ML081410420
| ML081410420 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/2008 |
| From: | Hironori Peterson Operations Branch III |
| To: | Jennifer Davis Detroit Edison |
| References | |
| 50-341/08-301 | |
| Download: ML081410420 (79) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No. 1 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Examiners: M. Bielby Operators:
C. Moore B. Pillaggi Initial Conditions: IC-18, MOL, 75% Rx. Power Turnover: The plant has been operating for 103 days. Reactor Power is currently 75% of Rated Thermal Power with Control Rods at the 86% Rod Line following rod pattern adjustment.
General Service Water Pump #4 is out of service for motor replacement with an expected return to service in 2 days. This shift will start the East Heater Feed Pump and raise Reactor Power to
>85% of rated with Recirculation flow. Reactor Engineering will be ready in one hour to pull rods for another rod pattern adjustment. GOP 22.000.03, Plant Operation 25% to 100% to 25%
(Rev 77) actions for power increase are complete through Step 4.2.18.2.
NOTE: The crews Pre-job Briefing for the reactor power increase is to be conducted prior to entering the simulator. (Suggested time 30 minutes prior to beginning the scenario.)
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description
- 1. N/A N (BOP) Start the Third HFP using SOP 23.107, Reactor Feedwater N (SRO) and Condensate Systems, Section 5.5.
- 2. N/A R (ATC) Increase Reactor Power With Recirculation Flow per GOP R (SRO) 22.000.03,Power Operation 25% To 100% To 25%.
- 3. B31RF0018 C (ATC) RRMG B Walkaway C (SRO) Uncontrolled RRMG B Speed Change (>10%), crew trips the affected RRMG (Immediate Action per AOP 20.138.03, Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change). Crew enters AOP 20.138.01, Recirc Pump Trip, Condition C & D.
NOTE: OPRMs are operable and initiate when 57%
speed on both recirc pumps CRS directs increased core monitoring for instability. He also directs increasing speed on the operating RRMG to raise core flow (>43%) and exit the Scram/Exit Region of the Power to Flow Map.
CRS reviews TS 3.4.1.A, Recirc Loops Operating, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to declare loop inop and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to adjust RPS trip setpoints to single loop values.
- 4. E51MF0009 I (BOP) Spurious RCIC Initiation I (SRO) Spurious start of RCIC, BOP verifies no valid actuation signal and trips RCIC when directed. CRS reviews TS 3.5.3.A, RCIC System, (Immediately verify HPCI operable and 14 day LCO).
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, 38 of 39
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No. 1 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Examiners: M. Bielby Operators:
C. Moore B. Pillaggi Initial Conditions: IC-18, MOL, 75% Rx. Power.
NOTE: Continued from page 1 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description
- 5. R14MF0001 M (All) Loss of Div 2 Offsite Power / EDGs start / Loss of all Heater Feed Pumps, and Reactor Feed Pumps.
N20MF0023 Loss of all Div 2 Buses. EDGs 13 & 14 auto start and re-energize ESF buses only. CRS enters AOP 20.300.345kV, Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN, and performs AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram. CRS enters EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 (Level 3).
- 6. E41MF0009 C (BOP) HPCI Auto Start Failure E41MF0005 C (SRO) HPCI fails to start on Level 2. The crew will identify and manually start HPCI using SOP 23.202, HPCI System, Encl C (Hard Card).
NOTE: After about 1 min of operation HPCI will isolate.
- 7. N21MF0031 C (BOP) SBFW F001 Fails As Is N21RF0019 C (SRO) BOP will start SBFW Pump A, for level control, and identify a F001 failure to open. The valve remains closed and subsequently loses power. The BOP will direct an operator to investigate, and when directed, the operator will restore power. NOTE: SBFW Pump A is the only available SBFW pump.
Crew re-starts RCIC by resetting the Trip Throttle Valve due to spurious initiation still in 23.206, RCIC, Sect 7.1 or Encl B Hard Card.
8a. B31MF0066 M (All) Recirc Loop A Rupture LOCA - A Recirculation leak will cause High Drywell Pressure and level to decrease. EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 re-entry on high Drywell Pressure and EOP Primary Containment Control, Sheet 2 entry on High Drywell Pressure.
The crew will start all available high pressure injection systems. (SLC).
At ~100 RPV Water Level BOP reports water level cannot be maintained > TAF.
CRS briefs crew for Emergency Depressurization.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, 38 of 39
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No. 1 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Examiners: M. Bielby Operators:
C. Moore B. Pillaggi Initial Conditions: IC-18, MOL, 75% Rx. Power.
NOTE: Continued from page 2 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 8b. N/A M (ALL) At TAF crew Emergency Depressurizes (EOP C-2) EOP 29.100.01, RF/ED/SC, Sheet 3 (CT). BOP opens 5 SRVs ADS preferred.
Crew restores water level 173 - 214 with available High Pressure and Low Pressure ECCS Systems. (CT)
I (SRO) ATC verifies EECW initiated and isolated to the Drywell in accordance with EOP PCC, Sheet 2. Determines Div 2 EECW is not isolated, and isolates by closing the P4400-F606B. He then restores cooling to CRD.
Crew sprays the Drywell using SOP 23.205, RHR System, Encl A. (Hard Card) (CT)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, 38 of 39
ILO NRC Initial Exam Scenario 1 Narrative Summary Initial conditions establish Reactor Power at 75%, necessary to best facilitate the RR Pump uncontrolled speed increase malfunction >10% (Malfunction 1). The CRS will be directing crew actions per the GOP, which produces a Normal activity for BOP to start a HFP, and a Reactivity maneuver for the RO to increase power (10-15%) with RR flow.
The BOPs start of HFP will be evaluated to its completion, followed by the ROs adjustment of RR flow. After the reactivity maneuver has been evaluated (following RR MG Set speeds 57%) the RR speed control malfunction will be initiated. The CRS will direct crew response via AOP 20.138.03, Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change (trip the affected recirc pump > 10% speed change).
This will result in single-loop operation and entry into AOP 20.138.01, Recirc Pump Trip and require CRS to comply with TS LCOs. Depending where the crew was on the power to flow map, they will probably find themselves in the Scram Region. With OPRMs operable they should monitor for instability and exit the region as soon as possible. The best way to accomplish this is to raise speed on the operating Recirc Pump until 43% core flow. NOTE: The operating Recirc Pump Speed will be 57% and it will be in the desired single loop speed range of 50 - 75%.
In response to a Loss of Heater Drains resulting from the transient, the CRS will also direct evaluation of the effects on Feedwater Heating and determine Loss of Feedwater Heating AOP inapplicability.
A malfunction will result in spurious auto-initiation and injection by RCIC. It is expected that the BOP will trip RCIC under CRS direction. This establishes conditions which will later require manual re-start of RCIC, if selected, for level-control post LOCA. CRS will evaluate and comply with TS LCOs, and should coordinate with support personnel to control/protect unaffected ECCS equipment.
An electrical fault on the 345kV distribution system will result in an interruption of Division 2 electrical power, a coincidental loss of feedwater, and Rx Scram (either manual or automatic). The Division 2 EDGs will re-energize the ESF Buses. The crew will enter AOPs 20.300.345kv, Loss of 345 Kv, and 20.000.21, Reactor Scram. After Scram Reports, the CRS will enter EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 (Level 3).
The loss of feedwater/scram will challenge RPV Level Control, which will be complicated by the LOCA, a loss of all Heater Feed Pumps and two Condenser Pumps, an auto start failure of HPCI, a loss of power to the Standby Feedwater discharge valve, and the earlier trip of RCIC.
Options available to restore RPV level include manual start of HPCI, re-starting RCIC, or opening the discharge valve and restoring Standby Feedwater (either manually or electrically after resetting overloads). If HPCI is manually started it will isolate after ~1 minute. When the only SBFW Pump A is started, the discharge valve will fail to open (N2103-F001). The valve will lose power shortly after receiving the open signal.
The only available high pressure injection sources available will be CRD A Pump, SLC A Pump, and RCIC, when re-started.
A Recirc leak will require the CRS to direct EOP actions to recover RPV level and protect the primary containment from overpressure. EOPs 29.100.01, RPV Control and Primary Containment Control, Sheets 1 & 2 will be entered on high drywell pressure. Most typically the ATC will be tasked with containment sprays, and BOP assigned to restore and maintain level.
When the CRS directs the ATC to, Verify EECW is initiated, isolated from the drywell, and restore cooling to CRD, the ATC will discover the P4400-F606B failed to isolate. He will report and close the valve.
At ~100" RPV Water Level, the BOP will report that RPV Water Level cannot be maintained >TAF. This will prompt the CRS to brief the crew for Emergency Depressurization.
At TAF, the crew will Emergency Depressurize (EOP C-2) (CT) in accordance with 29.100.01, RF/ED/SC, Sheet 3.
BOP will be directed to open 5 SRVs, ADS preferred. The crew will then brief and develop a plan for water level recovery, while the plant is being monitored during depressurization.
When LP sources inject and water level is restored >TAF, the crew will coordinate removal of injection systems to maintain RPV Water Level 173 - 214". (CT)
When level is recovered and stabilized, ATC will spray the Torus and Drywell to control Primary Containment Pressure. (CT)
The scenario will be terminated when the plant is stabilized, and evaluation activities are complete.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: N/A Page 5 of 25 Event
Description:
Overview Initial Conditions:
Reactor Power is 75% of RTP with control rods at the 86% Rod Line, following a rod pattern adjustment. GSW Pump #4 is out of service for motor replacement. It is scheduled to be returned to service in 2 days. This shift will start the E. HFP and continue to raise reactor power to >85% of RTP with Recirc Flow. GOP 22.000.03, Plant Operation 25% to 100% to 25% (Rev 77) actions for power increase are complete up to Step 4.2.18.2.
The objectives of this scenario are to:
- 1. Recognize, respond to, and take the required actions for an instrument / equipment failures requiring the use of operator and Tech Spec actions.
- 2. Operate RHR in all modes for Primary Containment Control.
- 3. Recognize and respond to an Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change.
- 4. Recognize and respond to a Recirc Pump Trip.
- 5. Recognize and respond to a Loss of 345kV Power.
- 6. Initiate HPCI Manually after failure to Auto Start.
- 7. Recover RCIC from a Manual Trip and manually start RCIC.
- 8. Execute steps in Primary Containment Control and operate the RHR System to control Drywell and Torus Temperature and Pressure.
- 9. Execute the steps of RPV Control for level (L) and pressure (P).
- 10. Direct and supervise the Shift team during Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency operations.
The crew will be required to respond to the following order of events:
- Recirc Motor Generator B Walkaway (TS 3.4.1)
- Spurious RCIC Initiation (TS 3.5.3.A)
- Loss of 345 KV Offsite Power
- HPCI Auto Start Failure
- Failure of N2103-F001, SBFW Disch To RPV Iso Valve
- LOCA - Recirc Loop A Rupture
- Failure of Div 2 EECW Hi Drywell Pressure Isolation.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1/2 Page 6 of 25 Event
Description:
Increase Reactor Power With Recirculation Flow Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 0 min SRO
- Briefs (short) on raising reactor power using recirc flow IAW SOP 23.138.01,Reactor Recirculation System Section 6.1 and GOP 22.000.03, Power Operation 25% To 100% To 25%.
- Directs BOP to start the E. Heater Feed Pump (HFP) IAW GOP 22.000.03, Power Operation 25% To 100% To 25%.
- Directs ATC to raise reactor power (after the Heater Feed Pump start) using recirc flow IAW SOP 23.138.01, Sect. 6.1, Speed Control, not to exceed 5% Jet Pump Loop Flow differential.
- 1. Notifies TB Rounds of E. HFP start and requests walkdown.
ROLE PLAY: TB Rounds reports E. HFP is ready for a start.
- 2. Starts East Heater Feed Pump and monitors RPV water level.
ROLE PLAY: TB Rounds reports good start on the E. HFP.
- 3. Places East HFP Aux Lube Oil Pump CMC switch in OFF/RESET for Heater Feed Pump started.
- 4. Places East HFP Aux Lube Oil Pump CMC switch in AUTO for Heater Feed Pump started.
- 5. May verify N20-F404, Cond Min Flow Ctrl Valve, throttles to maintain Condensate flow rate at least 9000 gpm.
- 6. May direct TB Rounds to adjust TBCCW as required to maintain E HFP lube oil temperature 90°F - 120°F.
ROLE PLAY: TB Rounds reports will monitor and adjust E. HFP oil temperature as necessary.
ROLE PLAY: RB Rounds reports RPS Alternate EPA Breakers are not tripped.
- Adjusts Turbine Flow Limiter to maintain 5% greater than reactor power.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1/2 Page 7 of 25 Event
Description:
Increase Reactor Power With Recirculation Flow Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC NOTE: When the examiner is satisfied of the candidates abilities to control reactivity, and recirc pump speeds are both > 57%,
he can proceed with the scenario at any time.
