Letter Sequence Request |
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Results
Other: CNL-15-189, Decommissioning Funding Update, ML090770757, ML091250151, ML092470504, ML101740152, ML101740157, ML101820478, ML102110075, ML102360283, ML102600474, ML103160419, ML110260321, ML111010165, ML111250430, ML111890037, ML11291A095, ML12069A330, ML12073A391, ML12073A392, ML12073A393, ML12081A073, ML13044A113
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MONTHYEARML0815601832008-05-29029 May 2008 Cable Issues Corrective Action Program for the Completion of WBN Unit 2 Project stage: Request ML0830900462008-10-30030 October 2008 Preservice Inspection Program Plan and Request for Relief No. WBN-2/PDI-4 Project stage: Request ML0905707412009-02-28028 February 2009 NUREG-0847, Supp. 21, Safety Evaluation Report, Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Project stage: Request ML0907003782009-03-0404 March 2009 Operating License Application Update Project stage: Request ML0907707572009-04-22022 April 2009 Notice of Receipt of Update to Application for Facility Operating License and Notice of Additional Opportunity for Hearing and Order Project stage: Other ML0907708072009-04-27027 April 2009 Federal Register Notice- Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 - Notice If Receipt of Update to Application for Facility Operating License and Notice of Additional Opportunity for Hearing Project stage: Request ML0912501512009-05-0808 May 2009 Public Notice of Receipt of Updated Application for Facility Operating License Project stage: Other ML0918900382009-07-21021 July 2009 Request for Additional Information Regarding Financial Information Related to Operating License Application Update Project stage: RAI ML0924705042009-08-26026 August 2009 Additional Information Regarding Financial Information Related to Operating License Application Update Project stage: Other ML0935209672009-12-15015 December 2009 TVA Meeting Presentation Project stage: Request ML0935600192009-12-22022 December 2009 Summary of Meeting with Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Regarding Digital Instrumentation and Controls Review Project stage: Meeting ML1002703512010-02-18018 February 2010 Request for Additional Information Regarding Physical Security Plan Project stage: RAI ML1006300192010-03-11011 March 2010 Request for Additional Information Regarding Radiological Emergency Response Plan Project stage: RAI ML1009700722010-04-0505 April 2010 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Physical Security Plan Project stage: Response to RAI ML1012302482010-04-27027 April 2010 Staff Information Requests Resulting from NRC December 15, 2009, Meeting with TVA Regarding Digital Instrumentation and Controls Review and NRC Clarifications to the Requests Provided During February 18, 2010. Project stage: Meeting ML1013406982010-05-28028 May 2010 Supplement to Request for Additional Information Regarding Radiological Emergency Response Plan (Tac No. ME0853) Project stage: RAI ML1015504882010-06-11011 June 2010 Request for Additional Information Regarding Fire Protection Program Project stage: RAI ML1015404772010-06-15015 June 2010 Review of Radiological Emergency Response Plan Project stage: Approval ML1017401572010-06-24024 June 2010 Notice of Receipt of Update Antitrust Information and Opportunity for Public Comment Project stage: Other ML1017401522010-06-24024 June 2010 Letter, Notice of Receipt of Update Antitrust Information and Opportunity for Public Comment Project stage: Other ML1018204782010-07-0101 July 2010 Revised Notice of Receipt of Update Antitrust Information and Opportunity for Public Comment Project stage: Other ML1018904062010-07-13013 July 2010 Request for Additional Information Regarding Antitrust Review Project stage: RAI ML1019703112010-07-16016 July 2010 Request for Additional Information Regarding Fire Protection Program Project stage: Request ML1021100752010-07-29029 July 2010 Jcn No: 4201, (TAC No. ME0853) Q4011 Task Order Number 9, Tennessee Valley Authority, Watts Bar Unit 2. Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Review Project stage: Other ML1021600852010-07-29029 July 2010 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Antitrust Review Project stage: Response to RAI ML1023602832010-08-20020 August 2010 Fire Protection Program, Commitment to Provide Additional Information on Multiple Spurious Operation Scenarios Project stage: Other ML12081A0732010-08-20020 August 2010 Enclosure 1 (W/Apps a, B, & C): Watts Bar, Unit 2, Fire Protection Program, Commitment to Provide Additional Information on Multiple Spurious Operation Scenarios Project stage: Other ML1026004742010-09-17017 September 2010 Response to NRC Question Regarding Emergency Plan Project stage: Other ML1031604192010-11-0505 November 2010 Watts, Unit 2, Fire Protection Program (TAC ME0853) - Commitment to Provide Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Evaluation Project stage: Other ML1102603212011-03-22022 March 2011 Notice of No Significant Antitrust Changes and Time for Filing Requests for Reevaluation Project stage: Other ML1109604072011-04-0101 April 2011 Response to Request for Additional Information on Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.3.2.6 for the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) Project stage: Response to RAI ML1110101652011-04-13013 April 2011 Status of Operating License Application Review and Project Schedule Implications Project stage: Other ML11146A0442011-05-20020 May 2011 Response to Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 11 and Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement Request for Additional Information Project stage: Supplement ML1118900372011-07-20020 July 2011 Schedule of Licensing Activities Project stage: Other ML1112504302011-08-12012 August 2011 Transition of Components to American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI Project stage: Other ML11291A0952011-10-13013 October 2011 Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests Project stage: Other ML1131302182011-11-18018 November 2011 Request for Additional Information Regarding Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Open Items 80, 81, 105, and 108 Project stage: Approval ML12069A3302012-01-19019 January 2012 Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests Project stage: Other ML12073A3922012-02-29029 February 2012 WNA-VR-00283-WBT-NP, Rev. 7, Nuclear Automation Watts Bar Unit 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Iv&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System. Attachment 2 Project stage: Other ML12073A3932012-03-0808 March 2012 TVA White Paper Common Q Pams Design Basis Conformance to the Requirements of IEEE 603-1991, Dated March 8, 2012 (Letter Items 1 and 3, Sser 23 Appendix Hh Item Numbers 94 and 105). Attachment 4 Project stage: Other ML12073A3912012-03-0909 March 2012 Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests Project stage: Other ML12160A3512012-06-0707 June 2012 Submittal of Additional Information Requested to NUREG-0847 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Related to Appendix Hh Open Item 26 - Diesel Generator Project stage: Supplement ML13044A1132013-02-0707 February 2013 Fire Protection Program (TAC No. ME0853) - Commitment to Provide Additional Information on Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Scenarios Project stage: Other CNL-15-017, Decommissioning Funding Status Report2015-03-31031 March 2015 Decommissioning Funding Status Report Project stage: Request CNL-15-189, Decommissioning Funding Update2015-09-10010 September 2015 Decommissioning Funding Update Project stage: Other 2010-07-01
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24219A0262024-08-12012 August 2024 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure IR 05000390/20240022024-08-0707 August 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2024002 and 05000391/2024002 Rev ML24204A2652024-07-25025 July 2024 Regulatory Audit Summary Related to Request to Revise Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 to Reduce the Residual Heat Removal Flow Rate ML24199A0012024-07-22022 July 2024 Clarification and Correction to Exemption from Requirement of 10 CFR 37.11(c)(2) ML24172A1342024-07-15015 July 2024 Exemptions from 10 CFR 37.11(C)(2) (EPID L-2023-LLE-0024) - Letter ML24170A8002024-07-15015 July 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 168 and 74 Regarding Revision to Technical Specification Table 1.1-1 for Required Number of Fully Tensioned Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Closure Bolts IR 05000390/20244402024-07-12012 July 2024 95001 Supplemental Inspection Supplemental Report 05000390-2024440 and 05000391-2024440 and Follow-Up Assessment Letter ML24131A0012024-07-0202 July 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 167 and 73 Regarding Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-427-A, Revision 2 CNL-24-052, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14)2024-06-27027 June 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14) CNL-24-018, License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-276-A, Revision 2, Regarding TS 3.8.1 AC Sources – Operating to Clarify Requirements for Diesel Generator Testing (WBN-TS2024-06-25025 June 2024 License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-276-A, Revision 2, Regarding TS 3.8.1 AC Sources – Operating to Clarify Requirements for Diesel Generator Testing (WBN-TS ML24089A1152024-06-21021 June 2024 Transmittal Letter, Environmental Assessments and Findings of No Significant Impact Related to