ML102810337

Retake - Final Operating Exam (Section C Only) Folder 3)

ML102810337
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/26/2010
From:	Gauding G Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	David Silk Operations Branch I
Hansell S
Shared Package
ML102080004	List: IR 05000272/2010302 ML102630142 ML102810251 ML102810337 ML102810346 ML102810407 ML102810426 ML103370018
References
TAC U01835
Download: ML102810337 (56)

Text

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: SGTR w/complications during depressurization SCENARIO NUMBER: 08-01 NRC Retake ESG-l (0913)

REVISION NUMBER: 1 EFFECTIVE DATE: Effective on final approval date below EXPECTED DURATION: 80 minutes PROGRAM: ~=---'

L.O.REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE STA L...:..c;.,-,--,-,-, OTHER REVISION

SUMMARY

New issue for 2009 A.llnual Exam Rev. 1 7-27 Swapped Tavg channel failure to PRN1 channel failure. Changed SGFP trip to SGFP malfunction which causes power reduction to be required. Removed 2R19D failure.

Added SG NR level channel failure for second Tech Spec call. Added 2A 4KV Vital bus loading on EDG after Rx trip, and 21 AF\V pp fails to start. Added AFW pump trips on start.

Extended scenario to S1 termination and added CT for 81 termination.

PREPARED BY: G 07-27-2010 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: YCCLuJdJ Salem Operations Traiuiug f/?3/IO Date APPROVED BY: $/.z~do

~7 Date PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l I. OBJECTIVES:

A. Given the unit at power with a failure of a power range nuclear instrument which causes continuous rod motion, take corrective action lAW AB.ROD-0003 B. Given the order or indications of a rod or rod control system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.

C. Given indication of a rod or rod control system malfunction, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.

D. Given the order to rapidly reduce load, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures Given indication or order to rapidly reduce load, DIRECT the response to the malfunction, in accordance with the approved station procedures.

F. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.

G. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.

H. Given the order or indications of a safety injection, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.

L Given indication of a safety injection, DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.

J. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube rupture in accordance with the approved station procedures.

K. Given indication of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), DIRECT the response to the SGTR in accordance with the approved station procedures.

Page 2 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l II. MAJOR EVENTS:

A. Channel II (N42) PRNI fails high.

B. 22 SG Channel I Level fails low.

C. 21 SGFP oil leak requiring power reduction.

D. 22 SG SGTR.

E. Loss ofRCS Spray capability while perfonning RCS pressure reduction.

F. PZR PORV sticks open during RCS depressurization.

Page 3 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l A. The crew will take turnover with the unit at 100% power, EOL, equilibrium conditions. 2B DO is CIT for governor repairs. 21 SOFP governor has a small oil leak that will be repaired when the unit enters its refueling outage in 3 days. Unit 1 and Hope Creek are at 100%

power. Unit 3 is available.

R Shortly after the crew takes the watch, Power Range Nuclear Instrument Channel II (N42) fails high resulting in inward rod motion and various alarms. The crew verifies no runback in progress, takes manual control of rods, implements S2.0P-ARROD-3, Continuous Rod Motion and S2.0P-ARNIS-l, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction, and removes the channel from service. The CRS will identifY the appropriate Tech Specs.

C. Once control room actions have been performed to remove PRNI Channel II from service, 22 SO NR Level Channell fails low. The crew will verify that ADFWCS has automatically removed the failed channel from control, and the CRS will identifY the appropriate Tech Specs.

D. A report from the field will come into the control room stating that the governor oil leak on 21 SOFP has gotten worse, and appears it will require shutdown to repair. The crew will initiate a power reduction in preparation for removing SOFP from service.

E. During the power reduction, a SOTR will ramp in over 10 minutes on 22 SO. The crew should identifY the loss ofRCS inventory and initiate a manual Reactor Trip and S1.

F. After the reactor trips, 2H 4KV group bus will de-energize (causes a loss of21 RCP).

2A 4KV vital bus will also de-energize, and be re-energized from 2A EDO automatically when 2A SEC loads the bus in Mode 1. 21 AFW pump will not start and must be manually started. 23 AFW pump trips during its start.

O. The crew will cooldown to target temperature in SOTR-I. When performing the RCS depressurization with normal spray, 23 RCP will trip, resulting in no spray flow. The crew will then use a PZR PORV to depressurize. The PORV will stick open when the depressurization is attempted to be terminated, and the crew will isolate the PORV with its block valve.

H. The scenario may be terminated once the depressurization is terminated by closing the stuck open PZR PORV block valve.

Page 4 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l IV. INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Initialize simulator to IC-258, lOO%, EOL, CB 24 ppm RH land RH2 CIT 21122 RH18 CIT 2VCl & 2VC4 CIT RCPs (SELF CHECK)

RTBs (SELF CHECK)

MSl67s (SELF CHECK) 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)

SGFPs (SELF CHECK) 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK) 2B DG(C/T)

Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-TraininglExamination Checklist."

Page 5 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 MONP254<10 Control Bank C position < 10 steps withdrawn

1. NI0193B, PR CH N42 fails HI/LOW NA NA RT-l N/A 200 SG0095B, 22 SG LvI Xmtr (529) CH I

2. fails NA NA RT-2 44 0

3. SGO078B, 22 SG Tube Rupture NA 10 min RT-3 0 900 RP318El, Aux Feed Pump 21 Fails to

4. start on SEC NA NA NA True True

5. RC0003C, 23 RCP electrically trip NA NA RT-5 False True

6. VL0297, 2PRl fails to position (0-100%) NA NA RT-7 0 100

7. VI,0298, 2PR2 fails to position (0-100%) NA NA RT-8 0 100

8. EL0140, 2H 4kV Group Bus de-energized 30 sec NA ET-l False True

9. AF0183, 23 AFW pump overspeed trip 60 sec NA ET-l False True

1. DG19D, 2B DG Locked Out N/A NA NA Yes Yes

2. DG20D, 2B DG Brkr Control Pwr N/A NA NA Off Off

3. DG2ID, 2B DG Brkr Racked Out N/A NA NA Tagged Tagged Page 6 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l Initial Description Delay Ramp Remote/Event Init Val Final Val C80l, 23ASD 2A Vital Bus Feeder-OPEN 30 sec NA ET-l Off On C804, 24ASD 2A Vital Bus Feeder-OPEN 30 sec "I A ET-l Off On

1. None Page 7 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

• State shift job assignments

• Conduct a shift briefing detailing instructions to the shift. Provide CREW members with a copy of the shift turnover sheet.

