ML063450027
| ML063450027 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 11/03/2006 |
| From: | Tamburro P - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| %dam200701, LS-AA-104-1001, Rev 2, OC-2006-S-0379, Rev 0, TAC 8261 ECR 06-00879, Rev 0 | |
| Download: ML063450027 (96) | |
Text
- 50.59 REVIEW COVERSHEET FORM., LS-AA-104-1001 Revision 2 Page I of I Station/Unit(s): Oyster Creek Unit I Activity/Document Number: ECR 06-00879 Revision Number:. 0
Title:
Drvwell Floor/Trough/Drainage Inspection and Repairs NOTE: For 50.59 Evaluations, information on this form will provide the basis for preparing the biennial. summary report submitted to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2).
Description of Activity:
(Provide a brief, concise description of what the proposed activity involves.)
ECR 06-00879 specifies repairs to the lower drywell elevation. The joint at the perimeter of the concrete floor slab is caulked to the steel shell of the drywell. Degraded concrete around the pipes to and from the drain trough isjepaired with grout. The existing trench into the concrete slab, in bay 5, is excavate slightly deeper. The degraded concrete surface of the raised slab'in the sub-pile room is accepted as-is. The non-uniform slope of the sub-pile room drain trough is also accepted as-is.
iI Reason for Activity: ... " "
(Discuss why the proposed activity is being performed.)
Water was found in one of the 2 trenches in the drywell concrete floor slab.. Extensive study (ref. A2152754 E05) was performed to evaluate the potential causes and effects. ECR 06-00879 was created to implement repairs to limit the amount of water that would bypass the intended drainage path and enter the floor slab crevices.
Effect of Activity:
(Discuss how the. activity impacts plant operations, design bases, or safety analyses described in the UFSAR.)
ILk The specified repairs do not impact plant operations or operability. There is no deviation from any described system function, method of operation, design basis or safety analysis described in the UFSAR. The repairs will help to ensure that the drywell drainage paths function as originally intended and designed.
Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:.
(Provide justification for the conclusion, including sufficient detail to recognize and understand the essential arguments leading to the conclusion.. Provide more than a simple statement that a 50.59 Screening, 50.59 Evaluation, or a License Amendment Request, as applicable, is not required.)
A 50.59 screening was prepared, and all five questions are answered 'no". The repairs do not invalidate any stated or implied conditions of the UFSAR regarding plant SSC condition, operation or reasonfor acceptance, but rather serve to restore the intended design function of the drywell drainage system. Based on the assessment and screening responses, a 50.59 evaluation is not required, and the activity can proceed without prior NRC approval.
Attachments:
Attach all 50.59 Review forms completed, as appropriate.
(NOTE: if both a Screening and Evaluation are completed, no Screening No. is required.)
Forms Attached: (Check all that apply.)
Applicability Review X 50.59 Screening 50.59 Screening No. OC-2006-S-0379 Rev. 0 50.59 Evaluation 50.59 Evaluation No. Rev.
50.59 SCREENING FORM LS-AA-104-1003 Revision 1 Page I of 3 50.59 Screening No. OC-2006-S-0379 Rev. No. 0 Activity/Document Number. ECR 06-00879 Revision Number. 0 L. 50.59 Screening Questions (Check correct response and provide separate written response providing the basis for the answer to each question)(See Section 5 of the Resource Manual (RM) for additional guidance):
1.' Does the proposed Activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects an UFSAR _YES X NO described design function? (See Section 5.2.2.1 of the RM)
- 2. Does the proposed Activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how UFSAR YES XNO described SSC design functions are performed or controlled? (See Section 5.2.2.2 of the RM)
- 3. Dbes the proposed Activity involve an adverse change to an element of a UFSAR described YES X NO evaluation methodology, or use of an alternative evaluation methodology, that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? (See Section 5.2.2.3 of the RM)
- 4. Does the proposed Activity involve a test or experiment not described in the UFSAR, where an _YES X NO SSC is utilized or controlled in, a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the UFSAR? (See Section 5.2.2.4 of the RM) ,*"'
- 5. Does the proposed Activity require a change in the Technical Specifications or Operating YES X*NO License? (See Section 5.2.2.5 of the RM)
FI. List the documents numbers (e.g., UFSAR, where Technical Specifications, relevant information other licensing was found basis, technical, (if not identified commitments, in the response etc.) reviewed,.
to each question).
including sections See below.
II. Select the appropriate conditions:
X If all questions are answered NO, then complete the 50.59 Screening and implement the Activity per the applicable governing procedure..
If question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES and question 5 is answered NO, then a 50.59 Evaluation shall be performed.
If questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 are answered NO and question 5 is answered YES, then a License Amendment is required prior to implementation of the Activity.
If question 5 is answered YES for any portion of an Activity, then a License Amendment is required prior to implementation of that portion of the Activity.. In addition, if question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES for the remaining portions of the Activity, then a 50.59 Evaluation shall be performed for the remaining portions of the Activity.
IV. Screening Signofts: it /5106 50.59 Screener: r*. VZi. / cr- . .
Sign: ... i-n ature)d Date: &102._27/
(Print name) Ii&
'0 -/ e- ~ifA ,-P Date: _/1/ /____
50.59 Reviewer: Sign:Z igatur (Print name) I (Signature)
I A? ,tote°"A lily/u (a
50.59 SCREENING FORM LS-AA-104-1003' Revision 1 Page 2 of 3 50.59 Screening No. OC-2006-S-0379 Rev. No. 0 A ~
CL V LJT1"%J%.U11W1A 1%.T....~h... V'P" n NANQ'7O Revision Number: 0 Expanded Responses:
- 1. Does the proposed Activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects an UFSAR described design function?
No. The UFSAR contains extensive discussion on the concrete outside of, and beneath, the steel drywell shell, including the gap between the two. That is because that concrete provides important shielding and support functions, and the gap is essential to these functions. However, there is very little mention of the concrete floor slab inside of the drywell.
Section.3.8,3.1.1, "Fill Slab".states that-the-concrete provides a working surface and transfers the loads of the drywell internal structures to the shell through direct bearing. Design functions of the fill slab are not impacted by the repatrs
'perormed undrECR-06-00879. The caulk instat-ation serves to prevent water from entering any gaps between the slab and shell, and has no impact on the load transfer or support functions. Inspection of the caulk will be performed every four years under the structural monitoring program to ehsure that. it does not degrade.
The drywell sump's purpose is to collect all leakage in the drywell so that it can be monitored arid quantified, as well as appropriately discharged. The trough and its supply and discharge paths direct the drains to the sump. The concrete repairs specified serve to restore the full capability of these functions by preventing any unintended diversion of the drains. The conditions of the raised floor slab section and the trough slope were determined to have no impact on the drainage function or the structural function of the concrete. This activity will leave the two trenches empty. This empty space may slightly delay the measurement of unidentified leak rate, which is measured by the 1-8 sump. The open trenches may collect unidentified leakage and temporarily prevent the leakage from reaching 1-8 sump. This delay has been evaluated in the ECR attachment 1 and is concluded to be minor. Tech. Spec. 3.3.D. 1 requires that reactor coolant' shall be limited to a 2 gpm increase in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. Assuming a 2 gpm leak were to instantaneously develop and leak into both trenches at the same time, it would take about 30 minutes for the trenches to fill and overflow at which point the leakage would enter the 1-8 sump. In addition the Tech Spec. requires that reactor coolant shall be limited to 5 gpm. Increases over 5 gpm over a short time frame are bounded by the tech spec requirement for the 2 gpm increase over a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. Assuming a 5 gpm leak were to instantaneously develop and leak into both trenches at the samie time, it would take about 12 minutes for the trenches to fill and overflow at which point the leakage would enter the 1-8 sump.
The torus suction strainers serve the function of preventing debris from damaging the ECCS pumps. The UFSAR esection 6.3.2.2.3 describes the design analysis which ensures that excessive debris is not created such that the suction strainers could become too clogged by debris to allow sufficient flow to the pumps. That analysis was reviewed. The result of the materials (that could generate clogging debris) added and removed from the drywell by the subject ECR is a reduction in these materials. Therefore there is no adverse effect on the analysis.
usnet The 1986 removal of concrete from the floor and curb, that formed the trenches in Bay 5 and 17, does not affect any safety related design functions. A review of the Design Basis Accidents documented in chapter 15 of the UFSAR shows that the floor and curb are not credited for mitigation of design accidents. In addition it does not adversely affect the s-or-e Design Bases Anlysis of the Drywell Vessel (reference GE Report "An ASME Section VIII Evaluation of Oyster Creek Drywell for Without Sand Case Part I Stress Analysis -Index 9.3" dated Feb 1991). The effects of the missing curb will not have a significant effect on the Design Basis Accident Analysis of the Containment Shell as discussed in attachment I section 4.1.9 of the ECR.
The curb feature (which is unique to Oyster Creek) has been credited in some Severe Accident Mitigation Events.
However the overall benefit ot'-c-is marginal. The PRA implications od-the curb removal were not specifically addressed at the time the PRA was developed, which was after-H1986. u 0022 has been issued to address this omission. An initial review has been completed and the results demonstrate a less than significant impact on LERF and no impact on CDF.
The minor amount of concrete removed from the existing trench in bay 5 is in an area where it also has no impact on these functions.
Therefore the scope of ECR 06-00879 does not adversely affect any design function that is described, implied or referred to in the UFSAR.
50.59 SCREENING FORM LS-AA-104-1003 Revision I Page 3 of 3 50.59 Screening No. OC-2006-S-0379 Rev. No. 0 Activity/Document Number: ECR 06-00879 Revision Number: 0
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- 2. Does the proposed Activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how UFSAR described SSC design functions are performed or controlled?
No. All of the changes made by the subject ECR are passive in nature, and do not affect the performance or control of any plant operations or evolutions. The repairs do not impact operation of the drywell sump, drywell structures or equipment or ECCS systems. No plant processes or procedures are affected by the changes. Therefore the scope of ECR 06-00879 does not adversely affect the performance or control of any UFSAR described design function.
- 3. Does the proposed Activity involve an adverse change to an element of a UFSAR described evaluation methodology, or useof an alternative evaluation methodology, that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?
No. The design analysis for suction strainer clogging described ini the UFSAR was reviewed with regard to the materials added by the subject ECR. The net change in debris generating materials was evaluated using the existing methodology of the design analysis to establish its acceptability. There are no other evaluation methodologies involved with this activity. Therefore the evaluation methodology used within ECR 06-00879 does not deviate from those described in the UFSAR.
- 4. Does the proposed Activity involve a test or experiment not described in the UFSAR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the UFSAR?
No. The purpose of the repairs is to direct drywell drains to the sump, as described in the UFSAR. The caulk and grout serve to restore this function. The addition of the materials has been evaluated in accordance with existing analyses and processes, and was found to be acceptable. The scope of ECR 06-00879 does not affect the use or control of any plant SSC. Therefore this activity does not involve any test or experiment that is not bounded by the UFSAR.
- 5. Does the proposed Activity require a change in the Technical Specifications or Operating License?
No. The repairs in ECR 06-00879 are passive in nature and do not affect the operational parameters or operability of any plant SSC. Additionally, none of the required actions or limits for operation of the Technical Specification or Operating License are impacted by the repairs. Therefore no changes are required to the Technical Specifications or Operating License.
Documents Reviewed:
UFSAR: Overview of entire document, plus detailed review of sections 1.2, 1.9, 3.8.2, 3.8.3, 5.2.5, 6.2, 6.3, 9.3, 11.2.
Tech Spec: Overview of entire document, plus detailed review of sections 3.4, 3.5, 4.4, 4.5, 5.2.
Operating License DPR- 16: Entire Document
References:
- 1. IR 546049, Water Observed ComingInto The Trench In Bay 5 Of Drywell
ECR 06-00879 rev. 0 Attachment 1, page 1 of 9 ECR 06-00879 Rev. 0 Attachment 1 - Design Attribute Review DESIGN ATTRIBUTES (Numbers correspond to CC-AA-102 rev 13, Att. 1 list items) 4.1.4.1 IDENTIFY BASIC SSC FUNCTIONS:
The Containment is an enclosure for the reactor vessel, the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System, and other branch connections of the Reactor Coolant System.
Per UFSAR section 6.2.1, the design criteria for the Containment are as follows:
- a. To withstand the peak transient pressure (coincident with an earthquake) which could occur due to the postulated break of any pipe inside the drywell.
- b. To channel the flows from postulated pipe breaks to the torus.
- c. To withstand the force caused by the impingement of the fluid from a break in the largest local pipe or connection, without containment failure.
- d. To limit primary containment leakage rate during and following a postulated break in the primary system to substantially less than that which would result in offsite doses approaching the limiting values in 10CFR100.
- e. To include provisions for leak rate tests.
The concrete floor slab at the base of the drywell provides a foundation for the RPV support pedestal, as well as a level support surface for personnel and equipment. The slab internal to the pedestal has an additional 6"slab on top, and is therefore at a higher elevation than the slab outboard of the pedestal, with the exception of the 6" wide trough just inboard of the pedestal. Drains external to the pedestal can reach the trough (and gump) via four pipes in the base of the pedestal that connect the inboard and outboard areas. The higher slab inside of the pedestal is sloped downward from the center to shed water to the trough.
4.1,4.2 IDENTIFY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF CONFIGURATION CHANGE:
The structural support function of the concrete slab is safety related, in that it provides structural integrity for the reactor vessel and its supporting equipment. The steel drywell containment vessel is also safety related, providing the containment integrity. The concrete slab is not required to be impregnable to water, as justified in tech eval A2152754 E06*. Therefore any coatings and caulks are not safety related, and only proief ired effect of minimiizin g water infiltration into the concrete/steel shell interface. This ECR is classified as safety related, however, because the added materials come into contact with the safety related steel and concrete, and could potentially have an adverse effect on them. Accordingly, the caulking material is Augmented, "A" Qualifty.
4.1.4.3 IDENTIFY SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION OF SSC:
The steel drywell vessel and the concrete floor slab are Seismic Category I structures.
Any added coatings or caulks do not affect these seismic capabilities. Therefore there are no ýeismic qualification requirements for added coatings or caulks. The concrete/steel shell interface is not considered a seismic gap.
ECR 06-00879 rev. 0 Attachment 1, page 2 of 9 4.1.5 IDENTIFY PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Coatings and caulk shall ,not degrade or alter the strength and integrity of the steel containment vessel and the concrete floor slab. Cementitious grout has a cured compressive strength as high, or typically higher than concrete, so it will behave in the same manner as the concrete to which it is applied. This prevents the need for consideration of any new failure effects for the grout. The caulk shall be qualified to remain adhered under all potential drywell conditions identified in procedure ES-027, with the exception of jet impingement.
4.1.6 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR SURVEILANCE AND ACCEPTANCE TESTING:
The design allows for future inspections of the installed caulk as required under the ASME Section XI program.
- I 4.1.7 SPECIFICATIONS, CODES, STANDARDS, OR REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS:
Specification IS-328227-004 Rev 13, "Function Requirements for Drywell Containment Vessel Thickness Examinations".
OC Station Procedure No. 2400-SMM-3150.16, "Mixing and Placement of Grouts".
GE NEDO-32686, Rev 0, "Utility Resolution Guidance for ECCS Suction Strainer Blockage".
EP-057, "Component Record List Control".
EP-01 1, "Methodology for Assigning and Maintaining the Quality Classification of Components".
ES-027, "Environmental Parameters - Oyster Creek NGS".
4.1.8 PWR SUMP PROGRAM IMPACTS FOR BRAIDWOOD, BYRON AND TMI:
Not applicable.
4.1.9 CALCULATIONS OR DESIGN ANALYSES AFFECTED:
The effect of the missing curb will not have a significant effect on the Design Basis Accident analysis of the Containment Shell For the following reasons:
The finite element models used in the GE analysis of the containment shell has fixed boundary conditions at the base where it is supported by the concrete foundation. With the sand bed removed, this interface is modeled at the base of the sand bed region (El 8' 11 7/8") The concrete floor inside the drywell at El 10'-3" extends up to an elevation of 12' -3". The concrete floor and curbs above the bottom of the sand pocket region were not considered to provide any support to the Drywell shell.
The-themal_.yis considered that the temperaturesof-the-sel-behind the curb were lower than that of the shell exposed to the drywell atmosphere. There are two portions of the curb that have been removed, each being approximately 16 inches wide.
Cutting-this small portion of the curb will expose a portion of the shell to higher temperatures. This will have a negligible affect on the shell thermal distribution and the
ECR 06-00879 rev. 0 Attachment 1, page 3 of 9 thermal analysis stresses. A review of the GE stress report indicated that in the sandbed region the highest stress (primary & secondary) is due to load Case VI (Post -Accident condition) - Gravity, Flooded Seismic) Which is a primary stress check and does not i'ncluded the DBA accident temperature load. The load condition that includes the DBA accident temperature is Load Case V-1. This load case has a maximum primary plus secondary stress in the sandbed region, which is approximately 73 percent of the allowable stress. The Load Case V-I includes the pressure, gravity, unflooded seismic, seismic relative support displacement and temperature gradient during DBA loads. The load case would conservatively determine combined stresses because the pressure and thermal stress will not maximize simulataneously. The localrhange in the shell temperature where the curb has been removed willincrease the-thermal-stress in-a localized area but this increase is iud e~dnot ýte si nificant. The stresses are secondary an-d-localized. The event is a one time loading that has no affect on metal fatigue. Any localized change in the thermal stress can be accommodated by the existing margin to the allowable stress.
As documented in Technical Evaluations A2152754-05, the amount of potential drywell debris that could enter the ECCS suction strainers is evaluated in calculation C-1302-241-E610-081. The grout behaves as the concrete already present in the drywell, and therefore does not contribute to the potential debris. No additional debris will be created by its presence, since it provides the same surface area available for abrasion or spalling during the DBA as the concrete, and has equal or better strength than the concrete.
The caulk can become dislodged by a water jet, and therefore must be addressed as oten--al additi lebris. However, the amount of caulk added is less than tleamount of silicone foam and elastomer removed from either one of the two trenches, and the silicone material was removed from both trenches. Therefore there is rwxet icrease in mass that could clog the suction strainers. The calculation does not specifically address the silicone foam in the trenches, but rather generically includes dust, dirt, concrete and debris in typical amounts for nuclear plants. The amounts are not based on the drywell inventory specific to Oyster Creek (except for insulation), but are numbers utilized by the industry as typical. Since the caulk being added is typically installed in nuclear plants, it can reasonably be considered to be captured in the generic debris amounts utilized in the calculation. Thus, from a practical perspective, there is no net increase in the mass of material in the drywell. And from a configuration control perspective, the caulk being installed is represented in the existing mass values used in the calculation. Therefore it is not necessary to revise the numerical values of the calculation, and the calculation remains accurate to the same degree as when it was originally created. However, text is added to alert calculation users of this issue, and that the mass values are considered to include the caulk installed by this ECR.
There are additional facts that reduce the threat of suction strainer clogging from the caulk. The caulk is at the lowest level of the drywell, installed in a comer joint. The position of the recirc pumps and piping are such that a break would impinge on the caulk in a direction that would push it into the comer rather than in a direction that would tear it from-tthe-cormer. If it were to be dislodged, its position is below the downcomers such that it would have to travel upward in the drywell to reach the torus. In most line breaks,
ECR 06-00879 rev. 0 Attachment 1, page 4 of 9 flow in the drywell is downward to the downcomers, making it unlikely that'the caulk strip would be washed upward. The cured caulk has a density roughly 1.5 times that of water, making it likely that it will remain at the bottom of the drywell and not reach the torus.
In some 'areas, backer rod will need to be installed in the gap between the concrete slab
"-d-thsfh-te I to reduce the amount of caulk needed. Thie backer rod is a negligi-lBe contribution to debris. The installer estimates-that1l0' of perimeter will require its usei:,
This amount of rod weighs on the order of a few ounces, which is insignificant compared to the calculation weights of 150 pounds for dust, dirt and concrete, and 25 pounds for miscellaneous additional debris. In addition, the backer rod will float, and therefore will not get to the suction strainers to contribute to their clogging. However, it is yery unlikely that the backer rod will dislodge at all. It is a high friction, compressible material that will be wedged into the gap between the steel shell and the concrete. Any water jet or other DBA will not penetrate into this gap with any significant force, so the rod is expected to remain in its installed location under all conditions. Therefore use of the backer rod is acceptable, and no calculation changes are required to reflect its use.
4.1.10 REDUNDANCY, DIVERSITY AND SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS:
Not applicable to this modification.
4.1.11 FAILURE EFFECTS REQUIREMENTS:
As discussed above, the grout is no different than the concrete floor slab already present, so its presence does not add any new potential failure effects. It is used to restore the contour to the trough in the sub-pile room. The grout will be placed in accordance with Procedure 2400-SMM-3150.16 with adequate controls to ensure that the grout will not experience bonding failure to the existing concrete. However, if it became delaminated from the concrete substrate, it would result in localized ponding in the trough, and could potentially reach the sump. Localized ponding in the trough is not a concern, since it would not damage the remaining concrete and would allow a negligible volume of water to remain in the drywell. Any grout that reached the sump would remain on the bottom of the sump, and would not affect the operation of the sump pump.
Procedure ES-027 for the DBLOCA defines the environmental parameters inside the drywell. The caulking materials will survive the DBLOCA environmental parameters with exception of the impingement zone of influence caused by the recirculation piping in close proximity to the caulked joints. Failure of the caulk bond could result in water infiltrating the crevice between the concrete drywell floor and the steel drywell vessel.
This is acceptable, as determined in A2152754 E06*. The caulk could become dislodged and travel through the downcomers to the torus. This has been addressed in the debris analysis as discussed above. The caulk is sufficiently flexible to accommodate any movement of the drywell vessel relativie to its concrete floor"slab, and will not restrict this movement. The caulk remains flexible and will remain adhered under the expected range of relative motion, having an elongation capability of 500 to 550 percent. The caulk
ECR 06-00879 rev. 0 Attachment 1, page 5 of 9 material used has also been successfully tested to the radiation dose associated with plant life service plus accident conditions (see ECR attachments).
4.1.12 USE ATTACHMENT 2 TO IDENTIFY FIRE PROTECTION AND APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS:
All screening questions of CC-AA-102 Att. 2 are answered "no". Therefore a formal fire protection review is not required. In particular, question 1 is answered "no" based on the following reasons: The grout material is essentially concrete, and is not flammable.
The MSDS for the caulk indicates that the material has an NFPA flammability rating of zero, and that. it is not a fire hazard. Review by the fire protection program manager indicates that there is no impact to the fire protection and Appendix R safe shutdown requirements and that the amount of polyethylene backer rod material is insignificant, the material is not exposed, there is no fire source in the area, and the environment is inerted;
- 4. .13 MATERIAL AND MATERIAL SUITABILITY REQUIREMENTS:
The cementitious grout used is compatible with the wet environment of the drywell and the concrete floor slab to whichit is bonded, and 's not adversely affected by the radiation levels present. The caulkl material is designed for this type of application and has been qualified to perform satisfactorily under drywell design basis accident conditions. Furthermore, the caulking material is compatible with the DW steel shell structure and concrete structure and will not result in harmful chemical reactions to any of these structures. The backer rod is also compatible with the drywell environment, and will not react with the steel, concrete, or drywell atmosphere.
4.1.14 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND IMPACTS:
The installed materials are rated for the drywell normal and accident conditions provided in procedure ES-027. The materials are essentially inert once cured, and will.
have no effect on the drywell environment. They are not flammable and do not generate any flammable gases, with the exception of the small amotnt of backer rod added, which has been accepted in the fire protection review. This modification does not affect the temperatue, pressure or humidity of the drywell environment.
4.1.15 EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION:
These modifications do not install any equipment requiring environmental qualification, and do not affect the EQ of any existing equipment.