- Raises reactor power IAW SOP 23.138.01, Reactor Recirc System, Section 6.1, by adjusting North and South RR MG Set speeds using B31-R621A and B, N and S RR MG Set Speed Controllers. [Speed will be incrementally increased on N and S RR Pumps to achieve an increase of > 5% RTP.]
ROLE PLAY: RB Rounds reports N and S RRMG Lube Oil Temperatures have been adjusted to 120ºF and bearing oil pressures are ~ 35 psig.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 25 Event
Description:
Uncontrolled RRMG B Speed Change (> 10%)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+15 min ATC Malf - B31RF0018 - RRMG B Walk-away
- Identifies and responds to annunciator 3D136, RECIRC SYS B FLUID DRIVE SCOOP TUBE LOCK.
- Determines RRMG B speed increased by 10%.
- Reports information to CRS AND announces, Tripping RRMG B.
- Trips RRMG B. (Immediate Action IB.1 of AOP 20.138.03, Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change.)
- Monitors reactor power and flow conditions.
NOTE: ATC may find the plant is operating in the Scram/Exit Region of the Power/Flow Map. With OPRMs operable, a scram is not required.
- May direct RB Rounds to investigate the cause for RRMG B walk-away, informs him of the trip, and to adjust lube oil temperature.
ROLE PLAY: RB Rounds reports cannot determine reason for RRMG B speed change and lube oil has been adjusted to maintain 120ºF.
- When directed, performs AOP 20.138.01, Condition C Actions:
- 2. Verifies Reactor Power < 67.2%.
- 3. Verifies 3D129, RECIRC A and B FLOW LIMITER 2/3 DEFEATED, alarmed.
- 4. Places Recirc A and B Flow Limiter 2/3 Defeat Switch in DEFEAT.
- 5. Closes B3105-F031B for tripped RR Pump. (Requests a peer check.)
- 6. After 5 minutes fully opens B3105-F031B. (Requests a peer check.)
- 8. Verifies not in the Exit or Scram region of power/flow map.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 25 Event
Description:
Uncontrolled RRMG B Speed Change (> 10%)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO
- Announces entry into AOP 20.138.03, Uncontrolled Recirculation Flow Change and AOP 20.138.01 Recirculation Pump Trip. (Crew Update)
- Hi-Com announcements of events.
- Conducts AOP briefs.
- Directs ATC to perform 20.138.01, Condition C Actions.
- When informed in the Scram/Exit Region of the Power/Flow Map, He directs actions per 20.138.01, Condition D, to raise speed on the operating Recirc Pump to exit the restricted area.
- Directs BOP to verify feedwater heating changes are due to the power change IAW ARP 5D85, Loss of Heater Drains.
- Notifies Reactor Engineer (RE) of the unplanned power change and requests his assistance.
ROLE PLAY: RE states he will come to the control room as soon as possible. Until he gets there, increase monitoring for instabilities.
- Notifies RP and Chemistry of power change >15%. (Condition E)
- Reviews TS 3.4.1, requirements for SLO. (4 hrs for adjustment of RPS setpoints and Thermal Limits for SLO)
- Notifies Work Control personnel of RRMG B problem, requests a Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD) be written, protected system signs be posted for RRMG A, and review of Plan of the Day for activities that might affect current plant conditions.
- Responds to annunciator 5D85, LOSS OF HEATER DRAINS
- Reports loss of Heater Drains due to Recirc Pump Trip.
- Reviews ARP 5D85.
- Reports Feedwater temperature change is consistent with power change.
- Peer checks closure of B3105-F031B.
- Peer checks re-opening of B3105-F031B.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 25 Event
Description:
RCIC Spurious Initiation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+35 min Malf - E51MF0009 - Spurious RCIC Initiation BOP
- Observes Alarm 1D24, RCIC SYSTEM ACTUATED.
- Announces alarm for CRS.
- Verifies no valid actuation Level 2 signal by checking:
- 1. Wide Range Level Indicators B21-R604A/B and/or Post Accident Recorders B21-R623A/B.
- Reports information to CRS.
NOTE: IF directed to shutdown RCIC, the candidate will use SOP 23.206. IF the CRS directs tripping RCIC, the candidate will perform Step 3 only.
- 1. Places E51-K615, RCIC Discharge Flow Controller, in MANUAL.
- 2. Using E51-K615, RCIC Discharge Flow Controller, lowers turbine speed until indicating approximately 3000 rpm.
- 3. Trips RCIC turbine as follows:
- a. Places RCIC Turbine Trip pushbutton collar in ARMED.
- Verifies Annunciator 1D90, RCIC TURBINE TRIP PUSHBUTTON ARMED, alarms.
- b. Depresses RCIC Turbine Trip pushbutton, and verifies:
- Annunciator 1D94, RCIC TURBINE TRIPPED, alarms.
- IF open, E5150-F059, RCIC Turbine Trip Throttle Vlv, closes.
- RCIC Turbine speed is decreasing or is at zero.
- RCIC Turbine Trip Solenoid ENERGIZED white light is ON.
- IF open, E5150-F019, RCIC Min Flow Vlv, closes.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 11 of 25 Event
Description:
RCIC Spurious Initiation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP
- Acknowledges 1D24, RCIC SYSTEM ACTUATED alarm report.
- Announces the event over the Hi-Com.
- Conducts a crew brief.
- Notifies Work Control personnel of RCIC problem, requests a CARD be written, protected system signs be posted for HPCI, and a review of POD for activities that might affect current plant conditions.
- May review reportability. (General Regulatory Reporting Requirements List)
- Monitors RPV water level, power, pressure, steam flow and feed flow.
- Reports power, level, and pressure are stable.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 25 Event
Description:
Loss of 345 KV with loss of Heater Feed and Reactor Feed Pumps Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+40 min Malf - R14MF0001 - Loss of 345 KV Offsite Power Malf - N20MF0023 - C. HFP Trip
- Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
- Verifies all rods in.
- Verifies power decreasing.
- Announces Scram Report.
- Performs a walkdown of the electrical panels with Hard Card from H11-P811.
- Continues walkdown of back panels.
- Directs operator to walkdown and investigate loss of 345 KV.
ROLE PLAY: Outside Rounds reports nothing abnormal on 345 KV Mat.
- Reports results of electrical walkdown to CRS.
(Conditions B & C)
- 2. Closes CW Pump #1, 2, & 3 Discharge Iso Valves (N7100-F601, F602, & F603). (Condition E)
- 3. Places CW Pump #1, 2, & 3 CMC Switches in OFF/Reset.
- 4. Verifies EDG 13 Output Breaker closed (EC-3) and verifies closed 72E Pos 2A, 72E Pos 5B, and 72EC Pos 2C (Condition G).
- 5. Verifies EDG 14 Output Breaker closed (ED-3) and verifies closed 72ED Pos 2D and 72F Pos 3A (Condition I).
- May cross-tie V and W buses for SBFW restoration, when directed. (Condition L)
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 25 Event
Description:
Loss of 345 KV with loss of Heater Feed and Reactor Feed Pumps Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO
- Directs ATC to place the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
- Announces events over Hi-Com.
- Requests Scram Reports.
- Directs ATC to electrical panels to investigate.
- Directs BOP to confirm isolations and actuations for level as they occur.
- Directs BOP to restore and maintain level 173-214 inches.
- Directs BOP to control pressure 900-1050 psig.
- Announces scram report.
- Assesses systems available for injection and uses any available systems.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 25 Event
Description:
Loss of all high pressure feed / HPCI Auto Start Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+40 min Malf - E41MF0009 - HPCI System Auto Start Failure SRO Malf - E41MF0005 - HPCI Isolation
- Directs BOP to restore level 173 - 214 inches per 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1, using Table 1 Injection Systems (HPCI, RCIC, SBFW, CRD, SLC).
- May give new level band 0-214 inches.
- Directs injecting SLC.
- Reports loss of Reactor Feed Pumps.
- Reports HPCI auto start failure on Level 2.
- 1. Places E4101-C003, HPCI Baro Cndr Vacuum Pump, in RUN, and verifies pump starts.
- 2. Opens E4150-F003, HPCI Stm Sply Otbd Iso Vlv.
- 4. Initiates a start of HPCI System by performing the next two steps simultaneously:
- a. Places E4101-C005, HPCI Turbine Aux Oil Pump, in RUN, and verifies pump starts.
- b. Opens E4150-F001, HPCI Turb Stm Supply Iso Valve.
- 5. Opens E4150-F006, HPCI Pmp Inbd Disch Iso Valve.
- 6. Adjusts flow as necessary on E41-K615, HPCI Pump Flow Controller.
- 7. Performs or verifies complete steps of Section 5.0, Manual Initiation.
- 1. Places C11-K612, CRD Flow Controller, in MANUAL.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 25 Event
Description:
Loss of all high pressure feed / HPCI Auto Start Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (contd) 2. Starts the Standby Control Rod Drive Pump.
- 3. Throttles open Flow Control Valve using C11-K612, CRD Flow Controller.
- 5. Monitors RPV Level.
- Injects SLC (From memory per ODE-10):
- 2. Verifies SLC Injection:
- Selected pump is ON.
- Squib-Continuity Lamp for each explosive valve goes OFF.
- Annunciator 3D11, SLC IGNITION CONTINUITY LOSS, alarms, indicating that the squibs have fired.
- C4100-F006, SLC Inj Line Otbd Check Valve, is open
- C41-R600, SLC Pumps A & B Disch Press Ind, is greater than Reactor pressure.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 16 of 25 Event
Description:
SBFW N2103-F001, Disch To RPV Iso Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+45 min Malf - N21MF0031 - SBFW F001 Fails As Is Malf - N21RF0019 - N2103-F001 Breaker SRO
- May direct BOP send an operator to investigate N2103-F001 power failure.
- Starts SBFW Pump B (From memory per ODE-10)
- 1. Starts N2103-C003A (B), West (East) Pump A (B) Aux Lube Oil Pump, if available.
- 2. Starts N2103-C001 (2), West (East) Standby Feedwater Pump A (B).
- 3. N2103-F001, SBFW Disch To RPV Iso Valve, does not automatically open (first pump) and subsequently loses power.
- Observes and reports N2103-F001 failure (SBFW Discharge Valve).
- Shuts down running SBFW Pumps while investigating N2103-F001 failure.
- Directs TB Rounds or other operator to investigate the loss of power to N2103-F001, at MCC 2PC-1 Pos 5A.
ROLE PLAY: TB Rounds reports that he is in the BOP Switchgear Room and will investigate right away.
Moments later TB Rounds reports hes at the MCC and can attempt to reset the thermal overloads, if desired. When BOP directs the reset, TB Rounds resets the thermal overloads. (Power to the valve is restored and valve opens.)
NOTE: Booth Operator coordinates Role Play with restoration.
Ensure SBFW Pumps are OFF.
(CLEAR N21MF0031 & N21RF0019)
- Observes N2103-F001 opening and reports the same to CRS.
- Opens N2103-F002, SBFW 6 Discharge Flow Control Valve.
- Starts systems per 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1, Table 1 to restore / maintain level 173-214 inches. (HPCI, RCIC, SBFW, CRD, SLC)
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 25 Event
Description:
SBFW N2103-F001, Disch To RPV Iso Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- May reset RCIC Turbine Trip to inject, IAW SOP 23.206, RCIC System, Section 7.1, as follows:
NOTE: RCIC will have a spurious initiation signal locked in.
- 1. Re-starts RCIC by performing the following:
- a. Place RCIC Turbine Trip pushbutton collar in DISARMED.
- b. Closing and re-opening E5150-F059, RCIC Trip Throttle Valve.
- 2. Monitors system operation and verifies flow path.
- 3. Reports RCIC is injecting at 650 gpm.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 18 of 25 Event
Description:
Recirc Loop A Rupture Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+55 min Malf - B31MF0066 - Recirc Loop A Rupture
- Reports High Drywell pressure EOP entry.
- Reports lowering RPV level.
- Reports Level 3 EOP re-entry.
- If HPCI was not previously manually started due to lowering level, operator reports HPCI auto start failure on high Drywell Pressure and Level 2.
- 1. Places E4101-C003, HPCI Baro Cndr Vacuum Pump, in RUN, and verify pump starts.
- 2. Opens E4150-F003, HPCI Stm Sply Otbd Iso Vlv.
- 4. Initiates a start of HPCI System by performing the next two steps simultaneously:
- a. Places E4101-C005, HPCI Turbine Aux Oil Pump, in RUN, and verifies pump starts.
- b. Opens E4150-F001, HPCI Turb Stm Supply Iso Valve.
- 5. Opens E4150-F006, HPCI Pmp Inbd Disch Iso Valve.
- 6. Adjusts flow as necessary on E41-K615, HPCI Pump Flow Controller.
- 7. Performs or verifies complete steps of Section 5.0, Manual Initiation.
- Starts 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1, Table 1 Injection Systems to restore/maintain level 173-214 inches. (SBFW, HPCI, RCIC, CRD, SLC)
- Reports Level 2.
- If Level 1 is reached, reports Level 1, and Inhibits ADS, when CRITICAL directed, if not previously inhibited.
TASK
- If Level 1 is reached, verifies MSIVs are closed.