Exemption Requests from 10 CFR 37.11(c)(2) ML24141A0482024-05-17017 May 2024 EN 56958_1 Ametek Solidstate Controls, Inc ML24100A7642024-05-16016 May 2024 Issuance of Amendment No. 166 Regarding Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown, to Remove Reference to C-S Diesel Generator (CNL-23-062) IR 05000390/20240012024-05-14014 May 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2024001 and 05000391/2024001 CNL-24-040, Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions2024-05-0808 May 2024 Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions IR 05000391/20240072024-04-30030 April 2024 Assessment Follow-up Letter for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 – Report 05000391/2024007 ML24120A1182024-04-29029 April 2024 – Notification of NRC Supplemental Inspection (95001) and Request for Information CNL-24-037, Clinch River, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Unit 1 and 2, Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Revision 422024-04-22022 April 2024 Clinch River, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Unit 1 and 2, Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Revision 42 ML24087A1912024-04-18018 April 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting CNL-24-033, Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions2024-04-17017 April 2024 Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions CNL-24-010, License Amendment Request to Recapture Low-Power Testing Time (WBN-TS-23-19)2024-04-17017 April 2024 License Amendment Request to Recapture Low-Power Testing Time (WBN-TS-23-19) CNL-24-024, Hydrologic Engineering Center River Analysis System Project Milestone Status Update2024-04-17017 April 2024 Hydrologic Engineering Center River Analysis System Project Milestone Status Update ML24072A0052024-04-15015 April 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 165 and 72 Regarding Increase in the Maximum Number of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods and Supporting Changes, and Revision to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report CNL-24-004, Application to Modify the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications for Main Control Room Chiller Completion Time Extension (WBN-TS-23-13)2024-04-0404 April 2024 Application to Modify the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications for Main Control Room Chiller Completion Time Extension (WBN-TS-23-13) IR 05000390/20244012024-04-0202 April 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000390/2024401 and 05000391/2024401 - (Public) CNL-24-020, Clinch River, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Description and Application to Revise the Technical Specifications Associated with QAPD Requirements2024-04-0101 April 2024 Clinch River, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Description and Application to Revise the Technical Specifications Associated with QAPD Requirements CNL-24-008, Guarantee of Payment of Deferred Premiums - 2023 Annual Report2024-03-27027 March 2024 Guarantee of Payment of Deferred Premiums - 2023 Annual Report CNL-24-007, Annual Insurance Status Report2024-03-27027 March 2024 Annual Insurance Status Report CNL-24-025, Notice of Intent to Pursue License Renewal for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Submittal Schedule2024-03-25025 March 2024 Notice of Intent to Pursue License Renewal for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Submittal Schedule ML24081A0262024-03-21021 March 2024 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions ML24079A0312024-03-19019 March 2024 Wb 2024-301, Corporate Notification Letter (210-day Ltr) CNL-24-031, Supplement to Request for Exemption from Various Part 72 Regulations Resulting from Fuel Basket Design Control Compliance2024-03-18018 March 2024 Supplement to Request for Exemption from Various Part 72 Regulations Resulting from Fuel Basket Design Control Compliance CNL-24-029, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Tennessee Valley Authority - Request for Exemption from Specific Requirements of 10 CFR Part 372024-03-14014 March 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Tennessee Valley Authority - Request for Exemption from Specific Requirements of 10 CFR Part 37 CNL-24-028, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2024-03-14014 March 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation IR 05000390/20240102024-03-0808 March 2024 Age-Related Degradation Inspection Report 05000390/2024010 and 05000391/2024010 CNL-24-012, Request for Exemption from Various Part 72 Regulations Resulting from Fuel Basket Design Control Compliance2024-02-28028 February 2024 Request for Exemption from Various Part 72 Regulations Resulting from Fuel Basket Design Control Compliance IR 05000390/20230062024-02-28028 February 2024 Annual Assessment Letter for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Report 05000390/2023006 and 05000391/2023006 CNL-24-023, Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision. Includes CECC EPIP-17, Revision 252024-02-20020 February 2024 Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision. Includes CECC EPIP-17, Revision 25 IR 05000390/20230042024-02-13013 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2023004 and 05000391/2023004 and Apparent Violation ML24038A3342024-02-0707 February 2024 Change to South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (Stepgs) Emergency Plan ML23319A2452024-01-29029 January 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 366 and 360; 164 and 71 Regarding the Adoption of TSTF-567, Revision 1, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues ML24008A2462024-01-18018 January 2024 Revision to the Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule CNL-24-017, Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure and Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure Revisions2024-01-17017 January 2024 Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure and Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure Revisions CNL-24-016, Supplement to Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14)2024-01-10010 January 2024 Supplement to Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14) CNL-23-052, Application to Adopt TSTF-427-A, Revision 2, Allowance for Non-Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System Operability2024-01-0909 January 2024 Application to Adopt TSTF-427-A, Revision 2, Allowance for Non-Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System Operability CNL-23-062, Application to Revise the Technical Specifications Section 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown, to Remove Reference to the C-S Diesel Generator (WBN-TS-23-018)2024-01-0808 January 2024 Application to Revise the Technical Specifications Section 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown, to Remove Reference to the C-S Diesel Generator (WBN-TS-23-018) ML23346A1382024-01-0303 January 2024 Regulatory Audit Summary Related to Request to Increase the Number of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods CNL-23-069, Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-12-21021 December 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation IR 05000390/20234412023-12-21021 December 2023 Plantfinal Significance Determination for a Security-Related Greater than Green Finding, Nov, and Assessment Follow-up, 05000390-2023441 and 05000391-2023441-Public CNL-23-036, Application to Revise Function 5 of Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation, for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (SQN-TS-23-02 and WBN-TS-23-08)2023-12-18018 December 2023 Application to Revise Function 5 of Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation, for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (SQN-TS-23-02 and WBN-TS-23-08) 2024-08-07
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARWBL-24-022, Cycle 5 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2024-05-16016 May 2024 Cycle 5 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report WBL-24-007, Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2.15 - Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program2024-03-0505 March 2024 Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2.15 - Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program CNL-24-016, Supplement to Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14)2024-01-10010 January 2024 Supplement to Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14) ML23346A1382024-01-0303 January 2024 Regulatory Audit Summary Related to Request to Increase the Number of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods ML23192A4472023-07-31031 July 2023 Staff Assessment of Updated Seismic Hazards at TVA Sites Following the NRC Process for the Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazards Information WBL-23-018, Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)2023-04-10010 April 2023 Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) CNL-23-002, Application to Revise Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications to Change the Number of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (WBN-TS-21-02) and Proposed Revision to Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Removal Sche2023-03-20020 March 2023 Application to Revise Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications to Change the Number of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (WBN-TS-21-02) and Proposed Revision to Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Removal Schedu WBL-22-034, Update to Fire