ML072550244
| ML072550244 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/2006 |
| From: | Entergy Corp |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GNRO-2007/00061 JC-Q1E22-N654-1, Rev. 3 | |
| Download: ML072550244 (27) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:Attachment 3 To GNRO-2007100061 GGNS Calculation JC-QIE22-N654-1, Rev. I
"* DRN No. Page(s) 31 CALCULATION (')Initiating Doc.: CR-GGN-2006-0863 COVER PAGE El DRN Superseded:
El DRNs Voided: F] Calculation SupersededNoided: 0 As-Built/No ICN Required I] Pending/ICN Required (Verify current status In IDEAS.) 0 CALCULATION '*) Reason For Pending Status: (ER, T.S., Change, etc.)
.JDRN NIA 141 Calculation No: JC-QIE22-N654-1 '1' Revision: 3
'51
Title:
Instrument Loop Uncertainty and Setpoint Determination for Loops 1E22-N654C&G HPCS Pump Suction Transfer on Low CST Level (TS 3.3.5.1) VI System(s): E22 & P1l t"' Component/Equipment Identifier: M' Safety Code: *' Calc Code: 1E22N054ClG 1E22N654ClG IE22FOOl 1E22F015 IE22K702 IPIIA002 0 Yes (ANO/GGNS Only) O Quality I] No Setpoint (20)Study Calc LI YES 0 NO i"' 10CFR50.59 Review: Structure:
"- Addressed in Bldg. AUX. Elev.
[] Attached Room Wall 0 No LBD Impact Coordinates: '"' R-Type: J05.02 114) Org. Code; (ANO/GGNS/RBS Only) NPE-I&C SKeywords: NIA Topical Codes: (ANO Only) REVIEWS , . , / Timothy Bryant Kyi'M.
"Wato0n G7Z erald Lantz (IS)Name/Signature/Date (IT) Name/Signature/Date " Name/Sign ture)ate 0 Design Verifier Responsible Engineer El Reviewer SupervisorlApproval El Checker (Only As-Built DRNs included in Revision)
El Comments Attached 0l Comments Attached
CALCULATION SHEET
*~--ENTERGY SHEET 2 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-OIE22-N654-1 -REV. 3 CALCULATION BY: "V"15 DATE "tIOA,;'1 VERIFIED BY -K4W DATE Z&.Z/p
__ ENTERGY TCALCULATION
.*'>/
SHEET SHEET 3 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-OIE22-N654-1 REV. 3 CALCULATION BY"T.A' DATE "t/-VERIFIED BYOvMAT " CALCULATION CALCULATION NO: JC-Q1E22-N654-1 Rev3 REFERENCE SHEET I. DRNs INCORPORATED: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. II Relationships: Sht Rev Input Output Impact DRN/ Doc Doc Y/N Tracking No.
- 1. see calc section 3.2 0 03
- 2. _ 03 13
- 3. _0 03 4.__ 0 0_
- 5. 0 03 III. CROSS
REFERENCES:
- 1. see calc section 3.1 IV. SOFTWARE USED:
Title:
N/A Version/Release: Disk/CD No. DISKICDS INCLUDED:
Title:
Version/Release Disk/CD No. V. OTHER CHANGES:
E ___ENTERGY <** CALCULATION SHEET SHEET 4 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-QIE22-N654-1 REV. 3 CALCULATION BY -K ý DATE 7/' a VERIFIED BY DATE' 0T/?*j TABLE OF CONTENTS SHEET COVER SHEET .1 RECORD OF REVISION 2 CALCULATION REFERENCE SHEET 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS 4 SECTION 1.0 PURPOSE 5 2.0 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 5
3.0 REFERENCES
6 4.0 GIVEN 9 5.0 ASSUMPTIONS 13 6.0 METHODOLOGY 14 7.0 CALCULATION 16
8.0 CONCLUSION
26 APPENDICES N/A ATTACHMENTS 1 ENGINEERING REVIEW FORM (1 sheet) 2 DESIGN VERIFICATION FORM (4 sheets)
-=-~-ENTERGY ,.$) (~V) CALCULATION SHEET SHEET 5 OF 26 CALCULATIONNO. JC-QIE22-N654-1 .REV. 3 CALCULATION BY ý 1ý DATE 7/I/OG VERIFIED BY 1'MWDATE 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this calculation is to determine the instrument loop uncertainty and limiting allowable values and setpoints for instrument loops IE22-N654C&G in support of ER 1999-0217. The values generated by this calculation are in accordance with Ref.