• Inform the CREW: "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walk-downs at this time. CRS please inform me when your CREW is prepared to assume the watch."

• Allow sufficient time for panel walk-down. When informed by the CRS the CREW is prepared to assume the watch, ensure the simulator is cleared of all unauthorized personnel.

Page 8 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 1 EvaluatorlInstriIctor Activity I ExpectedPlantiCandidate Response* I* Comments I

1. Channel II (N42) Power Range NI N42 fails High Simulator Operator: Insert RT-1

• RO announces unexpected inward rod at Lead Evaluators direction. movement at 72 spm, verifies no load reject in progress, and with CRS Malf: NIOI93B,<PR CH N42 fails concurrence places rod control in ManuaL HIlLOW Final Value: 120

• CRS enters S2.0P-AB.NIS-OOOI Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction based on identification of failed NIS channel, OR S2.0P-ARROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion.

Note: AB.ROD-3 steps start here

• CRS verifies Rod Control in manual and rod motion stopped.

• RO announces OHA E-28 PZR HTR ON PRESS LO as expected if inward rod motion causes pressure to lower sufficiently.

Note: Outward rod motion is

• RO monitors and controls Tavg lAW blocked by the Overpower Rod Att. 1.

Block.

• CRS verifies rod motion was in the inward direction.

• RO verifies NIS channel N42 has failed high.

Note: ARNIS-1 steps start here.

• CRS enters S2.0P-AB.NIS-l.

• CRS determines Rod Control in manual and rod motion stopped.

• CRS determines no load change is in progress.

Page 9 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Penrussion from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revisiou 2 I Evaluilt~l"!Instructor Activi~ I Expected Plant/Candidate Response I Comments I

• RO reports Power Range Channel II N42 has failed high.

• CRS directs PO to remove failed channel from service lAW S2.OP-SO.RPS-L

• PO informs crew prior to taking any action that will cause alarm status change

• PO ensures 2NR45 pen 1 recorder is not selected to 2N42.

• CRS enters TSAS 3.3. L 1 Actions 2 and 6.

• PO places Detector Current Comparator, Upper Section, switch in PRN42 and ensures the Channel Defeat light illuminates and OHA E-38 is clear.

• PO places Detector Current Comparator, Lower Section, switch in PRN42 position and verifies Channel Defeat light illuminates and OHA E-46 is clear

• PO places Power Mismatch Bypass switch in Bypass PRN42.

• PO places Rod Stop Bypass switch in Bypass PRN42 and ensures the overpower rod stop for channel II on 2RP4 is illuminated and OHA E-31 is clear.

• PO places Comparator Channel Defeat switch in N42 and ensures the Comparator Defeat lamp illuminates and OHA E-39 is clear.

• PO reports to CRS that SO.RPS-OOl is complete with the exception of actions required to be taken by I&C technician to trip the associated bistables.

Page 10 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2

!EvaluatorlInstructor Activity I Expected Plant/Candidate Response I Comments I Note: CRS may elect to leave rods

• CRS directs RO to withdraw control rods in manual due to step 3.6 of to restore Tavg to within +/- 1.5 degrees of AB.NIS not being complete until Tref.

I&C trips bistables. Continue to next event if this is the case.

Proceed to next event on direction

• RO withdraws control bank D rods in a from Lead Evaluator. slow and deliberate manner, and places rod control in Auto when Tavg is within +/- 1.5 degrees ofTref.

2. 22 SG NR level Channel I fails low

'Simulator Operator: Insert RT-2'

• PO reports unexpected OHA G-15 ADFCS whenrods have bUr~st()red to Trouble, and 22 SG Console Protection AROor on direction! 'ofilLead Level Lo-Lo.

Evaluator.

• PO reports 22 SG NR level channel I has failed low.

.MALF

SG0095B,'22 SG LvI l~rKillt.~ (529) CHlfails i Filial Value: 0 . .

• Crew refers to ARP and detennines ADFWCS Median Signal Select automatically removes the failed channel from any control function based on comparison with remaining two channels.

• PO verifies SG level being controlled.

• CRS contacts Maintenance Controls to remove inoperable channel from service.

• CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 Action 6, and 3.3.2.1 Action 19, both of which are 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to restore channel or place in tripped condition.

Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.

Page 11 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I EviluatorlInstructor Activity I Expected PlantlCandidateResponse I Comments I

3. SGFP oilleaklpower reduction Simulator Oper~tor: Qn direction from the Lead Evaiuator, call the control room as ~econdary NEO and report that the oil leak on 21 SGFP governor appe~sto have gotten worse, it is n9w ldiop per second. The Maintenance Supervisor at the SOfiP recommends removing the SOFP from service withiIl1he' next 30 minutes. Infomifuecontrol room that you can still easil)/tefill the reservoir when needed to maintain reservoir level with the oil that is staged at the feed um .

• CRS briefs crew on power reduction to remove 21 SGFP from service.

Note: IF the CRS decides to trip

• CRS briefs crew on actions which will be (AB. CN steps) 21 SGFP instead of reducing performed when 21 SGFP is manually power, and allowing the automatic tripped.

Main Turbine runback to occur, THEN the following steps of

• CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CN-OOOl.

S2.0P-AB.CN-0001, Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality will be performed.

• PO trips 21 SGFP, and verifies Main Otherwise go to steps for the Turbine automatic runback is initiated.

power reduction on next page.

• RO either verifies control rods automatically inserting or inserts control rods in manual to control Tavg.

Page 12 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I E~aluator/Instruct~r.~A_c_ti~Vl_*ty,,-*_ _~*~E_x-,p,-ected'Plant/Candidate Response I Comments

• RO initiates a boration to maintain control (AB.CN steps rods above the RIL and restore AFD. cont)

• PO verifies 22 SGFP rises to maintain adequate SG feed flow.

• PO ensures open 21-23CN108's, polisher Bypass Valves.

• PO ensures 2CN47, 23/24/25 Heater Strings Bypass valve is open, and closes 21-24GB4 and 21-24GB185s.

• PO verifies AFP Auto Armed bezel illuminated for 21 SGFP.

• PO monitors SG NR level to ensure it is trending to program.

• RO maintains Tavg on program with boration and rod control.