CRITICAL
TASK
- Bypasses and restores Drywell pneumatics if necessary.
- Maximizes injection and restores reactor water level to 173-214". (CT)
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 19 of 25 Event
Description:
Recirc Loop A Rupture Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO
- Assigns BOP level (173-214) and pressure control (900-1050 psig).
- Re-adjusts pressure band to 500 -1000 psig.
- Announces EOP entry on high Drywell Pressure, Drywell Temperature, Torus Pressure, Torus Level, and Torus Temperature. (Crew Updates)
CRITICA L
- Directs BOP to open 5 SRVs, ADS preferred [EOP 29.000.01, TASK RF/ED/SC Sheet 3 (Emergency Depressurization EOP C-2)].
(CT)
- Directs BOP to bypass and restore Drywell pneumatics if necessary.
- Briefs crew on water level restoration and control.
CRITICA
- Directs BOP to maximize injection with available Table 1 & 3 L sources, and restore and maintain reactor water level 173-214".
TASK (CT)
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 9 Page 20 of 25 Event
Description:
Div 2 EECW isolation to the Drywell / Restoration of Cooling to CRD Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+60 min Malf - EOPRF0038 - Div 2 EECW Hi Drywell Pressure Lead SRO Lifted
- IF necessary, may direct closure of P4400-F606B.
- Verifies Div 1 (2) EECW initiated and isolated to the Drywell by checking the indications of the following equipment:
- 1. The white Emergency Mode Light is ON for Div 1 (2).
- 2. EECW Pump A (B) is running.
- 3. EESW Pump A (B) is running.
- 4. P4400-F603A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Supply Iso Vlv is closed.
- 5. P4400-F601A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Return Iso Vlv is closed.
- 6. P4400-F602A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Makeup Tnk Iso Vlv is open.
- 10. P4400-F614, Div 1 EECW To Penet Clrs Iso Vlv is closed.
- 11. P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rms A/C Iso Vlv is closed.
- Reports D2 EECW not isolated to the Drywell. (P4400-F606B is open)
- Isolates D2 EECW to the Drywell by closing P4400-F606B.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 9 Page 21 of 25 Event
Description:
Div 2 EECW isolation to the Drywell / Restoration of Cooling to CRD Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC
- Restores cooling to CRD pumps as follows:
- 2. Depresses RESET pushbutton for Div 2 EECW Isolation Valves.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 10 Page 22 of 25 Event
Description:
Recirc Loop A Rupture / Containment Sprays Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+65 min SRO
- Assigns ATC containment pressure control.
- After report from ATC, directs ATC to stop spraying the Torus before Torus Pressure is 0 psig. (EOP Override)
CRITICAL
- Directs ATC to shutdown Drywell Cooling Fans TASK
- After report from ATC, directs to stop spraying the Drywell before Drywell Pressure is 0 psig. (EOP Override)
- 1. If High Drywell Pressure or RPV Level 1 actuation exist, place the Containment Spray Mode Select switch in MANUAL.
- 2. If RPV level is below Level 0, place selected division Containment Spray 2/3 Core Height Override keylock switch in MANUAL OVERRIDE.
- 3. If initiating Torus Cooling Mode, perform the following:
- a. Unlocks and opens E1150-F028A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Iso Vlv.
- b. Starts one RHR Pump.
- c. Throttles E1150-F024A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Clg Iso, to desired flow.
- d. When flow is > 3000 gpm, verifies E1150-F007A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Pmps Min Flow Vlv, closes.
- e. Starts RHR Service Water System. (RHRSW Flow may be delayed until after Torus Spray is established.)
- f. To increase cooldown rate, throttles closed E1150-F048A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Hx Bypass Vlv.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 10 Page 23 of 25 Event
Description:
Recirc Loop A Rupture / Containment Sprays Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC 4. If initiating Torus Spray Mode, perform the following:
(RHRSW Flow may be delayed until after Torus Spray is established.)
- b. Verifies open or unlocks and opens E1150-F028A (B),
Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Iso Vlv.
- c. Opens E1150-F027A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Spray Iso. Vlv.
- d. Verifies RHR flow increases by approximately 500 gpm.
- Shuts down Drywell Cooling Fans.
CRITICAL TASK
- 5. If initiating Drywell Spray Mode, perform the following:
- b. Starts or verifies started RHR Pump A or C (B or D).
- c. Unlocks and throttles open E1150-F016A (B), Div 1 (2)
RHR DW Spray Otbd Iso Vlv, and ensures that RHR flow does not exceed 14,000 gpm per RHR Pump.
- 6. Performs or verifies complete the following sections of SOP 23.205 as applicable:
- Torus Cooling Mode, Emergency Operation
- Torus Spray Mode
- Drywell Spray Mode
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 10 Page 24 of 25 Event
Description:
Recirc Loop A Rupture (Reset / Restart RCIC)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO
BOP NOTE: Level will likely be < Level 2 and RCIC will also have a spurious initiation signal locked in.
- Resets the RCIC Turbine Trip to inject, IAW SOP 23.206, RCIC System, Section 7.1, as follows:
- 1. Re-starts RCIC by performing the following:
- a. Places RCIC Turbine Trip pushbutton collar in DISARMED.
- b. Closes and re-opens E5150-F059, RCIC Trip Throttle Valve.
- 2. Monitors system operation and verifies flow path.
- 3. Reports RCIC is injecting at 650 gpm.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Scenario # 1 Lesson Scenario #1.lsn Malfunction List:
Label Description Target Delay Ramp Step H_P807_A008_3 GSW #4 OFF Light 0 0 0 1 P807_A008_1 GSW #4 OFF/RESET Switch 1 0 0 1 P602_B131_3 E. DWEDT Pump 1 0 0 1 P602_A094_3 W. DWEDT Pump 1 0 0 1 P602_B131_3 E. DWEDT Pump -1 240 0 1 P602_A094_3 W. DWEDT Pump -1 240 0 1 B31RF0018 RRMG B Scoop Tube Hand Crank 55 0 7 2 cd='BBBDB3101C001B_MZMLNA GT 942' E51MF0009 RCIC Spurious Initiation ACTIVE 0 0 3 R14MF0001 Loss of Div 2 Offsite Power ACTIVE 0 0 4 N20MF0023 Heater Feed Pump C Trip ACTIVE 0 0 4 E41MF0009 HPCI Auto Start Failure ACTIVE 0 0 4 N21MF0031* SBFW N2103-F001 Fail As-Is 0 0 0 4 EOPRF0038 RBCCW High Drywell Isolation Defeat DEFEAT 0 0 4 N21RF0019* MOV N2103-F001 Breaker OPEN 8 0 4 cd='P601_A290_2 OR P601_A291_2 EQ 1' E41MF0005 HPCI Spurious Isolation ACTIVE 45 0 4 cd='H_P602_A131_2 EQ 1' B31MF0006 Recirc Loop A Rupture 1 0 300 5
- Delete to reset thermal overload trip (simulated) of N21-F001 breaker.
Step 1 = Setup Step 2 = Recirc Runaway Step 3 = RCIC Initiation Step 4 = Loss of Power (w/ HPCI & SBFW Failures)
Step 5 = LOCA Simulator Instructions:
- 1. Initialize simulator to IC-18, and place in RUN.
- 2. Open and Execute Lesson Scenario #1.lsn.
- 3. Trigger Step 1, Setup. (Drywell Equipment Drain Tank will complete pumping down in about 4 minutes.
- 4. Place an RT dot near GSW Pump #4 CMC switch.
- 5. Bring crew into simulator and begin scenario when ready.
- 6. Trigger Step 2, Recirc Runaway, when the Recirc Pump speed increase starts. (The runaway begins when RRMG Set B speed reaches 57%.)
- 7. Trigger other steps as cued by examiner.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No. 2 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Examiners: M. Bielby Operators:
C. Moore B. Pillaggi Initial Conditions: IC-20, MOL, 100% Rx. Power Turnover: The plant has been operating for 23 days. Reactor Power is 100% of Rated Thermal Power. The South RBCCW Pump is out of service for motor replacement. It is scheduled to be restored tomorrow. Plans are to shift from Division 1 CCHVAC to Division 2 to collect routine vibration data on Division 2 CCHVAC equipment.
NOTE: The Pre-job Briefing for the CCHVAC shift is to be conducted prior to entering the simulator. (Suggested time 30 minutes prior to beginning the scenario.)
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description
- 2. C11MF0381 C (ATC) Control Rod 22-31 Drifts OUT C (SRO) CRS enters AOP 20.106.07, Control Rod Drift and determines TS 3.1.3.C, Control Rod Operability, (3 hrs to insert and 4 hrs to disarm).
ATC inserts, holds, and directs disarming control rod 22-31.
- 3. C97MF1087 Seismic System Event / Trouble Alarm 6D69 Crew monitors the plant and performs AOP Actions.
CRS enters AOP 20.000.01, Acts of Nature.
MF EBAORL BOP starts RHRSW MDCT Fans. When MDCT Fan B
_TCTVSP 1 is started, it trips. CRS enters TS 3.7.2.B, Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS), (72 hr LCO).
- 4. N61MF0003 M (ALL) East Condenser Air Leak CRS enters AOP 20.125.01, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
BOP starts an additional SJAE and OG Ring Water Pump.
C (ATC)
Due to Loss of Vacuum, ATC is directed and attempts C (SRO)
Rapid Power Reduction. He determines failure of PO P603_ R (ATC) Manual Runback, and takes individual manual control to A317_1 R (SRO) reduce recirc speeds to 55-60% core flow.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, 38 of 39
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No. 2 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Examiners: M. Bielby Operators:
C. Moore B. Pillaggi Initial Conditions: IC-20, MOL, 100% Rx. Power.
NOTE: Continued from page 1.
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description
- 5. M (ALL) Reactor Scram Performs override action 20.125.01 and places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN 2.5 psia.
After Scram Reports, CRS enters EOP 29.100.01 RPV Control, Sheet 1 (Level 3) and directs entry into AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram.
BOP controls water level 173 - 214 inches.
- 6. C97MF1087 M (ALL) Aftershock Seismic Event / Event Trouble Alarm (6D69)
B21MF0059 Loss of all level indication. Div 1 and Div 2 Level Instrument Reference Leg Ruptures. Flood up Level B21MF0060 Indication fails upscale high. (Level 8 trip on Main B21MF0073 Turbine, RFPs, HPCI, RCIC, and SBFW.)
CRS enters (EOP C-4) EOP RPV Flooding, 29.100.01, Sheet 3. (Level cannot be determined, adequate core cooling cannot be assured)
CRS enters EOP 29.100.01, Primary Containment Control, Sheet 2. (High Drywell Pressure)
- 7. B21MF0037 C (BOP) To prepare for RPV Flooding and provide adequate C (SRO) core cooling, BOP is directed to open 5 SRVs (CT).
SRV R fails to open. BOP will select and open another SRV and report this to the CRS.
- 8. N/A ALL The crew floods to the Main Steam Lines and establishes RPV Flooding conditions using Feedwater, SBFW, and Low Pressure ECCS Systems. (CT)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, 38 of 39
ILO NRC Initial Exam Scenario 2 Narrative Summary Initial conditions establish Reactor Power at 100%, with a plan to shift the operating divisions of CCHVAC to support maintenance. The crew will have briefed this activity prior to entering the simulator. The CCHVAC shift in accordance with SOP 23.413, Control Center HVAC is a Normal activity for BOP.
A Control Rod Drift, which will initially be identified and responded to by the ATC. Subsequent actions will be directed by the CRS from AOP 20.106.07, Control Rod Drift. The CRS will review and take actions per TS.
A Seismic Event will occur, and be followed by a subsequent aftershock. The CRS will initially direct Normal BOP response actions per the Acts of Nature AOP 20.000.01, Act of Nature, Earthquake. When the BOP starts the MDCT Fans, per the AOP, MDCT Fan B will trip. The CRS will review and take actions per TS.
A resultant condenser leak will be identified by lowering Main Condenser vacuum, at which time the CRS will direct actions per AOP 20.125.01, Loss of Condenser Vacuum. The CRS will direct ATC to lower power via Rapid Power Reduction (SOP 23.623, Reactor Manual Control System, Section 9.7). The Manual Runback pushbutton, on P603, malfunctions and ATC must take individual manual control of both Recirc Controllers to accomplish the Recirc Runback. BOP attempts to restore vacuum by operation of various Off-Gas System components and controls under CRS direction.
Continually lowering Main Condenser vacuum is expected to result in a manual scram
( 2.5 psia), prior to a main turbine trip. The Mode Switch will be taken to Shutdown and all rods will insert. After Scram Reports the CRS will enter EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 (Level 3) and AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram. The crew controls RPV Water Level 173 - 214.
A second seismic event (aftershock) results in failure of both Div 1 and 2 RPV Level instrumentation reference legs and Floodup Level indication. This causes a loss of all RPV level indication. The crew will ascertain that, RPV Level CANNOT be determined. NOTE: Main Turbine, RFPs, HPCI, RCIC, and SBFW will all have Level 8 trips.
