ML092170184

2009 Dresden Initial License Examination Proposed Simulator Scenarios

ML092170184
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	09/30/2008
From:	Valos N Division of Reactor Safety III
To:
References
Download: ML092170184 (83)

Text

Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-1 SHUTDOWN U2 EDG FOLLOWING SURVEILLANCE TESTING CONTROL ROD RPIS FAILURE RFP VENT FAN TRIPS WITH FAILURE OF STANDBY TO AUTO START SPURIOUS ERV OPENING FWLC CONTROLLER SETPOINT DRIFTS HIGH RBCCW PUMP TRIP LOSS OF RBCCW DUE TO LEAK / MANUAL SCRAM ECCS SUCTION LINE BREAK Rev. 00 09/08 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Station: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-1 Class ID: 2009-301 Evaluators Operators / crew position

/ ATC

/ BOP

/ CRS Initial Conditions: Rx Power ~ 2%

Turnover: Awaiting REMA to Continue Startup Shutdown U2 EDG Following Surveillance Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description BOP 1 NONE N EDG - Shutdown U2 EDG Following Surveillance Testing.

CRS ATC 2 RDFAILF5 I CRD - RPIS failure for rod F-05. T CRS FWDVF3 ATC 3 C RFP - 2A Vent Fan Trips with Failure of 2B to Auto Start.

FWDVF4 CRS ADS3CBN BOP 4 C ERV - Spurious ERV Opening. T ADS3CSD CRS ATC 5 RLLMLS I FWLC - FWLC Controller Drifts High.

CRS BOP 6 Q01 C RBCCW - Pump Trip.

CRS SER1784WR PPDSH1 SER1735 7 SER0369 M TEAM RBCCW - Loss of RBCCW / Manual Scram.

SER0322 RRMPMAHI RRMPMBHI 8 CSBRKSEV M TEAM Torus - Lowering Level from ECCS Suction Line Break.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 2 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Scenario Objective Evaluate the operators in using the Emergency Depressurization DEOP contingency procedure.

Scenario Summary Initial Conditions:

1. Unit is at 2% power.

2. Procedure DGP 01-01, Unit Startup, is in progress.

3. The following equipment is OOS:

a. None

4. LCOs:

a. Tech Spec 3.8.1 for U2 EDG surveillance.

Scenario Sequence

• The Team shuts down the U2 EDG following surveillance completion.

• Control rod F-05 loses all RPIS indication. The Team will insert the control rod, reference Tech Specs and direct taking it OOS.

• 2A RFP vent fan trips. 2B RFP vent fan fails to auto start. The Team will start 2B RFP vent fan.

• An ERV spuriously opens due to an electrical failure. Pulling its fuses closes the ERV.

• The FWLC setpoint drifts high. The Team will take manual control of the FWLC system.

• A RBCCW pump trips. The Team will start the standby pump.

• A large leak develops in the RBCCW system. The Team will scram the reactor and trip the recirculation pumps to prevent damage to them.

• An ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level. The HPCI System operation should be prevented and an emergency depressurization performed as directed by the DEOP for primary containment control. If HPCI operation is not prevented, it will spuriously initiate as Torus level drops.

Event One - Shutdown U2 EDG Following Surveillance Testing

• The crew shuts down the U2 EDG following surveillance testing.

Malfunctions required: 0

• None.

Success Path:

• Performs DOS 6600-01, Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 3 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Two - Control Rod RPIS Failure

• Control rod F-05 will loose all RPIS indication.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Loss of Control Rod F-05 RPIS indication)

Success Path:

• Inserts Control Rod F-05 and references Tech Specs Event Three - RFP Vent Fan Trips With Failure Of Standby To Auto Start

• The team recognizes and responds to a RFP Vent Fan Trip.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (2A RFP Vent Fan trip)

Success Path:

• The Team starts the standby RFP Vent Fan.

Event Four - Spurious ERV Opening

• An ERV spuriously opens.

Malfunctions Required: 1

• (ERV fails open)

Success Path:

• Performs DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, and pulls the ERVs control power fuses.

Event Five - FWLC Setpoint Drifts High

• The FWLC setpoint will drift high.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (FWLC setpoint failure)

Success Path:

• The Team performs DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control, and takes manual control of FWLC.

Event Six - RBCCW Pump Trip

• A RBCCW pump trips.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (RBCCW pump trip)

Success Path:

• The team starts the standby RBCCW pump.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 4 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Seven - Loss of RBCCW / Manual Scram

• A leak develops in the RBCCW system.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (RBCCW system leak)

Success Path:

• The team performs DOA 3700-01, Loss of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System.

Event Eight - Torus Leak

• The crew should recognize and respond to a lowering torus water level. If the Team does not prevent HPCI operation, a spurious HPCI initiation will occur while Torus level is dropping.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Torus Leak)

Success Path:

• Prevent HPCI operation.

• Emergency Depressurize.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 5 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1 If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-JA-150-08, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

a. Inform the crew that the QNE is preparing a new REMA and pulling control rods will resume when the QNE returns.

b. Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.

c. Provide the crew with a copy of applicable procedure(s) marked up and completed through the appropriate steps:

1) DGP 01-01, Unit Startup

2) DOP 0400-01, Reactor Manual Control System Operation

3) DOP 0400-02, Rod Worth Minimizer

4) DOP 5600-06, Unit 2 Turbine Startup (Shell warming in progress)

5) DOS 6600-01, Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests (Ready to shutdown U2 EDG) 2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. Initialize simulator in password protected IC 159 which has the following setup:

1) Mode Switch in STARTUP.

2) One Turbine Bypass valve partially open. (~2% RX power)

3) Control Rod F-05 at position 48. (Sequence XI.1.0.8333)

4) Rod Move step 21 in progress with rods C11, N05 & N11 withdrawn to position 48.

5) Shell warming in progress

b. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed, to maintain DP within limits.

c. Remove Process Computer point E208 from scan. (Causing nuisance alarms)

d. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.

e. Advance the chart recorders.

3 Verify the following simulator conditions:

a. Turbine Shell warming in progress.

b. 2A and 2/3 (on bus 24) RBCCW pumps running.

c. 2B RBCCW pump OFF.

d. 2A RFP vent fan running with 2B off.

e. Start and load U2 EDG per DOS 6600-01:

1) At the instructor station, set the U2 EDG droop to 55. (irf t02 true)

2) At the instructor station, acknowledge the local U2 EDG annunciator panel. (irf t20 acknowledge)

3) Reset the U2 EDG Trouble alarm on the 902-8 panel.

4) Place the U2 EDG control switch to START.

5) Turn the Synchroscope for the U2 EDG output breaker ON.

6) Adjust the U2 EDG voltage and frequency for synchronization.

7) Close the U2 EDG output breaker.

8) Adjust the U2 EDG load and frequency to the values directed by DOS 6600-01.

9) Turn the Synchroscope for the U2 EDG output breaker OFF.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 6 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

4 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. None NOTE: Perform the above setup prior to running the setup CAEP file.

5 Run the initial setup CAEP file: ILT-N-1.cae. Then perform the following:

NOTE: Variables with more than one array dimension will not load into the EVENT program from a CAEP file.

Therefore it is necessary to load variables fwdvf_drw(2,1) and fwdvf_drw(1,3) directly into the EVENT program.

a. Open the EVENT program and perform the following:

1) Double click line 5 to select Event 5. (dor fwdvf4 should already be in the Command box)

2) In the Event Action box, enter variable: fwdvf_drw(2,1)

3) Click Accept New Event. Verify the variable was added to Line 5.

4) Double click line 23 to select Event 23. (dor fwlvfind5 should already be in the Command box)

5) In the Event Action box, enter variable: fwdvf_drw(1,3)

6) Click Accept New Event. Verify the variable was added to Line 23.

7) Double click line 24 to select Event 24. (mmf ser1336 normal should already be in the Command box)

8) In the Event Action box, enter variable: fwdvf_drw(1,3)

9) Click Accept New Event. Verify the variable was added to Line 24.

NOTE: Some analog overrides do not load correctly from a CAEP file. (See SWR #8652) Therefore it is necessary to setup override WRPPDSH1 manually.

b. Open the ACTION Program and perform the following:

1) Select tab OVERRIDE AO

2) Locate override WRPPDSH1 and open it.

3) Set Ramp Start Value 65.0

4) Set Ramp time to 5:00

5) Set Delay Time to 10:00

6) Set Analog Value to 10.0

7) Set Event Trigger to 10

8) Click Insert.

6 Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks

 Time Critical Tasks

 PRA Key Operator Actions Required Actions Optional Actions SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 7 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event One - Shutdown U2 EDG Following Surveillance Testing Trigger Position Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator / Role Play:

1 NLO to set U2 EDG droop to 5: Wait 1 min, activate trigger 1 which sets the droop to 5 and forces up alarm 902-8 A-7, U2 Diesel Gen Trouble.

Verify trigger 2 activates automatically when alarm 902-8 A-7 comes in. This returns the 2 alarm to normal after 10 seconds.

Then report The U2 EDG droop is set to 5.

Role Play:

NLO to check the lubrication oil level with the dipstick: wait 1 min, and then report the U2 EDG oil level is midway between the FULL and LOW marks.

For other operator direction, respond as needed.

CRS Directs the BOP to Shutdown U2 EDG per DOS 6600-01, Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests.

BOP Performs DOS 6600-01, Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests.

Reduces the D/G load to less than 100 kW using the GOVERNOR control switch.

Opens the circuit breaker from the D/G 2 to 4 kV Bus 24-1 and records time.

Directs the NLO at the D/G governor to set the droop setting to 5 and reset the local annunciator.

Resets annunciator 902-8 A-7, U2 DIESEL GEN TROUBLE.

Adjusts D/G speed to 60 Hz with the GOVERNOR control switch.

Adjusts D/G voltage to 4160 volts with the VOLTAGE REG control switch.

Moves the D/G control switch to the STOP position momentarily, then moves the switch to the AUTO position and records time.

Floor Instructor Role Play:

When the NSO moves the D/G control switch to the AUTO position, notify him that as the U3 ANSO, you have been directed to complete the surveillance.

When the U2 D/G stops, acknowledge, announce and reset expected alarms:

902-7 G-8, U2 Diesel Gen Clg Wtr PP Trip/Lockout.

902-8 A-7, U2 Diesel Gen Trouble.

Event 1 Completion Criteria:

• U2 EDG shutdown, (Or in the cooldown period)

AND/OR,

• OR, at the direction of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 8 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Two - Control Rod RPIS Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

3 At the direction of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 3, RPIS failure for control rod F-05.

ROLE PLAY:

Respond as Support Groups notified.

ATC Reports and responds to DANs 902-5 A-3 ROD DRIFT, and B-3 ROD WORTH MIN BLOCK.

Views Full Core Display and identifies CRD with Rod Drift light.

Selects Control Rod F-05 and reports no indication on Four Rod Display for Control Rod F-05.

ATC Recognizes loss of control rod F-05 position indication on Full Core Display, Four Rod Display, RWM, and/or Process Computer.

CRS Enters DOA 0300-06, RPIS Failure, and directs its actions.

ATC Performs subsequent actions of DOA 0300-06, RPIS Failure:

Stops any power change or control rod motion in progress.

May insert Rod F-05 to 00 prior to entering DOA 0300-06.

Enters substitute position of 48 for F-05.

Inserts control rod F-05 one notch.

Determines no control rod position indication at alternate position.

Drives rod F-05 to fully inserted position.

Calls WEC to electrically or hydraulically isolate the control rod F-05 HCU.

May enter a substitute position and take OOS on the RWM per DOP 0400-02, Rod Worth Minimizer.

CRS References appropriate plant licensing documents and determines:

TS 3.1.3, condition C, required actions:

C.1 Fully insert inoperable control rod within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />; AND, C.2. Disarm the associated CRD within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Directs electrically or hydraulically isolating control rod F-05 HCU.

ROLE PLAY As QNE acknowledge reports. If concurrence is requested for any action, report I concur with (insert requested action here)

BOP Monitors panel, provides assistance as directed.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 9 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Two - Control Rod RPIS Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior TEAM May enter DOA 0300-12, Mispositioned Control Rod.

Notifies the Shift Manager, QNE, Work Week Manager, Fin team, IMD, OR EMD.

ROLE PLAY:

When NLO directed to disarm control rod F-05, report: Ill disarm F-05 after I receive a pre-job brief (it is not intended for this to be completed).

ATC Records failed RPIS indication per DOS 0300-06, CRD Abnormality Record.

Event 2 Completion Criteria:

• DOA 0300-06 actions have been taken,

• Technical Specifications have been referenced, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 10 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Three - RFP Vent Fan Trips With Failure Of Standby To Auto Start.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE: Ensure the ATC operator performs this Event Simulator Operator:

4 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 4, which causes 2A RFP vent fan to trip. The initial setup prevents 2B RFP vent fan from auto starting.

5 Verify trigger 5 automatically activates when 2B RFP vent fan control switch is placed to CLOSE. This allows 2B RFP vent fan to start.

20-22 Verify triggers 20-22 automatically activate when Trigger 5 activates. This deletes 2B RFP vent fan light overrides.

23-24 Verify triggers 23-24 automatically activate when 2A RFP vent fan control switch is placed to PTL. This returns 2A RFP vent fan AUTO TRIP light and trip alarm to normal.

Role Play:

NLO to check operation of 2B RFP vent fan: Wait 2 min, and then report that 2B RFP vent fan is operating normally.