• RO energizes PZR heaters. (EndAB.CN steps)

Note: Section 5.7 ofS2.0P

• CRS enters S2.0P-AB.LOAD-I, Rapid (Power reduction SO.CN-2, Steam Generator Feed Load Reduction to perform the power steps start here)

Pump Operation, is used for reduction.

removing a SGFP from service at power, and requires total Feed Flow to be less than 9.0 E4 Ibm/hr.

• CRS directs monitoring of CAS of AB.LOAD-l.

Note: 100% power feed flow is

• CRS directs RO and PO to perform a load

.~ 15 E6 Ibm/hr. A power reduction reduction at less than 5% per minute to to ~ 60% will be required. reduce total feedwater flow to ::; 9.0 E6 lbmlhr.

• CRS directs RO to maintain Tavg on program during the downpower using boration and rod control.

Page 13 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I Evaluatorllnstructor Activity I Expected Plant/Candidate Response ,. LComments I

• RO energizes all PZR heaters.

• RO calculates boron addition required for downpower and initiates boration.

• PO initiates turbine load reduction at rate directed by CRS

• RO either ensures automatic rod control is maintaining RCS Tavg on program, or inserts rods in manual.

Continue to next event on direction of Lead Evaluator after sufficient power reduction observation has been performed.

Page 14 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I EvaluatorlInstructor Activity I Expected Plant/Candidate Response I Comments I

4. SGTR Simulator Operator: Insert RT-3

• RO announces OHA A-6, RMS HI RAD on direction from Lead Evaluator OR TRBL as unexpected.

MALF: SG0078B,22 SGTR Final Value: 900 Ramp: 10 minutes (Note: This equals a 650 gpm tube rupture at 2235 psig ReS pressure.)

• CREW reports 2R53B, 22 SG N16 Main Steamline radiation monitor in alarm, followed by 2R15, Condenser Air Ejector radiation monitor.

• RO identifies lowering RCS pressure and PZR level.

• CRS enters S2.0P-AB.SG-1, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

• CRS directs the load reduction be placed on hold.

• CRS directs implementation ofS2.0P AB.SG-1 Continuous Action Summary.

• RO reports charging flow is rising, and PZR level is lowering.

Note: The decision on when to trip

• RO transfers to a centrifugal charging the Rx will determine how much pump by:

ofthis step is actually performed. - Ensuring Master Flow Control in Auto

- Closing 2CV55

- Starting 21 or 22 CVCS pp

- Adjusting 2CV55 while lowering 23 CVCS pp speed to minimum

- Stopping 23 CVCS pp

- Adjusting 2CV55 to control PZR lvl

- Placing 2CV55 in auto when required Page 15 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2

• Evaluato~jJnstructor Activl='tyoL*_-,-,-_!c...:E=xp==e::..::c..::..:te::..::d:;c:P~I=an=t/=-C-=.-=-an=d=i=d=at.:.:e:...:R:..:.e:...scc.a::p-=con=s:..:e~.*_~_ _ C~om=ll1ents L.I I

• When the crew detennines that the leak is greater than the capacity of the CVCS makeup system, the CRS will direct the RO to manually trip the Reactor and initiate Safety Injection lAW CAS of ARSG-l.

• RO manually trips Reactor, confinns Reactor Trip, and manually initiates Safety Injection.

• RO perfonns Immediate Actions's ofEOP TRIP-I.

- Verifies reactor trip

- Verifies reactor trip confinnation.

- Trips Turbine.

- Verifies one 4kV Vital Bus energized

- Verifies SI initiation Note: The STA will arrive in the

• PO recommends isolation of AFW to 22 control room 10 minutes after the SG based on TRIP-l CAS.

Rx trip announcement is made.

• PO requests pennission to throttle AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lbmlhr.

Page 16 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I Evaluator/Instructor Activity I Expected Plant/Candidate Response I Comments I

• PO reports only 22 AFW pump is in service, and AFW flow is being provided to 21 SG.

• PO reports 23 AFW pump trip.

• CRS orders 22AFli and 22AF21 closed.

=_-__-__ AFWflow isolated

. SAT UNSAT

• RO identifies SEC loading is not complete for 2A vital bus, and that 21 AFW pump did not start.

5. 21 AFW pp fails to start on

• RO blocks and resets 2A SEC. 21 AFW SEC actuation. pump starts due to the standing SG 10-10 level signal.

• PO verifies 21 & 22 AFW Pumps running.

• CREW verifies safeguards equipment alignment.

• RO ensures 21 and 22 CA330's are shut.

• RO reports containment pressure has remained < 15 psig.

• PO reports no indication of high steam flow requiring MSLI.

Page 17 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2

[jvaluator/lnstructor Activity* 1 Expected PlantlCandidateResponse *1* CoItlments 1

• CRS directs SM to implement the ECG.

Note: ECG call here would be Alert under 3.2.3.a

• PO verifies all Vital Buses are energized.

• RO verifies control room ventilation in accident-pressurized mode, and ensures 2 switchgear room supply fans and one switchgear room exhaust fan are in service.

• RO reports 1 CCW pumps running.

• CRS dispatches operator to shut 2CC37 and 2CC48.

• RO reports RHR is not aligned for Cold Leg Recirc.

• RO reports charging flow is > 100 gpm on SI systems charging flowmeter.

• RO reports RCS pressure and SI pump injection status.

• PO reports total AFW flow is >22E4 Ibmlhr OR one SG is >9% NR level, then maintains intact SG NR levels 9-33%.

• RO verifies RCS Tavg trending to 547°F with RCPs running.

• RO verifies reactor trip breakers open.

• RO verifies PZR PORVs closed and associated PORV Stop Valves open.

• RO verifies PZR Spray Valves closed and informs crew 21 RCP is tripped due to loss ofH 4KV Group Bus.

Page 18 0[30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I Evaluat()rlInstructor Activity . ExpeCted Plant/Candidate Response I Comments I

• RO reports RCS pressure >1350 psig.

• RO maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs.

• PO reports no SG pressure is dropping or completely depressurized.

• CRS directs transition to EOP-SGTR-l based on uncontrolled rise in NR or WR level on 22 SG.

Note: The STA will arrive in the

• CREW initiates monitoring of CFSTs.

control room 10 minutes after the Rx trip announcement is made

• PO reports 22 SG NR or WR level is rising in an uncontrolled manner.

• PO sets 22MS 10 to 1045 psig, and reports when it opens automatically as the SG pressurizes.