3.1.1. Instrument loops 1E51N635A&E that were originally included in this calculation are now addressed in Ref. 3.2.18. 2.0 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS The High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system is an ECCS system which supplies makeup water to the reactor in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or reactor isolation and failure of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system (Ref. 3.1.3 pg. 4). HPCS is automatically started on LOCA detection or may be manually started if required (Ref. 3.1.22 pg. 8). The normal source of water for HPCS is the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) which contains reactor grade water (Ref. 3.1.4 pg.5 & 25). However, low level in CST, or high level in the suppression pool, will initiate a transfer of suction to the suppression pool (Ref. 3.1.22 pg. 10 ). For the HPCS system, CST level is sensed by two level transmitters (1E22-LT-N054C&G) and two trip units (1E22-LIS-N654C&G) (Ref. 3.1.6, 3.1.7 & 3.1.8). When tank level decreases to the setpoint, the trip units send a signal to the 1E22F001 & 1E22F015 valve control logic to transfer HPCS pump suction from the CST to the suppression pool (Ref. 3.1.6, 3.1.7 & 3.1.8). Since water in the suppression pool is not of reactor quality, this transfer is done only after all condensate sources have been exhausted or the suppression pool level is too high (Ref. 3.1.22 pg. 10). The primary design consideration for the transfers is the maintenance of suction head on the HPCS pump (Ref. 3.1.3 pg. 3, 3.1.22 pg. 6) which will ensure an uninterrupted flow of water to the reactor. The obvious analytical limit is the level of the vortex breaker of the suction piping which is 9" above the bottom of the CST. With instrument zero at 1' I", this equates to -0.333 ft. (Ref. 3.2.10, 3.2.11 & 3.2.8) Because the transmitters will not function below instrument zero, the analytical limit would ordinarily be set equal to 0.0 ft. In this case, however, the portion of suction piping that connects to the CST is non-safety related. Per 3.2.3, the instrumentation must be capable of detecting a suction pipe failure such that the suction swap to the suppression pool is completed before suction head is lost. For this to happen, the setpoint must be above the elevation of the top of the suction pipe. The analytical limit will therefore be set equal to 3.0 ft, the indicated level of the top of the suction pipe. (Ref. 3.2.8)
'A CALCULATION SHEET ~--ENTERGY -
SHEET 6 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-QIE22-N654-1 REV. 3 CALCULATION BY - DATE 71j,./ VERIFIED BY L .D)ATE O A low CST level (or a failure of the suction piping) will initiate the transfer of the HPCS suction from the CST to the suppression pool (3.1.22 pg. 10). This transfer could occur during an accident situation when HPCS is required to operate; therefore, transmitters 1E22N054C & G are required to function in accident environments. The HPCS system is designed in accordance with seismic Category I requirements; therefore, Loops IE22-N654C & G do have to function during and after a seismic event (Ref. 3.1.22 pg. 3). The postulation of an SSE and a LOCA at the same time is not required (Ref. 3.1.30). It is necessary to postulate a LOCA and a subsequent SSE or a SSE and a subsequent LOCA. Therefore, both seismic and LOCA effects will be included in this calculation. It must be noted that per the tech spec (Ref. 3.1.5) there is no upper limit on the CST low level setpoint for the HPCS pump suction swap. The friction loss errors discussed in section 7.5 will result in the low level trip occurring much earlier than desired. This will result in less usable CST volume. The 18 ft CST tech spec requirement (Ref. 3.1.31) only applies in modes 4 or 5 when suction from the suppression pool is not available. In this case the automatic swap would be disabled. Per Ref. 3.1.33, the CST is not credited for HPCS in modes 1,2 or 3.
3.0 REFERENCES
3.1 Cross References 3.1.1 Standard No. GGNS-JS-09 Rev 1, Methodology for the Generation of Instrument Loop Uncertainty & Setpoint Calculations 3.1.2 SDC-E51 Rev 2 (RCIC) 3.1.3 GE Design Spec Data Sheet 22A3131AC Rev 11 (HPCS) 3.1.4 System Design Criteria SDC E22 Rev 2 High Pressure Core Spray System 3.1.5 Tech Spec Table 3.3.5.1-1, Sheet 3 3.1.6 J-1248-L-005C Rev 0 Loop Diagram 3.1.7 J-1248-L-005G Rev 0 Loop Diagram 3.1.8 J-1248-004 Rev I Logic Diagram
RCALCULATION SHEET SHEET 7 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-Q1E22-N654-1 REV. 3 (CALUULATI.N
,bY I_ V1L IY -w a EAIe. DATE Q1 M- 1065 Rev 40 P&ID I 3.1.9 3.1.10 J-1506B Rev I Instrument Location El 119 3.1.11 A-0011 Rev8Plan at El 119 3.1.12 Passport EDB 3.1.13 J-0400 Rev 17 Control Room Panel Location 3.1.14 A-0120 Rev 16 Control Room Floor Plan 3.1.15 FSK-I-1065-010-B Rev 8 3.1.16 GE PPD 164C5150 Sht I Rev 18, Sht 2 Rev 17, Sht 3 Rev 18 3.1.17 CR 1999-0481 3.1.18 GE PPD 184C4571 Sht I Rev9 3.1.19 CR 1999-0433 3.1.20 Tech Spec SR 3.3.5.1.5 3.1.21 Tech Spec SR 3.3.5.1.3 3.1.22 GE Design Spec 22A3131 Rev 5 (HPCS) 3.1.23 TRM Table TR3.3.5.1-1 Rev. 29 3.1.24 CR 97/1071-00 3.1.25 PER 91/6068 Rev 1 3.1.26 P&ID M-1086, Rev. 30 3.1.27 NEDC-31336P-A, Class 3 September 1996, General Electric Instrument Setpoint Methodology 3.1.28 CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 57h Edition (pg. F-5) 3.1.29 UFSAR 15.6.5.1
