|
---|
Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000390/20250102024-11-0404 November 2024 Notification of an NRC (FPTI) (NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2025010 0500039/ 2025010) (RFI) CNL-24-074, Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions2024-10-23023 October 2024 Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions IR 05000390/20243012024-10-17017 October 2024 Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000390/2024301 and 05000391/2024301 ML24282B0412024-10-15015 October 2024 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 ML24261C0062024-10-0404 October 2024 Correction to Amendment No. 134 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 and Amendment No. 38 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 ML24260A1682024-10-0404 October 2024 Regulatory Audit Summary Related to Request to Add and Revise Notes Related to Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5 ML24284A1072024-09-26026 September 2024 Affidavit for Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 CNL-24-060, Supplement to Request for Approval of the Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Description2024-09-24024 September 2024 Supplement to Request for Approval of the Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Description CNL-24-047, Decommitment of Flood Mode Mitigation Improvement Systems2024-09-24024 September 2024 Decommitment of Flood Mode Mitigation Improvement Systems ML24262A0602024-09-23023 September 2024 Summary of August 19, 2024, Meeting with Tennessee Valley Authority Regarding a Proposed Supplement to the Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan CNL-24-065, Tennessee Valley Authority – Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions2024-09-18018 September 2024 Tennessee Valley Authority – Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions 05000390/LER-2024-002, Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Generator Protection Relay Actuation2024-09-0505 September 2024 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Generator Protection Relay Actuation IR 05000390/20240052024-08-28028 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan and Assessment Follow-Up Letter for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Report 05000390-2024005 and 05000391-2024005 ML24218A1442024-08-27027 August 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 169 and 75 Regarding Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 to Reduce the Residual Heat Removal Flow Rate IR 05000390/20244022024-08-20020 August 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000390-2024402 and 05000391/2024402 - Public CNL-24-061, Supplement to Application to Revise Function 5 of Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1, ‘Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation,’ for the Sequoyah and Watts Bar (SQN-TS-23-02 and WBN-TS-23-08),2024-08-19019 August 2024 Supplement to Application to Revise Function 5 of Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1, ‘Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation,’ for the Sequoyah and Watts Bar (SQN-TS-23-02 and WBN-TS-23-08), ML24219A0262024-08-12012 August 2024 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure IR 05000390/20240022024-08-0707 August 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2024002 and 05000391/2024002 Rev ML24204A2652024-07-25025 July 2024 Regulatory Audit Summary Related to Request to Revise Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 to Reduce the Residual Heat Removal Flow Rate ML24199A0012024-07-22022 July 2024 Clarification and Correction to Exemption from Requirement of 10 CFR 37.11(c)(2) ML24172A1342024-07-15015 July 2024 Exemptions from 10 CFR 37.11(C)(2) (EPID L-2023-LLE-0024) - Letter ML24170A8002024-07-15015 July 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 168 and 74 Regarding Revision to Technical Specification Table 1.1-1 for Required Number of Fully Tensioned Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Closure Bolts IR 05000390/20244402024-07-12012 July 2024 95001 Supplemental Inspection Supplemental Report 05000390-2024440 and 05000391-2024440 and Follow-Up Assessment Letter 05000391/LER-2024-003, Inoperability of Both Trains of Unit 2 Low Head Safety Injection2024-07-11011 July 2024 Inoperability of Both Trains of Unit 2 Low Head Safety Injection ML24131A0012024-07-0202 July 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 167 and 73 Regarding Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-427-A, Revision 2 CNL-24-052, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14)2024-06-27027 June 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14) CNL-24-018, License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-276-A, Revision 2, Regarding TS 3.8.1 AC Sources – Operating to Clarify Requirements for Diesel Generator Testing (WBN-TS2024-06-25025 June 2024 License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-276-A, Revision 2, Regarding TS 3.8.1 AC Sources – Operating to Clarify Requirements for Diesel Generator Testing (WBN-TS ML24089A1152024-06-21021 June 2024 Transmittal Letter, Environmental Assessments and Findings of No Significant Impact Related to Exemption Requests from 10 CFR 37.11(c)(2) ML24141A0482024-05-17017 May 2024 EN 56958_1 Ametek Solidstate Controls, Inc ML24100A7642024-05-16016 May 2024 Issuance of Amendment No. 166 Regarding Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown, to Remove Reference to C-S Diesel Generator (CNL-23-062) IR 05000390/20240012024-05-14014 May 