NLO to check 2A RFP vent fan breaker: Wait 2 min, and then report 2A RFP vent fan breaker tripped on over current.

ATC Acknowledges and announces alarm 902-6 F-8, RFP Vent Fan Trip:

Determines 2B RFP Vent Fan did not auto start as expected and manually starts it.

Sends operators to check status of the RFP vent fans.

Performs DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.

CRS Directs starting 2B RFP vent fan.

Enters DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.

BOP Assists as directed.

TEAM May reference DOA 5750-01, Ventilation System Failure.

Event 3 Completion Criteria:

• 2B RFP vent fan is started, AND / OR;

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 11 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Four - Spurious ERV Opening.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

6 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 6, which causes C ERV to spuriously open due to an electrical failure.

As the NLO sent to pull control power fuses for the C ERV (wait 3 min) activate trigger 7 7, which removes control power fuses for the C ERV, then call the control room on the phone and report: I have pulled the C ERV fuses.

As the QNE called to evaluate core parameters (wait 2 min) then report: core parameters are within limits.

BOP Determines/announces that C ERV is open. Performs DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, immediate actions:

Places the C ERV control switch to OFF.

ATC Verifies FWLCS has stabilized level.

CRS Enters DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, and directs actions.

BOP Determines that C ERV is still open and performs subsequent actions of DOA 0250-01:

Cycles C ERV control switch to MAN and OFF twice.

Cycles the ADS INHIBIT switch from NORMAL to INHIBIT to NORMAL several times.

Directs C ERV control power fuses pulled.

When torus temp is greater than circulating water inlet temperature, starts torus cooling as directed.

Reports when > 95° and DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, entry is required.

Checks hydrogen addition operation.

May monitor torus temp per DOS 1600-20, Suppression Pool Temp Monitoring.

Resets the acoustic monitor.

CRS May direct scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

May enter DEOP 200-01, Primary Containment Control, for high Torus level.

If Torus temperature reaches 95°F, then enters DEOP 200-1, Primary Containment Control, and performs/directs:

Monitoring of PC/P Initiation of torus cooling. (May already be started per DOA 0250-01)

Monitoring of Torus level.

Verifying initiation of drywell and torus H2/O2 monitors.

ATC Performs scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.

o Scram preparatory conditions already exist.

BOP Determines/announces that C ERV closed when fuses pulled.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 12 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Four - Spurious ERV Opening.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Declares C ERV inoperable.

Determines following Technical Specifications apply:

• 3.4.3, Safety and Relief Valves, Condition A.1: Restore the relief valve to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

• 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition G.1: Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

• 3.6.1.8, Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker, SR 3.6.1.8.2:

Perform a functional test of each required vacuum breaker within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

• May reference 3.6.2.1.A for Torus Temperature

• May reference 3.3.6.3.A for ERV instrumentation

• May reference 3.6.1.6, Low Set Relief Valves, Condition A.1: Restore to Operable status within 14 days.

CRS Directs performance of Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker testing.

TEAM May enter and perform DGA 7, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition Event 4 Completion Criteria:

• The failed ERV is closed,

• Technical Specification determination completed, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 13 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Five - FWLC Controller Setpoint Drifts High Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

8 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 8, which causes the FWLC setpoint to drift high.

Role Play:

Support Personnel: respond you will assist as directed.

TEAM Determines RPV level is increasing.

CRS Enters DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control.

Directs ATC to control RPV level manually.

ATC Places FWLC in MAN and manually controls RPV level.

BOP Assists as directed.

TEAM May enter DGA 07, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition.

CRS Contacts support personnel for assistance.

Event 5 Completion Criteria:

• RPV level stabilized, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 14 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Six - RBCCW Pump Trip Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

9 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 9, which trips 2A RBCCW pump.

Role Play:

NLO to check 2B RBCCW pump operation: Wait 2 min, then report 2B RBCCW pump is operating normally.

NLO to check 2A RBCCW pump breaker: Wait 2 min, then report 2A RBCCW pump breaker has an overcurrent target up.

NLO to check 2A RBCCW pump: Wait 2 min, then report 2A RBCCW pump motor is very hot to the touch.

BOP Acknowledges and announces alarm(s):

o 923-1 C-1, U2 or U3 RBCCW Pump Trip o 923-1 D-1, U2 or U3 RBCCW Press Lo (may not come up)

Starts 2B RBCCW pump.

Sends an operator to check RBCCW system status.

Performs DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip, actions as directed.

CRS May enter DOA 3700-01, Loss of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW)

System.

Directs BOP to start 2B RBCCW pump.

Enters DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip.

ATC Assists as directed.

CRS Contacts support personnel for assistance.

Event 6 Completion Criteria:

• Standby RBCCW pump started, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 15 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Seven -Loss of RBCCW Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

10 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 10, which simulates a leak in the Reactor Building from the RBCCW system.

11 As the NLO sent to defeat the RBV high Drywell pressure and RPV water level interlocks (wait 5 min) activate trigger 11 and then report: the RBV high Drywell pressure and RPV water level interlocks are defeated.

12 Verify trigger 12 automatically activates when East RBFDS mass is >7950.0 (variable wamrfsa2). This holds the East RBFDS mass above the High High level.

16-19 Verify triggers 16 thru 19 automatically activate when all RBCCW pumps are OFF. This returns overrides to normal.

ROLE PLAY:

As the NLO sent to check RBCCW head tank level (wait 2 min) then report: RBCCW head tank level is out of the sight glass low. The head tank makeup valve is open.

As the NLO to check RBCCW head tank drain sightglass (wait 1 min) then report there is no flow through the RBCCW head tank drain sightglass.

As the NLO sent to check RBCCW system (wait 2 min) then report: There is a very large leak coming from the RBCCW HX area. The floor is flooded with water.

If asked as the NLO about isolating the leak, report: The leak cannot be isolated.

As the NLO sent to check the RBFDS (wait 2 min) then report: the East Reactor Building Floor Drain sump is overflowing onto the Torus basement floor.

If called as the Radwaste Control Room Operator and asked about the inputs into the Radwaste sumps, report: the Floor Drain input has increased significantly.

BOP Announces alarm 923-1 F-1, U2 RBCCW Head Tank Lvl Hi/Lo

• Refers to DAN and performs actions.

• Monitors operation of the RBCCW system.

• Dispatches NLO to check U2 RBCCW Head tank level.

• Announces entry into DOA 3700-01, Loss of Cooling by Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System, is required.

CRS Enters DOA 3700-01, Loss of Cooling by Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System, and directs actions.

BOP Performs DOA 3700-01, Loss of Cooling by Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System, actions as directed.

Announces alarm 923-4 A-3, U2 E. RBFD Sump Lvl Hi-Hi

• Dispatches operators to check sumps

• Announces entry to DEOP 300-01, Secondary Containment Control, is required.

CRS Enters DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control.

May enter DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in Plant, and direct actions.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 16 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Seven -Loss of RBCCW Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Performs DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in Plant, actions as directed.

CRS May direct scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

ATC Performs scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.

o Scram preparatory actions already exist.

CRS Determines RBCCW System loss CANNOT be prevented and performs / directs:

Manual scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

May enter DOA 0202-01, Recirculation (Recirc) Pump Trip - One or Both Pumps and direct tripping both Recirc pumps.

Directs tripping RBCCW pumps.

ATC / Performs the scram actions per their hardcards.

BOP Trips Recirc pumps Trips RBCCW pumps Event 7 Completion Criteria:

• Reactor scram ordered, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 17 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Eight - An ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

13 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 13 which starts an ECCS suction line break in the torus basement.

Note:

It takes about 20 minutes for torus level to reach 11 feet. At the discretion of the lead examiner, use the cues later in this event to jump ahead in time to expedite the level drop if desired.

BOP Reports the following alarms:

• 923 A-3 (B-2), U2 E(W) RBFD SUMP LVL HI-HI

• 902-4 C-23, Torus Narrow Range Wtr Lvl Lo Checks the torus narrow range level indicator. Reports level dropping.

Directs NLO to perform DOS 1600-02, Torus Level Verification Using Local Sight Glass.

Directs NLO to investigate leakage to torus basement.

Verifies proper operation of the RBFD Sump pumps. (Will require resetting the Group 2 isolation at both the 902-5 panel and the 923-4 panel for the sump pumps to operate if a Group 2 Isolation occurs).

Role Play:

As the NLO sent to verify Torus level locally using sight glass (wait 4 min), then report:

Local Torus level is (use value from variable ppc232, unless it is <20, then report it is below the sightglass).

As the NLO sent to investigate leakage (wait 2 min) or if not sent, then as the NLO on his round, report: there is a large rupture from a pipe attached between the Torus shell and the Torus suction ring header near the East LPCI Corner room. The Torus basement floor is covered with water. There is no valve on the line.

As the NLO sent to report LPCI corner status (wait 2 min), then report: there is no water in either LPCI corner room.

As Maintenance sent to determine if the leak can be stopped (wait 3 min), then report:

Maintenance cannot stop the leak.

CRS May enter DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in Plant.

BOP Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in Plant, as directed:

Makes PA announcement.

Directs NLO to investigate leakage to torus basement.

Notifies Radiation Protection and Security as time permits.

Cue: (if desired for time compression) (to be handled by Lead Examiner)

When torus level is < 14.5 feet and/or at the discretion of the lead examiner, cue the crew that we are taking a time jump and that both torus wide range level meters indicate 12.5 feet and are dropping at about 1 foot per 10 minutes.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 18 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Eight - An ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

14 If the Team has not prevented HPCI operation prior to reaching a Torus level of 12 feet and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 14, which causes a spurious initiation of HPCI.

CRS Enters and directs performance of DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control:

May attempt to add water to the Torus by opening the HPCI 14 valve.

May decide to anticipate RPV Blowdown:

• Directs opening turbine bypass valves.

Directs BOP to prevent HPCI from operating before torus level reaches 12 feet.

BOP Opens turbine bypass valves. (if directed)

BOP Performs the following actions per DEOP 200-01, Primary Containment Control, as directed:

May attempt to add water to the torus by opening the HPCI 14 valve.

Monitors/Reports DEOP 200-01 entry parameters.

Prevents HPCI from operating.

CRS Enters DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control, and directs:

If Reactor Building Ventilation isolates when unit is scrammed, directs restarting Reactor Building Ventilation.

BOP Performs DEOP 300-01, Secondary Control, as directed:

Time permitting, restarts Reactor Building Ventilation (if it isolates when the reactor is scrammed).

Cue: (if time compression was used above) 10 minutes after the initial time compression cue was given and/or at the discretion of the lead examiner, cue the crew that both the Torus wide range level meters indicate 11.5 feet and are dropping at a rate of about 1 foot per 10 minutes.

CRS When informed that torus level is approaching 11 feet:

Enters DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, and directs:

Initiation of Isolation Condenser to maximum flow.

Verification that SP/L >6 feet.

Opening all ADS valves. (Only 4 ADSVs available; fuses pulled on C)

Verification relief valves are open.

Directs other Emergency Depressurization systems initiated:

o May direct fuses installed for C ADSV.

o Directs turbine bypass valves opened. (May already be open for anticipation of Emergency Depressurization)

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 19 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Eight - An ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Performs DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, actions as directed:

Initiates Isolation Condenser to maximum flow Verifies that SP/L >6 feet.

Opens ADS valves. (Only 4 ADSVs available; fuses pulled on C)

Verifies all relief valves are open.

Initiates other Emergency Depressurization systems as directed:

o May direct fuses installed for C ADSV.

o Opens turbine bypass valves. (May already be open for anticipation of Emergency Depressurization)

Events 8 / Scenario Completion Criteria:

• HPCI operation prevented,

• RPV depressurization in progress, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 20 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Critical Tasks:

When suppression pool level cannot be maintained above top elevation of (PC-3.2) the HPCI Exhaust (12), TRIP AND PREVENT HPCI operation irrespective of adequate core cooling.

When it is determined that suppression pool water level cannot be held (PC-3.3) above 11 feet wide range, INITIATE emergency depressurization SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 21 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-4 C-23 TORUS NARROW RANGE WTR LVL LO DAN 902-5 A-3 ROD DRIFT ALARM DAN 902-5 B-3 ROD WORTH MIN BLOCK DAN 902-5 C-3 ROD OUT BLOCK DAN 902-6 F-8 RFP VENT FAN TRIP DAN 902-8 A-7 U2 DIESEL GEN TROUBLE DAN 923-1 C-1 U2 OR U3 RBCCW PUMP TRIP DAN 923-1 D-1 U2 OR U3 RBCCW PRESS LO DAN 923-1 F-1 U2 RBCCW HEAD TANK LVL HI/LO DAN 923-4 A-3 (B-2) U2 E(W) RBFD SUMP LVL HI-HI DEOP 0100-00 RPV CONTROL DEOP 0200-01 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL DEOP 0300-01 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL DEOP 0400-02 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION DGA 07 UNPREDICTED REACTIVITY ADDITION DGP 02-03 REACTOR SCRAM DGP 03-04 CONTROL ROD MOVEMENTS DOA 0040-02 LOCALIZED FLOODING IN PLANT DOA 0250-01 RELIEF VALVE FAILURE DOA 0300-06 RPIS FAILURE DOA 0300-12 MISPOSITIONED CONTROL ROD DOA 0600-01 TRANSIENT LEVEL CONTROL DOA 3700-01 LOSS OF COOLING BY REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER (RBCCW) SYSTEM DOA 5750-01 VENTILATION SYSTEM FAILURE DOA 6500-10 4KV CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOP 0400-02 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER DOP 6700-20 480V CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOS 0300-06 CRD ABNORMALITY RECORD DOS 1600-02 TORUS LEVEL VERIFICATION USING LOCAL SIGHT GLASS DOS 6600-01 DIESEL GENERATOR SURVEILLANCE TESTS.