___ ENTERGY EGCALCULATION SHEET SHEET 8 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-p 1E22-N654-1 REV. 3 CALCULATION BY ""j5 DATE }t1i/rVERIFIED 13Y ]d ATE 3.1.30 deleted 3.1.31 Tech Spec SR 3.5.2.2 3.1.32 Tech Spec bases SR 3.5.2.1 & 3.5.2.2 (page B 3.5-18) 3.1.33 EAR E99-018 response 3.2 Relationships 3.2.1 Standard GGNS-E-100 Rev 5, "Environmental Parameters for GGNS" 3.2.2 MC-QIE22-00010 Rev 1 3.2.3 ER 1999-0217-00 3.2.4 865E542-002, Rev. 4 DRN 05-383 3.2.5 Rosemount Instruction Manual 4247-1 dated 7/76 Trip/Indicator 460000047 3.2.6 Vendor Manual # 460001972 3.2.7 E22 MPL# 283X237BA DRN 05-434 3.2.8 J-1660B Rev 4 Level Settings Diagram DRN 05-1560 3.2.9 Vendor manual 460000944 Tab 20 3.2.10 C143.0-N1P11A002-1.3-17 Rev 2, HPCS / RCIC CST Suction Nozzle 3.2.11 C143.0-NIP1 1A002-1.3-2 Rev 3, CST Vendor Drawing 3.2.12 J301.0-QS-27.0-15 Rev 0; Rosemount Low Dose Rate Radiation Test Report for 1153 Pressure Transmitters D8600063 (contained in EQ09.1-3) 3.2.13 06-IC-I E22-R-0002 Rev 104 3.2.14 06-IC-1E22-Q-0002 Rev 101 3.2.15 Bechtel Calculation M5.6.007, Rev. 1, Sht. 781
CALCULATION SHEET ENTERGY SHEET 9 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-01IE22-N654-1 - REV.- 3 CALCULATION BY LŽý .. DATE _I 2--1I bVERIFIED BY ýALIDATE 7W466 3.2.16 MP&L Spec C196.0, Rev.5 3.2.17 J1660A DRN 05-1559 3.2.18 JC-Q1E51-N635-1 Rev I 3.2.19 SC-1 E22-LT-N054 Rev I Scaling Calculation 3.2.20 02-S-01-33 rev 18, Turbine Building Rounds 3.2.21 DCP 83/0108, added CST temperature monitoring instrumentation 3.2.22 MS-02 rev 50 3.2.23 SFD1065 rev 6 3.2.24 386X409BA rev 6, 1H13P601-21B EDL 3.2.25 163C1392 sht I rev 15 item 7, 1E51R600 flow controller PPD 3.2.26 04-1-01-E51-1 rev 123, RCIC SOl 3.2.27 06-OP-1E51-Q-0003, rev 119, RCIC pump surveillance 4.0 GIVEN 4.1 Instrument Loop Block Diagram Transmitter Trip Switch Power P&ID Loop Dia. I E22-LT-N054C,G IE22-LIS-N654C,G IE22A-PS2 3.1.9 3.1.6, 3.1.7
ENTERGY BCALCULATION SHEET SHEET 10.. OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-I,E22-N654-I REV, 3 ,CALCULATION BY DATE aVERIFIED BY I DATE 0 4.2 Transmitter Environment Description Data Reference Tag Number IE22-LT-N054C,G; Instrument Location: Panel Local 3.1.6, 3.1.7 Room IA201 3.1.10, 3.1.11 Environmental Conditions: Normal:Zone N-032 3.2.1 Temperature 65-104F 3.2.1 Pressure 0.25 to 0 in.wg. 3.2.1 Radiation (Gamma) 3.5E2 rads (40 yr TID) 3.2.1 Humidity 50% RH 3.2.1 DBE or Accident: Zone A-057 3.2.1 Temperature 124F 3.2.1 Pressure 0.25 to 0 in.wg. 3.2.1 Radiation TID 1.46E5 rads 3.2.1 Radiation dose rate 0.034E6 rads/hr 3.2.15 Humidity 50% RH 3.2.1 Seismic Conditions !50.5g Assumption 5.2 Surveillance Intervals 18 months 3.1.5, 3.1.20 4.3 Trip Unit Environment Description Data Reference Tag Number IE22-LIS-N654C,G; Instrument Location: Panel I H13 -P625; 3.1.6, 3.1.7 Room OC504 3.1.13, 3.1.14 Environmental Conditions: Normal: Zone N-028 3.2.1 Temperature 60-90 OF 3.2.1 Pressure 0.1 to 1.0 in wg. 3.2.1 Radiation (Gamma) 1.8E2 rads (40 yr TID) 3.2.1 Humidity 50% RH 3.2.1 DBE or Accident: Same as Normal 3.2.1 Surveillance Intervals 92 days 3.1.5, 3.1.21
NCALCULATION SHEET SHEET 11 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-O1E22-N654-I REV. 3 ,CALCULATION BY JILý. DATE I2.7ýJo VERIFIED BY-Iq DATE 04 && ( 4.4 Transmitter Vendor Data Description Data Reference Tag Number IE22-LT-N054C,G; Manufacturer Rosemount 3.2.3, 3.2.7 Model I153GB5PA 3.2.3, 3.2.7 URL 62.5 ft (750 inwc) 3.2.6 Span 39.81 ft (13.19" to 490.87") 3.2.19 39.81 ft (13.31" to 490.99") 3.2.19 Accuracy: +/-0.25% span 3.2.6 Drift: +0.25% URL per six months 3.2.6 Power Supply: <0.005% span per volt 3.2.6 Temperature: +(0.75% URL + 0.5% span)/100F 3.2.6 Humidity: Sealed unit - no effects 3.2.6 Radiation: +/- 0.5 % URL for 0.035 Mrad/hr 3.2.12, 5.8 Static Pres: N/A for gage pressure transmitter 3.2.6 Seismic: + 0.25% URL for 3 g 5.2 Overpressure: <+/-0.25 URL for 2000 psi 3.2.6 Output Range 4-20 madc 3.2.6 4.5 Trip Unit Vendor Data Description Data Tag Number 1E22-LIS-N654C,G; Manufacturer Rosemount 3.2.4, 3.1.16 Model 51 ODU or 71 ODU Assumption 5.6 Repeatability: +/-0.2% span 3.2.5, Note I Drift: +/-0.2% span per 6 months 3.2.5 Input Range 4-20 madc 3.2.5
__ENTERGY CALCULATION SHEET SHEET 12 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-QIE22-N654-1 REV. CALCULATION BY DATE 1J Lo/, VERIFIED BY _A DATE Q7&&,7&6 Note 1: Table 5 of Ref. 3.2.5 defines environmental conditions at the Trip Switch in terms of "operating condition" and "environment." Conditions in Zone N-028 are bounded by line 2 defined as "adverse operating conditions" and "normal environment" The corresponding line on Table 6 specifies repeatability under the defined conditions as
+/-0.2%. This repeatability is valid for 6 months operation. An allowance for power supply effects, temperature effects, humidity effects and radiation effects are included in the repeatability.
