FW line leak worsens in DW requiring shutdown.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

  • Performs RC-2 actions consisting of:
  • Confirms proper Level Control response:
  • Checks ECCS Injection Systems and secure as necessary.
  • Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value.
  • IF set down does not auto function, then manually reduces FW Master Controller setpoint to approximately 9 inches.

BOP

  • Performs RC-3 consisting of:
  • Monitor RPV pressure.
  • Confirm proper operation of pressure control system (TBV, LLS, etc.).
  • If necessary, allow RPV pressure to exceed 1074 psig then cycle any SRV to initiate LLS.
  • Maintain RPV pressure between 1074 and 800 psig.
  • Notify SRO of pressure control system operation.

SRO

  • Per the PC flowchart, verifies torus level is <285 inches and may direct ATC to spray the Torus if RHR is NOT needed for adequate core cooling.

ATC

  • Places the A and B Isolation Override switches on the 2H11-P652 panel to Override
  • Throttles 2P41-F316C or A and 2P41-F316D or B to open while monitoring PSW division 1 and 2 pressure on 2H11-P650 panel ensuring that PSW pressure remains above 80 psig.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 7 Page 15 of 27 Event

Description:

A FW line leak worsens in DW requiring shutdown.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Places Cnmt Spray Vlv Cntl switch in the MANUAL position.
  • Starts RHR pump(s) in loop A (B), if not already running.
  • Notifies SRO that RHR is in Torus Sprays (The flow is only 700gpm, so it may be difficult to see flow indication from a distance.)

SRO

  • Per the PC flowchart, may direct ATC to spray the Drywell if RHR is NOT needed for adequate core cooling.
  • Confirms Torus pressure > 11 psig, verifies that Torus Level is <215 inches, in the safe area of Graph 8 (DWSIL) and then directs an operator to:
  • Place the DW cooling fans to Off
  • Shutdown Recirc pumps (if running)
  • If directed to spray the Drywell, places BOTH Recirc pumps to PTL Off on panel 2H11-P602.
  • Places the following DW cooling fans control switches in the OFF position.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 7 Page 16 of 27 Event

Description:

A FW line leak worsens in DW requiring shutdown.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Places Cnmt Spray (A or B) Vlv Cntl switch in the MANUAL position.
  • Starts RHR pump(s) in loop A (B), if not already running.
  • Notifies SRO that DW spraying the Drywell is complete SRO

ATC

  • Confirms closed 2P33 F605, Panel Inlet from Torus
  • Places 2P33 S16, LOCA Override, H2/O2 Analyzer Outbd Isol Vlvs to Bypass
  • Places 2P33 S17, LOCA Override, H2/O2 Analyzer Inbd Isol Vlvs to Bypass
  • Confirms the H2/O2 Analyzer Running red light for the A & B train are illuminated
  • If either train red light does not illuminate, depresses Channel A or Channel B Reset pushbuttons on 2H11-P700 panel.
  • Confirms analyzers are running.
  • Notifies SRO H2/O2 Analyzers are running.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 8 Page 17 of 27 Event

Description:

2N21-F006A fails to close requiring all Cond/FW isolated Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior The malfunction for this event was in at the beginning of the scenario (diN21-F006A Final Value of OPEN).

BOP

  • Discovers A FW line break
  • Notifies SRO of A FW line break and attempts to close 2N21-F006A, A FW Isolation valve on P603 panel
  • Closes 2N21-F110, S/U Level Control Bypass Vlv (Critical Task)
  • Closes 2N21-F125, S/U Level Control Isol Vlv (Critical Task)

NOTE: The above Critical Task, if NOT performed, will require an Emergency Depress from exceeding EOP Graph 2, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit.

BOP

  • Lowers RFPT speed to minimum
  • Places all Condensate Booster pumps switches in Pull-To-Lock OFF
  • Shutdown all Condensate pumps except ONE.

SRO

  • Directs the BOP to:

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 8 Page 18 of 27 Event

Description:

2N21-F006A fails to close requiring all Cond/FW isolated Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

  • Controls HPCI operation for level control by performing one or more of the following IF A FW Line break has NOT been discovered:
  • Transfers 2E41-R612 controller to manual and adjust its speed demand output to obtain the desired pump flow

BOP

  • When feed flow is less than the capacity of the S/U level control valve ( 1.5 mlbm/hr), then:
  • Places 2C32-R619, FW S/U level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.
  • May attempt to restart the CRD pumps (neither pump will restart)
  • Attempts to controls RWL with the RCIC System. Notifies SRO if RWL gets outside assigned band.

BOP

  • ONCE A FW Line break has been discovered shuts down HPCI by either:
  • If running:

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 8 Page 19 of 27 Event

Description:

2N21-F006A fails to close requiring all Cond/FW isolated Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ALL

  • Recognizes 4160 V Bus 2A & 2B are de-energized.
  • Directs SO/Maintenance to investigate.

Simulator Operator, when notified, waits 10 minutes and reports, as Maintenance, that investigations are ongoing and the buses cannot be returned to service at this time.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 9 Page 20 of 27 Event

Description:

RCIC F013 stuck closed (Loss of High Pressure Feed)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior The malfunction for this event was in at the beginning of the scenario (diE51-F013 Final Value of CLOSE) and rfE51_234 to BYPASS.

BOP

  • Attempts to manually start RCIC:
  • Depresses RCIC Manual Initiation P/B
  • Confirms Barom Cndsr Vac Pump started
  • Dispatches SO/Maint. to investigate 2E51-F013 failure Simulator Operator, ENSURE Event Trigger B21-13 ACTIVATES when 2B SRV is open.

NOTE: When RWL drops below -101 inches OR Main Condenser Vacuum decreases to 10 inches Mercury Vacuum, the MSIVs will close requiring the following actions to take place.