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2024001 and 05000391/2024001 CNL-24-040, Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions2024-05-0808 May 2024 Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions 05000391/LER-2024-002, Re Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Steam Generator 3 Level LO-LO2024-05-0606 May 2024 Re Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Steam Generator 3 Level LO-LO IR 05000391/20240072024-04-30030 April 2024 Assessment Follow-up Letter for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 – Report 05000391/2024007 ML24120A1182024-04-29029 April 2024 – Notification of NRC Supplemental Inspection (95001) and Request for Information CNL-24-037, Clinch River, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Unit 1 and 2, Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Revision 422024-04-22022 April 2024 Clinch River, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Unit 1 and 2, Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Revision 42 ML24087A1912024-04-18018 April 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting CNL-24-010, License Amendment Request to Recapture Low-Power Testing Time (WBN-TS-23-19)2024-04-17017 April 2024 License Amendment Request to Recapture Low-Power Testing Time (WBN-TS-23-19) CNL-24-024, Hydrologic Engineering Center River Analysis System Project Milestone Status Update2024-04-17017 April 2024 Hydrologic Engineering Center River Analysis System Project Milestone Status Update CNL-24-033, Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions2024-04-17017 April 2024 Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions ML24072A0052024-04-15015 April 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 165 and 72 Regarding Increase in the Maximum Number of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods and Supporting Changes, and Revision to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report CNL-24-004, Application to Modify the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications for Main Control Room Chiller Completion Time Extension (WBN-TS-23-13)2024-04-0404 April 2024 Application to Modify the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications for Main Control Room Chiller Completion Time Extension (WBN-TS-23-13) IR 05000390/20244012024-04-0202 April 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000390/2024401 and 05000391/2024401 - (Public) CNL-24-020, Clinch River, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Description and Application to Revise the Technical Specifications Associated with QAPD Requirements2024-04-0101 April 2024 Clinch River, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Description and Application to Revise the Technical Specifications Associated with QAPD Requirements CNL-24-007, Annual Insurance Status Report2024-03-27027 March 2024 Annual Insurance Status Report CNL-24-008, Guarantee of Payment of Deferred Premiums - 2023 Annual Report2024-03-27027 March 2024 Guarantee of Payment of Deferred Premiums - 2023 Annual Report 05000391/LER-2024-001, Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Generator Protection Relay Actuation2024-03-27027 March 2024 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Generator Protection Relay Actuation CNL-24-025, Notice of Intent to Pursue License Renewal for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Submittal Schedule2024-03-25025 March 2024 Notice of Intent to Pursue License Renewal for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Submittal Schedule ML24081A0262024-03-21021 March 2024 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions ML24079A0312024-03-19019 March 2024 Wb 2024-301, Corporate Notification Letter (210-day Ltr) 2024-09-05
[Table view] Category:Technical Specifications
MONTHYEARWBL-24-019, Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report2024-04-30030 April 2024 Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report ML24072A0052024-04-15015 April 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 165 and 72 Regarding Increase in the Maximum Number of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods and Supporting Changes, and Revision to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report CNL-24-020, Clinch River, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Description and Application to Revise the Technical Specifications Associated with QAPD Requirements2024-04-0101 April 2024 Clinch River, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Description and Application to Revise the Technical Specifications Associated with QAPD Requirements ML23319A2452024-01-29029 January 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 366 and 360; 164 and 71 Regarding the Adoption of TSTF-567, Revision 1, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues CNL-24-016, Supplement to Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14)2024-01-10010 January 2024 Supplement to Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14) CNL-23-052, Application to Adopt TSTF-427-A, Revision 2, Allowance for Non-Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System Operability2024-01-0909 January 2024 Application to Adopt TSTF-427-A, Revision 2, Allowance for Non-Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System Operability CNL-23-062, Application to Revise the Technical Specifications Section 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown, to Remove Reference to the C-S Diesel Generator (WBN-TS-23-018)2024-01-0808 January 2024 Application to Revise the Technical