4.6 Power Supplies Power Supply Tag No. IE22A-PS2 (I E22K702) 3.1.6,3.1.7 Power Supply Nominal 24.0 volts 3.2.4, 3.1.18 Power Supply Variations 23 - 28 vdc 3.2.4, 3.1.18 4.7 Instrument Tubing The CST outlet piping runs to the RCIC and HPCS pumps. One side of the transmitter is tapped into this line; the other is vented to atmosphere. Description Data Reference Room I A201 3.1.10, 3.1.11 Normal Temp 65-104F 3.2.1 DBE Temp 124F 3.2.1 Vertical Rise 2.763 ft. +/-2 in. 3.1.15 4.8 Condensate Storage Tank Per 3.2.23, the normal temperature of the CST water is 130F. Per 3.2.22, this is also the maximum expected temperature (based on associated line HCD-9). During normal plant operation the minimum CST water temperature will not drop below 75F. During extended cold weather plant outages the temperature could fall below the 65F limit for the feedwater injection piping for RCIC. As a result, CST temperature monitoring instrumentation was installed. (reference 3.2.21) Procedural controls were put in place to maintain the temperature above 70F (3.2.20).
_ENTERGY NCALCULATION
.I:,
SHEET SHEET 13 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC- IE22-N654-1 - DEV.T 3 CALCULATION BY "i DATE " 4,310k VERIFIED BY DATE 1 7 5.0 ASSUMPTIONS 5.1 Per reference 3.1.1, the M&TE error is normally assumed to be equal to the reference accuracy of the pressure transmitter. Per 3.2.13, a Fluke 45 (+/-0.040 ma) and a pressure gage (+/-1.194" or +0.0995 ft) are used to calibrate 1E22N054C & G. The total M&TE error for this device is the SRSS of the two. Converting the ma error to ft; (0.040 ma)(40 ft / 16 ma) = 0.10 ft. The SRSS of 0.1 and 0.0995 is 0.141 ft. Since this is larger than the +0.25% (40 ft) =+-0.1 ft reference accuracy of the transmitter, the +0.141 ft value will be assumed for the M&TE error. 5.2 The published 0.5% URL seismic effect for the 1153 series B transmitters is for a 4 g peak ZPA (Ref. 3.2.6). Per reference 3.2.16, the worst ZPA experienced at Aux Building elevation 119' is 0.361g. At the 122' mounting location of the transmitters it will be conservative to assume a ZPA of 0.5g. The +0.25% URL published seismic effect for 1152 transmitters (with 3 g peak ZPA per Ref. 3.2.9) will instead be assumed because of the similarity of the sensing modules. See also reference 3.1.27 page 2-12. 5.3 Vendor documents list equipment performance data without stating the statistical basis for the numbers. Although some vendor data is "worst case", it will be assumed that all such data is a 2 sigma value. 5.4 Per reference 3.2.13 & 3.2.14, a Rosemount readout assembly is used to calibrate the Rosemount trip units. Per reference 3.2.5, the accuracy of the readout assembly is +0.01 ma which is equal to (0.01 ma)(40 ft/16 ma) = +0.025 ft and the accuracy of the trip unit is +0.2% span = 0.2% (40 ft) = +0.08 ft. However, since Ref. 3.2.13 & 3.2.14 specify a setpoint tolerance of +0.04 ma = (0.04)(40/16) = 0.1 ft, the larger +0.1 ft value will be assumed for the M&TE error. 5.5 Assume the IR effects are negligible since the cables are not located in line break areas. 5.6 Based on data in reference 3.1.12, the trip units are currently Rosemount 51ODU's. Since this model is obsolete, they may be replaced with 71ODU's in the future (Ref. 3.1.25). The performance spec for the 71 ODU is equal or better than the 51ODU. 5.7 Assume that the standby gas treatment system maintains a 2.0 in. DP between the Aux. Building and the atmosphere outside the plant (based on PDS data for T42N03 1A/B). This will be a bias term when determining LU.
