ML092530430
| ML092530430 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/2009 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Division of License Renewal |
| References | |
| Download: ML092530430 (31) | |
Text
IPRenewal NPEmails From: STROUD, MICHAEL D [MSTROUD@entergy.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 08, 2009 3:46 PM To: Green, Kimberly Cc: KSutton@morganlewis.com; Curry, John J; YOUNG, GARRY G
Subject:
IPEC-ACRS-Sept10-NRC.pdf Attachments: IPEC-ACRS-Sept10-NRC.pdf Kim, See attached pdf copy of the Entergy slides for the ACRS meeting.
Thanks Mike 1
Hearing Identifier: IndianPointUnits2and3NonPublic_EX Email Number: 1607 Mail Envelope Properties (A79A58994C541C48BBCFB319610763CB05CF3C1C)
Subject:
IPEC-ACRS-Sept10-NRC.pdf Sent Date: 9/8/2009 3:46:21 PM Received Date: 9/8/2009 3:46:39 PM From: STROUD, MICHAEL D Created By: MSTROUD@entergy.com Recipients:
"KSutton@morganlewis.com" <KSutton@morganlewis.com>
Tracking Status: None "Curry, John J" <jcurry2@entergy.com>
Tracking Status: None "YOUNG, GARRY G" <GYOUNG4@entergy.com>
Tracking Status: None "Green, Kimberly" <Kimberly.Green@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None Post Office: LITEXETSP002.etrsouth.corp.entergy.com Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 150 9/8/2009 3:46:39 PM IPEC-ACRS-Sept10-NRC.pdf 2365890 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:
Recipients Received:
Indian Point Energy Center ACRS License Renewal Committee Meeting September 10, 2009 1
Indian Point Energy Center Personnel in Attendance Joe Pollock Vice President, Site - IP Fred Dacimo Vice President, License Renewal - IP John McCann Director, Licensing Pat Conroy Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance - IP Don Mayer Director, Emergency Planning Garry Young Director, Business Development Tom Orlando Director, Engineering - IP Bob Walpole Manager, Licensing - IP Mike Tesoriero Manager, Programs & Components - IP Tom McCaffrey Manager, Design Engineering John Curry Project Manager, License Renewal - IP Mike Stroud Project Manager, License Renewal Alan Cox Technical Manager, License Renewal Rich Drake Supervisor, Civil / Structural Engineering Nelson Azevedo Supervisor, Code Programs 2
=
Background===
3
ACRS Items of Interest
- Containment Penetration Cooling System
- Exterior Containment Concrete Monitoring
- IP2 Containment Liner
- IP2 Refueling Cavity Leakage
- IP2 Spent Fuel Pool Leak Plume 4
Containment Penetration Cooling System ACRS Questions Did the analysis look at no flow, in other words, blockage of those cooling channel paths such that there was no convective heat transfer from the concrete?
If those cooling channels became plugged or fouled such that you had no air passage through there or substantially reduced air passage, regardless of the status of the blowers, would you still reach only a maximum of 200 degrees Fahrenheit?
5
Containment Penetration Cooling System
Response
- Calculations were performed assuming no flow conditions which indicate temperature would exceed 200 degrees.
- Design simplicity and operating practices assure high system reliability.
6
Containment Penetration Cooling System
- Operators perform daily rounds.
- Operating procedures provide corrective actions based on instrument readings, including cleaning out penetrations, and replacing filters and silencers.
- Plant operating experience indicates that system is properly managed and is reliable.
- Concrete properties would not degrade below 300 degrees F.
7
Exterior Containment Concrete Monitoring ACRS requested more information on IPEC containment concrete conditions.
Response
The IPEC concrete containments are monitored by the ISI IWL Program.
8
Exterior Containment Concrete Monitoring
- Isolated areas of surface degradation exist at some Cadweld rebar joints and scaffolding attachment points used during construction.
- Documented in initial IWL inspections in 1995.
- Areas are monitored and have shown no structural impact to containment concrete.
- 41 locations at IP2 and 7 locations at IP3
- Locations are being coated.
9
Exterior Containment Concrete Monitoring ILRT Results
- Past ILRT results all below requirement of 0.075% of free volume per day.
- No unexplained changes in ILRT leak rates.