BOP

  • Confirms all MSIVs close at -101 inches
  • Manually initiates LLS when reactor pressure exceeds 1074 psig by cycling any SRV switch to open then closed
  • Confirms LLS valves operate as required
  • Discovers 2B LLS SRV did not close and is still open
  • Cycles switch several times
  • Notifies SSS to pull fuses for 2B SRV (Simulator Operator, after 4 minutes ENTER RB-5 to remove fuses for 2B SRV.)
  • Monitors RPV water level as it trends down.
  • Informs the SRO of water level reaching -155.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 9 Page 21 of 27 Event

Description:

RCIC F013 stuck closed (Loss of High Pressure Feed)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO

  • Order BOP to Inhibit ADS (if not previously done)
  • Orders emergency depressurization once water level decreases below -155 and prior to -185.
  • Orders all available table 8 systems injecting until water level raises above -155.
  • As time permits, directs Torus Cooling to be placed in service.

BOP

  • Verifies ALL RHR & Core Spray pumps (P601) are running or starts by placing switches to start IAW placard.

ATC

  • Opens 7 ADS valves prior to RWL reaching -185 by: (Critical Task)
  • Placing switches for the ADS valves to OPEN.
  • Confirms ALL ADS valve red lights illuminate.
  • Confirms ALL ADS valve yellow lights illuminate.
  • Confirms Reactor pressure is decreasing.
  • Notifies the SRO that ALL ADS valves are open.

BOP

  • Verifies / Opens RHR and Core Spray injection valves open once the Reactor Pressure Low 500 psig alarm illuminates.
  • Verifies injection from Core Spray and RHR pumps begins as soon as reactor pressure decreases below the shut off head of the pumps.
  • When water level is restored above Top OF Active Fuel throttles flow for C/S and RHR per the SRO directions.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 9 Page 22 of 27 Event

Description:

RCIC F013 stuck closed (Loss of High Pressure Feed)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC NOTE: The operator may place torus cooling in service by using the Placard that's available or using the appropriate section of the procedure. These steps assume the Placard is used. The A and/or B loop of RHR may be used depending on Torus temperature. The following steps are written assuming "B" loop and "B" pump is used. If/When "A" loop is used, substitute "A" for "B" for valves and if "B" pump is not used substitute "A", "C", or "D" for "B" pump.

ATC

  • Overrides 2E11-F068B (A) Low Discharge Pressure Interlock
  • Places 2E11-F068B (A) Low Discharge Pressure Interlock switch to normal position.

< 450 psig ATC

  • IF desired to start a SECOND RHRSW pump,
  • Throttles 2E11-F068B (A) to achieve max flow rate (not to exceed 4400 GPM).
  • Starts second RHRSW Pump.
  • Positions 2E11-F068B (A) to obtain < 8800 gpm AND < 450 psig

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-03 Event No.: 9 Page 23 of 27 Event

Description:

RCIC F013 stuck closed (Loss of High Pressure Feed)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Places RHR B (A) Loop in Torus cooling per the placard by performing the following steps:
  • Starts RHR Loop B (A) pump
  • Receives annunciator "SEC System Auto Initiation Signal Present."
  • Notifies the SRO that RHR "B" (A) loop is in service
  • May place the second pump in service.

With the Chief Examiners direction, the scenario should be terminated when the crew has emergency depressurized the reactor and re-established adequate core cooling with water level above TAF.

Page 24 of 27 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-03 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initiating Conditions: Unit 2 is 67% RTP shutting down for an upcoming outage.

Turnover Lower reactor power to remove 2A RFPT from service and leave rotating at approximately 1000 rpm.

Summary:

  • Event 1: Reactivity: The ATC will reduce reactor power via Recirc to achieve <7 mlbm/hr for 2A RFPT removal from service.
  • Event 2: Normal; After reactor power is reduced, the BOP will remove the 2A RFPT from service and leave rotating at approximately 1000 rpm.
  • Event 3: Instrument; The 2A CRD pump will trip due to a low suction pressure instrument failure. The ATC will be required to manually start the standby CRD pump to restore system flow & pressure.
  • Event 4: Instrument/TS; The ADS System will experience an inadvertent initiation which will require the ATC to place the ADS Inhibit switches to INHIBIT prior to the valves opening to prevent exceeding >100°F cooldown rate. (Critical Task) ADS will be inop.
  • Event 5: Component/TS; Small leak on the A FW line in the DW requiring the BOP to place SBGT in service to vent DW. DW Floor drain leakage will be above TS limits.
  • Event 6: Component/TS; The operating train of SBGT will experience a Hi dP condition requiring the BOP to swap to the other SBGT train. SBGT will be declared inop.
  • Event 7: Major; The A FW line break increases in the DW causing a High Drywell pressure scram.
  • Event 8: 2N21-F006A fails to close requiring the BOP to close 2N21-F125 and F110, isolating all Condensate/Feedwater. (Critical Task) This is critical since the Condensate/Feedwater system has the potential to pump ~189,000 gallons of Hotwell/CST water to the DW and then to the Torus via the broken FW line, requiring an Emergency Depress from exceeding EOP Graph 2, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit.
  • Event 9: Component; RCIC F045 stuck closed and with HPCI pumping out the A FW line a Loss of High pressure feed occurs. The ATC will OPEN 7 ADS valves prior to RWL reaching -

185 inches. (Critical Task)

Page 25 of 27 Critical Tasks NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-03 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Critical Tasks

  • The ADS System will experience an inadvertent initiation which will require the ATC to place the ADS Inhibit switches to INHIBIT prior to the valves opening to prevent exceeding >100°F cooldown rate. (Event 4)
  • 2N21-F006A fails to close requiring the BOP to close 2N21-F125 and F110, isolating all Condensate/Feedwater, which prevents a potential of pumping ~189,000 gallons of water out the FW break into the DW and then to the Torus, requiring an Emergency Depress from exceeding EOP Graph 2, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit. (Event 8)
  • Emergency Depress with 7 ADS valves prior to RWL reaching -185 inches. (Event 9)