4.1.16 OPERATING EXPERIENCE:
These repairs are based, in part, on the past findings documented in the structural monitoring program, as discussed in the ECR introduction. The caulk applied to the drywell floor joint is the same material used successfully in this application at Peach Bottom, Turkey Point, St. Lucie, Oconee, Catawba, McGuire, and Wolsong, per the coatings consultant on site for the outage (Jon Cavallo, VP of Corrosion Control Consultants and Labs, Inc.).
4.1.17 EPIX DATABASE IMPACTS:
None.
(
ECR 06-00879 rev. 0 Attachment 1, page 6 of 9 4.1.18 PRA IMPACTS:
Although the Level 2 PRA took some credit for the curbhprobabilistically, the minor amount of concrete removed from the trench in Bay 5 is not significant enough to markedly change LERF or the conclusions of the SAMA analysis, (Ref. IR 550022). The failure probabilities for the OC liner due to core material impingement are not,..
significantly different than those for other Mark I containments where the concrete curb does not exist. Therefore there are no impacts to the PRA analysis.
4.1.19 SYSTEM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS:
The ECCS suction strainers must not become clogged to the point that theq affect the operability of the ECCS systems. The amount of installed material that could become dislodged and reach the suction strainers has been analyzed and found to be within the available margin for continued operability of ECCS systems. Also, materials installed will not affect the operption of the drywell sump pumps.
4.1.20 HUMAN FACTORS REQUIREMENTS:
Not applicable to this ECR.
4.1.21 USE ATTACHMENT 9 TO IDENTIFY PROCEDURE CHANGES:
The requirement to inspect the caulk will be added to procedure ER-OC-330-1006 for the Containment ISI program inspections IAW ASME Section XI program and is tracked under A2152754-1 1. Based on review of attachment 9 and the impact review performed, there are no other procedure impacts. ,- VI_
4.1.22 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:
None required.
4.1.23 SYSTEM INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS:*
This activity will leave the two trenches that were previously filed with a foam material empty. This empty space may slightly delay the measurement of unidentified leak rate which is measured by the 1-8 sump. The o enycollect unidentified leakage and temporarily prevent the leakage from reaching 1-8 sump. However this delay is conservatively estimated to be no more than a 30 minutes. The total empty volume of the both trench is estimated to be approximately3 aons. Tech. Spec. 3.3.D. 1 requires that reactor coolant shall be limited to a 2 gpm increasei a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. Assuming a 2 gpm leak were to instantaneously develop and leak into both trenches at the same time, it would take about 30 minutes for the trenches to fill and overflow at which point the leakage would enter the 1-8 sump.
The installed materials are primarily structural;1dcosmetic repairs, and do not interface with any other plant systems.
ECR 06-00879 rev. 0 Attachment 1, page 7 of 9 4.1.24 LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT REQUIREMENTS:
/ There are no special requirements for these modifications.
4.1.25 USE AT[ACHMENT 5 TO DETERMINE RADIATION PROTECTION/
ALARA APPLICABILITY:
Based on the responses to the attachment 5 questions, an ALARA review is required for this scope of work.
4.1.26 WALKDOWNS:
Several walkdowns and inspections were performed by engineering, planning and the work group to determine the best course of action and the preferred design solution. The walkdowns established the existing field conditions, and the installability of the intended design solutions.
4.1.27 ACCESS FOR MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, ISI, OR IST:
The design allows for future inspections of the installed caulk as required under the ASME Section XI program, and for future inspections of the trenches to determine if they contain water. The installed caulk and grout does not impede access to any plant equipment.
4.1.28 HANDLING, STORAGE, CLEANING, SHIPPING AND TRANSPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Cleaning requirements in preparation for application of the caulking material are specified in AWA #3 of this ECR.
4.1.29 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPACT:
None for this modification.
4.1.30 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS:
The MSDS for all materials should be obtained by the work group, and reviewed to determine the applicable hazards and precautions.
4.1.31 USE ATTACHMENT 6 TO DETERMINE IMPACT ON NUCLEAR FUEL, CORE COMPONENTS, CORE DESIGN, REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT, CRITICALITY CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, AND TRANSIENT AND ACCIDENT ANALYSES:
There are no impacts. The materials used are qualified for the drywell environment.
Potential creation of debris under DBA conditions has been evaluated and determined to be bounded by the existing conditions and analyses.
4.1.32 LOAD PATH REQUIREMENTS:
There are no special handling requirements for the materials used for these modifications.
4.1.33 MECHANICAL SYSTEM DESIGN LIMITS:
ECR 06-00879 rev. 0 Attachment 1, page 8 of 9 None applicable.
4.1.34 IDENTIFY CHEMISTRY REQUIREMENTS:
Chemistry has approved the materials applied by this ECR for use in the drywell.
Leachable contaminants are within the limits of this environment.
4.1.35 ELECTRICAL REQUIREMENTS:
Not applicable.
4.1.36 INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS:
Not applicable.
4.1.37 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:
Not applicable.
4.1.38 IDENTIFY CIVIL / STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS:
The repairs do not perform a structural function, but only serve to direct water to the drywell sump. The materials utilized are compatible with, and do not affect the structural integrity of the existing structural elements.
4.1.39 IDENTIFY SEISMIC / DYNAMIC QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:
Similar to the above item, the installed materials do not have a seismic function or requirements, and do not impact the seismic capabilities of existing SSC's.
4.1.40 PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS:
Personnel shall be qualified for installation of the materials specified.
4.1.41 SPECIAL PROCEDURES OR SPECIAL INSTALLATION SPECIFICATIONS:
The applicable portions of Specification IS-328227-004 rev. 13 are referred to in the work instructions of AWA #5. Unless directed otherwise within this ECR, all materials shall be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Grout is to be installed in accordance with Specification IS-551-81-6 as directed in AWA #1.
4.1.42 IDENTIFY / OBTAIN INTERFACING DEPARTMENT REVIEWS:
Interface reviews have been performed by the work group (Dave Ryan), the Venture planner (John Burt), Operations (Robin Brown), the structural monitoring program owner (Sugit Niogi), the system manager (Sylvain Schwartz), the fire protection program manager (Mark Carlson) and the ISI program manager (Greg Harttraft). The completed reviews are attached to this ECR. All identified impacts have been addressed, or have a tracking mechanism to ensure their completion.
4.1.43 USE ATTACHMENT 11 TO DETERMINE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON LICENSE RENEWAL:
This ECR directs a VT inspection of the drywell 1-8 sump pit liner and tracked under A2152754-13, which will satisfy the structural monitoring requirement for license renewal and tracked under A2152754-13. All'of-the questions of attachment 11 are
ECR 06-00879 rev. 0 Attachment 1, page 9 of 9 answered "no". The SSC's involved are not affected, and the materials installed do not perform any of the roles or functions addressed by the screening questions.
4.1.44 NEIL REQUIREMENTS:
None.
4.1.45 PERFORM A SINGLE POINT VULNERABILITY (SPV) REVIEW:
A single point vulnerability (SPV) review has been performed for this ECR to identify all events that can result in an unplanned reactor scram in a proactive manner, with the intent of taking action to prevent such events. No SPV's were identified. This ECR does not eliminate any existing SPV's, and does not create any new SPV's.
4.1.46 STEAM GENERATOR REPLACEMENTS:
Not applicable.
4.4 USE ATTACHMENT 7 TO IDENTIFY CONFIGURATION CONTROL ACTIVITIES:
In order to inspect the caulk at the drywell floor under the ISI program, it must be listed as a component in the component database (CRL). Therefore component ID NRO0\MB001-INT (system 187) has been created for the caulk.
Drawing BR 4070 sheet 1 is posted by this ECR, to show the caulk installation.
Drawing GU 3B-153-34-1000 is also posted to indicate that the silicone foam and elastomer are no longer installed in the 2 trenches (no markup required).
The silicone foam and elastomer removed from the trenches was installed under specification IS-328227-003. This document could not be located in EDMS, but the posting of the drawing (above) to indicate removal of these materials provides sufficient
'configuration control.
No drawing revision is needed for the grout repairs around the embedded pipes to and from the trough. These repairs restore the trough to its design configuration and do not affect any drawings.
Calculation C-1302-241-E610-081 is revised to indicate that the caulk material is to be considered as included in the debris tally on sheet 5 of the calculation.
4.5 USE ATTACHMENT 8 TO IDENTIFY AFFECTED PROGRAMS:
The ISI program is impacted by this ECR. Future inspection of the caulk is required, and this is implemented by revision to procedure ER-OC-330-1006 and tracked under A2152754-1 1. Furthermore, the Structures Monitoring Progam is impacted by this ECR and Procedure ER-OC-450 will-be updated as requir"d-by the program owner and will be tracked under A2152754-1 1.
- Note: This document refers to A-2-1 51-5.4.E06 jn several places and relies on its conclusions. At the time of preparation of this document, that evaluation had been prepared and reviewed, but not yet approved. Therefore its approval, with conclusions that still suppportthe infmation-in.is document, must be verified prior to closure of this document.
Evaluation A2152754 E06 has been complete without impact on this ECR
PAGE 0001 E C R Printout W NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP ASSIGNED ORG: OEDM PRINT DATE/TIME: 11/04106 13:50 ASSIGNED INDV: KESTER, PR REQUIRED DATE: 11/04/06 INITIATOR: TAMBURRO ECR STATUS: APPVD REQUEST ORG: OED STATUS DATE: 11/04/06 A/R NO:' A2152754 INIT. DATE: 10/24/06 PROJECT NO: A/R STATUS: ASIGND A/R
SUBJECT:
DRYWELL FLOOR/TROUGH/DRAINAGE INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS A. IDENTIFICATION:
SYSTEM:_ _ COMP ID: OC 1 187 F- MISC 187.
INIT OPER: Y QA CLASS: Q POTL REPT: N TECH SPEC:, Y REQD IN MODES: 1 2 3 PAGES ATTACHED: Y NO. OF PAGES: 38 ID/DATE: JDHI 11/03/06 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION and PROPOSED DISPOSITION:
RING IR21, WATER WAS DISCOVERED IN THE EXCAVATED TRENCH THE. DRYWELL ELEVATION 10'-3" FLOOR. THIS ECR WILL OVIDE FOR INSPECTION AND REPAIR OF THE DRAINAGE PROVISIONS FOR THIS FLOOR, AS WELL AS PROTECTION OF THE DRYWELL SHELL.
IN PARTICULAR, THIS ECR ADDRESSES:
1- CLEANING, INSPECTION AND REPAIR, AS NEEDED, OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM TRENCH (CONCRETE AREA UNDER REACTOR VESSEL)
INCLUDING THE ENTRANCE TO THE PIPE THAT DIRECTS THE DRAINS TO THE SUMP.
2- CLEANING AND INSPECTION OF THE DRYWELL SUMP.
3- CLEANING AND PREPARATION OF THE INTERFACE OF THE DRYWELL FLOOR AND DRYWELL SHELL, AND INSTALLATION OF A CAULKING MATERIAL INTENDED TO PREVENT WATER INFILTRATION.
4- ADDITIONAL EXCAVATION OF THE TRENCH AT BAY 5, TO ALLOW FOR FURTHER UT EXAMINATION OF THE DRYWELL SHELL, FOLLOWED BY PARTIAL GROUTING OF THAT TRENCH TO OPTIMIZE ONGOING PROTECTION OF THE DRYWELL SHELL.
NOTE: THIS ECR WAS CREATED AS A REPLACEMENT FOR ECR 06-00875, IN ORDER TO1HAVE THE ECR UNDER THE APPROPRIATE A/R.
PAGE 0002 E C R Printout NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP B. EVALUATION:
50.59 REVIEW REQD: Y ORIG 50.59 REVIEW AFFECTED: N 50.59 SE REQD: N REPORTABLE: N DATE/TIME:i STATION PROC/PROGRAM REVIEW COMPLT: CAUSE.: I FINAL OPERABILITY: COMP: SYSTEM: PLANT:
SCHED CODE/WINDW: 1R21 187 CEGO 10/21/06 ADVANCED WORK AUTH: Y FINAL DISP: RP INTERIM DISP: 4 APPROVED DISPOSITION:
AWA FOR DRYWELL FLOOR REPAIRS:
THE FOLLOWING ADIYANCED WORK AUTHORIZATIONS ARE PREPARED.
IN ACCORDANCE WITH CC-AA-103. THE WORK DESCRIBED BELOW DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN-SERVICE EQUIPMENT. THE SCOPE AND SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS DESCRIBED IN EACH SECTION BELOW.
AWA #1i - SUB-PILE ROOM (CONCRETE AREA UNDER REACTOR SSEL) TROUGH CLEANING, INSPECTION AND PARIAL REPAIR:
THE TROUGH IS THE DRAINAGE TRENCH AT THE SUB-PILE ROOM PERIMETER. THE TROUGH MUST BE THOROUGHLY CLEANED AND INSPECTED, TO DETERMINE IF REPAIRS ARE REQUIRED. ALL STANDING WATER SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE TRENCH. ALL LOOSE MATERIAL (DEBRIS, LOOSE AGGREGATE, ETC.) MUST BE REMOVED. IN PARTICULAR, ALL LOOSE OR EASILY LOOSENED MATERIAL IN THE TROUGH, AROUND THE PIPES THAT CONNECT TO THE SUMP SHOULD BE.REMOVED. DAMAGE TO ANY AREAS OF THE.
TROUGH SHOULD BE QUANTIFIED. WHERE DEPRESSIONS IN THE TROUGH FLOOR ARE VISUALLY NOTICED, PLACE A 24" LONG STRAIGHT EDGE IN THE TROUGH AND MEASURE THE DEPTH OF THE DEPRESSION. NOTIFY ENGINEERING OF THE DEPTH, EXTENT, AND LOCATION OF ANY POCKETS OR DEPRESSIONS GREATER THAN 1/4" DEEP. AT THE DRAIN PIPES FROM THE TROUGH TO THE
.SUMP, PROVIDE ENGINEERING WITH MEASUREMENTS OF DEPTH, WIDTH AND HEIGHT OF ANY CONCRETE DAMAGE. AT THE FOUR PIPES THAT PASS WATER FROM OUTSIDE OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM, NOTE AND INFORM ENGINEERING OF THE BOTTOM ELEVATION OF THE PIPE RELATIVE TO THE BOTTOM SURFACE OF THE TROUGH (E.G. PIPE BOTTOM IS 3/8" LOWER THAN BOTTOM OF TROUGH).
GROUT REPAIRS CAN BE PERFORMED TO THE AREA AROUND THE PIPES TO THE SUMP AND THE PIPES FROM OUTSIDE THE SUB-PILE ROOM TO INSIDE, AS NEEDED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH "ECIFICATION OCIS 551-81-6 (AS A STRUCTURAL REPAIR).
JE A STERFLOW 713 PLUS" OR "MASTERFLOW 928" SHALL BE
'TSED FOR THE REPAIRS (SAFETY RELATED MATERIAL), AND IT SHALL BE MIXED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANUFACTURER'S INSTRUCTIONS RATHER THAN THOSE IN THE SPECIFICATION.
TEST CUBE SAMPLES DO NOT NEED TO BE TAKEN AS DIRECTED IN THE SPECIFICATION, SINCE THIS APPLICATION DOES NOT
PAGE 0003 E C R Printout NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP APPROVED / DISPOSITION:
RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CURED GROUT.
BASED ON A PRELIMINARY INSPECTION BY SAM MARKOS, THE AREAS WHERE A GROUT REPAIR IS DEFINITELY REQUIRED AROUND THE DRAIN PIPE ARE: BOTH PIPES TO THE SUMP, AT THE POINT WHERE THEY EXIT THE TROUGH, AND THE INBOARD SIDE OF THE PIPE THROUGH THE PEDESTAL WALL, AT AZIMUTH .270.
THESE THREE PIPES REQUIRE REMOVAL OF ALL LOOSE MATERIAL AROUND THE PIPE, DOWN TO CLEAN, SOLIDLY SECURED AGGREGATE. THE.AREA MUST BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATION GROUTING PROCEDURE PRIOR TO GROUTING..
CARE MUST BE TAKEN NOT TO CREATE ANY BLOCKAGES TO-FLOW THAT WOULD CREATE STANDING WATER IN THIS AREA. OTHER REPAIRS ,TO THE TRENCH WILL BE SPECIFIED BY ENGINEERING FOLLOWING PEVIEW OF THE DATA PROVIDED.
THE ABOVE SCOPE OF WORK DOES NOT ALTER THE DESIGN OR FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT SSC. CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS. ANY GROUT REPAIRS SERVE TO RESTORE THE AFFECTED SSC TO ITS INTENDED DESIGN CONDITION.
OORDINATION WITH THE OCC IS IMPERATIVE TO MAINTAIN THE I OUGH AREA DRY DURING THE REPAIR AND CURING PROCESSES.
AWA #1*PREPARED BY: P. KESTER REVIEWED BY: DANFIORELLO AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS SCOPE IS PROVIDED TO GEORGE SEVCIK:
(OWP) BY HOWIE RAY (SMDE DESIGNEE FOR S. HUTCHINS)
(SMDE) ON 10/24/06, 12:00.
AWA #2 - DRYWELL SUMP CLEANING AND INSPECTION:
THE DRYWELL SUMP COULD BE A SOURCE OF WATER INFILTRA-TION INTO THE CONCRETE. THE SUMP INTERIOR SHOULD BE DRAINED AND CLEANED SO THAT THE STAINLESS STEEL LINER CAN BE INSPECTED FOR FLAWS OR DAMAGE. TEMPORARY DAMMING SHOULD BE PLACED TO PREVENT WATER.FROM ENTERING THE SUMP UNTIL THE INSPECTION IS COMPLETE. THE SUMP SHOULD BE CLEANED SUFFICIENTLY SUCH THAT A VT-I INSPECTION OF THE INTERIOR SURFACES OF THE SUMP LINER CAN BE PERFORMED.
THE RESULTS OF THE INSPECTION SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO ENGINEERING. IF ANY FLAWS ARE FOUND, REPAIRS WILL BE SPECIFIED ACCORDINGLY,.
THE ABOVE SCOPE OF WORK DOES NOT ALTER THE DESIGN OR
~NCTION OF ANY PLANT SSC. CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE UTINE TASKS.
AWA #2 PREPARED BY: P. KESTER REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS.SCOPE IS PROVIDED TO GEORGE SEVCIK (OWP) BY HOWIE RAY (SMDE DESIGNEE FOR S. HUTCHINS)
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(SMDE) ON 10/24/06, 12:00.
AWA #3 - DRYWELL FLOOR-TO-SHELL INTERFACE CLEANING, PREP FOR CAULKING:
A BEAD OF CAULK WILL BE APPLIED TO THE DRYWELL SHELL WHERE IT MEETS THE CONCRETE STEPPED CURBING A*OUND THE PERIMETER OF THE CONCRETE DRYWELL FLOOR SLAB AT "9 ELEVATION 10'-3". THE SCOPE OF THIS AWA IS THE CLEANING AND PREPARATION OF THE CONCRETE AND STEEL SURFACES FOR CAULKING, BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE INSTALLATION OF THE CAULKING. ALL DEBRIS AND LOOSE CONCkETE SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE INTERRFACE. HAND tOdLS (DENTIST PICK, SMALL WIRE BRUSH; CHIPPING HAMMER, ETC.) AND A VACUUM SHOULD BE USED. THE CONCRETE SURFACE IS REPORTED TO BE SUFFICIENTLY ROUGH FOR ADHESION OF THE CAULK, AND THEREFORE MAY NOT REQUIRE ROUGHENING. THIS SHOULD BE ASSURED BY INSPECTION. A BAND OF AT LEAST 1" WIDTH OF CONCRETE ADJACENT TO THE DRYWELL SHELL SHOULD BE ASSURED TO HAVE A ROUGHNESS EQUIVALENT TO 60 GRIT SANDPAPER, OR OUHE. THE STEEL SURFACE SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR A NOF AT LEAST I" ADJACENT TO THE CONCRETE. ANY LOOSE POORLY ADHERED MATERIAL SHOULD BE REMOVED USING HAND TOOLS SUCH AS A STIFF BRUSH, A PUTTY KNIFE OR SCOTCH-BRITE TO SSPC-SP 2 STANDARD. WELL ADHERED COATINGS DO NOT NEED TO BE REMOVED...
THE ABOVE SCOPE OF WORK DOES NOT ALTER THE DESIGN OR FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT SSC. CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS.
AWA #3 PREPARED BY: P. KESTER REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS SCOPE IS PROVIDED TO GEORGE SEVCIK (OWP) BY HOWIE RAY (SMDE DESIGNEE FOR S. HUTCHINS)
(SMDE) ON 10/24/06, 12:00.
AWA #4 - EXCAVATE ADDITIONAL CONCRETE FROM THE BAY #5 TRENCH MORE OF THE DRYWELL SHELL MUST BE EXPOSED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE BAY #5 TRENCH TO FACILITATE ADDITIONAL DRYWELL SHELL UT MEASUREMENTS. THE BAY #5 TRENCH IS IN THE DRYWELL ELEV 10'-3" FLOOR SLAB, IN THE BAY #5 REGION, ADJACENT TO THE DRYWELL SHELL.
CONCRETE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE BAY #5 TRENCH SHALL EEXCAVATED AS REQUIRED TO EXPOSE AN ADDITIONAL 3-1/2" (+/-) BAND OF THE DRYWELL SHELL. THE BAND SHALL BE ACROSS THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE TRENCH.
EXTREME CARE SHALL BE EXERCISED TO AVOID DAMAGE
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/
(NICKS, CUTS, SCRAPES) TO THE DRYWELL SHELL.
ALSO NOTE THAT A VERTICAL STEEL PLATE STIFFENER (APPROX 1" THICK) IS EMBEDDED IN THE CONCRETE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE BAY #5 TRENCH. THE STIFFENER PLATE IS PARALLEL TO THE DRYWELL SHELL AND APPROXIMATELY 7" FROM THE SHELL. A PORTION OF THE TOP EDGE OF TIIS PLATE IS EXPOSED IN THE EXISTING TRENCH EXCAVATION. EXTREME CARE SHALL BE EXERCISED TO AVOID DAMAGE (NICKS, CUTS,,
SCRAPES) TO THIS STIFFENER PLATE.
ALL WORK SHALL BE DONE WITH HAND TOOLS.
ALL MATERIAL REMOVED SHALL BE QUARANTINED FOR FURTHER INSPECTION/TESTING AS REQUIRED.
DOCUMENT THE FINAL CONFIGURATION OF THE TRENCH (DEPTH AND WIDTH) AFTER THE EXCAVATION. FORWARD THIS INFORMATION TO THE PROJECT ENGINEERING TEAM (ATTENTION:
HOWIE RAY).
kDIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHS SHALL BE TAKEN OF THE NEWLY POSED DRYWELL SHELL IMMEDIATELY AFTER.EXCAVATION IS MPLETE. DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHS SHALL ALSO BE TAKEN OF THE SURFACE OF THE EXCAVATED CONCRETE THAT WAS ADJACENT TO THE DRYWELL SHELL. ALL DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHS FILES SHALL ,Bt' TRANSMITTED TO THE PROJECT ENGINEERING TEAM (ATTENTION: HOWIE RAY).
THE SCOPE OF THIS AWA DOES NOT ALTER OR IMPACT THE FUNCTIONOF ANY PLANT SSC'S.
AWA PREPARED BY: DP KNEPPER - PEDM AWA REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS SCOPE IS PROVIDED TO JIM HEARNS (OWP) BY HOWIE RAY (SMDE DESIGNEE FOR S. HUTCHINS)
(SMDE) ON 10/24/06, 18:00.
AWA #5 - CAULK DRYWELL SHELL-TO-CONCRETE FLOOR JOINT:
AT THE OUTBOARD PERIMETER OF THE ELEV. 10'-3"1 DRYWELL FLOOR, THE CONCRETE SLAB MEETS THE DRYWELL SHELL. THIS INTERFACE HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR CAULKING UNDER AWA #3.
THE CAULK WILL BE APPLIED TO THAT JOINT UNDER THIS AWA.
SE CAULK SHALL LAP ONTO THE CONCRETE AND STEEL SURFACES 1/4" TO 3/4" ON EACH SURFACE.