See Critical Task #1 to

• PO shuts 22MS167, and verifies 22MS18, document completion. 22MS7, and 22GB4 are shut.

• CRS verifies 22MS167, 22MS18, and 22MS7 are shut.

• PO reports 22 SG is ruptured.

• CRS dispatches operator to shut ruptured SG sample valve 2SS327.

• CRS verifies ruptured SG isolated from intact SGs.

• PO verifies 22 SG NR level is >9%, and ensures AFW flow isolated to 22 SG.

• CRS directs AFW flow to remain isolated to 22 SG.

• PO reports when 22MS 10 opens.

Page 19 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2 I Evaluator/Instructor Activity I Expected Plant/Candidate Response I Comments I

• RO reports power is available to both PZR PORV stop valves, both PORVs are shut, and both PZR PORV stop valves are open.

• PO reports no SO pressures are dropping uncontrollably or completely depressurized.

Note: 21 SO NR level will be

• PO maintains intact SO levels 9 to 33%

higher, and will steam less than 23 NR.

and 24 SOs due to no RCP running in 21 loop.

• RO resets SI and Phase A isolation.

• RO verifies Phase B isolation reset.

• RO opens 21 and 22 CA330.

• PO resets Band C SECs and resets 230V Control Centers.

• RO reports no RHR injection flow, and stops both RHR Pumps.

• PO verifies ruptured SO is identified, isolated, and >375 psig.

• CRS sends an operator to swap gland sealing steam to alternate source.

• CREW determines RCS target temperature based on ruptured SO pressure is 503 deg.

• PO reports 21, 23, and 24 SOs are available for cooldown.

• PO reports Main Steam Dumps are available.

Page 20 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2

• EvaluatorlInstructor~ctivity 1 Expected ])laIltlCandidateResponse I* Comments 1

• PO initiates cooldown to target temperature by:

- Placing stm dumps in manual.

- Adjusting valve demand to O.

- Depressing MS Pressure Control.

- Adjusting valve demand to 25%.

- Depressing Bypass Tavg at 543 deg.

Note: PO will be steaming 23 and

• PO stops cooldown and maintains 24 SGs due to 22 SG being temperature <503 degrees by placing steam isolated and 21 loop having an idle dumps in auto and verifYing they operate to RCP. AFW flow should be raised maintain temp < 503 deg.

to these 2 SGs.

• RO shuts charging pump mini flows when RCS pressure is < 1500 psig.

• PO reports 22 SG pressure is stable or nsmg.

• RO reports subcooling >20 deg.

Note: 23 RCP is running. IF crew

• RO reports normal PZR spray is available.

decides normal spray is not available due to 21 RCP not running, then go to next page for PORV failure actions.

• Crew reviews depress termination criteria.

• RO fully opens both PZR spray valves.

6. 23 Rep Trip

• RO reports spray is lowering pressure.

• RO reports 23 RCP has tripped.

eletftfip***

Final~~lue:True;',!~"'0.ml

• CRS returns to step 17.2 and answers no, Page 21 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-I06-0204 Revision 2

• EvaluatorlInstructorAc!ivity  !,Expected PlantlCandidateR,~,~sp,,-,o=n=s-=-e_ __ I* Comments I PZR Spray is not reducing RCS pressure.

• RO shuts both spray valves.

• RO reports both PZR PORVs are available.

• Crew reviews depress tennination criteria.

RO opens only ONE PORV.

7. PZR PORV fails open

• When conditions in Table F is met, (RCS pressure< 24 SG pressure and PZR Ivl >

11 %) RO attempts to shut PORV opened for depressurization, and reports valve will not shut.

(JT#3 (ElUtFM)

• RO shuts block valve associated with stuck

~~ll!veupstream open PORV to isolate PORV, and reports POR RCS pressure is rising.

Tenninate Scenario after evaluation of CT#3 is complete.

Page 22 0[30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l VI. Scenario

References:

A. Emergency Plan (ECG)

B. Technical Specifications C. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

D. Salem UFSAR E. S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operations F. S2.OP-SO.RPS-OOOl, Nuclear Instrumentation Channel TriplRestoration G. S2.OP-ARROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion H. S2.0P-AB.NIS-OOOl, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction I. S2.OP-SO.CN-0002, Steam Generator Feed Pump Operation J. S2.OP-ARCN-OOOl, Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality K. S2.OP-AB.LOAD-OOOl, Rapid Load Reduction L. 2-EOP-TRIP-I, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection M. 2-EOP-SGTR-l, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Page 23 of30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Penrussion from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 1 PLANT STATUS UNIT TWO TODAY MODE: 1 POWER: 100% RCS BORON 24 MWe 1230 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): N/A MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

3.8.1.1. Action a - 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> from now REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core burnup 12,000 EFPH EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:

Restore 2B EDG to service later this shift.

ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek are at 100% power.

No penalty minutes in last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

PRIMARY:

2B EDG CIT for governor repair.

SECONDARY:

21 SGFP has a governor oil leak - 1 drop every 5 seconds. Secondary NEO is monitoring lX1hr, and refilling reservoir as needed. Oil leak is scheduled to be repaired during refueling outage which starts in 3 days. Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1.

U3 is available.

Condensate Polishing is in service- full flow.

RAD\VASTE: None CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: None Page 24 of 30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST

1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load

2. Simulator is in RUN

3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON

4. All required computer terminals in operation

5. Simulator clocks synchronized

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented

7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date

8. Shift manning sheet available

9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced

11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

13. Required procedures clean

14. Multiple color procedure pens available

15. Required keys available

16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel

17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.

18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary

19. Exam security set for simulator

20. Ensure a current ReS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out

21. Shift logs available if required

22. Recording Media available (if applicable)

24. Reference verification performed with required documents available

25. VerifY phones disconnected from plant after drill.

Page 25 of 30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability ofthe plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...

• degradation of any barrier to fission product release

• degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity

• a violation of a safety limit

• a violation of the facility license condition

• incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)

• a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...

• effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

• recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

• take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

• prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

Page 26 of 30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 4 SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.

SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l REVIEWER: P. Williams Qualitative Attributes PBW 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.

PBW 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.

PBW 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events.

PBW 4. Each event description consists of-

• the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated

• the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event

• the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew

• the expected operator actions (by shift position)

• the event termination point PBW 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

PBW 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

PBW 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

PBW 8. The simulator modeling is not altered.

PBW 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated.

PBW 10. The scenario has been validated.