Protection Report Figures Redacted2022-08-0101 August 2022 Update to Fire Protection Report Figures Redacted WBL-21-057, Cycle 4 Mid-Cycle Outage Generic Letter 95-05 Voltage-Based Alternate Repair Criteria Final Report2021-12-16016 December 2021 Cycle 4 Mid-Cycle Outage Generic Letter 95-05 Voltage-Based Alternate Repair Criteria Final Report WBL-21-056, Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)2021-12-0909 December 2021 Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) CNL-21-018, Application to Adopt TSTF-205-A, Revision of Channel Calibration, Channel Functional Test, and Related Definitions, and TSTF-563-A, Revise Instrument Testing Definitions to Incorporate the Surveillance .2021-12-0909 December 2021 Application to Adopt TSTF-205-A, Revision of Channel Calibration, Channel Functional Test, and Related Definitions, and TSTF-563-A, Revise Instrument Testing Definitions to Incorporate the Surveillance . ML21244A3452021-09-20020 September 2021 Proposed Alternative IST RR 9 to the Requirements of the ASME OM Code for Test Plan Group 6 Relief Valves CNL-21-055, Revision to Refueling Outage 3 Generic Letter 95-05 Voltage-Based Alternate Repair Criteria Final Report2021-07-20020 July 2021 Revision to Refueling Outage 3 Generic Letter 95-05 Voltage-Based Alternate Repair Criteria Final Report CNL-21-040, Supplement to Expedited Application for Approval to Use a Growth Rate Temperature Adjustment When Implementing the Generic Letter 95-05 Analysis for the (WBN TS-391-21-002)2021-03-23023 March 2021 Supplement to Expedited Application for Approval to Use a Growth Rate Temperature Adjustment When Implementing the Generic Letter 95-05 Analysis for the (WBN TS-391-21-002) ML21060A9132021-03-17017 March 2021 Final Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for Initial and Updated Decommissioning Funding Plans for Watts Bar ISFSI CNL-21-011, Expedited Application for Approval to Use a Growth Rate Temperature Adjustment When Implementing the Generic Letter 95-05 Analysis for the (WBN TS-391-21-002)2021-02-25025 February 2021 Expedited Application for Approval to Use a Growth Rate Temperature Adjustment When Implementing the Generic Letter 95-05 Analysis for the (WBN TS-391-21-002) WBL-21-006, Refueling Outage 3 Generic Letter 95-05 Voltage-Based Alternate Repair Criteria Final Report2021-02-11011 February 2021 Refueling Outage 3 Generic Letter 95-05 Voltage-Based Alternate Repair Criteria Final Report CNL-20-102, 10 CFR 71.95 Report for 3-60B Casks User2020-12-16016 December 2020 10 CFR 71.95 Report for 3-60B Casks User WBL-20-066, Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)2020-12-16016 December 2020 Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) CNL-20-074, Submittal of Additional Supplement to License Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate (WBN-TS-19-06)2020-08-28028 August 2020 Submittal of Additional Supplement to License Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate (WBN-TS-19-06) WBL-20-004, Analysis of Capsule U from Watts Bar Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program2020-04-16016 April 2020 Analysis of Capsule U from Watts Bar Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program CNL-19-082, License Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate (WBN-TS-19-06)2019-10-10010 October 2019 License Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate (WBN-TS-19-06) L-19-034, Wafts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report2019-06-18018 June 2019 Wafts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report L-19-026, Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)2019-04-0404 April 2019 Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) ML19039A0492019-02-0808 February 2019 Amd 1 to USAR Chapter 9 Auxiliary System NRC Additional Redactions ML19003A5692019-01-16016 January 2019 Review of the Fall 2017 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML18242A0382018-08-30030 August 2018 Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report CNL-18-092, Application to Revise the Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-266-A, Revision 3, Eliminate the Remote Shutdown System Table of Instrumentation and Controls (WBN-TS-18-02)2018-08-0101 August 2018 Application to Revise the Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-266-A, Revision 3, Eliminate the Remote Shutdown System Table of Instrumentation and Controls (WBN-TS-18-02) CNL-18-007, Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Supplemental Information2018-04-10010 April 2018 Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Supplemental Information ML17356A2692017-12-20020 December 2017 Construction Lessons Learned Report ML17313A1282017-11-0909 November 2017 Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) CNL-17-134, Transmittal of WCAP-18191-NP, Watts Bar Unit 2 Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation and Supplemental Reactor Vessel Integrity Evaluations2017-10-13013 October 2017 Transmittal of WCAP-18191-NP, Watts Bar Unit 2 Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation and Supplemental Reactor Vessel Integrity Evaluations ML17272A0192017-09-29029 September 2017 Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report ML17263A1162017-09-20020 September 2017 Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report ML17209A5542017-07-28028 July 2017 Cycle 14 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report CNL-17-050, Submission of Technical Reports to Support a Public Meeting Regarding the Transition to the Reactor Oversight Process for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index2017-05-30030 May 2017 Submission of Technical Reports to Support a Public Meeting Regarding the Transition to the Reactor Oversight Process for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index ML16215A1042016-08-0202 August 2016 Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System Report ML16113A0202016-04-22022 April 2016 Submittal of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations 50.59 Summary Report CNL-16-038, Application to Revise Technical Specification 4.2.1, Fuel Assemblies and Radioactive Waste System Design Basis Source Term Supplement to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information2016-03-31031 March 2016 Application to Revise Technical Specification 4.2.1, Fuel Assemblies and Radioactive Waste System Design Basis Source Term Supplement to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information CNL-16-034, TMI Task Action I.D.1 Commitment Closure Regarding Control Room Design Review Special Program2016-02-19019 February 2016 TMI Task Action I.D.1 Commitment Closure Regarding Control Room Design Review Special Program CNL-15-263, Application to Revise Technical Specification 4.2.1, Fuel Assemblies (WBN-TS-15-03) - Supplemental Information Related to the Onsite Regulatory Audit at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory2015-12-29029 December 2015 Application to Revise Technical Specification 4.2.1, Fuel Assemblies (WBN-TS-15-03) - Supplemental Information Related to the Onsite Regulatory Audit at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory CNL-15-204, Response to NRC Question Regarding the Revised Containment Analysis, Including Enclosure 3, WCAP-17834-NP, Revision 2, Wcobra/Trac Long Term LOCA M&E and Containment Integrity Analysis and Enclosure 4, Affidavit2015-09-21021 September 2015 Response to NRC Question Regarding the Revised Containment Analysis, Including Enclosure 3, WCAP-17834-NP, Revision 2, Wcobra/Trac Long Term LOCA M&E and Containment Integrity Analysis and Enclosure 4, Affidavit CNL-15-165, Submittal of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Survey Results2015-08-20020 August 2015 Submittal of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Survey Results CNL-15-143, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Nuclear Power Group Commercial Grade Dedication Recovery Project - Closure Report2015-07-31031 July 2015 the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Nuclear Power Group Commercial Grade Dedication Recovery Project - Closure Report CNL-15-131, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Report, Revision 32015-07-15015 July 2015 Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Report, Revision 3 CNL-15-106, 3, Sequoyah and Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2 - Provides Service List Update for Routine Information2015-07-0808 July 2015 3, Sequoyah and Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2 - Provides Service List Update for Routine Information CNL-15-097, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report for Watts Bar Plant, Response to NRC Request for Information Per 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2015-06-16016 June 2015 Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report for Watts Bar Plant, Response to NRC Request for Information Per 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML15121A6562015-05-0101 May 2015 NRC Region II - CIB1 Watts Bar 2 Ip&S 194 Additional Questions Request List CNL-15-039, Severe Accident Management Alternatives for Reactor Coolant Pump Seals2015-04-10010 April 2015 Severe Accident Management Alternatives for Reactor Coolant Pump Seals CNL-15-043, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report for Watts Bar, Response to NRC Request for Information Per Title 10 of CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Acc2015-03-25025 March 2015 Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report for Watts Bar, Response to NRC Request for Information Per Title 10 of CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accid 2024-05-16