E CAULK IS TO FOLLOW THE CONCRETE-TO-STEEL INTERFACE, FOLLOWING THE CHANGES IN CURB ELEVATION (INCLUDING THE SIDES AND TOPS OF THE CURBS), AND THE DIPS INTO THE TWO TRENCHES. THE BAY 5 TRENCH SHOULD NOT BE CAULKED UNTIL ALL NDE WORK IS
PAGE 0006.
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COMPLETED, BUT.PRIOR TO RECOATING THE STEEL. TECHNICAL EVALUATION A2152754-5 IS BEING DEVELOPED TO DOCUMENT THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THIS AWA, AND PROVIDE' A DETAILED SKETCH OF THE CAULK CONFIGURATION ALONG WITH MANUFACTURERS INSTRUCTIONS. THE CAULKING MATERIAL SHALL BE THIOKOL 2235M BY POLYSPEC. THEJINSTALLATION OF THE CAULKING MATERIAL IS ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED THATCAULKING MATERIAL IS QUALIFIED TO BE USED INSIDE THE DRYWELL AS AUGMENTED QUALIFY, QA CLASS "A" OR BETTER. THE SURFACE PREPARATION SHALL BE AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #3 OF THIS ECR, AND INSTALLATION SHALL BE IAW THE MANUFACTURER'S INSTRUCTIONS (EXCEPT.THATI PRIMER, BACKER ROD AND BOND BREAKER TAPE ARE NOT REQUIRED). Q) VERIFICATION IS '
REQUIRED FOR PREPARATION (PER AWA #3 OF THIS ECR) AND INSTALLATION (MIXING, POT LIFE, APPLICATION). DBA QUALIFICATION OF THE CAULK IS BEING FINALIZED.
WORK SCOPE:
1- PERFORM UT OF DRYWELL SHELL IN THE BAY 5 TRENCH AFTER ADDITIONAL EXCAVATION DESCRIBED IN AWA #4 HAS BEEN MPLETED. UT SCOPE IS SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED IN CTION 3.2.6 OF SPECIFICATION IS-328227-004 REV. 13, BUT R THE NEWLY EXPOSED STEEL AREA IN THE TRENCH (REF. AWA*
- 4).
2- CLEAN/PREP STEELAND CONCRETE SURFACES FOR CAULKING AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #3 3- INSTALL CAULKING AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. FINISHED CAULK SHOULD FORM A CONTINUOUS BARRIER AROUND THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF THE CONCRETE FLOOR, WHERE IT MEETS THE STEEL DRYWELL SHELL.
4- NDE SHALL PERFORM A PSI (PRE-SERVICE INSPECTION VT3) OF THE FINAL CAULK CONFIGURATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME SECTION XI REPAIR/REPLACEMENT PROGRAM.
5- RECOAT THE DRYWELL SHELL SURFACE IN BOTH THE BAY 5 AND BAY 17 TRENCHES AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 3.2.2.4.3 OF SPECIFICATION IS-328227-004 REV. 13.
THIS AWA DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN-SERVICE EQUIPMENT.
AWA #5 PREPARED BY: P. KESTER REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS SCOPE IS PROVIDED TO JOHN BURT (VENTURE) BY F.H. RAY (SMDE DESIGNEE FOR S. HUTCHINS)
(SMDE) ON 10/25/06, 13:30.
TE REVISION OF THE ABOVE AWA #5: THE MAXIMUM LAP NGTH OF THE CAULK ONTO THE CONCRETE AND STEEL HAS EEN REDUCED FROM I" TO 3/4" TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL ADDED TO THE DRYWELL.
AS REVIEWER OF THE ORIGINAL AWA, I HAVE REVIEWED AND AGREE WITH THE REVISED LAP LENGTH DAN FIORELLO
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CHANGE APPROVED ON 10/26/06 AT 07:00 BY HOWIE RAY.
JOHN BURT WAS NOTIFIED BY DAVE KNEPPER, AND A MARKED-UP S'KETCH REFLECTING THE CHANGE WAS PROVIDED TO HIM. .
REVISION 2 TO THE AWA #5:
AWA #5 AND ITS REVISION PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS TO CAULK SXJFACES BETWEEN THE DRYWELL VESSEL PLATE AND THE CONCRETE IN THE.TWO TRENCHES. AWA #5 USED MASTERFLOW 928 GROUT MATERIAL. TO APPLY THE CAULK THE SURFACES MUST BE DRY. HOWEVER THE SURFACE AT
,.THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH IN BAY 5 AND THE SEAM BETWEEN THE CONCRETE AND STEEL ARE MOIST EVEN AFTER APPLYING MASTERFLOW 928. THEREFORE, THE CAULK CANNOT BE APPLIED. IF THIS CONDITION CONTINUES TO EXIST, PREPARE THE SURFACES AND INSTALL THE MINIMUM ALLOWED LAYER 1/2 INCH AND MAXIMUM 2 INCH OF GROUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AWA #1. THE GROUTING MATERIAL SHALL BE "747 RAPID-SETTING GROUT" d FACTURED BY BASF AND MIXING SHALL BE PLASTIC ACHIEVE A FINAL SETTING TIME OF 80 MINUTES. THE OF GROUT SHALL BE INSTALLED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH AT MOIST SURFACES OVER EXISTING MASTERFLOW 928 HAVE BEEN PLACED WHERE CONCRETE MEETS THE DRYWELL' VESSEL. THE PURPOSE OF THE ADDITIONAL LAYER OF 747 RAPID-SETTING GROUT IS TO COVER THE MOIST AREAS TO ALLOW PROPER APPLICATION OF THE CAULK. WAIT A MINIMUM OF 80 MINUTES FOR THE GROUT TO SET BEFORE APPLYING ANY CAULK. THIS GROUT DOES NOT PERFORM ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. THE REQUIRED STRENGTH IS MINIMAL AND IS PLACED TO FORM A SUITABLE SURFACE FOR CAULK. THE MATERIAL WILL BE CONFIRMED TO BE SET BEFORE APPLICATION OF THE CAULK. THEREFORE, THE MATERIAL MAY BE COMMERCIAL GRADE.
THIS AWA AND ITS REVISIONS DO NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT. CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS.
AWA #5, REVISION 2 PREPARED BY: NIOGI, SUJIT (PIMS INPUT BY DJF)
REVIEWED BY: DAN FIOkELLO IS AWA REVISION 2 IS APPROVED BY F. H. RAY OR S. HUTCHINS (SMDE)
THIS AWA #5, REVISION 2 IS PROVIDED TO DAVE RYAN AT 18:45 11/02/06 BY F.H. RAY END OF AWA #5, REVISION 2
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AWA #5 REVISION 3 BASED ON THE LATE DELIVERY OF THE 747 GROUT, IT IS PERMISSABLE TO USE THE BASF MASTERFLOW 928 GROUT. PER'THE MANUFACTURE PRODUCT DATA SHEET, MASTERFLOW 928 WILL REACH A FINAL SET IN 4 HOURS. THE CONSISTANCY' OF THE 928 SHOULD BE MIXED TO PLASTIC CONSISTANCY. PER TELEPHONE WITH THE TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE OF POLYSPEC THE MANUFACTURER OF THIOKOL 2235M THE CAULK CAN BE APPLIED AFTER THE GROUT REACHES THE FINAL SETý REVISION 3 TO AWA #5 AUTHORIZES THE USe OF MASTERFIOW 928. THE MINIMUM THINKNESS OF THE APPLICATION NEEDS'T6 BE CONSISTANT WITH THE EARLIER GUIDANCE FOR MASTERFLOW 928.
AWA #5 REVISION 3 PREPARED BY J. HALLENBECK REVIEWED BY:NIOGI, SUJIT THIS AWA REVISION 3 IS APPROVED BY:MAKAR, JOHN haS AWA #5 V 3, 2006 REVISION 3 IS PROVIDED TO DAVE'RYAN AT: 12:05 END OF AWA #5 REVISION 3 AWA #6 - USE OF BACKER ROD BEHIND CAULK JOINT:
SCOPE OF AUTHORIZED WORK:
BASED ON THE SIZE OF THE GAP BETWEEN THE DRYWELL CONCRETE FLOOR SLAB AND THE STEEL DRYWELL SHELL, IT IS DESIRED TO INSTALL BACKER ROD IN SOME AREAS TO MINIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF CAULK NEEDED. THE BACKER ROD IS A POLYETHYLENE MATERIAL (204-07780) THAT WILL BE COVERED BY THE CAULK, AND THEREFORE WILL NOT BE EXPOSED.
THE INSTALLER ESTIMATES THAT 10' OF PERIMETER WILL REQUIRE ITS USE. THIS AMOUNT OF ROD WEIGHS ON THE ORDER OF A FEW OUNCES. RELATIVE TO THE MATERIAL WEIGHTS IN THE SUCTION STRAINER CLOGGING CALCULATION, THE WEIGHT IS INSIGNIFICANT COMPARED TO THE CALCULATION WEIGHTS OF 150 POUNDS FOR DUST, DIRT AND CONCRETE, AND 25 POUNDS FOR MISCELLANEOUS ADDITIONAL DEBRIS. IN ADDITION, THE BACKER ROD WILL EITHER FLOAT , OR MELT AND FLOWN DOWN ROUGH THE GAP BETWEEN THE CONCRETE AND THE STEEL SHELL EXPOSED.TO EXTREME TEMPERATURE. THEREFORE, THE BACKER ROD WILL NOT GET TO THE SUCTION STRAINERS TO CONTRIBUTE THEIR CLOGGING.
PRIMARILY, THOUGH, THE BACKER ROD WILL BE WEDGED INTO THE GAP BETWEEN THE SHELL AND THE CONCRETE, AND IS THEREFORE VERY UNLIKELY TO BE DISLODGED BY ANY DBA IN THE DRYWELL.
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MARK CARLSON AND TIM TRETTEL WERE CONSULTED FOR FIRE PROTECTION CONCERNS, AND THEY INDICATED THAT BASED ON THE AMOUNT AND THE LOCATION, USE OF THE BACKER ROD IS ACCEPTABLE WITH REGARD TO FIRE LOADING ADDED.TO THE DRYWELL. THEREFORE AUTHORIZATION IS GIVEN.TO UTILIZE BACKER ROD IN THIS APPLICATION.
PREPARED BY: P. KESTER CHANGES TO THE ABOVE AWA WERE MADE BY THE REVIEWER BASED ON THE PREPARER INPUT.
AS STATED IN CC-AA-103, THIS WORK IS BEING PERFORMED AT RISK AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT.
THIS AUTHORIZATION IS GIVING TO TOM BADDERS, VENTURE PLANNING..
INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWED BY S. MARKOS IS AWA HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY THE OC SDEM HUTCHINS, ON 10/26/06 @ 20:27 END OF AWA # 6 AWA #7'-' REPAIR OF VOID IN THE TROUGH ADJACENT TO SUMP 1-8:
SCOPE OF WORK:
WALK DOWN BY WILLIAMS COATING INC. REVEALED THAT APPROXIMATELY 4 INCH WIDE VOID EXIST IN THE TROUGH ADJACENT TO THE SUMP 1-8. ALSO IT APPEARS THAT A FOREIGN GLASS OBJECT IS LODGED IN TO THE VOID. THE OBJECT SHALL BE REMOVED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BY BREAKING IT IN TO SMALL PIECES AND VACUUM CLEANING THE BROKEN GLASS PIECES. ALL PIECES SHALL BE RETAINED FOR.LATER EVALUATION. AFTER REMOVING THE BROKEN GLASS-PIECES THE VOID SPACE SHALL FILLED WITH GROUT WITH "MASTERFLOW 713 PLUS" OR "MASTERFLOW 928". THIS HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR APPLICATION IN THE DRYWELL PER AWA #1.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS':
U THE STEPS FOR CLEANING, SURFACE PREPARATION, MIXING PLACEMENT OF GROUT SHALL BE AS DELINEATED IN AWA #1 MANUFACTURER INSTRUCTIONS SHALL BE FOLLOWED. IF -
THE VOID IS MORE THAN 2" WIDE, 33% BY WEIGHT OF CLEAN, DAMP 3/8" PEA GRAVEL MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF ASTM C33 MAY BE ADDED TO THE MIXTURE. SEVENTEEN POUNDS OF PEA GRAVEL SHALL BE ADDED TO EVERY 50 POUNDS OF GROUT.
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GROUT AND PEA GRAVEL SHALL BE AT ROOM TEMPERATURE (APPROXIMATELY 70 DEGREES F). THE GROUT MIXTURE SHALL BE COMPACTED WITH A STEEL ROD OR SIMILAR DEVICE TO ELIMINATE VOIDS AND CONSOLIDATE THE GROUT MIXTURE AS IT BEING PLACED IN THE VOID.
THE AWA DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT.
CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS. ANY GROUT REPAIRS SERVE TO RESTORE THE AFFECTED SSC TO ITS INTENDED DESIGN CONDITION.
AWA #7 PREPARED BY S. NIOGI. ,
REVIEWED BY: P. TAMBURkO AND DAN FlOR!ELLO THIS AWA IS APPROVED BY F.H. RAY FOR S. HUTCHiNS (SMDE)
THIS AWA IS PROVIDED TO G. SEVCIK AND B. MAZE AT 1930 ON 10/28/06 BY F.H. RAY.
ENSURE ALL DEBRIS REMOVED FROM THE VOID IN THE CONCRETE TROUGH IS RETAINED FOR LATER EVALUATION. *
- ******************E*****1 TO AWA #7****************
ITEREVISION OF THE AWA #7: IF THE WIDTH OF THE VOID IS 2 INCHES OR SMALLER PEA GRAVEL IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE ADDED TO THE GROUT MIXTURE.
REVISION 1 TO AWA #7 IS PREPARED BY SUJIT NIOGI REVISION I TO AWA #7 WAS REVIEWED BY DAN FIORELLO AWA 7, REVISION 1 AUTHORIZATION:
THIS AWA IS APPROVED BY F.H. RAY FOR S. HUTCHINS (SMDE)
AND I PROVIDED TO D. RYAN AND J. BURT AT 1100 ON 10/30/06 BY F.H. RAY.
AWA #8 - SEALING TRENCH IN BAY 5
.SCOPE OF WORK' AWA #5 PROVIDES INSTRUCTIONS TO CAULK SURFACES BETWEEN THE DRYWELL VESSEL PLATE AND THE CONCRETE IN THE TWO TRENCHES. TO APPLY THE CAULK THE SURFACES MUST BE DRY.
HOWEVER THE SURFACE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH IN BAY 5 AND THE SEAM BETWEEN THE CONCRETE AND STEEL ARE
~IST. THEREFORE THE CAULK CANNOT BE APPLIED.
THIS CONDITION CONTINUES TO EXIST, PREPARE THE URFACES AND INSTALL THE MINIMUM ALLOWED LAYER (1 INCH)
OF GROUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AWA #1. THE LAYER OF GROUT SHALL BE INSTALLED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH AT MOIST SURFACES WHERE EXISTING CONCRETE MEETS THE DRYWELL VESSEL. THE PURPOSE OF THE LAYER OF GROUT IS TO COVER
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THE MOIST AREAS TO ALLOW PROPER APPLICATION OF THE CAULK. WAIT A MINIMUM OF 24 HOURS FOR THE GROUT TO CURE.-
APPLY THE CAULK ON DRY SURFACES BETWEEN THE GROUT AND THE STEEL VESSEL AND OVER LAP THE AREAS WHERE OTHER CAULKING HAS ENDED.
THE AWA,."DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT.
CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS. ANY GROUT REPAIRS SERVE TO RESTORE THE AFFECTED SSC TO ITS INTENDED CONFIGURATION.
AWA #8 PREPARED BY P. TAMBURRO REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO THIS AWA IS APPROVED BY F.H. RAY FOR S. HUTCHINS (SMDE)
HIS AWA IS PROVIDED TO DAVE RYAN AT 1600 10/30/06 BY H. RAY.
END OF AWA 8 AWA #9- LEAK TEST OF TROUGH INSIDE THE PEDESTAL, EL.10'-9" UNDER VESSEL SCOPE OF WORK THE TROUGH IS APPROXIMATELY 811 DEEP AND LOCATED INSIDE THE REACTOR SUPPORT PEDESTAL AT EL.10'-9".
THERE ARE FOUR 4" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVES AT 90 DEGREES APART THROUGH THE 4 FEET REACTOR PEDESTAL WALL FOR DRAINING WATER FROM DRYWELL FLOOR EL. 10' -3" TO THE TROUGH. THE INVERT ELEVATION OF THE 4" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVE IS 10'-3". THE TROUGH IS CONNECTED TO THE SUMP 1-8 BY TWO 2" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVES. THE INVERT ELEVATION OF THE 2" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVE IS 10'-i 1/4".
THIS AWA #9 PROVIDES THE INSTRUCTIONS TO PLUG THESE SIX SLEEVES (FOUR 4" DIAMETER AND TWO 2" DIAMETER).
THE SLEEVES CAN BE PLUGGED USING TAPERED SILICONE RUBBER PLUGS, MCMASTER-CARR CATALOG PART NO.
77K75 FOR 4" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVES (FOUR REQUIRED)
MCMASTER-CARR CATALOG PART NO. 9277K79 FOR 2" IAMETER PIPE SLEEVES (TWO REQUIRED). THESE PLUGS SHALL BE INSERTED FROM INSIDE THE PEDESTAL IN TO THE PIPE SLEEVES. AFTER THE PLUGS ARE INSERTED IN TO THE SLEEVES THE SURFACE AROUND THE PLUGS BETWEEN THE PIPE SLEEVE AND THE PLUG SHALL BE COVERED WITH DUCT TAPE OR
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EQUAL AS APPROVED BY THE CHEMISTRY AND OPERATION DEPARTMENT. THE SURFACES MUST BE DRY BEFORE THE TAPE IS APPLIED ALTERNATE TYPE PLUGS AS APPROVED BY ENGINEERING MAY BE UTILIZED IF REQUIRED.
BEFORE FILLING THE TROUGH WITH WATER, USING A THIN STEEL NARROW RULER OR THIS NARROW FLAT BAR (OR EQUIVALENT)
TO VERIFY THAT NO ADDITIONAL VOIDS EXIST IN THE TROUGH *.
THAT COULD ADD TO THIS LEAKAGE PATH.
IF SIGNFICANT VOIDS ARE DISCOVERED, REPAIR USING GROUT.
REPAIR STEPS FOR CLEANING, SURFACE PREPARATION, MIXING AND PLACEMENT OF GROUT SHALL BE AS DELINEATED IN AWA #1 AND MANUFACTURER INSTRUCTIONS SHALL BE FOLLOWED.
IF REPAIR BY GROOT IS PERFORMED, ALLOW 24 HRS FOR CURING PRIOR TO PLUGGING THE DRAIN HOLES OR PERFOMING THIS PMT TEST OF THE SUBJECT TROUGH.
WATER IN BAYS 15 AND 17 TRENCHES SHOULD BE VACUUMED OUT.
FILL THE TROUGH WITH WATER AT LEAST 7" DEEP AND MONITOR THE HEIGHT OF THE WATER FOR TWO HOURS AND CAREFULLY RECORD THE DEPTH. REFILL THE TROUGH WITH IATER TO 7" HEIGHT IF ANY WATER IS LOST DURING THE FIRST WO HOURS. AFTER THE TROUGH IS REFILLED, MEASURE THE IGHT OF WATER EVERY ONE HOUR FOR NEXT FOUR HOURS.
THE HEIGHT OF WATER SHALL BE MEASURED AT 90 DEGREE DISTANCES APART USING THE EXACT LOCATIONS EACH TIME.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA - THE LEVEL AFTER 4 HOURS SHALL NOT HAVE DROPPED MORE THAN 1/4 INCH WITH A MEASURING ACCURACY OF, 1/16 INCH THE AWA DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT.* CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS. ALL PLUGS AND THE TAPE SHALL BE REMOVED AFTER THE LEAK TEST AND THE AFFECTED AREA OF THE SSC SHALL BE RESTORED TO ITS INTENDED CONFIGURATION.
THIS AUTHORIZATION IS GIVEN TO TOM BADDER OF VENTURE PLANNING.
AWA #9 PREPARED BY NIOGI, SUJIT REVIEWED BY: P. TAMBURRO THIS AWA IS APPROVED BY SP HUTCHINS (SMDE)
IS AWA IS PROVIDED TO DAVE RYAN AT o0 11/01/06 BY.
.H. RAY REVISION 1 TO AWA 9 NOTE THAT REVISION 1 TO AWA 9 CHANGED THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA TO A DROP IN WATER LEVEL OF 1/4 INCH WITH A
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/
MEASURING ACCURACY OF 1/16 INCH. THE PURPOSE OF THE TEST IS CHECK FOR ANY GROSS LEAKAGE FROM THE TROUGH THROUGH CRACKS AND VOIDS. THERE WILL BE SOME LOSS OF WATER THROUGH EVAPORATION. ALSO SINCE CONCRETE IS PERMEABLE, THERE WILL BE SOME LOSS OF WATER THROUGH SEEPAGE INTO THE SOUND CONCRETE.
REVISION 1 TO AWA 9 PREPARED BY: DAN FIORELLO REVISWION 1 TO AWA 9 REVIEWED BY PETE TAMBURRO THIS AWA REVISION HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO DAVE RYAN AND JOHN BURT AT 15:00 ON 11/2/2006 BY F.H. RAY.
REVISION 1 TO AWA 9 APPROVED BY: F.H.
RAY FOR S. HUTCHINS AS SMDE.
END OF AWA #9 REVISON 2 TO AWA #9 OR BETTER ALARA PRACTICE: WATER LEVEL IN THE TROUGH AT WILL BE MARKED ON THE REACTOR PEDESTAL WALL AT ONE
-A CAMERA WILL BE FIXED ON THE MARK TO FACILITATE MONITORING OF THE TROUGH WATER LEVEL WITH RESPECT TO THE LEVEL MARK ON THE PEDESTAL WALL. FINAL FIELD VERIFICATIONS WILL BE PERFORMED FOR WATER LEVEL AND DEPTH. RESULTS OF THE FIELD TEST WILL BE DOCUMENTED IN THE W.O. CREM FOR ACCEPTANCE.
THIS REVISION OF THIS AWA DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT. THIS AWA IS GIVEN TO TOM BADDER OF VENTURE.
PREPARED BY S. MARKOS REVIEWED BY: JOHN A. CAMIRE APPROVED BY SMDE: S. HUTCHINS END OF AWA #9, REV. 2 BEGINING OF ECR 1.0 PROBLEM DEFINITION AND SCOPE:
1.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION:
DURING 11R, TWO TRENCHES WERE CUT FROM THE CONCRETE
- LOOR WHERE IT MEETS THE DRYWELL SHELL TO EVALUATE ELL THICKNESS AND TO REMOVE PLUG SAMPLES IN BAYS 5 AND 17. AFTER EVALUATION AND REPAIR, THE SHELL WAS SPRAY COATED IN THE TRENCH AREAS, FILLED UP WITH DOW CORNING 3-6548 SILICONE RTV FOAM AND SEALED AT THE TOP BY POURING A PROTECTIVE SEALING LAYER OF PROMATEC LOW DENSITY SILICONE ELASTOMER. IT WAS EVIDENT AFTER A 12R
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INSPECTION. OF 'THE AREA, THAT WATER WAS SEEPING INTO THE TRENCHES. PROBABLE SOURCES OF WATER MAY BE (A):
VARIOUS COMPONENT (E.G. VALVE) LEAKAGES, (B): SPILLS FROM DRAIN TANKS, AND (C): EXCESS WATER FROM OUTAGE ACTIVITIES (E.G. CRD CHANGES). IN APRIL 1994, THE TRENCH AREAS WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED AGAIN WHEN A WALKDOWN WAS CONDUCTED DURING A FORCED OUTAGE,. THE
.AREAS WERE FOUND TOTALLY DRY. DURING THE 1995
.STRUCTURAL MONITORING INSPECTIONS NO SIGNS OF CORROSION OF THE INNER SURFACE OF EXPOSED-STEEL SHELL IN THE TRENCHES WAS FOUND. THE PRESENCE OF1 WATER IN THE TRENCHES WAS OBSERVED IN 16R REFUELING OUTAGE IN 1997.