10
% P e r D a y o f C o n ta in m e n t F r e e V o lu m e , L a 19 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 7
19 6 7
19 8 8
19 0 8
19 2 8
19 4 86 19 88 19 9
19 0 9
19 2 9
19 4 9
ILRT Results 19 6 9
20 8 00 20 02 20 0
20 4 06 11 IP3 IP2
Exterior Containment Concrete Monitoring Conclusion The results of all ILRTs for both Units 2 and 3 have been satisfactory.
Visual inspections of the containment structures were performed with satisfactory results.
12
IP2 Containment Liner ACRS requested more information on IP2 containment liner deformation and concrete conditions.
Response
A feedwater line leak in 1973 caused hot steam/water to impinge on the IP2 uninsulated portion of the containment liner causing a deformation of the liner in the vicinity of the piping (i.e., a bulge, approximately 5/8 inch and 2 feet high running horizontally intermittently around containment for 60 feet).
13
IP2 Containment Liner
- An evaluation of the steam/water mixture, that impinged on the liner, concluded that concrete temperature was below 300qF, the containment design temperature; therefore no damage to the concrete was expected.
- ILRTs and magnetic particle inspections of the liner and weld channel testing demonstrated liner integrity and that there was no loss or degradation of containment integrity.
14
IP2 Containment Liner
- Ultrasonic inspection showed that 9 of 28 L-shaped studs in the bulged area were broken.
- These L-shaped studs are imbedded in the concrete and overlap rebar. Design of the 1/2 inch diameter studs is such that the stud would break well before containment concrete damage would occur.
15
IP2 Containment Liner
- Insulation was installed over the liner including the area of the bulge to preclude exposure again.
- An inspection of the bulged liner behind the insulation will be performed before the period of extended operation.
16
IP2 Containment Liner Conclusion
- The 1973 feedwater line leak event did not adversely affect the containment liner and concrete condition.
17
IP2 Refueling Cavity Leakage ACRS requested information about the safety significance of the leak and better figures to show the flow paths.
Response
Refueling cavity leakage has no safety significance.
Leakage occurs only during approximately two-week period while the canal is filled during refueling outages once every two years.
Industry experience, as confirmed by recent EPRI Report No. 1019168, supports the conclusion that degradation of the reinforcing steel and concrete is negligible.
18
IP2 Refueling Cavity Leakage
- Leak location
- The refueling cavity begins to leak when the cavity has been filled to between 80 and 85.
- Leakage occurs from three primary areas.
- Leakage is collected in sump and pumped to liquid radwaste processing system 19
IP2 Refueling Cavity Leakage Inspections and Evaluations
- Evaluated on several occasions with the conclusion that leakage had negligible impact on structural integrity of the refueling cavity walls and adjoining structures.
- Previous inspections - included core samples removed from the refueling cavity wall in 1993.
20
IP2 Refueling Cavity Leakage Future Plans
- Inspection prior to the period of extended operation will be performed to re-confirm no long term degradation (planned for 2010).
- Rebar inspections including core bore samples
- License renewal commitment
- Cavity liner repair activities planned for the subsequent refueling outages
- If a solution to the leakage is not achieved, IPEC will perform additional core samples and reinforcing steel inspections prior to the end of the first ten years of the PEO.
21
IP2 Refueling Cavity 22
IP2 Refueling Cavity 23
IP2 Spent Fuel Pool Leak Plume ACRS asked the applicant to bring more detailed hydrologic plume data for the IP2 spent fuel pool.
24
Plume Characteristics and Leak Behavior
- Site conceptual hydrology model is robust and extensively documented.
- Over 40 monitoring wells, most of which are multi-level and range up to ~300 in depth
- Wells are configured with level transducers and sample ports for chemical/radiological sampling
- Plume characteristics and leak behavior understood in 3D space and time.
- Long-term monitoring program is institutionalized
- Assess plume attenuation
- Radiological dose assessment
- Ongoing capability for detecting new leaks should they occur
- No tritium found in offsite wells, dose impact <0.1% of limit 25
IP2 Spent Fuel Pool Leak Unit 2 Source Map GW flow is west to river Wells provide sentinel and broad base monitoring Detection capability of leak near pool confirmed via dye testing
[Tritium Plume]
26
IP2 Spent Fuel Pool Leak Tracer Test Multi month test adds confirmatory data to conceptual model Supports retention mechanism at Unit 2 pool Connectivity between Units 2 and 1 observed 27
IP2 Spent Fuel Pool Leak 28
Comments and Questions 29