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items

1. Total Malfunctions 5-8 7 1. CRD pump trips due to low suction pressure instrument failure (Event 3)
2. ADS Inadvertent initiation (Event 4)
3. Small leak on A FW line in the DW (Event 5)
4. Hi dP & Low flow on SBGT train (Event 6)
5. A FW line break increases in DW (Event 7)
6. 2N21-F006A fails to close requiring all Cond/FW isolated (Event 8)
7. RCIC F045 stuck closed (Loss of all HP feed)

(Event 9)

2. Malfunctions After 1-2 2 1. 2N21-F006A fails to close (Event 8)

EOP Entry 2. RCIC F045 failed (Loss HP feed) (Event 9)

3. Abnormal Events 2-4 4 1. CRD pump trips due to low suction pressure instrument failure (Event 3)
2. ADS Inadvertent initiation (Event 4)
3. Small leak A FW line in the DW (Event 5)
4. Hi dP & Low flow on SBGT train (Event 6)
4. Major Transients 1-2 1 1. A FW line break increases in DW (Event 7)
5. EOPs entered, 1-2 2 1. RC EOP Flow Chart (Event 5) requiring substantive 2. PC EOP Flow Chart (Event 5) actions
6. EOPs contingencies 0-2 1 1. CP EOP Flow Chart (Event 9) requiring substantive actions

Page 26 of 27 Critical Tasks NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-03 Op-Test No.: 2011-301

7. Critical Tasks 2-3 3 1. The ADS System will experience an inadvertent initiation which will require the ATC to place the ADS Inhibit switches to INHIBIT prior to the valves opening to prevent exceeding >100°F cooldown rate.. (Event 4)
2. 2N21-F006A fails to close requiring the BOP to close 2N21-F125 and F110, isolating all Condensate/Feedwater, requiring an Emergency Depress from exceeding EOP Graph 2, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit. (Event 8)
3. Emergency Depress with 7 ADS valves prior to RWL reaching -185 inches. (Event 9)

HLT 6 NRC FINAL Operating Exam Scenario 3 SHIFT TURNOVER UNIT 1 STATUS Power: 100% RTP Activities in progress: None UNIT 2 STATUS Power: Unit 2 is 67% RTP shutting down for an upcoming outage.

The following equipment is None inoperable:

Scheduled evolutions: Lower reactor power to remove 2A RFPT from service and leave rotating at approximately 1000 rpm.

Surveillances due this None shift:

Active clearances: None Rod Configuration: See RWM

Page 1 of 28 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-04 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions. Unit 1 is 100% RTP. Unit 2 is 93% RTP.

Turnover: IAW 34SO-N42-001-2, Hydrogen Seal Oil System, starting at step 7.3.3.2.5 return Hydrogen Seal Oil to a Normal lineup.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A Restoration To Normal Hydrogen Seal Oil System Lineup starting at N (BOP) step 7.3.3.2.5 of 34SO-N42-001-2.

2 aoN40R600 UAT 2B Hi temp/lower power/remove from service 3 C (BOP) mf65111604 R (ATC) mf651116045 4 mfC32_90 FW Master Controller loses power/Time compression repair/return to C (ATC) service 5 mfR25_221 C (BOP) Essential Bus 2B breaker tripped open, return to service TS (SRO) 6 mfE41_103 I (ATC) HPCI Inadvertent Initiation TS (SRO) 7 mfC71_59 Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS (Power/Level Control, insert control mfC11_211 M (ALL) rods Critical Tasks) mfE51_109 RCIC fails to auto start on low RWL 8 mfS22_270A C (ATC) Main Generator PCBs fail to open mfS22_270B 9 svoN37225 C (ATC) Lowering pressure set to <845 psig Rx pressure with one bypass valve failure

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 28 Event

Description:

Restoration To Normal Hydrogen Seal Oil System Lineup starting at step 7.3.3.2.5 of 34SO-N42-001-2.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 Simulator Operator, IF contacted as SO, report the following:

Mins

  • Seal Oil Vacuum Pump Separator Tank oil level is between the High AND Low Oil Level on 2N42-LG-R306, Separator Tank Sight Glass
  • Oil level in the Vacuum Tank is above the bottom of the lower observation window
  • Seal Oil Vacuum Pump shaft has been manually rotated.

BOP

  • Enters Restoration To Normal Hydrogen Seal Oil System Lineup at step 7.3.3.2.5

Simulator Operator, WHEN contacted as SO, 2N42-R302, Vacuum Tank Pressure, is 26.5 in. Hg and steady.

  • Confirms 2N42-R302, Vacuum Tank Pressure, stabilizes above 26 in. Hg. by contacting SO locally.
  • Secure 2N42-C002, Emergency Seal Oil Pump, as follows:
  • Holds control switch for ESOP in OFF Pull To Lock position until pump stops as indicated by its extinguished red AND green lights
  • Alarm 651-216 clears
  • AFTER pump stops, releases control switch.
  • Confirm its green light is illuminated.

Simulator Operator, when contacted as SO, report the following:

  • 2N42-R300, Seal Oil Pump Disch Press, is 105 psig
  • 2N42-R301, Seal Oil / Machine Gas dP, pressure, is 8 psig above generator gas pressure.