IN THE 17R REFUELING OUTAGE, NO SION'OF WATER WAS OBSERVED IN THE TRENCHES. IN THE 18R REFUELING OUTAGE DRYWELL INSPECTION THERE IS NO MENTION OF WATER PRESENCE IN THE TRENCHES.
DURING IR21, WATER WAS DISCOVERED IN THE TRENCH IN BAY
- 5. THIS WATER WAS VACUUMED OUT, BUT THE TRENCH SOON
.REFILLED INDICATING THAT WATER WAS CONTAINED IN OR LROUND THE SLAB. THE FLOOR SLAB IS POURED AGAINST THE TTOM OF THE DRYWELL SHELL. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF TER SAMPLES SHOWED THAT THE WATER IS NEUTRAL TO WEAK BASIC. WHEN THE PLANT IS AT POWER THE DRYWELL IS INERTED WITH NITROGEN. LACK OF OXYGEN AND NEUTRAL TO WEAK BASIC WATER DO NOT FORM AN AGGRESSIVE ENVIRONMENT THAT COULD LEAD TO CORROSION OF THE DRYWELL STEEL SHELL. THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED WITH VISUAL INSPECTION
.OF THE INNER SURFACE OF THE DRYWELL EXPOSED SHELL IN THE AREA OF THE TRENCHES. THE ABOVE OBSERVATION INDICATES THAT (A): PROMATEC LDSE IS NO LONGER ACTING AS A SEAL TO PREVENT INTRUSION OF SURFACE WATER, AND (B): DOW CORNING RTV FOAM IS RETAINING THE WATER REACHING THE TRENCHES.
THE POTENTIAL SOURCES OF THE WATER ARE DIRECT LEAKAGE
.INTO THE FLOOR-TO-SHELL GAP DUE TO STANDING WATER ON THE FLOOR OR WATER RUNNING DOWN THE INTERIOR OF THE SDRYWELL SHELL. IN ADDITION THE WATER COULD ALSO BE TRAVELING THROUGH CRACKS OR CONSTRUCTION JOINTS IN THE CONCRETE SLAB, COMING FROM THE TROUGH AROUND THE INNER FACE OF THE REACTOR PEDESTAL, OR FROM THE 1-8 SUMP IF HOLES EXIST IN THE SUMP LINER.
INSPECTION OF THE SUMP LINER SHOWS THAT IT IS IN GOOD NDITION WITH NO HOLES. THEREFORE THE SUMP IS NO NGER CONSIDERED AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE FOR THE WATER.
AFTER REMOVING DEBRIS FROM TROUGH AROUND THE INNER FACE OF THE REACTOR PEDESTAL (PER AWA #1) A VOID WAS FOUND IN CONCRETE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE TROUGH (IR 00550437).
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS VOID ALLOWS WATER TO BYPASS
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THE TROUGH ROUTING ARRANGEMENT TO THE 1-SUMP AND ALLOWS WATER TO ENTER THE CONCRETE FLOOR AND MIGRATE THROUGH CRACKS OR CONSTRUCTION JOINTS TO THE TRENCH IN BAY 5.
AS A RESULT AWA # 7 WAS ISSUED TO THE FIELD TO REPAIR THIS VOID AND ELIMINATE THIS LEAKAGE SOURCE INTO THE CONCRETE FLOOR.
1.2-SCOPE:
THIS EC,ý THEREFORE ADDRESSES SEVERAL TOPICS:
1.2.1-THE GAP BETWEEN THE DRYWELL SHELL AND THE CONCRETE FLOOR SHALL BE CAULKED AT THE INTERFACE.
1.2.2-THE GAP BETWEEN THE DRYWELL SHELL AND THE TRENCH SIDES SHALL BE CAULKED AT THE INTERFACE.
1.2.3-THE EXISTING TRENCH IN BAY 5 IS EXCAVATED FURTHER TO DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF THE DRYWELL SHELL IN THAT AREA. ACTIONS ARE SPECIFIED FOR FINISHING THE TRENCH SURFACES AFTER THE UT NSPECTIONS ARE COMPLETED.
2.4- INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLEANING AND INSPECTION OF THE DRYWELL SUMP WERE PROVIDED UNDER AWA #2 TO DETERMINE IF ANY REPAIRS ARE REQUIRED. THE RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO ENGINEERING FOR EVALUATION UNDER THE-STRUCTURAL MONITORING PROGRAM.
1.2.5-THE TROUGH INSIDE OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM (THE AREA INSIDE OF THE PEDESTAL AT ELEVATION 10'-3") AND THE PIPES THAT CONNECT IT TO THE AREA OUTSIDE OF THE PEDESTAL AND THE SUMP WERE INSPECTED UNDER AWA #1. THE RESULTS INDICATED.THAT CONCRETE REPAIRS ARE NEEDED AROUND THE PIPES CONNECTING THE TROUGH TO THE SUMP, THE AREA OUTSIDE OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM, AND THE VOID IN THE TROUGH.
THEREFORE THESE REPAIRS ARE ADDRESSED IN THIS ECR.
1.2.6-THE TROUGH INSPECTION ALSO IDENTIFIED LOW POINTS IN THE-TROUGH. ACCEPTANCE OF THESE LOW POINTS WITHOUT ACTION IS JUSTIFIED IN THIS ECR.
1.2.7-INSPECTIONS IN THE SUB-PILE ROOM REVEALED THAT CE RAISED FLOOR SLAB IS DEGRADED, WITH EXPOSED GREGATE. THIS CONDITION IS ADDRESSED IN THIS "CR, INCLUDING JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION UNTIL REPAIRS ARE DETERMINED AND IMPLEMENTED DURING A FUTURE REFUELING OUTAGE, IF DESIRED (SEE ATTACHED DESIGN ATTRIBUTES).
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1.3 ECR TYPE AN CLASSIFICATION:
BASED ON "NO" ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE SCREENING QUESTIONS OF CC-AA-103 ATTACHMENTS F AND Q, THIS ECR IS CLASSIFIED AS A DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE. SAFETY RELATED SSC'S ARE AFFECTED.
.1.4 TECHNICAL TASK RIGOR/RISK ASSESSMENT:
- 1. TECHNICAL TASK RIGOR/RISK ASSESSMENT WAS PE:FORMED PER HU-AA-1212. THE INITIAL BRIEF FOR THIS TASK WAS CONDUCTED ON 10/18/06. FOR THE'TASK OF DETERMINING THE SOURCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE WATER ýADDRESSED IN A2152754 E06, NOT IN SCOPE OF THIS ECk), A RISK RANK OF 2 WAS DETERMINED., AN* EVALUATION TgAM!OF MULTIPLE SME'S WAS ASSEMBLED, AlD IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY REVIEW WAS REQUIRED.- THE SCOPE OF THIS ECR IS TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THAT TECHNICAL TASK. FOR THE SCOPE OF THIS ECR, A RISK RANK OF 3 WAS DETERMINED. THEREFORE THIS ECR REQUIRES AN ON-SITE INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY REVIEW.
".0 SOLUTION / TECHNICAL EVALUATION:
.1l DESIGN CHANGE ATTRIBUTES:
DESIGN CHANGE ATTRIBUTES AND INPUTS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED PER ATTACHMENT IA OF CC-AA-102, AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN ATTACHMENT 1 OF CC-MA-i02-1001. THIS REVIEW IS PROVIDED IN ATTACHMENT 1 OF THIS ECR.
2.2 CONFIGURATION ACTIVITIES IMPACT REVIEW:
CONFIGURATION CONTROL ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ATTACHMENT 7 OF CC-AA-102 AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN ATTACHMENT 7A OF CC-MA-102-1001. THIS REVIEW IS DOCUMENTED IN ATTACHMENTS 1 AND 2 OF THIS ECR.
2.3 PROGRAM IMPACT REVIEW PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ATTACHMENT 8 OF CC-AA-102 AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN ATTACHMENT 8A OF CC-MA-102-1001. THIS REVIEW IS DOCUMENTED IN ATTACHMENTS 1 AND 2 OF THIS ECR.
2.4 SOLUTION
THE REPAIRS SPECIFIED UNDER THIS ECR ARE INTENDED TO.
CONTROL WATER FLOW IN THE BOTTOM OF THE DRYWELL.
THOUGH DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE IN A2152754 E06*,
EIS DESIRABLE TO MINIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF WATER IN THE pORES AND SMALL SPACES IN AND AROUND THE DRYWELL CONCRETE FLOOR SLAB AT ELEVATION 10'-3"*. TO DO THIS, THE SUMP HAS BEEN INSPECTED AS DIRECTED IN AWA #2 TO MINIMIZE ITS POTENTIAL AS A SOURCE OF LEAKAGE INTO THE SLAB. VT-I INSPECTION OF THE SUMP SHOWS THAT THE
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000 ECR TYPE: DCP STAINLESS STEEL LINER IS IN GOOD CONDITIONS AND HAS NO HOLES. THEREFORE THIS SOURCE OF THE LEAKAGE IS ELIMINATED AS A LEAKAGE SOURCE, (A2152754-13).
THE TROUGH AREA HAS ALSO BEEN INSPECTED, AND WILL BE REPAIRED AS REQUIRED TO DIRECT FLOW TO THE $UMP (BY REPAIRING THE CONCRETE AROUND THE PIPES). 'AFTER REMOVING DEBRIS FROM TROUGH AROUND THE INNER FACE OF THE REACTOR PEDESTAL (PER AWA #1) A VOID WAS FOUND IN THE CONCRETE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE TROUGH (IR 00550437).
THIS VOID MAY ALLOW WATER TO BYPASSES THE TROUGH ROUTING ARRANGEMENT TO THE 1-8 AND ALLOWS WATER TO ENTER THE CONCRETE FLOOR, WHICH ALLOWS WATER TO MIGRATE THOUGH CRAdKS AND CONSTRUCTION JOINTS IN THE FLOOR TO THE TRENCH IN BAY 5. AS A RESULT AWA # 7 WAS ISSUED TO REPAIR THIS VoID AND ELIMINATE THIS LEAKAGE SOURCE INTO THE CONCRETE FLOOR. THE REPAIR OF THE TROUGH SHOULD ELIMINATE THE LEAKAGE SOURCE, WHICH CONTINUES TO FILL THE BAY 5 TRENCH.
ADDITION, THE PERIMETER OF THE SLAB WILL BE CAULKED THE STEEL VESSEL TO PREVENT WATER FROM ENTERING THE P AT THIS INTERFACE. THESE REPAIRS SHOULD ELIMINATE MOST OF THE FLOW PATHS INTO THE SLAB AREA.
THE TRPENCH AT BAY 5 WILL BE EXCAVATED SEVERAL INCHES DEEPER TO ALLOW FOR FURTHER UT INSPECTION OF THE DRYWELL SHELL. AFTER THIS, THE NEW CONCRETE EDGES*
AGAINST THE STEEL SHELL WILL BE CAULKED AND THE STEEL SHELL EXPOSED AREA WILL BE COATED. THE DEGRADATION OF THE RAISED SLAB IN THE SUB-PILE ROOM, AND THE LOW POINTS IN THE TROUGH DO NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE CONTROL OF WATER IN THIS AREA. THEREFORE NO REPAIRS ARE REQUIRED FOR THESE CONDITIONS AT THIS TIME.
2.5 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
THE DESIGN SOLUTIONS ARE EXPLAINED HERE, AND SUPPORTED BY THE ATTACHED DESIGN ATTRIBUTES.
WATER HAS BEEN FOUND IN THE TRENCHES OF THE 10'-3" DRYWELL FLOOR SLAB DURING SEVERAL PAST INSPECTIONS. AS JUSTIFIED IN A2152754 E06* (SEE NOTE AT END OF D.A.R.),
THE PRESENCE OF THIS WATER IS NOT DETRIMENTAL TO THE STEEL DRYWELL SHELL. HOWEVER, CAULK WILL BE INSTALLED THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE CONCRETE AND THE DRYWELL ELL TO MINIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF WATER ENTERING THE GAP ETWEEN THE CONCRETE SLAB AND THE SHELL. THE CAULK WILL FOLLOW THE CONTOUR OF THE EDGE OF THE CONCRETE ALONG THE STEEL SHELL, GOING UP AND DOWN THE CHANGES IN CURB ELEVATION AND INTO THE DEPRESSIONS OF THE TRENCHES. THE CAULK DOES NOT INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF
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MATERIAL POTENTIALLY FOULING THE SUCTION STRAINERS BECAUSE A GREATER AMOUNT OF MATERIAL (SILICONE FOAM AND ELASTOMER) WAS REMOVED FROM THE TRENCHES AND IS NOT BEING REPLACED, REFER TO TECHNICAL EVALUATIONS A2152754-05 AND A2152754-12 FOR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT ON THE SUCTION STRAINERS THE TRENCH IN BAY 5 WAS EXCAVATED APPROXIMATELY 6"1 DEEPER TO EXPOSE THE DRYWELL SHELL FOR ACCESS FOR UT MEASUREMENTS. THE MINOR AMOUNT OF CONCRETE REMOVED HAS NO IMPACT ON THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITYIOF THE SLAB SINCE THE SLAB IS PRINCIPAT9 LY A FILL LAYER TO PROVIDE A LEVEL FLOOR (EXCEPT FORBEARING DIRECTLY'UNDER THE PEDESTAL). "
THE CONCRETE REMOVED IS A PORTION OF THE REMAINING THIN WEDGE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH, BETWEEN THE (RELATIVELY) FLAT BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH AND THE SLOPED SHELL SURFACE. NO REINFORCING OR STRUCTURAL STEEL IS AFFECTED. THE STEEL SHELL REMAINS INTACT AS THE CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY. THE NEWLY EXPOSED DRYWELL VESSEL S UT INSPECTION RESULTS SHOW THE VESSEL THICKNESS IS O TO NOMINAL THICKNESSES.
THE NEW EDGE OF THE CONCRETE WILL BE CAULKED TO THE STEEL SHELL TO MAINTAIN THE CONTINUITY OF THE CAULK BARRIER,' THE STEEL WILL BE COATED WITH GREASE AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 3.2.2.4.3 OF SPECIFICATION IS-328227-004 REV. 13, TO PREVENT CORROSION OF ANY AREAS THAT ARE NOT COATED WITH THE NORMAL ZINC BASED COATING. REMOVAL OF THE SILICONE FOAM AND ELASTOMER FROM THE TRENCHES HAS NO IMPACT ON THE FLOOR SLAB OR THE STEEL SHELL. WATER WAS FOUND IN THE TRENCHES UNDER THE SILICONE MATERIAL, SO THEYARE NOT EFFECTIVE AS A WATER SEAL IN THIS APPLICATION. ANY WATER COLLECTING IN THE TRENCHES WILL NOT AFFECT THE STEEL DUE TO THE GREASE APPLIED, AND THE CONCRETE IS NOT DETRIMENTALLY IMPACTED BY CONTACT WITH THE WATER.
IN THE TROUGH AREA, THE CONCRETE WAS FOUND TO BE.
DEGRADED AROUND SEVERAL PIPES. THE TWO PIPES TO THE SUMP WERE FOUND TO HAVE VOIDS AND LOOSE MATERIAL UNDER THEM ON THE TROUGH SIDE, AS WAS THE AZIMUTH 270 PIPE FROM OUTSIDE OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM TO THE TROUGH. THESE THREE AREAS WILL BE RESTORED TO THEIR ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION USING SAFETY RELATED MASTERFLOW 928 OUT, WHICH IS AS STRONG OR STRONGER THAN THE ORIGINAL NCRETE.
IN ADDITION, AFTER REMOVING DEBRIS FROM TROUGH AROUND THE INNER FACE OF THE REACTOR PEDESTAL (PER AWA #1) A VOID WAS FOUND IN CONCRETE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE TROUGH (IR 00550437). MOST LIKELY THIS VOID ALLOWS WATER TO
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BYPASSES THE TROUGH ROUTING ARRANGEMENT TO THE 1-8 AND ALLOWS WATER TO ENTER.THE CONCRETE FLOOR, WHICH ALLOWS WATER TO MIGRATE THOUGH FLOOR TO THE TRENCH IN BAY 5.
AS A RESULT AWA # 7 WAS ISSUED TO THE FIELD TO REPAIR THIS VOID AND ELIMINATE THIS LEAKAGE SOURCE INTO THE CONCRETE FLOOR. THE REPAIR OF THE TROUGH SHOULD ELIMINATE THE LEAKAGE SOURCE, WHICH CONTINUES TO FILL THE BAY 5 TRENCH.
THE DEPTH OF THE TROUGH WAS MEASURED RELATIVE TO STANDING WATER IN THE TROUGH TO DETERMINE IF THE FLOOR OF THE TROUGH WAS SLOPED TO THE SUMP AREA. IT WAS FOUND THAT,,GENERALLY, THE LOW POINT OF THE TROUGH IS AT THE SUMP (0 DEGREES) AND THE HIGH POINT IS OPPOSITE THE SUMP (180 DEGREES). THE TROUGH IS RELATIVELY FLAT FROM 270 DEGREES TO 0 DEGREES, HAVING ONLY A 1/8" DIFFERENCE IN WATER DEPTH. THE FLOOR AND WALLS OF THE TROUGH WERE FOUND TO BE IN GOOD CONDITION, HAVING NO SIGNIFICANT CRACKS OR PATHS OF LEAKAGE INTO THE SLAB INTERIOR. BASED ON THIS INFORMATION, IT WAS DETERMINED HAT THERE WAS LITTLE BENEFIT TO RESURFACING THE TROUGH OOR TO PROVIDE A CONTINUOUS PITCH TO THE SUMP. ANY
. ANDING WATER IN THE TROUGH DOES NOT AFFECT THE CONCRETE. ALSO, RAISING THE FLOOR OF THE TROUGH IN THE 270 DEGREE REGIONCOULD CAUSE WATER TO COLLECT OUTSIDE OF THE VPEDESTAL IN THAT AREA, OR EVEN FLOW OUT OF THE TROUGH'TO THE OUTER AREA THROUGH THE PIPE THAT CONNECTS THE TWO AREAS. THEREFORE, BASED ON THERE BEING NO TANGIBLE BENEFIT AND POTENTIAL NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES, NO REPAIRS ARE SPECIFIED FOR THE TROUGH FLOOR OR WALLS.
THE RAISED SLAB IN THE CENTER OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM HAS EXPOSED AND LOOSE AGGREGATE, AND SPALLING ALONG.THE EDGE IN A FEW PLACES. THIS SLAB IS PITCHED DOWNWARD FROM THE CENTER POINT IN ORDER TO SHED WATER INTO THE TROUGH. THERE IS NO STRUCTURAL FUNCTION OF THE RAISED PORTION OF THE SLAB OTHER THAN TO PROVIDE A WORKING SURFACE FOR UNDER VESSEL WORK. THE DISLODGED AND LOOSE AGGREGATE AND DEBRIS HAS BEEN REMOVED, SO THERE IS NO CURRENT CONCERN WITH THE CONDITION. FUTURE REPAIRS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO PREVENT FURTHER DEGRADATION AND CREATION OF DEBRIS. THEREFORE THE DEGRADED CONDITION OF THE SLAB IS ACCEPTABLE AT THIS TIME, AND NO REPAIRS ARE SPECIFIED.
.0 IOCFR50.59 REVIEW:
THIS ECR IS DETERMINED TO BE A DCP-TYPE PER CC-AA-103.
AS SUCH, A 50.59 REVIEW IS REQUIRED. 50.59 SCREENING OC-2006-S-0379 HAS BEEN PERFORMED PER LS-AA-104 FOR THIS CONFIGURATION CHANGE. THE 50.59 SCREENING CONCLUDES THAT A 50.59 REVIEW IS NOT REQUIRED AND THAT
PAGE 0020 E C R Printout NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP APPROVED DISPOSITION:
PRIOR NRC APPROVAL IS NOT REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THIS CONFIGURATION CHANGE.,
- . /
4.0. PLANNING, INSTALLATION AND TESTING INSTRUCTIONS:.
4.1 PLANT MODE(S) APPLICABILITY:
THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE REQUIRES INSTALLATION OF.
MATERIALS IN THE DRYWELL. THEREFORE THIS MODIFICATION MUST BE INSTALLED AND INSPECTED DURING THE IR21 OUTAGE.
4.2 INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS:
4.2.1 GENERAL 4.2.1.1 WORK WILL BE IN A POSTED HIGH RAD AREA. AN ALARA PLAN MUST BE DEVELOPED FOR THE REQUIRED WORK ACTIVITIES.
4.2.1.2 THE MIXING AND PLACEMENT OF GROUT SHALL BE IN CCORDANCE WITH 2400-SMM-3150.16 AND THE MANUFACTURER'S STRUCTIONS. A QV QUALIFIED INSPECTOR MUST WITNESS E MIXING AND PLACEMENT OF THE GROUT.
4.2.1.3 THE MIXING OF THE CAULKING MATERIALS AND PLACEMENT MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH' THE MANUFACTURER' S INSTRUCTIONS AND THIS ECR, AND BE WITNESSED BY QV QUALIFIED INSPECTOR.
4.2.2 REPAIRS IN.SUB-PILE ROOM (AREA INSIDE OF THE PEDESTAL) 4.2.2.1 LOOSE DEBRIS AND EASILY DISLODGED AGGREGATE SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE TROUGH AND THE RAISED FLOOR SLAB.
4.2.2.2 GROUT REPAIR IS REQUIRED AT THE TWO PIPES FROM THE TROUGH TO THE SUMP, AND AT THE AZIMUTH 270 PIPE THROUGH THE PEDESTAL WALL TO THE TROUGH, AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #1. IN ADDITION THE VOID SHALL BE REPAIRED PER AWA #7.
4.2.2.3 ENSURE THAT LOOSE MATERIAL IS REMOVED AND CLEAN AGGREGATE IS EXPOSED PRIOR TO-INSTALLATION OF THE 50.16.GROUT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE 2400-SMM-REPAIR
- .2.2.4 THE DRYWELL SUMP LINER SHOULD BE CLEANED AND INSPECTED AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #2, WITH ANY UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS BEING REPORTED TO ENGINEERING FOR CONSIDERATION OF REPAIRS AND BEING TRACKED UNDER A2152754-13.
PAGE 0021 E C R Printout NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP APPROVED DISPOSITION:
4.2.3 CAULKING THE ELEVATION 10' -3" SLAB PERIMETER 4.2.3.1 THE STEEL AND CONCRETE SURFACES SHOULD BE PREPARED AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #3. LOOSE COATINGS, DIRT, DEBRIS AND CONTAMINANTS MUST BE REMOVED PRIOR TO CAULKING. SURFACE CONDITIONS SHOULD MEET MANUFACTURERS INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAULK PLACEMENT.
4.2.3.2 CAULK SHALL BE APPLIED TO THE FULL PERIMETER OF THE SLAB, AT ITS INTERFACE WITH THE STEEL SHELL, AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #5 AND MODIFIED BY AWA #6 'FOR USE OF BACKER ROD.,
4.2.3.3 NOTE THE QV INSPECTIONS REQUIRED BY THE AWA, AND THE REVISION TO AWA #5 REDUCING THE MAXIMUM LAP OF THE CAULK ONTO THE STEEL AND CONCRETE TO 3/4".
4 .2 .4 TRENCH EXCAVATION AND RESTORATION
... 2.4.1 THE TRENCH IN BAY 5 SHALL BE FURTHER EXCAVATED
..DESCRIBED IN AWA #4.
4.2.4.2 AFTER COMPLETION OF UT EXAMINATIONS, CAULK CAN BE APPLIED AT THE INTERFACE WITH THE STEEL SHELL AND THE CON4CRETE PER SECTION 4.2.3. REMOVE ALL STANDING WATER FROM THE TRENCH AND ALLOW THE SURFACES TO DRY SUFFICIENTLY TO ALLOW THE APPLICATION OF THE GROUT.