PBW 11. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.

Page 27 of 30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l ATTACHl\'1ENT 4 (Cont)

SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature This page should be completed for each scenario. The ranges listed for each scenario represents a target and are not absolute limitations.

Scenarios that do not fit into the ranges listed should be further evaluated to ensure they are appropriate.

Initials Qualitative Attributes GSG 8 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GSG 3 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GSG 2 Abnormal Events: 2-3 GSG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 GSG 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GSG 0 EOP Contingency Procedures requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GSG 3 Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS:

Malfunctions after EOP entry is 3, and add to the scenario being an effective evaluation tool.

The 4 critical tasks are all associated with the natural progression of a SGTR and allow effective evaluation of the entire SGTR event to its conclusion.

Page 28 of 30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 5 ESG CRITICAL TASKS 08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-1 CT #1 (FSAR) Isolate AFW to the ruptured SO within 10 minutes of entry into TRIP-I, and (E-3-B) subsequently close 22MS167, 22MS18, 22MS7 and 220B4 in SOTR-l.

BASIS: Salem FSAR Accident Analysis for SOTR, Section 15.4.4.2, Analysis, page 15.4-53, states that the evaluation (Reference 72) with respect to operator action time for a faulted SO is applied to the SOTR action time. FSAR Accident Analysis for SO faults assumes operator action will be taken within 10 minutes of AFW initiation to isolate AFW flow to the faulted SO (15.4.8.2.2, page 15-4.109).

CT #2 (E-3-B) Establish and maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from SOTR-l does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling or too low such that a challenge to Thermal Shock (FRTS)or Sub criticality FRSM) CFSTs.

BASIS: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SOTR leads to a transition from SOTR-l to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy.

CT#3 (E-O-M) Close the block valve upstream of the stuck-open PORV by completion of step 23 of SOTR-l.

BASIS: Failure to close the block valve under the postulated plant conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release.

Page 29 of 30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l 08-01 NRC RETAKE ESG-l SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN EVENT YIN EVENT N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water Y Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss ofCCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN YIN TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers -_N . Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area Y Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg Y Auxiliary Feed Pump CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation N Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Y Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Y Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N Early depressurize RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

Page 30 of 30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: Multiple faulted SGs wI Cant Spray failure SCENARIO NUMBER: 08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 REVISION NUMBER: o EFFECTIVE DATE: Effective on final approval date below EXPECTED DURATION: 60 minutes PROGR;\IV!: '---'------'

L.O.REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE L--_--l STA I*. I OTHER New issue for 08-01 NRC Retake exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 07/28/2010 uthor Date APPROVED BY:

Salem Operations Training I hD rr/23Date APPROVED BY: L~?7 £, [)/owiJ!t,f ~/z&/td Facility Representative Date Page 1 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 I.

ENABLING OBJECTIVES A. Given the unit at 70% reactor power, the crew will pelform a power increase to 90% at 1O%1hr, lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004(Q).

B. Given the order or indications of a charging system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction ofthe charging system in accordance with the approved station procedures.

C. Given indication of a loss or malfunction of the Charging system DIRECT corrective action for a Charging System malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.

D. Given the indication of excessive stearn flow, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures.

Given the indication of excessive stearn flow, DIRECT the response to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures.

F. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.

G. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.

H. Given the order or indications of a safety injection, pelform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.

I. Given indication of a safety injection, DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.

J. Given the order or indications of a multiple stearn generator depressurization, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the generator depressurization in accordance with the approved station procedures.

K. Given the order or indications of excessive containment pressure, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures.

L. Given indication of excessive containment pressure, DIRECT the response to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures.

Page 2 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESO-2 A. Power Ascension R CCW pump trip C. Controlling PZR Level Channel Fails Hi D. Steam Leak on 23 SO E. Multiple Faulted SGs and FRCE A The crew will receive the unit at 70% power EOL with all systems in automatic. 21 CFCU will be CIT. The crew will be provided instruction to perform a power increase to 90% power at 10% per hour.

R 22 CCW pump will trip. 23 CCW pump will auto start and restore system header pressure. Thc CRS will enter TSAS 3.7.3 for 2 operable CCW loops.

C. The controlling PZR level channel will fail high. Charging flow will lower. The crew will establish manual control ofPZR level to prevent flashing in the letdown line and remove the failed channel from service.

D. While continuing the power ascension, a small steam leak will develop on 23 SG. The crew will enter ARSTM-OOOI and determine a unit shutdown is required.

E. Once the crew has determined a shutdown is required the steam leak will worsen. The crew will trip the reactor, recognize an ATWT when the reactor does not initially trip, open the reactor trip breakers, initiate a MSLI, and initiate a safety injection. All MSIVs will fail to shut, and remain full open.

F. While in TRIP-l the crew will observe that Phase B/Spray Actuation has failed and manually initiate. Once the crew has transitioned to LOSC-l thc STA will inform the crew that a Purple Path for FRCE-l is prcsent. While in FRCE-l the crew will throttle AFW to each SG to ] E41bm/hr.

G. The scenario will end when transition out of LOSC-2 has occurred.

Page 3 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 IC-259 on 2010 Exam Thumb Drive computer ~woints, pro~t;:dures, bezyl cQ~ets)

RH 1 and RH2 CIT 21 & 22RH18s CIT VCl &4C/T RCPs (SELF CHECK)

RTBs (SELF CHECK)

MS167s (SELF CHECK) 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)

SGFP (SELF CHECK) 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)

S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation, open and marked up to Step 5.1.19 21 CFCU CIT Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-TraininglExamination Checklist."

Page 4 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Note: ET-l was used in scenario development but is NOT used in this scenario.

