ML082831697
| ML082831697 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/2008 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Division of License Renewal |
| References | |
| Download: ML082831697 (7) | |
Text
IPRenewal NPEmails From: Kimberly Green Sent: Thursday, October 09, 2008 4:50 PM To: STROUD, MICHAEL D Cc: Tyner, Donna; IPRenewal NPEmails
Subject:
Draft Telecon Summary of August 27, 2008 re Operating Experience Attachments: ML0826801930.doc
- Mike, Attached is the draft telecon summary from the call on August 27, 2008 regarding operating experience for structures. Please review and let me know if any corrections are needed.
- Thanks, Kimberly Green Safety PM (301) 4151627 kimberly.green@nrc.gov 1
Hearing Identifier: IndianPointUnits2and3NonPublic_EX Email Number: 682 Mail Envelope Properties (83F82891AF9D774FBBB39974B6CB134F75767627AE)
Subject:
Draft Telecon Summary of August 27, 2008 re Operating Experience Sent Date: 10/9/2008 4:49:48 PM Received Date: 10/9/2008 4:49:50 PM From: Kimberly Green Created By: Kimberly.Green@nrc.gov Recipients:
"Tyner, Donna" <dtyner@entergy.com>
Tracking Status: None "IPRenewal NPEmails" <IPRenewal.NPEmails@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None "STROUD, MICHAEL D" <MSTROUD@entergy.com>
Tracking Status: None Post Office: HQCLSTR01.nrc.gov Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 331 10/9/2008 4:49:50 PM ML0826801930.doc 76794 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:
Recipients Received:
LICENSEE: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
FACILITY: Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON AUGUST 27, 2008, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC., CONCERNING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO THE INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATIONOPERATING EXPERIENCE The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the applicant) held a telephone conference call on August 27, 2008, to obtain clarification on additional information recently submitted by the applicant by letter dated August 14, 2008, concerning operating experience. The telephone conference call was useful in clarifying the information submitted by the applicant. provides a listing of the participants and Enclosure 2 contains a listing of the items discussed with the applicant, including a brief description on the status of the items.
The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.
Kimberly Green, Safety Project Manager Projects Branch 2 Division of License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-247 and 50-286
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/encls: See next page
ML082680193 OFFICE LA:DLR PM:RPB2:DLR OGC BC:RPB2:DLR NAME SFigueroa KGreen STurk RFranovich DATE 09/29/08 *via phone 10/08/08 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AUGUST 27, 2008 PARTICIPANTS AFFILIATIONS Kim Green U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
George Thomas NRC Hans Ashar NRC Rich Morante Brookhaven National Laboratory Mike Stroud Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy)
Alan Cox Entergy Reza Ahrabli Entergy Charlie Caputo Entergy John Curry Entergy John Skonieczny Entergy Rich Drake Entergy ENCLOSURE 1
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DATED AUGUST 14, 2008 INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION OPERATING EXPERIENCE August 27, 2008 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the applicant) held a telephone conference call on August 27, 2008, to obtain clarification of the following additional information submitted by the applicant by letter dated August 14, 2008 concerning the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 (IP2 and IP3) license renewal application.
Audit Question 27 Response The staff asked the applicant to describe the containment liner insulation and to clarify why the liner behind the insulation is being treated as inaccessible. The staff asked the applicant whether the insulation panels are sealed. The applicant stated that the insulation is encapsulated in a stainless steel jacket and contains a layer of asbestos. The staff asked if the insulation could be removed. The applicant stated that removal of the insulation is an asbestos abatement issue. The applicant stated that, in order to prevent moisture intrusion, the insulation jacket panels are sealed at the joints, at the top where it interfaces with un-insulated liner, and at the bottom where it interfaces with the concrete floor slab. Approximately 20-percent of the liner is insulated. Hence, the liner behind the insulation is treated as inaccessible.
Audit Question 358 Response The staff did not require any clarification on this response.
Audit Question 359 Response The staff asked the applicant to describe where the reactor refueling cavity leakage was occurring and what type of coatings were in place in the refueling cavity. The applicant stated that the leakage occurs only during refueling and is occurring from the degraded stainless steel liner, and that it is not occurring in the area of the seals. The applicant indicated that the observed leakage is 5 to 10 gallons per minute. With regard to the coating, the applicant stated that the welds are coated with ceramalloy which is proving to be too rigid. The ceramalloy is being replaced with insta-coat, but the replacement is happening piecemeal. The insta-coat has slowed the leakage. The applicant stated that it is in the process of developing an action plan which will be tracked in the corrective action program but is subject to change. The applicant agreed to provide a summary of the planned corrective actions after the plan has been finalized and approved.
Audit Question 360 Response The staff asked if a visual inspection had been performed of the IP2 spent fuel pool and refuel cavity and if so, how extensive it was. The applicant stated that the accessible 40-percent of the IP2 spent fuel pool liner above the fuel racks and 100-percent of the IP2 spent fuel transfer canal liner has been visually inspected. The staff asked the applicant to provide a brief history of the IP2 spent fuel pool leak. In the early 1990s during a rerack, damage occurred causing a pinhole leak. The liner was subsequently repaired. During excavation to install a crane, ENCLOSURE 2
dampness in the vicinity of a hairline crack in the concrete was observed. The applicant stated that the source of the dampness was thought to be residual water from the pinhole leak that came out during the excavation. The applicant installed vacuum boxes at the location of the hairline crack. Since the installation of the boxes, the applicant stated that it had not observed any leakage. The applicant asserted that there was no known leakage for the IP2 spent fuel pool at this time. The staff asked about the structural integrity of the concrete of the spent fuel pool. The applicant stated that it would look at the original design calculations to see how much margin exists for the spent fuel pool concrete structure, accounting for degradation of the concrete and reinforcement from potential leakage of borated water including the period of extended operation. Also, the applicant stated that bore samples had been taken from the area of the previous crack, and it would provide the documents that contained the information on the bore samples.
Audit Question 361 Response The staff asked the applicant where the subject spalling on the containment had occurred. The applicant clarified that the spalling locations occurred on the vertical wall of the containment structure and not on the dome as suggested in the condition reports that the staff had previously reviewed during the audit. The applicant indicated that the spalling occurred on both IP2 and IP3 containments. The staff asked the applicant to provide clarification of the reason for the spalling. The applicant stated that the spalling was occurring in locations where there was insufficient concrete coverage over the cadweld sleeves and also in locations where anchors for scaffolding had been placed during construction. In these locations, cosmetic repairs were performed after the scaffolding was removed. The staff asked the applicant about the worst case margins in the concrete and rebar at the degraded areas, and for photographs and locations/dimensions of the spalls on both containments. The applicant stated that it would provide this information.