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARWBL-24-007, Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2.15 - Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program2024-03-0505 March 2024 Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2.15 - Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program ML23346A1382024-01-0303 January 2024 Regulatory Audit Summary Related to Request to Increase the Number of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods WBL-22-034, Update to Fire Protection Report Figures Redacted2022-08-0101 August 2022 Update to Fire Protection Report Figures Redacted ML21244A3452021-09-20020 September 2021 Proposed Alternative IST RR 9 to the Requirements of the ASME OM Code for Test Plan Group 6 Relief Valves ML19003A5692019-01-16016 January 2019 Review of the Fall 2017 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML18242A0382018-08-30030 August 2018 Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report CNL-18-092, Application to Revise the Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-266-A, Revision 3, Eliminate the Remote Shutdown System Table of Instrumentation and Controls (WBN-TS-18-02)2018-08-0101 August 2018 Application to Revise the Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-266-A, Revision 3, Eliminate the Remote Shutdown System Table of Instrumentation and Controls (WBN-TS-18-02) CNL-18-007, Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Supplemental Information2018-04-10010 April 2018 Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Supplemental Information ML17313A1282017-11-0909 November 2017 Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) ML17272A0192017-09-29029 September 2017 Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report ML17263A1162017-09-20020 September 2017 Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System (Pams) Report ML17209A5542017-07-28028 July 2017 Cycle 14 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML16215A1042016-08-0202 August 2016 Technical Specification (TS) 5.9.8 - Post Accident Monitoring System Report ML16113A0202016-04-22022 April 2016 Submittal of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations 50.59 Summary Report CNL-16-038, Application to Revise Technical Specification 4.2.1, Fuel Assemblies and Radioactive Waste System Design Basis Source Term Supplement to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information2016-03-31031 March 2016 Application to Revise Technical Specification 4.2.1, Fuel Assemblies and Radioactive Waste System Design Basis Source Term Supplement to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information CNL-16-034, TMI Task Action I.D.1 Commitment Closure Regarding Control Room Design Review Special Program2016-02-19019 February 2016 TMI Task Action I.D.1 Commitment Closure Regarding Control Room Design Review Special Program CNL-15-263, Application to Revise Technical Specification 4.2.1, Fuel Assemblies (WBN-TS-15-03) - Supplemental Information Related to the Onsite Regulatory Audit at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory2015-12-29029 December 2015 Application to Revise Technical Specification 4.2.1, Fuel Assemblies (WBN-TS-15-03) - Supplemental Information Related to the Onsite Regulatory Audit at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory CNL-15-165, Submittal of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Survey Results2015-08-20020 August 2015 Submittal of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Survey Results CNL-15-131, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Report, Revision 32015-07-15015 July 2015 Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Report, Revision 3 CNL-15-106, 3, Sequoyah and Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2 - Provides Service List Update for Routine Information2015-07-0808 July 2015 3, Sequoyah and Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2 - Provides Service List Update for Routine Information ML15121A6562015-05-0101 May 2015 NRC Region II - CIB1 Watts Bar 2 Ip&S 194 Additional Questions Request List CNL-15-043, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report for Watts Bar, Response to NRC Request for Information Per Title 10 of CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Acc2015-03-25025 March 2015 Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report for Watts Bar, Response to NRC Request for Information Per Title 10 of CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accid CNL-14-212, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Re Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2014-12-30030 December 2014 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Re Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML14163A6582014-09-18018 September 2014 Closeout of Generic Letter, 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors ML14212A6032014-07-31031 July 2014 WBRD-50-391/86-60 - Final Report and Revised Completion Schedule IR 05000391/19860602014-07-31031 July 2014 WBRD-50-391/86-60 - Final Report and Revised Completion Schedule ML14149A1502014-06-16016 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14133A5422014-05-23023 May 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML13246A0222013-08-28028 August 2013 Submittal of Pre-op Test Instruction ML13178A2812013-06-26026 June 2013 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report Supplement ML13144A5762013-05-22022 May 2013 Watt Bar, Units 1 & 2, Report of Drug Testing Error in Accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(c)(1) ML13121A0602013-04-29029 April 2013 Commitment Summary Report ML13126A2942013-04-29029 April 2013 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report ML13080A3632013-03-18018 March 2013 Enclosure 3, Summer 2011 Compliance Survey for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Outfall Passive Mixing Zone ML13080A3662013-03-18018 March 2013 Enclosure 1, Summer 2010 Compliance Survey for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Outfall Passive Mixing Zone ML13080A0732013-03-12012 March 2013 Extension Request Regarding the Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report Required by NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation.. ML13175A1352013-03-0505 March 2013 2-PTI-092-03, Revision 0, Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Noise Checks During Hot Functional Testing. ML12356A3172012-12-17017 December 2012 Submittal of Pre-op Test Instruction, 2-PTI-063-06, Revision 0, Safety Injection System Check Valve Test. ML12335A3402012-11-27027 November 2012 Tennessee Valley Authority - Fleet Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Walkdown Results of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of ML13108A2842012-11-12012 November 2012 Unit 1, Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report ML13175A1362012-11-0808 November 2012 2-PTI-099-06, Revision 0, Reactor Protection Setpoint Verification. ML13175A1342012-11-0101 November 2012 2-PTI-082-02, Revision 0, Rod Control - Non Hft. ML13175A1332012-10-22022 October 2012 2-PTI-085-01, Revision 0, Rod Control Functional Test. ML12236A1642012-07-19019 July 2012 Enclosure 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 ML12223A1832012-03-29029 March 2012 Environmental Protection Agency 2012 - Facility Detail Report - Environmental Facts Warehouse Fii - Moccasin Bend Wwtp ML11362A0562011-12-20020 December 2011 Status of Regulatory Framework for the Completion of Construction and Licensing for Unit 2 - Revision 7 (TAC No. MD6311), and Status of Generic Communications for Unit 2 - Revision 7 ML11341A1572011-11-30030 November 2011 Attachments 7 Through 9, WNA-CN-00157-WBT-NP, Revision 1, CAW-11-3316, and WBT-D-3566 Np, Incore Instrument System Signal Processing System Isolation Requirement ML11326A2842011-11-18018 November 2011 Commitment Summary Report ML11257A0502011-08-31031 August 2011 Attachment 7, WCAP-17427-NP, Rev. 1, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System Computer Security Assessment, Attachment 8, Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure and Attachme ML1104003852011-02-0707 February 2011 Enclosure 2, Appendix a, Hydrothermal Effects on the Ichthyhoplankton from the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Supplemental Condenser Cooling Water Outfall in Upper Chickamauga Reservoir 2024-03-05
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Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 May 29, 2008 10 CFR 50.54f U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Stop: OWFN P1-35 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of Docket No. 50-391 Tennessee Valley Authority )
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - UNIT 2 - CABLE ISSUES CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM FOR THE COMPLETION OF WBN UNIT 2
Reference:
- 1. TVA letter dated January 29, 2008, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) -
Unit 2 - Regulatory Framework for the Completion of Construction and Licensing Activities for Unit 2" This letter provides the program methods that TVA proposes to use to resolve those sub issues of the Cable Issues Corrective Action Program (CAP) which are different from that used for WBN Unit 1. In Reference 1, TVA committed to describe such differences and appropriate justifications for their use in Unit 2. Enclosure 1 provides the differences and their justification in each case which demonstrate equally effective alternate resolutions to these cable issues.