_ ENTERGY fCALCULATION SHEET SHEET 14 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC- 1E22-N654-1 REV. 3 CALCULATION BY _7j" DATE Y11!7 O0 VERIFIED BY 1K DATE 5.8 For conservatism it appears that Rosemount has specified the'radiation effect error in terms of % URL instead of % span. The "true" radiation effect error for the 1153 transmitter at 0.03 5 Mrads/hr will likely be less than +/-0.25% span based on a review of Ref. 3.2.12 test data. However, a +0.5% URL effect will be assumed to maintain Rosemount conservatism. 5.9 The radiation drift effect (RD) of the transmitters will assumed to be zero since it is calibrated every 18 months. 5.1 0 A flow of 9000 gpm is assumed for the flow induced errors in sections 7.5, 7.7 & 7.8. This assumes a RCIC flow of 825 gpm and that HPCS is at 8175 gpm runout flow per Ref. 3.1.4. Although the RCIC design flow is 800 gpm (3.1.2), the actual RCIC flow is adjustable from 0 to 1000 gpm via controller 1E5IR600 (3.2.24 & 3.2.25). References 3.2.26 & 3.2.27 specify the nominal setting for the flow controller is 800 gpm. Reference 3.2.27 specifies a flow rate acceptance criteria of 800 +10 gpm using a DVM. The assumed RCIC flow of 825 gpm (810 gpm + 15 gpm instrument uncertainty allowance) is therefore conservative. 6.0 METHODOLOGY 6.1 Device Uncertainties For each module, the uncertainty terms applicable to this application will be specified and combined into the following module errors: RA - reference accuracy L - positive bias uncertainty M - negative bias uncertainty MTE - measurement and test equipment inaccuracies D - drift 6.2 Loop Uncertainties The random and bias components of: PE - errors associated with the Primary Element PM - errors in Process Measurement, and IR - errors due to degradation in Insulation Resistance will be quantified, the loop error equation given, and the device and loop uncertainties combined to produce:
CALCULATION SHEET ___ ENTERGY -, SHEET 15 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-O IE22-N654-1 REV. 3 , ,CALCULATION BY DAT 1 06 oA VERIFIED BY DATE 0 ZZ AL - SRSS of all device random uncertainties except drift LL - The sum of all positive bias uncertainties ML - The sum of all negative bias uncertainties CL - SRSS of all measurement and test equipment inaccuracies used for calibration. DL - SRSS of all drifts LU - SRSS( AL, CL, PE, PM )+IR + LL - ML 6.3 Total Loop Uncertainty The total loop uncertainty will be calculated using the Ref. 3.1.1 equation: TLU = LU + DL 6.4 Allowable Value The allowable value for the loop will be calculated using the Ref. 3.1.1 equation: AV = AL LU 6.5 Nominal Trip Setpoint The nominal trip setpoint will be calculated using the Ref. 3.1.1 equation: NTSP = AL +/- TLU 6.6 Spurious Trip Avoidance The probability of a spurious trip during normal plant operation using the Tech Spec setpoint will be evaluated using the methodology of Ref. 3.1.1 and calculated loop errors. Per Ref. 3.1.1, a 95% probability of no spurious trip is acceptable. 6.7 LER Avoidance The probability of exceeding the Tech Spec allowable value without a trip at the tech spec setpoint will be evaluated using the methodology of Ref. 3.1.1 and calculated loop errors. Per Ref. 3.1.1, a 90% probability of avoiding LERs is acceptable. Note: When considering the probability of a spurious trip, any late actuation will be conservative. Similarly, when considering the probability of an LER, any early actuation will be conservative. This means that single sided distributions are appropriate for this evaluation.
CALCULATION SHEET _ ENTERGY ,.- SHEET j16. OF 26 . CALCULATION NO. JC-01E22-N654-1 REV. 3 CALCULATION BY DATE 7JZ.7Q4 VERIFIED BY _-X&+/- DATE OS Per Ref. 3.1.1, a Z of 1.645 corresponds to a probability of 95%. Similarly, a Z of 1.28 corresponds to a probability of 90%. 6.8 Nomenclature The nomenclature of Ref. 3.1.1, Section 1.6, will be used. Errors associated with the transmitter will be subscripted with a "I", errors associated with the trip unit will be subscripted with a "2", while loop errors will be subscripted with an "L". For example, DI would be the transmitter drift, D2 would be the trip unit drift, and DL would be the loop drift. 6.9 Worst Case Loop The equipment and environments for each loop are identical; therefore, no worst case calculation is required. 7.0 CALCULATION 7.1 Transmitter Uncertainties Using the vendor data from Section 4.4: URL = 62.5 ft SPAN = 39.81 t 40 ft RAi = +/- 0.25% span
= (0.0025)*(40)
= +/- 0.100 ft Temp Effect = +/- (0.75 % URL + 0.5% span) / I OF
= +/-{(0.75%)(62.5) + (0.5%)(40)}/100F
= +/- 0.669 ft/IOOF Temperature effect will be broken into TD (65-90F per Ref. 3.1.1), TEN (90-104F, the balance of the normal range from Sec 4.2) and TEA (the additional accident range from Sec 4.2).