The CRS enters (EOP C-4) EOP 29.100.01, RF/ED/SC, Sheet 3 (RPV Flooding). Flooding will be complicated during the depressurization phase when one of the preferred SRVs (R) fails to open. BOP is expected to identify this failure and take action to open an alternate valve.
The crew floods to the Main Steam Lines using Feedwater, SBFW, (CRS may use EOP defeat 29.ESP.19 or direct BOP to depress and hold N2103-F001 pushbutton to defeat the SBFW L8), and Low Pressure ECCS Systems.
The scenario will be terminated after RPV Flooding conditions are established.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: N/A Page 1 of 15 Event
Description:
Overview Initial Conditions:
The plant has been operating for 23 days. Reactor Power is 100% of Rated Thermal Power. The South TBCCW Pump is out of service for motor replacement. It is scheduled to be restored tomorrow. Plans are to shift from Division 1 CCHVAC to Division 2 to collect routine vibration data on Division 2 CCHVAC equipment.
The objectives of this scenario are to:
- 1. Recognize, respond to, and take the required actions for an instrument / equipment failures requiring the use of operator and Tech Spec actions.
- 2. Recognize and respond to a Control Rod Failure to Latch (Rod Drift).
- 3. Recognize and respond to an Earthquake.
- 4. Recognize and respond to a Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
- 5. Execute steps of RPV Control to control Reactor Water Level (L) and Pressure (P).
- 6. May require the execution of steps in Primary Containment Control and operation of the RHR System to control Drywell and Torus temperature and pressure.
- 7. Execute the steps of Secondary Containment Temperature Control (SCT).
- 8. Execute steps of Reactor Pressure Vessel Flooding (RF).
- 9. Direct and Supervise the Shift team during Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operations.
The crew will be required to respond to the following order of events:
- Control Rod Drift (22-31) - (Tech Spec 3.1.3.C)
- Trip of RHRSW MDCT Fan B - (Tech Spec 3.7.2.B)
- East Condenser Air Leak
- Failure of Manual Runback (pushbutton)
- Reactor Scram
- Failure of SRV R to OPEN Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 15 Event
Description:
CCHVAC Shift Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO
0 min BOP
- 1. Directs operators to perform an operational check of Div 2 CCHVAC radiation monitors. (checked and independently verified)
ROLE PLAY: Report CCHVAC rad monitors have been verified by Reece/Kuttig.
- 2. Documents performance in the Unit Log.
- 3. Contacts RB Rounds to verify Div 2 CCHVAC ready for starting.
ROLE PLAY: RB Rounds reports Div 2 CCHVAC is ready for a start.
- 4. Verifies the following switches:
- Div 2 Mode Select Switch in NORMAL.
- Emergency Air Intake Selector Switch in AUTO.
- 5. Verifies Div 2 CCHVAC equipment CMC Switches are in AUTO.
- 6. Places the Div 2 Mode Select Switch in ALL AUTO and verifies:
- CCHVAC Supply Fan, starts
- CCHVAC Chilled Water Pump starts.
- 7. Places the Div 1 Mode Select Switch in ALL STOP.
- 8. Verifies the following Div 2 equipment starts:
- CCHVAC Return Air Fan starts. (After supply fan establishes flow.)
- CCHVAC Chiller starts (after ~40 sec) and remains running.
ROLE PLAY: RB Rounds reports good start on Div 2 CCHVAC.
NOTE: Examiner may elect to move on after candidate starts next step. No physical actions are required by the candidate.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 15 Event
Description:
Control Rod 22-31 Drifts into the Core.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
+10 min ATC Malf - C11MF0381 - Control Rod 22-31 Drifts Out
- Responds to Annunciator 3D80, CONTROL ROD DRIFT.
- Places Rod Select Power ON.
- Determines that Control Rod 22-31, is drifting out of the core.
- Reports rod 22-31 drifting out of the core.
- Reviews ARP 3D80.
ROLE PLAY: RB Rounds reports standing by at HCU 22-31.
- When directed, performs AOP 20.106.07, Control Rod Drift Condition B:
- 1. Fully Inserts Rod 22-31 holding Rod Out Notch Override Switch in EMER ROD IN.
- 2. Directs RB Rounds to disarm the control rod by:
- Closing C11-F103 at HCU 22-31.
- Closing C11-F105 at HCU 22-31.
NOTE: Booth Operator steps the scenario to clear/delete the Malfunction just before the RB Rounds report.
ROLE PLAY: When directed and complete, RB Rounds reports C11-F103 and F105 are closed for HCU 22-31.
- Resets Rod Drift.
- Announces entry into AOP 20.106.07, Control Rod Drift.
- Conducts AOP Brief.
- Complies with TS 3.1.3 C, Control Rod Operability by:
- 1. Fully inserting Control Rod 22-31 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
- 2. Disarming Control Rod 22-31 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
- Notifies the Reactor Engineer (RE) that rod 22-31 drifted into the core, was fully inserted, and disarmed.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 15 Event
Description:
Control Rod 22-31 Drifts out of the Core.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ROLE PLAY: IF the RE is consulted about the decision to insert rod 22-31, state that it is acceptable to fully insert the rod. Do not raise power until further research is done.
May notify Tagging Center that Control Rod 22-31 is inoperable and needs an STR (Tagging Record) to reflect isolation.
- Exits the AOP.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 15 Event
Description:
Seismic Event Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
+25 min NOTE: The Booth Operator will play the Earthquake Sound if available.
Malf - C97MF1087 - 06D69 Seismic System Event / Trouble Alarm
- Responds to Annunciator 6D69, SEISMIC SYSTEM / EVENT TROUBLE.
- Reviews ARP 6D69.
- Directs an operator to the Seismic Monitor Panel in the Relay Room (H11-P831) to evaluate printout IAW 23.612, Seismic Monitoring.
ROLE PLAY: Report the Seismic Monitor red ERROR LED is OFF and the printout indicates 0.03G vertical and 0.05G horizontal.
- When directed, performs AOP 20.000.01, Condition AC:
- 1. Directs all operators to inspect plant for structural damage and leaks.
- 2. Directs RB Rounds to reset the following:
- Div 1 CCHVAC Purge Compressor (23.413).
- Div 2 CCHVAC Purge Compressor (23.413).
ROLE PLAY: After approximately 3 minutes, RB Rounds reports CCHVAC Purge Compressors have been reset.
- 3. Starts all RHRSW MDCT Fans and checks for proper running indication IAW 23.208, RHR Complex Service Water Systems, Section 5.11 as follows:
- Contacts Outside Rounds to inform him MDCT Fans will be started and to have him check the fans ready for a start.
ROLE PLAY: Outside Rounds reports he is in the RHR Complex and has completed his rounds on the equipment. It is ready to be started.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 15 Event
Description:
Seismic Event Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP
- Depresses and holds vibration reset for the MDCT fan.
- Within 5 seconds, starts the MDCT fan in LOW-SPEED.
- After MDCT Fan has started, releases the reset pushbutton.
Malf - EBAORL_TCTVSP - MDCT Fan B Trip
- Reports trip to CRS
- Contacts Outside Rounds to investigate fan trip.
ROLE PLAY: Outside Rounds reports after several minutes that MDCT Fan B breaker relay indicates overload.
- Announces entry into AOP 20.000.01, Acts of Nature.
(Earthquake) (Crew Update)
- Conducts AOP Brief.
- Makes Hi-Com announcement.
- 1. Contacts Tagging Center to initiate a CARD to remove plates from Passive Seismic Detectors for data evaluation.
- 2. Contacts the University of Michigan Seismic Observatory and Davis Besse.
ROLE PLAY: U of M and Davis Bessie report after evaluating their seismic activity data, the results are 0.03G vertical and 0.05G horizontal.
- Acknowledge report of MDCT Fan trip.
- Reviews TS 3.7.2.B, Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) - (72 hr LCO)
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 15 Event
Description:
Seismic Event Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Appendix D, 38 of 39
- Monitors plant parameters IAW 20.000.01 (Earthquake)
Condition AA.
- 1. Reactor Vessel Level.
- 2. Reactor Vessel Pressure.
- 3. Reactor Power.
- 4. Drywell Pressure.
- 5. Torus Water Level.
- 6. Drywell Unidentified Leakage.
- 7. Process Radiation Monitors.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 15 Event
Description:
Condenser Vacuum Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
+35 min Malf - N61MF0003 - E. Condenser Air Leak BOP
- Responds to Annunciators:
- 1. 6D19, OFFGAS DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE HIGH.
- 2. 6D39, OFFGAS CHARCOAL UNITS FLOW HIGH.
- 3. 6D45, OFFGAS SOUTH VALVE F406B CLOSED.
- 4. 6D46, OFFGAS DELAY PIPE PRESSURE HIGH.
- Observes Delay Pipe pressure high and Charcoal Units flow high.
- Reviews ARPs for the alarm windows.
- Reports lowering condenser vacuum.
- Performs AOP 20.125.01 Condition A Actions:
- b. Opens N6200-F601 (602, 602, 603) SJAE Main Steam Supply Valve.
- Performs AOP 20.125.01 Condition F Actions:
- 1. Contacts TB Rounds to prime the North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump.
ROLE PLAY: After 2 minutes, TB Rounds reports the North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump is primed.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 15 Event
Description:
Condenser Vacuum Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- Verifies N6200-F665, North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump Cooling Water Valve at 10% open.
- Starts the North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump.
- Verifies the N6200-F663, N. Absolute Filter Inlet Valve, N6200-F667, N. Buffer Tank Outlet Valve and P4300-F606, TBCCW To North Off-Gas Ring Water Cooler Inlet Valve open.
ROLE PLAY: TB Rounds reports good start on the North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump.
- Announces event over the Hi-Com.
- Announces entry into AOP 20.125.01, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
- Conducts AOP Brief.
- Directs BOP to perform AOP 20.125.01, Condition A and F to start additional SJAEs and the North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump.
- Directs ATC to perform AOP 20.125.01, Condition C for Rapid Power Reduction and H to monitor potential causes.
- Conducts a Pre-Scram Brief.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 15 Event
Description:
Condenser Vacuum Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC
- Performs AOP 20.125.01, Condition C Actions:
- 1. Contacts the CSS to notify of load reduction.
- 2. Performs a rapid power reduction IAW 23.623, Reactor Manual Control System, Section 9.6, by depressing the Reactor Recirculation RECIRC MANUAL RUNBACK pushbutton.
PO - P603_A317_1 - Manual Runback Pushbutton OFF
- Determines Manual Runback failure.
- Takes individual manual control to reduce recirc speeds to 55-60% core flow.
- Performs AOP 20.125.01, Condition H Actions to verify status of:
- 1. Condenser vacuum breakers.
- 2. Proper Feedwater Heater levels.
- 3. Condenser Pump seal water flow, etc.
- Monitors Main Condenser Vacuum for 2.5 psia indication.
- Notifies crew Condenser Vacuum is 2.5 psia. (Crew Update)
- Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN when condenser vacuum indicates 2.5 psia or when directed.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 15 Event
Description:
Reactor Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
+50 min ATC
- 1. Verifies all rods in. (Rod Worth Minimizer)
- 2. Verifies power decreasing.
- 3. Verifies SDV Vent and Drain Valves closed.
- 6. Directs RB Rounds to verify Scram Discharge Volume integrity.
- 7. Stops all Heater Drain Pumps.
- Enters 29.100.01 Sheet 1, RPV Control (Level 3).
- Requests Scram Reports.
- Directs BOP to Confirm Isolations and actuations for level as they occur.
- Gives Scram Report.
- Monitors and controls RPV Level 173-214 inches.
- Monitors and controls RPV Pressure 900-1050 psig.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6/7 Page 12 of 15 Event
Description:
Loss of Level Indication / RPV Flooding Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+60 min NOTE: Booth Operator will play the Earthquake Sound.
Malf - C97MF1087 - Seismic Event / Trouble Alarm (6D69)
B21MF0059 - Rx Nozzle 12A Sensing Line Rupture B21MF0060 - Rx Nozzle 12B Sensing Line Rupture B21MF0073 - RPV Level Floodup Fails Hi B21MF0037- SRV R Fails Closed
- Determines all Narrow Range Level Indication (C32R606A-D) is lost.
- Determines Flood Up (B21R605) indication is lost.
- When directed, injects with Condensate and Feedwater through the SULCV, restarting Heater Feed Pumps IF required.
- When directed, injects with both SBFW Pumps by continuously depressing the F001 valve open pushbutton. (May not be directed)
- Orders 29.ESP.19, SBFW Level 8 Defeat. (May not perform due to other priorities)
NOTE: Booth Operator will activate EOPRF0047 (DEFEAT)
ROLE PLAY: After 5 min report 29.ESP.19 defeats are installed.
- IF High Drywell pressure signal is received:
- 1. Verifies initiation of EECW and isolation to the Drywell by verifying the following:
- a. The white Emergency Mode Light is ON for Div 1 (2).
- b. EECW Pump A (B) is running.
- c. EESW Pump A (B) is running.
- d. P4400-F603A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Supply Iso Vlv is closed.