BOP

  • Confirms the following by contacting SO locally:
  • 2N42-R300, Seal Oil Pump Disch Press, is 100 - 110 psig
  • 2N42-R301, Seal Oil / Machine Gas Dp, pressure, is being maintained 7 - 9 psig above generator gas pressure.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 28 Event

Description:

UAT 2B Hi temp requiring the removal from service.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 15 Simulator Operator At Lead Examiners direction, ACTIVATE: (RB-1)

Min

  • mf65111604, Unit Aux Xfmr 2B Misc Alarm (Annunciator On)
  • aoN40R600, Gen & Transformer Temps, final of 110, ramp 100 THEN, 2 minutes later ACTIVATE: (RB-2)
  • mf65111605, Unit Aux Xfmr 2B Winding Temp High (Annunciator On)

ALL 651-116, UNIT AUX XMFR 2B MISC ALARM, annunciates Two minutes later, 651-117, UNIT AUX XMFR 2B Winding Temp High, annunciates.

BOP

  • Responds to alarm UNIT AUX XMFR 2B MISC ALARM, 651-116
  • Notifies GCC of the alarm.
  • Dispatches an operator to check the transformer local panel in the Low Voltage Switchyard, 2H21-P214.
  • Responds to alarm UNIT AUX XMFR 2B Winding Temp High, 651-117
  • Notifies the SRO that per the ARPs Rx Power will need to be reduced if the winding temperature is increasing and to Transfer the loads to Startup Transformer (SUT) 2C, if the oil temperature is high.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 28 Event

Description:

UAT 2B Hi temp requiring the removal from service.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator

  • 3 minutes from being dispatched, call the control room as the operator dispatched to the Unit 2B UAT and report that the 2B UAT oil temperature is 91°C and that the winding temperature is 106°C and slowly increasing.
  • DO NOT PROMPT TO TRANSFER LOADS
  • If more updates of temperature are required, increase temps 1°C EACH UPDATE, until load is reduced.
  • When load is reduced temps will stabilize above the setpoints
  • When the UAT is unloaded, temps will slowly decrease, however the afore mentioned alarms will NOT clear until locally reset.

SRO

  • Directs BOP operator to enter 34SO-R22-001-2 for transferring 4160VAC buses from Unit Aux Transformer (UAT) 2B to Start-Up transformer (SUT) 2C BOP
  • Reviews the precautions and limitations section or the caution at step 7.3.6 of the procedure and determines that reactor power must be lowered to <2558 MWth.
  • Notifies the SRO of the required power reduction SRO
  • Directs the ATC to lower Rx power to ()2550 MWth

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 28 Event

Description:

UAT 2B Hi temp requiring the removal from service.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE TO EXAMINERS:

The power reduction is performed in Event 3, then return here to complete this event.

SRO

  • After Rx power has been reduced, orders the BOP operator to transfer 4160VAC buses 2A and 2B to the SUT 2C.

BOP Swapping of 2A 4160VAC from the UAT to the SUT

  • Verifies reactor power < 2558 MWth
  • Confirms power is available to Startup Aux XFmr 2C as indicated by the potential lights on panel 2H11-P651
  • Confirms OPEN ACBs 135544, 135564 and 135584 (2H11-P652)

BOP

  • Places 135434/135454 Station Svc Interlock Cutout switch in OFF-(DOWN)
  • Places Sync Switch (SSW) ACB 135454 in ON
  • Confirms the sources of power to 4160V Bus 2A are synchronized and voltage is normal on Start-Up Aux Transformer 2C BOP
  • Closes ACB 135454, 4160V Bus 2A Alternate Supply, AND confirms that current increases from Startup Auxiliary Transformer 2C
  • Trips ACB 135434, 4160V Bus 2A Normal Supply
  • Places Sync Switch (SSW) ACB 135454 in OFF
  • Places 135434/135454 Station Svc Interlock Cutout switch in NORMAL-(UP)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 28 Event

Description:

UAT 2B Hi temp requiring the removal from service.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Swapping of 2B 4160VAC from the UAT to the SUT

  • Verifies reactor power < 2558 MWth
  • Confirms power is available to Startup Aux XFmr 2C as indicated by the potential lights on panel 2H11-P651
  • Confirms OPEN ACBs 135544, 135564 and 135584 (2H11-P652)
  • Places 135444/135464 Station Svc Interlock Cutout switch in OFF-(DOWN)
  • Places Sync Switch (SSW) ACB 135464 in ON
  • Confirms the sources of power to 4160V Bus 2B are synchronized and voltage is normal on Start-Up Aux Transformer 2C BOP
  • Closes ACB 135464, 4160V Bus 2B Alternate Supply, AND confirms that current increases from Startup Auxiliary Transformer 2C
  • Trips ACB 135444, 4160V Bus 2B Normal Supply
  • Places Sync Switch (SSW) ACB 135464 in OFF
  • Places 135444/135464 Station Svc Interlock Cutout switch in NORMAL-(UP)
  • Notifies the SRO that 4160 VAC 2A and 2B buses have been transferred from the UAT to SUT 2C.

Simulator Operator, after UAT 2B is removed from service, MODIFIES Override aoN40-R600 to a Final of 50 with a 5 ramp rate.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 28 Event

Description:

Reduce Reactor power to ~ 2550 MWth to remove UAT 2B from service.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: This reactivity change will occur as a result of the need to reduce power to place the 2A and 2B 4160VAC buses on SAT 2C (Event 2).

NOTE:

The SRO may direct the operator to exceed 10MWe/min.

It is allowable to enter the immediate exit region for protecting equipment, but in this particular event the power reduction should be completed prior to entering the immediate exit region.

ATC

  • Reduces Rx power to <2558 MWth using Recirc per SRO direction in event #3 (approx 90% power).
  • Enters the following procedures
  • Depresses either the Master Recirc Flow Control Lower Fast/Medium/Lower Slow pushbuttons or the individual pump Speed Control Lower Fast/Medium/Lower Slow pushbuttons.
  • Monitors power decrease by observing APRM and generator output indications.
  • Monitors the Power to Flow map to determine if the Immediate Exit Region is entered.
  • Notifies the SRO of the proximity to the Immediate Exit region.

