ML102810426
| ML102810426 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/2010 |
| From: | Gauding G Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | David Silk Operations Branch I |
| Hansell S | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML102080004 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC U01835 | |
| Download: ML102810426 (57) | |
Text
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE:
SGTR w/complications during depressurization SCENARIO NUMBER:
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-l (0913)
REVISION NUMBER:
1 EFFECTIVE DATE:
Effective on final approval date below EXPECTED DURATION:
80 minutes PROGRAM:
L.O. REQ U AL
'----C=-....l INITIAI~ LICENSE
'--~....J STA
'----'f.....J OTHER REVISION
SUMMARY
New issue for 2009 AIIDual Exam Rev. 1 7-27 Swapped Tavg channel failure to PRNI channel failure. Changed SGFP trip to SGFP malfunction which causes power reduction to be required. Removed 2R19D failure.
Added SG NR level channel failure for second Tech Spec call. Added 2A 4KV Vital bus loading on EDG after Rx trip, and 21 AFW pp fails to start. Added 23 AFW pump trips on start.
Extended scenario to SI termination and added CT for SI termination.
PREPARED BY:
07-27-2010 Date APPROVED BY:
APPROVED BY:
7 Date PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l I.
OBJECTIVES:
A. Given the unit at power with a failure of a power range nuclear instrument which causes continuous rod motion, take corrective action IA W AB.ROD-0003 B. Given the order or indications ofa rod or rod control system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
C. Given indication of a rod or rod control system malfunction, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
D. Given the order to rapidly reduce load, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures E. Given indication or order to rapidly reduce load, DIRECT the response to the malfunction, in accordance with the approved station procedures.
F. Given the order or indications ofa reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
G. Given indication ofa reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
H. Given the order or indications ofa safety injection, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.
I. Given indication of a safety injection, DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.
J. Given the order or indications ofa steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube rupture in accordance with the approved station procedures.
K. Given indication ofa steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), DIRECT the response to the SGTR in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Page 2 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 II.
MAJOR EVENTS:
A. Channel II (N42) PRNI fails high.
B. 22 SG Channel I Level fails low.
C. 21 SGFP oil leak requiring power reduction.
E. Loss of RCS Spray capability while perfonning RCS pressure reduction.
F. PZR PORV sticks open during RCS depressurization.
Page 3 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Penmssion from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 III.
SCENARIO A. The crew will take turnover with the unit at 100% power, EOL, equilibrium conditions. 2B DG is CIT for governor repairs. 21 SGFP governor has a small oil leak that will be repaired when the unit enters its refueling outage in 3 days. Unit 1 and Hope Creek are at 100%
power. Unit 3 is available.
B. Shortly after the crew takes the watch, Power Range Nuclear Instrument Channel II (N42) fails high resulting in inward rod motion and various alarms. The crew verifies no runback in progress, takes manual control ofrods, implements S2.0P-AB.ROD-3, Continuous Rod Motion and S2.0P-AB.NIS-l, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction, and removes the channel from service. The CRS will identifY the appropriate Tech Specs.
C. Once control room actions have been performed to remove PRNI Channel II from service, 22 SG NR Level Channell fails low. The crew will verifY that ADFWCS has automatically removed the failed channel from control, and the CRS will identifY the appropriate Tech Specs.
D. A report from the field will come into the control room stating that the governor oil leak on 21 SGFP has gotten worse, and appears it will require shutdown to repair. The crew will initiate a power reduction in preparation for removing SGFP from service.
During the power reduction, a SGTR will ramp in over 10 minutes on 22 SG. The crew should identifY the loss ofRCS inventory and initiate a manual Reactor Trip and SI.
After the reactor trips, 2H 4KV group bus will de..energize (causes a loss of21 RCP).
2A 4KV vital bus will also de-energize, and be re**energized from 2A EDG automatically when 2A SEC loads the bus in Mode 1. 21 AFW pump will not start and must be manually started. 23 AFW pump trips during its start.
G. The crew will cooldown to target temperature in SGTR-l. When performing the RCS depressurization with normal spray, 23 RCP will trip, resulting in no spray flow. The crew will then use a PZR PORV to depressurize. The PORV will stick open when the depressurization is attempted to be terminated, and the crew will isolate the PORV with its block valve.
The scenario may be terminated once the depressurization is terminated by closing the stuck open PZR PORV block valve.
Page 4 of31 PSEG Restricted Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l IV.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
__ Initialize simulator to IC-258, 100%, EOL, CB 24 ppm
/'~
PREP FOR TR.AINING Initial RH 1 and RH2 CIT 21/22 RH18 CIT 2VCl & 2VC4 CIT RCPs (SELF CHECK)
RTBs (SELF CHECK)
MS167s (SELF CHECK) 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)
SGFPs (SELF CHECK) 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK) 2B DG (CIT)
Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist."
Page 5 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 EVENT TRIGGERS:
Initial I ET #
I Description MONP254<1O Control Bank C position < 10 steps withdrawn MALFUNCTION
SUMMARY
Initial I Descri12tion Delal' Ram12 Remote/Event Init Val Final Val
- 2.
NA NA RT-2 44 0
fails
900 RP318El, Aux Feed Pump 21 Fails to
- 4.
NA NA NA True True start on SEC
- 5. RC0003C, 23 Rep electrically trip NA NA RT-5 False True
- 6. VL0297, 2PRI fails to position (0-100%)
NA NA RT-7 0
100
- 7. VL0298, 2PR2 fails to position (0-100%)
NA NA RT-8 0
100
- 8. EL0140, 2H 4kV Group Bus de-energized 30 sec:
NA ET-l False True
- 9. AF0183, 23 AFW pump overspeed trip 60 sec:
NA ET-l False True REMOTE/FIELD FUNCTION
SUMMARY
Initial I Description Delay Ram12 Remote/Event Init Val Final Val
- l. DG19D, 2B DG Locked Out N/A NA NA Yes Yes
- 2. DG20D, 2B DG Brkr Control Pwr N/A NA NA Off Off
- 3. DG2ID, 2B DG Brkr Racked Out N/A NA NA Tagged Tagged Page 6 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires SpecifLc Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l Y:
Initial Description Delay Ramp Remote/Event Init Val Final Val C80!, 23ASD 2A Vital Bus Feeder-OPEN 30 sec NA ET-I Off On C804, 24ASD 2A Vital Bus Feeder-OPEN 30 sec NA ET-I Off On
- 1.