Specifications Section 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown, to Remove Reference to the C-S Diesel Generator (WBN-TS-23-018) CNL-23-001, Rebaseline of Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the Technical Specifications (WBN-TS-23-01)2023-12-13013 December 2023 Rebaseline of Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the Technical Specifications (WBN-TS-23-01) ML22348A0052023-01-25025 January 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 326, 349, and 309; 363 and 35; 159 and 67 Regarding Adoption of TSTF-554, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements ML22349A6472023-01-20020 January 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 325, 348, and 308; 362 and 356; and 158 and 66 Regarding Adoption of TSTF-529, Rev. 4, Clarify Use and Application Rules ML22276A1612022-10-24024 October 2022 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 359, 353, 155, & 63 Regarding Adoption of TSTF Traveler TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections ML22187A0192022-09-20020 September 2022 Issuance of Amendment No. 154 Regarding Revision to Technical Specification 3.3.2 to Revise Allowable Value for Trip of Turbine-Driven Main Feedwater Pumps ML22187A1812022-09-20020 September 2022 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 153 and 62 Regarding Extension of Completion Time for Technical Specification 3.7.8 for Inoperable Essential Raw Cooling Water Train CNL-22-030, Application to Revise Technical Specification 3.4.12, Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN-TSC-22-01) and TS 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN-TS-22-03)2022-07-27027 July 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specification 3.4.12, Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN-TSC-22-01) and TS 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN-TS-22-03) CNL-22-039, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-554-A, Revision 1, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements (BFN TS-537) (SQN-21-05) (WBN-TS-21-04)2022-07-13013 July 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-554-A, Revision 1, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements (BFN TS-537) (SQN-21-05) (WBN-TS-21-04) WBL-22-017, Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report2022-03-22022 March 2022 Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report ML21260A2102021-11-22022 November 2021 Issuance of Amendment No. 57 to Revise Technical Specifications to Change the Steam Generator Secondary Side Water Level ML21158A2842021-09-17017 September 2021 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 148 and 55 to Revise Technical Specifications for Function 6.E of Table 3.3.2-1, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation ML21099A2462021-05-14014 May 2021 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 146 and 52 to Adopt TSTF-490, Deletion of E Bar Definition and Revision to RCS Specific Activity Tech Spec ML21078A4842021-05-0505 May 2021 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 145 and 51 for One-Time Change to Technical Specification 3.7.11 to Extend the Completion Time for Main Control Room Chiller Modifications ML21015A0342021-03-0909 March 2021 Issuance of Amendment No. 144 Regarding Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation ML21034A1692021-02-26026 February 2021 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 143 and 50 Regarding Implementation of Full Spectrumtm Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis (LOCA) and New LOCA-Specific Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rod Stress Analysis Methodology ML20232C6222021-02-11011 February 2021 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 142 and 49 Regarding Revision to Technical Specifications to Implement WCAP-17661-P-A, Revision 1, Improved RAOC and CAOC Fq Surveillance Technical Specifications (EPID L-2020-LLA-0037 ML20282A3452020-11-19019 November 2020 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 313, 336, 296, 350, 344, 138, and 44 Revise Emergency Plan On-Shift Emergency Medical Technician & Onsite Ambulance Requirements ML20226A4442020-10-21021 October 2020 Issuance of Amendment No. 42 Regarding Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate ML20273A0432020-09-29029 September 2020 Plants Unit 1 and 2 - Periodic Submission for Changes Made to the Technical Specification Bases and Technical Requirements Manual ML20156A0182020-08-10010 August 2020 Issuance of Amendment No. 40 Regarding Technical Specifications for Steam Generator Tube Repair Sleeve CNL-19-115, Non-Voluntary License Amendment Request to Modify Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications 3.2.1, Fq(Z), to Implement Methodology from WCAP-17661, Revision 1, Improved RAOC and CAOC Fq Surveillance Technical Specific2020-03-0202 March 2020 Non-Voluntary License Amendment Request to Modify Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications 3.2.1, Fq(Z), to Implement Methodology from WCAP-17661, Revision 1, Improved RAOC and CAOC Fq Surveillance Technical Specificat ML20028F7332020-02-28028 February 2020 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 132 and 36 Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-425, Revision 3 ML19276E5572019-12-0909 December 2019 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 130 and 33 Regarding Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler, TSTF-500, DC Electrical Rewrite - Update to TSTF-360 ML19238A0052019-11-26026 November 2019 