T.S. 3.1.3 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY T.S. 3.3.6.3 ERV INSTRUMENTATION T.S. 3.4.3 SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES T.S. 3.5.1 ECCS OPERATING T.S. 3.6.1.6 LOW SET RELIEF VALVES T.S. 3.6.1.8 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER T.S. 3.6.2.1 TORUS TEMPERATURE SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 22 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

EXAM ILT-N-1 QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES 7 Total malfunctions inserted (4 to 8) / (10 to 14) 1 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry (1 to 4) / (3 to 6) 3 Abnormal events (1 to 2) / (2 to 3) 1 Major transients (1 to 2) / (2 to 3) 3 EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP (1 to 3) / (3 to 5) 1 EOPs contingency procedures used (0 to 3) / (1 to 3) 60 Approximate scenario run time (45 to 60 min) / (one scenario may approach 90 minutes) 40% EOP run time (40 to 70% of scenario run time) 2 Crew critical tasks (2 to 5) / (5 to 8)

Yes Technical Specifications exercised (Yes or No)

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 23 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Computer Aided Exercise Programs

1. NRC Exam ILT 08-1

1. SCENARIO ILT-N-1.cae

1. Written by FRF

1. Rev 00

1. Date 09/08

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Overrides alarm 902-3 C-03 off.

imf ser0004 off imf ser0019 off

1. Overrides W. LPCI/CS sump alarm OFF imf ser0557 off

1. Prevents 2B RFP vent fan from starting ior fwdvf4 trip

1. Overrides 2B RFP vent fan lights. Necessary to prevent flickering when fan started.

ior fwlvfind2 onl2 ior fwlvfind4 offl2 ior fwlvfind6 offl2

1. Inserts C ERV binding of 20%.

imf ads3cbn 20.0l2

1. Removes alarm 902-3 A-2, MSL Rad Mon Hi alarm. (Should not be up) imf ser0024 offl4 imf ser0058 offl4 imf ser0060 offl4 imf ser0062 offl4

1. EVENT TRIGGERS

1. Event Trigger 1 Sets U2 EDG droop to 5 and forces up alarm 902-8 A-7, U2 Diesel Gen Trouble.

trgset 1 "0"l6 irf t02 (1) falsel6 imf ser1589 (1) onl6

1. Event Trigger 2 clears alarm 902-8 A-7.

trgset 2 "sezpoint(1589)"l6 trg 2 "imf ser1589 (0 10) normal"l6

1. Event Trigger 3 Fails all control rod F-05 RPIS indications.

trgset 3 "0"l8 imf rdfailf5 (3)l8 imf cr043s (3) badl8

1. Event Trigger 4 trips 2A RFP vent fan.

trgset 4 "0"l8 ior fwdvf1 (4) offl10 ior fwdvf3 (4) tripl10 ior fwlvfind5 (4) onl10 imf ser1336 (4) onl10

1. Event Trigger 5 Automatically activates when 2B RFP vent fan control switch is placed to CLOSE.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 24 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

1. Deletes the override for the 2B RFP vent fan control switch TRIP position.

1. NOTE: The digital control switch variable {fwdvf_drw(2,1)} to trigger the Event must be manually

1. entered in the EVENT program because the CAEP program will not handle it.

trgset 5 "0"l12 trg 5 "dor fwdvf4"l12

1. Event trigger 6 causes the C ERV setpoint to drift to fail it open.

Trgset 6 "0"l12 imf ads3csd (6) 75.0l12

1. Event Trigger 7 Deletes C ERV binding malfunction so valve will close and removes fuses for the C ERV.

Trgset 7 "0"l14 trg 7 "dmf ads3cbn"l14 irf adsrfc (7) pulledl14

1. Event Trigger 8 Drifts the FWLCS setpoint.

Trgset 8 "0"l14 irf rllmls (8) 50.0 5:00l14

1. Event Trigger 9 Trips 2A RBCCW pump.

Trgset 9 "0"l16 imf q01 (9)l16

1. Trigger 10 Simulates a RBCCW leak in the Rx Bldg.

1. Ramps E. RBFDS mass to fill it.

1. Overrides alarm 923-1 E-2 RBCCW Head Tank Lvl Lo.

1. After 10 min, ramps RBCCW Disch pressure meter to 10 psig over 5 min.

1. After 11 min, overrides alarm 923-1 D-1.

1. After 12 min, overrides 902-4 G-3 ON.

1. After 12:15 min, overrides 902-4 G-7 ON.

Trgset 10 "0"l16 trg 10 "ramp wamrfsa2 5000.0 8000.0 3:00"l16 imf ser1784 (10) onl18 imf ser1735 (10 11:00) onl18 imf ser0369 (10 12:00) onl18 imf ser0322 (10 12:15) onl18

1. Trigger 11 Jumpers the RBV Group II Isolation signal.

Trgset 11 "0"l20 irf cirbvnt (11) liftedl20

1. Event Trigger 12 Activates when E. RBFDS mass is >7950.0, which holds E. RBFDS mass above Hi Hi level.

Trgset 12 "wamrfsa2 .gt. 7950.0"l20 trg 12 "ramp wamrfsa2 7950.0 8000.0 10:00"l20

1. Event Trigger 13 Inserts an ECCS suction line break.

trgset 13 "0"l22 trg 13 "ramp wamwlps 200.0 201.0 1:00:00"l22 imf csbrksev (13) 100.0l22 imf csppbbrk (13) 100.0l22

1. Event Trigger 14 Inserts a spurious HPCI initiation.

trgset 14 "0"l24 imf hpinit (14)l24

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Triggers 16-19 Activate when no RBCCW pumps are running. #####

1. Event Trigger 16 Deletes RBCCW pressure meter override.

Trgset 16 ".not. (wrsp(1) .or. wrsp(2) .or. wrsp(3))"l28 trg 16 "dor wrppdsh1"l24 SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 25 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

1. Event Trigger 17 Returns alarm 923-1 D-1 override to normal.

Trgset 17 ".not. (wrsp(1) .or. wrsp(2) .or. wrsp(3))"l30 trg 17 "imf ser1735 normal"l24

1. Event Trigger 18 Returns alarm 902-4 G-3 override to normal.

Trgset 18 ".not. (wrsp(1) .or. wrsp(2) .or. wrsp(3))"l32 trg 18 "imf ser0369 normal"l26

1. Event Trigger 19 Returns alarm 902-4 G-7 override to normal.

Trgset 19 ".not. (wrsp(1) .or. wrsp(2) .or. wrsp(3))"l34 trg 19 "imf ser0322 normal"l26

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Triggers 20-22 Activate when Trigger 5 activates. #####

1. Event Trigger 20 Deletes 2B RFP vent fan CLOSE light override.

Trgset 20 "et_array(5)"l36 trg 20 "dor fwlvfind4"l36

1. Event Trigger 21 Deletes 2B RFP vent fan AUTO TRIP light override.

Trgset 21 "et_array(5)"l36 trg 21 "dor fwlvfind6"l36

1. Event Trigger 22 Deletes 2B RFP vent fan OFF light override.

Trgset 22 "et_array(5)"l38 trg 22 "dor fwlvfind2"l38

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Triggers 23-24 Activate when 2A RFP vent fan is placed to PTL. #####

1. NOTE: The digital control switch variable {fwdvf_drw(1,3)} to trigger Events 23-24 must be manually

1. entered in the EVENT program because the CAEP program will not handle it.

1. Event Trigger 23 Deletes 2A RFP vent fan AUTO TRIP light override.

Trgset 23 "0"l38 trg 23 "dor fwlvfind5"l38

1. Event Trigger 24 returns SER for 2A RFP vent fan trip alarm to NORMAL..

Trgset 24 "0"l40 trg 24 "mmf ser1336 normal"l40

1. END SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 26 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Date: TODAY Unit 2 Turnover Online Information Protected Pathway(s) Shutdown Information 0 MWe Time to Boil: N/A Online Risk: Green Shutdown Risk: N/A Risk Equipment:

Reactivity Management Limit: MFLCPR N/A Action Level: N/A Unit 2 Priorities S/D Method: DGP 02-01 Continue Unit Startup.

Complete U2 EDG Surveillance LCORAs 2 LCORA 3.8.1.B DOS 6600-01 Start 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago Title U2 EDG Clock Ends in 7 days Compensatory Actions Degradation Frequency Compensatory Action Documentation Responsible Unit 2 Conditions, Status, Abnormalities Reactor Power on IRM range 8 with one bypass valve partially open.

The QNE is preparing a new REMA. Expected to be ready in 1/2 hour.

The U2 EDG is ready to be shutdown. All data has been collected.

Unit 2 Abnormal Component Position U2 Open Operability Determinations with Compensatory Actions Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities DGP 01-01 DOP 5600-06 DOS 6600-01 Common Unit Activities Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Unit 2 Procedures in Progress (Non-Surveillance)

DGP 01-01, Unit Startup DOP 5600-06, Main Turbine Startup Unit 2 Surveillances in Progress DOS 6600-01, Ready to continue procedure at step I.15.g.

SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 27 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Date: TODAY Unit 2 Turnover Online Information Protected Pathway(s) Shutdown Information 0 MWe I. II. Time to Boil: N/A Online Risk: Green Shutdown Risk: N/A Risk Equipment:

Reactivity Management Limit: MFLCPR N/A Action Level: N/A Unit 2 Priorities S/D Method: DGP 02-01 Start 2B RBCCW Pump, secure 2/3 Pump for Oil change.

Continue Unit Startup.

LCORAs LCORA None Start Title Clock Ends Compensatory Actions Degradation Frequency Compensatory Action Documentation Responsible Unit 2 Conditions, Status, Abnormalities Reactor Power on IRM range 8 with one bypass valve partially open.

The QNE recommends single notching control rod move step 21 out to rod position 32. This is to avoid short periods due to proximity of the rods to the SRMs.

NLO in field for RBCCW pump swap.

Unit 2 Abnormal Component Position U2 Open Operability Determinations with Compensatory Actions Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities DGP 01-01 DOP 5600-06 DOP 3700-02 Common Unit Activities Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Unit 2 Procedures in Progress (Non-Surveillance)

DGP 01-01, Unit Startup DOP 5600-06, Main Turbine Startup Unit 2 Surveillances in Progress None SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 28 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Date: TODAY Unit 3 Turnover Online Information Protected Pathway(s) Shutdown Information 912 MWe Time to Boil: 0 Online Risk: Green Shutdown Risk: N/A Risk Equipment:

Reactivity Management Limit: MFLCPR 0.78 Increasing slowly Action Level: 0.980 Unit 3 Priorities S/D Method: DGP 02-01 Maintain load per TSO direction.

LCORAs LCORA # None Start Title Clock Ends Compensatory Actions Degradation Frequency Compensatory Action Documentation Responsible Unit 3 Conditions, Status, Abnormalities Unit 3 Abnormal Component Position U3 Open Operability Determinations with Compensatory Actions Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Common Unit Activities Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Unit 3 Procedures in Progress (Non-Surveillance)

None Unit 3 Surveillances in Progress None SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 29 of 29 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-2 RAISE REACTOR POWER USING RECIRCULATION FLOW CORE SPRAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE RFP DEVELOPS OIL LEAK MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTROLLER FAILS DOWNSCALE SWAP TBCCW PUMPS INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR TRIP LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR / REACTOR SCRAM UNISOLABLE ISOLATION CONDENSER STEAM LEAK TO RX BLDG /

EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION FOR HIGH RAD Rev. 00 09/08 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Station: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-2 Class ID: 2009-301 Evaluators Operators / crew position

/ ATC

/ BOP

/ CRS Initial Conditions: Rx Power ~ 33%

Turnover: Raise Power With Recirculation Flow Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description ATC 1 NONE R Recirc - Raise Reactor Power using Recirculation Flow.

CRS CSV4A BOP 2 C Core Spray - A CS System Low Pressure. T SCAFILOF CRS ATC 3 NONE C RFP - 2B RFP Develops an Oil Leak, Must Swap.

CRS ATC Recirc - Master Recirc Flow Controller Fails Downscale /

4 RRMASDND I CRS Secondary Containment Doors Found Open. T BOP 5 NONE N TBCCW - Swap TBCCW Pumps.

CRS BOP 6 N33 C Inst Air - Instrument Air Compressor Trip.

CRS 7 NP2 M TEAM Inst Air - Instrument Air Leak / Manual Scram.

8 ICSTMRB M TEAM Iso Cond - Steam Inlet Line Leak into Reactor Building.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec Scenario ILT-N-2 2 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Scenario Objective Evaluate the operators in using the Emergency Depressurization DEOP contingency procedure.

Scenario Summary Initial Conditions:

• Mode 1 at approximately 30% reactor power.

• Unit 3 is in Mode 1.

Scenario Sequence

• The Team raises reactor power using recirculation flow.

• A Core Spray System low-pressure alarm is received and the CRS must review Tech Specs and declare the loop INOP.

• The Team receives a report from the field that 2B RFP has an oil leak. The Team starts 2A RFP and secures 2B RFP.

• The Master Recirc Flow Controller fails downscale. The NSO will lockout both recirc scoop tubes. A short time later, a report from the field that Secondary Containment is breached by doors found open. The crew directs the doors be closed.