None Page 7 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:
- State shift job assignments
- Conduct a shift briefing detailing instructions to the shift. Provide CREW members with a copy of the shift turnover sheet.
- Inform the CREW: "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walk-downs at this time. CRS please inform me when your CREW is prepared to assume the watch."
- Allow sufficient time for panel walk-down. When informed by the CRS the CREW is prepared to assume the watch, ensure the simulator is cleared of all unauthorized personnel.
Page 8 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
I TQ-AA-106-0204 Revision 2 IEvaluatorlInstructor Activity I Expected Plant/Candidate Response IComments
- 1. Channel II (N42) Power Range NI N42 fails High Simulator Operator: Insert RT-1 at Lead Evaluators direction.
Malf: NI0193B, PR CH N42 fails HIILOW Final Value: 120 Note: AB.ROD-3 steps start here Note: Outward rod motion is blocked by the Overpower Rod Block.
Note: AB.NIS-I steps start here.
- RO announces unexpected inward rod movement at 72 spm, verifies no load reject in progress, and with CRS concurrence places rod control in Manual.
- CRS enters S2.0P-AB.NIS-OOOI Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction based on identification of failed NIS channel, OR S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion.
- CRS verifies Rod Control in manual and rod motion stopped.
- RO announces OHA E-28 PZR HTR ON PRESS LO as expected ifinward rod motion causes pressure to lower sufficiently.
- CRS verifies rod motion was in the inward direction.
- RO verifies NIS channel N42 has failed high.
- CRS enters S2.0P-AB.NIS-I.
- CRS determines Rod Control in manual and rod motion stopped.
- CRS detennines no load change is in progress.
Page 9 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 IEvaluatorlInstructor Activity Expected Plant/Candidate Response IComments I
I
- RO reports Power Range Channel II N42 has failed high.
CRS directs PO to remove failed channel from service lAW S2.0P-SO.RPS-l.
- PO informs crew prior to taking any action that will cause alarm status change
- PO ensures 2NR45 pen 1 recorder is not selected to 2N42.
- CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 Actions 2 and 6.
- PO places Dett::ctor Current Comparator, Upper Section, switch in PRN42 and ensures the Channel Defeat light illuminates and OHA E-38 is clear.
- PO places Dett::ctor Current Comparator, Lower Section, switch in PRN42 position and verifies Channel Defeat light illuminates and OHA E-46 is clear
- PO places Power Mismatch Bypass switch in Bypass PRN42.
- PO places Rod Stop Bypass switch in Bypass PRN42 and ensures the overpower rod stop for channel II on 2RP4 is illuminated and OHA E-31 is clear.
- PO places Comparator Channel Defeat switch in N42 and ensures the Comparator Defeat lamp illuminates and OHA E-39 is clear.
- PO reports to CRS that SO.RPS-OOI is complete with the exception of actions required to be taken by I&C technician to trip the associated bistables.
Page 10 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
I I EvaluatorlInstl'uctor ActivitY Note: CRS may elect to leave rods in manual due to step 3.6 of AB.NIS not being complete until I&C trips bistables. Continue to next event ifthis is the case.
Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
.;Vhen~ods ha~~been#~stor¢dto.
ARO or on qil:~ction/from
- Eva1uatoI':::'~*:
MA:LF:S~0095B,~i2 SG.Lvl Xmtt(529)CHI fails Final Value: 0 Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
I Expected Plant/Candidate Response
- CRS directs RO to withdraw control rods to restore Tavg to within +1-1.5 degrees of Tref.
- RO withdraws control bank D rods in a slow and deliberate manner, and places rod control in Auto when Tavg is within +1-1.5 degrees ofTref.
- PO reports 22 SG NR level channell has failed low.
- Crew refers to ARP and determines ADFWCS Median Signal Select automatically removes the failed channel from any control function based on comparison with remaining two channels.
- PO verifies SG level being controlled.
- CRS contacts Maintenance Controls to remove inoperable channel from service.
- CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 Action 6, and 3.3.2.1 Action 19, both ofwhich are 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to restore channel or place in tripped condition.
TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I Comments Page 11 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specifie Permission from Nuclear Training
I TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2
- EvaluatorlInstructor Activity I Expected Plant/CandidateResponse
[ Comments
- 3. SGFP oil lea kipower reduction
. Simulator Operator: On direction from the. Lead Evaluator, call the control room as* Secondary NEO and reportthat the oilleakon 21 SGFP governor appears to have gotten worse, it is"n9w 1 drop per second. The Maintenance SupervisOrat.tlle SGFF recommends f(!moving the SGFP from service within the next 30 minutes. Inform the control room that you can still easily refill the reservoir when needed to maintain reservoir levelwith'the oil that is sta ed at the feed urn.
Note: IF the CRS decides to trip 21 SGFP instead ofreducing power, and allowing the automatic Main Turbine runback to occur, THEN the following steps of S2.0P-AB.CN-OOOl, Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality will be performed.
Otherwise go to steps for the power reduction on next page.
- CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CN-OOOl.
PO trips 21 SGFP, and verifies Main Turbine automatic runback is initiated.
- RO either verifies control rods automatically inserting or inserts control rods in manual to control Tavg.
Page 12 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
I TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I EvaluatorlInstructor Activity
.. Expected Plant/Candidate Response
! Comments Note: Section 5.7 ofS2.0P SO.CN-2, Steam Generator Feed Pump Operation, is used for removing a SGFP from service at power, and requires total Feed Flow to be less than 9.0 E4 lbmlhr.
Note: 100% power feed flow is
-15 E6 lbmlhr. A power reduction to - 60% will be required.
- RO initiates a boration to maintain control rods above the RIL and restore AFD.
- PO ensures open 21-23CNI08's, polisher Bypass Valves.
- PO ensures 2CN47, 23/24/25 Heater Strings Bypass valve is open, and closes 21-24GB4 and 21-24GB185s.
- PO verifies AFP Auto Armed bezel illuminated for 21 SGFP.
- PO monitors SO NR level to ensure it is trending to program.
- RO maintains Tavg on program with boration and rod control.
- RO energizes PZR heaters.
- CRS enters S2.0P-AB.LOAD-l, Rapid Load Reduction to perform the power reduction.
- CRS directs RO and PO to perfonn a load reduction at less than 5% per minute to reduce total feedwater flow to::: 9.0 E6 lbmlhr.