NOTE: When Reactor power has been reduced to <2558 MWth return to Event 2 for removing loads from 2B UAT.

SRO

  • If the plant is in the Immediate Exit Region, then:
  • Conducts a rod movement briefing.
  • Directs the ATC operator to insert control rods to exit the Immediate Exit Region.

ATC

  • Attends the rod movement briefing.

Simulator Operator, WAIT until Event 2 (removing UAT 2B from service) is complete and at the Chief Examiners request, PROCEED to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 28 Event

Description:

FW Master Controller loses power/Time compression repair/return to service Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 23 Simulator Operator, at direction of the Chief Examiner, ACTIVATE: (RB-4)

Mins malfunction mfC32_90, FW Master Controller R600 Internal Power Supply Failure.

ATC

  • Enters 603-132, Feedwater Control System Trouble
  • Determines the alarm source by scanning narrow range RWL, feedwater flow, steam flow indications AND RFPT/RWL controllers on 2H11-P603.
  • Places Reactor Level Mode Select Switch to MAN position.
  • May toggle PF1 button on appropriate controller to ILLUMINATE PF4 light AND reset annunciator. (This action will remove all annunciator inputs from this controller).

Simulator Operator

  • When contacted, as I & C, after 3 minutes, NOTIFY the SRO that a wiring harness going to 2C32-R600 had accidentally been bumped and became unplugged and that you reconnected the wiring harness.

DELETE (RB-4)

If asked why you were behind the panel, you were walking down a proposed DCR package for the upcoming Refueling Outage.

SRO Directs the ATC to restore 2C32-R600 to normal alignment.

ATC

  • Confirms 2C32-R601A M/A Station (PF lamp FLASHING), has assumed the role of 2C32-R600, Master Controller, in Single Element mode (Feedwater Control Mode Select Switch indicating light EXTINGUISHED)
  • Places Feedwater Control Mode Select Switch in 1 ELEM position
  • Confirms/Places Reactor Level Mode Select Switch to manual

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 28 Event

Description:

FW Master Controller loses power/Time compression repair/return to service Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Adjust the output signal of 2C32-R600 to match the output of 2B RFPT M/A Station.
  • Place 2B RFPT M/A Station from MANUAL to AUTO.
  • Adjust setpoint of 2C32-R600 to agree with actual RWL.
  • Place 2C32-R600 in AUTO and ADJUST setpoint as necessary to maintain desired RWL.
  • Confirm OR place Reactor Level Mode Select Switch in AUTO position AND confirm its GREEN indicating light ILLUMINATES.
  • Place Feedwater Control Mode Select Switch in 3 ELEM position AND confirm its GREEN indicating light ILLUMINATES.

ATC

  • Places the 2A RFPT M/A station in MANUAL
  • Slowly changes the RFPT 2A speed UNTIL the RFP flows MATCH
  • Checks the input AND the output of RFP 2A M/A Station by depressing the PF key and reading the controller output (PF lamp LIT)
  • Adjusts the manual output lever UNTIL the input and output are matched ATC
  • Places 2A RFPT M/A Station in automatic by depressing the 'A' pushbutton until it ILLUMINATES
  • If required, adjusts RFP B (A) Speed Control Bias Setting to maintain RFPT 2B and 2A speed WITHIN 100 RPM
  • Notifies the SRO that 2C32-R600 has been restored to automatic control.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 28 Event

Description:

Essential Bus 2B, breaker trip open, return to service Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 20 Simulator Operator, at direction of the lead examiner, ACTIVATE: (RB-5)

Mins malfunction mfR25_221, Loss Of Essential Bus 2B.

ALL Various alarms indicating Essential Bus 2B has lost power.

SRO Directs BOP to enter 34AB-R24-001-2, Loss Of Essential AC Distribution Buses, for loss of Essential Bus 2B.

BOP

  • Confirms 600 V 2D is energized by potential lights illuminated at 2H11-P652.
  • Dispatches SO/Maintenance to confirm close Essential Cabinet 2B (2R25-S037) Frame 7M Feeder Breaker at 600 Volt Bus 2D Control Panel 2H21-P246.

SRO Addresses TS 3.8.7, Distribution Systems - Operating and determines that Condition C exists requiring Essential Bus 2B and Instrument Bus 2B returned to operable status in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

Addresses TS 3.4.5. B, requiring grab samples of primary containment atmosphere once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and restore within 30 days.

When the Simulator Operator reports on local actions, directs the BOP to restore Essential Bus 2B and Instrument Bus 2B.

Simulator Operator, Once Tech Specs have been addressed, Call the control room, as a Systems Operator, and report that a Nuclear Technician was mopping the floor in 600 V Bus 2D room and had accidentally bumped a switch on Panel 2H21-P246. All other switches are in their Normal position.

When asked to reclose Frame 7M Feeder Breaker, DELETE (RB-5) malfunction mfR25_221.

If asked to check the breakers in Essential cabinet 2B, report all breakers are closed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 28 Event

Description:

Essential Bus 2B, breaker trip open, return to service Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: The following steps may be performed out of order, AFTER placing Group Isolation Reset Switch to the Group 1 and Group 2/5 positions, on P601.

BOP Once Essential Bus 2B and Instrument Bus 2B are energized, restores Instrument Bus 2B loads, continues at step 4.7 and performs the following:

  • Following confirmation of any group isolation(s), RESET isolation(s) by placing Group Isolation Reset Switch to the Group 1 and Group 2/5 positions, on P601.
  • Opens the following Fission Product Monitoring isolation valves, panel P700:

It is NOT intended for the crew to restore all of the loads associated with INSTRUMENT BUS 2B.