Additionally, this letter includes a discussion of the trending analysis performed for cable damage issues on Unit 1 and how trending will be addressed on Unit 2.
Finally, TVA identified one electrical sub issue pertaining to Physical Cable Separation and Electrical Isolation having to do with coil-to-contact and contact-to-contact, for which TVA planned to use a different approach than was used on Unit 1. Upon further consideration, TVA has decided to use the same approach as was used on Unit 1 to resolve this sub issue.
TVA requests NRC approval of the alternative program methods to address the Cable Issues CAP. This submittal contains no new open actions required by licensing.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 May 29, 2008 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 29th day of May 2008. If you have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-2351.
Sincerely, Masoud Baj eani Watts Bar t 2 Vice President Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
Lakshminarasimh Raghavan U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MS 08H4A One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 Joseph Williams, Senior Project Manager (WBN Unit 2)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 Loren R. Plisco, Deputy Regional Administrator for Construction U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center, Suite 23T85 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931 NRC Resident Inspector Unit 2 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381
Enclosure 1 Corrective Actions for Cable Issues In the late 1980s, various concerns related to cable installation and routing were identified at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) through Employee Concerns, Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) findings. The root cause of these concerns were primarily absence or incompleteness of specific guidelines in the development of design input or output documents, and in some instances, the lack of procedural details for the installation of cables.
For WBN Unit 1, the Cable Issues Corrective Action Plan (CAP) was implemented. This CAP defined the scope and provided the corrective actions to resolve the past issues and prevent their future recurrence. The following sub-issues were identified by the Cable Issues CAP:
- 1. Silicone rubber insulated cables
- 2. Cable jamming
- 3. Cable support in vertical conduits
- 4. Cable support in vertical trays
- 5. Cable proximity to hot pipes
- 6. Cable pullbys
- 7. Cable bend radius
- 8. Cable splices
- 9. Cable sidewall bearing pressure (SWBP)
- 10. Pulling cables through 90-degree condulets and mid-route flexible conduits
- 11. Computerized Cable Routing System (CCRS) software and data base verification and validation The Cable Issues CAP was originally submitted to the NRC on December 16, 1988 (Reference 2). It was revised, and Revision 1 was submitted on June 27, 1989. Revision 2 was issued in a letter to the NRC on October 11, 1990 (Reference 3), where TVA specified the revisions to Revision 1 in response to NRC comments. The NRC endorsed the approach by issuing a Safety Evaluation Report (SER), dated April 25, 1991, as well as in Supplements 7 (dated April 27, 1992) and 9, Appendix Y (dated June 16, 1992) to NUREG-0847. Revision 3 of the CAP was submitted to the NRC on January 13, 1994 (Reference 4). NRC reviewed Revision 3 in a letter dated February 14, 1994. The TVA submittal dated November 1, 1995, notified NRC that the Cable Issues CAP (Reference 6) was complete.
TVA implemented the corrective actions for Class 1 E cables (WBN Unit 1 and common equipment). This scope also included a subset of Unit 2 Class 1E cables that were required for Unit 1 operation/safe shutdown. NRC performed 'field inspections throughout TVA's implementation process and confirmed that TVA's implementation of the cable issues corrective actions was satisfactory before NRC granted an operating license for WBN Unit 1. NRC findings and conclusions are delineated in the following Inspection Reports:
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390/94-53, 50-391/94-53
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390/95-17, 50-391/95-17
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390/95-57, 50-391/95-57 I
0 Inspection Report Nos: 50-390/95-77, 50-391/95-77 In reference 1, TVA stated its plans to implement the Unit 1 approach on the remaining Unit 2 Class 1 E cables with the exception of the following issues:
- 1. Cable jamming
- 2. Cable pullbys
- 3. Cable SWBP
- 4. Pulling cables through 90-degree condulets and mid-route flexible conduits
- 5. CCRS software and database verification and validation The Unit 1 resolution and proposed Unit 2 resolution for each of the five (5) issues are delineated as follows:
- 1. Cable Jamminq Statement of the problem:
NRC issued a Technical Evaluation Report (TER) on January 30, 1987. The TER identified the potential for undetected cable damage since TVA-WBN documents did not address the cable jam ratio. Jam ratio is D/d, where d is the cable outside diameter and D is the conduit inside diameter. When three single conductors of the same size, with a jam ratio of 2.8 to 3.1 (IEEE 690-1984), are pulled into a conduit, the cable may align in a flat configuration with resultant jamming.
Resolution of this issue on Unit 1:
WBN implemented the following actions to resolve this issue:
" WBN evaluated Class 1 E conduit segments to identify those segments most likely to have experienced jamming during installation. This population (Unit 1 and Unit 2 safety-related cables with a jam ratio between 2.8 and 3.1) was ranked according to their calculated percent of allowable SWBP, which is defined as the radial force exerted on cable insulation at a bend while the cable is being pulled in a raceway.
- Six of the 39 cables identified by the above process were to be replaced as a result of other issues. These cables were removed and inspected for evidence of cable damage due to jamming. Cables with the highest calculated SWBP of those removed and exhibiting no damage were considered the "bounding" configuration.
Lower ranked configurations of the above identified population were considered enveloped by this inspection.
TVA's CAP closure report to the NRC for Unit 1, dated November 1, 1995, stated that "Class 1E conduits were evaluated to identify those segments most likely to have experienced jamming during installation. These segments were ranked according to their calculated percent sidewall bearing pressure. Cables were removed and inspected, and no evidence of damage due to jamming was identified. The inspected cables included those from the highest calculated SWBP and are considered to bound the lower ranked cables."
Thus, there were no cables in the population that were at risk of jamming.
2
Corrective Action for Unit 2:
Calculation WBPEVAR8905050, Cable Jamming, which addressed both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable population, identified 77 conduits with potential for cable jamming. Such potential existed when conduit contained 3 cables of the same size and conductors greater than #10 AWG, jam ratio was between 2.8 and 3.1, and conduit length was greater than 10 feet.
Calculation WBPEVAR9008003 documented the evaluation of these cables for the 76 conduits identified as remaining in this population, since one conduit was removed because the affected cable was no longer routed in the conduit. The population contained 39 Unit 1 and 37 Unit 2 conduits. This calculation documented the installed conduit configuration via walkdown. It also calculated the cable pull tension and SWBP and ranked the conduits based upon SWBP, with the highest ranked more likely to incur damage due to jamming.