CONDITIONS MAY NOT ALLOW FOR A COMPLETE DEWATERING OF THE TRENCH AND DRYING OF ALL SURFACES. IN THIS CASE APPLY A MINIMUM APPLICATION OF GROUT TO THESE SURFACES AND ALLOW 8 HOURS FOR IT TO DRY. ONCE DRY APPLY THE CAULK.
.4.2.4.3 RECOAT THE DRYWELL SHELL SURFACE IN BOTH THE BAY 5 AND BAY 17 TRENCHES AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 3.2.2.4.3 OF SPECIFICATION IS-328227-004 REV. 13.
4.2.4.4 DO NOT REINSTALL THE SILICONE FOAM OR ELASTOMER TOPPING IN THE TWO TRENCHES.
4.3 ACCEPTANCE TESTING:
4.3.1 GROUT REPAIRS - LEAK TEST WILL BE PERFORMED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE RhPAIRS AS DETAILED IN AWA #9.
THE LEAK TEST IS USED AS A POST MAINTENANCE VERIFICATION.
.32, CAULKING AN ISI PRE-SERVICE INSPECTION (PSI)
ILL BE PERFORMED ON THE CAULK. SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THIS VISUAL EXAMINATION PROVIDES SATISFACTORY ACCEPTANCE TESTING FOR THIS INSTALLATION.
4.3.3 TRENCH EXCAVATION/RESTORATION - ACCEPTANCE
PAGE 0022 E C R Printout NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP APPROVED DISPOSITION:.
TESTING FOR THIS PORTION OF THE WORK IS A VISUAL VERIFICATION BY THE WORK GROUP THAT ALL STEEL SHELL SURFACE AREA IN THE TRENCHES IS COATED,. ETTHER WITH THE ORIGINAL ZINC BASED COATING OR THE GREASE SPECIFIED IN THIS ECR.
4.4 MATERIALS
204-04825 MASTERFLOW 928 GROUT (PCi) 204-07780 BACKER ROD POLYSPEC THIOKOL 2235M CAULK
5.0 REFERENCES
I,,
I. -A2152754 E05, 'TECHNICAL BASIS FOR CAULK DEBRIS GENERATION
- 2. -A2152754 E06, EVALUATION OF WATER IN BOTTOM OF DRYWELL 3.-50.59 SCREENING OC-2006-S-0379 4.-CALCULATION C-1302-241-E610-081
~0 ATTACHMENTS:
- -DESIGN ATTRIBUTE REVIEW, 9 PAGES 2.-IMPACT REVIEWS (ATTACHMENT 10'S OF CC-AA-102), 7 PAGES 3.-EP-011 QUALITY CLASSIFICATION FORM, 3 PAGES 4.-MARKUP TO DWG BR 4070, 1 PAGE 5.-KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE RADIATION TEST REPORT (CAULK), 17 PAGES 6.-COPY OF C-1302-241-E3610-081, REV 2A MINOR REVISION, 1 PAGE.
IND. DESIGN REVIEW COMMENTS:
STRUCTURAL TECHNICAL REVIEW WAS PERFORMED BY DAN FIORELLO.
I PERFORMED A REVIEW OF THE WORD DOCUMENT CONTAINING THE PROBLEM RESOLUTION, I REVIEWED THE AWAS AND THE TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE DESIGN CHANGE AND AM IN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHANGES. I ALSO REVIEWED THE DESIGN ATTRIBUTES IN ATTACHMENT 1. MY COMMENTS WERE MINOR AND WERE INCOPORATED INTO THE DOCUMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW BY PETE TAMBURRO IHAVE REVIEWED THE ATTACHED ECR IN ACCORDANCE TH CC-AA-103 ATTACHMENT D.
ECR DESIGN INPUTS ARE CORRECT.
LL ASSUMPTIONS ARE REASONABLE. THE APPROPRAITE QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN SPECIFIED.
ALL DESIGN INTERFACE REQURIEMENTS ARE MET. THE INSTALLED CAULK HAS BEEN QUALIFIED. ADEQUATE MAINTENANCE AND
PAGE 0023 E C R Printout IND.
NUMBER: OC 06-00879 DESIGN REVIEW COMMENTS:
000 ECR'TYPE: DCP INSPECTION FEATURES HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED. RADIATION EXPOSURE HAS BEEN CONSIDERED. ALL RECORD RETENTION AND APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED.
.THEREFORE I RECOMMEND APPROVAL OF THIS ECR.
ALL COMMENTS RECEIVED FOR THE THIRD REVIEWER HAS BEEN SATISFACTORY RESOLVED AS DOCUMENTED IN EMAIL DATED 10/28.
SIGNED FOR ELDRIDGE, SHARON DUE TO PIMS INACCESSIBILITY.
AWA I THROUGH 9 INCLUDING REVISIONS WHICH WERE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT AND CORRECT THE IDENTIFIED DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AGAINST THE FINAL DISPOSITION AND ALL REVIEWER COMMENTS REMAIN VALID.,
THIS PACKAGE ALSO RECIEVED A FINAL INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY REVIEW BY MPR ASSOCIATES AND WAS FOUND ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT REVISION.
MANAGERS COMMENTS THIS DCP IS APPROVED FOR USE. THIS MODIFICATION WILL PROVED THE HEALTH OF THE DRYWELL AND CONCRETE TO SURE THAT THE PHYSICAL PLANT IS KEPT HEALTHY THROUGH FE EXTENSION.
C. DOCUMENT CHANGES:
DOC CHANGES REQUIRED: Y DOC SCREEN STATUS:
AFFECTED DOCUMENTS:
F Type Document ID Sheet As-Built Incorp Dwg Inc Inc Resp Type Cat Due Date Date Rev Orgn OC DWG BR 4070 1 1.02 D OED OC DWG GU 3B-153-34-1000 N/A 6.01 F OED
PAGE 0024 E C R Printout ECR TYPE: DCP W NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 D. APPROVALS:
Name User ID Date INTERFACING GROUPS: FIORELLO DAN (STRUCTRUAL) DJF2 '10/27 06 MARKOS FOR ELDRIDGE, SHARON L STMI o10/31/06 CAQ: ISS rTTw
~Jta TkmD
.. A.,,~. ___________________
9, :
RESP ENGINEER: MARKOS, SAM / KESTER, PAUL STM1 10/28/06 IND REVIEWER: TAMBURRO, PETER PXTO 11/03/06 MANAGER:. CAMIRE, JOHN A. JC08 11/,04 /06
,I 4 i E. ECR WORK COMPLETION NOTIFICATION:
WORK REQUIRED: Y AUTO CLOSE: N PRK1 FILM ID: BLIP NBR: BOX NBR:_
COMPLT 20061024 R SC:C2013725 187 01 1 MOBILIZE WORK AREA C2013725 02 1 COMPLT 20061025 DESC: 187 DOP TEST HEPA UNIT C2013725 03 1 COMPLT 20061024 DESC: 187 CLEAN.TROUGH C2013725 04 1 HOLD 20061024 DESC: 187 MATERIALS / PARTS WORK ORDER C2013725 05 1 INPROG 20061024
- DESC: 187 PERFORM PENTOFEAR EXT QUEANTIFY C2013725 06 1 COMPLT 20061030 DESC: 187 QUANTIFY EXTENT OF REPAIRS
PAGE 0025 E C R Printout W NUMBER:
/
OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP E. ECR WORK COMPLETION NOTIFICATION:
WORK REQUIRED: Y AUTO CLOSE: N PRKI FILM ID: BLIP NBR: BOX NBR:
C201 3725 07 1 COMPLT 20061101 DESC: '187 REPAIR PER AWA #1 C201 3725 08 1 READY 2'0061030 DESC: 187, ENGINEERInG 'INSPECTION C201.3725 09 1 READY 20061025 DESC: 187 ENGINEERING ECR/MOD ACCEPTANCE C201 .3725 10 1 COMPLT 20061102 DSC: 187 GROUT REPAIR PER AWA #7 C201 3725 11 1 COMPLT 20061103 DESC: 187 MOBILIZE CHECK FOR VOIDS C201 3725 12 1 COMPLT 20061103 DESC: 187 INSTALL PLUGS C2o01 3725 13 1 COMPLT. 20061103 DESC: 187 FILL TROUGH AND VERIFY NO LEAK C201 3725 14 1 COMPLT 20061103 DESC: 187 "TROUGH LEAK TEST" C201 3725 15 1 COMPLT 20061103 DESC: 187 GROUT REPAIR (CONTINGENT)
C201 3725 16 1 COMPLT .20061104 DESC: 187 DEMOBILIZE
PAGE 0026 E C R Printout ECR'TYPE: DCP W NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 E. ECR WORK COMPLETION NOTIFICATION:
WORK REQUIRED: Y AUTO CLOSE: N PRK1 FILM ID: BLIP NBR: BOX NBR:
C2013726 01 1 COMPLT 20061029 DESC: "187 REMOVE CONCRETE IN BAY #5 C2013726 02 1 READY 20061025 DESC: 187, ENGINEERING ECR/AWA ACCEPTANCE C2013726 03 1 COMPLT 20061104 DESC: BAY 5 & 17 COAT T.IT5 BAY WATERWTTH VACUUM 0 C2013726 DESC: 187 C2013726 04 05 1
1
-COMPLT 20061104 VACUUM WATER FROM BAiY #5 COMPLT 20061102 DESC: 187 GROUT REPAIR BAY #5 TRENCH C2013726 06 1 COMPLT 20061101 DESC: 187 REMOVE WATER FROM BAY 17 C2013726 07 1 COMPLT 20061104 DESC: 187 PROVIDE ENGINEERING SUPPORT C2013729 01 1 COMPLT 20061029 DESC: 187 CLEAN OUT PERIMETER CREVICE C2013729 02 1 COMPLT 20061029 DESC: 187 CAULK PERIMETER CREVICE C2013729 03 1 READY 20061027 DESC: 187 ENGINEERING INSPECTION
PAGE 0027 E C R Printout
. NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP E. ECR WORK COMPLETION NOTIFICATION:
WORK REQUIRED: Y AUTO CLOSE: N PRKI FILM ID: BLIP NBR: BOX NBR: _ _
C2013729 04 1 READY 2 0061027 TIP Q 0. 1 07 C2013729 05 1 READY 2'6061030 DESC: 187 CONDITIONAL 'RELEASE OF MATERIAL C2013729 06 1 COMPLT -'20061104 DESC: 187 VERIFY MATERIALS HAVE' BEEN C2013729 07 1 COMPLT I 20061029 DESC: 187 CLEAN GREASE FROM GALVANIZE.
.C2013729 08 1 COMPLT 20061103 DESC: 187 COMPLETE CAULKING C2013732 01 1 COMPLT 20061029 DESC: 187 CLEAN OUT DRYWELL SUMP C2013732 02 1 COMPLT 20061028 DESC: 187 PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DRYWELL SU C2013732 03 1 COMPLT 20061030 DESC: 187 ENGINEERING INSPECTION C2013732 04 1 COMPLT 20061029 DESC: 187 DW10 ROV REMOTE VT EXAMS DRYWELL SUMP C2013732 05 1 COMPLT 20061029 DESC: 187 REMOVE COVERS FROM DW SUMP
PAGE 0028 E C R Printout W NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP" E. ECR WORk COMPLETION NOTIFICATION:
WORK REQUIRED: Y AUTOCLOSE: N PRKI FILM ID: BLIP NBR: BOX NBR:
C2 01 .3732 06 1 COMPLT rr,-.1*rA T 20061029
- qTT.T. r-'P TT*r DESC:
C201.3732 07 1 COMPLT 20061030 DESC: ,GRATING C6-1568 REMOVE GRATING C2 01 .3732 08 1 SCHED 20061103 DESC: 187 PERFORM PMT C201 .3732 09 1 COMPLT 20061031 DESC: 187 REINSTALL COVERS FROM DW SUMP C201
.3732 10 1 COMPLT 20061030 DESC: 187 TO BE CLOSED NO WORK PERFORMED C201 3732 11 1 COMPLT 20061030 DESC: -187 OPS SUPPORT TO EMPTY SUMP C201 3732 12 1 COMPLT 20061030 DESC: 187 TO BE CLOSED OUT C201 3732 13 1 COMPLT 20061029 DESC: 18.7 POWERWASH DRYWELL SUMP C2013732 14 1 COMPLT 20061029 DESC: 187 HYDROLAZE DRYWELL SUMP C2013732 15 1' COMPLT 20061029 MEClHANIClATLLY CLTEAN 1-8 R UIMP DESC: 187 MECHANICALLY CLEAN 1-8 SUMP
PAGE 0029 E C R Printout O NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP H. ECR WORK COMPLETION NOTIFICATION:
WORK REQUIRED: Y AUTO.CLOSE: N PRK1 FILM ID: BLIP NBR: BOX NBR:
C2013732 18 1 COMPLT 20061029 All DESC: 187 REMOVE TENT (CONTINGENT)
C2013732 17 1*., COMPLT* ý20061029 DESC: 187 ERECT TEfIT (CONTINGENT)
C2013732 19 1 COMPLT 20061031 DESC: 187 PERMITS PERMITS C2013732 20 1 I COMPLT 20061030 ESC: 187 PERFORM WELD REPAIR AWA XXX C2013732 21 1 COMPLT 20061103 DESC: 187 DEMOBILIZE C2013732 22 1 COMPLT 20061031 DESC: 187 PERFORM STATIC TEST C2013727 01 1 COMPLT 20061026 DESC: 187 DW10 PREP DW SHELL FOR UT INSPECTION.
A2152754 05 COMPLT 11/04/06 DESC: TECHNICAL BASIS FOR AWA FOR ECR 06-00879 A2152754 06 RETURN 11/04/06 DESC: EVALUATE IMPACT OF WATER IN BAY 5 & 17 TRENCHES A2152754 12 ACCEPT 10/28/06 DESC: ENSURE DRYWELL CAULK PASSES QUALIFICATION TESTING
PAGE 0030 E C R Printout NUMBER: OC 06-00879 000 ECR TYPE: DCP E. ECR WO1rK COMPLETION NOTIFICATION:
WORK REQUIRED: Y AUTOCLOSE: N PRK1 FILM ID: BLIP NBR: BOX NBR:
A2152754 13 COMPLT 11/03/06 DESC: ,'ENSURE DRYWELL SUMP LINER PASSES VT-i INSPECTION F. COMPONENT CHANGE REQUESTS:
CCR Revw Prop User Affected Component List Rey Flag Stat ID Date OC 1 187 M MISC NRO1\MB001-INT 000 Y F DA0 10/27/06
PAGE 0031 E C R. Printout COMPONENT CHANGE REQUEST MECHANICAL MISCELLANEOUS
- OMP ID : dC 1 187 M MISC NR01\MB001-INT ECR/NCR ID: E 06-00879 000
,CR REV : 000
,AST UPD : 10/31/06 PXTO REVIEWED Y IROPOSD CRL STATUS: F CCR STATUS: APPVD REVIEWED BY --PXTO REVIEW DATE 10/31/06 COMPONENT INFORMATION --------
UMP FEG : OC 1 187 000 4 CLEAR PT:
.MP DESCRIPT: DRYWELL INTERIOR MOISTURE BARRIER @ CONCRETE FLOOR ELEV 10-3 WHERE DW FLOOR MEETS DW SHELL MP DESCRIPT .j1 1ANUFACTURER,:
LFGR STYLE :
IOM NUMBER
- COMPUTER ADDRESS; _
[ODEL NUMBER : THIOKOL 2235M
[FG TYPE
- ERIAL NUMBER
- _
,OCATION - LOC: DW 10 IAA LOC:
CODES AND CLASSIFICATIONS
!AWSS -
- A SEIS CAT z SSEL/SQUG N
'M EQPT ENV QUAL N E INTERFACE REG.GDE. 1.23 N REG.GDE. 1.26 : N
.EG.GDE. 1.97'. N REG.GDE. 1.143. N
.EG.GDE. 1.155
- N ATWS N FIRE PROTECTION
- N
'IRE SSD N 10CFR73.55 N SWP/RWP EB 79-18 N IEB 80-11 N EMER HT SNK : N CM SET POINT CLASS: X ISI CLASS
- M SME SEC XI ISI: Y ASME SEC XI IST: N ASME REPR/REPL RES BND INSTR : N MRULE/EPIX N A4 SCOPE : N SA CLASS N LR TECH SPEC RAM ITE PIPE CD IVOR REQ : - -
THER RR *- m Y TMI-2 PDMS BORON ASIC REFERENCE DOCUMENT:
BR 4070 EFS/OTHER COMMITMENTS THE AMOUNT OF POTENTIAL DRYWELL DEBRIS THAT COULD ENTER THE ECCS SUCTION STRAINERS IS EVALUATED IN CALCULATION C-1302-241-E610-081.
PAGE 0032 E C R Printout COMPONENT CHANGE REQUEST IAE03
.MECHANICAL MISCELLANEOUS
ýOMP ID : OC 1 187 M MISC NRO1\MB001-INT ECR/NCR ID: E 06-00879 000
'CR REV : 000 JAST UPD : 10/31/06 PXTO REVIEWED :
?ROPOSD CRL STATUS: F CCR STATUS: APPVD REVIEWED BY :-PxT0 REVIEW DATE : 10/31/06 TECHNICAL COMPONENT DATA, --------
IINE NUMBER _VALVE SIZE :
2OMP SUB-TYPE:
?LOW RATING
)ESIGN TEMP 3PEED RATING 3LWR PRES RT
)RIVER SPEED
)ESIGN PRESS TOLUME
)IMENSIONS IORSEPOWER 2APACITY hATED SPEED 3HF HEAD EUWESS SHELL PRESS:
z LF PRESS:
rEMP CORRECT 3ACKPRESS COR:
3ENCH TEST PR:
'ERVICE FLUID:
~~~~~~---------------------fOtJNT=........................
SUB INDICATED
?C TYPE DOCUMENT ID SHEET TYPE DESCRIPTION CRL ACTION
)C CALC C-1302-241-E610-081 7047 SUCTION STRAINER DEBRIS GENERAT A
)C DWG BR 4070 1 7002 REACTOR PEDESTAL SECTION & DETA A CCR PURCHASE AND DESIGN DATA
-N SERVICE DATE: _10/27/06 PO NO:
TENDOR CODE
- PEC NBR ITEM NBR
)ESIGN CODE
- ONSTR CODE L CODE
PAGE 0033 E C R Printout COMPONENT CHANGE REQUEST MECHANICAL MISCELLANEOUS
.OMP ID : 4- 1 187 M MIF(- NRol \m-ROO1- TNT ECR/NCR ID: E 06-00879 000 "CR REV : 000
-AST UPD: 10/31/06 PXTO REVIEWED : Y
?ROPOSD CRL STATUS: F CCR STATUS: APPVD REVIEWED BY PXTO REVIEW DATE 10/31/06
COMMENTS = ID == DATE NOTE: THIS IS THE CAULK JOINT AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE PRK1 10/27/06
,DRYWELL CONCRETE FLOOR AT ELEVATION 10'3", WHERE IT MEETS PRKI 10/27/06 THE STEEL DRYWELL SHELL. PRKI 10/27/06
===CCR IST' PUMP AND VALVE TESTING DATA-----------------------
IAX DESIGN STROiE TIME POSITION OPEN: P+ID COORD: ACT TYPE NORMAL:
CLOSED: APP. J TYPE C G.L. 89-10 SAFE VALVE CAT SIZE: 0.00 0.00 FAIL TESTING REQUIREMENTS (old)
TST TYP FREQ/DIR PROCEDURE RT NBR RR/CSTJ/ROJ
=- - - PENETRATION SEAL INFORMATION 9-1 1ARRIER ID:
A
- R RATING
- TEAM FIRE : SECURITY:
.WATER: EWATER: S+HG RAD:
,IR S CTMT:
PENETRATION/COMMODITY
'EN SIZE _
'EN CONFIG:
'OMMODITY SIZE
ýOMMODITY MATERIAL:
'IPING: MAX MVMT : AXIAL LATERAL MAX PIPE TEMP:
- LECTRICAL NEW CABLE LOADING: (% FILL)
AD _ _EQUIV FT OF CONC. REQD A/BA RATIO: .(ACTUAL)
ATER _ _ PSIG(MAX FLD HT. - MIN PEN. ELEV X 0.43)
PENETRATION SEAL A SIDE B SIDE ETAIL:
- ~END-OF-CCR
CC-AA-102 ER,06-00879, REV. 0 Revision 13 A'1TACHIfET . Page 61 of 77 PAGE'l OF 17 ATTACHMENT 1OA.
Operations Department (including Radwaste) Configuration. Change Review Checklist PgIo Configuration Change Document No.: JC-CA 06 00 A#, 0 This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals of a, Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is .0 expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular formab This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility.
Review Requirements S4., InitiallDate
- 1. The impact on the station equipment, changes in equipment responses, and changes in operator response for different scenarios have been discussed. As the representative of the Operations Department, I fully understand the impael, including training needs, upon my department and concur that my concerns have been ,adequately addressed. 614 /0-27-tx 2.: I have confirmed thd identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-
- 102 attachments listed below:
- Attachment 7 - Configuration Activities (List Tracking PP/D-Z74 No. ,Vojq(' )
- Attachment 8- Programs (Tracking No. b.j)./ .
- Attachment 9 - Procedures and Training (Tracking IY lo-2-7-06.
No. -,j Y.
- 3. Acceptance *riterla for Post Maintenance Testing and any special tests required to adequately demonstrate system operability following implementation of a Configuration Change have been specified.
- 4. ALARA for operation has been considered in the design.
- 5. Appropriate component labeling is used in the design package, including drawings. P.P0-2-7-LY
- 6. The Configuration Change does not interfere with operation of existing nearby equipment.
- 7. There are no -operating procedure changes required by this Configuration Change that introduce new susceptibility to water hammer or hydraulic transients that might result in impacting plant operation.
- 8. The design can be implemented within constraints of plant operation/mode. This includes an operation assessment of all affected systems and interfacing structures, systems and.
components during the mode(s) in which the design change is being implemented. It~/0-27 V6.
- 9. The configuration change has been reviewed and will not introduce a new single point of vulnerability and there are no existing SPVs (unless approved by Site Engineering Director)
- 10. Impact of this configuration change on Operator Aids has been reviewed and appropriate actions have been or will be taken (refer to OP-AA-1 15-101 and the Operator Aid Log)/IV,
- 11. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007) 0A-2-7-06/
- 12. Changes impacting the Clearance and Tagging Program have been identified and are being tracked.
My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or appropriate contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activities required of my department have been identified.
1Lt* e*1~N Date:____________
Operations Department Representative Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer I
CC-AA-102 ECR 06-00879, REV. 0 Revision 13 APTACGHMENT 2-" Page 62 of 77 PAGE 2-OF -1 11 ATTACHMENT 101B Plant Engineering Configuration Change Review Checklist Page I of I Configuration Change Document No.: 44 9 O -00 79 inw. 0 This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartment approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility.
Review Requirements Initial/Date
- 1. My department has participated as required, and concurred with the proposed Configuration Change; and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department. Included in this review is verification that restoration activities will not result in hydraulic transients that could result in water hammer /
or affect the continued operation of the unit /O/r,
- 2. I have, confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed 7 below: ECJ.. oC-0087 9 Attachment 7 - Configuration Activities (Tracking No. A- z/Jz-77'4-)
Attachment 8 - Programs (Tracking No. I Attachment 9 - Procedures and Training (Tracking No. . )
- 3. Acceptance criteria for DCP Testing and any special tests required to adequately demonstrate system operability following Configuration Change implementation have been specified.
- 4. Parameters for performance monitoring and trending are adequately instrumented.
"A4-
- 5. If applicable, changes to system descriptions in UFSAR and DBDs have been reviewed and are correct.