AFTER the operator restores 2D11-F052, F053 & F072, AT the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator operator PROCEEDS to the next event.

BOP

  • Notifies Unit 1 NPO to restore Control Room ventilation to the desired mode of operation per 34SO-Z41-001-1.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 28 Event

Description:

Essential Bus 2B, breaker trip open, return to service Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

  • Restores the Drywell Cooling Fans to normal alignment per 34SO-T47-001-2.
  • Alarm 650-204, Drywell/Torus RCDR R627 Temp High, may be received if Drywell Cooling Fans are not restored to a pre-event lineup.

It is NOT intended for the crew to restore all of the loads associated with INSTRUMENT BUS 2B.

AFTER the operator restores 2D11-F052, F053 & F072, AT the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator operator PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 28 Event

Description:

HPCI Inadvertent Initiation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 15 Simulator Operator Mins

  • WAIT UNTIL THE BOP OPERATOR IS AWAY (I.E. AROUND BACK) BEFORE ENTERING THIS MALFUNCTION.
  • Simulator Operator, at Chief Examiner's direction, ENTERS (RB-3) malfunction mfE41_103, HPCI auto start.

ALL Recognize and report HPCI has started from an invalid initiation signal.

ATC

  • Verifies reactor water level and Drywell Pressure is normal.

Enters 34AB-E10-001-2, Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS/RCIC.

ATC

  • Secures HPCI as follows: (Critical Task)
  • Either, Places HPCI Controller in Manual and lowers output to prevent injection and then performs the following:

OR:

  • When HPCI turbine has stopped, places the HPCI Aux Oil Pump in Pull To Lock off.
  • When the "HPCI Turbine Brg Oil Press Low" alarm is received, releases the HPCI Turbine Trip push-button.

ATC/BOP

  • IF injection occurs from HPCI, the following alarms occur:
  • After HPCI is shutdown, returns Feedwater Control Mode select switch to 3-ELEM.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 28 Event

Description:

HPCI Inadvertent Initiation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP/ATC

  • When injection from HPCI is terminated, the following alarms may be received:
  • If 602-134, Recirc A Flow Limit and 602-234, Recirc B Flow Limit are received,
  • Notifies SRO of Recirc A and B runback
  • When directed, resets A flow limit by performing the following:
  • Confirms initiating conditions have cleared
  • Confirms plant conditions are stable
  • Depresses Recirc A Runback Reset pushbutton, P602
  • Verify Recirc A speed AND flow remain stable
  • Informs SRO the runback has been reset
  • When directed, resets B flow limit by performing the following:
  • Confirms initiating conditions have cleared
  • Confirms plant conditions are stable
  • Depresses Recirc B Runback Reset pushbutton, P602
  • Verify Recirc B speed AND flow remain stable
  • Informs SRO the runback has been reset Simulator Operator - AFTER SRO declares HPCI inop per TS 3.5.1.C, as I & C tech called to resolve the HPCI problem, inform the SRO that the HPCI initiation logic appears to be causing the inadvertent start signal and that you will be investigating the problem further.

SRO

  • Must verify within one hour that RCIC is operable by administrative means
  • Contacts Maintenance (if ATC has not done this) to investigate inadvertent HPCI start.
  • If 602-134 & 602-234, Recirc A & B Flow Limits are received, directs operator to reset IAW 34SO-B31-001-2.

Simulator operator proceeds to the next event at the Chief Examiners direction.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 7 Page 15 of 28 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, at direction of the lead examiner, ACTIVATE: (RB-6) malfunction mfC71_59, Spurious Reactor Scram.

SRO Directs ATC to scram the reactor

  • Enters RC or RC-A EOP Flowcharts.
  • Directs ATC to perform RC-1 placard.
  • Directs BOP to perform RC-2 and RC-3 placards.
  • If time allows assigns TC-1 to be performed.
  • Directs ATC to:
  • Confirm the reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown.
  • Confirm ARI Initiation.
  • Confirm Recirc runback to minimum/tripped.

ATC

  • Manually SCRAMs the Reactor using the SCRAM pushbuttons.

(Placard)

  • Places Rx Mode Switch in S/D.
  • Initiates Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) by rotating the button collars and depressing both ARI pushbuttons at the same time.
  • Informs the SS that all rods are NOT fully inserted (ATWS).
  • May inject SBLC depending on RWL/power level (if power is above 5%, the ATC is directed to inject SBLC IAW the RC-1 placard).
  • Places SDV Isol Vlv Switch to ISOL and verifies closed.
  • If not tripped, places Recirc to minimum speed (if power is above 5%,

the ATC is directed to trip Recirc IAW the RC-1 placard).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 7 Page 16 of 28 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Injects SBLC (power >5%)
  • Unlocks and places SBLC pump select switch in Start Sys A or Start Sys B position.
  • Confirms Squib Valve Ready Lights are extinguished.
  • Recognizes that the selected SBLC pump started and discharge pressure is increasing.
  • Reports to SRO SBLC is injecting from control room.

ATC

  • Reports to the SRO that:
  • The Reactor Mode Switch is in the Shutdown position.
  • ARI has been initiated (ATC may initiate ARI at this time).
  • Recirc is at minimum speed (if power is above 5%, the ATC is directed to trip Recirc IAW the RC-1 placard).

BOP Performs actions of placards RC-2 and RC-3 after Reactor SCRAM.