Therefore: TDi = (0.669)*(25/100)
= +/- 0.167 ft
ENTERGY ETGCALCULATION SHEET SHEET 17 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-Q1E22-N654-1 REV. 3 CALCULATION BY DATE "// 7!ca VERIFIED BY J*__DATE TEN, = (0.669)*(14/100)
=+/- 0.0937 ft TEA, = (0.669)*(20/100)
+/- 0.134 ft Per Ref. 3.2.6, humidity has no effect on the sealed transmitter.
HE1 = +/- 0.00 inwc Radiation Drift (normal) RDI =+/- 0.00 inwc Sec. 5.9 Accident dose = 1.35E5 rads Sec 4.2 Accident dose rate = 0.034E6 rads/hr Radiation effect (Accident) REA, = +/- 0.5% URL
= 4 (0.5%)*(62.5)
= +/-0.313 ft Per See 4.6, the worst power supply variations are -1.0 volts, +4.0 volts. For simplicity, this will be conservatively taken as +/- 4.0 volts.
PSI =+/- 0.005% span / volt variation
= +/- (0.00005)*(40 fi)*(4 volts)
=d0.008 ft Seismic Effects SE, =+0.25% URL
= +/- 0.25% (62.5 ft) 0.156 ft Overpressure is a differential pressure above the upper range limit, in this case 62.5 ft. Per Ref. 3.2.11 & 3.2.8, the CST is 31 ft high, therefore, these transmitters will not experience the overpressure effect.
OVPI = 0.000 ft
ECALCULATION SHEET SHEET 18 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-QIE22-N654-1 REV. CALCULATION BY -TLI, !5- DATE 7Zh1o* VERIFIED BY M DATE L-2& The static pressure effect is not applicable for gage pressure transmitters. SPE, = +/- 0.00 inwc Drift is specified for six months. The actual worst case calibration period is 22.5 months (Ref 3.1.1). Per Ref. 3.1.27page 2-8 the drift for each time interval can be combined using the SRSS methodology. Therefore: DR, = +/-{SQRT (22.5/6))* (0.25% URL) for 22.5 months
+/- {SQRT (3.75)1 *(0.25%)*(62.5)
= +/-0.303 ft Summarizing for the transmitter:
A] =+/- SRSS( RAI, (TENI+TEA1 ), REA1 , PSI, SEI)
= +/- SRSS{0.100, (0.0937+0.134), 0.313, 0.008, 0.156)
+/- 0.429 ft Li =+ 0.0 inwc MI =-0.0 inwc CI =O0.141 ft Assumption 5.1 DI = SRSS(DRi, TD)
= +/- SRSS(0.303, 0.167) 0.346 ft 7.2 Trip Unit Uncertainties Using the vendor values from Sec 4.5:
SPAN = 40 ft A2 = +/- 0.20% span
= +/- (0.002)*(40)
= + 0.080 ft L2 = + 0.00 inwc M2 = - 0.00 inwc C2 = +0.10 ft Assumption 5.4
i ENTERY _LA CALCULATION SHEET SHEET 19 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-QIE22-N654-1 REV. 3 ,CALCULATION BY - f5 DATE 1b..T/o VERIFIED BY JAM DATE Six months of drift allowance is included in the reference accuracy of the trip units. Since these trip units are calibrated every six months, the six month drift is equal to zero. D2 =+0.0 ft 7.3 Primary Element Accuracy PE = + 0.00 inwc (This loop does not employ a primary element) 7.4 Process Measurement Accuracy Changes in water density caused by changes in reference leg water temperature will affect the loop accuracy by causing the transmitter to sense a level that is either lower or higher than the actual level in the CST. The PM effect associated with the density changes is determined by using the following equation extracted from reference 3.1.1 Appendix B. PM = HV ((SVI/SV2) - 1) The temperature in the reference leg of the transmitters will be assumed to be between 65*F to 124°F (Ref. 3.2.1) and the calibration temperature will be 90'F (Ref. 3.2.1). HV = reference leg water height = 2.763 ft Section 4.7 SV I = specific volume at TI (90'F) = 0.016099 ft3 /lbm Ref. 3.1.28
**Calculate PM for the lower temperature range value:
SV2 = specific volume at T2 (65°F) = 0.016041 ft3 /Ibm Ref. 3.1.28 PM tubing= (2.763)((0.016099/0.016041)- 1)) = +0.001 ft
**Now calculate for the upper temperature range value:
SV2 = specific volume at T2 (124°F) = 0.016221 ft3 /lbm Ref. 3.1.28 PM tubing = (2.763)((0.016099/0.016221 )- 1)) = -0.021 ft PM tubing = + 0.001 ft, -0.021 ft
_,. ENTERGY NCALCULATION
. /..
SHEET SHEET 20 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-01E22-N654-1 REV. CALCULATION BY -rlTY DATE 7/ 016 VERIFIED BY
- DATE 6 Changes in the CST water temperature will result in level changes that are not detected by the level transmitters. The PM effect associated with the density changes is again determined by using the following equation extracted from reference 3.1.1 Appendix B.