Page 13 of31 (ARCN steps cont)
(EndARCN steps)
(Power reduction steps start here)
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I EvaluatorlInstructor Activity
. Expected Plant/Candidate Response I Comments
- RO energizes all PZR heaters.
- PO initiates turbine load reduction at rate directed by CRS
- RO either ensures automatic rod control is maintaining ReS Tavg on program, or inserts rods in manual.
Continue to next event on direction of Lead Evaluator after sufficient power reduction observation has been perDmned.
Page 14 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 IEvaluatorlInstructor Activity Expected Plant/Candidate Response I Comments
. *'1 1
- 4. SGTR Simul~!()r Operator:.!ns~RT-3
MALF: SG0078D, 24 SGTR Final Value: 900 Ramp: 10 minutes (Note: This equals a 650 gpmtube rupture at 2235 psigl{CS pressure.)
- CREW reports 2R53B, 22 SG N16 Main Steamline radiation monitor in alarm, followed by 2R15, Condenser Air Ejector radiation monitor.
- CRS enters SVJP-AB.SG-l, Steam Generator Tube Leak.
- CRS directs the load reduction be placed on hold.
- RO reports charging flow is rising, and PZR level is lowering.
Note: The decision on when to trip RO transfers to a centrifugal charging the Rx will determine how much pump by:
of this step is actually performed.
- Ensuring Master Flow Control in Auto
- Closing 2CV55 Starting 21 or 22 CVCS pp
- Adjusting 2CV55 while lowering 23 CVCS pp speed to minimum Stopping 23 CVCS pp
- Adjusting 2CV55 to control PZR lvl
- Placing 2CV55 in auto when required Page 15 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
. Evaluatorllnstructor Activity 1I0s:
C801, 23ASJ) 2A.Vital Bus Feeder-OPEN""
C801 24C§g,:~AVital Bus Feeder.;OPE!N Malf: I:L0140, 2H 4kVGroup B~~~e:energized."\\;~:5 FinalValU~;;;::iTtiii~ ",.
])ela '
Note: The STA will arrive in the control room 10 minutes after the Rx trip announcement is made.
IExpected Plant/Candidate Response TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I Comments When the crew determines that the leak is greater than the capacity ofthe CVCS makeup system, the CRS will direct the RO to manually trip the Reactor and initiate Safety Injection lAW CAS ofAB.SG-I.
RO manually trips Reactor, confirms Reactor Trip, and manually initiates Safety Injection.
- Verifies reactor trip
- Verifies reactor trip confirmation.
- Trips Turbine.
- Verifies one 4kV Vital Bus energized
- Verifies SI initiation
- PO requests permission to throttle AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lbmlhr.
Page 16001 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 IEvaluatorlInstructor Activity Expected Plant/Candidate Response IComments I
I CT#l (FSAR)(E-3-B) Isolate AFW to the ruptured SG within 10 minutes of entry into TRlP-l and subsequently close 22MS167, 22MS18, 22MS7 and 22GB4 in SGTR-l.
- 5. 21 AFW pp fails to start on SEC actuation.
- PO reports 23 AFW pump trip.
- CRS orders 22AF 11 and 22AF21 closed.
- PO closes 22AF 11 and 22AF21.
- PO verifies 21 & 22 AFW Pumps running.
- CREW verifies safeguards equipment alignment.
- RO ensures 21 and 22 CA330's are shut.
- RO reports containment pressure has remained < 15 psig.
- PO reports no indication ofhigh steam flow requiring MSLI.
Page 17 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
I TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I EvaluatorlInstructor Activity I* Expected Plant/Candidate Response I Comments Note: ECG call here would be Alert under 3.2.3.a
- PO verifies all Vital Buses are energized.
- RO verifies control room ventilation in accident-pressurized mode, and ensures 2 switchgear room supply fans and one switchgear room exhaust fan are in service.
- CRS dispatches operator to shut 2CC37 and 2CC48.
- PO reports total AFW flow is >22E4 Ibmlhr OR one SG is >9% NR level, then maintains intact SG NR levels 9-33%.
- RO verifies reactor trip breakers open.
- RO verifies PZR Spray Valves closed and informs crew 21 RCP is tripped due to loss ofH 4KV Group Bus.
Page 180f31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
i TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2
!EvaluatorlInstructor Activity I Expected Plant/Candidate Response IComments Note: The ST A will arrive in the control room 10 minutes after the Rx trip announcement is made See Critical Task #1 to document completion.
- RO reports ReS pressure> 1350 psig.
- PO reports no SO pressure is dropping or completely depressurized.
- CREW initiates monitoring ofCFSTs.
- PO sets 22MS 1 0 to 1045 psig, and reports when it opens automatically as the SO pressunzes.
- PO shuts 22MS167, and verifies 22MS18, 22MS7, and 22GB4 are shut
- CRS verifies 22MS167, 22MS18, and 22MS7 are shut.
- PO reports 22 SO is ruptured.
- CRS dispatches operator to shut ruptured so sample valve 2SS327.
- PO reports when 22MS 1 0 opens.
Page 190f31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I Evaluator/lnstruct()! A:::::..=.ct=.iv.:..::i:.::,tYL**__.-...J1-'E=xpo;:..*e:..;:c;..;;;.te;;;...:d=-=..P=la:.::n:.::t/,-,C:..;:a:.::n::.=d=.id=:a=-:t:.=-e-=R:::..:e;..;;;.sPL0:::..:n=:s:....:e__
I Comments I
- RO reports power is available to both PZR PORV stop valves, both PORVs are shut, and both PZR PORV stop valves are open.
- PO reports no SO pressures are dropping uncontrollably or completely depressurized.
Note: 21 SO NR level will be PO maintains intact SO levels 9 to 33%
higher, and will steam less than 23 NR.
and 24 SOs due to no RCP running in 21 loop.
- RO verifies Phase B isolation reset.
- RO opens 21 and 22 CA330.
- PO resets Band C SECs and resets 230V Control Centers.
- PO verifies ruptured SO is identified, isolated, and >375 psig.
- CRS sends an operator to swap gland sealing steam to alternate source.
- PO reports 21, 23, and 24 SOs are available for cooldown.
- PO reports Main Steam Dumps are availablc.