- e. P4400-F601A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Return Iso Vlv is closed.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6/7 Page 13 of 15 Event
Description:
Loss of Level Indication / RPV Flooding Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC f. P4400-F602A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Makeup Tnk Iso Vlv is open.
- k. P4400-F614, Div 1 EECW To Penet Clrs Iso Vlv is closed.
- l. P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rms A/C Iso Vlv is closed.
- 2. Restores Cooling to CRD by performing the following:
- b. Depresses RESET pushbutton for Div 2 EECW Isolation Valves.
CRITICAL TASKS
- Directs shutting down injection systems, when flooded to Main Steam Lines, while maintaining SRVs open and RPV Pressure as low as practical.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6/7 Page 14 of 15 Event
Description:
Loss of Level Indication / RPV Flooding Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP
- Responds to Seismic System/Event Trouble alarm. (6D69)
- Directs an operator to investigate in the Relay Room.
- Determines all Wide Range level instrumentation is lost.
- Reports RPV Level cannot be determined.
- When directed, opens 5 ADS Valves.
CRITICAL
- Determines SRV R does not open.
TASK
- Opens an additional SRV.
CRITICAL TASK
- When directed, closes MSIVs and Main Steam Line Drains.
(Could be closed on loss of vacuum).
CRITICAL
NOTE: Core Spray and RHR may automatically align on High Drywell Pressure.
- 1. CS is started and aligned for injection IAW SOP 23.203, Core Spray System, Enclosure A. (Hard Card)
- a. Starts Core Spray Pump A and C (B and D).
- b. When Reactor Pressure drops below 461 psig, opens E2150-F005A (B), CSS Loop A (B) Inboard Isolation Valve.
- c. Verifies E2150-F031A (B), Div 1 (2) CS Pmps Min Flow Vlv, closes.
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6/7 Page 15 of 15 Event
Description:
Loss of Level Indication / RPV Flooding Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6/7 Page 15 of 15 Event
Description:
Loss of Level Indication / RPV Flooding BOP 2. RHR/LPCI is started and aligned for injection IAW 23.205, RHR System, Enclosure B. (Hard Card)
- a. Starts RHR Pumps A and C (B and D)
- b. Closes B3105-F031A(B), N(S) RR Pump Discharge Vlv, for loop where injection is desired.
- c. When Reactor Pressure decreases below 461 psig, opens E1150-F015A(B), Div 1(2) LPCI Inbd Iso Vlv.
- d. When RHR Loop A(B) Flow Indicator, E11-R603A(B) is >3000 gpm, verifies E1150-F007A(B), Div 1(2) RHR Pmps Min Flow Vlv, closes.
- e. Determines that Reactor vessel is flooded to the Main Steam Lines.
- e. Establishes RPV pressure as low as practical to maintain SRVs open, CRITICAL by stopping and starting injection systems as necessary.
TASK Appendix D, 38 of 39
Scenario # 2 Lesson Scenario #2.lsn Malfunction List:
Label Description Target Delay Ramp Step H_P805_B058_3 South TBCCW Pump OFF Light 0 0 0 1 C11MF0381 Control Rod 22-31 Drift ACTIVE 0 0 2 C97MF1087* 06D69 Seismic System Event/Trouble Alarm 1 0 0 3 EBAORL_TCTVSP MDCT Fan Trip 1 0 0 4 N61MF0003 East Condenser Vacuum Leak 2.5 0 3 5 P603_A317_1 Manual Recirc Runback Pushbutton 0 0 0 5 B21MF0037 Main Steam SRV Failure B21-F013R 0 0 0 6 C97MF1087* 06D69 Seismic System Event/Trouble Alarm 1 0 0 6 B21MF0059 Reactor Nozzle 12A Sensing Line Rupture ACTIVE 30 0 6 B21MF0060 Reactor Nozzle 12B Sensing Line Rupture ACTIVE 60 0 6 B21MF0073 RPV Lvl Xmtr Fail As-Is Floodup Div 2 B21-N027 570 75 0 6
- Deletes automatically after 60 seconds.
Step 1 = Setup Step 2 = CR 22-31 Drift Out Step 3 = Seismic Event Step 4 = MDCT Fan Trip Step 5 = Loss of Vacuum Step 6 = Loss of Level Indication Simulator Instructions:
- 1. Initialize simulator to IC-20, and place in RUN.
- 2. Open and Execute Lesson Scenario #2.lsn.
- 3. Trigger Step 1, Setup.
- 4. Place an RT dot near the South TBCCW Pump CMC switch.
- 5. Bring crew into simulator and begin scenario when ready.
- 6. Trigger other steps as cued by examiner.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No. 3 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Examiners: M. Bielby Operators:
C. Moore B. Pillaggi Initial Conditions: IC-19, EOL, 100% Rx. Power Turnover:
The plant has been operating for 403 days. Reactor Power is currently 100% of Rated Thermal Power with Control Rods at the 101% Rod Line following rod pattern adjustment. The N.
Turbine Lube Oil Vapor Extractor is out of service for motor replacement. The plan for the shift is to remove the North TBCCW Pump from service for lubrication and outboard motor bearing replacement. The shift is also to perform 27.109.01, Turbine Steam Valves Test, NOTE: The crews Pre-job Briefing for the reactor power decrease and Turbine Steam Valves Test is to be conducted prior to entering the simulator. (Suggested time 30 minutes prior to beginning the scenario.)
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description
2 C51MF0002 I (ATC) #2 APRM fails upscale high.
I (SRO) When directed, ATC removes APRM #1 from bypass and bypasses #2 APRM per 23.605, Average Power Range Monitoring (APRM) System, Sect 6.4. CRS reviews TS to determine tracking LCO.
- 3. N/A R (ATC) Lower reactor power to 93% with Recirculation Flow per R (SRO) GOP 22.000.03, Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%, in preparation to perform 27.109.01, Turbine Steam Valves Test.
- 4. C51MF0001 #1 APRM fails downscale low.
APRM downscale and control rod block in alarms.
SRO reviews TS 3.3.1.1.A (Place instrument in tripped condition in 12 hrs.)
C (SRO) BOP takes immediate actions per AOP 20.000.25, Failed Safety Relief Valve (SRV), by depressing the open and closed pushbuttons repeatedly. The SRV will close.
The CRS reviews TS 3.4.3.A, SRVs (tracking LCO), TS 3.6.1.6.A, Low-Low Set Valves (14 day LCO), and TS 3.6.1.8, Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers (SR 3.6.1.8.2, 12 hrs to perform the vacuum breaker test after a SRV discharge to Torus).
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, 38 of 39
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No. 3 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Examiners: M. Bielby Operators:
C. Moore B. Pillaggi Initial Conditions: IC-19, EOL, 100% Rx. Power.
NOTE: Continued from page 1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description
- 5. SRV G fails open a second time.
(contd) BOP again takes immediate actions per AOP 20.000.25, Failed Safety Relief Valve (SRV), by depressing the open and closed pushbuttons repeatedly. The SRV will again close.
SRO/BOP directs removing fuses to prevent recurrence per AOP 20.000.25, Enclosure A.
OR571916T C (SRO) ATC observes and reports. SRO enters AOP 20.106.03, VNOISE CRD Flow Control Valve Failure, Condition A. ATC takes manual control, and adjusts CRD Pressure as required.
- 7. N30MF0044 M (ALL) Turbine Trips / Failure to Scram (ATWS)
C71MF0006 C (ATC) Failure to scram is reported and the crew enters the EOPs C11MF0001 C (SRO) on Scram Condition with power >3%. CRS directs actions from 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control-ATWS. ATC performs FSQ 1-8 actions, all are unsuccessful. (Manual rod insertion will be successful).
BOP inhibits ADS, bypasses and restores drywell pneumatics, and if MSIVs not shut, orders 29.ESP.11.
C41MF0004 C (SRO) When ATC is ordered to inject SLC. He informs CRS and starts second SLC Pump. SLC is successfully injected. (CT)
- 9. N/A M (ALL) BOP lowers water level and maintains 0-50 inches on Core Level (EOP C-5, Level / Power Control). EOP 29.100.01, PC Control, Sheet 2 ATC performs manual rod insertion (CT). When 29.ESP.10 (Defeat of ARI Logic Trips) is complete and ARI Trip Logic is reset, the scram discharge volume will drain (3D94 clear).
The ATC will perform the Scram-Reset-Scram section of 29.ESP.03, Alternate Control Rod Insertion, which will insert all rods. (CT)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, 38 of 39
Initial conditions establish Reactor Power at 100% with the N. Turbine Lube Oil Vapor Extractor out of service for motor replacement. The crew plans to shift the operating TBCCW Pumps to remove the North for scheduled maintenance. The crew will have briefed this activity prior to entering the simulator. The TBCCW shift is in accordance with SOP 23.128, TBCCW System and is a Normal activity for BOP.
APRM #2 Fails High. ATC will evaluate alarms and report the failure. The CRS will evaluate and direct bypassing the APRM. The ATC will bypass the APRM per 23.605, APRM System, Section 6.4. An operator will be directed to the Relay Room to investigate and report all indications. The CRS will evaluate the failure and apply Tech Specs. (Tracking LCO)
Power will be lowered to 93% in accordance with GOP 22.000.03, Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%, to support the performance of surveillance 27.109.01, Turbine Steam Valves.
Next APRM #1 will fail downscale. ATC will report observed conditions and alarms. The crew will investigate the event. The CRS will review and determine applicable Tech Spec actions.
SRV G will fail open. BOP will perform immediate actions to close the SRV. He should repeatedly depress the OPEN and then the Close pushbuttons, observing plant response, between cycles of the pushbuttons. The CRS will enter AOP 20.000.25, Failed SRV. After several attempts, the SRV will close. The SRV will fail open a second time, and the BOP and CRS will repeat the previous actions. he CRS should declare the SRV inoperable and take actions per the AOP Enclosure A (remove fuses) to ensure the SRV remains closed. The CRS will review and take actions per TS.
The CRD Flow Control Valve will begin oscillating, resulting in oscillating flow. The ATC will observe and report. The CRS will enter AOP 20.106.03, CRD Flow Control Valve Failure. The crew takes action by placing the valve controller in manual. The valve/flow will stop oscillating, and ATC will manually adjust CRD flow as necessary.
The Main Turbine trips, but RPS fails to actuate resulting in a failure to scram (ATWS). RPV Water Level decreases rapidly to below Level 1, and the MSIVs close. ATC reports Failure to Scram, and the crew enters the EOPs on Scram Condition and Rx power cannot be determined to be <3%. After Scram Reports, the CRS directs actions from 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control-ATWS. ATC performs FSQ 1-8 actions (unsuccessful). The success path for the ATWS is manual rod insertion and level-power control.
The BOP inhibits ADS, and if time allows before MSIV closure, he bypasses and restores Drywell Pneumatics. When directed, he controls level 0-50 inches on Core Level (to maintain power low) until SLC is injected and rods are inserted. He maintains pressure 900-1050 psig using Low-Low Set.
When ATC reports FSQ 1-8 is complete, the CRS directs SLC initiation. ATC initiates SLC, but the first pump trips. He starts the other pump, reports the events, and gives his Standard SLC Report, also reports that the first pump tripped. He then attempts to drift rods and then drives rods.
When 29.ESP.10 defeats are installed, ATC resets ARI and drains the SDV per 29.ESP.03, Scram-Reset-Scram, Section 4.0, so the reactor can be re-scrammed. When the SDV is drained (3D94 clear), the reactor is re-scrammed (using ARI), and all rods are fully inserted.
The scenario may be terminated after all rods are in.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: N/A Page 4 of 18 Event
Description:
Overview Initial Conditions:
The plant has been operating for 403 days. Reactor Power is currently 100% of Rated Thermal Power with Control Rods at the 101% Rod Line following rod pattern adjustment.
The N. Turbine Lube Oil Vapor Extractor is out of service for motor replacement. The plan for the shift is to remove the North TBCCW Pump from service for lubrication and outboard motor bearing replacement. The shift is also to perform 27.109.01, Turbine Steam Valves Test. The crew will begin with the LPSV and LPCV portion of the test because I&C support will not be available to perform the on-line valve position calibration on #1 LPIV later in the shift.
The objectives of this scenario are to:
- 1. Recognize, respond to, and take the required actions for an instrument / equipment failures requiring the use of operator and Tech Spec actions.
- 2. Recognize and respond to a Failed SRV.
- 4. Execute steps of RPV Control-ATWS to control Reactor Pressure Vessel level (FSL)
Reactor Pressure (FSP) and Reactor Power (FSQ).
- 5. May require the execution of steps in Primary Containment Control and operation of the RHR System to control Drywell and Torus temperature and pressure.
- 6. Direct and supervise the Shift team during Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency operations.