- 6. Existing Surveillance Procedures are adequate for monitoring system performance or revision are being tracked to assure timely completion. (Action Tracking No. )
- 8. New components are classified per MA-AA-716-210 in the PCM web-based tool, appropriate revisions in the PCM web-based tool for existing components have been made, oradditions and changes are being tracked to assure timely completion. (Action Tracking No. )
AIA-
- 9. Design. conditions, inputs, and assumptions used in processes, designs or analyses subject to Nuclear Fuels Dept. design authority, if affected, have been discussed with NF and addressed if req'd.
- 10. The configuration change has been reviewed and will not introduce a new single point of vulnerability and there are no existing SPVs. (unless approved by Site Engineering Director) i1. Changes to operator rounds data points have been initiated per OP-AA-1 02-102. (Action Tracking No.)
- 12. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The design 71 summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007)
- 13. Determine if the interim configuration has any potential impact on the operational and nuclear safety requirements of all affected systems and interfacing structures, systems and components during the
- 74 mode(s) in which the design change is being implemented.
My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or appropriate contents) and understands the impact regarding my departmejit's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activitiEs requiredd_of my ep ent en identified.
Pi t Engineering Repriesentatie Daate Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort I
ECR 06-00879, REV. 0 ATYIACHMENT "2, CC-AA-102 Revision 11 PAGE 3OF -1 Page 57 of 63 ATTACHMENT 10C Engineering Programs Configuration Change Review Checklist Page 1 of I CONFIGURATION CHANGE DOCUMENT NO.: ' 6 "/1 ('T This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals'of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each departmlent is expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility. '1, Review Requirements InitiallDate
- 1. My department has participated'as required, and concurred with the proposed Configuration /2-Change; and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department. f4'/C J oh
- 2. I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA- AAA 102 attachments listed below: /1L. ot7/0
- Attachment - Configuration Activities (Action Tracking ft, 0k 771f*?
No. "j/A T
- Attachment8 - Programs (Action Tracking No. P/1 ) MA k'
- Attachme t 9-Procedures and Training (Action Tracking I1AL. /Q No.
- 3. DCP Testing has been specified to adequately demonstrate program compliance for components. These tests have been reviewed to assure that there is no likelihood of initiating a water hammer event. 1__4____
- 4. Changes to system descriptions in UFSAR and component DBDs have been reviewed and /OAl t42t are correct.
- 5. Existing Surveillance Procedures are adequate for monitoring system performancer AMC-297 b revisions are being tracked to assure timely completion. (Action Tracking No. -A/ i
- 6. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The' 0 design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007)
My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or appropriate contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activitie f deo ment have been identified.
Engineering Programs Representative Date Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort
,ECR 06-00879, REV. 0 C C-AA-102 AT]'ACHMýENTI,*
PAGE ,14CF-7 Revision 11 I Page 57 of 63 ATTACHMENT 10C Engineering Programs Configuration Change Review Checklist.
Page 1 of I CONFIGURATION CHANGE DOCUMENT NO.: ' 0- 0 53 7 £ \/.NJ - L)
This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility.
Review Requirements Initial/Date
- 1. My department has participated as required, and concurred with the proposed Configuration y /,
Change; and fully understands the Configuration Change impliqations for my department. ",WL/ J.127/4
- 2. I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed below: (
- Attachment 7 - Configuration Activities (Action Tracking V,{ 6 No. Vf UP 0 Attachment 8 - Programs (Action Tracking No. I _j )
- Attachment 9 - Procedures and Training (Action Tracking 1//2 71, No.-
- 3. DCP Testing has been specified to adequately demonstrate program compliance for components. These tests have been reviewed to assure that there is no likelihood of initiating a water hammer event. A
- 4. Changes to system descriptions in UFSAR and component DBDs have been reviewed and /I A are correct.
- 5. Existing Surveillance Procedures are adequate for monitoring system performance or , J /4 revisions are being tracked to assure timely completion. (Action Tracking No. t(A )
- 6. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The /,
design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007)
My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or appropriate contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, ocedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activities required of my departmen have, be, identified. _/
Engineering Progr"s Representat e Date Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort
ECR 06-00879, REV. 0 CC-AA-102 ATrACHMENT 2,-- Revision 13. I.
PAGE 7 OF 7 Page 63 of 77 F
ATTACHMENT 10C Engineering Programs Configuration Change RevieW-Checklist Page I of I CONFIGURATION CHANGE DOCUMENT NO.: - O "0600?79l/'ee. .
S.
This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approyals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment isthe required level of questions that each department Is expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Change. A'long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts, On other station programs and areas of responsibility.
Review Requirements Initial/Dats
- 1. My department has participated' as required, and concurred with the proposed Configuratipn Change; and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department-
- 2. 1 have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed below:.
- Attachment 7- Configuration Activities (Tracking
- ~No.)
I/,4 :1
- Attachment 8 - Programs (Tracking No. A2152
- Attachment 9 - Procedures and Training (Tracking
- No.)
- 3. DCP Testing has been specified to adequately demonstrate program compliance for components. These tests have been reviewed to assure that there Is no likelihood of:
initiating a water hammer event.
- 4. Changes to system descriptions in UFSAR and component DBDs have been reviewed and "11L7 are correct,
- 5. Existing Surveillance Procedures are adequate for monitoring system performance or revisions are being tracked to assure timely completion. (Action Tracking No. ) NAL
- 6. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007)
My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or appropriate contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. Aul Configuration Change support acrti. pf y department have been identified.
Eng4 ering P*trbams Representative Dat..
Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort
ECR 06.00879, REV. 0 CC-AA-102 ATTACHMENT "7. ARevision 13 I PAGE6OF"7 Page 64 of 77 ATTACHMENT 10D Maintenance Department Configuration Change Review Checklist Page 1 of I Configuration Change Document No.: 0,-0014 ,e.A*',' 0 This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and ar*e-s of responsibility.
Review Requirements InitiallDate
- 1. My department has participated as required and concurred with the proposed 'onfiguration Change; and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department. "2/ .
- 2. I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-1 02 attachments listed below:
'$'c- .~~~
- Attachment 8 - Programs (Tracking 0 ol/~7L W~ZI No . J a tT4r94 'c,",""0
- Attachment 9 - Procedures and ,ina X~5fZ1O2j<6S(Tracking No.~~ IV 6'*(
- 3. Cbostructability requirements have been considered (e.g., shop fabrication, field fabrication, scaffolding, rigging, ALARA, special tools, etc.) . "'
- 4. Demolition and removal boundaries have been clearly specified..- A1 .
- 5. Equipment layout allows maintenance space for newly installed components and does not interfere with maintenance of existing equipment. --
- 6. Items not in inventory, long lead time items, and required spare parts have "/
been identified. (Tracking Number.
- 7. Acceptance criteria for maintenance testing has been specified as required. -
My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or applicable contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operpions, procedures, and rograms. All Configuration Change support acti ties require of my department een identified.
7 7z 4ebi*M*ntega-rice Departmentee/Ii Date:
Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort
,9C - ooY71tgP CC-AA-102 Revision 11 I p~A 1 DIC4 kot 7 Page 60 of 63 ATTACHMENT 1OF Configuration Change Review Checklist for Use by Other bepartments Page 1 of I Department ./ 2., *- .I CONFIGURATION CHANGE DOCUMENT NO.:; 6 -0 *'7' This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Chqnge. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular'format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility. I I I Review Requirements InitiallDate
- 1. My department has participated in the Configuration Change process (scope meetings, walkdowns, impact review, etc.) as required, and concurred with the proposed Configuration Change; and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department.
- 2. I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed below:
- Attachment 8 - Programs (Action Tracking No.
- Attachment 9 - Procedures and Training (Action Tracking - kXA~
No.)
- 3. Other Considerations required to be completed in support of the Configuration Change:
- 4. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007) 6fkZQ4L~
My department has reviewed the Configuration Change document (or applicable contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support 7es required of my department have been identified.
_ 1_ , Date: 44.L2t
- Zcted Plant Department Representative (See EC Milestone for Dept Review signature authentication)
-Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort
ECR 06-00879, REV 0, ATTACHMNTM 3 PAGE . 01 3 Procedure EP-01 1 Rev. 11 AmerGen. Exhibit 2A AnExo,/Btih ErgyComp.any. QUALITY CLASSIFICATION EVALUATION FORM (Typical) EP-0111 ECR No: 06-00879 REV: 0 PAGE 1_.OF
/
I. Component Information 0 NEW COMPONENT El REVISION El INITIAL CLASSIFICATION Facility: OC Unit: 1 Category: M Type: MISC CRL Component No.: NR01\MB001-INT.
Host System No.: 187 Host ComponentlDescription: DRYWELL System Classification: 0D Q F] A, E] N Host Component Classification: no Q E A [3 N II. Evaluation
- 1. What are the safety functions of the host system and the host component? If both the host system and host component do not perform a safety function, mark this question and question 2 as "N/A" and continue to question 3.
Host System:
Host System:
The Containment is an enclosure for the reactor vessel, the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System, and other branch connections of the Reactor Coolant System.
Per UFSAR section 6.2.1, the design criteria for the Containment are as follows:
- a. To withstand the peak transient pressure (coincident with an earthquake) which could occur due to the postulated break of any pipe inside the drywell.
- b. To channel the flows from postulated pipe breaks to the torus.
- c. To withstand the force caused by the impingement of the fluid from a break in the largest local pipe or connection, without containment failure.
- d. To limit primary containment leakage rate during and following a postulated break in the primary system to substantially less than that which would result in offsite doses approaching the limiting values in 10CFRI00.
- e. To include provisions for leak rate tests.
Host Comopnent:
The concrete floor slab at the base of the drywell provides a foundation for the RPV support pedestal, as well as a level support surface for personnel and equipment
- 2. Does the item play a role in accomplishing the host system or host component's safety function? If "NO", go to Question
- 3. If"YES" mark questions 3 and 4 as "N/A" and go to section III. In either case, explain your answer.
NO
- 3. Does the item serve as an isolation device between a safety related and non-safety related interface with regard to fluid systems, electrical circuits, primary containment or effluent control? If "YES", explain your answer. If "NO", mark this question "NO" and go to Question 4.
NO
- 4. Are there any credible failure mechanisms/modes of the item that would prevent its host system or host component from performing its safety function? Explain.
The amount of potential drvwell debris that could enter the ECCS suction strainers is evaluated in calculation C-1 302-241 -E610-081.
11111. Component Classification If the answer to question 2, 3 or 4 is YES, classify the item as Safety Related (Q).
If the item is not 0, is it required to meet any of the commitments or requirements of Exhibit 3 in EP-01 1? If YES, identify those commitments/requirements on Exhibit 2B and classify the item as Augmented Quality (A); otherwise, classify the item as "Not Safety Related" (N).
El 0 (Safety Related) 0A (Augmented Quality) IN (Not Safety Related)
Revisions E] UPGRADES - Operability Review/CAP Initiated El DOWNGRADES - 10CFR50.59 Previous Report number: _(Required for EDMS) CAP No. SE No.:
MAINT. RULE COORD. NOTIFIED OF CLASSIFICATION REVISION: 0 PREPARER'S INITIALS: SM DATE: 10/27/06 E2-1 (EP-Ol 1/S6)
(EP-01 E2-1
ECR 06-00879, REV 0, ATTACE3O 3 OF 3 AmerGen.
An Exeon/Sdtsb Emg ECR 06-00879, REV 0, ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 2 OF 3 opn OC Evaluation (Typical)
Exhibit 2B - EP-011 ECR No: 06-00879 Rev No.: 0' Date: 10/27/06 Quality Class: A EQ (10 CFR 50.49): -
Facility: 0C Unit: 1 System: 187 Category: M Type: - Cmp Nbr: NR01\MB001-INT Item
Description:
DRYWELL INTERIOR MOISTURE BARRIER @ CONCRETE FLOOR ELEV 10'-3" WHERE DW FLOOR MEETS DW SHELL.
Functions: (include Safety Function for Safety Related items)
NONE. INSTALLED TO MINIMIZE WATER INTRUSION INTO CONCRETE FLOOR.
ALL ITEMS ARE TO BE EVALUATED REGULATORY COMMITMENTS (Blank indicates "N". X indicates "Y") SSEL/SQUG: Check One Box Only El R.G. 1.23 (Meteorological Monitoring) El 10 CFR 50.62 (ATWS) E] 1. (Host Component SQUG Eval- Active SSEL.)
El R.G. 1.26 (Quality Group Classification) El 10 CFR 73.55 (Security) ***(Note 1)*** El 2. ("Rule Of Box" SQUG Eval - Active SSEL)
El R.G. 1.143 (Radwaste Management Systems) R.G. 1.97: Check one Box only El 3. (Essential Relay - Active SSEL)
E] R.G. 1.155 (Station Blackout) El R.G. 1.97 CAT 1 required to be classified "Q" El 4. (Operator Action Relay - Active SSEL)
El IEB 79-18 (Plant Paging) El R.G. 1.97 CAT 2 El 5. (Host Component SQUG Eval- Inactive SSEL.)
El IEB 80-11 (Block Walls) El R.G. 1.97 CAT 3 El 6. ("Rule Of Box" SQUG Eval - Inactive SSEL)
[E 7. (SQUG Qualified Component Not On SSEL)
Seismic Category: Check one Box only El W - (Seismic Class 1 - Operable During &After SSE) El Y - (R.G. 1.29 Anti Fall-down) M-RULE/EPIX/PSA El X- (Seismic Class 1 - Operable After SSE) 0 Z - (No Seismic Class applies) _ M-RULE (R / Y / N) [E A4 SCOPE (Y / N)
OTHER CLASSIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (Blank indicates "N", X indicates "Y") El PSA CLASS (Y/ N) - ORAM (O/S/B/N)
I E Interface [] Emer Ht Sink El Press Boundary Inst. 0 License Renewal ASME REQUIREMENTS (Blank Indicates "N", X Indicates "Y") 10 CFR 50 APP. R/BTP APP. A (FHAR)
_ ISICLASS(AICINIM/1l213) 0 SECXIISi[ FSSD(N/1/2) El FIREPROT(Y/N)
El SEC Xl IST El ASME.REPAIR/REPLACE El Refs/Other Commitments:
Comments: MUST MEET ENVIRONETAL CONDITIONS OF DBLOCA FOR SUCTION STRAINERS CLOGING.
References:
C-1 302-241 -E610-081, Rev. 0 Reason for Revision:
ICD A* IQ0
ECR 06-00879. REV 0. 0 ATTA~CHMENT
. . . . . 3O 3 OF 3 Note 1: "Y"Requires the following Special Text Entry in PIMS: "***SECURITY REQUIRED PRIOR TO WORK ON THIS COMPONENT***-
Exhibit 2C - EP-01 1 QC Evaluation (Typical)
Multiple Component Sheet For ECR#
CMP NBR CATG TYPE FUNCTION (Include Safety Function for "Q"components) m rP3 Ir-D Al I4IQ&
ECR OG-OO&79 L.P. 8-7" DRAINAGE CHANNEL DRAM~NG AFFECTED.
B.R4070 5M. I ECK Or.-OO&79 ATTACI1MENTA-I'AGEN Oft BY:[D.ABBRU5CATO DATE: I 012710G
, OCT, . 1997 I:88pm MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(815)33752S1 NO.W7 P.4/16 Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute P. 0. BOX 7. DAEDUK-DANJI. TAEJAN. 305-606. KOREA TEL.(O42 868-2000 /TLX. KAERI K45553 /FAX.(042 868-2702 CRTIFICATE OF RADIATION PROCESSING Date 1994. 7- 7.
CUSTOM~
x' T SAMPLE 0,l SOUR=E DOSIME11 iNlcol (M. 2w82.
DOSE ~ M O rd(0 v
,-a f0Mrt Ask4~v D=ER=T :0.5S Mrad/br (AVRI, ECL 2OSUR TIME 400 hr 194- 6 20, 14:00 -7 7 06:54 LOSS TI-E :M OPERATOR PARK. MOC!W2EL DATEj L4.
APPROVED I Th. DATEH 1W..n~i Z U
Head, Radiation Processing~ Proiect
1, . ýOCTI. 27. 1997 1: 09PM MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(815)3,75261 NO.227 P.5/16 No. I.
(T eat R epocr t)
- + j T, (fepcrt No.) TP-04882 (1994.07.13)
A* L &(ApIVI -nt Addresis) :#260, NA A-RI, YANG NAN-t1YLN, KYUN'G BUIK. XMOEA 2I4 Af 1 (Company) MIUNDAL lMNGR & CZi4ST/WOLSM? #2 Nppp
- YOUjNr-JONG, KL M.
'1.. xf rd (Rep.resentatIve)
(om~:dity)
M t THlIIOKL SEAL~AMI 2282' (2HL-A/XKKC-B) q Al~ ~j I (T1est Resixlt) fc o r*
!.t.pci f ic. Gravity -1.44 I SM 5000-90 Solid Contmtu 9819 IHardness(Shace 'A) 138 ASmH U'2240 Wdork Lifed2GC min i55 , ASTh4 C 503 Tack Froee2O1C) hr I7-1/2 ASTH C 679 STm&i Ie Strength, La Es/Cd 27? ASTh D 412 Elon~gation %
9 450
- 1mix'Lng PA ti.0 IA~ 7.:.
USE PURPOSE W)1lSUBM ITAVO XM.ýn)
THIS SHALL NO BE LSED OIUTiSTOE 'IlE DEFINED USAGE AS VJPJL AS F[P. THFr
.M rufdVsgt or.PXPAGANWDA, LAWSUIT ANDT Ufl-jFiR LMfAL~ HEUIREMfN'TS...
- THfrS TEST IMPORT WAS 12XECUTED IN I PAE(s).
0 00 Alliis is to ':ertify thait the above-ment i orne' commoditie-s has been 3, W .sted in Lhe requeat test.
(Certificated by) olý j.A0 Korea Tsillng and Reaeateh Int*ti for Chemleal Indusly' "
Director General A 14-*t 0 A
ýýOCT,27.1997 1: 09PM MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(B15)3375261O -NO.027 P.6/16
?o, I (Tet 8 e po rt) 1.1;,l ~Report Cj No.-) : TP-04833 (1994.07.12)
Ai -* ? ! . (Amiplicant Address) #260, NA A-RI, YANO NAM-*MN, KYUNG BUR, K O :
,1I4 f j (Company) K.WNIDAl LNOR & COC4PT /WOibSONU #2 NPPP f "J (Representative) JANE4 IiENG-DIK I" 94 (Cowmodity) 1 T1iIOKOL SEALAINT (2282)
S*.4 (Test Result) ,*~ f*xIt*c-63.
TM..'ST , ' iT,SS ULT , TRT Mk."nl0)
- -- - -- - - -a- ' ~ ----------------------....-
Tensile Strength . 'flM I 10 AS IM D 412 Elongation I So o00 Hardner1(Shore A) D 2240
-17"ASTM USK~ :SUBMI7rFJD PURFOSE FORCsuMI'rrAL TO XCFM)
NOTE + THIS SHALL NMT BE USED OMfESDE THE. DEFINED USAGE AS W4ELLT AS kullt 7(E PUP-OSqF. OF PRQPAGANTA, LWSUIT AND OTHER L1MfAL REUiTROEfENT'P.
b .~T1hS TEST E1FAkT WAS EMO21rMu IN 1, PACE(a) 0E uo 0
This is to certify that the above mentioned vmmod ties Va-% been .. 0 tesLed in i.he request tast.
- te b
{Curtificated by)
Kois. Tweling, an~d 1060afoh Inatlul o hnstliuk DilrectOor aeneal A
- 4 9 4 'd -7 Cg r.- -'n-- 8.71 88-4 71
OCT. 2.1997 1:a09PM MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(815)3375261. NO.027 P.7/16 LP' ,V POLYSULFIDE POLYMER T5/69 RADIATION RESISTANCE OF LP0 LIQUID POLYSULFIDE POLYMER BASED COMPOUNDS INTRODUCTION Several independent test laboratory studies have been conducted on the radiation resistance of LP9 liquid polysulfide based compounds. In one study, -an LP liquid polysulfide based compound withstood gamma radiation doses up to 6A6 X 10'7 roentgens, for a period of seven days, with little degradation to physical properties. In a second study, specially formulated LP liquid polysulfide based compounds immersed in JP-4 jet fuel withstood as much as 1.7 x 100 roentgens, with only a small loss in physical properties. Both studies showed that commercially available LP liquid polysulfide polymer base aircraft sealants formulated to meet Federal Specifications MIL-S-7502C and MIL-S-8802C had the best resistance to radiation.
O DISCUSSION OF RADIATION RESISTANCE DATA FROM OTHER REPORTS One report which contains radiation data is entitled, "Research on Elastomeric and Compliant Materials for Aerospace Sealants", Technical Documentary Report No. ASD-TDR-62-709. In this study, eight different polymer based sealants, which were all proprietary sealants, were evaluated and compared. Of those sealants tested, the LP liquid polysulfide based sealants gave the bestresistance to gamma radiation, In testing the LP liquid polysulfide based sealant compounds for radiation
- ' resistance, three different curing agents were used. The best radiation and heat resistance results S.:. obtained were on those LP polysulfide polymer compounds which used either the chromate* or MnO 2
- , cure as compared to the PbO2 cure. The best results obtained in this study were on an LP liquid S- pypoly olymer based compound that withstood gamma radiation doses of 6.4 x 106 roentgens at temperatures of 190*F for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. After 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> at 250°F, this compound was still serviceable
- < . although some degradation was evident.
A second report that contains considerable radiation data on various sealant systems is entitled, "The Effects of Reactor Radiation on Elastomers and Sealants-Ill", by L. L. Morgan. This is Document No.
NARF-60-37T, and is also listed as ASTIA No. 256,689. In this study, a number of proprietary compounds, as well as compounds prepared by Thiokol, were evaluated against a number of combined environments. The maximum gamma dosage which LP'liquld polysulfide based sealants withstood, when exposed in air 'at 900°F, was 1.7 x 105 roentgens. After this maximum gamma radiation exposure, the samples still exhibited tensile properties of 400 psi and elongation values of 265%.
US. Parent No. 2,787,608 ssued 4/2/17 to ProductrR~eearrc Comranty. Los Angeleso Cal. should be referred to before process*,t* and marketing commercial producte based on the chromwne cure sysrem.
71-" :ik / CHEMICAL DIVISION 0 930 Lower Ferry Road 0 P.O. Box 1296 r Trenton, N.J. 08607 0(609) 396-4001 0 Registered tradeimark of Thiokol Corporaijon.
The Information In t[is bulletnl Is derived from the best available sources and ia belleved to be accurrate. Mowavor, no guarantee Is. expredeed or implied regarding tits accut.c, of t*ese d4tA of the use of ibis vroducl. not era any statements In this bulletin intended to Infringe on any patent.
- OCT.217. 1997 1: 10PM MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(815)337521 NO.027 P.6/16 in another test, cured tensile specimen samples of several LP liquid polysulfide polymer based sealant compounds were immersed in JP-4 fuel for seven days. Next, the samples received a gamma dose of 1.7 x 10 roentgens, after which they were left immersed in the JP-4 fuel for thirty more days. After completion of the exposure tests, the samples still exhibited a tensile strength of 350 psi and an elongation of 125%. The LP liquid polysulfide polymer based compounds used in these exposure tests were based on a chromate and MnO2 cure system.
Refer to Table I for typical LP liquid polysulfide polymer based formulations and the physical and heat resistant properties of the cured compounds. Then, refer to Tables II and Ill for a summary of results on five cure systems and their correlation between radiation and heat resistance. All data in the following Tables was compiled from tests conducted by Convair, a division of General Dynamics, Fort Worth, Texas. Convair conducted all the irradiation studies on the test sampies, which were prepared and supplied by Thiokol Chemical Corporation. Among the sealants formulated by Thiokol, It was established that cure systems exhibiting the best heat resistance also exhibited the best radiation resistance, Exposure to higher temperatures dpring irradiation indicated that heat alone cai cause degradation. ',
00 00 U
2
- *OCT. 2. 1997 1: 18PM MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(815)337526 . NO. 027 P.9/16 TABLE I PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF COMPOUNDS BASED ON THIOKOL'S LP-32 POLYMER
/
Compound (pbw) A CB c 0 E LP-32 Polymer 100 100 100 100 100 Titanox RA-50 - 50 -
EH-330 1.2 -
25% Maleic Anhydride In Cvclohexanone - - 2 -
Durez-10694 5 - - 5 S R F'#3 30 - - 40 30 MOO - 4 -
Sulfur 0.1 - - 0.1 Siearic Acid 1 .. 1 Cumene Hydroperoxide - - 6 -
50% TeOA in Dibuty! Phthalate - 4 ...