Page 20 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
I TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 IEvaluatorlInstnictor Activity I Expected Plant/Candidate Response
.. t Comments CT#2. ~~J3i\\0~5Establisl{3nd Inaintafu' ~Ji'i{'
Illperat>>re that transition SGTR does Note: PO will be steaming 23 and 24 SOs due to 22 SO being isolated and 21 loop having an idle RCP. AFW flow should be raised to these 2 SOs.
Note: 23 RCP is running. IF crew decides normal spray is not available due to 21 RCP not running, then go to next page for PORV failure actions.
- 6. 23 Rep Trip
§iJnulatOrOper~~()r:fus.~
c:~erRD.~ep9rts rJf~sslJn~ls
- 19W~1J
- g.::
MALF~;ii~2RC
~Iec,ttrjp F'InalValue: True
.~....
- PO initiates cooldown to target temperature by:
Placing stm dumps in manual.
Adjusting valve demand to O.
Depressing MS Pressure Control.
- Adjusting valve demand to 25%.
Depressing Bypass Tavg at 543 deg.
- PO stops cooldown and maintains temperature <503 degrees by placing steam dumps in auto and verifYing they operate to maintain temp < 503 deg.
- PO reports 22 SO pressure is stable or nsmg.
- RO reports sub cooling >20 deg.
- RO reports normal PZR spray is available.
- Crew reviews depress termination criteria.
- RO fully opens both PZR spray valves.
....~A._........
RO reports spray is lowering pressure.
- CRS returns to step 17.2 and answers no, Page 21 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 IEvaluatorlInstructor Activity Expected Plant/Candidate Response IComments I
I Simulator Operator: Insert RT-7 OR RT -8 as applicable to fail open the PORV which the RO opens.
RT-7 MALF: VL0297,2PRI fails 100% open RT -8 MALF:VL0298 2PR2 fails 100% open
- 7. PZR PORV fails open CT#3 (E-O-M)
Close the block valve upstream of the stuck-open PORV by completion of step 23 ofSGTR-l.
SATUNSAT PZR Spray is not reducing RCS pressure.
- RO shuts both spray valves.
- Crew reviews depress termination criteria.
11 %) RO attempts to shut PORV opened for depressurization, and reports valve will not shut.
- RO shuts block valve associated with stuck open PORV to isolate PORV, and reports RCS pressure is rising.
- PO reports >22E41bmlhr AFW flow capability.
- RO reports PZR level is > 11 %.
- RO stops both 81 pumps.
Page 22 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
I TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2
. Evaluatorflnstructor Acti"i1:y I Expected Plant/Candidate Response IComments
~~~~~--~==~~~~~~------
CT#4 (E-3~D) A.}1'ermjnaf~,:~t..,
fl~~(~~~~lJt 1 char~,g PU;wlt*~.r;i~
a~~.~~~e~Ipumps secure~*and.. '
BIT isolated) within.;;O minutes ofSGTR initiatlon,cand B.) Control RCS pressure and makeup flow bymaintainfug.
PZR level?,2;;.~.. prior to end..9L m; ~;~;:!;":u///r/~://:/: /,(":,;<<::;,,',
". :':~~;(:::;~<::?£f::t~~
scenano..* *.* /;~
vi)
A.)Time 2SJ4, 2SJ5,..........'......_
2SJ13.shut:
";':::'~~~.:
- ~,~\\\\\\,\\
--'t'\\~;..",,-
SAT_',..--_
/
/-/. ""
/ -,,
- "'::7:'>' :~~*rl_~<:*.
-:~~,,;/ // '<"!'>
,~):!~RJ.feveIC()ntto~,
SAT"""* "
UNSAT T errninate Scenario after evaluation ofCT#4 is complete.
- RO stops all but one charging pumps.
- RO opens 2CV139 and 2CV140.
- RO closes 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJl2, and 2SJl3 BIT isolation valves.
- RO closes 2CV55 charging flow control valve.
- RO opens 2CV68 and 2CV69 charging discharge valves.
- RO adjusts 2CV55 to maintain PZR level>
25%.
Page 23 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 VI.
Scenario
References:
A.
Emergency Plan (ECG)
B.
Technical Specifications C.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
D.
Salem UFSAR E.
S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operations F.
S2.0P-SO.RPS-OOOl, Nuclear Instrumentation Channel TriplRestoration G.
S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion H.
S2.0P-AB.NIS-OOOl, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction L
S2.0P-SO.CN-0002, Steam Generator Feed Pump Operation J.
S2.0P-AB.CN-OOOI, Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality K.
S2.0P-AB.LOAD-OOOl, Rapid Load Reduction L.
2-EOP-TRIP-l, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection M.
2-EOP-SGTR-l, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Page 24 of31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l ATTACHMENT 1 PLANT STATUS UNIT TWO TODAY MODE:
1 POWER:
100%
RCS BORON 24 MWe 1230 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): N/ A MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:
3.8.1.1. Action a - 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> from now REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core burnup 12,000 EFPH EVOLUTIONSIPROCEDURES/SURVEILLANC ES IN PROGRESS:
Restore 2B EDG to service later this shift.
ABNOAAIAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek are at 100% power.
No penalty minutes in last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
PRIMARY:
2B EDG CIT for governor repair.
SECONDARY:
21 SGFP has a governor oil leak ~ 1 drop evelY 5 seconds. Secondary NEO is monitoring lXlhr, and refilling reservoir as needed. Oil 1eak is scheduled to be repaired during refueling outage which starts in 3 days. Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1.
U3 is available.
Condensate Polishing is in service-full flow.
RADW ASTE: None CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE 'VATER: None Page 25 of 31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 2 SThIULATOR READY -FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST
- 1.
Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
- 2.
Simulator is in RUN
- 3.
Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4.
All required computer terminals in operation
- 5.
Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6.
All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7.
TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8.
Shift manning sheet available
- 9.
Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10.
All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11.
Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12.
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13.
Required procedures clean
- 14.
Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15.
Required keys available
- 16.
Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17.
All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18.
Rod step counters correct ( channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19.
Exam security set for simulator
- 20.
Ensure a current ReS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
- 21.
Shift logs available ifrequired
- 22.
Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 24.
Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25.
Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
Page 26 of 31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission ofthis task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability ofthe plant.
The examination team determines ifan automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. Ifincorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
L Examples ofCTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation ofthe facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples ofeTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
Page 27 of 31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 4 SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.
SCENARIO IDENTIFIER:
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l REVIEWER: P. \\Villiams Qualitative Attributes PBW
- 1.
The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.
PBW
- 2.