The crew will be required to respond to the following order of events:
- APRM #2 Fails Upscale (TS 3.3.1.1.F)
- APRM #1 Fails Downscale (TS 3.3.1.1.A)
- SRV G Fails Open (TS 3.4.3.A, 3.6.1.6.A, & SR 3.6.1.8.2)
- Main Turbine Trip / ATWS, with total failure of RPS
- SLC Pump A / B Failure
- EOP Contingency 5 (Level / Power Control)
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _1_ Page _5_ of _18_
Event
Description:
The crew shifts TBCCW Pumps to remove the N. TBCCW Pump from service for maintenance.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 0 min SRO
- Short brief/discussion on crew evolution.
- Directs BOP to shift TBCCW Pumps.
- Makes Hi-Com announcement.
- Crew Update: Shifting TBCCW Pumps
- Shifts pumps IAW 23.128, TBCCW System, Section 6.0, Alternating Pumps
- Starts Standby P4300-C003, South TBCCW Pump.
- Stops pump to be removed from service, P4300-C001, North TBCCW Pump.
- Verifies Supply Header Pressure is approximately 36 to 43 psig.
- Verifies P43-F405, TBCCW DP Control Vlv, is maintaining a differential pressure across the TBCCW Pumps of 20 to 30 psid (COP H11-P805
- Periodically monitors system using the following instruments:
- P43-R805, TBCCW Headers Pressure Indicator.
- P43-R803, TBCCW Heat Exchangers Temperature recorder Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _2_ Page _6_ of _18_
Event
Description:
_APRM #2 Fails Upscale High____________________________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 5 min SRO C51MF0002 - APRM #2 Fails Upscale
- Announces the event over the Hi-Com.
- Reviews TS 3.3.1.1.F, and declares APRM #2 inoperable. (Mode 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Tracking LCO.) Discusses with the crew.
- Acknowledges and reports alarms:
- 3D097, APRM NEUTRON FLUX UPSCALE TRIP
- 3D113, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWL BLOCK
- Crew Update, APRM #2 Failed Upscale.
System, Section 6.4, Bypassing APRM Channel
- Place APRM Bypass Joy-Stick (2) (H11-P603) in position corresponding to APRM channel to be bypassed.
- Verify the following for APRM channel in bypass:
- APRM 2 BYPASS light is ON at H11-P603.
- BYP is displayed in inverse video in the header for APRM 2 instrument at RR H11-P608 and/or ODA on H11-P603.
- Blue BYPASSED LED is ON for APRM 2 on each 2/4 Logic Module (4) at RR H11-P608.
- Contacts operator to verify Relay Room indications.
ROLE PLAY: Operator reports, Blue BYPASSED LED is ON for APRM 2 on each 2/4 Logic Module (4) at RR H11-P608. Relay Room indications confirmed APRM #2 has failed upscale high.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _3_ Page _7_ of _18_
Event
Description:
_Crew lowers reactor power to 93% for Turbine Valves Surveillance__
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 15 min SRO
- Short brief/discussion on crew evolution.
- Directs BOP to contact the System Supervisor to notify him of the load decrease.
- Directs ATC to maintain Turbine Flow Limiter 5% above reactor power, throughout power decrease.
- Assigns BOP as backup/verifier of Turbine Flow Limiter adjustment, throughout power decrease.
- Assigns BOP to have TB Rounds monitor, adjust, and verify > 2000 gpm through each inservice Condensate Filter Demin.
- Directs ATC to lower reactor power to 93% by lowering recirc pump flow.
- Makes Hi-Com announcement.
- Acknowledges SRO direction.
- Commences power reduction IAW 23.138.01, Reactor Recirculation System, Section 6.1 Speed Control.
(Verifies RRMG speed controller in AUTO.)
- Crew Update Commenced Lowering Reactor Power.
- Adjust setpoint (SP) of B31-R621A (B), N (S) RR MG Set Speed Controllers to desired speed. (By intermittently depressing the setpoint down arrow on the speed controller.)
- Monitors the speed indicator on the speed controller and maintains both controllers approximately matched.
- Monitors power on the APRMs and adjusts the Turbine Flow Limiter to maintain ~5% above reactor power.
- Acknowledges SRO direction.
- Contacts the System Supervisor to notify him of the load decrease.
ROLE PLAY: System Supervisor acknowledges the load decrease. Asks, Approximately how many MWe decrease."
- Contacts TB Rounds to monitor, adjust, and verify > 2000 gpm through each inservice Condensate Filter Demin.
ROLE PLAY: TB Rounds acknowledges direction from BOP.
- Acts as backup/verifier of Turbine Flow Limiter adjustment, throughout power decrease.
- Acts as backup/verifier for RRS speed adjustment.
- Monitors and maintains Condensate Header D/P > 25 psid.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _4__ Page _8_ of _18_
Event
Description:
___________ APRM #1 Fails Downscale_______________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 30 min SRO C51MF0001 - APRM #1 Fails Downscale
- Announces the event over the Hi-Com.
- Reviews TS 3.3.1.1.A, and declares APRM #1 inoperable. (Place in trip condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.) Discusses with the crew.
- Acknowledges and reports alarms:
- 3D098, APRM NEUTRON FLUX DOWNSCALE
- 3D113, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWL BLOCK
- Crew Update, APRM #1 Failed Downscale.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _5_ Page _9_ of _18_
Event
Description:
__SRV G Fails Open_________________________________________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 35 min B21MF0029 - SRV G Fails Open SRO
- Announces the event over the Hi-Com.
- Conducts AOP brief.
- Reviews TS and declares SRV G Inop:
- TS 3.4.3.A, SRVs, Tracking LCO.
- TS 3.6.1.6.A, Low-Low Set Valves, 14 Day LCO.
- TS 3.6.1.8, Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers. Determines SR 3.6.1.8.2 applies, perform vacuum breaker test within 12 hrs. after SRV discharge to Torus.
NOTE: When SRV lifts the second time, the above steps will be repeated.
- Contacts FSS to inform him of the SRV problem and to have him contact maintenance for troubleshooting.
- Contacts WWM to request a review of scheduled maintenance that may be affected by SRV G being inoperable. May contact the Emergent Issues Team (EIT)
Leader to develop a troubleshooting plan IAW MWC05.
- May discuss preparations for shutdown based on results of investigation.
- Reports steam flow / feed flow mismatch.
- Reports MWe decrease.
- Reports steam flow and feed flow have returned to original values after SRV closure.
- Reports MWe returned to original value after SRV closure.
NOTE: When SRV lifts the second time, the above steps will be repeated.
- Crew Update, SRV G has failed open.
- Depresses OPEN pushbutton.
- Depresses CLOSE pushbutton.
- Repeats as necessary until the SRV G closes.
- Crew Update, SRV G is closed.
NOTE: When SRV lifts the second time, the above steps will be repeated.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _5_ Page _10_ of _18_
Event
Description:
____ SRV G Fails Open (Continued)_________________________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP
- When directed to Perform Condition E:
- Depresses Div I and Div II Low-Low Set Logic reset pushbuttons.
- Directs an operator to the Relay Room to monitor SRV Tailpipe Temperatures.
ROLE PLAY: Operator reports SRV G Tailpipe Temp is 285°F and slowly lowering.
- When directed, directs an operator to pull SRV G fuses.
ROLE PLAY: Report removing fuses on SRV G. 2 min later, report fuses are removed.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _6_ Page _11_ of _18_
Event
Description:
___CRD Flow Oscillation____________________________________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 45 min SRO C102SENSOR571916TVNOISE - CRD Controller Noise
- Announces the event over the Hi-Com.
- Conducts AOP Brief.
- Contacts FSS to inform him of the CRD FCV problem and to have him contact maintenance for troubleshooting.
- Place CRD Flow Controller in MANUAL.
- Adjust CRD Flow Controller to establish 37-63 gpm on C11-R800.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _7_ Page _12_ of _18_
Event
Description:
____Turbine Trips / Failure to Scram ATWS_________________________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 55 min SRO N30MF0044 - Main Turbine Trip C71MF0006 - Total Scram Failure C11MF0001 - All Rods Stuck 93%
- Announces the event over the Hi-Com.
- Crew Update, Entering EOP 29.100.01, RPV Contol-ATWS, Sheet 1A, based on Failure to Scram Condition.
- Directs ATC to perform FSQ 1-8.
- Directs BOP to confirm isolations and actuations as they occur.
- Observes P603 alarms and indications.
- Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN, observes scram failure.
- Depresses Manual Scram pushbuttons, observes scram failure.
- Crew Update, Failure to scram.
- When asked, gives Scram Report.
- When directed, Performs FSQ 1-8, (Rx will not shutdown, success path is through manual control rod insertion.)
NOTE: ARI will insert the withdrawn control rods a couple notches.
- Reports FSQ 1-8 is complete and Reactor Power is ~20%.
- When asked, gives Scram Report.
- When directed, confirms isolations and actuations as they occur.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page _13_ of _18_
Event
Description:
_______Initial SLC Pump Selected Trips___________________________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 58 min SRO
- Starts first SLC pump, observes pump trips.
CRITICAL
TASK (G3352-F004 & G3352-F220 are CLOSED.)
- Reports failure of first SLC Pump.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _9_ Page _14_ of _18_
Event
Description:
____ATWS (Continued)_____________________________________________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 60 min SRO
- Directs BOP to maintain pressure band 900-1050 psig, use Low-Low Set.
- Inserts rods using 29.ESP.03.
ROLE PLAY: Booth operator will perform 29.ESP.03 Defeats. After 5 min, report 29.ESP.10 is complete.
- 29.ESP.03 Alternate Control Rod Insertion Methods, for existing conditions, per 29.ESP.03 Enclosure A:
- 1. Increase CRD Cooling Water D/P (Section 2.0)
- 2. Manual Control Rod Insertion (Section 3.0)
- 4. Vent CRD Over piston Volume (Section 8.0)
- Increase CRD Cooling Water D/P (Section 2.0):
- 1. Place C11-R600, CRD Flow Controller, in MANUAL.
- 2. Start standby Control Rod Drive pump.
- 3. Open Flow Control Valve using C11-R600, CRD Flow Controller.
CRITICAL
- Manual Control Rod Insertion (Section 3.0):
TASK
- 1. Place C11-R600, CRD Flow Controller, in MANUAL
- 2. Start both CRD pumps.
- 3. If no CRD pump can be started, exit this method of Alternate Control Rod Insertion.
ROLE PLAY: After 2 minutes RB Rounds reports C1100-F034 is closed. (Booth Operator will perform C11RF0123, Charging Water Header Isolation Valve F034, 0% with a 30 sec ramp.)
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Appendix D, 38 of 39 Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _9_ Page _16_ of _18_
Event
Description:
______ ATWS (Continued)_____________________________________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRITICAL ATC 5. As necessary, throttle C1152-F003, CRD Drive/Clg Water PCV, to TASK maintain sufficient drive water D/P for rod motion.
- 6. As necessary, adjust C11-R600, CRD Flow Controller, to maintain sufficient drive water D/P for rod motion
- 7. Place the Rod Worth Minimizer keylock switch in BYPASS.
- 8. Insert the Cram Array using EMERGENCY IN.
- 9. When the Cram Array has been inserted, attempt to achieve a checkerboard control rod pattern using EMERGENCY IN as follows:
- a. Select and fully insert control rods in a spiral out from center pattern, other concurrent actions may preclude obtaining an actual checkerboard pattern.
- 10. Continue to fully insert all remaining control rods using EMERGENCY IN as follows:
- a. Select and fully insert control rods in a spiral out from center pattern.
- 1. Reset ARI as follows:
- b. Depress ATWS ARI/RPT Div I (II) RESET pushbuttons.
- c. Verify ARI is reset.
NOTE: When ARI is reset, malfunction C11MF0001 will automatically clear to allow the control rods to be inserted.
- 2. Verify the SDV vent and drain valves are open.
NOTE: It is not required to fully drain the scram discharge volume prior to reinitiating a manual reactor scram.
- 3. Allow the scram discharge volume to drain. (3D94 Clear)
CRITICAL TASK 4. Initiate a manual scram by performing the following:
- Arm and depress the four ATWS ARI/RPT manual initiation pushbuttons.
- 5. IF control rods move inward, return to Step 1
- Crew Update, ALL rods are IN.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Op-Test No.: _2008-1_ Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _9_ Page _17_ of _18_
Event
Description:
______ ATWS (Continued)_____________________________________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP
- Control RPV Water Level 0-50 inches on Core Level.
NOTE: MSIVs will be closed on Level 1 due to rapid level decrease and RFPTs will coast down. Pressure will be controlled by SRVs (Low-Low Set)
- Dials down RCIC to 200-300 gpm.
- Restarts all DW Cooling Fans.
- Aligns for 1 division of SGTS and shuts down CCHVAC Emergency Makeup Fan.
- Controls pressure in pressure band with Low-Low Set.