VL0420 21MS167 Fail to position

l. NA NA None 95.1 95.1 (O-lOO%)

VL0421 22MS167 Fail to position

2. NA NA None 95.1 95.1 (O-lOO%)

VL0422 23MS 167 Fail to position NA NA None 95.1 95.1 (O-lOO%)

VL0423 24MS167 Fail to position

4. NA NA None 95.1 95.1 (0-100%)

RP0276A Auto Phase B Fails to

5. NA NA None True True act Tm A RP0276B Auto Phase B Fails to

6. NA NA None True True actTmB RP0277A Auto Cnt Spry Fails to

7. NA NA None True True act Tm A RP0277B Auto Cnt Spry Fails to NA NA None True True actTm B MS0088Cr 23 Main Stm Line

9. NA 5 min RT-2 0 1.5 Leak Inside Cnt MS0090Cr 23 Main Stm Line

10. NA NA RT-3 0 80 Leak PR0017A PZR level CH 1

11. NA NA RT-6 NA 100 (LT459) fails HI

12. CC0172B 22 CCW pump trip NA NA RT-l False True RP0058 Failure of Automatic Rx l3. NA NA None True True trip RP0059A Failure of Manual Rx

14. NA NA None True True trip RP0059B, Failure of Manual SIIRx

15. NA NA None True True Trip Page 5 of26 ..

PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Trammg

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 CT191-1D 21CFCU Bkr #1 Low Speed

1. NA NA None off off 125VDC CT191-2D 21CFCU Bkr #2 High Speed

2. NA NA None off off 125VDC CT191-3D 21CFCU Bkr #3 High Speed

3. NA NA None off off 125VDC

4. CT201D 21 CFCU Rack Out NA NA None tagged tagged None

1.

• Ensure PZR Level Channel I is the level channel Page 6 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2

• State shift job assignments

• Conduct a shift briefing detailing instructions to the shift. Provide CREW members with a copy of the shift turnover sheet.

• Inform the CREW: "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walk-downs at this time.

CRS please inform me when your CREW is prepared to assume the watch."

• Allow sufficient time for panel walk-down. When informed by the CRS the CREW is prepared to assume the watch, ensure the simulator is cleared of all unauthorized personneL Page 70f26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

1. Power Ascension Reas~hr:f

• CRS briefs crew on evolution

"'~iheet*

Note: Rod Control may remain in Auto

• CRS implements S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004.

or placed in manual with CRS approval lAW IOP-4, P&L 3.6

• CRS directs PO to commence Turbine load increase at 10%lhour.

Note: The Main Turbine is initially set

• PO sets up Digital EHC (DEHC) up for 15 % per minute, the PO must console for 1O%/hr load increase, and change the ramp rate to 10% per hour. initiates load increase.

Note: The RO should maintain a log of

• RO initiates a dilution per the reactivity dilutions to ensure reactivity additions plan provided.

are tracked.

• PO monitors DEHC for proper response of load increase.

• RO monitors Tavg and Delta T and MWe for expected indications of load increase.

• IF control rods are placed in manual per CRS direction, THEN RO will slowly and deliberately withdraw control rods to maintain Tavg on program.

• IF control rods remain in auto, RO announces when rod motion starts and stops.

Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.

Page 8 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 EvaluatorlInstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

2. 22 CCW pump trip Sim~latorOj>erat{)t:

~'Lea4Evaluat()J:' direction.

~";;: ':f- ,;'

~j ,

Note: The Thermal Barrier Discharge

• RO/PO announces unexpected CCI Flow Lo alarm will come in bezel alarms:

immediately, and stay locked in the - DISCHARGE FLOW LO (Thermal longest. During scenario development barrier return flow) and validation, OHAs D20-23 RCP - 21 (22) CC HDR PRESSURE LO BRG CLG WTR FLO LO alarmed on one occasion, but immediately cleared.

The standby CCW pump auto start restores header pressure and all alarms will clear.

Note: RO should remain focused on the

• RO/PO reports 22 CCW pump has reactor while positive reactivity is being tripped and 23 CCW pump has auto added. started.

Note: CRS may order the power

• RO/PO reports CCW header 10 ascension placed on hold, but it is not pressure alarm cleared.

required.

• Using ARP for DISCHARGE FLOW LO, PO reports seal injection to all RCPs is 6-12 gpm with total seal injection flow <40 gpm.

CRS may refer to ARCC-l, but its

• PO reports DISCHARGE FLOW LO is actions regarding low header pressure cleared.

only start the standby pump to restore pressure, which has already automatically occurred.

• CRS dispatches personnel to check breaker for 22 CCW pump and 22 CCWpump.

Proceed to next event after TS is identified

• CRS enters TSAS 3.7.3 for less than 2 on direction from Lead Evaluator. operable CCW loops.

Page 9 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

3. PZR Level Controlling Channel (LT459) Fails Hi

,§ini~la(p'tf;:pperator: Inseij:RT~6at

• RO announces the following alarms as Le~ E:valfiatofdirectiont'; .. unexpected:

- OHA E-20, PZR HTR ON LVL HI,

- OHA E-4 PZR LVL HI

- All RCP Seal Water Flow Lo alarms

• RO reports PZR B/LT heaters in Auto have turned on, and charging flow is lowering to ~45 gpm, and diagnoses failure ofPZR controlling level channel.

• RO may place Master Flow Controller in manual with CRS concurrence and raise charging flow to prevent flashing in the letdown line prior to AB entry.

• CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CVC-OOOl, Loss of Charging.

Note: Note: CRS may order the power

• CRS directs ROfPO to place the load ascension placed on hold, but it is not ascension on hold. (if directed) required. Next 3 steps are here ifload is stabilized.

• PO places the Main Turbine on HOLD (if directed)

• RO secures any dilution in progress. (if directed)

• RO initiates RCS dilution lAW reactivity plan every 15 minutes IF power ascension remains in progress.

• CRS directs PO to monitor CAS.

• RO reports 23 charging pump is running.

Page 10 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 EvaluatorlInstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

• RO reports there is no indication of cavitation.

• RO reports PZR Level Chmmel1 has failed hi.

Note: RCP seal injection flow will rise

• RO takes manual control of charging as charging flow is increased, and flow if not previously done, and raises CV71 may have to be adjusted to charging flow to restore PZR level to maintain less than 40 gpm total seal program IAWAtt. 2.

injection flow.

• RO announces RCP seal injection 10 flow alarms have cleared as expected when charging flow is raised.

• RO selects channel III for control.

• RO restores one group of PZR BIU heaters to OFF and AUTO.

• RO reports letdown remains in service.

• CRS directs RO to restore charging flow controller to auto when PZR level is restored to program.

• CRS directs PO to remove PZR level channel I from service IAW S2.0P SO.RPS-0003.

Lead Evaluator may direct continuation

• CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 action 6.

to next event once Tech Specs are identified by CRS.

• PO verifies PZR Level chmme1 III selected for control, Chmmel II selected for alarm, and ensures PZR level recorder to chmmel II or III.

Continue to next event on direction of

• PO informs CRS that IC support is Lead Evaluator required to perform remainder of procedure.