The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out ofservice, but it does not cue crew into expected events.
PBW
- 3.
The scenario consists mostly ofrelated events.
PBW
- 4.
Each event description consists of-the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position) the event termination point PBW
- 5.
No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
PBW 6.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
PBW
- 7.
Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
PBW 8.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
PBW
- 9.
All crew competencies can be evaluated.
PBW
- 10.
The scenario has been validated.
PBW
- 11.
ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
Page 28 of 31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l ATTACHMENT 4 (Cont)
SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note:
The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature This page should be completed for each scenario. The ranges listed for each scenario represents a target and are not absolute limitations.
Scenarios that do not fit into the ranges listed should be further evaluated to ensure they are appropriate.
Initials Qualitative Attributes GSG 8
Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GSG 3
Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1 GSG 2
Abnormal Events: 2-3 GSG 1
Major Transients: 1-2 GSG 2
EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GSG 0
EOP Contingency Procedures requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GSG 4
Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS:
Malfunctions after EOP entry is 3, and add to the scenario being an effective evaluation tooL The 4 critical tasks are all associated with the natural progression ofa SGTR and allow effective evaluation ofthe entire SGTR event to its conclusion.
Page 29 of 31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 5 ESG CRITICAL TASKS 08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 CT #1 (FSAR) Isolate AFW to the ruptured SG within 10 minutes ofentry into TRIP-I, and (E-3-B) subsequently close 22MS167, 22MS18, 22MS7 and 22GB4 in SGTR-l.
BASIS:
Salem FSAR Accident Analysis for SGTR, Section 15.4.4.2, Analysis, page 15.4-53, states that the evaluation (Reference 72) with respect to operator action time for a faulted SG is applied to the SGTR action time. FSAR Accident Analysis for SG faults assumes operator action will be taken within 10 minutes of AFW initiation to isolate AFW flow to the faulted SG (15.4.8.2.2, page 15-4.109).
CT #2 (E-3-B) Establish and maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from SGTR-l does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling or too low such that a challenge to Thermal Shock (FRTS)or Subcriticality FRSM) CFSTs.
BASIS: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from SGTR -1 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy.
CT#3 (E-O-M) Close the block valve upstream of the stuck-open PORV by completion of step 23 of SGTR-l.
BASIS:
Failure to close the block valve under the postulated plant conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew perfOlmance which leads to degradation ofany barrier to fission product release.
CT#4 (E-3-D) Terminate SI flow (all but 1 charging pump and both SI pumps secured and BIT isolated) within 50 minutes of SGTR initiation, and control RCS pressure and makeup flow by maintaining PZR level >25% prior to end ofscenario.
BASIS:
Failure to terminate SI flow and control RCS pressure and makeup flow during a SGTR (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation strategy. It also constitutes a "significant reduction ofsafety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Page 30 of 31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l 08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN EVENT N
TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable Y
Steam Generator Tube Rupture N
Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N
LOCA YIN EVENT N
Loss of Service Water N
LossofCCW N
Loss of Control Air N
Station Black Out COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
Gas Turbine N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area Y
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg Y
Auxiliary Feed Pump CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation N
Valves N
SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OPERATOR ACTION N
Connect to gas turbine N
Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss ofcomponent cooling system N
Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N
Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N
Isolate the cves letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Y
Cooldown the Res and depressurize the system Y
Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N
Early depressurize RCS N
Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation fonn for each ESG.
Page 31 of 31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE:
Multiple faulted SGs wi Cont Spray failure SCENARIO NUMBER:
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 REVISION NUMBER:
o EFFECTIVE DATE:
Effective on final approval date below EXPECTED DURATION:
60 minutes PROGRAM:
L--_---I L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE
'----'---I STA OTHER New issue for 08-01 NRC Retake exam PREPARED BY:
07128/2010 uthor Date APPROVED BY:
Salem Operations Training
~/23bD f
Date APPROVED BY: L./f?£7 £. Po'dLoUL FacIlity Representative Date Page 1 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Permission frum Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ENABLING OBJECTIVES A.
Given the unit at 70% reaetor power, the crew will perform a power increase to 90% at 1O%1hr, lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004(Q).
B.
Given the order or indications ofa charging system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction ofthe charging system in accordance with the approved station procedures.
C.
Given indication of a loss or malfunction ofthe Charging system DIRECT corrective action for a Charging System malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
D.
Given the indication of excessive steam flow, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the indication ofexcessive steam flow, DIRECT the response to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures.
F.
Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
G.
Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
H.
Given the order or indications of a safety injection, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.
I.
Given indication ofa safety injection, DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.
J.
Given the order or indications ofa multiple steam generator depressurization, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the generator depressurization in accordance with the approved station procedures.
K.
Given the order or indications ofexcessive containment pressure, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures.
L.
Given indication of excessive containment pressure, DIRECT the response to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Page 2 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 A. Power Ascension B. CCW pump trip C. Controlling PZR Level Channel Fails Hi D. Steam Leak on 23 SO E. Multiple Faulted SGs and FRCE A. The crew will receive the unit at 70% power EOL with all systems in automatic. 21 CFCU will be CIT. The crew will be provided instruction to perform a power increase to 90% power at 10% per hour.
B. 22 CCW pump will trip. 23 CCW pump will auto start and restore system header pressure. The CRS will enter TSAS 3.7.3 for 2 operable CCW loops.
C. The controlling PZR level channel will fail high. Charging flow will lower. The crew will establish manual control of PZR level to prevent flashing in the letdown line and remove the failed channel from service.
D. While continuing the power ascension, a small steam leak will develop on 23 SO. The crew will enter AB.STM-OOOI and determine a unit shutdown is required.
E. Once the crew has determined a shutdown is required the steam leak will worsen. The crew will trip the reactor, initiate a MSLI, and initiate a safety irUection. All MSIVs will fail to shut, and remain full open.
F. While in TRIP-l the crew will observe that Phase B/Spray Actuation has failed and manually initiate. Once the crew has transitioned to LOSC-1 the STA will inform the crew that a Purple Path for FRCE-l is present. While in FRCE-l the crew will throttle AFW to each SO to lE41bmlhr.
