05000285/LER-2011-005, Regarding Failure to Correctly Enter Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation for the Reactor Protective System

Regarding Failure to Correctly Enter Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation for the Reactor Protective System

ML111300096
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	05/09/2011
From:	Reinhart J Omaha Public Power District
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
LIC-11-0026 LER 11-005-00
Download: ML111300096 (5)

LER-2011-005, Regarding Failure to Correctly Enter Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation for the Reactor Protective System

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2852011005R00 - NRC Website

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LlC-11-0026 May 9,2011 u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2011-005, Revision 0, for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached licensee Event Report 2011-00S, Revision 0, dated, May 9, 2011. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFRSO.73(a)(2)(i)(8). No commitments are being made in this letter. If you should have any questions, please contact me.

J ffrey Reinhart S e Vice President JARJepm Attachment c:

E. E. Collins,Jr., NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector INPO Records Center Employment with Equal Opportunity

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013

, the NRC may not conduct or sp onsor, and a person is not required to respond to, th e

information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Fort Calhoun Station

2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000285

3. PAGE 1 OF 4

4. TITLE Failure to Correctly Enter Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation for the Reactor Protective System

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 6 14 2010 2011 - 005 -

0 5 9

2011 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE 01

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate corrective action has been to provide guidance to the operations staff to use TS 2.0.1 for the failure of an RPS M coil. This action has been completed.

FCS will conduct a formal review of other components which do not have specific TS LCO action statements and station actions that could be non-conservative with regard to entering TS 2.0.1. The review will identify those items that need administrative controls and place them in the appropriate station procedures.

FCS procedures will be modified to require an alternate strategy be developed for items that have identified station vulnerabilities if funding for the initial action is not approved.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The RPS provides for a redundant trip path on each set of power supplies to the clutch power supplies. A single failure such as the one documented in this LER is insufficient to prevent the RPS from deenergizing the clutch power supplies and causing a reactor trip. However, during the period that the RPS M2 contactor was stuck shut, the system did not meet the single failure design criteria. During this period, the failure of the redundant RPS M1 contactor in the shut position would have resulted in a failure to automatically trip the reactor. The M1 contactor was functional, and successfully tested during the time that the M2 contactor was degraded. The M1 contactor was subject to the same environment as the M2 contactor. However, during the time that M2 was failed the DSS system was fully operational and capable of causing a reactor trip. The first step of the standard post trip actions for the station (Emergency Operating Procedure 1) require operators to Verify Reactivity Control is established and if the reactor does not trip, then the operators perform the following steps concurrently:

a. Manually trip the Reactor (CB-4).

b. Manually trip the Reactor (AI-31).

c. Place the DSS Manual Trip Switches in "TRIP" (AI-66A/B).

d. Manually open the CEDM Clutch Power Supply Breakers (AI-57).

Since the reactor would have tripped, this event did not pose a significant threat to the health and safety of the public.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This event does not result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

FCS has not had any previous similar failures of RPS that have been reported.