• The Team swaps TBCCW pumps.

• 3C Instrument Air Compressor (IAC) trips. Instrument Air pressure begins slowly dropping. Standby Air Compressor 2B is started to restore air pressure.

• A large leak develops in the Instrument Air system. The Team will scram the reactor due to the leak severity.

An electrical ATWS occurs and ARI is used to insert the control rods.

• After the Team has stabilized the plant, an unisolable Isolation Condenser Steam Line Leak into the Reactor Building occurs. Due to a Fuel Element Failure (FEF), Rx Bldg rad levels will increase to the point that the Team will perform an Emergency Depressurization.

Event One - Raises Reactor Power Using Recirculation Flow

• The Team raises reactor power using recirculation flow as directed by the QNE.

Malfunctions required: 0 None Success Path:

• Raises reactor power using recirculation flow.

Scenario ILT-N-2 3 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Two - A Core Spray System Low Pressure Alarm

• A Core Spray System low-pressure alarm is received.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (A Core Spray System low-pressure)

Success Path:

• CRS declares the system INOP and references Tech Specs.

Event Three - 2B RFP develops an oil leak, must swap

• Report from the field of an oil leak on 2B RFP.

Malfunctions required: 1

• 2B RFP oil leak Success Path:

• The Team starts 2A RFP and secures 2B RFP.

Event Four - Master Recirc Flow Controller Failure / Secondary Containment Doors Open

• Master Recirc Flow Controller fails downscale. The NSO will lock out scoop tubes. Later a report is received that Secondary Containment Doors are open.

Malfunctions Required: 1

• (Master Recirc Flow Controller fails down)

Success Path:

• Locks out both scoop tubes.

• Performs DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirc System Flow Control Failure.

• Directs the Secondary Containment Doors closed.

Event Five - Swap TBCCW Pumps

• The crew swaps TBCCW pumps.

Malfunctions required: 0

• None.

Success Path:

• 2B TBCCW pump started and the 2A TBCCW pump stopped.

Scenario ILT-N-2 4 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Six - Instrument Air Compressor Trip

• 3C Instrument Air Compressor trips. Instrument Air pressure begins slowly dropping.

Malfunctions required: 1

• 3C Instrument Air Compressor trips Success Path:

• Standby Air Compressor 2B is started.

Event Seven - Loss of Instrument Air / Reactor Scram

• A large leak develops in the Instrument Air system. An electrical ATWS occurs.

Malfunctions required: 2

• Instrument Air Leak

• Electrical ATWS Success Path:

• Initiate ARI.

Event Eight - Unisolable Isolation Condenser Steam Leak to Rx Bldg / Emergency Depressurization for High Rad

• An unisolable Isolation Condenser Steam Line Leak into the Reactor Building occurs. Due to a FEF, Rx Bldg rad levels will increase to the point that the Team will perform an Emergency Depressurization.

Malfunctions required: 2

• Unisolable Isolation Condenser Steam Line Leak

• FEF Success Path:

• The Team performs an Emergency Depressurization.

Scenario ILT-N-2 5 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1 If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities IAW with TQ-JA-150-08, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

a. Provide the Crew with a copy of DGP 03-01, Power Changes.

b. Provide the Crew with a copy of DOP 3200-03, Startup Of Second Or Third Reactor Feed Pump Or Shifting To Alternate Reactor Feed Pump.

c. Provide the Crew with a copy of DOP 3800-01, Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System (TBCCW).

d. Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.

2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. Initialize simulator in an IC with the Unit at 33% power. (IC 152 on the Exam Jump drive is setup for the following conditions)

b. Establish the following conditions:

1) Core flow at ~40 Mlbm/hr. (Adjust control rods if necessary to maintain ~33% power)

c. Verify:

1) 2B RFPs running.

2) 2A RFP OFF.

3) 2C RFP in STBY on Bus 22.

d. Verify:

1) 2A and 2C Condensate pumps running.

2) 2B Condensate pump OFF.

3) 2D Condensate pump in STBY

e. Verify running Condensate pump amps within operational limits.

f. Verify 2A FRV in Master Auto with 2B FRV in MAN.

g. Verify 2A TBCCW pump running and 2B off.

h. Verify 2A and 3C IACs running with 2B IAC off. (The CAEP file will close 2B IAC disc vlv per OPS)

NOTE: Complete the above setup before running the CAEP file.

i. Run the initial setup CAEP file: ILT-N-2.cae

j. Open, BUT DO NOT RUN YET, CAEP file: ILT-N-2 Rad.cae 3 Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

NOTE: The variables changed in CAEP file ILT-N-2 Rad.cae do not reset when the simulator is reset. CAEP file ILT-N-2 Clear Rad.cae will reset the variables.

4 After scenario completion and when the Lead Examiner releases the simulator, perform the following:

a. Place the simulator in RUN.

b. Run CAEP file: ILT-N-2 Clear Rad.cae

c. Freeze and reset the simulator to the desired IC.

d. Verify the Rad levels are indicating normal values.

Scenario ILT-N-2 6 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks

 Time Critical Tasks

 PRA Key Operator Actions Required Actions Optional Actions Scenario ILT-N-2 7 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event One - Raise Reactor Power using Recirculation Flow Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE: If the Team attempts to start the RFP before Event 3, report that contractors are cleaning around the 2A RFP. Wait to start it.

FLOOR INSTRUCTOR / SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

If the team announces that they will adjust gains, inform them an extra NSO will perform 1 the adjustment. Then:

Tell the team you are time compressing.

Direct the simulator operator to activate trigger 1 and verify gains within limits.

Inform the team the gains are adjusted.

(Note: trigger 1 can be toggled OFF, then back ON as many times as necessary to adjust gains)

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

NLO to cut in condensate demin beds: Use instructor station drawing FW4 to cut in condensate demin beds and acknowledge the local trouble alarm. Provide appropriate communications.

CRS Directs ATC to raise load with recirc flow to 58 Mlbm/hr core flow.

ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 03-01, Power Changes, and DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation, as directed:

Uses MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTLR, 2(3)-262-22, potentiometer to raise flow AND control reactor power.

BOP Monitors Panels.

Event 1 Completion Criteria:

• Sufficient power increase as determined by the Lead Examiner.

Scenario ILT-N-2 8 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Two- Core Spray System Low Pressure Alarm Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

2 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 2, which closes ECCS Keep Fill to 2A Core Spray loop and cracks open Core Spray 4A valve to bleed the pressure down.

Role Play:

NLO to investigate ECCS Jockey pump, (wait 3 min.):

Report, the ECCS jockey pump appears to be operating normally but I hear flow noise in the area.

If asked, wait 2 minutes:

Report, Water is spraying onto the 2A Core Spray motor from the flange of relief valve RV 2-1402-28A.

If asked local Core Spray system pressure, wait 1 minute:

Report, Local Core Spray system pressure is approximately (Use pressure from instructor station drawing CS1) psig.

If sent to vent system:

Report, No water is coming out the vent.

If calling radwaste to ask about RBEDT levels:

Report, The rate of input into the Unit 2 RBEDT has increased, the level is currently 60%.

BOP Reports alarm to CRS.

Carries out actions of DAN 902-3 D-7, 2A/B CORE SPRAY HDR PRESS LO:

Verify FLOW TEST VLV MO 2-1402-4A is fully closed.

Verify PP DISCH VLV MO 2-1402-24A is fully open.

Check for relief valve RV 2-1402-28A 2A CORE SPRAY PMP DISCH HDR RV leaking to Reactor Building Equipment Drain Tank OR valves leaking into Torus.

Notify Operations Shift Supervisor.

Directs WEC to send Operators out to investigate.

Directs an Equipment Attendant to inspect ECCS jockey pump for proper operation.

Places 2A Core Spray pump in PTL.

May direct 2A Core Spray pump discharge valve closed.

ATC Assists BOP with carrying out actions of DAN as necessary.

Scenario ILT-N-2 9 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Two- Core Spray System Low Pressure Alarm Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Directs carrying out actions of the DAN.

References Tech Spec 3.5.1 Condition B1.

Required action, restore Low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days. (Surveillance Requirement SR 3.5.1.1.)

Orders 2A Core Spray pump placed in PTL.

May direct closing keepfill to 2A Core Spray system. (2-1425-500)

OR May direct closing keepfill to 2A Core Spray system. (2-1402-36A)

May direct 2A Core Spray pump discharge valve closed.

Notifies Shift manager Notifies maintenance groups.

Event 2 Completion Criteria:

• 2A Core Spray system declared inoperable, AND/OR,

• At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Scenario ILT-N-2 10 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Three - 2B RFP develops an oil leak, requiring it to be secured Trigger Position Actions or Behavior Role Play:

Call the control room as the U-2 NLO and report, While I was on rounds, I found 2B RFP has an oil leak on a line to the speed changer. It cannot be stopped.

If asked the oil is contained on the bed plate and I plugged the drain before the oil reached it.

If asked, The oil level is below the sight glass.

If asked, I recommend securing 2B RFP as soon as possible.

If asked, Zinc injection is lined up to 2B RFP".

ATC Acknowledges report from the field and relays it to the CRS.

CRS May enter DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control.

Directs ATC to start 2A RFP and secure 2B RFP.

ATC Starts 2A RFP per DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control, OR DOP 3200-03, Startup Of Second Or Third Reactor Feed Pump Or Shifting To Alternate Reactor Feed Pump.

Places RFPs Standby Selector switch, STBY PP SELECT in OFF position.

Closes MO 2-3201A, Opens 2A RFP RECIRC VLV PCV 2-3201A by placing control switch in OPEN.

Verifies reactor water level is stable.

Verifies sufficient system pressures.

If previously closed, places MO 2-3201A, 2A PP DISCH VLV control switch to OPEN position.

Starts 2A RFP.

Verifies reactor water level is stable.

Verify RFP Auxiliary Oil Pump AUTO stops.

WHEN MO 2-3201A, 2C PP DISCH VLV, is fully open (the RED valve position indicating light is extinguished), THEN places 2A RFP RECIRC VLV PCV 2-3201A control switch in AUTO.

Directs NLO to perform checks on 2A RFP.

Scenario ILT-N-2 11 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Three - 2B RFP develops an oil leak, requiring it to be secured Trigger Position Actions or Behavior ATC Secures 2B RFP per DOP 3200-05, Reactor Feed Pump Shutdown.

Places RFPs standby selector switch, STBY PP SELECT, in OFF.

Verifies the 2B AUX OIL PP control switch in AUTO.

Opens 2B RFP recirculation valve, by placing 2B RFP RECIRC VLV PCV 2-3201B control switch in OPEN position.

Verifies reactor water level is stable.

Closes MO 2-3201B, 2B RFP DISCH VLV.

Verifies reactor water level remains stable.

Stops 2B RFP.

As the RFP slows down, verifies the associated auxiliary oil pump automatically starts.

Close 2B RFP recirculation valve, by placing 2B RFP RECIRC VLV control switch in AUTO position.

Direct a NLO to verify the 2B RFP has come to rest.

WHEN 2B RFP has come to rest, THEN opens MO 2- 3201B, 2B RFP DISCH VLV.

Directs NLO to perform remaining in plant steps for securing 2B RFP.

Role Play:

NLO to verify 2B RFP is at rest: Wait 1 min, then report, 2B RFP is at rest.

Acknowledge request to perform procedural steps for 2A and 2B RFPs. After a few minutes, report that the steps are completed.

CRS Directs 2B RFP Aux Oil PP secured to stop leak.

ATC Places 2B RFP Aux Oil PP in PTL.

Role Play:

If asked after 2B RFP Aux Oil PP is placed in PTL: Report, the oil leak on 2B RFP has stopped.

TEAM May direct Zinc injection lined up to 2A RFP per DOP 3200-09, Zinc Injection System Operation.

Role Play:

Acknowledge request to realign Zinc Injection.

Event 3 Completion Criteria:

• 2A RFP started and 2B RFP secured AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Scenario ILT-N-2 12 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Four - Master Recirc Flow Controller Fails Downscale / Secondary Containment Doors Open Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

3 When the BOP is NOT near the 902-4 panel and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 3, which will cause Master Recirc Flow Controller to fail downscale.

ATC Determines and announces Recirculation Flow transient occurring by observing any of the following:

o Decrease in Recirc Loop Flow as indicated on FR 2-260-7.

o Decrease in Rx Power indicated on WI 2-6040-59.

o Decrease in Core Flow and DP on DPR/FR 2-263-110.

o Decrease in Total Stm Flow on UR 2-640-27.

o Decrease in Rx Pressure on P/FR 2-640-28.

o Decrease in Total Feedwater Flow on UR 2-640-26.

o Decrease in Power Level on RR 2-750-10A/D, & RR 2-750-10B/C.

CRS Enters DOA 0202-03 Reactor Recirc System Flow Control Failure.

May enter DGA 07, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition.

ATC Performs the following actions per DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirc System Flow Control Failure:

Places 2A & B M-G Set Scoop Tube Power Lockout Reset Switches in the Lockout position.

Verifies Core thermal power <2957 MWt.

Verifies Recirc Pump NOT operating in the instability region of the MG Set voltage regulator AND uncontrolled pump flow AND speed oscillations are NOT occurring.

Verifies NOT operating in the unstable region of the Power / Flow Map.

ATC Completes actions of Recirc M-G Lockout in DOP 0202-12, Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set Scoop Tube Operation.