G. The scenario will end when transition out of LOSC-2 has occurred.
Page 3 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 IC-259 on 2010 Exam Thumb Drive
//(
F9R.~TRAINING (i.e. computer setpoints, pt:~~~~;i\\i~ieIcq~ersl" RH 1 and RH2 CIT 21 & 22RHI8s CIT VCI &4C/T RCPs (SELF CHECK)
RTBs (SELF CHECK)
MS 167s (SELF CHECK) 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)
SGFP (SELF CHECK) 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK) 21 CFCU CIT Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-TraininglExamination Checklist."
Page 4 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 EVENT TRIGGERS:
Initial ET# I Description I
- 1.
None "C C";'
'_fUNCP;~~%~~~X:,;" ""","
Initial I Description Delay Ramp VL0420 21MS167 Fail to position NA NA None 95.1 95.1 I.
(0-100%)
VL0421 22MS167 Fail to position NA NA None 95.1 95.1
- 2.
(0-100%)
VL0422 23MS167 Fail to position
- 3.
NA NA None 95.1 95.1 (0-100%)
VL0423 24MS 167 Fail to position
- 4.
NA NA None 95.1 95.1 (0-100%)
RP0276A Auto Phase B Fails to
- 5.
NA NA None True True act Tm A RP0276B Auto Phase B Fails to
- 6.
NA NA None True True actTmB RP0277A Auto Cnt Spry Fails to
- 7.
NA NA None True True act TmA RP0277B Auto Cnt Spry Fails to
- 8.
NA NA None True True act TmB MS0088Cr 23 Main Stm Line
- 9.
NA 5 min RT-2 0
1.5 Leak Inside Cnt MS0090Cr 23 Main Stm Line
- 10.
NA NA RT-3 0
80 Leak PR0017A PZR level CH 1 NA NA RT-6 NA 100 II.
(LT459) fails HI CCOl72B 22 CCW pump trip NA NA RT-1 False True
- 12.
RP0058 Failure of Automatic Rx NA NA None True True
- 13.
trip RP0059A Failure of Manual Rx NA NA None True True
- 14.
trip Page 5 0:f26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Trammg
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
CT191-1D 21CFCU Bkr #1 Low Speed 125VDC CT191-2D 21CFCU Bkr#2 HighSpeed 125VDC CT191-3D 21 CFCU Bkr #3 High Speed 125VDC CT201D 21 CFCU Rack Out NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA None None None None off off off tagged off off off tagge d
- 1.
None Ensure PZR Level Channel I is the level channel Page 6 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2
- State shift job assignments
- Conduct a shift briefing detailing instructions to the shift. Provide CREW members with a copy of the shift turnover sheet.
- Inform the CREW: "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walk-downs at this time.
CRS please inform me when your CREW is prepared to assume the watch."
- Allow sufficient time for panel walk-down. When informed by the CRS the CREW is prepared to assume the watch, ensure the simulator is cleared ofall unauthorized personnel.
Page 7 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity
- 1. Power Ascension Reactivitypl~ pet~he turnof~r
.sheet"*..
Note: Rod Control may remain in Auto or placed in manual with CRS approval lAW IOP-4, P&L 3.6 Note: The Main Turbine is initially set up for 15 % per minute, the PO must change the ramp rate to 10% per hour.
Note: The RO should maintain a log of dilutions to ensure reactivity additions are tracked.
Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
Expected Plant/Student Response
- CRS briefs crew on evolution
- CRS implements S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004.
- CRS directs PO to commence Turbine load increase at 10%lhour.
- RO initiates a dilution per the reactivity plan provided.
- PO monitors DEHC for proper response ofload increase.
- RO monitors Tavg and Delta T and MWe for expected indications ofload increase.
- IF control rods are placed in manual per CRS direction, THEN RO will slowly and deliberately withdraw control rods to maintain Tavg on program.
- IF control rods remain in auto, RO announces when rod motion starts and stops.
Comments Page 8 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Sp{)cific Pcnnission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity
- 2. 22 CCW pump trip
.~;.ll;!lIlflt(}rT.~~~~~~?r:IdsertRT-1 at Dead Evaluat<>rOirection.
"'C, MALF:(]CQll2B22CCW p trip...............*..*.,>,2.,;.,.....,
Final VaIue:*TriIe*********.
Note: The Thennal Barrier Discharge Flow Lo alann will come in immediately, and stay locked in the longest. During scenario development and validation, OHAs D20-23 RCP BRG CLG WTR FLO LO alanned on one occasion, but immediately cleared.
The standby CCW pump auto start restores header pressure and all alanns will clear.
Note: RO should remain focused on the reactor while positive reactivity is being added.
Note: CRS may order the power ascension placed on hold, but it is not required.
CRS may refer to AB.CC-l, but its actions regarding low header pressure only start the standby pump to restore pressure, which has already automatically occurred.
Proceed to next event after TS is identified on direction from Lead Evaluator.
Expected Plant/Student Response RO/PO announces unexpected CCI bezel alarms:
- DISCHARGE FLOW LO (Thennal barrier return flow)
- Using ARP for DISCHARGE FLOW LO, PO reports seal injection to all RCPs is 6-] 2 gpm with total seal injection flow <40 gpm.
- PO reports DISCHARGE F£OW LO is cleared.
Page 9 of26 Comments PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- 3. PZR Level Controlling Channel (LT459) Fails Hi
~~~l1lIlator Opera~9r:~sert'RT-6 RO announces the following alarms as Lead Evaluator direction.
unexpected:
- OHA E-20, PZR HTR ON L VL HI, L><
>Y"~i~$~'""
",:c;'
- ~ALF::rR0017A.~ZRLevel*CH
- OHA E-4 PZR L VL HI
~
(i,;r4~~) Fails Higlj.
- All RCP Seal Water Flow Lo alarms FinaIValue:.lOO
- RO reports PZR B/U heaters in Auto have turned on, and charging flow is lowering to ~45 gpm, and diagnoses failure ofPZR controlling level channel.
- RO may place Master Flow Controller in manual with CRS concurrence and raise charging flow to prevent flashing in the letdown line prior to AB entry.
- CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CVC-OOOl, Loss of Charging.
Note: Note: CRS may order the power CRS directs RO/PO to place the load ascension placed on hold, but it is not ascension on hold. (ifdirected) required. Next 3 steps are here ifload is stabilized.
- PO places the Main Turbine on HOLD (ifdirected}
- RO secures any dilution in progress. (if directed)
- RO initiates RCS dilution IA W reactivity plan every 15 minutes IF power ascension remains in progress.
- RO reports 23 charging pump is runnmg.