BOP Performs RC-2 actions consisting of:

(Placard)

  • Confirms proper Level Control response:
  • Checks ECCS Injection Systems
  • Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value
  • When feed flow is less than the capacity of the S/U level control valve

( 1.5 mlbm/hr), then:

  • Places 2C32-R619, FW S/U level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.
  • Will control RWL at 9 inches (if 3 Element Control was returned to service after Instrument Bus 2B re-energized)
  • If 3 Element Control was NOT returned to service after Instrument Bus 2B was re-energized, both RFPTs will trip on high RWL.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 28 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs RC-3 consisting of:

(Placard)

  • Monitor RPV pressure.
  • Confirm proper operation of pressure control system (TBV, LLS, etc.).
  • If necessary, allow RPV pressure to exceed 1074 psig then cycle any SRV to initiate LLS.
  • Maintain RPV pressure between 1074 and 800 psig.
  • Notify SRO of pressure control system operation.

SRO

  • Directs ATC or STA to report reactor power or observes reactor power on SPDS.

ATC/STA

  • Reports power level to the SRO.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 28 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: The SRO may proceed down the power or level path first.

If asked, STA will direct the ATC to start in the center of the core and spiral out in a black and white pattern.

ATC

  • Confirms ARI initiation signals are clear and then depresses ARI Reset pushbutton OR dispatches an operator to place ARI System Test switch, to TEST, on panel 2C11-P001
  • Attempts to drive rods by:
  • Place Reactor Mode switch to REFUEL.
  • Obtain recommendations from STA
  • Verifies adequate CRD drive water pressure for driving rods and may operate 2C11-R600, CRD Flow Control, to achieve higher drive water dP.
  • May start second CRD pump
  • Drive rods to at least 02 using the Emerg In or IN (Critical Task)

(Critical Task - Commence insertion of control rods within 20 minutes of reactor scram.

A Critical Task may be created if operation of the plant results in significant heat addition to the Torus occurs. The Critical Task will be emergency depressing the plant prior to entering the unsafe region of the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit graph).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 7 Page 19 of 28 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Continuous Recheck: Simulator Operator, when the following conditions exist:

Scram is RESET, RWL is controlled between -60 and -90 inches, AND WITH CHIEF EXAMINERS DIRECTION, DELETES mfC11_211.

ATC

  • Dispatches operator to install jumpers to override all automatic scram signals.
  • Places Discharge Volume Isolation Test switch to Norm at 2H11-P603.
  • Resets Scram when notified that jumpers have been installed.
  • Confirms all SDV Vent and Drain Valves are open.

NOTE: If mfC11_211 has NOT been deleted, then the operator will perform the following step multiple times. Check with Chief Examiner for DELETING this malfunction.

ATC

  • When one of the following alarms clears, inserts a manual scram:
  • 603-101, Scram Disch Vol High Level Trip
  • 603-119, Scram Disch Vol Not Drained
  • Notifies SRO that all rods are IN SRO
  • Directs an operator to INHIBIT ADS
  • Directs BOP or SSS to have MSIV closure on low RPV level overridden.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 7 Page 20 of 28 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC/BOP

  • 2H11-P602, Places the following switches to INHIBIT:
  • Places override switches for 2P41-F316 in the override switches to Override.

SRO If water level is above -60 and power above 5% when the SRO addresses CP-3, directs the BOP to lower water level to maintain -90 to -60 using 31EO-EOP-113-2.

Directs STA to verify Isolations and ECCS initiations.

BOP

  • Reduces injection to control RWL -60 inches to -90 inches with Table 13 systems:
  • Lowers Feedwater flow as necessary to achieve a lowering RWL trend.
  • If HCPI was manually started, the operator will reduce controller output to lower RWL.
  • If HCPI was in standby, places 2E41-C002-3, HPCI Aux. Oil Pump, in PULL-TO-LOCK.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 7 Page 21 of 28 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO

  • If further reduction in RPV level is needed, Directs the BOP operator to control RPV level between -185 and -60 using Table 13 systems.

Any band between -60 inches and -185 inches is acceptable.

(Typically -60 to -100 to maintain RPV level above -101)

  • If RWL is subsequently allowed to increase to >-60 inches and Rx power is >5%, the override will be re-addressed to once again, lowering level to between -90 and -60.

NOTE: Performing ONE or MORE of the following using Feedwater, HPCI or RCIC, will meet the Critical Task: (Critical Task is to Maintain RWL above -185 inches).

BOP

  • Use Feedwater system to control RPV water level in the assigned band.

(Critical Task - Maintain RWL above -185 inches)

  • Verify/Place RFPT controllers in Manual
  • Raise RFPT speed to increase pressure to above RPV pressure
  • Verify/Place the Startup Level Control Valve in Manual
  • If HPCI injection is attempted the operator: (Critical Task - Maintain RWL above -185 inches)
  • Take 2E41-C002-3, Aux Oil Pump, control switch to the START position.
  • Confirm 2E41-F012, Min Flow Valve, CLOSES at flow

> 790 gpm.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 7 Page 22 of 28 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: RCIC has failed to auto start.

BOP

  • IF RCIC injection is attempted and RCIC is NOT tripped: (Critical Task - Maintain RWL above -185 inches)
  • Depresses RCIC Manual Initiation P/B
  • Confirms Barom Cndsr Vac Pump starts
  • Adjusts controller for desired flow
  • IF RCIC injection is attempted AND RCIC was manually tripped:

(Critical Task - Maintain RWL above -185 inches)

  • Transfers 2E51-R612, Turbine Controller, to manual and adjust output to 50%.
  • Throttle opens 2E51-F524, Trip & Throttle Valve, AND concurrently opens 2E51-F013, Pump Discharge Valve
  • Confirms 2E51-F019, Min Flow Valve, Opens, AND subsequently closes, when system flow is > 79.3 gpm.
  • Continues to throttle 2E51-F524 Open, until turbine speed is limited by 2E51-R612, Turbine Controller, then:
  • Fully opens 2E51-F524, Trip & Throttle Valve.
  • Increases 2E51-R612, Turbine Controller, output to achieve 3000 to 4000 rpm.
  • Transfers 2E51-R612, Turbine Controller, to auto and adjust to desired flow rate.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 7 Page 23 of 28 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO IF the following conditions exist:

  • Reactor power >5%.
  • Torus temperature is in the safe region of the BIIT curve.