Verifies alarm is received on annunciator 902-4 C-1(5), 2A(B) RECIRC M-G SCOOP TUBE PWR FAILURE.

Places BOTH recirc pump speed control transfer stations in manual (MAN) at panel 902-4:

• 2A(B) RECIRC PP SPEED CONTLR, 2-262-25A(B)

Verify MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTLR, 2-262-22, is in manual (MAN).

At the recirc pump speed control transfer station with the locked out scoop tube, rotate the potentiometer counterclockwise to set speed demand to minimum (30%):

• 2A(B) RECIRC PP SPEED CONTLR, 2-262-25A(B)

At panel 902-4, place an Equipment Status Tag on 2A(B) M-G SET SCOOP TUBE POWER LOCKOUT RESET switch stating the reason the recirc MG set scoop tube is locked out.

BOP Assist ATC as directed.

Scenario ILT-N-2 13 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Four - Master Recirc Flow Controller Fails Downscale / Secondary Containment Doors Open Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Verifies actions of DOA 0202-03 and DOP 0202-12 are carried out.

Role Play:

Call the control as the U2 NLO and report, Both the inner and outer U2 Reactor Building Truck Interlock doors are blocked open with an air hose running through them.

NLO to have the doors unblocked and closed: Wait 5 min, then report, Both the inner and outer U2 Reactor Building Truck Interlock doors are blocked closed.

TEAM Receives report that both the inner and outer U2 Reactor Building Truck Interlock doors are blocked open.

Directs NLO to close the doors.

CRS References Technical Specifications and determines:

TS 3.6.4.1.A: Determines must restore Secondary Containment within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

CRS May contact any/all of the following to inform of situation or request assistance:

Shift Manager WEC Supervisor Operations Manager Shift Operating Supervisor Duty Maintenance Supervisor Duty Engineering Manager Work Week Manager Event 4 Completion Criteria:

• 2A & 2B Recirc Scoop Tubes locked out,

• Secondary Containment Doors closed and Tech Specs referenced, AND/OR,

• At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Scenario ILT-N-2 14 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Five - Swap TBCCW Pumps Trigger Position Actions or Behavior Role Play:

As the NLO sent to verify 2B TBCCW pump suction and discharge valves open (wait 1 min), then report: 2B TBCCW pump suction and discharge valves are open.

As the NLO sent to verify 2B TBCCW pump oil levels (wait 1 min), then report: 2B TBCCW pump oil levels are normal.

As the NLO sent to report on operation of 2B TBCCW pump, report: 2B TBCCW pump is operating normally.

As the NLO sent to check TBCCW system parameters after 2A pump is secured (wait 1 min), then report: TBCCW system parameters are normal.

CRS Directs swapping from 2A TBCCW pump to 2B TBCCW pump per DOP 3800-01, Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System (TBCCW).

BOP Performs the following actions per DOP 3800-01, Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System (TBCCW):

Directs NLO to verify 2B TBCCW pump suction and discharge valves open.

Directs NLO to verify 2B TBCCW pump oil levels.

Starts 2B TBCCW pump and verifies proper operation.

Stops 2A TBCCW pump.

Verifies system parameters normal.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 5 Completion Criteria:

• TBCCW Pump swap completed AND/OR

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Scenario ILT-N-2 15 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Six -Instrument Air Compressor Trip Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

4 At the direction of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 4, which trips the 3C Instrument Air Compressor and inserts a small IA leak to cause pressure to slowly drop.

ROLE PLAY:

NLO to investigate 3C IAC trip: (Wait 2 min)

Report the 3C IAC tripped on low lube oil pressure. There is nothing else abnormal at the compressor.

NLO to check 3C IAC breaker: (Wait 2 min)

Report the 3C IAC breaker is closed and looks normal.

Note: The compressor will NOT be restored to operation.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

5 NLO to lineup 2B IAC to U2 Instrument Air System, wait 2 min, activate trigger 5 and then report 2B IAC is lined up to U2 Instrument Air System.

ROLE PLAY:

NLO to verify proper operation of 2B IAC: (Wait 2 min)

Report the 2B IAC is operating normally. If not yet directed to line up 2B IAC to U2 Instrument Air System, then also report that 2B IAC Dryer is not lined up to the Instrument Air header.

BOP Announces alarm 923-1 B-5, U2 OR U3 INST AIR COMP TRIP:

Reports 3C IAC tripped Directs an NLO to investigate the cause of the 3C Instrument Air Compressor trip.

May send a NLO to check 3C IAC breaker.

CRS May enter DOA 4700-01, Instrument Air System Failure.

Directs BOP to perform DOP 6700-20, 480 Volt Breaker Trip.

BOP Performs DOA 4700-01, Instrument Air System Failure, as directed:

Starts the 2B IAC.

Directs an NLO to verify proper operation of 2B IAC.

Performs DOP 6700-20, 480 Volt Breaker Trip.

Event 6 Completion Criteria:

• Unit 2 Standby IAC started, AND/OR,

• At the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.

Scenario ILT-N-2 16 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Seven - Instrument Air Leak / Reactor Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Note: The next Event begins automatically when the Mode Switch is placed to S/D.

Simulator Operator:

At the direction of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 6 to initiate the Instrument Air leak 6 at 40% severity.

Role Play:

NLO sent to check air compressor and air dryer operation, wait 3 min. then report, The air compressors are all running loaded and there are no problems at the air dryers.

Personnel sent to inspect IA system for rupture, acknowledge the order.

If asked, U1 air system is not is service Simulator Operator / Role Play:

NLO sent to open the U2 - U3 SA Crosstie valve, verify trigger 7 is inserted then report, 7 The U2 - U3 SA Crosstie valve is open.

NLO sent to cross-connect Instrument Air (4 min.) initiate trigger 8 then report the cross-8 connect valve is open.

BOP Announces alarm 923-1 F-4, U2 Inst Air Press Low Verifies U2 SA to IA Auto Crosstie Valve opens at 85 psig CRS Announces entry into DOA 4700-01, Instrument Air System Failure, and directs team actions.

Briefs team to be prepared to manually scram the reactor and close the outboard MSIVs IF Instrument Air pressure drops to 55 psig.

Announces entry into DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control, and directs concurrent performance with DOA 4700-01, IA System Failure.

BOP Directs NLO(s) to check air compressors and air dryers for proper operation Directs in-plant personnel to inspect U2 IA system for proper lineup and leaks.

May direct NLO to cross-connect U2 to U3 IA Systems per DOP 4700-03, U2/3 IA Cross-Connect Operation.

May direct NLO to cross-connect U2 to U3 SA Systems CRS May direct scram preparations per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

ATC Performs scram preparations per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed:

o Starts the turbine motor suction pump AND turning gear oil pump.

o Trips H2 addition.

Scenario ILT-N-2 17 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Seven - Instrument Air Leak / Reactor Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE:

The following portion of the event is based on a failure of the RPS electrical scram (inserted in setup). ARI will be successful in inserting all control rods. Since the ARI action is part of the SCRAM procedure, all rods in may be reported before the CRS enters DEOP 400-05, Failure to Scram.

CRS When IA pressure drops to 55 psig, directs team to:

Scram the reactor per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

Close the outboard MSIVs.

ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, and DEOP 100, RPV Control, as directed:

Places Mode Switch to Shutdown and depresses the Scram pushbuttons.

Determines all rods are not inserted.

Initiates ARI.

Verifies rods inserted and announces:

o Rods did not go in, Electrical ATWS, ARI initiated, all rods in.

o Maintains RPV level as directed by CRS.

o Inserts SRMs and IRMs.

CRS Enters DEOP 100, RPV Control, and may enter DEOP 400-05, Failure to Scram, depending on timing of reports from ATC regarding status of rods. If DEOP 400-05 is entered, it will be exited as soon as report of all rods in is received.

Directs actions of DEOP 100.

Directs actions of DGP 02-03.

Verification of all isolations, ECCS and EDGs starts.

Holding RPV/L +8 to +48 inches.

Maintaining RPV/P <1060 psig using the Iso Cond to control RPV/P (may use Hardcard)

BOP Closes the outboard MSIVs.

Performs Reactor Scram actions per his Hardcard.

CRS Directs the outboard MSIVs closed when IA pressure drops to Event 7 Completion Criteria:

• The reactor is scrammed and ARI initiated, AND/OR

• At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Scenario ILT-N-2 18 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Events Eight - Unisolable Isolation Condenser Steam Line Leak into the Reactor Building / Emergency Depressurization Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE:

This Event automatically starts 3 min. after the Mode Switch is placed to S/D.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

9 Verify trigger 9 automatically activates when the Mode SW is placed to S/D. After 3 min, this starts the next Event by causing:

• A FEF to be inserted.

• An Iso Cond Steam line leak into the RX Bldg between the 1 and 2 valves.

4 min. after trigger 9 is activated, RUN CAEP file: ILT-N-2 Rad.cae. This causes the following ARMs to increase:

• Isolation Condenser Area.

• Vessel Instrument Rack Area.

• West CRD Area.

• RX Bldg South Access Area.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR Verify Trigger 10 activates automatically when Isolation Condenser Area radiation reaches 10 500 mr/hr. (variable ppr216 >500.0) This causes the RWCU Area Radiation Monitor to ramp full scale and alarm by using overrides.

11 Verify Trigger 11 activates automatically when the RWCU Area Radiation Monitor is bypassed. This clears its SER alarm.

ROLE PLAY:

As a dispatched NLO OR as a NLO on rounds, (wait 2 min. after the leak starts) then report over the radio: There is steam accumulating on 3rd and 4th floor of Unit 2 reactor building. It appears to be coming from the Iso Cond 2 valve room area, and it is getting very hot and humid up here.

ROLE PLAY:

If dispatched as RPT to take surveys, wait until the 902-11 panel indication for the Isolation Condenser Area is >3000 mr/hr and when directed by the Lead Evaluator to make the report. Then report: The Unit 2 reactor building 2nd floor, near 5 & 6 racks, 3rd floor, near 2 valve room door, and the entire 4th floor rad levels are > 3000 mr/hr.

BOP Announces numerous alarms due to the Iso Cond steam line break and fuel element failure such as:

O 902-3 A-1, RX BLDG RAD HI O 902-3 B-1, REFUEL FLOOR RAD HI O 902-3 B-4, ISOL COND VLVS OFF NORM Dispatch NLO(s) and/or Rad Tech(s) to check areas for leaks and radiation levels.

BOP Checks backpanel ARMs and temperature recorders to determine the areas affected are the Iso Condenser, RWCU and Vessel Instrument Rack areas.

Scenario ILT-N-2 19 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Events Eight - Unisolable Isolation Condenser Steam Line Leak into the Reactor Building / Emergency Depressurization Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Performs DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control actions as directed:

Verifies Rx Bldg Vent isolates and SBGT starts.

Monitors affected areas temperatures and radiation levels.

Operates all available area coolers (LPCI/CS and HPCI room coolers).

BOP Makes PA announcement to evacuate the reactor building.

Determines leak is from the Iso Cond 2 valve room from knowledge, reports from field, or by receiving alarm 902-3 H-2, ISOL COND LINE BREAK (GRP 5 ISOL) and reports to CRS.

Closes RX Outlet Isol MO 2-1301-2 Valve, attempts closure of the RX Outlet Isol MO 2-1301-1 Valve (will not close).

Determines leak is unisolable (between 1 and 2 valves) due to the Iso 1 valve being unable to close.

BOP Should periodically check backpanel ARM temperature recorders to determine rate and/or trend of the areas affected from steam leak.

CRS Enters DEOP 300-1 Secondary Containment Control, when informed area rad or temperature level(s) are above Max Normal.

CRS When notified of 2 or more areas above Max Safe, enters DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, and directs:

Verifying all rods in to at least position 04.

Drywell Pressure < 2.0 psig.

Verifying SP/L >6 feet.

Opening all ADS valves.

Verifying all ADS valves are open.

BOP Executes DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, as directed:

Verifies SP/L >6 feet.

Opens all ADS valves.

Verifies all ADS are open.

CRS May request a RPT to update DEOP related area rad levels which are fullscale on the ARMs.

Events 8 / Scenario Completion Criteria:

• Emergency Depressurization in progress, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Scenario ILT-N-2 20 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Critical Tasks:

(RPV-6.1) With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, TAKE ACTION TO REDUCE POWER by inserting control rods.

(SC-1.2) With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area radiation exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, INITIATE emergency depressurization.

Scenario ILT-N-2 21 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-3 A-1 RX BLDG RAD HI DAN 902-3 B-1 REFUEL FLOOR RAD HI DAN 902-3 B-4 ISOL COND VLVS OFF NORM DAN 902-3 D-7 2A/B CORE SPRAY HDR PRESS LO DAN 902-3 H-2 ISOL COND LINE BREAK DAN 902-4 C-1(5) 2A(B) RECIRC M-G SCOOP TUBE PWR FAILURE DAN 923-1 B-5 U2 OR U3 INST AIR COMP TRIP DAN 923-1 F-4 U2 INST AIR PRESS LOW DEOP 0100 RPV CONTROL DEOP 0300-01 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL DEOP 0400-02 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION DGA 07 UNPREDICTED REACTIVITY ADDITION DGP 02-03 REACTOR SCRAM DGP 03-01 POWER CHANGES DOA 0202-03 REACTOR RECIRC SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL FAILURE DOA 4700-01 TRANSIENT LEVEL CONTROL DOA 4700-01 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM FAILURE DOA 6500-10 4KV CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOA 0600-01 TRANSIENT LEVEL CONTROL DOA 4700-01 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM FAILURE DOP 0202-03 REACTOR RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION DOP 0202-12 RECIRCULATION PUMP MOTOR GENERATOR SET SCOOP TUBE OPERATION.