Note: CRS may not elect to start

• CRS directs ROfPO to recommence Page 11 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments moving power until channel has been power ascension. (if placed on hold) removed from service.

4. Steam Leak in Containment Simulator Operator: Enter RT-2 at

• RO reports OHA C-38 CFCU LK Lead Evaluator direction. DET HI, as unexpected.

MALF: MS0088Cr 23 Main

• PO refers to ARP.

Stm Line Leak Inside ent

• RO reports CFCU leak detection HI Final Value: 1.5 HI, as unexpected.

Ramp: 5min Notes:

1. CFCU leak detection alarm will

• PO determines no rise in CNTMT annunciate ~ 2 minutes 20 seconds radiation and that leak is inside after leak insertion. containment based on rising

2. Containment pressure will begin containment pressure.

rising ~ 3 minutes and 10 seconds after leak insertion.

• CRS enters S2.0P.AB.STM-0001,

3. Containment pressure will be rising Excessive steam Flow.

at ~ 1 psig every 6 minutes. (24 minutes until auto SI/Rx trip would

• CRS directs the load ascension placed occur at 4 psig in containment.) on hold.

• CRS initiates Attachment 1 of S2.0P.AB.STM-0001 :

1. Monitors for reactor power rise

2. RCS cooldown

3. Need to initiate MSLI 4.

• PO verifies EHC system operating correctly, and MS 1Os and Steam Dumps are closed.

Simulator Operator: Once a rate

• CRS determines a shutdown is and plan is determined by the CRS, required and plans rate and reactivity or CRS briefs CASRx trip actions management then enter RT-3 PRIOR to crew OR initiating a Rx trip. Determines a Rx trip is required based on CAS.

Malf: MS0090Cr 23 Main Stm Line Leak

• RO calculates boration required if Final Value: 80 downpower is required.

Page 12 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

• RO reports demand for a Rx trip and the Rx did NOT trip, and infonns CRSofATWT.

• RO attempts to trip the Rx using the Rx trip handles, and reports the Rx did not trip.

• • • • ct#f1E~O-;~) ...;.",'h"K,#

• RO trips the Rx by opening the Manuall trip tile R!Jrom t~~ Reactor Trip Breakers.

riortoentering SAT

• RO reports the Rx trip is confinned.

Note: 2 paths exist for attempting to

• CRS directs RO to initiate MSLI initiate a MSLI. AB.SG-1 CAS lAW CAS of AB.STM. (May be actions state to: perfonned after Immediate Actions of

- Trip the Rx TRIP-I are perfonned.)

- Confinn the Rx trip.

- Initiate MSLI

- SI if MSLI is unsuccessful.

OR IfCRS enters TRIP-I due to automatic Rx trip demand, then MSLI actuation should be directed after the immediate actions are complete using the CAS of AB.SG-l.

• RO reports MSLI does not actuate. (if attempted prior to TRlP-I lA's.)

• CRS directs RO to initiate SI. (if MSLI failure is identified)

• RO initiates SI or backs up auto SI (if perfonning CAS actions in AB.SG) and continues or perfonns lAs of TRIP-I

1. Trips Turbine

2. VerifY Vital AC busses energized

3. VerifY SI actuated Page 13 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

• CRS/RO verify immediate actions of TRIP-l are complete by performing verification of immediate action steps.

• After lAs of TRIP-l completed, CRS directs MSLI if not previously attempted.

• RO reports MSLI is unsuccessful and all MSIVs remain open.

• CREW monitor CAS items after completion of immediate actions Note: With all SGs faulted, AFW

• PO throttles AFW flow to no less than flow should not be isolated to any 22E4 lbmlhr with CRS concurrence.

SG.

• RO reports SEC loading is not complete for B vital bus, but that all available equipment started.

• PO reports 21 and 22 AFW pumps are operating.

• RO reports safeguards valve alignment SAT.

• RO reports 21 and 22CA330s are shut.

• RO reports containment pressure is

> 15 psig, and auto Containment Spray and Phase B isolation have NOT automatically initiated.

• RO manually initiates CS and Phase B, stops RCPs, and verifies Phase B valve alignment.

Page 14 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

• RO reports High Steam Flow SI status and failure ofMSLI to shut MS167s.

Role Play: Respond as WCC

• CRS contacts WCC to assist in Supervisor when contacted that you closing MS167s locally.

will assemble a team of operators and mechanics and attempt to shut the valves you were directed to shut.

If contacted later in scenario about status of getting MS 167 s shut, state that the team has just been dispatched from the WCC.

If CRS dispatches an NEO directly to attempt closure of any MS 167, state that you will swing by WCC to pick up a Safety Man.

Note: Correct ECG classification is

• PO reports all 4 KV vital busses are an Alert under 5.1.2.A energized.

Note: ECG basis document specifically excludes Heat Sink: Red Path due to operator action from being used in Table 3 determination ofECG calL

• RO reports CAY is in Accident Pressurized mode.

• RO reports correct switchgear room ventilation operation.

• R 0 reports 2 CCW pumps are running.

• RO reports correct ECCS pump alignment and expected flows for RCS conditions.

Note: PO should have lowered AFW

• PO reports AFW flow is >22E4 lbmlhr.

flow to as close to 22E4 lbmlhr as possible.

• RO reports all RCPs are stopped.

Page 15 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

• RO reports both reactor trip breakers are open.

• RO reports both PZR PORVs are shut and Block valves are open.

• PO reports all SG pressures lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.

Note: LOSC-l and LOSC-2 steps start

• CRS directs transition to LOSC-I.

on page 17 Note: The STA will arrive in the

• STA initiates monitoring ofCFSTs control room 10 minutes after the Rx and reports Red or Purple path on trip announcement is made. The STA Containment environment.

may be ready as soon as TRIP-l is exited to report CFST status, but could still be performing verification.

Transition should be made as soon as STA reports CFST status.

FReE Steps start here

• CRS transitions to FReE-I.

• PO verifies Phase A isolation valve shut and 2VC5 and 2VC6 shut.

• RO verifies CS in service, Phase B isolation valves shut, and RCPs stopped.

• RO reports MSIV s remain open.

Page 16 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuc1ear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

• CRS directs PO to minimize AFW to no less than 1E4 Ibmlhr per SG.

• CRS transitions to procedure in effect (LOSC-I or 2)

• STA reports RED path on Heat Sink CSF after PO reduces AFW flow.