These cables were inspected to determine if there was any evidence of cable jamming damage. Calculation WBPEVAR9008003 documents that 24 conduits of the 76 total conduit population were inspected. These conduits were distributed through the entire ranking, including the worst case conduit, with 9 of the 24 being among the highest ranked conduits receiving inspection. The removal and inspection of these cables was controlled by Design Change Notice (DCN) to preclude damage to the cables during the cable removal process, and the DCN included data sheets to record inspection results. The results of the cable jamming inspection were submitted to NRC on December 21, 1993.
The cable numbers associated with the 24 conduits mentioned above and involved in the inspection were: 1PL4961A, IPL4975A, 1PL4982B, 1PL4985B, 2PL4975A and 2PL4978A, two of which are Unit 2 cables. Calculation WBPEVAR9008003 documented the results of this inspection. No damage indicative of jamming was found. Since the population of safety-related conduits with potential for jamming was extracted from CCRS on or before April 1989, those safety-related cables with a jam ratio between 2.8 and 3.1 irrespective of the unit designation were identified. This population included Class 1E cables with potential for jamming applicable to Unit 1 as well as Unit 2. Therefore, no additional corrective actions are required to resolve this issue for Unit 2.
As a recurrence control for future installations, TVA's General Construction Specification G-38, "Installing Insulated Cables Rated up to 15,000 Volts," was revised to require that the cable jamming ratio not be between 2.8 and 3.1 prior to pulling cables in conduits and duct banks without prior approval from Engineering.
NRC Inspections:
The NRC performed inspections involving each of the sub-issues discussed in this submittal. Each inspection identified was docketed for both units. While the inspections were focused primarily on Unit 1 and common activities, they included discussion of Unit 2 attributes which are relevant to this program. The following NRC Inspection Reports document the NRC review of the cable jamming sub-issue:
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/92-01
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/92-22
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/92-26
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/92-35
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/94-53
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/95-17 3
- 2. Cable Pullby Issue Statement of the problem:
In response to an employee concern that a welding arc that struck the conduit during construction activities in the vicinity of the conduit may have damaged the cables in it, WVA removed the cables from a conduit in the reactor protection system of Unit 2. Upon removal of the cables, significant damage was found, resulting in the exposure of the conductors of five instrumentation cables. This damage was not attributed to a welding arc, but to the pulling stresses exerted during the cable installation process and specifically, cable pullby. The Electrical Insulation Research Center at the University of Connecticut confirmed this conclusion. Pullby is defined as pulling cable(s) in a conduit that has previously installed cables in it.
Resolution of this issue on Unit 1:
TVA performed a scope assessment by removing 358 cables consisting of approximately 33,500 linear feet in 28 conduits. These cables were inspected for damage, and exposed conductors were found on two of the cables removed from one of the conduits. The damage mechanism was attributed to the cable pullby process. To assess the adequacy of Class 1 E cable installations at their nuclear plants, TVA developed the following approach.
Based upon the conduit size, conduit length, percent fill and cable construction, pullcharts, with conservative assumptions, were developed to determine SWBP. These assumptions were:
- 1. Pullbys have always occurred.
- 2. As much as 50 percent of the final fill weight is assumed to have been involved in a pullby in small conduits with the proportion decreasing to 20 percent for 5-inch raceways.
- 3. A total of 360 degrees of bends distributed between pullpoints.
- 4. Within each length, the maximum footage has been utilized in the calculation. The expected SWBPs have been calculated for various ranges of conduit lengths.
- 5. A coefficient of friction of 0.75 was used in evaluating pullbys where the final fill was less than 45 percent. For greater fill percentages, the coefficient of friction was increased to as high as 1.0 in recognition of the difficulty of pulling into conduits where the pullby results in a substantial overfill.
Separate pullcharts were developed for voltage levels V1N2, V3, and V4 for various ranges of conduit fill, where:
V4 - Consists of cables rated at 600 VAC that provide low voltage power at service voltages from 277 to 480 VAC. In addition, heavily loaded control power and direct current power cables are designated as V4 regardless of their service voltage. These cables are not shielded.
V3 - Consists of cables rated 600 VAC in control or control power applications with service voltages of 277 VACNDC or less. These cables are not shielded.
V2 - Consists predominately of shielded cables in medium-level signal applications such as transmitters, resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) (greater than 1OOmV), rotor eccentricity and vibration detectors, and annunciators. The cables are predominantly rated 300 VAC.
4
V1 - Consists of shielded cables predominantly rated 300 VAC in low-level instrumentation applications such as thermocouples, strain gauges, thermal converters, and RTDs that are 100 mV and less.
Using this approach, TVA identified three levels of potential for pullby damage to Class 1 E conduits, namely low, moderate and high risk.
The low-risk category consisted of those combinations of parameters which yielded expected SWBP which were less than or equal to the values specified in TVA's General Construction Specification G-38. These values were based on testing performed for TVA and are discussed along with the SWBP issue later in this document. The moderate-risk category was defined as that group of Class 1E conduits in which the expected SWBP under the assumed conditions could have exceeded the TVA's permissible values. The high-risk category included those Class 1 E conduits in which damage could potentially be found with considerable frequency as a result of the severity of the assumed configuration and installation.
Cables in the low-risk category were accepted "as is" based on successful completion of DC high potential withstand test or visual inspection of a worst-case sample from the low-risk category population. The testing and inspection validated the SWBP threshold between the moderate-risk and low-risk categories. The high potential testing was performed in accordance with a criteria agreed upon by the NRC staff utilizing the recommendation of IEEE 400-1980 for hi-pot testing and using negative polarity DC voltage. The testing sample consisted of 20 conduits from voltage levels V1 and V2 and 20 conduits from voltage levels V3 and V4.
Pull records for cables categorized as moderate-risk were reviewed to determine if any pullbys occurred during the cable installation process. If no pullbys occurred, the subject cables were accepted "as is." If a pullby occurred and the conduit was overfilled (40 percent actual inside area for conduits containing three or more cables), the subject cables were reclassified as high risk and replaced. If the conduit was not overfilled and a pullby occurred, walkdowns were performed to determine the presence and location of mid-run pullpoints. (The initial classification process assumed the absence of intermediate pullpoints.) If intermediate pullpoints existed, the length of the individual segments was determined, SWBPs recalculated and compared to their limitations, and those segments re-categorized. If any segments remained in the moderate category, the cables were classified as high risk and replaced, except for cables contained in five of these conduits, which were of short length and accepted "as is" based on inspections which found no cable damage. For the remaining conduits, pull records were reviewed to confirm that the largest pullby did not exceed SWBP limitations. If SWBP limitations were exceeded, the cables were classified as high risk and were replaced. If SWBP limitations were not exceeded, the cables were classified as low risk and accepted "as-is."
In the high-risk category, pull records were reviewed. If no pullby occurred, then the subject cables were accepted "as is." If a pullby occurred, then the cables were replaced, except for cables contained in three of the conduits, which were short and accepted "as is" based on inspections which found no cable damage.
Medium voltage cable (V5) routed in safety-related raceways and required for Unit 1 operation was reviewed separately to confirm the absence of pullbys or the performance of 5
satisfactory post-pullby high potential tests on active cable so that these cables could be de-coupled from the pullby issue. This proved to be the case.