STARTUP OF SECOND OR THIRD REACTOR FEED PUMP OR SHIFTING TO DOP 3200-03 ALTERNATE REACTOR FEED PUMP DOP 3200-05 REACTOR FEED PUMP SHUTDOWN DOP 3800-01 TURBINE BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM (TBCCW)

DOP 4700-03 U2/3 IA CROSS-CONNECT OPERATION DOP 6700-20 480 VOLT BREAKER TRIP TS 3.5.1 ECCS-OPERATING TS 3.6.4.1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Scenario ILT-N-2 22 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

EXAM ILT-N-2 QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES 8 Total malfunctions inserted (4 to 8) / (10 to 14) 2 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry (1 to 4) / (3 to 6) 2 Abnormal events (1 to 2) / (2 to 3) 2 Major transients (1 to 2) / (2 to 3) 2 EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP (1 to 3) / (3 to 5) 1 EOPs contingency procedures used (0 to 3) / (1 to 3) 60 Approximate scenario run time (45 to 60 min) / (one scenario may approach 90 minutes) 40% EOP run time (40 to 70% of scenario run time) 2 Crew critical tasks (2 to 5) / (5 to 8)

Yes Technical Specifications exercised (Yes or No)

Scenario ILT-N-2 23 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Computer Aided Exercise Programs ILT 06-1 EXAM SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Initial Setup CAEP:

1. SCENARIO ILT-N-2.cae

1. Written by FRF

1. Rev 00

1. Date 09/08

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Causes a failure of RPS electrical scram but ARI works.

imf b12

1. Binds Iso Cond 1 valve 90% open.

imf ic1vbn 90.0

1. Overrides 902-3 C-1 OFF due to nuisance alarms.

imf ser0063 off

1. Close 2B IAC Disch Vlv (OPS says it would be closed if the Comp is OFF) irf vp2 0.0

1. Sets APRM Master gain pot to 1.0 irf niagain 1.0l2

1. EVENT TRIGGERS

1. Event Trigger 1 sets gain for all 6 APRMs.

trgset 1 "0"l2 trg 1 "irf niagainf true"l2

1. Event Trigger 2 causes 2A/B Core System Low Pressure Alarm (902-3 D-7)

1. Cracks open 4A VLV and isolates Keep Fill to 2A Loop trgset 2 "0"l4 trg 2 "set csv4a = 0.002"l4 irf csafilof (2) closedl4

1. Event Trigger 3 Causes master recirc flow controller to fail downscale.

trgset 3 "0"l4 imf rrmasdnd (3) 0.3 2:00 0.6l4

1. Event trigger 4 inserts an IAC trip and IA leak to cause pressure to slowly drop.

trgset 4 "0"l6 imf n33 (4)l6 imf np2 (4) 12.0l6

1. Event trigger 5 Opens 2B IAC Disch Vlv and deletes the IA leak malfunction.

trgset 5 "0"l8 trg 5 "dmf np2"l8 irf vp2 (5) 100.0l8

1. Event trigger 6 Inserts a large IA leak.

trgset 6 "0"l10 trg 6 "imf np2 87.0 10:00 40.0"l10

1. Event trigger 7 Opens the U2/U3 Service Air crosstie.

trgset 7 "0"l10 irf vpc (7) 50.0l10 Scenario ILT-N-2 24 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

1. Event trigger 8 Opens the U2/U3 Instrument Air crosstie.

trgset 8 "0"l12 irf vp4 (8) 50.0l12

1. Event Trigger 9 Activates when the Mode Switch is placed to S/D.

1. After 3 min, inserts a FEF.

1. After 3 min, starts an Iso Steam line leak into the RX Bldg between the 1 and 2 valves.

trgset 9 "rpdmode4_drw"l12 imf radffd (9 3:00) 8.0 20:00 0.0l14 imf icstmrb (9 3:00) 2.5l14

1. Event Trigger 10 Activates when IC Area rad is >500 mr/hr.

1. Ramps RWCU Area Rad meter to full scale over 3 min. using override.

1. After 2 min, overrides RWCU Area Rad Hi light ON and inserts SER alarm.

trgset 10 "ppr216 .gt. 500.0"l14 ior mrgrwcu (10) 1.0 3:00l14 ior mrlrwcuh (10 2:00) onl16 imf ser0260 (10 2:00) onl16

1. Event Trigger 11 Activates when RWCU Area Rad (STA 7) alarm is bypassed.

1. Returns SER alarm to OFF.

trgset 11 "mrdrwcub_drw"l18 trg 11 "imf ser0260 off"l18

1. END

1. ILT-N-2 Rad.cae

1. Written by FRF

1. Rev 00

1. Date 09/08

1. Ramps IC Area Rad monitor to 3000 mr/hr.

set rmarmfailf(8) = true ramp rmarmfaild(8) 5.0 3000.0 12:00

1. After 1 min, ramps Vessel Instru Rack Area Rad monitor to full scale over 2 min.

set rmarmfailf(9) = truel60 ramp rmarmfaild(9) 0.5 100.0 2:00l60

1. After 2 min, ramps W CRD Area Rad monitor to full scale over 2 min.

set rmarmfailf(5) = truel120 ramp rmarmfaild(5) 5.0 100.0 2:00l120

1. After 3 min, ramps RB South Access Area Rad monitor to full scale over 2 min.

set rmarmfailf(7) = truel180 ramp rmarmfaild(7) 5.0 100.0 2:00l180

1. END

1. ILT-N-2 Clear Rad.cae

1. Written by FRF

1. Rev 00

1. Date 09/08

1. Clears IC Area Rad monitor.

set rmarmfailf(8) = false

1. Clears Vessel Instru Rack Area Rad monitor.

set rmarmfailf(9) = false Scenario ILT-N-2 25 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

1. Clears W CRD Area Rad monitor.

set rmarmfailf(5) = false

1. Clears RB South Access Area Rad monitor.

set rmarmfailf(7) = false

1. END Scenario ILT-N-2 26 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Date: TODAY Unit 2 Turnover Online Information Protected Pathway(s) Shutdown Information 250 MWe NONE Time to Boil: 0 Online Risk: Green Shutdown Risk: N/A Risk Equipment:

Reactivity Management Limit: MFLCPR 0.78 Increasing slowly Action Level: 0.980 Unit 2 Priorities S/D Method: DGP 02-01 Raise power with recirc flow.

Swap TBCCW pumps.

LCORAs LCORA None Start Title Clock Ends Compensatory Actions Degradation Frequency Compensatory Action Documentation Responsible Unit 2 Conditions, Status, Abnormalities An Emergency Load drop was performed 2 shifts ago due to concerns with Feedwater Heater level controllers. IMD has resolved the issue and the QNE recommends immediately raising power by increasing recirc flow to 58 Mlbm/hr core flow. Then before starting 2A RFP, the QNE will evaluate core parameters and recommend how to pick up load after that. The TSO has been notified.

Engineering is taking vibration readings on 2A TBCCW pump. Next will be vibration readings on 2B TBCCW pump.

The shift manager will notify the control room when to start 2B TBCCW pump and shutdown 2A TBCCW pump.

2A RFP has been prepped for starting. The Unit 2 NLO has been briefed for starting 2A RFP. The RFP will be started after the load pickup with recirc flow.

Unit 2 Abnormal Component Position None U2 Open Operability Determinations with Compensatory Actions None Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities DGP 03-01 Swap TBCCW pumps Common Unit Activities Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Unit 2 Procedures in Progress (Non-Surveillance)

DGP 03-01, Power Changes Unit 2 Surveillances in Progress None Scenario ILT-N-2 27 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Date: TODAY Unit 3 Turnover Online Information Protected Pathway(s) Shutdown Information 912 MWe Time to Boil: 0 Online Risk: Green Shutdown Risk: N/A Risk Equipment:

Reactivity Management Limit: MFLCPR 0.78 Increasing slowly Action Level: 0.980 Unit 3 Priorities S/D Method: DGP 02-01 Maintain load per TSO direction.

LCORAs LCORA # None Start Title Clock Ends Compensatory Actions Degradation Frequency Compensatory Action Documentation Responsible Unit 3 Conditions, Status, Abnormalities None Unit 3 Abnormal Component Position U3 Open Operability Determinations with Compensatory Actions Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Common Unit Activities Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Unit 3 Procedures in Progress (Non-Surveillance)

None Unit 3 Surveillances in Progress None Scenario ILT-N-2 28 of 28 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-3 CIRC WATER PUMP TRIP TRIP OF RPS MG SET, RE-ENERGIZE FROM RESERVE POWER CRD FLOW CONTROLLER FAILS HIGH SPURIOUS HPCI ISOLATION WITH FAILURE TO ISOLATE STATOR COOLING PUMP TRIP WITH FAILURE OF STANDBY TO START SMALL STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL / MANUAL SCRAM HYDRAULIC ATWS / DRYWELL LEAK GETS WORSE Rev. 00 09/08 Operations Review:

Facility Representative Date Training Approval:

Exam Author Date

Scenario Outline Station: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-3 Class ID: 2009-301 Evaluators Operators / crew position

/ ATC

/ BOP

/ CRS Initial Conditions: Rx Power ~ 95%

Turnover: Maintain Current Power Level per TSO Direction Swap Service Water Pumps Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description BOP 1 HP6 C Circ Water - 2A Pump Trip CRS ATC 2 B02 C RPS - Trip of MG Set, Re-energize from Reserve Power. T CRS 3 C ATC CRD - CRD Flow Controller Fails High.

RDFCFHI CRS HPGP4RLY BOP 4 I HPCI - Spurious HPCI Isolation with Failure to Isolate. T AT46 CRS K11 ATC 5 C Stator Cooling - 2A Pump Trip With Failure of 2B to Start.

MGDSCBTR CRS 6 I21 M TEAM Steam Leak - Small Leak in Drywell / Manual Scram.

RDHLVFPA 7 RDHLDEGA M TEAM ATWS - Hydraulic ATWS / Drywell Leak Gets Worse.

I21

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 2 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Scenario Objective Evaluate the Teams ability to operate the plant with a hydraulic ATWS condition.

Scenario Summary

1. Unit is at full power.

2. The following equipment is OOS:

a. None

3. LCOs:

a. None Scenario Sequence

• Circulating water pump 2A then trips on overload and the BPO manually starts circulating water pump 2B to maintain condenser vacuum.

• The Team receives a report that the Engineering department determined that EPAs 2B-1 and 2B-2 are inoperable. The CRS determines Tech Spec requirements and then a trip of RPS EPA 2B-1 causes a loss of RPS Bus A. The Team will reenergize RPS Bus A from reserve power and begin restoration of affected systems to a normal condition.

• The indicated flow to the CRD Flow Controller fails high. This causes the controller demand to the CRD FCV to fail low. If the team does not recognize the failure quickly and restore CRD cooling flow, the ROD DRVE HI TEMP alarm comes up. The Team takes manual control of the CRD Flow Controller to restore system parameters to normal.

• A HPCI steam flow GP 4 isolation instrument fails causing an isolation signal. The HPCI steam valves fail to isolate and the Team manually closes them. The CRS addresses Tech Spec requirements.

• The 2A stator cooling water pump trips on overload and the standby pump fails to start automatically. The team should manually start the 2B stator cooling water pump.

• A small steam leak in the Drywell occurs upstream of the steam line restrictors occurs. The Team will perform a manual scram due to the increasing Drywell pressure.

• A Hydraulic ATWS occurs when the reactor is scrammed. The Team inserts control rods by repeated scrams and / or driving control rods. The steam leak worsens requiring the Team to spray the Drywell.

Event One - Circulating Water Pump Trip

• The crew should recognize and respond to Circulating water pump 2A tripping on overload.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Circulating Water Pump trip)

Success Path:

• Start 2B Circulating Water Pump.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 3 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Two - RPS MG Set Trip / Re-energize from Reserve Power

• The Team receives a report that the Engineering department determined that EPAs 2B-1 and 2B-2 are inoperable. Then a trip of RPS EPA 2B-1 causes a loss of RPS Bus A.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (RPS EPA 2B-1 trips)

Success Path:

• The CRS determines Tech Spec requirements.

• Re-energize RPS Bus A from Reserve Power.

Event Three - CRD Flow Controller Failure

• Indicated flow to the CRD Flow Controller fails high. This causes the controller demand to the CRD FCV to fail low.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Indicated flow to the CRD Flow Controller fails high)

Success Path:

• The crew takes manual control of the CRD Flow Controller.

Event Four - Spurious HPCI Isolation

• HPCI steam flow GP 4 isolation instrument fails causing an isolation signal. The HPCI steam valves fail to isolate.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (HPCI Isolation with Failure to Isolate)

Success Path:

• The Team isolates the HPCI steam supply.

Event Five - 2A Stator Water Cooling Pump Trips

• The team recognizes and responds to trip of 2A stator water cooling pump and failure of 2B stator water cooling pump to automatically start.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Stator Cooling Water Pump Trip.)

Success Path:

• Manually start 2B stator water cooling pump.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 4 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Six - Small Steam Leak in Drywell / Manual Scram A small steam leak in the Drywell occurs upstream of the steam line restrictors occurs.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Small steam line leak)

Success Path:

• Performs a manual scram.