PM = HV ((SVI/SV2) - 1) The worst case PM error would be at the 30.167 ft high alarm setpoint (3.2.17). However, for this calculation it is only necessary to consider the error at the 6.083 ft low level setpoint (3.2.8). HV = CST water level = 6.083 ft SVI = specific volume at TI (130'F) = 0.01625 ft3 /lbm Ref. 3.1.28 SV2 = specific volume at T2 (70*F) = 0.01605 ft3 /Ibm Ref. 3.1.28 PM CST = (6.083)((0.01625/0.01605)-1)) = +0.076 ft PM total = SRSS (PM tubing, PM CST)
= +SRSS(0.001, 0.076), -SRSS(0.021, 0.00)
= +0.076, -0.021 Assume PM = +0.080 ft 7.5 Friction Loss Bias For an ideal CST level measurement, the transmitter would have a dedicated sensing line with a tap near the bottom of the tank like the non-safety related CST level transmitter 1P 11 N003. This transmitter is located inside the CST dike area near the CST. Bechtel chose to locate the safety related CST level transmitters inside the aux building so that they would not have to design a means of protecting them from seismic and tornado missile hazards. Instead of providing a dedicated sensing line to the transmitters in the aux building, Bechtel chose to utilize a tap off of the 20 " HCB-9 HPCS / RCIC suction line. With zero flow, the level readings of the safety related level transmitters will be correct. With flow, the measured pressure will be less than the CST pressure due to frictional
__ENTERGY "TG
;1 CALCULATION SHEET "0/
SHEET 21 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-QIE22-N654-1 REV. 3 CALCULATION BY "TW 1 DATE "ZMTLOý6 VERIFIED BY ý AE pressure drops in the pipe. This will result in a lower level l6eing indicated (Ref. 3.1.19). Per Ref. 3.2.2 Att. 5 page 3 & 4, the friction loss error is 2.738 ft at 7115 gpm and 4.337 ft at 9000 gpm. FL = -4.337 ft Assumption 5.10 7.6 Ventilation System Bias NRC information notice IEN 97-0033 was issued to advise addressees of the potential adverse affects ventilation systems can have on level instrumentation (Ref. 3.1.N4). The level transmitters of this calculation have low pressure ports opened to the ambient pressure of area IA201 of the Aux. Building. The fuel pool area ventilation system maintains the Aux. Building at a negative pressure. This causes the level transmitters to indicate the CST level 0.7 inwc higher than it actually is based on PDS data for T42N037A/B. When the Standby Gas Treatment system is operating, the indication of the CST level by the transmitters could be 2.0 inwc (0.167 ft) higher than it actually is based on the PDS data for T42N037A/B. VNT= +0.167 ft (Ref. 4.9) 7.7 Response Time (Drawdown) Bias The suction swap to the suppression pool will be delayed because of instrument response times and valve stroke times. As a result, the level of the CST will drop below the low level trip setpoint. Per Ref. 3.2.2 Att. 5 page 3 & 4, the maximum "drawdown" effect is 0.893 ft at 7115 gpm and 1.096 ft at 9000 gpm. The minimum effect is 0.881 ft at 7115 gpm and 1.081 ft at 9000 gpm. RTmax = +1.096 ft Assumption 5.10 7.8 Vortexing Per Ref. 3.2.2 Att 5 page 3 & 4, vortexing could occur at 2.504 ft indicated level at a flow rate of 7115 gpm and 4.207 ft indicated level at 9000 gpm. Since vortexing is not desirable, the vortex height will be conservatively treated as a positive bias although the formation of a full vortex would likely result in a lower indicated pressure that would be interpreted as a level decrease (a negative bias). VTX = +4.207 ft Assumption 5.10
CALCULATION SHEET ENTERGY SHEET. 22 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-01 22-N654-1 REV. 3 CALCULATION BY "-r"&[1 DATE 7&A.-o4 VERIFIED BY 3 DATE 07&2&k 7.9 Effective Flow Induced Error The total Effective Flow Induced Error (FIE) is the sum of the Friction loss, Response Time and Vortexing errors. FIE = FL + RTmax + VTX
= -4.337 + 1.096 + 4.207
= +0.966 ft For comparison the total Effective Flow Induced Error (FIE') without the Vortexing error will also be calculated.
FIE'min = FL + RTmax at 7115 gpm
= -2.738 + 0.893
= -1.845 ft FIE'max = FL + RTmin at 9000 gpm
=-4.337 + 1.081
= -3.256 ft 7.10 Insulation Resistance Bias IR = +0.0 Assumption 5.5 7.11 Loop Uncertainties Using the equations from Ref. 3.1.1 and the values from above:
AL =A+SRSS( At, A2 )
+ SRSS( 0.429, 0.080)
+/-
- 0.436 ft LL =+ L + L2 = 0.0 inwc ML =M - M2 = 0.0 inwc CL = - SRSS(Cl, C 2)
-+/-SRSS(0.141,0.10)
-+/-0.173 ft DL = - SRSS(D1 , D2 )
- +/--SRSS(0.346, 0.0)
- 0.346 ft
NCALCULATION ENTERGY SHEET SHEET 23 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-OIE22-N654-1 REV. 3 ,CALCULATION BY _:f* DATE !/L.C*Q VERIFIED BY Jd DATE LU+ = + SRSS( AL, CL, PM, PE ) + IR + VNT + FIE
= + SRSS( 0.436, 0.173, 0.080, 0.0) + 0.0 + 0.167 +0.966
= + 0.476 + 1.133
= +1.609 ft LU. = - SRSS( AL, CL, PM, PE)
= - SRSS( 0.436, 0.173, 0.080, 0.0)
= -0.476 ft For comparison, the loop uncertainties LU'+: LU'. without the FIE error will be calculated.