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 129 and 32 Regarding Changes to Technical Specifications 3.8.1, 3.8.7, 3.8.8, and 3.8.9 CNL-19-067, Application to Revise Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 - Technical Specifications for Steam Generator Tube Repair Sleeve (WBN-TS-391-19-13)2019-09-30030 September 2019 Application to Revise Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 - Technical Specifications for Steam Generator Tube Repair Sleeve (WBN-TS-391-19-13) CNL-19-060, Supplement to Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program (WBN-TS-18-14)2019-08-29029 August 2019 Supplement to Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program (WBN-TS-18-14) ML18277A1102019-08-27027 August 2019 Units, 1 & 2 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 309, 332, 292, 345, 339, 128, and 31 Regarding Unbalanced Voltage Protection ML19112A0042019-07-25025 July 2019 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 127 and 30 Regarding the Use of Optimized Zirlo Fuel Rod Cladding ML19098A7742019-06-0707 June 2019 Issuance of Amendments Regarding Technical Specifications Changes Pertaining to 120-Volt Alternating Current Vital Buses ML18255A1562018-10-30030 October 2018 Issuance of Amendment to Modify Technical Specification 3.3.1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Turbine Trip Function on Low Fluid Oil Pressure ML18079A0292018-06-26026 June 2018 Issuance of Amendments Regarding Adoption of TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements (CAC Nos. MF8912and MF8913; EPID L-2016-LLA-0034) ML17311A7862017-12-0707 December 2017 Issuance of Amendment Regarding Ventilation Filter Testing Program (CAC No. MF9584; EPID L-2017-LLA-0207) ML17215A2432017-10-0202 October 2017 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3; Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments to Change Technical Specifications to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler-522 (CAC No. MF9562-MF9566) CNL-17-029, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements for AC Sources2017-03-0606 March 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements for AC Sources ML16343A8142017-01-0505 January 2017 Issuance of Amendment Regarding One-Time Extension of Intervals for Surveillance Requirements 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 NL-16-164, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2 - Application to Modify Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirement Intervals for AC Sources (WBN-TS-16-024)2016-10-17017 October 2016 Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2 - Application to Modify Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirement Intervals for AC Sources (WBN-TS-16-024) CNL-16-164, Application to Modify Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirement Intervals for AC Sources (WBN-TS-16-024)2016-10-17017 October 2016 Application to Modify Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirement Intervals for AC Sources (WBN-TS-16-024) ML16159A0572016-07-29029 July 2016 Issuance of Amendment Regarding Revised Technical Specification 4.2.1 Fuel Assemblies to Increase the Maximum Number of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods CNL-16-047, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request to Use F* Steam Generator Alternate Repair Criteria2016-05-0404 May 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request to Use F* Steam Generator Alternate Repair Criteria ML15344A3182015-12-23023 December 2015 Issuance of Amendment Regarding Fire Protection License Conditions ML15348A1122015-12-14014 December 2015 Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2.15 - Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program ML15301A1402015-10-22022 October 2015 Current Facility Operating License NPF-96, Tech Specs, Revised 11/08/2017 ML15251A5872015-10-22022 October 2015 Issuance of Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 2024-04-30
[Table view] |
Text
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 January 27, 2011 10 CFR 50.36 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 NRC Docket No. 50-391
Subject:
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Unit 2 - Change to Developmental Technical Specification (TS) Section 3.1.8, Rod Position Indication
Reference:
TVA letter to NRC dated October 12, 2010, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Unit 2 - Change to Developmental Technical Specification (TS)
Sections 3.6.11, Ice Bed, and 3.1.8, Rod Position Indication This letter transmits changes to WBN Unit 2 Developmental TS Section 3.1.8, Rod Position Indication, resulting from discussions with the staff on October 26, 2010. The enclosure proposes the removal of the previously inserted word indirectly, from TS 3.1.8 action statements regarding verification of the position of the control rods using Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS). The word indirectly had been inserted via the above reference letter. Rather than inserting the word indirectly in the action statements, it was agreed via discussions mentioned above to insert additional verbiage in TS Bases Section TS 3.1.8 to describe the method used to determine rod position using PDMS. In addition, the word inferred was replaced with determined within the Action Statement A.1 discussion within TS Bases Section 3.1.8. TVA believes that the changes to TS 3.1.8 identified in the reference above coupled with the subsequent minor changes discussed in this letter address the difference that the Unit 2 configuration presents.