• CRS transitions to FRHS-l, verifies it was operator action that lowered AFW flow less than 22E4 lbmlhr, and returns to LOSC-I.

Lose steps start here

• RO reports MSLI has been initiated and all MSI67s remain open.

• PO reports all SG are completely depressurized.

• CRS transitions to LOSC-2.

• PO ensures all valves in Table A are shut, and reports21-24MS 167 remain open.

• CRS dispatches operators to locally shut MS 167s one loop at a time if not previously dispatched.

• PO lowers 23 AFW pp speed to minimum, trips then stops 23 AFW pp if not previously performed.

• CRS dispatches an operator to shut 21 and 23MS45s.

Page 17 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

• RO reports RCS cooldown rate is

> 1000 1hr.

• PO reduces AFW flow to no less than lE4 Ibm/hr to each SG, if not previously perfonned in FRCE-I.

• PO identifies 21 MS 167 has shut, and 21 SG pressure is rising.

Tenninate the scenario when the

• CRS transitions to LOSC-l based on transition to LOSC-l has been CAS ofLOSC-2.

perfonned.

Page 18 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

R Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG)

D. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation 2-EOP-TRIP-l, Rx Trip or Safety Injection F. 2-EOP-LOSC-l, Loss of Secondary Coolant G. 2-EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization H. 2-EOP-FRCE-l, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure I. S2.0P-ARSTM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow J. S2.0P-ARLOAD-OOOl, Rapid Load Reduction Page 19 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 1 PLANT STATUS UNIT TWO TODAY MODE: 1 POWER: 70% RCSBORON: 1285 ppm M\VE 700 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):

N/A MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

21 CFCU CIT 3.6.2.3 6 days remaining service water valve work REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup is 2500 EFPH. Power defect from 70%-100%= 484 pcm.

Control Bank D @ 133 steps Xenon burning out at 60 pcmJhr.

The Reactor fuel is conditioned to 100%.

Reactivity plan for power increase at 10% I hr is to dilute 150 gal every 10 minutes for a total of 1,800 gal over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, while withdrawing rods as needed to maintain Tave on program.

EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:

Power ascension to 90% power at 10%/hr. Power was reduced to repair 21 SGFP governor oil leak.

Repair of the governor is complete, and both SGFPs are in service. Initial steady state power prior to raising power was 60%, and had been there for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. Power is currently 70%, and load increase was placed on hold for shift turnover 5 minutes ago. Power ascension being performed iAW S2.0P IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation, which is complete up through Step 5.1. 19.

ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

CONTROL ROOM:

Hope Creek and Salem Unit 1 are at 100% power PRIMARY:

21 CFCU CIT SECONDARY:

23 Condensate Pump is O/S lAW IOP-4.

Condensate polishing is in service - full flow.

Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1.

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress.

CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:

None Page 20 of26 PSEG Confidcntial- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATORREADY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST

1. VerifY simulator is in "TRAIN" Load

2. Simulator is in RUN

3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON

4. All required computer terminals in operation

5. Simulator clocks synchronized

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented

7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date

8. Shift manning sheet available

9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced

11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

13. Required procedures clean

14. Multiple color procedure pens available

15. Required keys available

16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel

17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.

18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary

19. Exam security set for simulator

20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out

21. Shift logs available if required

22. Recording Media available (if applieable)

23. Ensure ECG classification is correct

24. Reference verification performed with required documents available

25. VerifY phones disconnected from plant after drill.

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08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse conseql,lences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...

• degradation of any barrier to fission product release

• degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity

• a violation of a safety limit

• a violation of the facility license condition

• incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)

• a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples ofCTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...

• effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

• recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

• take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

• prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

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08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 4 SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIE\V CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.

SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 08-01 NRC Retake Reviewer: P Williams ESG-2 Rev. 0 Qualitative Attributes PBW 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.

PBW 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.

PBW 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events.

PBW 4. Each event description consists of:

• the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated

• the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event

• the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew

• the expected operator actions (by shift position)

• the event termination point PBW 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

PBW 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

PBW 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

PBW 8. The simulator modeling is not altered.

PBW 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated.

PBW 10. The scenario has been validated.

PBW 11. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.

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08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 4 (Cont)

SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature This page should be completed for each scenario. The ranges listed for each scenario represents a target and are not absolute limitations. Scenarios that do not fit into the ranges listed should be further evaluated to ensure they are appropriate.

Initial Qualitative Attributes GSG 6 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GSG 1 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GSG 2 Abnormal Events: 2-3 GSG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 GSG EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GSG 2 EOP Contingency Procedures requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GSG 3 Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMM.ENTS:

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08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 5 ESG CRITICAL TASKS 08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 Rev. 0 CT#l (E-O-A) Manually trip the Rx from the control room prior to entering FRSM-I.

Basis Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreperably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an "incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensatory action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation ofthe RPS.

CT#2 (E-O-E) Manually initiate Phase B and Spray Actuation before an extreme challenge (Red Path) develops to the Containment CSF or prior to exiting TRIP-I. (prior to transitioning from step 11 in 2-EOP-TRIP-1)

Basis Failure to actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions constitutes a "demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an EFS system or component." In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of contaimnent cooling equipment also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls that would lead to violation of the facility license condition."

CT#3 (Basis Doc) Reduce AFW to no less than 1E4 Ibmlhr per SG prior to exiting FRCE-I.

Basis Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable severe challenge to the integrity CSF. Also failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality and the containment CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety" The standard which has been applied to this CT in this scenario encompasses the reason for minimizing AFW flow to lE4lbmlhr in FRCE with multiple faulted SGs. The reason this is done is to prevent thermal shock conditions to SG components if the SG was allowed to dry out, and then subsequently have AFW flow reinitiated. This meets the definition given on Attachment 2 of Examples ofCTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...

• degradation of any barrier to fission product release.

Not maintaining verifiable minimum AFW flow (1 E4th) when it is possible to do so could result in a SGTR when cold feedwater is subsequently reinitiated.

Note: This action is also performed in LOSC-2, and should be evaluated as SAT if performed in LOSC-2.

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08-01 NRC Retake ESG-2 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSmpS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAl\tIAGE YIN EVENT EVENT N

TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water

__N_ Steam Generator Tube Rupture Y Loss of CCW N

--- Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air

__N_ Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out

--N - LOCA COMPONENTffRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM. OR TRAIN YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N Early depressurize RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG Page 26 of26 PSEG Confidential- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training