Then Addresses the override located at coordinate C2 on EOP Flowchart CP-3 to Terminate and Prevent injection to the RPV.

  • Determines that RPV level can be maintained above -185 inches.
  • Arrives at Wait Until (CP-3 at F-7) for Hot Shutdown Boron Weight.

Simulator Operator The malfunction for the next event is already inserted.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 8 Page 24 of 28 Event

Description:

Main Generator PCBs fail to open.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator; ENSURE malfunctions mfS22_270A and mfS22_270B are already inserted. They were inserted from the beginning.

BOP/ATC

  • As time allows, and when generator load goes below 80 MWe, the crew performs TC-1 to trip the Main Turbine.
  • Manually Trip the Turbine.
  • Confirm the generator PCBs and exciter field breaker tripped.
  • Determines that the PCBs did NOT Open.
  • Manually Opens PCB 179740
  • Manually Opens PCB 179750
  • Confirm the 4160 VAC station service busses have transferred to their alternate supply.
  • Confirm/Place TGM in auto.

o Start TG Oil Pump o Motor Suction Pump o Lift Pumps

  • Confirm Steam Seal & Condenser Vacuum systems proper operation.
  • Notifies the SRO that TC-1 is complete and that the Main Generator Output PCBs had to be opened manually.

Simulator Operator The malfunction for the next event is already inserted.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 6-04 Event No.: 9 Page 25 of 28 Event

Description:

Lowering pressure set to <845 psig Rx pressure with one bypass valve failure.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, ENSURE svoN37225 to a Final value of 0 is already inserted. It was inserted from the beginning.

SRO

  • Directs the BOP operator to lower reactor pressure to <845 psig.

BOP

  • Lowers the pressure setpoint to <845 psig using the DEHC system as described on the following graphic.
  • Notifies the SRO that Bypass valve #1 did NOT open.
  • Notifies the SRO that Pressure set has been reduced to <845 psig.

Simulator: Operator, with Chief Examiners permission, the Scenario will be stopped when:

  • SRO transitions to RC,
  • SBLC injection terminated
  • SRO assigns a new water level band of +3 to +50.

Page 26 of 28 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-04 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initiating Conditions: Unit 2 is 95% RTP.

Turnover Return MSOP to service; remove ESOP IAW 34SO-N42-001-2.

Summary:

  • Event 1: Normal: The BOP will return Hydrogen Seal Oil to a Normal lineup IAW the system operating procedure.
  • Event 2/3: Component/Reactivity; After the MSOP is in service, UAT 2B will experience a Hi temperature requiring the removal from service. The ATC will lower Reactor power in order to remove the UAT from service. Once power is <2558 MWt, the BOP will remove the UAT from service.
  • Event 4: Component; The FW Master Controller will lose power causing the 2A RFPT M/A Station to assume automatic control while 2B RFPT M/A Station will default to manual. Time compression for repair and then the ATC will return Master Controller to service.
  • Event 5: Component/TS; Essential Bus 2B supply breaker will trip open de-energizing Essential Bus 2B and subsequent loads. Once investigated the breaker will be reclosed and the BOP will return loads to service.
  • Event 6: Component; HPCI will experience an inadvertent initiation requiring the ATC to shutdown HPCI.

The SRO will direct/ensure the ATC injects SBLC prior to leaving RC-1 (Critical Task) AND the ATC will insert control rods within 20 minutes of the scram. (Critical Task)

  • Event 8: Main Generator PCBs fail to open which requires manual open.
  • Event 9: Component; One bypass valve fails when the ATC lowers pressure set to reduce Rx pressure to <845 psig.

Page 27 of 28 Critical Tasks NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 6-04 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Critical Tasks

  • Inject SBLC prior to exiting RC-1 placard (Event 7)

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items

1. Total Malfunctions 5-8 7 1. UAT 2B Hi temp (Event 2)
2. FW Master Controller loses power (Event 3)
3. Essential Bus 2B breaker tripped open (Event 5)
4. HPCI Inadvertent Start (Event 6)
5. Spurious Reactor Scram (Event 7)
6. Main Generator PCBs fail to open (Event 8)
7. One bypass valve failure (Event 9)
2. Malfunctions After 1-2 2 1. Main Generator PCBs fail to open (Event 8)

EOP Entry 2. One bypass valve failure (Event 9)

3. Abnormal Events 2-4 4 1. UAT 2B Hi temp (Event 2)
2. FW Master Controller loses power (Event 3)
3. Essential Bus 2B, breaker tripped open (Event 5)
4. HPCI Inadvertent Start (Event 6)
4. Major Transients 1-2 1 1. Spurious Reactor Scram/ATWS (Event 7)
5. EOPs entered, 1-2 2 1. RCA EOP (Event 7) requiring substantive 2. PC EOP (Event 7) actions
6. EOPs contingencies 0-2 1 1. CP-3 EOP (Event 7) requiring substantive actions
7. Critical Tasks 2-3 2 1. Inject SBLC prior to exiting RC-1 placard (Event 7)
2. Begins inserting control rods within 20 minutes of scram (Event 7)

HLT 6 NRC FINAL Operating Exam Scenario 4 SHIFT TURNOVER UNIT 1 STATUS Power: 100% RTP Activities in progress: None UNIT 2 STATUS Power: Unit 2 is 93% RTP.

The following equipment is NONE inoperable:

Scheduled evolutions: IAW 34SO-N42-001-2, Hydrogen Seal Oil System, starting at step 7.3.3.2.5 return Hydrogen Seal Oil to a Normal lineup.

Surveillances due this None shift:

Active clearances: None Rod Configuration: See RWM

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