LU'+ = + SRSS( AL, CL, PM, PE ) + IR + VNT
= + SRSS( 0.436, 0.173, 0.080, 0.0) + 0.0 + 0.167
+ 0.476 + 0.167
-+0.643 ft LU'. = - SRSS( AL, CL, PM, PE)
= - SRSS( 0.436, 0.173, 0.080, 0.0)
- -0.476 ft 7.12 Total Loop Uncertainty TLU+ = LU+ + DL
- + 1.609 + 0.346
= + 1.955 ft TLU. = LU. - DL
= - 0.476 - 0.346
= - 0.822 ft Without FIE error; TLU'+ = + SRSS( AL, CL, DL, PM ) + VNT
= + SRSS( 0.436, 0.173, 0.346, 0.080) + 0.167
= + 0.588 + 0.167
= +0.755 ft TLU'_ = - SRSS( AL, CL, DL PM)
= - SRSS( 0.436, 0.173, 0.346, 0.080)
= - 0.588
__ ENTIERGY ECALCULATION SHEET SHEET 24 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. J 1-OlE22-Nfi54-, REV. 3 CALCULATION BY q DATE 2. o4 VERIFIED BY I DATE 7.13 Allowable Value AV = AL + LU+
= 3.0 + 1.609
= 4.609 ft The specified allowable value will be 4.7 ft.
7.14 Nominal Trip Setpoint NTSP = AL + TLU+
= 3.0 + 1.955
= 4.955 The specified setpoint will be 5.0 ft.
The minimum CST level after the HPCS suction swap Lmin = NTSP - TLU'÷ - FIE' min = 5 - 0.755 - (-1.845) = 6.090 ft at 7115 gpm. The maximum CST level after the HPCS suction swap, Lmax = NTSP - TLU'. - FIE max = 5 - (-0.588) - 3.256) = 8.844 ft at 9000 gpm. 7.1 5 Spurious Trip Avoidance Sigmai = (1/n)
- SRSS( LU+, DL) Ref. 3.1.1 n=2 Sec 5.3 Sigmaj = (1/2)
- SRSS( 1.609, 0.346)
= 0.823 It is assumed that the minimum normal operating value of the CST would be equivalent to the C ST low level alarm (I PI IK603) of 23'-1" actual or 22'-0" indicated (Ref. 3.2.17).
XT =22.0 ft SigmaN is the standard deviation associated with XT. In this application, XT is assigned as an enveloping value and SigmaN should be set to zero. SigmaN = 0.00 Z = ABS(Tech Spec SP - XT) / SRSS(SigmaN, Sigma1 ) Ref. 3. 1.1
CALCULATION SHEET
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SHEET_.25 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-QlE22-N654-1 REV. 3 CALCULATION BY "-1l"1.' DATE27!L-(- VERIFIED BY 4 DATE
= ABS(5.0 - 22.0) / SRSS(O.00, 0.823)
= 20.656 This is above the Sec 6.6 minimum acceptable Z value of 1.645 for 95%.
7.16 LER Avoidance Sigma, = (1/n)
- SRSS (AL, CL, DL) n =2 Sigma, = (1/2)
- SRSS ( 0.436, 0.173, 0.346)
= 0.291 Z = ABS(Tech Spec AV - Tech Spec SP) / SigmaI Ref. 3.1.1
= ABS(4.7 - 5.0) 0.291
= 1.031 This is slightly below the Sec 6.7 minimum acceptable Z value of 1.28 for 90%.
However, the LER avoidance evaluation does not require the inclusion of accident or seismic effects. A new sigma' without these uncertainties will be derived and the associated Z' will be calculated. A'1 = + SRSS( RAh, TENI, PS 1)
=+/- SRSS{0.100, 0.0937, 0.008)
=+0.137 ft A' 2 =A 2 ==+0.080 ft A'L SRSS(A' , A' 2 )
= + SRSS( 0.137, 0.080) 0.159 ft Sigma', = (1/2)
- SRSS ( A'L, CL, DL)
= (1/2)
- SRSS(0.159, 0.173, 0.346)
= 0.209 Z' = ABS(Tech Spec AV - Tech Spec SP) / Sigma',
= ABS(4.7 - 5.0) / 0.209
= 1.435 This is above the Sec 6.7 minimum acceptable Z value of 1.28 for 90%.
CALCULATION SHEET ENTERGY SHEET 26 OF 26 CALCULATION NO. JC-QIE22-N654-1 REV.3 CALCULATION BY TlK")* DATE VERIFIED BY J
" 46'7 ATE
8.0 CONCLUSION
The Tech Spec setpoints and allowable values support the safety function '(are conservative with respect to the calculated values) and give adequate margin from spurious trips and LERs. Therefore, they are acceptable. The minimum CST level after the HPCS suction swap is 6.090 ft at 7115 gpm. The maximum CST level after the HPCS suction swap is 8.844 ft at 9000 gpm.
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS SYSTEM E22 LOOP NUMBERS N654C&G TOTAL LOOP UNCERTAINTY + 1.955, - 0.822 ft LOOP UNCERTAINTY + 1.609, - 0.476 ft DRIFT ALLOWANCE + 0.346 ft M&TE +/- 0.173 ft SPECIFIED (ft) CALCULATED (ft) Analytical Limit 3.0 Allowable Value 4.7 (TS) 4.609 Nominal Trip Setpoint 5.0 (TRM) 4.955}}