- When all rods are reported in and when directed, raises water level to 173-214 inches, using available high pressure systems. (RCIC, HPCI, SBFW) 80 min END SCENARIO Appendix D, 38 of 39
Scenario # 3 Lesson Scenario #3.lsn Malfunction List:
Label Description Target Delay Ramp Step H_P804_A173_4 North TLO Vapor Extractor OFF Light 0 0 0 1 C11MF0001 All Rods Stuck (ATWS) 93 0 0 1 C71MF0006 Total Scram Failure ACTIVE 0 0 1 C41MF0003 SLC Pump A Trip cd='P603_B002_1 EQ 1 ACTIVE 0 0 1 AND C41MF0004 EQ 0 C41MF0004 SLC Pump B Trip cd='P603_B002_3 EQ 1 ACTIVE 0 0 1 AND C41MF0003 EQ 0 C51MF0002 APRM Channel 2 Failure 130 0 0 2 C51MF0001 APRM Channel 1 Failure -5 0 0 3 B21MF0029* Main Steam SRV Failure B21-F013G 100 0 0 4 B21MF0029* Main Steam SRV Failure B21-F013G 100 0 0 5 H_P601_B223_2 SRV G Div 2 OPEN Light 0 0 0 6 H_P601_B224_2 SRV G Div 2 CLOSE Light 0 0 0 6 B21MF0029* Main Steam SRV Failure B21-F013G 0 0 0 6 C102SENSOR571916T CRD Flow Controller Noise Amplitude 0.3 0 60 7 VNOISE**
N30MF0044 Main Turbine Trip ACTIVE 0 0 8 C11RF0123 C11-F034, Charging Water Hdr Isol. Vlv 0 0 30 9 EOPRF0011 Division 1 ARI Level 2 Isolation Defeat DEFEAT 0 0 10 EOPRF0012 Division 1 ARI Pressure Isolation Defeat DEFEAT 0 0 10 EOPRF0013 Division 2 ARI Level 2 Isolation Defeat DEFEAT 0 0 10 EOPRF0014 Division 2 ARI Pressure Isolation Defeat DEFEAT 0 0 10
- Auto deletes when SRV is manually closed.
- Auto deletes when controller is placed in Manual.
Step 1 = Setup Step 6 = Pull SRV Fuses Step 2 = APRM Fails High Step 7 = CRD FCV Oscillations Step 3 = APRM Fails Low Step 8 = Main Turbine Trip Step 4 = SRV Failure #1 Step 9 = Close C11-F034 Step 5 = SRV Failure #2 Step 10 = 29.ESP.10 Simulator Instructions:
- 1. Initialize simulator to IC-19, and place in RUN.
- 2. Open and Execute Lesson Scenario #3.lsn.
- 3. Trigger Step 1, Setup.
- 5. Bring crew into simulator and begin scenario when ready.
- 6. Trigger Step 6 when directed to pull SRV fuses.
- 7. Trigger Step 9 when directed to close C11-F034.
- 8. Trigger Step 10 when directed to perform 29.ESP.10.
- 9. Trigger all other steps as cued by examiner.
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No. 4 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Examiners: M. Bielby Operators:
C. Moore B. Pillaggi Initial Conditions: IC-20, MOL, 100% Rx. Power Turnover: _The plant has been operating at 100% power for 400 days. Reactor Power is currently 100% of Rated Thermal Power with Control Rods at the 109% Rod Line following rod pattern adjustment. The plan for the shift is to shift RBCCW Pumps for scheduled maintenance on the center pump.
NOTE: The crews Pre-job Briefing for the reactor power increase is to be conducted prior to entering the simulator. (Suggested time 30 minutes prior to beginning the scenario.)
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description
- 2. B21MF0067 I (SRO) ECCS Level 3 & 8 NR Div 2 B21-N095B Fails Low BOP responds to alarm 1D32 and reviews ARP. ATC verifies power level and pressure. BOP gives ARP with list of TS to CRS. CRS declares instrument inop and reviews TS 3.3.2.2.A (7 days) and TS 3.3.5.1.E.2 (8 days)
- 3. N21MF0029 R (ATC) Spurious N. RFP Trip / RRS Runback / Loss of Heater R (SRO) Drains C (BOP) CRS enters AOP 20.107.01, Loss of Feedwater or Feedwater Control. The crew verifies RR runs back, starts SBFW and injects at 1200 gpm, and inserts the Cram Array to lower reactor power to 65%. (~15% reactivity change)
- 4. C51MF0198 I (ATC) RBM B Fails High I (SRO) The crew bypasses RBM B per 23.607, Rod Block Monitoring System, Section 5.1. The CRS declares RBM B inoperable and enters TS 3.3.2.1.A (24 hr LCO).
- 5. B21MF0103 RB Steam Tunnel Leak / MSIVs Fail to Isolate B21MF0015 Crew observes increasing temperature in RB Steam Tunnel B21MF0009 on IPCS. Crew should attempt to isolate the steam leak, by B21MF0054 closing the MSIVs, when the area temperature is 160 ºF (MNO), to isolate all systems discharging into the area. IF area temp is 200 ºF and the MSIVs are not closed, then the crew should close them due to the auto isolation failure.
NOTE: MSL C MSIVs do not fully close.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No. 4 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Examiners: M. Bielby Operators:
C. Moore B. Pillaggi Initial Conditions: __________________________________.
NOTE: Continued from page 1 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description
- 6. N/A M (ALL) Reactor Manual Scram (Mode Switch to Shutdown)
Before the RB Steam Tunnel Area temperature reaches the Max Safe Operating Temperature (MSO) of 210 ºF, the crew briefs and places the Mode Switch in Shutdown. (CT)
When Scram Reports are complete the crew enters EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 (Level 3) and AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram.
7a. E41MF0007 HPCI Steam Leak & E4150-F002 Failure to Auto Isolate /
EOPRF0022 E4150-F600 Thermal Overload E41MF0001 Fire Alarm in the HPCI Quad, the crew may enter AOP E41MF0008 20.000.22, Plant Fires. When 3D34, SEC CONTM TEMP HIGH - HIGH EOP ENTRY alarms the crew will enter EOP 29.100.01, SC/RR, Sheet 5 due to HPCI Area temperature greater than Max Normal Operating (MNO) 148 ºF.
7b. NOTE: 1D66, STEAM LEAK DETECTION AMBIENT TEMP HIGH alarms at 154 ºF in HPCI area and an isolation signal is generated.
When BOP attempts to isolate, E4150-F002 will not close (failed as is), and when E4150-F600 valve close pushbutton is depressed or an isolation signal is received, the valve loses power. The leak cannot be isolated.
- 8. N/A M (ALL) When Area Temperatures are > MSO (210 ºF) in 2 areas the EOP directs Emergency Depressurization, EOP 29.100.01 RPV Flood/ED, Sheet 3 (EOP Contingency 2).
CRS directs BOP to open 5 SRVs (ADS preferred) (CT) and while the plant is depressurizing the crew briefs water level restoration and control.
- 9. N/A The crew restores and maintains water level 173 - 214.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ILO NRC Initial Exam Scenario 4 Narrative Summary Initial conditions establish Reactor Power at 100%, with a plan to shift the operating RBCCW Pumps to support maintenance. This is a Normal for BOP.
A Jet Pump 5/6 Failure will occur. ATC reports changes in Jet Pump and Recirc Loop Flows.
He will determine that it is a Jet Pump failure and not a Recirc Pump issue. The CRS will enter AOP 20.138.02, Jet Pump Failure and direct actions per the AOP. The CRS declares JP #5 inop and takes actions per TS. He will direct the ATC to monitor for thermal hydraulic instabilities.
A spurious trip of the North Reactor Feed Pump (N. RFP) occurs, which results in a Reactor Recirc Runback and a Loss of Heater Drains. The CRS enters AOP 20.107.01, Loss of Feedwater or Feedwater Control. ATC verifies Recirc Runs back and RPV Water Level is maintained. The CRS directs BOP to start SBFW and inject at 1200 gpm to increase the margin from low suction pressure trip on the running RFP. The ATC will be directed to insert the Cram Array to lower reactor power to 65%. NOTE: If power were allowed to rise fully, from loss of feedwater heating, power would increase to 72%. The ATC will insert a number of Cram Rods to decrease power 65%. (Power decrease of about 15% when Cram Rod insertion is complete.)
While the ATC is inserting rods, RBM B will fail upscale high. This will cause an RBM Upscale/Inop alarm and a rod block. RBM downscale alarms are expected during this evolution. The crew should observe and determine the alarm is incorrect for the situation. The CRS will direct the RBM to be bypassed. The ATC will bypass RBM B per SOP 23.607, Rod Block Monitoring System. The CRS declares the RBM inop and takes action per TS.
A steam leak will occur in the HPCI Room. This will cause 16D27, FIRE ALARM and the panel will indicate it is in the HPCI Quad. The shift will direct an operator to investigate the alarm.
The CRS may enter AOP 20.000.22, Plant Fires and brief the AOP in the event it is a real fire.
(The ARP allows shift discretion to deem it a confirmed fire). The crew may look at IPCS HPCI Room temperature, but they may think the room temperature is increasing due to a fire. The field operator will report there is steam rising from the NE RB quad stairwell.
NOTE: Depending on room temperature at the time of this report the CRS may direct HPCI steam Line isolation before 3D34 alarms.
When HPCI Room Temperature increases to 148 ºF, 3D34, SEC CONTM TEMP HIGH - HIGH EOP ENTRY alarm is received. The CRS will enter EOP 29.100.01, SC/RR, Sheet 5. The EOP steps direct isolating systems discharging into the area when any area temperature exceeds Max Normal Operating Value (MNO) (148 ºF for HPCI). The CRS should direct isolating the HPCI Steam Line now, if not previously performed.
NOTE: When HPCI Room Temperature is > 154 ºF an isolation signal is generated and 1D66, STEAM LEAK DETECTION AMBIENT TEMP HIGH alarms When the BOP attempts to isolate the HPCI Steam Line the E4150-F002 will not close. If he attempts to isolate, before the isolation signal, the E4150-F600 will lose power when he depresses the close pushbutton. If it is after the isolation signal, he will discover the E4150-F600 has no power. In any case the isolation attempt will be unsuccessful.
Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 The CRS should brief the crew for plant scram. The EOP directs the plant must be scrammed before HPCI Room Temp reaches the Max Safe Operating Value (MSO)
(210 ºF) (CT). The crew can scram the plant anytime after the failure to isolate and commence a plant cool down to minimize the potential for rad release. When Scram Reports are complete the crew enters EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 (Level 3) and AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram.
After the plant is scrammed a second steam leak will occur in the RB Steam Tunnel.
The crew should be monitoring IPCS Temperatures and observe the Main Steam Tunnel Temperature increase. When temperature is above 160 ºF (MNO), or before, the crew should attempt to isolate the MSIVs.
NOTE: If temperature is above 200 ºF, and the MSIVs havent been closed, the crew should close the MSIVs due to auto isolation failure.
When area temperatures are > MSO in 2 or more areas the EOP directs Emergency Depressurization. The CRS enters EOP 29.100.01, RF/ED/SC, Sheet 3 (Emergency Depressurization EOP C-2). The CRS directs BOP to open 5 SRVs, ADS preferred. (CT)
The crew restores, controls, and maintains RPV Water Level 173 - 214.
The scenario will be terminated after Emergency Depressurization and plant conditions are stable.
Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: N/A Page 6 of 17 Event
Description:
Overview Initial Conditions:
The plant has been operating at 100% power for 400 days. Reactor Power is currently 100% of Rated Thermal Power with Control Rods at the 109% Rod Line following rod pattern adjustment. The plan for the shift is to shift RBCCW Pumps for scheduled maintenance on the center pump.
The objectives of this scenario are to:
- 1. Recognize, respond to, and take the required actions for an instrument / equipment failures requiring the use of operator and Tech Spec actions.
- 2. Recognize and respond to a Jet Pump Failure.
- 3. Recognize and respond to a spurious N. RFP Trip.
- 4. Recognize and respond to a RBM Failure High.
- 5. Execute steps of RPV Control to control Reactor Water Level (L) and Pressure (P).
- 6. Execute the steps of Secondary Containment Temperature Control (SCT).
- 7. Execute steps of Reactor Pressure Vessel Flooding (RF).
- 8. Direct and Supervise the Shift team during Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operations The crew will be required to respond to the following order of events:
- ECCS NR Div 2 B21-N095B Fails Low (RPV Lvl Xmtr L3 & L8) (TS 3.3.2.2.A and TS TS 3.3.5.1.E.2)
- Spurious RFP Trip
- RBM Failure High - (Tech Spec 3.3.2.1.A)
- RB Steam Tunnel Leak
- Failure of MSIVs to Isolate
- Reactor Scram
- HPCI Steam Leak
- Failure of E4150-F002 to Auto Isolate
- E4150-F600 Thermal Overload Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 7 of 17 Event
Description:
RBCCW Pump Shift Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+0 min SRO
- Shifts RBCCW Pumps in accordance with 23.127, Section 6.1:
- 1. Directs Rounds Operator to place T4100-B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit, switch in OFF and to verify RPS MG Set doors are closed.
ROLE PLAY: After ~1 minutes, RB Rounds reports T4100-B033 switch is in OFF and RPS MG Set Doors are closed.
- 2. Closes P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rms A/C Iso Vlv (H11-P808).
NOTE: 2D119, RBCCW PUMPS DIFF PRESS HIGH/LOW, may alarm during pump shift.