Page 10 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Note: RCP seal injection flow will rise as charging flow is increased, and CV71 may have to be adjusted to maintain less than 40 gpm total seal injection flow.
Lead Evaluator may direct continuation to next event once Tech Specs are identified by CRS.
Continue to next event on direction of Lead Evaluator Note: CRS may not elect to start Expected Plant/Student Response
- RO reports there is no indication of cavitation.
- RO reports PZR Level Channel 1 has failed hi.
- RO takes manual control ofcharging flow if not previously done, and raises charging flow to restore PZR level to program lAW Att. 2.
- RO announces RCP seal injection 10 flow alarms have cleared as expected when charging flow is raised.
- RO selects channel III for control.
- RO restores one group ofPZR B/U heaters to OFF and AUTO.
- RO reports letdown remains in service.
- CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 action 6.
- PO verifies PZR Level channel III selected for control, Channel II selected for alarm, and ensures PZR level recorder to channel II or III.
- CRS directs RO/PO to recommence Page 11 of26 Comments PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity moving power until channel has been removed from service.
- 4. Steam Leak in Containment Sim.ulator (lperatQr;;
.L~dEvaliliitQr direction.
IN,;;, :'
.. Final Value:~,1.5
- Ramp: *5 min Notes:
- 1. CFCU leak detection alann will annunciate - 2 minutes 20 seconds after leak insertion.
- 2. Containment pressure will begin rising - 3 minutes and 10 seconds after leak insertion.
- 3. Containment pressure will be rising at - 1 psig every 6 minutes. (24 minutes until auto SVRx trip would occur at 4 psig in containment.)
SimqJato~Operaf§!tbil()~ a
,aud plan is4~~n,iiieA<bythe CRS, or GRSbriefsCAS RX'tnp actions the~.~ntetRT-:3 PRIOlf iIliti81i~g,f1:~x Expected Plant/Student Response power ascension. (ifplaced on hold)
- RO reports OHA C-38 CFCU LK DET HI, as unexpected.
- PO refers to ARP.
- RO reports CFCU leak detection HI HI, as unexpected.
- PO determines no rise in CNTMT radiation and that leak is inside containment based on rising containment pressure.
- CRS directs the load ascension placed on hold.
- 1. Monitors for reactor power rise
- 2. RCS cool down
- 3. Need to initiate MSLI
- PO verifies EHC system operating correctly, and MS lOs and Steam Dumps are closed.
- CRS determines a shutdown is required and plans rate and reactivity management OR Determines a Rx trip is required based on CAS.
Page 12 of26 Comments PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Spc:cific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- RO reports demand for a Rx trip and the Rx did ':'JOT trip, and informs CRSofATWT.
- RO attempts to trip the Rx using the Rx trip handles, and reports the Rx did not trip.
- RO trips the Rx by opening the Reactor Trip Breakers.
- RO reports the Rx trip is confirmed.
Note: 2 paths exist for attempting to CRS directs RO to initiate MSLI initiate a MSLI. AB.SG-I CAS lAW CAS ofAB.STM. (May be actions state to:
performed after Immediate Actions of
- Trip the Rx TRIP-l are performed.)
- Confirm the Rx trip.
- Initiate MSLI
- SI if MSLI is unsuccessful.
OR IfCRS enters TRIP-l due to automatic Rx trip demand, then MSLI actuation should be directed after the immediate actions are complete using the CAS of AB.SG-l.
- RO reports MSLI does not actuate. (if attempted prior to TRIP-l lA's.)
- RO initiates SI or backs up auto Sl (if performing CAS actions in ARSG) and continues or performs lAs of TRIP-l
- 1. Trips Turbine
- 2. VerifY Vital AC busses energized
- 3. VerifY SI actuated Page 13 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Note: With all SGs faulted, AFW flow should not be isolated to any SG.
Expected Plant/Student Response
- CRS/RO verify immediate actions of TRIP-l are complete by perfonning verification ofimmediate action steps.
- After lAs ofTRIP-l completed, CRS directs MSLI ifnot previously attempted.
- CREW monitor CAS items after completion ofimmediate actions
- RO reports SEC loading is not complete for B vital bus, but that all available equipment started.
- PO reports 21 and 22 AFW pumps are operating.
- RO reports 21 and 22CA330s are shut.
- RO reports containment pressure is
> 15 psig, and auto Containment Spray and Phase B isolation have NOT automatica1ly initiated.
Comments Page 14 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Spedfic Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Role Play: Respond as WCC Supervisor when contacted that you will assemble a team ofoperators and mechanics and attempt to shut the valves you were directed to shut.
If contacted later in scenario about status ofgetting MS l67s shut, state that the team has just been dispatched from the WCC.
If CRS dispatches an NEO directly to attempt closure of any MS167, state that you will swing by WCC to pick up a Safety Man.
Note: Correct ECG classification is an Alert under 5.I.2.A Note: ECG basis document specifically excludes Heat Sink Red Path due to operator action from being used in Table 3 determination ofECG calL Note: PO should have lowered AFW flow to as close to 22E4 lbmlhr as possible.
Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- PO reports a1l4KV vital busses are energized.
- RO reports CA V is in Accident Pressurized mode.
- RO reports correct switchgear room ventilation operation.
- PO reports AFW flow is >22E4 Ibmlhr.
Page 15 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Note: LOSC-l and LOSC-2 steps start on page 17 Note: The ST A will arrive in the control room 10 minutes after the Rx trip announcement is made. The ST A may be ready as soon as TRIP-l is exited to report CFST status, but could still be performing verification.
Transition should be made as soon as ST A reports CFST status.
FReE Steps start here Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- RO reports both reactor trip breakers are open.
- PO reports all SG pressures lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.
- CRS directs transition to LOSC-I.
- ST A initiates monitoring ofCFSTs and reports Red or Purple path on Containment environment.
- CRS transitions to FRCE-I.
- PO verifies Phase A isolation valve shut and 2VC5 and 2VC6 shut.
Page 16 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires SpecitIc Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- CRS transitions to procedure in effect (LOSC-I or 2)
- CRS transitions to FRHS-I, verifies it was operator action that lowered AFW flow less than 22E4 Ibmlhr, and returns to LOSC-I.
Lose steps start here
- RO reports MSLI has been initiated and all MS167s remain open.
- PO reports all SG are completely depressurized.
- CRS transitions to LOSC-2.
- PO ensures all valves in Table A are shut, and reports 2I-24MSI67 remain open.