Corrective Action for Unit 2:
The risk categories established above will be used for Unit 2. The basis for utilizing the same risk categories on Unit 2 is that the worst case samples used in the hi-pot testing performed to validate the SWBP threshold between the moderate and low-risk categories on Unit 1 are representative of the Unit 2 cable population. Therefore, hi-pot testing will not be repeated for Unit 2. The Unit 2 Class 1E cables not evaluated under Unit 1 scope will be evaluated for the cable pullby issue using the same approach used on Unit 1, except those in the high-risk category. In this category, cable pull records will be reviewed to determine if a pullby occurred during the cable installation process. If no pullby occurred, then the cables will be accepted "as is". If pullby occurred and the conduit is overfilled, the cables in that conduit will be replaced. If a high-risk conduit is not overfilled, a walkdown will be performed to determine the presence and location of mid-run pullpoints. The length of the individual segments will be determined and SWBP recalculated to determine if the cable segment can be re-categorized. If any segment remains in this high risk category, the cables in that conduit will be replaced.
NRC Inspections:
As discussed previously, the NRC performed inspections involving each of the sub-issues discussed in this submittal. Each inspection identified was docketed for both units. While the inspections were focused primarily on Unit 1 and common activities, they included discussion of Unit 2 attributes which are relevant to this program. The following NRC Field Inspection Reports document the NRC review of the cable pullby sub-issue at WBN:
Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/89-08 Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/89-11 Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/90-06 Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/90-09 Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/90-12 Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/90-20 Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/90-22 Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/90-30 Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/94-32
- 3. Cable SWBP Issue:
Statement of the problem:
As previously defined, SWBP is the radial force exerted on cable insulation at a bend while cable is being pulled in a raceway. At WBN, SWBP was not properly addressed in the design and installation process, and installations may have exceeded the allowable value.
Resolution of this issue on Unit 1:
To resolve this issue of SWBP, TVA performed the following:
. A walkdown was conducted to identify severe case conduit configurations.
6
- Calculations were prepared to determine the expected pulling tension and SWBP for those severe case conduits.
- Testing to determine increased allowable SWBP values, based on actual cables used at TVA nuclear plants was conducted at TVA Central Laboratory.
" An independent review by a third-party contractor to corroborate the results of TVA's SWBP tests was performed.
TVA revised construction specifications to require that SWBP be limited to the values determined by the above testing. WBN site installation procedures were revised to provide explicit restriction to cable pulling limits based on this testing and the relationship between pulling tension and SWBP.
TVA initiated resolution of the SWBP issue by developing design calculations to determine the magnitude of SWBPs exerted on Class 1 E cables in existing conduit installations at WBN. Screening calculations were performed to reduce the number of conduits from approximately 10,400 to 1,914 (calculation WBPEVAR8603006) containing Class 1E cables which had the potential of having exceeded their allowable SWBP. This population of 1,914 conduits consisted of 926 Unit 1 conduits, 748 Unit 2 conduits, and 240 Unit 0 (common) conduits.
A field inspection team consisting of Engineering, Construction, and Quality Assurance (QA) personnel selected a severe case sample of 81 (42 of these were Unit 2 and 7 were common) conduits from the remaining 1,914 conduits and performed SWBP calculations for these conduits. This is included in calculation WBPEVAR8603006. The sample consisted of approximately 20 conduits each from voltage levels V2, V3, V4 and V5 (medium voltage cables-shielded cables rated 8000 VAC that provide power at 6900 VAC to boards and large motors). Isometric sketches were then prepared of the 81 conduits complete with field measurements, to define the conduit configuration. Conduits from voltage level V1 were reviewed, but were not included in this sampling because it was determined that none of the cables at this voltage level would exceed SWBP limits.
The calculated SWBP values were compared with 1986 typical manufacturer's limits of 300 lb/ft for power and control cables and 100 lb/ft for instrumentation cables which were in effect at the time. Cables in 12 of the conduits had calculated SWBPs which exceeded the limits. A cable SWBP test program was initiated to demonstrate the acceptability of these higher SWBPs.
This program addressed WBN as well as the other TVA nuclear plants and thus test specimens were representative of cables procured from many manufacturers and installed in the various voltage level raceways in all of TVA's nuclear plants. The test report was transmitted to the NRC by TVA's letter dated June 15, 1990, for WBN (Reference 7).
Representative samples of power, control, signal and instrument, and coaxial cables from TVA's nuclear power plants were pulled through the test conduits which contained four horizontal 90-degree bends. The applied tension was controlled and measured during each pull to achieve maximum SWBP. With the exception of power cables 2 AWG and larger, where ultimate breaking strength was much greater than could be achieved during testing or installation, each cable was tensioned to near its ultimate breaking strength.
After pulling, the cables were inspected and dimensioned, outer jacket was removed from the multi-conductor cable, and individual conductors were subjected to a dielectric 7
breakdown test. AC dielectric breakdown values were compared to those of the virgin samples to determine the effect of higher SWBP.
The test results conclusively established allowable SWBP values as follows:
- 1,000 lb/ft for power and control cables (V5/V4N3)
- 500 lb/ft for medium and low level signal cables (V2)
- 300 lb/ft for coaxial and tri-axial cables (VI)
TVA contracted with D. A. Silver and Associates, Inc., to independently review the SWBP test methodology, results, and conclusions. The review provided confirmation of the revised SWBP values. These are the values now in General Construction Specification G-38.
Of the 81 conduits that were evaluated, TVA identified one Unit 1 conduit that was not bounded by these higher limits. TVA replaced the cables in this conduit.
To provide further confidence, TVA selected an additional 40 conduits located in harsh environments which were not previously analyzed. This population included 28 Unit 1 conduits, 10 Unit 2 conduits, and 2 Unit 0 conduits. These conduits were walked down to develop isometric sketches reflecting the as-installed configurations. SWBPs and pulling tensions were then calculated considering this information. The SWBP calculation (WBPEVAR9010001) which documented the evaluation of these 40 randomly selected conduits was issued. The results of this calculation identified no case where the allowable SWBP limits were exceeded.
Corrective Action for Unit 2:
Based upon the extensive test program described above, SWBP limits were established.
Analysis of the 81 severe case conduits against these limits revealed that the cable in one conduit may have exceeded these values. Given that these cases were representative of both units, this result, coupled with the positive results of the examination of an additional 40 conduits, provided a high level of confidence that cables required for WBN Units land 2 operation would not have experienced excessive SWBPs during installation, and therefore, no further corrective action is required for the remaining Class 1E cables that are installed in Unit 2.
NRC Inspections:
As discussed previously, the NRC performed inspections involving each of the sub-issues discussed in this submittal. Each inspection identified was docketed for both units. While the inspections were focused primarily on Unit 1 and common activities, they included discussion of Unit 2 attributes which are relevant to this program. The following NRC Field Inspection Reports document the NRC review of the SWBP sub-issue at WBN:
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/94-18
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/94-53
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/95-64 8
- 4. Pulling Cables through 90-degree condulets and Mid-Route Flexible conduits:
Statement of the problem:
A concern was raised for the potential damage to cables in 90-degree condulets because of the small supporting surface the inside corners of condulets provide for cables under tension. The small radius inside corners can in time cut into the insulation, or the conductor can creep through the insulation, reducing the insulation level of the cables. Also, concerns were raised regarding flexible conduits used at WBN in the middle of a conduit run. Since the inside surface of a flexible conduit has overlapping corrugations, the entire surface of the cable pulled through a flexible conduit segment in a bend may be subjected to high frictional forces that might tear the cable jacket and insulation.