50%PbO2 In TP-680 15 - - -
43% Ammonium Chromate Solution inH 2O - -H - 1 Cabosil M-5 - - 20 -
Sodium Stearate - 5 - -
MnOz."D" Grade - - - - 3 Original Physical Properties >
Tensile, psi 390 310 435 800 390 300% Modulus, psi 240 780 130 610 280 Elongation, % 500 530 910 590 435 S Hardness, Shore A 50 33 46 61 50 Physical Properties After One Week at 1680F.
Tensile. psi 550 350 620 910 910 3QO% Modulus, psi 300 150 165 610 310 Elongation. % 540 630 830 490 700 Hardness. Shore A 53 50 48 62 50 Physical Properties After One Week at 2120F, Tensile, psi 710 420 870 950 780 300% Modulus, psi 380 140 290 680 290 Elongation, 440 750 740 460 710 Hardness, Shore A 57 49 57 64 45 Physical Properties After One Weelk at 250 F.
Tensile, psi 540 350 800 710 430 300% Modulus. psi 120 460 510 160 Elongation,% 190 650 460 420 750 Hardness, Shore A 64 48 58 67 43 3
-UU U.e-d. I'zU( 1: 11im MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(B15)337S2WNO87 .140.027 P.10/16 P.6i TABLE II PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF EXPERIMENTAL SEALANTS, BASED ,
ON THIOKOL'S LP-32 POLYMER, AFTER IRRADIATION IN AIR AT 900F.
Compound Gamma x 107 Neutron x10 'Tensile, psi Elongation, %
A 0 0 480 625 1.4, .. 4 460 490 10.1 8 300 210 10.1 7 250 160 B 0 0 450 700 1.5 1.3 420 720 10.1 8 260 280 10.1 7 170 200 C 0 0 820 670 1.4 1,3 580 560 10.1 7.1 420 320 Q- 10.1 7 400 260 D '0 0 1230 570 2.2 1.3 1140 440 10,1 7 650 210 10.1 7 530 160 E 0 0 670: 5o0 2.2 1.3 480 450 8.4 7 280 250 17.4 10 250 210 Gamma Irradiation In Roentgens, but originally expressed as ergstgm. (C)
Neutron irradiation In n/cm2 where E>0.33 MEV 4-
OCT.27-1997 1:11PM MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(815)3375261 NO.027 P.11/16
/ TABLE III PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF EXPERIMENTAL SEALANTS BASED ON THIOKOL'S LP-32 POLYMER, AFTER IRRADIATION AND IMMERSION IN JET FUEL Compound Gamma x 107wNeut os's..10 Tensile, psi Elongation,%
A 0,0 480 540 2.9 1.2 290 340 11.3 7 60 40 S0 0- "340 670 2-9 12 150 240
.13.0 6. 20 60 c 0 0 740 ,sO 2.9 1.2 S70 . 620 13.0 7 170 110 D 0 0 1020 530 1.7.2 1 3o50 120 :i H0 E 0 600 11,5 530 I . . . . .. ._..
8 115 70
...... _ _ 1_ _ll*?
l] . . . . , ......
Treatmerrt (JP.4 inmersion 7 days at 75?F.. irradiation during imrlersion followed by 30 days immersion in JP-4 Fuel at 7*FJ.
Gamma irradiation in Roentgens. but originally expressed as erghgm. (Cl Neutron irradiation in r/cm' where F_>0.3MEV LIST OF BRAND NAME COMPOUNDING INGREDIENTS Material Trade Name Chemical Composition Manufacturer TP-680 Polymeric Thiokol/Chemical Division 00 Cabosil M-5 Fumed silica Cabot Corporation Durez 10694 Phenolic resin Hooker Chemical Corp.
EH-330 Catalyst, tertiary amine Thiokol Chem. Corp.
MnO - "ID"grade Manganese dioxide, special Manganese Chemical grade MnO2 Corporation Titanox RA-50 Titanium dioxide Titanium Pigments Corporation
OCT.27. 1997
- 1:11PM MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(815)3375261 .NO.62? P.12/16 DIVISION HEADQUARTERS P. O. Box 1296 Trenton, New Jersey 08607 (609) 396-4001 SALES OFFICES Suite 521 One Oxford Valley Langhorne, Pennsylvania 19047 (215) 752-5355 6272 Oakton Street Morton Grove, Illinois 60053 (312) 583-2900
- 0. 2631 Michelle Drive Tustin, California 92680 (714) 832-3560 00.- 114.IN CANADA:
0 Thiokol Canada Limited 75 Homer Avenue Toronto, Ontario, Canada M8Z 4X5 (416) 259-1141 IN ENGLAND:
Thiokol Chemicals Limited Station Tower, Station Square Coventry CV1 2GH, England Telephor~e+/- 2-1213 7XC 0,6k e,/CHEMICAL DIVISION A DIVISION OF THIOKOL CORPORATION TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08607
1=7 r £: lit-" N'UNIUN bU" WUIV510}CK(615)33521 NO.827 .: P. 13/16
/
Engineering Paper No. 893 THE EFFECT OF NUCLEAR RADIATION ON SEALANTS
!by 00 Raymond A. Siebert Process Engineer 00o Materials Research & Process,'pgineering Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc.
This paper to be presented at the Society of Aircrafc Materials and Process Engineers, Symposium on Sealants and Sealing Aircraft, Missiles, and Electrical Components#
October 28, 1959, In the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, 7660 W. Beverly Blvd., Los Angeles, California
.4
I VV r .,I.-_rC-rl '.,rrjtUln --K WU,,L&)1UUKlUta tOl)ý:,,q,-aZ51 NO.627 P. 14/16 In addition to the obvious thermaf and mechanical effects,' of an atomic
- h explosion, additional. effects may result from exposure to high intensity nuclear radiation. An aircraft or missile which might survive the heat and shock wave of an atomic detonation could donceivably become, disabled because of radiation effects on components of an essential system such as hydraulic controls or power plant. Recently, Douglas Aircraft Company had the opportunity to investigate the effects of nuclear radiarion from an atomic explosion, on various process materials used in the construction of aircraft and missiles. Tncluded in the test materials were various sealants which were selected because of their general usage in the aim-frame and missile industry.
- 1. material A is a polysulfide based EIL-S-8S02 typý jet fuel resistant integral fuhl tank sealant which employs a chromate based accelerator.
- 2. Material 3 is a black, polysulfide based MIL-S-7502 type integral fuel tank sealant which utilizes a lead peox'ide based accelerator.
- 3. Material C is a polysulfide. based M)T-S-8516 type electrical pp@tting compound which utilizes a lead peroxide based accelerator.
0 4. Material D is a room temperature curing silicone based sealant.
5.: Material 3 is a heat curing silicone based sealant which is
-putty-ike in consistency before cure.
= S ecimen Preparation PTest specimens were prepared from 1/8 inch thick sheets of cured sealant W<which had been milled to removed entrapped air immediately after addition of the accelerator. After the sheets had cured 7 days at 77 -t20F..a dumb-bell specimens were cut using the die described in AS= DP-412-51T as Die D. The resulting specimens measured 4 inches in length with a maximum width of 5/8 of an inch and a throat width of 1/8 of an inch. Since Material E, the heat curing silicone, was too viscous for air-free milling, 1/2 by 4 inch rectangular specimens were cut from a 1/8 inch thick sheet which had been pressed from a portion of the uncured compound.
Each specimen was then weighed to the nearest milligram and enclosed in a piece of 1100 alumifun (2S) tubing with an inside diameter of 3/4 of an inch and a leigth of 5 inches. The ends of the tubes were crimped closed and the sealants allowed to cure an additional 37 days at 77
- 2oT.
The specimens were then divided into 5 groups,with each group qonsistung of 3 specimens of each sealant. Each group, with the exception of the control group, was encased in a 6 inch aluminum sphere having a wall thickness of 1-1/2 inches in order to protect the specimens from thermal and mechanical damage. These speres were shipped to the test site where they were placed at varying distances from ground zero. The control specimens were maintained at 77 + 20?. for the duration of the test.
.1-i.
ýOCT.27.1997 1: 12PM MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(815)3375261 NO.027 P.15,ý16 Evaloution of Effects.
Eighteen days after the detonatiop, the test specirmens were removed from the aluminum tubes and checked for induced radioactivity. Only. the poly-svlfide specimens - Materials A, B and C - which had been exposed at Positions 1 and 2 exhibited any measurable induced radioactivity, as shown In the Table of Results. All specimens including the controls were re'eighed and per cent changes in weight calculated. There were no significant trends apparent in the weight changes except, perhaps, in Material. E which will be discussed. later.
All du"bel semesj, Oith, A total- cure of 62 days, were tested for ultiat re s~ .tretgt1h tand 'elongationproperties at 77 7k 207. using -a
,,Sott t*e*st"r Mbode*lIL equyppedq ,wth Type Z-1 clamps and operating at a-claseaaiio opt iatii of 2%int`i prmnute. All specimens of Material E er ms urdfor har~dness. Using-aRxTroter. Model A.
As ndiate intheTabe o ~.sulsthere was no consistent pattern in eir~e te ultiate te~~ teg r elongation of the exposed specimens par ttoed
ý te tItos The. e*expos;fed specimens of fuel tank sealants, Materials Aend B. exibitedý:ve slitght increase in ultimate tensile strngt I~t this increas* Va ot po rtional to the amount of radiation r~eceie -~.thevarlo*zsgrops The 'only consistent changes were observed in. t~he bardneus rendingse or exposed specimens of Material E, where a PrTges; v increasei in ha!44nessP witt increasing proximity to ground zero Vas noted, The changes in weight and hardness exhibited by. the exposed specimens of Material E were possibly caused by increased temperatures as the specimens were situated closer to ground zero. However, if the temperature at C- Position I was sufficient to cure Material E to a hardness of 45-50, boAm which3 andnormally C at this requires 5 to should position 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />shave 250 0 F., thedetectable at exhibited specimens signs of Materialp of "
C, : heat exposure, such as increased tensile strength or reduced elongation.
o Since there appeared to be no other evidence of beat effects,* the changes exhibited by Material E were probably a result of bombardment by thermal U* < neutrons whose energy effects may have been sufficient to polymerize the relatively low molecular weight silicone compodnd.
Generally, the sealant; tested did not experience. sufficient damage to impair their serviceability at the levels of radiation involved in this test. Since an aircraft or missile exposed to higher levels of radiation from an atomic explosion would probably be destroyed or disabled by the heat or shock wave, any effects on sealant materials at these levels would appear to be of secondary interest.
ECR 06-;00879,-RV. 0 TABLE ATTACHMENT q..PAGEAOF)- ',
T V .1. 4.
W040h1 nugia III 1-4mj% ft 41- Cf. S. "1 .8
~~~~SF4= *ILAIY&M ga 110JIIM, DZ JfK L1f Exposure, Actual. .Variation Adtual Variation Varietion Induced TIn WeIghlt from Tanalle from Actual from .Radioactivity Mnl-09w-ral
- ej-
.. . ... u~o.ronioJ H..d...
,10 x to 6 -0.30 -0,08, 419 +7.5 175 +2.9 1200 4.0 x 5 -0.26 -0122 419 +7.5 205_ +Z.5 - 300 A 9.0 x 104 -0.34 -0.04 432 +10,8 195 +14.8 " None 2.7 x 104 -0.'26 -0.UL 422 +8.2 180 +59 - None Control -0.38 - 390 - ~ i 117"
]7o- - ;* ", - : None, C
.~~ .. .......
.. C 1.1 x 106 -3.12 +0.50 435 +1.4 390!'- +4.0 * - .*
- 600
- 60 4.0 x 10 5 -2.74 +0.02 445 +3.7 390 +4.0 - 100 B ! ,Ox 104 -2.62 -0.10 438 +2.1 365 -2.7 None
- on 2.7 x i04 -2.80 +0,08 451 C
+5.1 380 +1.3 - None C Control -2.72 - 429 375 - - None 0
ý4.0 x 1 -1.71 +0.70 [: .,: . . tO 3 :400 196 -5.8 195 -L6. ..
C w 104 -09 -0.05 2.7 x 0 -0.96 -0.05 208 0.0 219 -10.6
- None Control -1.01. 208 - 245
- - None
....~~~~~~~~~ * ,,.
, : .. :,:: , ...... ..... ..... . ,~~~~~
7*;
4.0 x 105 -0.89 +0.49 532 -6.8 138 -12.7 - Honae 2.7 x 1.0 -0.66 A0,26 588 +3,0 160 +1.3 - None Control -0,40 - 571 . - 1.58 .,"- None IL x0I 16 16 :+0,86 :
- - - .45-50 .* None 4,0 x 10 5 -1.25 +0,46 - - - . - 35-40 5 Nove B 9.0 x i04 -1.45 +0.66 ... 35 None 2,7 x 1 -1.10 +0.3L - " .. - - 25-30 None Control -0.79 - - - - - 15-20: None 1A Roentgen is defined as tbhat quantity of X- or Oami:radiation aduc that the associated corpuscular emLssion per 0.001293 gram of air produces, Ln aLr, Ions carrying one electrostatic unit or quantity of elect*-city of either Alan.
10/25/2006 11:49 2813976512 POLYSPEC PAGE 01 8
NSF Iunternational. ?JflV 9. 1 1Q'7 NOV 20 1 QQ Ann Arbor, Mi
- Sacramento, CA -Washington, D.C.' Bruses, l'Belgium Send To 32300tIM' Plant 3,301 MORTON INTERNATIONAL, TNC. MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
100 NORTH RZVZRSIDE PLAZA: 5724 ELDER FERRY ROAD CHICAGO, IL 60606-1598 MOSS POINT, MS 39581 Attn: MA. MARK NOWAK Attn..MR. HAL MC L=GCKLIN Thank'you for having your product tested by NSF.
The enclosed report detai*s the results ol the testing performe* on. your px:*duct. Yoi~r program representative will be contacting you in the near future if tbere are any remaining 1,aquea concernigq the status of this product.
Please do not hesitate to, contact uA If you have any immediate questions pertaining to your product.
0 CC. -~r 6.0 %J7GI$O 1 1A
___________E7-r~.
W.'F9711205405 ROport for Job 955316 Page 1 of 6 This report shall not bb reproduced, except in its entirety, withou t the written approval of NSF. This report do, not roapreveft tYsr crtificav~ti@ or &utihO*L3~t~n to wo the "2cW m4k. Authorization to maoo the 2YDP H~xk Le iinLmd.
to products appearing in the Company's Official NSF Listing Book or NSF's Internet Product CertifLoation Direato:
P.0, box 130140 Ann Atbor. Michigan 48113-0140 USA 313-769-8010 1-800-NSF-MARK Fax 313-769-0109 E-Mail. info@nsf.arg Web:http!//ww,.nsf.otg
POLYSPEC PAGE 02.
18/25/2006 11:49 2813976512 Tracking ID: IA01875 Reqion: 04 ICO11ection Date: 10-APR-19:96 00:00;00.00
Description:
Thiokol 2235-M Lab Number: $60502730 Sampled: APR:10, 1996 Received: APR 16, .1996 Class Function: JASM/ICSK Tracking ID: IA01875 Listed or ReteSt: Al Normalization Amount (Fioid): 7.75 Normalization Volume (Fi~ld): 1 Normalization Factor - N2: 0 Testing Standard: 61 P aramt r Result UIits Entred
Description:
.'Thljokol 2235-M, sample exposed at 30C aid. pH 5 Lab Number! S61003055 Sampled:. APR 10, i996 Received: APR 16, 1996 Pa~rameter S art 1 Control UnitsR Entared Add4itive sample preparation: informattol Date exposure completed 10-30-96 Sample: I1-OCT-XP9P 00:10 Control: 11-OCT-1996 MOOiO 10-30-96 surface area exposed (Al) 128 128 in2 7.30 7.50 liters 10-30-96 Final volume of solution (VI) 24.00 hoUrs 10-30-96 Length of exposure .(TI) 24.00 o Arsenic NO (4) ND (4) uq/L 11-05-96
> Cadmium. NRD(1) HD (1) UCJ/L 11-08-96 RD (1) RD (1) ug/L ND (0. 0002) tD (0.0002) Mg/L 10-17-96 0Description: Thilokol 2235-i M, Sample exposed at 30C and pH 8 Lab Nutt ber: S61003056 o Sampled: AxR 10, 1996 Received: APR 16M 1996 U *4
" 4+.
Parameter NAMUI n " a Additives sample preparationlinformation Date exposure completed 10-30-96 Samples Il-OCT-1996 00.00 Control: 11-OMT-1996 00t00 Surface Aira exposed (Al) 12. 12.5 in2 10-30-96 7.60 liters 10-30-96 Final volume of solution (d'i) 7.30 houra 10-30-96 Length of.expocure (TI) 24.00 24.00 Phenolics 0.032 ND (0.001) mg/L 10-15-96 2-Mercaptoethanol ND(50) ND (50) ug/L 11-05-96 PhthalataS, in Water, Scan, 0 compounds, 625 NDlI) ND (1) ug/L 11-18-96 B-is (2-Ethylhexyl) Phthalate ua/L 11-18-96
'Dutyl Benzyl Phthalate 3 ND (1)
NOD idicates Not DetGo~td.
F9711205405 Report for Job 955316 Page 2 of.6 This repot szhall not be reproduoed, ecepot in its entirety, without the vritten approval of NBS'.This repo*t do Act reprosent NSF CertifALnatiohe oay il O fhtration toNS the M MArn. S Aoo inatlee to us* te2 IUSf Mark 4a UgL*&
to products appearinq in the Company's Official'NSF Listing Book or lNSF'n Internet Product Cartificatian Pirecto
10/25/2006 11:49 2813976512 POLYSPEC PAGE 83ý S61003056 Continued n -. m -j -
.R1I' er' -smi roQnrrni Onir*EA ntpraed Phtha1ates 4 in Water, Scan, 6 Compounds, 625 Continued Di-n-Butyl Phthalate 1 1 ug/L 11-18-96 Diethyl Phthalate ug/L 11-18-96 Dimethyl Phthalate ND(10) ND (10) ug/L 11-18-96
,Di-n-Octyl Phthalate NTD(1) ND (1) ug/L 11-18-96 Note:.
A1.o found approximately:
8.2 ug/L AS: fen2enemetbanel 3.3 ug/L AS: 1-Phenyl ethanone 3.9 ug/L Age 2-Phenyl-2.Lpropanol.
0.61 ug/L AS: Bin (2-chiotoethoxy) methane
,External [0 lineal Phthalatea, in Water, Scan, .6 compounds, 625 20, ug/L LP: Oxygen conttaining, NW>03 7 ug/L LP: Tetramethyl urea 6 ug/L LP: Mix of oxygen containing, MW 89 and oxathiolane and ethyl hexanol 6 ug/t. LP: TNitxogen.ccntaining, MNfll4 0 ug/L LP: (Propenylozy) benzene 200 ug/L LP: Mix of Diogathiocane and surrogate standard dS-nitrobenzane 10 Ug/L LP:. Trimethyl 0entanediol 3 ug/L LP: (Propenyl) Phenol 3 ug/L LP: Oxygen containing, MW=>144 7 ug/L 'LP: Tetramethyl thiourea 3 ug/L LP: Nitrogen, dxygen containing, MW>157 20 ug/L LR': Oxygen conptaining, b->142 10 ug/L LP: Oxygen containing, MW1>159
- 40 ug/L LPz Oxygen containing, MW>173 900 ug/L LP: Mix of nittogen containing, MW=>199 and surrogate standard p 20 100 30 ug/L ug/L uq/L dS-fluorobJiphenyl LP: Aromatic oygen containing, MW=>f62 LE: Aromatic oXygen containing, MW=>164, #1 LP: Aromatic nItrogen, oxygen containing, MW>178 0 100 Ug/L LI: Aromatic ofygen containing, MW->164, #2
,4. ug/L LP: Mix of oxy4en containing, MW=>190 and ditert butyl methOey phenol 2 ug/L LP: Oxygen tontlaining, MW=>202 7' ug/L LI: Nitrogen cdntaining, MW4>176 0*~ a ug/L LP: Mix of nittogen containing, MW>IA and Oxygen containing, MW->204 3 ug/L LLP: Mix, two ogygen containing, MW->86 and MW>165 and aromatic oxygen eontainiflg, MW=->206 u6 LP* Aromatic o4ygen containing, MW=d>204, t 6 ug/L LP: Aromatic oý4ygen containing, MW=>204, #2 1
6 0q /L LP' Nitrogen cdntlning, MW>'200 100 ug/L LP: Nitrogen cdntaining, MW>212, #1 10 ug/L LI: Nitrogen cdntaining hydrocarbon, MW;192 3 ug/L LI; Aromatic oXygen containing, MW=>236 4 uqg/L LP: Aromatic oygen containing, MW=>204, #3 30 ug/L LP: Aromatic o~ygen containing, MW=>192 50 ug/L LP: Aromatic o.ygen containing, MW=>194 6 ug/L LP: Nitrogen centaining, MW>212, #2 6 ug/L LPs (Methyl phenyl ethyl) phenol 8 ug/L LP: Nitrogen ceontaining, MW>240 7 ug/L LP: Unknown hydrocarbon, MW>209 6 ug/L LP: Mix of nitrogen containing, MW>230 and oxygen containing, MW=->226 ND tiadAtes Not Detected.
F9711205405 Report for Job 955316 Page 3 of 6 l l
Thia report shall not represent NSF nAt be reproduced, exOept in its entirety, without the written approval of NSF. This report &
Certification or authoar4Ation to use the NSF Mark. Authorization to une the NSF MarkiLai mil to products appearing in the Company's Official NSF Listing Book or NSF's Internet Product Certification Dlrect;
10/25/2006 11:49 2813976512 POLYSPEC PAGE 04
$61003056 Continued Parameter Contio Unt-UrSimin a
Phthalates, in Water, Scan, 6 compounds, 625 Continued 3 ug/L LP: Nitrogen cc~ntaining, MW>244 80 ug/L LPs Nitrogen "ontaining, MW=>257 8 ug/L LP: Oxygen cont!faining, MW-166 I 100 ug/L LP: Nitrogen containing hydrocarbon, MW>270 40 ug/L LPz Nitrogen ccntaining, MW>286 10 ug/L LP: Nitrogen c*taining, MW>260 10 ug/L LP2 Nitrogen eo~taining, MW->299 100 ug/L LP: Unknown hydrocarbon, MW=>300 30 ug/L LY: Unknown hydrocarbhn, 'MW->312 20 ug/L Lgi Mix of nitziogen containing, MW>328 and oxygen containinq, HW->310 "
2 ug/L LP: Oxygen contli'ning, MW->390 200 LP":g/L Nitrogen co~ntaining hydrocarbon, MW=>335 I0 ug/L LP: Unknown hydrocarbon, MW>341 .
