05000285/LER-2011-003-03, Regarding Inadequate Flooding Protection Due to Ineffective Oversight

Regarding Inadequate Flooding Protection Due to Ineffective Oversight

ML113530555
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	12/17/2011
From:	Bannister D Omaha Public Power District
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
LlC-11-0132 LER 11-003-03
Download: ML113530555 (6)

LER-2011-003, Regarding Inadequate Flooding Protection Due to Ineffective Oversight

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2852011003R03 - NRC Website

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Omaha Public Power Distriel 444 South 16 111 Street Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247 LlC-11-0132 December 17, 2011 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 References: 1.

Docket No. 50-285

2.

Letter from OPPD (J. A. Reinhart) to NRC (Document Control Desk), dated April 4, 2011 (LlC-11-0023)

3.

Letter from OPPD (T. R. Nellenbach) to NRC (Document Control Desk) dated May 13, 2011 (LlC-11-0051)

4.

Letter from OPPD (T. R. Nellenbach) to NRC (Document Control Desk) dated May 16, 2011 (LlC-11-0039)

5.

Letter from OPPD (T. R. Nellenbach) to NRC (Document Control Desk) dated August 12, 2011 (LlC-11-0088)

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2011-003, Revision 3, for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2011-003, Revision 3, dated, December 17, 2011. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) and (D).

If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

~~~

D. fB~nnister Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Fort Calhoun Station DJB /epm Attachment c:

E. E. Collins, Jr., NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector INPO Records Center Employment with Equal Opportunity

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Fort Calhoun Station

2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000285

3. PAGE 1 OF 5

4. TITLE Inadequate Flooding Protection Due To Ineffective Oversight

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 2

3 2011 2011 - 003 -

3 12 16 2011 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE 1

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET Mindsets existed that FCS was safe as is relative to external flooding events. These mindsets collectively led to the incorrect conclusion that regulatory requirements were being met.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Configuration changes were developed as needed and the penetrations sealed. Comprehensive corrective actions to address the root and contributing causes have been developed and will be addressed through the corrective action program.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The Fort Calhoun Station is required to be protected from flooding within the stations licensing basis.

The safety related equipment required to mitigate the consequences of an accident were affected by these findings. The openings could have jeopardized the ability of the safety related equipment to perform their design basis function during an accident. Other methods of removing decay heat and mitigating the consequences of a flooding event were available. Therefore, this external flooding concern has substantial importance to safety as indicated by the Yellow Finding issued for this event.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This event does result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.

PREVIOUS EVENTS No licensee event report prior to this has identified the flooding issue. LER 2011-001 which had been written to report a flooding penetration has been cancelled as indicated in Reference 3 to the cover letter to this LER. The penetration is discussed in this LER.