TVA has submitted WBN Unit 2 TS Developmental Revisions A, B, C, and D via letters dated March 4, 2009; February 2, 2010; August 16, 2010; and October 12, 2010, respectively. Changes to the TS in this letter are reflected as Developmental Revision E.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 January 27, 2011 There are no new commitments associated with this submittal. If you have any questions, please contact William Crouch at (423) 365-2004.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 27!h day of January 2011.
Respectfully, t1"/3~'f~
Masoud a' stani Watts B ~nit 2 Vice President
Enclosure:
Description of Change to Developmental TS Section 3.1.8, "Rod Position Indication" Attachments to
Enclosure:
- 1. Mark-up of Developmental WBN Unit 2 TS Section 3.1.8, "Rod Position Indication,"
to Create Revision E
- 2. Retyped Version of WBN Unit 2 TS Section 3.1.8, "Rod Position Indication,"
Developmental Revision E
- 3. Mark-up of Developmental WBN Unit 2 TS Bases Section 3.1.8, "Rod Position Indication," to Create Revision E cc (Enclosure):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., N.E., Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 NRC Resident Inspector Unit 2 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381
Enclosure Description of Change to Developmental Technical Specification (TS)
Section 3.1.8, Rod Position Indication
Background
The NRC approved a change via Amendment 82 to the Unit 1 TS (Reference), to be able to verify the position of a control rod with an inoperable Rod Position Indication (RPI) with either the Movable Incore Detector System (MIDS) or with the Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS).
There is a fundamental difference; however, between WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. Unit 1 has the MIDS and Unit 2 will have the Westinghouse In-Core Information Surveillance and Engineering (WINCISE) system. The MIDS collects 61 axial points from top to bottom of the core, each point representing about 2.4 inches each or 3.8 control rod steps. WINCISE has fixed incore detectors with only 5 axial nodes of about 28.8 inches each or 46 control rod steps. These large axial nodes prevent the use of raw detector data to be used to directly verify the position of the rod on Unit 2.
The indirect PDMS method would be used to verify the position of a control rod with an inoperable RPI on Unit 2. The PDMS develops a detailed three-dimensional power distribution via its nodal code coupled with updates from plant instrumentation. The monitored power distribution, which includes radial adjustments from the core exit thermocouples, can be compared to the reference power distribution expected with all control rods properly aligned. In this way, agreement between the two power distributions can be used to indirectly verify that the control rod with the inoperable RPI is aligned.
By letter dated October 12, 2010, TVA proposed, in part, to insert the word indirectly into TS 3.1.8, Action Statements, A.1, A.2.1, A.2.3, and B.1. After a discussion with the staff on October 26, 2010, it was agreed to remove the word indirectly from the action statements and to insert new verbiage into the bases section of TS 3.1.8 which describes the method used to determine rod position using PDMS.
Description of Change
- 1. Remove the word indirectly from TS 3.1.8, Action Statements, A.1, A.2.1, A.2.3, and B.1.
- 2. Insert the following text as the last paragraph of the background section for TS Bases Section, 3.1.8:
The Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) as controlled by Technical Requirements Manual Section 3.3.3 develops a detailed three dimensional power distribution via its nodal code coupled with updates from plant instrumentation, including the fixed incore detectors. The monitored power distribution is compared to the reference power distribution corresponding to all control rods properly aligned. Agreement between the two power distributions can be used to indirectly verify the control rod is aligned.
- 3. Replace the word inferred with the word determined in first paragraph of the TS Bases Action Statement A.1 discussion.
E-1
Enclosure Description of Change to Developmental Technical Specification (TS)
Section 3.1.8, Rod Position Indication Attachments 1 and 2 contain the mark-up and the retyped version of the appropriate TS pages. Attachment 3 contains the mark-up of the appropriate TS Bases pages for information only.