- 3. Starts the South RBCCW Pump.
- 4. Stops the Center RBCCW Pump.
- 5. If necessary reviews ARP 2D119.
- 6. Verifies P42-F403, RBCCW DP Control Vlv, is maintaining proper differential pressure by verifying annunciators 2D100 and 2D104 are clear.
- 7. Opens P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rms A/C Iso Vlv (H11-P808).
- 8. Direct the Rounds Operator to place T4100-B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit, switch in AUTO, and to verify RPS MG Set doors are closed.
ROLE PLAY: After ~1 minutes, RB Rounds reports T4100-B033 switch is in AUTO and RPS MG Set doors are closed.
- Periodically monitors RBCCW system temperatures and pressures to ensure proper system operation.
Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 8 of 17 Event
Description:
ECCS NR Div 2 B21-N095B Fails Low (RPV Lvl Xmtr L3 & L8)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+10 min SRO Malf - B21MF0067 - B21-N095B Fails Low - 150
- Reviews 23.601, Instrument Trip sheets.
- Declares instrument inop.
- Reviews TS 3.3.2.2.A (7 days) and TS 3.3.5.1.E.2 (8 days).
- Conducts brief, reports TS and LCO time restraints. Informs crew that Div 2 ADS will have a confirmatory L3 locked in and SBFW will not receive a L8 isolation.
- Requests FSS to write a LCO, review 23.601, & to generate a STR and to place the instrument in a tripped condition. Has FSS contact WWM, I&C Foreman, & meet with them to generate a trouble shooting game plan.
- Responds to alarm 1D32, ADS REACTOR H2O LEVEL L3
- Verifies B21-R604B indicates < Level 3 (173.4 inches) on COP H11-P602.
- Directs an operator to D2 testability cabinets.
ROLE PLAY: After 1 min, report B21-695B indicates 165 with a tripped light (ADS L3 Permissive) and B21-N710B has no tripped light (FW/MT L8).
- Relays information to CRS.
- Announces power, level, and pressure are sat.
- Monitors his control panel.
Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 17 Event
Description:
N. RFP Trip / Reactor Recirc Runback / Loss of Heater Drains Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+20 min ATC Malf - N21MF0029 - Reactor Feed Pump N Trip
- Responds to plant conditions; diagnoses and reports loss of N. RFP.
- Verifies Recirc Runback:
- 1. Verifies RR runs back to 2/3 Limiter.
- 2. Places Recirc A & B Limiter 2/3 Defeat Switch in NORMAL.
- Inserts CRAM Array to lower reactor power to 65%. (First 2 sheets plus others.)
- Reports power level to CRS when 65%.
- At 65%, when directed, places Recirc A & B Flow Limiter 2/3 Defeat Switch to DEFEAT.
- Responds to plant conditions; diagnoses and reports loss of N. RFP.
- Starts SBFW and injects at 1200 gpm:
- 1. Starts West Pump A Aux Lube Oil Pump.
- 2. Starts East Pump B Aux Lube Oil Pump.
- 3. Starts West Standby Feedwater Pump A.
- 4. Verifies N2103-F001, SBFW Disch to RPV Iso Vlv, automatically opens.
- 5. Starts East Standby Feedwater Pump B.
- 6. Throttles open N2103-F002, SBFW 6" Disch Flow Ctrl Vlv, until 1200 gpm is achieved.
- May complete shutdown of N. RFP in accordance 23.107:
- 1. Opens or verifies open the N. RFPT drain valves.
- 2. Pushes Reactor Feed Pump Turbine North green SPEED DECREASE pushbutton until backlight is ON and speed demand is 0%.
- Direct Rounds Operator to verify Feedwater Heaters 3, 4, 5, and 6 relief valves closed.
ROLE PLAY: After ~2 minutes, Rounds Operator reports Feedwater Heaters 3, 4, 5, and 6 relief valves are closed.
- Shuts down SBFW when reactor power level is 65%:
- 1. Shuts down West Standby Feedwater Pump A.
- 2. Closes N2103-F002, SBFW 6" Disch Flow Ctrl Vlv.
- 3. Shuts down East Standby Feedwater Pump B.
- 4. Verifies N2103-F001, SBFW Disch to RPV Iso Vlv, automatically closes.
- 5. After SBFW pumps have been shut down for 5 minutes, shuts down West &
Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 East Pump A & B Aux Lube Oil Pumps.
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 10 of 17 Event
Description:
N. RFP Trip / Reactor Recirc Runback / Loss of Heater Drains Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. Verify or transfer Hydrogen injection to a HFP that will remain operating following HFP shutdown in accordance with 23.143,"Hydrogen Water Chemistry System."
- 2. Close or verify closed N2000-F830A, B, or C, East, Center, or West HFP Suction Hydrogen Inj Iso Valve, for the HFP to be shutdown (TB1-N14).
- 3. Adjust/verify Heater Drain Pump Seal pressure in accordance with 23.108, "Extraction Steam And Heater Drains."
- 4. Place the associated Auxiliary Oil Pump in RUN.
- 5. Stop the Heater Feed Pump.
- 6. Verify N20-F405A (B, C), East (Center, West) HFP Min Flow Ctrl Vlv, closes.
- 7. Adjust/verify Heater Drain Pump Seal pressure in accordance with 23.108, "Extraction Steam And Heater Drains."
- Conducts AOP Brief.
- Directs BOP to inject with SBFW at 1200 gpm.
- Directs ATC to insert CRAM Array to lower reactor power to 65%.
- When reactor power level is verified 65%, directs BOP to shutdown SBFW.
- Notifies SNE.
ROLE PLAY: SNE acknowledges report.
- Monitors Core Thermal Limits.
- Directs Chemistry to perform required sampling for reactor power change >15%.
ROLE PLAY: Chemistry acknowledges report.
- Contacts Radiation Protection about >15% power reactor change.
ROLE PLAY: Radiation Protection acknowledges report.
- Directs BOP to maintain Turbine Flow Limiter 5% > Reactor power.
- Directs BOP to shutdown a HFP.
- At 65% Reactor Power, as indicated on APRMs, directs ATC place Recirc A & B Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Flow Limiter 2/3 Defeat Switch to DEFEAT.
Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 12 of 17 Event
Description:
RBM B Fails High Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+40 min ATC Malf - C51MF0198 - RBM B Failure
- Responds to 3D109, RBM UPSCALE/INOP and 3D113, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWL BLOCKED alarms.
- Bypasses RBM B in accordance with 23.607:
- 1. Places RBM Bypass switch in B.
- 2. Verifies white Bypassed light for RBM B is ON.
- Evaluates compliance with Tech Spec 3.3.2.1.A (24 hr LCO).
- Declares RBM B inoperable and enters LCO.
Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 17 Event
Description:
RB Steam Tunnel Leak / MSIVs Fail to Isolate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+50 min BOP Malf - B21MF0103 - Steam Line Rupture in the Tunnel B21MF0015 - Inboard MSIV Failure-B2103F022C B21MF0009 - Inbd MSIV Fails Shut B21-F022A B21MF0054 - Outboard MSIV Failure-B2103F028C
- Responds to 1D66, STEAM LEAK DETECTION AMBIENT TEMP HIGH alarm.
Reports potential EOP entry. (Main Steam Tunnel Temp 160ºF.)
- Responds to IPCS alarm for Main Steam Tunnel high temperature.
- Manually closes MSIVs when directed.
- Observes RB Tunnel temperature continuing to rise.
- Responds to 3D34, SEC CONTM TEMP HIGH-HIGH EOP ENTRY alarm.
Reports potential EOP entry. (Main Steam Tunnel Temp 160ºF.)
- Responds to 3D18, IPCS MONITORED INPUTS ABNORMAL. (High area temp alarm.)
- Monitors IPCS Area Temperatures.
- Directs BOP to isolate Main Steam Lines when temperature is 160°F.
- Monitors RB Steam Tunnel temperature.
- Before RB Steam Tunnel temperature reaches 210°F, briefs crew on reactor shutdown.
Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 17 Event
Description:
Reactor Scram Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+60 min ATC
CRITICA L
- Verifies all control rods fully inserted.
TASK
- Verifies reactor power decreasing.
- Gives Scram Report.
- Verifies Recirc Pumps runback to minimum.
- Verifies SDV Vent and Drain Valves closed.
- Gives scram report.
- Maintains reactor pressure 900-1050 psig allowing Low-Low Set to control pressure.
- Requests Scram Reports.
- Before RB Steam Tunnel temperature reaches 210°F, announces entry into EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1, step RC-1 and AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram.
Directs the ATC to place the Mode Switch in Shutdown.
- Directs BOP to maintain reactor pressure 900-1050 psig allowing Low-Low Set to control pressure.
- Makes Hi-Com announcement of event.
MSO. (FS1)
Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 15 of 17 Event
Description:
HPCI Steam Leak / E4150-F002 Failure to Isolate / E4150-F600 Thermal Overload Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+70 min BOP Malf - E41MF0007 - HPCI Steam Line Leak EOPRF0022 - E410F002 Isolation Defeat for RPV Venting E41MF0001 - E4150F600 Thermal Overload Failure E41MF0008 - E4150F002 Fails As-Is
- Responds to 16D27 (Plant Fire). Observes Fire Light in HPCI Room.
- May direct an operator to investigate fire alarm in HPCI Room.
ROLE PLAY: Operator reports steam in RB SE Quad stairwell.
- Recognizes failure of HPCI to isolate.
- Attempts to manually isolate HPCI steam line.
- Discovers and reports that E41-F002 will not close, and E41-F600 breaker has tripped.
- May open an SRV to lower pressure to 500 psig, when directed.
- Monitors HPCI Room and Main Steam Tunnel Temps on IPCS.
- May Place RHR in Torus Cooling.
- May enter AOP 20.000.22, Plant Fires.
- Before HPCI Room temperature reaches 210°F, brief crew on Emergency Depressurization.
Op-Test No.: 2008-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8/9 Page 15 of 17 Event
Description:
Area Temperature > 210°F in 2 Areas (HPCI Rm & Steam Tunnel)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+75 min BOP
CRITICA
- Bypasses and restores Drywell pneumatics if necessary.
L TASK
- Restores reactor water level 173-214".
Appendix D, Page 39 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 SRO
- When area temperatures are >MSO in 2 or more areas, directs BOP to open 5 SRVs, ADS preferred [EOP 29.000.01, RF/ED/SC Sheet 3 (Emergency Depressurization EOP C-2)]. (CT)
- Directs BOP to bypass and restore Drywell pneumatics if necessary.
- Briefs crew on water level restoration and control.
- Directs BOP to restore and maintain reactor water level 173-214".
Appendix D, 38 of 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario # 1 Lesson Scenario #1.lsn Malfunction List:
Label Description Target Delay Ramp Step H_P807_A008_3 GSW #4 OFF Light 0 0 0 1 P807_A008_1 GSW #4 OFF/RESET Switch 1 0 0 1 P602_B131_3 E. DWEDT Pump 1 0 0 1 P602_A094_3 W. DWEDT Pump 1 0 0 1 P602_B131_3 E. DWEDT Pump -1 240 0 1 P602_A094_3 W. DWEDT Pump -1 240 0 1 B31RF0018 RRMG B Scoop Tube Hand Crank 55 0 7 2 cd='BBBDB3101C001B_MZMLNA GT 942' E51MF0009 RCIC Spurious Initiation ACTIVE 0 0 3 R14MF0001 Loss of Div 2 Offsite Power ACTIVE 0 0 4 N20MF0023 Heater Feed Pump C Trip ACTIVE 0 0 4 E41MF0009 HPCI Auto Start Failure ACTIVE 0 0 4 N21MF0031* SBFW N2103-F001 Fail As-Is 0 0 0 4 EOPRF0038 RBCCW High Drywell Isolation Defeat DEFEAT 0 0 4 N21RF0019* MOV N2103-F001 Breaker OPEN 8 0 4 cd='P601_A290_2 OR P601_A291_2 EQ 1' E41MF0005 HPCI Spurious Isolation ACTIVE 45 0 4 cd='H_P602_A131_2 EQ 1' B31MF0006 Recirc Loop A Rupture 1 0 300 5
- Delete to reset thermal overload trip (simulated) of N21-F001 breaker.
Step 1 = Setup Step 2 = Recirc Runaway Step 3 = RCIC Initiation Step 4 = Loss of Power (w/ HPCI & SBFW Failures)
Step 5 = LOCA Simulator Instructions:
- 1. Initialize simulator to IC-18, and place in RUN.
- 2. Open and Execute Lesson Scenario #1.lsn.
- 3. Trigger Step 1, Setup. (Drywell Equipment Drain Tank will complete pumping down in about 4 minutes.)
- 4. Place an RT dot near GSW Pump #4 CMC switch.
- 5. Bring crew into simulator and begin scenario when ready.
- 6. Trigger Step 2, Recirc Runaway, when the Recirc Pump speed increase starts. (The runaway begins when RRMG Set B speed reaches 57%.)
- 7. Trigger other steps as cued by examiner.
Appendix D, 38 of 39