Resolution of this issue on Unit 1:
To address the concern of pulling cables around 90-degree condulets, the resolution method for silicone rubber insulated cables was used. Since silicone rubber insulation is more susceptible to damage than any other type of cable insulation, it envelops the other types of insulation used at WBN. Based on this, conduits containing silicone rubber insulated cable, with more than two 90-degree condulets within a conduit route, were used for this evaluation. This resulted in identification of ten potential critical case conduits (calculation WBPEVAR8806004 identified 3 conduits that were in Unit 2). To ensure that these cases would be acceptable after installation, these cables were removed and subjected to testing to qualify them for 40 years of radiation and thermal aging followed by a loss-of-cooling-accident event. As documented in NUREG 0847, SER supplement 7, Appendix P, the NRC reviewed TVA qualification of the silicone rubber insulated cables manufactured by Anaconda. The NRC staff concluded that based on additional calculations, TVA had demonstrated that the environmental conditions for WBN were enveloped by the environmental conditions under which cables were tested. Therefore, since the silicone rubber insulated cables were more susceptible to damage when pulling through 90-degree condulets than other types of cables, this resolution enveloped other types of cable insulation at WBN. There were no cases of cables actually being pulled through 90-degree conduits.
The concern for pulling through flexible conduits was addressed in conjunction with the cable pullby damage issue. Based upon the evaluation of the damaged cables pulled through a flexible conduit by the Electrical Insulation Research Center of the University of Connecticut and hi-pot testing of other cables, TVA concluded that the damage was not a result of pulling cables through mid-route flexible conduits, but of cable pullbys. Calculation WBPEVAR9103005 documents the evaluation. The cable installation procedures have been revised and require that cables shall not be pulled through flexible conduits unless it is a straight section of a flexible conduit or a flexible conduit with a maximum of 15-degree offset.
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Corrective Action for Unit 2:
The silicone rubber cable test provides confidence that if cables were actually pulled through 90-degree condulets, damage would not have occurred. In addition, hi-pot testing of cables confirmed that no damage resulted from pulling cables through mid-route flexible conduit. Given this and the actions taken to prohibit cable pulling through 90-degree condulets and mid-route flexible conduits with greater than 15-degree offset, no additional corrective actions are necessary to resolve this issue for Unit 2.
NRC Inspections:
As discussed previously, the NRC performed inspections involving each of the sub-issues discussed in this submittal. Each inspection identified was docketed for both units. While the inspections were focused primarily on Unit 1 and common activities, they included discussion of Unit 2 attributes which are relevant to this program. The following NRC Inspection Reports document the NRC review of these sub-issues at WBN:
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/94-53
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/95-17
- 5. CCRS Software and Database Verification and Validation Statement of the problem:
Concerns about the adequacy of the CCRS had been expressed and documented in corrective action documents, employee concerns, and an NRC Inspection Report associated with TVA's Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The root cause for the CCRS concerns was the lack of adequate procedures to ensure a verified data base and the failure to follow procedures that existed when installations were made. These procedures were related to both the engineering /design processes and the use of the CCRS software and its output as used by construction.
Resolution of the Issue on Unit 1:
The following approach was used to resolve CCRS concerns at WBN:
- CCRS computer software was qualified.
- Existing data in CCRS was verified.
- Procedures for controlling data entry, data revision, and data utilization were revised.
- The CCRS software was verified and validated.
To verify the adequacy of the CCRS data base, data from the WBN review and evaluation of 4,595 cables out of a total population of approximately 15,000 Class 1 E cables for both Units 1 and 2 was used. The total included existing documentation resulting from the review of Environmental Qualification and Appendix R cables for Unit 1. The evaluation established the basis for accepting the CCRS data base for Class 1 E cable applications for both Units 1 and 2.
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The CCRS computer software was validated and verified in accordance with TVA QA procedures.
Corrective Action for Unit 2:
The CCRS software has been replaced with a program called Integrated Cable and Raceway Design System (ICRDS). ICRDS is verified and validated software in accordance with QA procedures. The resident data for both WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 was transferred from CCRS into ICRDS database. This data transfer from CCRS into ICRDS was also verified and validated for WBN. Thus, this issue is considered resolved.
NRC Inspections:
As discussed previously, the NRC performed inspections involving each of the sub-issues discussed in this submittal. Each inspection identified was docketed for both units. While the inspections were focused primarily on Unit 1 and common activities, they included discussion of Unit 2 attributes which are relevant to this program. The following NRC Inspection Reports document the NRC review of the CCRS data base and CCRS software verification and validation sub-issue at WBN:
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/94-53
- Inspection Report Nos: 50-390, 391/95-77 11
Special Trend Report - Cable Issues
Background:
During the cable removal activities related to the cable damage issue, Nuclear Engineering personnel inspected cables that were removed for the presence of pullby damage. Very little damage was found that was attributable to the pullby issue. However, the following anomalies were discovered.
- 1. Cables routed in the wrong raceways (misrouted cables)
- 2. Undocumented splices
- 3. Unknown, misidentified, and misrouted spare and/or abandoned cables
- 4. Cable damage resulting from other than pullby This special trend analysis is documented in the following reports:
- Special Trend Analysis, RO
- Special Trend Analysis, R1
- Special Trend Report, R3 After identifying these anomalies, TVA decided that further measures were required to obtain the data necessary to evaluate the above conditions. In order to achieve this, TVA collected data during field work on misrouted cables; undocumented splices; and unknown, misidentified, and misrouted spare and/or abandoned cables. Quality Control personnel inspected all cables that were removed for damage, and QA performed additional inspections of the typical installation and installation practices that were suspected to be additional source of cable damage. The data from these inspections was used to provide the above periodic trend reports. The acceptable Quality Level for identification of a potential adverse trend was set at 95 percent. All damage mechanisms which exceeded 5 percent were considered as potential adverse trend requiring corrective actions and recurrence control measures.
After analyzing the data collected over a four year period from 1990 to 1994, TVA concluded that an adverse trend did not exist with respect to the anomalies cited above because the acceptable quality level was met in all of the above categories except for the termination/splice damage category. TVA will inspect Class 1 E splice terminations, and if required, rework them. TVA will also replace all EQ splices for Unit 2 and those Class 1 E splices that are subject to moisture intrusion (see Reference 1).
TVA has a mature CAP already in use on Unit 1, and this program is being implemented for Unit 2. The program includes trending and the capability to trend specific attributes, such as the above anomalies. For Unit 2, such anomalies will be flagged and trending accomplished utilizing the existing CAP. Based on the capabilities of this program and how it is implemented, there is no need for special trending of the above issues on Unit 2.
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References
- 1. TVA letter dated September 11, 1985, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 -
Incorrect Equipment in Harsh Environments" (L44 850911 809)
- 2. TVA letter dated December 16, 1988, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 -
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan for Cable Issues" (L44 881216 807)
- 3. TVA letter dated June 27, 1989, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Revision to Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan for Cable Issues" (L44 890627 805)
- 4. TVA letter dated October 11, 1990, "TVA Responses to NRC Comments Resulting from August 1 -3, 1990 Meeting" (L44 901011 801)
- 5. TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, "Cable Issues Corrective Action Program Plan, Revision 3" (T04 940113 823)
- 6. TVA letter dated November 1, 1995, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Completion of Cable Issues Corrective Action Program (CAP)" (T04 951101 254)
- 7. TVA letter dated June 15, 1990, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 - Supplemental Information on WBN Cable Issues - Ampacity and Large Low Voltage Power Cables in Standard Conduit Bodies" (L44 900615 802) 13