Reference:
- 1. NRC to TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Issuance of Amendment Regarding the Application to Implement Beacon Core Power Distribution and Monitoring System (TAC No. ME1698), dated October 27, 2009 [ML092710381]
E-2
Attachment 1 to Enclosure Mark-up of Developmental WBN Unit 2 TS Section 3.1.8, Rod Position Indication to Create Revision E Technical Specification Pages 3.1-15 3.1-16
Rod Position Indication 3.1.8 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.8 Rod Position Indication LCO 3.1.8 The Rod Position Indication (RPI) System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2 ACTIONS
NOTE----------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable rod position indicator per group and each demand position indicator per bank.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
NOTE----------------- A.1 Verify the position of the Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Rod position monitoring by rods with inoperable Required Actions A.2.1 and position indicators A.2.2 may only be applied to indirectly by using the one inoperable RPI and shall PDMS.
only be allowed: (1) until the end of the current cycle, or OR (2) until an entry into MODE 5 of sufficient duration, whichever A.2.1 Verify the position of the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> occurs first, when the repair of rod with the inoperable the inoperable RPI can safely position indicator AND be performed. Required indirectly by using the Actions A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.2.3 PDMS. Once every 31 days shall not be allowed after the thereafter plant has been in MODE 5 or AND other plant condition, for a sufficient period of time, in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, if rod control which the repair of the system parameters inoperable RPI could have indicate unintended safely been performed. movement A. One RPI per group AND inoperable for one or more groups.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.1-15 (developmental) DE
Rod Position Indication 3.1.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.2 Review the parameters of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> the rod control system for indications of unintended AND rod movement for the rod with an inoperable Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> position indicator. thereafter AND A.2.3 Verify the position of the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, if the rod rod with an inoperable with an inoperable position indicator position indicator is indirectly by using the moved greater than PDMS. 12 steps.
AND Prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 50% RTP and within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of reaching 100% RTP OR A.3 Reduce THERMAL 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> POWER to less than or equal to 50% RTP.
B. One or more rods with B.1 Verify the position of the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> inoperable position rods with inoperable indicators have been moved position indicators in excess of 24 steps in one indirectly by using the direction since the last PDMS.
determination of the rod's position. OR B.2 Reduce THERMAL 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> POWER to less than or equal to 50% RTP.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.1-16 (developmental) DE
Attachment 2 to Enclosure Retyped Version of Developmental Revision E WBN Unit 2 TS Section 3.1.8, Rod Position Indication Technical Specification Pages 3.1-15 3.1-16
Rod Position Indication 3.1.8 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.8 Rod Position Indication LCO 3.1.8 The Rod Position Indication (RPI) System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2 ACTIONS
NOTE----------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable rod position indicator per group and each demand position indicator per bank.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
NOTE----------------- A.1 Verify the position of the Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Rod position monitoring by rods with inoperable Required Actions A.2.1 and position indicators by A.2.2 may only be applied to using the PDMS.
one inoperable RPI and shall only be allowed: (1) until the OR end of the current cycle, or (2) until an entry into MODE 5 A.2.1 Verify the position of the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of sufficient duration, whichever rod with the inoperable occurs first, when the repair of position indicator by using AND the inoperable RPI can safely the PDMS.
be performed. Required Once every 31 days Actions A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.2.3 thereafter shall not be allowed after the AND plant has been in MODE 5 or other plant condition, for a 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, if rod control sufficient period of time, in system parameters which the repair of the indicate unintended inoperable RPI could have movement safely been performed.
A. One RPI per group AND inoperable for one or more groups.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.1-15 (developmental) E
Rod Position Indication 3.1.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.2 Review the parameters of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> the rod control system for indications of unintended AND rod movement for the rod with an inoperable Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> position indicator. thereafter AND A.2.3 Verify the position of the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, if the rod rod with an inoperable with an inoperable position indicator by using position indicator is the PDMS. moved greater than 12 steps.
AND Prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 50% RTP and within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of reaching 100% RTP OR A.3 Reduce THERMAL 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> POWER to less than or equal to 50% RTP.
B. One or more rods with B.1 Verify the position of the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> inoperable position rods with inoperable indicators have been moved position indicators by in excess of 24 steps in one using the PDMS.
direction since the last determination of the rod's OR position.