Event Seven - Hydraulic ATWS / Drywell Leak Gets Worse A hydraulic ATWS occurs when the reactor is scrammed.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Hydraulic ATWS)

Success Path:

• The Team inserts control rods by repeated scrams and / or driving control rods.

• The Team sprays the Drywell.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 5 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1 If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-JA-150-08, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

a. Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.

2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. Initialize simulator in a full power IC.

b. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed, to maintain DP within limits.

c. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.

d. Advance the chart recorders.

3 Verify the following simulator conditions:

a. Verify 2A and 2C Circ Water PPs running with 2B OFF.

b. Verify 2A Stator Cooling Water pump running with 2B OFF.

NOTE: Do NOT run the initial setup CAEP file until the above setup is completed.

4 Run the initial setup CAEP file: ILT-N-3.cae 5 Open but do NOT run CAEP file: ILT-N-3_ClrHydLk.cae 6 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. None 7 Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks

 Time Critical Tasks

 PRA Key Operator Actions Required Actions Optional Actions SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 6 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event One - Circulating Water Pump 2A Trips on Overload.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

1 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 1, which trips 2A Circulating Water pump.

BPO Performs the following actions per DAN 902-7 A-15, Circ Wtr PP Trip, DOA 4400-01, Circulating Water System Failure, and DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip, as directed:

Starts 2B Circulating Water pump. (immediate action)

Verifies condenser vacuum returning to normal.

Verifies 2A Circulating Water pump discharge valve closes.

Sends NLO to check 2A Circulating Water pump breaker and operation of 2B Circulating Water pump.

Places 2A Circulating Water pump control switch in PTL.

Verifies Circulating Water Flow reversal valves lined up normally.

May send NLO to check Cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens.

Role Play:

As the NLO sent to 2A Circulating Water pump breaker (wait 3 min), then report: 2A Circulating Water pump breaker has an overcurrent target up.

As the NLO sent to 2A Circulating Water pump (wait 3 min), then report: 2A Circulating Water pump motor is hot to the touch.

As the NLO sent to check 2B Circulating Water pump operation (wait 2 min), then report: 2B Circulating Water pump is operating normally.

As the NLO sent to check Cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens (wait 3 min), then report: the Cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens are clear.

CRS Enters and directs performance of DOA 4400-01, Circulating Water System Failure, and DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip.

Notifies the Shift Manager and EMD.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 1 Completion Criteria:

• 2B Circulating Water pump started, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 7 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Two - RPS MG Set Trip / Re-energize From Reserve Power Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ROLE PLAY:

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, call the CRS as the Shift Manager and inform him that Engineering has determined that defective components where installed in RPS EPAs 2B-1 and 2B-2 during their last preventative maintenance. Therefore, RPS EPAs 2B-1 and 2B-2 are inoperable and may exhibit erratic operation. Engineering considers all other EPAs operable.

CRS References Licensing Documents and determines the following applies:

• TS 3.3.8.2, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring, Condition B: Remove associated inservice power supply from service within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Directs WEC to brief an operator to transfer RPS Bus A to Reserve Power.

May direct Team to review DOA 0500-05, Loss of Reactor Protection System Bus.

ATC / Reviews DOA 0500-05, Loss of Reactor Protection System Bus, as directed.

BOP SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

After the CRS has addressed Tech Specs and / or at the discretion of the Lead 2

Examiner, activate trigger 2, which inserts a 2B RPS MG Set overcurrent trip. This simulates RPS EPA 2B-1 tripping.

NOTE: Communications from the AEER should be over the phone (not the radio)

ROLE PLAY:

NLO to check RPS power supplies: wait 2 min. and call and report, the RPS EPA 2B-1 is tripped.

NLO to power the 2A RPS bus from the reserve power: wait five minutes, call the U2 NSO on the phone and report Steps G.3.l.(1) thru (4) of DOP 0500-03, for supplying power to RPS 2A bus are your steps.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

When notified to re-energize RPS Bus 2A, wait a minute, and then activate trigger 3.

3 Report RPS Bus 2A has been reenergized from the alternate power supply. If asked:

AC voltage is 120.

ATC Announces loss of 2A RPS Bus.

Performs the following:

Perform actions of DOA 0500-05, Loss of Reactor Protection System Bus.

Directs an NLO to restore power to the 2A RPS Bus per DOP 0500-03, RPS Power Supply Operation.

May bypass APRM 6.

Resets the RPS CH A half scram per DOP 0500-07, Insertion/Reset of Manual Half Scram.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 8 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Two - RPS MG Set Trip / Re-energize From Reserve Power Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Resets the Division 2 Refuel Floor Rad Monitor and Reactor Building Vent Rad Monitor.

Restores Reactor Building Ventilation IAW DOP 5750-02, Reactor Building Ventilation and secures SBGT IAW DOP 7500-01, SBGT Operation.

Resets ACAD/CAM system per DOP 2400-01 to reclose the 2-2499-3B and 4B valves.

CRS Enters DOA 0500-05, Loss of Reactor Protection System Bus, and directs actions.

Coordinates restoration of affected plant systems.

Event 2 Completion Criteria:

• Tech Specs referenced,

• RPS Bus A reenergized and restoration of affected plant systems in progress, AND/OR,

• At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 9 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Three - CRD Flow Controller Failure Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 4, which causes the indicated 4

flow to the CRD Flow Controller to fail high. This causes the controller demand to the CRD FCV to fail low.

NOTE: If the team does not recognize the failure quickly and restore CRD cooling flow, the ROD DRIVE HI TEMP alarm comes up after ~ 5 min.

Simulator Operator:

If CRD Temperature variable rdgtemp(21) reaches 250.0 deg. F, verify the following automatic triggers:

5 Trigger 5: automatically activates when variable rdgtemp(21) is >250.0 deg. F.

Forces up alarm 902-5 F-3, ROD DRIVE HI TEMP.

6 Trigger 6: automatically activates alarm 902-5 F-3 is up and variable rdgtemp(21) is <245.0 deg. F. Returns alarm 902-5 F-3, ROD DRIVE HI TEMP, TO NORMAL.

ATC From panel monitoring or alarm 902-5 F-3, ROD DRVE HI TEMP, notices and announces loss of CRD system flow.

Performs DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, actions as directed:

Diagnoses failure of the CRD Flow Controller and takes manual control of it.

Restores CRD system flows and pressures to normal.

CRS Enters and directs performance of DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure.

Notifies Shift Manager and IMD of CRD Flow Controller failure.

May reference TRM 3.3.h, Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation System (RVWLIS) Backfill System, due to short loss of RVWLIS supply.

Role Play; NLO to check CRD FCV operation: (wait 2 min)

Report the CRD FCV appears to be operating normally and is at position (Use position displayed on Instructor Station drawing RD2; report as percent).

NLO to check CRD system flow locally (FI 2-302-56); (wait 1 min)

Report CRD system flow indicates >100 gpm (pegged high).

NLO to check drive water flow locally (FI 2-302-64): (wait 1 min)

Report CRD drive water flow indicates (same as control room meter).

NLO to check cooling water flow locally (FI 2-302-65): (wait 1 min)

Report CRD cooling water flow indicates (same as control room meter).

Respond as groups notified.

BOP Monitors panels and assists as directed.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 10 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event 3 Completion Criteria:

• Team has taken manual control of the CRD Flow Controller, AND/OR

• At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 11 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Four - Spurious HPCI Isolation with Failure to Isolate Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

At the discretion of the Lead examiner, activate trigger 7, which causes a HPCI steam 7

flow GP 4 isolation instrument failure resulting in an isolation signal. The HPCI steam valves fail to isolate.

Support Personnel to investigate: wait several min, then report There is relay damage which will take 12 hrs to repair.

BOP Announces alarm 902-3 C-12, HPCI Stm Line Flow Hi.

TEAM Determines HPCI GP 4 isolation should have occurred.

CRS Directs BOP to close the HPCI GP 4 isolation valves.

BOP Isolates HPCI as directed:

Closes MO 2-2301-4.

Closes MO 2-2301-5.

TEAM May enter DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control.

CRS Notifies Shift Manager and IMD of Event.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Note: The Tech Spec LCOs apply once the Team learns the length of time to repair.

CRS References Technical Specifications and determines:

TS 3.3.6.1 Action A.1, Place Channel in trip within 24 hrs.

TS 3.5.1 Action A.1, Place Channel in trip within 24 hrs.

TS 3.5.1 Action B.1, Restore Isolation capability within one hour.

TS 3.5.1 Action F.1, Verify Isolation Condenser is OPERABLE immediately AND restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

Event 4 Completion Criteria:

• Actions taken to isolate HPCI steam line,

• And, Tech Specs addressed, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 12 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Five - 2A Stator Water Cooling Pump Trips Trigger Position Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator / Role Play:

8 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 8, which causes 2A stator cooling water pump to trip on overload and 2B to fails to auto start.

9 Verify trigger 9 activates automatically, when 2B stator cooling water pump control switch is placed to close, to remove the trip override inserted in the initial setup.

10 Verify trigger 10 activates automatically, when 2B Stator Clg Wtr PP control switch Trip position override is deleted. Closes 2B stator cooling water pump breaker.

11 Verify trigger 11 activates automatically, when 2B stator cooling water pump breaker closes. Returns the 2B Stator Clg Wtr PP trip SER alarm to NORMAL.

NOTE: If the operator starts the standby Stator Cooling PP quickly, not all the alarms below may come in.

BOP Announces the following alarms:

DAN 902-7 B-10, Stator Clg PP Trip DAN 902-7 C-10, Stator Clg Panel Trouble DAN 902-7 E-11, H2 Seal Oil & Alterrex Pnl Trouble DAN 902-7 C-3, Turb Stator Coolant Runback Performs appropriate actions per DOA 7400-01, Failure of the Stator Coolant System:

Starts 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump (Immediate Action)

Verifies Runback condition clears.

Sends NLO to verify 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump operating normally.

Sends NLO to check breaker and 2A Stator Cooling Water Pump for cause of trip.

Performs DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.

Places 2A Stator Cooling Water Pump control switch in PTL.

NOTE: Before making the reports below, check to see which alarms come up on the 902-7 panel. If the operator is fast, not all may alarm.

Simulator Operator / Role Play:

As the NLO sent to acknowledge the stator cooling water trouble and/or the H2 Seal Oil & Alterrex Pnl Trouble alarm (wait 2 min), activate trigger 12 and report: I have 12 acknowledged stator cooling water trouble and/or the H2 Seal Oil & Alterrex Pnl Trouble alarm. The alarms are cleared and were . (Use table below to determine report) 902-7 alarm received Local alarm to report 902-7 C-10, Stator Clg Panel Trouble Inlet Flow Low, &

Inlet Pressure Low 902-7 E-11, H2 Seal Oil & Alterrex Pnl Rectifier Coolant Flow Low.

Trouble 902-7 C-3, Turb Stator Coolant Turbine Runback Runback SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 13 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Five - 2A Stator Water Cooling Pump Trips Trigger Position Actions or Behavior Role Play:

As the NLO sent to check operation of 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump (wait 2 min) then report: 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump is operating normally.

As the NLO sent to check cause of 2A Stator Cooling Water Pump trip (wait 2 min),

then report: 2A Stator Cooling Water Pump tripped on overload.

CRS Enters and directs performance of DOA 7400-01, Failure of the Stator Coolant System.

Enters and directs performance of DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.

Notifies Work Week Manager, IMD and/or EMD Monitors panels and assists as directed.

ATC Event 5 Completion Criteria:

• 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump started, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 14 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Six and Seven - Small Steam Leak In Drywell / Manual Scram / Hydraulic ATWS / Drywell Leak Gets Worse Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

13 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 13, which causes a small Main Steam line leak to develop in the Drywell.

Role Play:

NLO to search for leak Report, I am on my way out to check for leaks.

NLO to check Cribhouse inlet temperature: (wait 5 min.)

Report, Cribhouse inlet temp is 70oF.

NLO to check Drywell CAM: (wait 2 min) Report that the Unit 2 Drywell CAM is trending up.

Simulator Operator / Role Play:

When requested: Wait several min, activate the appropriate trigger and report 14 completed.

15 Trigger 14: bypasses MSL GP 1 RPV/L and Offgas High Rad.

Trigger 15: installs scram jumpers.

16 Trigger 16: pulls ARI fuses.

ATC / BOP Recognizes and announces that Drywell pressure is slowly rising.

Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-01, Slow Leak, as directed:

Maintain Level with FWLCS (immediate action).

Notifies Shift Supervisor and Rad Protection.

Monitors for EP conditions.

Directs search for leak.

Shutdown H2 Addition.

Makes PA announcement.

Monitors leakage rate, reactor water level, and Drywell pressure.

Verify Crib House inlet temperature is <95oF.

Initiates Torus cooling per Hard Card. (May be operating from previous event)

CRS Enters and directs performance of DOA 0040-01, Slow Leak.

Sets Scram contingency of 1.5 psig DW pressure.

May enter DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, and direct scram preparatory actions.

Prior to reaching the Drywell Pressure scram setpoint, enters DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, and directs a manual reactor scram.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 15 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Six and Seven - Small Steam Leak In Drywell / Manual Scram / Hydraulic ATWS / Drywell Leak Gets Worse Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ATC/BOP Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, scram preparatory actions as directed:

Inserts control rods to reduce FCL <93%.

Reduces power with recirc flow to 56 Mlbm/hr, Starts the motor suction pump and the turning gear oil pump.

Trips hydrogen addition.

ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed:

Presses scram pushbuttons Places mode switch in shutdown Check rods inserted.

Determines control rods did not insert.

Initiates ARI Announces ATWS condition and RX power is >6%.

Runs back Recirc Pumps.

Trips recirc pumps.

Initiates SBLC.

Maintains RPV/L between +8 and +48 inches or as directed by Unit Supervisor.

BOP Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.

CRS Enters DEOP 100, RPV Control, and directs actions.

Due to report of ATWS condition, exits DEOP 100 AND enters DEOP 0400-05, Failure to Scram, and directs/performs actions:

Placing ADS to inhibit. (Not expected to be a Critical Task for this scenario)

Placing Core Spray pumps in PTL.

Inserting control rods using Alternate Rod Insertion.

Directs driving control rods.

Directs performing Scram/Reset/Scram.

Verifying required auto actions.

Installing of the jumpers for the MSIV low level isolations and the Off Gas high Rad isolations.

If RX power >6%, terminating and preventing all injection except boron and CRD until RPV level 35 inches.

Holding RPV level between -164 inches and the level lowered to.

Stabilizing RPV pressure below 1060 psig.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 16 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Six and Seven - Small Steam Leak In Drywell / Manual Scram / Hydraulic ATWS / Drywell Leak Gets Worse Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ATC Terminates and prevents all injection except boron and CRD at the 902-5 panel in automatic as follows:

• Using the RX LOW FLOW CONTROL STATION, 2(3)-640-20, lowers FWLC SETPOINT to -40 inches.

BOP Terminates and prevents all injection except boron and CRD at the 902-3 panel as follows:

• HPCI is already prevented.

• PLACES LPCI 22 valves in Pull-to-Close.

ATC Drives control rods per DEOP 500-05, Alternate Insertion Of Control Rods, as follows: (RPV-6.1)

• Bypasses the RWM.

• Maximizes CRD drive water pressure.

• Inserts Control Rods by either using the ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch or the EMERG ROD IN position of the ROD OUT NOTCH OVERRIDE switch.

Performs Scram/Reset/Scram per DEOP 500-05, Alternate Insertion Of Control Rods, as follows: (RPV-6.1)

• Directs ARI fuses pulled if RPV level is lowered below - 59 in.

• Directs scram jumpers installed.

• Places SDV Hi Water Bypass in the BYPASS position.

• Closes the SDV vent and drain valves.

• Resets the scram.

• Opens SDV Vent and Drain valves.

• Manually scrams the reactor when the SDV is drained.

• Repeats as necessary.

Simulator Operator:

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, if it is desired to allow the control rods to fully insert during Scram/Reset/Scram actions, then when the scram is reset, Run CAEP file ILT-N-3_ClrHydLk.cae, which clears the SDV hydraulic lock.

Note:

The following actions are required only if the scenario runs long enough for the Team to get the control rods inserted.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 17 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Six and Seven - Small Steam Leak In Drywell / Manual Scram / Hydraulic ATWS / Drywell Leak Gets Worse Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Based on report that all control rods are inserted exits DEOP 0400-05 and enters DEOP 0100.

• Directs securing SBLC.

ATC Performs as directed:

• Secures SBLC.

ATC / BOP Performs as directed:

• Re-establishes injection using available injection systems to MAINTAIN RPV water level above -164 (in band directed by Unit Supervisor).

Simulator Operator:

17 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 17, which increases the Main Steam line leak size so that Drywell Sprays are required.

TEAM Reports Drywell pressure increasing at a faster rate.

CRS Enters DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, when Drywell pressure reaches 2 psig and performs/directs:

Verifying of Torus water level <27.5 ft.

Initiation of Torus sprays.

Monitoring of Drywell temperature (Drywell sprays may be initiated for temperature control)

Monitoring Torus Temperature and initiation of Torus cooling.

Monitors Torus level.

BOP Performs DEOP 0200-1, Primary Containment Control, actions as directed:

Monitors Drywell temperature and pressure and initiates torus sprays per Hard Card LPCI/CCSW OPERATION, as directed.

CRS When PC/P is above 9 psig or before DW/T reaches 281°F, performs/directs:

Verification of DSIL Tripping of recirc pumps Tripping of DW coolers Initiation of DW sprays (PC-5.1)

BOP Initiates drywell sprays per Hard Card LPCI/CCSW OPERATION, as directed (PC 5.1)

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 18 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Event Six and Seven - Small Steam Leak In Drywell / Manual Scram / Hydraulic ATWS / Drywell Leak Gets Worse Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS May contact any/all of the following to inform of situation or request assistance:

Operations Manager Shift Operating Supervisor Duty Maintenance Supervisor Duty Engineering Manager Work Week Manager Event 6 & 7 / Scenario Completion Criteria:

• Control rod insertion in progress,

• Drywell sprays initiated, AND/OR,

• At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 19 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Critical Tasks (PC 5.1) When drywell pressure exceeds the suppression chamber spray initiation pressure (9 psig), Initiate drywell sprays, while in the safe region of the drywell spray initiation limit.

(RPV-6.1) With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, TAKE ACTION TO REDUCE POWER by injecting boron and/or inserting control rods, to prevent exceeding the primary containment design limits.

(RPV-6.2) With a reactor scram required, reactor not shutdown, and conditions for ADS blowdown are met, INHIBIT ADS to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization, to prevent causing a significant power excursion.

(Conditions may not occur to cause this to be critical for this scenario)

(RPV-6.3) During an ATWS with conditions met to perform power/level control TERMINATE AND PREVENT INJECTION, with exception of boron and CRD, into the RPV until conditions are met to re-establish injection.

(RPV-6.4) When conditions are met to re-establish injection use available injection systems to MAINTAIN RPV water level above -164.

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 20 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-3 C-12 HPCI STM LINE FLOW HI DAN 902-5 F-3 ROD DRVE HI TEMP DAN 902-7 B-10 STATOR CLG PP TRIP DAN 902-7 C-10 STATOR CLG PANEL TROUBLE DAN 902-7 C-3 TURB STATOR COOLANT RUNBACK DAN 902-7 E-11 H2 SEAL OIL & ALTERREX PNL TROUBLE DEOP 0200-01 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL DEOP 0400-05 FAILURE TO SCRAM DEOP 0500-05 ALTERNATE INSERTION OF CONTROL RODS DEOP 100 RPV CONTROL DGP 02-03 REACTOR SCRAM DOA 0040-01 SLOW LEAK DOA 0300-01 CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM FAILURE DOA 0500-05 LOSS OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM BUS DOA 4400-01 CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM FAILURE DOA 7400-01 FAILURE OF THE STATOR COOLANT SYSTEM DOP 0500-03 RPS POWER SUPPLY OPERATION DOP 0500-07 INSERTION/RESET OF MANUAL HALF SCRAM DOP 5750-02 REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION DOP 6700-20 480V CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOP 7500-01 SBGT OPERATION TRM 3.3.h REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM TS 3.3.8.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TS 3.5.1 ECCS - OPERATING SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 21 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Simulator Scenario Review Checklist (contd)

ILT-N-3 Quantitative Attributes 6 Total malfunctions inserted (4 to 8) / (10 to 14) 1 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry (1 to 4) / (3 to 6) 4 Abnormal events (1 to 2) / (2 to 3) 2 Major transients (1 to 2) / (2 to 3) 2 EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP (1 to 3) / (3 to 5) 1 EOPs contingency procedures used (0 to 3) / (1 to 3) 60 Approximate scenario run time (45 to 60 min) / (one scenario may approach 90 minutes) 40% EOP run time (40 to 70% of scenario run time) 4 Crew critical tasks (2 to 5) / (5 to 8)

Yes Technical Specifications exercised (Yes or No)

SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 22 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

CAEP Files

1. ILT-N-3.cae

1. For ILT Class 08-1 NRC Exam

1. Written by FRF

1. Rev 00

1. Date 09/08

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Inserts a SDV hydraulic lock and blockage.

imf rdhlvfpa 94.0 imf rdhldega 94.0

1. Lifts leads to HPCI GP 4 Isolation Relays irf hpgp4rly lifted

1. Overrides the 2B Stator Clg Wtr PP control switch Trip position to TRIP

1. so the pump will not auto start.

ior mgdscbtr trip

1. Overrides the AUTO TRIP light OFF so it does not flash ON during the start.

ior mglscbat offl2

1. Overrides the 2B Stator Clg Wtr PP trip SER alarm OFF.

imf ser0777 offl2

1. Sets APRM Master Gain pot to 1.0 irf niagain 1.0l2

1. EVENT TRIGGERS

1. Event Trigger 1 inserts a 2A circulating water pump trip trgset 1 "0"l2 imf hp6 (1)l2

1. Trigger 2 Trips 2B RPS MG Set trgset 2 "0"l4 imf b02 (2)l4

1. Trigger 3 Transfers RPS Bus 2A to the normally energized reserve power EPAs trgset 3 "0"l4 irf b03 (3) truel4

1. Event Trigger 4 inserts a failure high of the indicated flow to the CRD flow controller.

1. Sets one of the CRD's enthalpy higher, so alarm 902-5 F-3 comes up sooner.

trgset 4 "0"l6 imf rdfcfhi (4)l6 trg 4 "set rdhmech(21) = 190.0"l6

1. Event trigger 5 Activates when CRD temp high is reached.

1. Forces alarm 902-5 F-3 up.

trgset 5 "rdgtemp(21) .gt. 250.0"l6 imf ser0973 (5) onl6

1. Event trigger 6 Returns alarm 902-5 F-3 to normal.

trgset 6 "sezpoint(973) .and. (rdgtemp(21) .lt. 245.0)"l8 trg 6 "imf ser0973 normal"l8 SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 23 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

1. Event Trigger 7 Fails HPCI steam flow switch to insert a GP 4 isolation signal.

trgset 7 "0"l8 imf at46 (7) 1038.5l8

1. Event Trigger 8 Trips 2A Stator Cooling Water pump.

trgset 8 "0"l10 imf k11 (8)l10

1. Event Trigger 9 activates when 2B Stator Clg Wtr PP control switch

1. is placed to the Normal After Close position. This deletes 2B Stator Clg Wtr PP

1. control switch Trip position override.

1. This allows the 2B Stator Clg Wtr PP to start.

trgset 9 "mgdscbnc_drw"l10 trg 9 "dor mgdscbtr"l10

1. Event Trigger 10 Activates when 2B Stator Clg Wtr PP control switch Trip

1. position override is deleted. Closes 2B stator cooling water pump breaker.

trgset 10 ".not. mgdscatr_drw(2)"l12 trg 10 "set mgzsccl(2) = true"l12

1. Event Trigger 11 Activates when 2B stator cooling water pump breaker closes.

1. Returns the 2B Stator Clg Wtr PP trip SER alarm to NORMAL.

trgset 11 "mgzsccl(2) .and. (.not. sezpoint(777))"l12 trg 11 "imf ser0777 normal"l12

1. Event Trigger 12 acknowledges stator cooling water & H2 Seal Oil/Alterrex Pnl trouble alarms.

trgset 12 "0" l14 irf t22 (12) acknowledgel14 irf t81 (12) truel14

1. Event Trigger 13 Inserts a steam leak upstream of the restrictors.

trgset 13 "0"l14 imf i21 (13) 0.0015 5:00 0.002l14

1. Event Trigger 14 installs MSL Group 1 RPV level byp and Offgas High Rad byp jumpers.

trgset 14 "0"l16 irf ci59jp (14) inl16 irf ogogjp (14) inl16

1. Event Trigger 15 installs scram jumpers.

trgset 15 "0"l16 irf rpjumpas (15) onl16

1. Event Trigger 16 pulls ARI fuses trgset 16 "0"l18 irf aw4 (16) pulledl18

1. Event Trigger 17 Increases size of steam leak upstream of the restrictors.

trgset 17 "0"l18 trg 17 "mmf i21 0.5"l18

1. END SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 24 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Date: TODAY Unit 2 Turnover Online Information Protected Pathway(s) Shutdown Information 912 MWe Time to Boil: N/A Online Risk: Green Shutdown Risk: N/A Risk Equipment:

Reactivity Management Limit: MFLCPR N/A Action Level: N/A Unit 2 Priorities S/D Method: DGP 02-01 Maintain power per TSO.

LCORAs LCORA None Start Title Clock Ends Compensatory Actions Degradation Frequency Compensatory Action Documentation Responsible Unit 2 Conditions, Status, Abnormalities Unit 2 Abnormal Component Position U2 Open Operability Determinations with Compensatory Actions Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities DOP 3900-01 Common Unit Activities Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Unit 2 Procedures in Progress (Non-Surveillance)

None Unit 2 Surveillances in Progress None SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 25 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)

Date: TODAY Unit 3 Turnover Online Information Protected Pathway(s) Shutdown Information 912 MWe Time to Boil: 0 Online Risk: Green Shutdown Risk: N/A Risk Equipment:

Reactivity Management Limit: MFLCPR 0.78 Action Level: 0.980 Unit 3 Priorities S/D Method: DGP 02-01 Maintain load per TSO direction.

LCORAs LCORA # None Start Title Clock Ends Compensatory Actions Degradation Frequency Compensatory Action Documentation Responsible Unit 3 Conditions, Status, Abnormalities None Unit 3 Abnormal Component Position U3 Open Operability Determinations with Compensatory Actions Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Common Unit Activities Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Unit 3 Procedures in Progress (Non-Surveillance)

None Unit 3 Surveillances in Progress None SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 26 of 26 Rev. 00 (09/08)