- CRS dispatches operators to locally shut MS 167 s one loop at a time ifnot previously dispatched.
- CRS dispatches an operator to shut 21 and 23MS45s.
Page 17 of26 PSEG Confidcntial-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity m
~LOSC~2.~n~6I,t~nmeni'pi-e¥S;Ure is r reduced below 15';~~i."...... /".
Terminate the scenario when the transition to LOSC-1 has been performed.
Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
> lOO°Ihr.
- PO identifies 21MS167 has shut, and 21 SG pressure is rising.
Page 18 0:f26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 A. Alann Response Procedures (Various)
R Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG)
D. 2-EOP-TRIP-l, Rx Trip or Safety Injection E. 2-EOP-LOSC-l, Loss of Secondary Coolant F. 2-EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization G. 2-EOP-FRCE-l, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure H. S2.0P-AB.STM-000l, Excessive Steam Flow
- 1.
S2.0P-ARLOAD-000l, Rapid Load Reduction Page 19 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specitic Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 1 PLANT STATUS UNIT TWO TODAY MODE:
1 POWER:
70%
RCSBORON:
1285 ppm MWE700 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):
N/A MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:
21 CFCU CIT 3.6.2.3 6 days remaining service water valve work REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup is 2500 EFPH.
Power defect from 70%-100%= 484 pcm.
Control Bank D @ 133 steps Xenon burning out at 60 pcmJhr.
The Reactor fuel is conditioned to 100%.
Reactivity plan for power increase at 10% / hr is to dilute 150 gal every 10 minutes for a total of 1,800 gal over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, while withdrawing rods as needed to maintain Tave on program.
EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:
Power ascension to 90% power at 10%/hr. Power was reduced to repair 21 SGFP governor oil leak.
Repair ofthe governor is complete, and both SGFPs are in service. Initial steady state power prior to raising power was 60%, and had been there for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. Power is currently 70%, and load increase was placed on hold for shift turnover 5 minutes ago.
ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
CONTROL ROOM:
Hope Creek and Salem Unit 1 are at 100% power PRIMARY:
21 CFCU CIT SECONDARY:
23 Condensate Pump is O/S IA W IOP-4.
Condensate polishing is in service - full flow.
Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1.
RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress.
CIRCULATING \\VATERISERVICE WATER:
None Page 20 of26 PSEG ConfidentiaI-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY..FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST
.... {
- 1.
Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
- 2.
Simulator is in RUN
- 3.
Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4.
All required computer terminals in operation
- 5.
Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6.
All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7.
TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8.
Shift manning sheet available
- 9.
Procedures in progress open and signed-offto proper step
- 10.
All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced 11.
Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12.
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13.
Required procedures clean
- 14.
Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15.
Required keys available
- 16.
Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17.
All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18.
Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19.
Exam security set for simulator
- 20.
Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
- 21.
Shift logs available ifrequired
- 22.
Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23.
Ensure ECG classification is correct
- 24.
Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25.
Verify phones disconnected from plant afteT drill.
Page 21 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment ofthe examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability ofthe plant.
The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences ofan individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation ofa safety limit
- a violation ofthe facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples ofCTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation ofan ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
Page of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 4 SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.
SCENARIO IDENTIFIER:
08-01 NRC Retake Reviewer: P Williams ESG-2 Rev. 0 Qualitative Attributes PBW
- 1.
The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.
PBW 2.
The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.
PBW 3.
The scenario consists mostly ofrelated events.
PBW 4.
Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point PBW 5.
No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
PBW 6.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
PBW 7.
Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
PBW 8.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
PBW 9.
All crew competencies can be evaluated.
PBW
- 10.
The scenario has been validated.
PBW 11.
ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
Page 23 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specitic Permission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 4 (Cont)
SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note:
The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature This page should be completed for each scenario. The ranges listed for each scenario represents a target and are not absolute limitations. Scenarios that do not fit into the ranges listed should be further evaluated to ensure they are appropriate.
Initial Qualitative Attributes GSG 6
Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GSG Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GSG 2
Abnonnal Events: 2-3 GSG Major Transients: 1-2 GSG 1
EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GSG 2
EOP Contingency Procedures requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GSG 3
Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS:
Page 24 of26 PSEG Confidcntial-Possession Requires Specific Pcnnission from Nuclear Training
08-01 ~RC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 5 ESG CRITICAL TASKS 08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Rev. 0 CT#l (E-O-A) Manually trip the Rx from the control room prior to entering FRSM-I.
Basis Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreperably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an "incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensatory action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability by the crew to recognize a failure ofthe automatic actuation of the RPS.
CT#2 (E-O-E) Manually initiate Phase B and Spray Actuation before an extreme challenge (Red Path) develops to the Containment CSF or prior to exiting TRIP-I. (prior to transitioning from step 11 in 2-EOP-TRIP-I)
Basis Failure to actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions constitutes a "demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an EFS system or component." In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls that would lead to violation of the facility license condition. "
CT#3 (Basis Doc) Reduce AFW to no less than lE4lbmlhr per SG prior to exiting FRCE-I.
Basis Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable severe challenge to the integrity CSF. Also failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality and the containn1ent CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety" The standard which has been applied to this CT in this scenario encompasses the reason for minimizing AFW flow to lE4lbmlhr in FRCE with multiple faulted SGs. The reason this is done is to prevent thermal shock conditions to SG components if the SG was allowed to dry out, and then subsequently have AFW flow reinitiated. This meets the definition given on Attachment 2 ofExamples ofCTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
degradation of any barrier to fission product release.
Not maintaining verifiable minimum AFW flow (1 E4th) when it is possible to do so could result in a SGTR when cold feedwater is subsequently reinitiated.
Note: This action is also performed in LOSC-2, and should be evaluated as SAT if performed in LOSC-2.
Page 25 of26 PSEG Confidential-Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training
08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FOR.J\\t1 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN EVENT N
TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N
Steam Generator Tube Rupture N
Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N
LOCA EVENT N
Loss of Service Water Y
Loss ofCCW N
Loss of Control Air N
Station Black Out COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YIN COMPONENT. SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N
CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N
Gas Turbine N
Any Diesel Generator N
Auxiliary Feed Pump N
SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OPERATOR ACTION N
Connect to gas turbine N
Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N
Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N
Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N
Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N
Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N
Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N
Early depressurize RCS N
Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG Page 26 of26 PSEG Contidential-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training