B.2 Reduce THERMAL 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> POWER to less than or equal to 50% RTP.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.1-16 (developmental) E
Attachment 3 to Enclosure Mark-up of Developmental WBN Unit 2 TS Bases Section 3.1.8, Rod Position Indication to Create Revision E Technical Specification Bases Pages B 3.1-48 B 3.1-50
Rod Position Indication B 3.1.8 BASES BACKGROUND The axial position of shutdown rods and control rods are determined by (continued) two separate and independent systems: the Bank Demand Position Indication System (commonly called group step counters) and the Rod Position Indication (RPI) System.
The Bank Demand Position Indication System counts the pulses from the Rod Control System that move the rods. There is one step counter for each group of rods. Individual rods in a group all receive the same signal to move and should, therefore, all be at the same position indicated by the group step counter for that group. The Bank Demand Position Indication System is considered highly precise (+ 1 step or + 5/8 inch). If a rod does not move one step for each demand pulse, the step counter will still count the pulse and incorrectly reflect the position of the rod.
The RPI System provides an accurate indication of actual control rod position, but at a lower precision than the step counters. This system is based on inductive analog signals from a series of coils spaced along a hollow tube with a center-to-center distance of 3.75 inches, which is 6 steps. The normal indication accuracy of the RPI System is + 6 steps
(+ 3.75 inches), and the maximum uncertainty is + 12 steps
(+ 7.5 inches). With an indicated deviation of 12 steps between the group step counter and RPI, the maximum deviation between actual rod position and the demand position could be 24 steps, or 15 inches.
The Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) as controlled by Technical Requirements Manual Section 3.3.3 develops a detailed three dimensional power distribution via its nodal code coupled with updates from plant instrumentation, including the fixed incore detectors. The monitored power distribution is compared to the reference power distribution corresponding to all control rods properly aligned. Agreement between the two power distributions can be used to indirectly verify the control rod is aligned.
APPLICABLE Control and shutdown rod position accuracy is essential during power SAFETY operation. Power peaking, ejected rod worth, or SDM limits may be ANALYSES violated in the event of a Design Basis Accident (Ref. 2 through 12), with control or shutdown rods operating outside their limits undetected.
Therefore, the acceptance criteria for rod position indication is that rod positions must be known with sufficient accuracy in order to verify the core is operating within the group sequence, overlap, design peaking limits, ejected rod worth, and with minimum SDM (LCO 3.1.6, "Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits," and LCO 3.1.7, "Control Bank Insertion Limits").
The rod positions must also be known in order to verify the alignment (continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-48 (developmental) DE
Rod Position Indication B 3.1.8 BASES (continued) because these are the only MODES in which power is generated, and the OPERABILITY and alignment of rods have the potential to affect the safety of the plant. In the shutdown MODES, the OPERABILITY of the shutdown and control banks has the potential to affect the required SDM, but this effect can be compensated for by an increase in the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System.
ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable rod position indicator per group and each demand position indicator per bank. This is acceptable because the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable position indicator.
A.1 When one RPI channel per group fails, the position of the rod can still be inferred determined indirectly by use of incore power distribution measurement information. Incore power distribution measurement information is obtained from an OPERABLE Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) (Ref. 15). Based on experience, normal power operation does not require excessive movement of banks. If a bank has been significantly moved, the Required Action of B.1 or B.2 below is required. Therefore, verification of rod position within the Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is adequate for allowing continued full power operation, since the probability of simultaneously having a rod significantly out of position and an event sensitive to that rod position is small.
A.2.1, A.2.2 The control rod drive mechanism (a portion of the rod control system) consists of four separate subassemblies; 1) the pressure vessel, 2) the coil stack assembly, 3) the latch assembly, and 4) the drive rod assembly.
The coil stack assembly contains three operating coils; 1) the stationary gripper coil, 2) the moveable gripper coil, and 3) the lift coil. In support of Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2, a Temporary Alteration (TA) to the configuration of the plant is implemented to provide instrumentation for the monitoring of the rod control system parameters in the Main Control Room. The TA creates a circuit that monitors the operation and timing of the lift coil and the stationary gripper coil. Additional details regarding the TA are provided in the FSAR (Ref. 14).
Required Actions A.2.1 and A.1 are essentially the same. Therefore, the discussion provided above for Required Action A.1 applies to Required Action A.2.1. The options provided by Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 allow for continued operation in a situation where the component causing (continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-50 (developmental) DE