3 ug/L LP:. Unknown hyd ocarbon, MW>25" 40 ug/L LP2 Ntxogen, ohtýnlnq hydiQcarbon, MW->379 Comment Unregulated VOC'a Volatiles: N..10-18-96 Sample: Aslo had 520 ugVL carbon dasulfide. 0 Dichlorodifluoramethane ND(O.5) NDD(O.5) tg/L 10-18-96 Chloromafthane ND(O.5) ND(0.5) uq/L i0-18.-96 Bromomethane ND(O.5) MD (0.5y ug/L 10-19-96 Chloroethane ND(O.5) ND (0. S) ug/L 10-18-96 Trichlorofluoromethane NP(0.5) ND(O.S) . u9L 10-18-964 Trichlorotrifluoroethane NDD(0.5) ND(O.5) ugrL 10-1f--956 Methylene Chloride ND(0.2) ND(O.2) ug/L 10-18-96 trans-1,2-Dichloroethylene. ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L 10-"18-96 i,1-Dichloroethane ND(O.5) ND(O.5) ug/L I0-18-90 2, .2-bichloropropane ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ugfL 10-1e-96 ois-1,2-Dichlo roethylene ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug(L 10-18-196' Chloroform 1,2 ND(O.5) ug/L 10-19-L96 Bromochloromethane ND (0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L 10-18-96
- 0 ,l-Dichloropropene ND (0.5) ND(0.5) uq/L 10-18-96 Carbon Tetrachloride ND(0.5) ND (0.5) ug/L 10-18-96 1,2-Dichloropropane ND(0.5) ND(0.5) uq/L 10-19-96 Bromodichloromethane ND(O.5) ND(O.5) bfg/L 10-18-96 O L Dibrom~methane ND(0.S) ND (0.5) ug/L 10-18-96
- o 2-Chloroethylvinyl Ether ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L 10-18-96 O
t'-
cis-1,3-Dichloropropene trane-2,3-Dichloropropene ND(0.5)
ND(0.5)
ND (0.5)
ND(1.5) ug/L ug/L 10-18-96 10-18-96 1,1,2-Trichloroethane ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L 10-18-06 T3-Dchloropropahne I NHD(0.5) ND(O.5) ugL. 10-18-96 U Tatrachloroethyleno "40(0,5) ND(0.5) 1g'.20-2.8-96 Chlorodibrompmethane ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L 10-18-96 chlorobenzene ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L 10-18-96 1,1,1,2-Tetrachloroethane ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L 10-18-96 Bromoform ND(O.5) ND(O.5) Ug/L 10-18-96 1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L 10-18-96 1,2,3-Trichloropropane 0.5 ND(0.5) ua/L 10-18-96
.1,3-Dich!orobenzeno ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L i0-19-98 1,4-Dichl2robenzene ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L 10-18-96 1,2-Dichlorobenzene ND(0.5) ND(0.5) ug/L 10-18-96 Methyl-tert-tutyl Ether ND(0.5) WD(0.5) ug/L 10-18-96 Methyl Isobutyl Ketone ND(S) ND(5) ug/L 10-18-90 Methyl Ethyl Ketone ND(5) ND(5) ug/L 10-18-96 NW indicatee Not Detected.
F971120540S Report for Job 955316 Paie 4 of 6 Thia report shall not be reproduced# escept in lta entirety, without the written approval of NSF. This report do not represent NSF Certification or aut*or Zation to uSe the NSF Mark. Authorization to use the NSF Mark A limit to products appearing in the Company's Official NSF Listing Book or NSF'. Xnternet Product Certification Direete
)(o FCA
-- o0 00 *7ý0 17 5 1Revision3 CC-AA-309-1001 144f c/mA4,t¢/ C Page 31 of 64 ATTACHMENT 2 Design Analysis Minor Revision Cover Sheet Page 1 of 4 Design Analysis (Minor Revision) I Last Page No.' 5-/4 S' AnalysisNo.:' C - / ZV( E /O O / Revision: 2 Z-A
Title:
3 ScroAw Slm-,xef L*.*'1 6-Cezero#o Mdc-'ir-"
ECIECR No.:' O4 -0o?79 Revision:' 0 Station(s):, O S fV'- Ce- ./
Unit No,:' /
SafetylQA Class:' S, -e-System Code(s): '0 7_/ /I r7 Is this Design,Analysis Safeguards Information?" Yes 0 No I-yes, see SY-AA-101-106 If
.Does this Design Analysis contain Unverified Assumptions? 12 Yes El No [ If yes, ATIIAR#:
This Design Analysis SUPERCEDES: 13 in its entirety.
Description of Changes (list affected pages): 4
,4/d4,7o-le-7 57Z~~/X~ ~/
CAA1 (44!d' #6 i <le conra'e-reýW & ,c (e-
/ ,/ ce,= -*de tfn
< o -0079
' Av- 0.
Disposition of Changes: -7Z>-t o w- ' 1lk c./A/
Print Sin am dem O.~ccI-f~0G../c~ed',f1, c ,fckc-y6et i,7 Are oi-004?79 V 0~. Vs vioýe- is
/Ld1icA Ca/-*b,9rV we uIV tckt v4zr /m'(e Ps Y AxikIJ/ /er ,/.1) 1r)~~te Preparer~1 le,/X brf~/<1------.~
Ae /0 Z-7104 Print Name Sign Name Da Method of (For External Review:
External ApprverOnely) Analysest Detailed Reviewr Alternate calculations E TestIng S-qo#W-
& f e Reviewer,' Is ,- / ioee Print Name ig a.Daft Review Independent reviewJ23 Peer review [I/
Notes: ~
(For External Analyses Only)
External Approver: 20 ___________ _______________
Print Name Sign Name Data Exelon Reviewer l Approver: ..7-22m Een Print Name
/ Sign Name Date
Exelkn.
Risk Management Team Nuclear Memorandum Date: November 3, 2006 To: G.A. Krueger ,
Mike Godknecht cc: D.E. Vanover ,
B.D. Sloane ,
From: E.T. Bums L.K. Lee
Subject:
A Reassessment of the Oyster Creek Risk Metrics Using Current Drywell Configuration The enclosed is in response to a request by Mike Godknecht to assess the impact of a modified Oyster Creek drywell floor curb configuration.
Enclosed is our current understanding of the .Oyster Creek drywell floor configuration and its associated impacts.
The actions taken with regard to the reassessment are as follows:
- A URE has been created and evaluated (See URE OC2006-001)
- The draft reassessment was provided for comment on Thursday 11/2/06
- The draft reassessment has been finalized and reissued as an Exelon Support Application
. The reassessment has been reviewed A design record file has been created with the details of the sensitivity calculations. This DRF is retained by the Oyster Creek Model Owner on the Campbell network server.
This memo forwards the following with regard to the drywell curb modeling:
- An assessment of the risk metric impacts
- An assessment of possible SAMA effects C467060002-7361-1 1/3/2006
A REASSESSMENT OF THE OYSTER CREEK RISK METRICS USING CUI='ENT DRYWELL CONFIGURATION
/RM Documeintaion Approval RM.DQCIJM NTATION NO. OC-2006-SA-001 ni V: 0 PAGE NO. I STATION: Oy.ter Creek.ucJpar Gener~atingg Station '
UNIT(S) AFFECTED: 1 TITLE: A Re ssessen~t of tlic Oyster .Creek1isk Metrics U~ing Current Drywedl Configuration SUJMMARY: The Oyster Creek Level 2 PRA was performerd in. 2004 assuming taiet a six inch curb sutoeulnded the ped(.,s!f in the .dywell. The cur'eat Oyster Creek conf*g*ration differs from that
.Modeled in th.* 2004PRA.
The current Oyster Creek configuration of the drywell floor lies the 6 in. barrier between the pedestal and the drycll shell, except ibat two "se..cons" have been cutout of the barrier and trernches cut in the conprete toward the shell. One of the:seqqions, cut out.is appro.ximately across fiopm the drywell pedestal doorway (i.e., the discharge point for debris from. the pedestal). Giveni this configuration, the cu.rb is likely not an effective barrir to the debris.
This support application evaluates the inmpact of the change in the model for both risk 4ignifiance and.
potential impact on SAMA.
The results ate that the risk impact is very small per RQ 1..174 and there is no measur-able effect on the SAMA. valuaition *ha.t .,ould influence decision-makers.
f ] Review required after periodie Update
[XJ InWernal RM Documentation [X] External RM Documentation tlectraonlc Calculation Data.Files: See body of the documentation.
Method of Review: i] Detailed [ J AltmnaIe [ ) Review of External )Doeument This RM documnentatio.n.supersedes: In its entirety.,
Preparedby: Ed Burns ,LarrvLee /
- T.("
- I tA[*..
Print Sign Date Reviewed by: Don Vanover I~~/ ///9 Print Sign Date Approyod by: Cve 1(iee a..4 l '
Print Sign Date C467060002-7361-I 1/3/2006
A REASSESSMENT OF THE OYSTER CREEK RISK METRICS*
USING CURRENT DRYWELL CONFIGURATION (CUTOUTS IN THE DRYWELL CURB)
Reassessment of the Oyster Creek Risk Metrics A REASSESSMENT OF THE OYSTER CREEK RISK METRICS USING CURRENT DRYWELL CONFIGURATION (CUTOUTS IN THE DRYWELL CURB)
Overview The Oyster Creek Level 2 PRA was performed in 2004 assuming that a six inch curb surrounded the pedestal in the drywell. The current Oyster Creek configuration differs from that modeled in the 2004 PRA.
This evaluation summarizes the changes.in the risk metrics used by the INRC in risk-informed 'applicat'ions if the assumption regarding the presence of a curb is removed from the PRA. The NRC specified risk metrics used here to assess the importance of this change are as follows:
" Core Damage Frequency (CDF)
" Large Early Release Frequency (LERF)
Background
The Oyster Creek containment drywell configuration as modeled in the PRA includes a plant feature not present at other BWR Mark I plants, i.e., a six inch curb that surrounds the drywell pedestal near the shell. This curb may provide a barrier to prevent the flow of molten debris from reaching the drywell shell.
In the Oyster Creek PRA, when DW sprays are available, Theofanous, et. al. in NUREG/CR-5423 assessed the conditional shell failure probability as 1E-4 without any barrier. This assessment was adopted for Oyster Creek "as is".
In the Oyster Creek PRA model, the following assessments were made of the effect of the curb barrier for postulated severe accidents when no effective drywell water injection was available (e.g., no drywell sprays):
For severe accidents in which core melt progression proceeds at high pressure until RPV breach, the barrier is found not to provide an effective method of preventing contact between the shell and 1 C67060002-7361-11/3/2006
Reassessment of the Oyster Creek Risk Metrics the molten debris. Therefore, the barrier is treated with a 1.0 failure probability., This makes Oyster Creek the same as other Mark I BWRs as assessed in NUREG/CR-5423 by Theofanous, et. al.
- For severe accidents in which core melt proceeds at a low pressure at the time of RPV breach (e.g., LOCAs or cases with successful emergency depressurization), the barrier was judged to potentially be successful in preventing an "early" shell breach. This benefit is for cases where debris was retained mostly in the drywell sumps and in the RPV because then residual debris on the floor would be prevented from reaching the shell by the barrier. The conditional success probability of the debris being retained in the RPV and the sumps plus the benefit from the curb preventing significant debris contact was 0.25. Therefore, 75% of the low pressure core melt s~equences which did not have effective debris cooling available resulted in early failure. of the drywell shell due to direct debris contact.
Updated Information The current Oyster Creek configuration of the drywell floor has the 6 in. barrier between the pedestal and the drywell shell, except that two "sections". have been cut out of the barrier and trenches cut in the concrete toward the shell. One of the sections cut out is approximately across from the drywell pedestal doorway (i.e.,
the discharge point for debris from the pedestal). Given this configuration, the curb is likely not an effective barrier to the debris. Therefore, the revised Oyster Creek drywell shell analysis becomes essentially the same as other Mark I plants, i.e.,
direct debris contact will occur with the shell.
Specifically, the conditional probability of shell failure identified by Theofanous in NUREG/CR-5423 under conditions of no water injection and the debris in contact with the shell is used and all credit for the presence of the curb is to be removed from the revised calculation.
Results The sensitivity quantitative reassessment of the PRA is performed to reflect this.
Oyster Creek configuration by assuming the following:
2 C67060002-7361-1 1/3/2006
Reassessment of the Oyster Creek Risk Metrics
- The Oyster Creek drywell curb does not provide an effective barrier to prevent debris contacting the shell for either high or low pressure core melt scenarios when no water is available to cool the debris.
" The Theofanous assessment of drywell shell failure probability for low pressure core melt scenarios is used.
This reassessment of the Oyster Creek Risk Metric$ using the current 'drywell configuration that includes two cutouts in the curb adjacent to the drywell shell results in the following changes in risk metrics:
PRA Model Risk Metric Risk Metric (2004B) Reassessment Change CDF 1.05E-5/yr 1.05E-5/yr 0% 0.0/yr LERF 5.80E-7/yr 6.38E-7/yr 9.8% 5.8E-8/yr W The significance of the risk metric changes are assessed by comparing the changes with the acceptance guidelines issued by the NRC in RG 1.174. The result of this evaluation is that these changes are considered to be very small risk chahges by the NRC guidance.
I.
3 C67060002-7361- 11/3/2006
AN EXAMINATION OF SAMA RES.ULTS THAT MAY BE AFFECTED BY CURRENT DRYWELL CONFIGURATION
Examination of SAMA Results AN EXAMINATION OF SAMA RESULTS THAT MAY BE AFFECTED BY CURRENT DRYWELL CONFIGURATION
/
1.0 OVERVIEW An extensive evaluation of potential candidates for Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) was undertaken by AmerGen as part of license renewal. this evaluation included both a base evaluation plus extensive sensitivity calculations with relatively large changes in input parameters to assess the robustness of SAMA cost-benefit calculations.
The SAM4 evaluation 'was performed assuming that the Oyster Creek dry'well had a curb in the drywell that was adjacent to the drywell shell. The following reassessment considers no credit for the presence of the curb.
This summary uses the original extensive analysis to place the change to the drywell configuration modeled in the PRA into perspective relative to the SAMA cost benefit calculations.
2.0' CALCULATIONS 2.1 Maximum Impact The Maximum Averted Cost-Risk (MACR) used in the Oyster Creek SAMA evaluation is $4,462,000.
To characterize the potential impact on the SAMA evaluation, one approach is to use the change in LERF to represent the entire impact on the radionuclide release spectrum. It is recognized that when the change in the full Level 2 PRA model is performed that there will be comparable reductions in other radionuclide release categories (e.g., H/I) and very small increases in the low radionuclide release categories (e.g., L/E). These compensating changes are addressed in the alternative MACR calculation shown in Section 2.2.
1 C67060002-7361-1 1/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Results The 9.8% increase in the LERF due to the elimination of the credit for a drywell curb results in an increase in the following SAMA input parameters:
- Dose of 0.46 person-rem/yr or 1.2% change
- Weighted Cost Risk ($/yr) of $2,187/yr or 1.85% change These changes translate into a total MACR of $4,528,110 or an increase of 1.5%
above the base MACR value used in the original SAMA evaluation submitted to the NRC.
This approximates the, maximum change' that is possible from the'change in modeling of the curb effects. In fact, the increase in the LERF category results in a comparable frequency reduction in other radionuclide release categories.
Therefore, the net change will be even less than that cited above. Section 2.2 provides a "best estimate" evaluation of the change in input SAMA parameters.
2.2 Detailed Level 2 Calculation A detailed recalculation of the radionuclide releases with credit for the curb removed indicated that the LERF increase was made up of a comparable decrease in the High/Intermediate release category and relatively minor changes in other radionuclide release categories.
Therefore, a more accurate assessment of the risk changes results in the following SAMA input parameters:
" Dose increase of 0.1 person-rem or 0.3%
- Weighted Cost Risk increase of $1,000/yr or 0.85%
These changes translate into a total MACR of $4,488,000 or an increase of 0.58%
above the base MACR value used in the original SAMA evaluation submitted to the NRC.
2 C67060002-7361-1 1/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Results These are judged to be very small changes in base values used in the cost benefit evaluation of SAMAs. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 further discuss this effect to place it in perspective.
2.3 SAMA Sensitivity Results The SAMA evaluation developed a comprehensive list of potential alternatives to assess. This list was initially screened based on excessive costs. These screened out alternatives are discussed in Section 3.0. The alternatives thatwere retained received a detailed quantitative evaluation.
As part of the SAI4A evaluation and the subsequent RAIs, there were extensive sensitivity. calculations performed to assess the cost benefit of the SAMA items under varying inputs and assumptions and to demonstrate the robust nature of the calculations. Those sensitivity cases examined relatively large changes in the input parameters. The insights from these sensitivity calculations were then used to provide input to the decision-makers regarding individual SAMA items.
As part of the sensitivities, the calculations included:
A CDF increase of a factor of 150% and therefore of all radionuclide releases. This represents a significantly more severe case then that postulated for the small changes associated with the impact of the elimination of credit for the curb. The 15 0% change can be compared with the relatively small change of 0.3% and 0.85% to the dose and weighted cost risk, respectively, associated with removal of credit for the curb taken from the detailed calculation discussed in Section 2.2.
- Real Discount Rate Changes: The sensitivity changes applied to the examined alternatives resulted in net changes in MACR of over
$100,000 in some cases. This sensitivity is significantly more inclusive than the small changes noted for the curb modifications.
The removal of credit for the drywell curb has a negligible impact on the base SAMA evaluations. In addition, the sensitivity cases performed demonstrate the benefit of 3 C67060002-7361-1 1/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Results the SAMAs
/
over a much broader range of variation than that introduced by the curb evaluation.
3.0 SPECIFIC EXAMPLE SAMAS Examples of SAMA items that could offset the impact of the modified curb, but were previously discarded based solely on cost were reviewed again when the credit for the curb is removed to assess their potential benefit. (See Table 1).
It is noted that some SAMA items were screened out based on: (1) inapplicability (e.g., ATWS mitigation 'SAMA 9, 79); or (2) as indicated in the NRC submittal on SAMA (Appendix, F of the License Renewal) that regardless of assumptions, the item is not a SAMA that would ever be considered (e.g., SAMAs 65, 69, 70, 72, 77, 80, 103, 115, 137). Therefore, these are not included in Table 1.
4.0 CONCLUSION
There are no specific SAMA items for which the cost benefit assessment would be significantly changed by the explicit incorporation of the modified curb in the baseline SAMA calculations. The SAMA sensitivity calculations identified in the original submittal to the NRC and subsequent RAI responses encompassed the very small variation in benefits assigned to the curb.
In other words, the removal of credit for the drywell curb has a negligible impact on the base SAMA evaluations. In addition, the sensitivity cases performed demonstrate the benefit of the SAMAs over a much broader range of variation than that introduced by the curb evaluation.
4 C67060002-7361-1 1/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Re Table 1
SUMMARY
OF SENSITIVITY REVIEW OF PHASE I SCREENED SAMA REVIEW OF ITEMS SCREENED DUE TO COST (C) OR COST EXCEED BENEFIT (F) FOR NO. SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION PHASE I DISPOSITION SCREENING REVIEW 2 Additional HP An additional high pressure injection F, I -Installation of another high As a sensitivity, the base model was Injection System system would increase high pressure pressure injection system is costly-and requantified after modifying logic to injection diversity and reduce the is not offset by benefits. Benefits "AND" a new-basic event with probability of requiring RPV associated with an additional high feedwater. This basic event is depressurization early in an accident. An pressure injection source are intended to represent a new high additional HP injection system would also minimized by the Oyster Creek pressure injection system, with no impact the contribution of liner melt- features of IC and CRD. IC is a support system requirements. The through sequences in the Level 2 passive high pressure inventory value was set equal to 5E-2. The evaluation by reducing the frequency of control method and the Oyster Creek resultant CDF was 7.34E-6/yr for a high pressure core melt accident class. CRD includes a dedicated bypass line delta CDF of 3.15E-6/yr.
The benefit of this SAMA would be that allows significant flow. SAMA increased If the pump was 1) diesel improvement related to CRD is This benefit (CDF reduction) is similar powered, 2) could provide power to included in Item 92. Improving CRD - in magnitude to that of SAMA 130.
operate Its own injection valves, and 3) be flow would provide an additional high SAMA 130 yields an averted cost of locatedin a flood safe zone. pressure injection system for scenarios $747,000. Using this averted cost as wherein CRD Is not currently credited. a surrogate to estimate the benefit of SAMA 2 and multiplying this by a Cost of a self-powered, high pressure factor of 2.5, to bound both the RDR injection system; located in a separate and 95th sensitivities, a value that Is fire and flood zone Is expected to.cost still far below the implementation cost
$10,000,000. This Is in excess of the is obtained (i.e., $1,867,500 versus maximum averted cost. .$10,000,000). Therefore, this SAMA remains not cost beneficial despite the use of the conservatively biased sensitivity Inputs. -
The change in curb configuration would have no more than a 0.58%
change and the conclusion would remain the same.
5 C67060002-7361- 11/3/2006
Examination of SAMA I Table 1
SUMMARY
OF SENSITIVITY REVIEW OF PHASE I SCREENED SAMA REVIEW OF ITEMS SCREENED DUE TO COST (C) OR COST EXCEED BENEFIT (F) FOR NO. SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION PHASE I DISPOSITION SCREENING REVIEW 3 Enhance RPV depressurization, while a reliable F - Monticello estimated the cost of Regardless of the assumptions used to Depressurization action, Is an important contributor to plant this modification to be about assess the value of risk-reduction, this and Injection Cues risk. The cognitive portion of this action Is $700,000. This is the result of SAMA is not judged cost-beneficial specifically identified as an important combining the costs of performing the because the potential for improvement contributor for another BWR. Potential training/procedural changes and the over the current capabilities is means of improving the probability of required hardware changes. negligible..
identifying the need for depressurization Procedural changes are generally on include: adding a unique audible alarm the order of $50,000 to $100,000 [F- The change in curb configuration and/or a highly visible alarm light to 20] and the hardware costs are would have no more than a 0.58%
denote the need for depressurization. estimated based on the $600,000 cost change and the conclusion would Installation of a large, graphical core of installing computer aided remain the same.
display for water level Is an additional instrumentation in the main control enhancement. room. This will not significantly reduce operator error rate as annunicators are currently in place and -
improvement potential is minimal.
6 Drywell Igniters or This SAMA would provide a means to F - Benefit is negligible because Oyster Regardless of the assumptions used to Passive Hydrogen reduce the chance of hydrogen detonation. Creek containment operates with an assess the value of risk-reduction,_this Ignition System inerted environment. Therefore, for SAMA is not judged cost-beneficial inerted containments, such as the because the potential for improvement Oyster Creek Mark I containment, the over the-current capabilities is NRC has previously concluded that negligible.
Igniters are not safety significant. The Calvert Cliffs application for license The change In curb configuration renewal [F-3] estimates the cost of a would have no more than a 0.58%
passive hydrogen ignition system to change and the-conclusion would be $760,000. remain the same.
6 C67060002-7361-1 1/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Table 1
SUMMARY
OF SENSITIVITY REVIEW OF PHASE I SCREENED SAMA REVIEW OF ITEMS SCREENED DUE TO COST (C) OR COST EXCEED BENEFIT (F) FOR NO. SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION PHASE I DISPOSITION SCREENING REVIEW 8 Additional DFP for An additional diesel fire pump would D - Oyster Creek currently has 1 As a sensitivity, the base model was Fire Service Water provide another source of water for RPV electric and 2 diesel fire pumps. The requantified after modifying logic to System injection and containment spray. This electric pump is powered from normal "AND" a new basic event with the could be achieved through the AC power and uses a tank with limited other fire pumps. This basic event is implementation of a procedure to direct the volume. The two-diesel fire pumps - intended to represent a new diesel fire pressurization of the Fire Protection system are located outside the protected area pump, with no support system using a fire truck, in a standard metal sided building with requirements. The value was set concrete foundation. equal to 5E-2. The resultant CDF was 1.05E-5/yr for a delta CDF of 1.91E-F - Addition of a third diesel fire pump 8/yr.
is judged to have exceedingly small incremental benefit for RPV injection. This benefit remains very small and This is because: clearly would yield a small averted
- OC has numerous Injection cost. This SAMA is not cost-beneficial sources - even If the benefit is multiplied by a
- Common-cause failure among factor of 2.5, or more.
the fire pumps dominates regardless If there-are 2 or 3 The change in curb configuration pumps. would have no more than a 0.58%
change and the conclusion would remain the same.
The containment spray enhancement Is treated under SAMA 111.
7 C67060002-7361-1 11/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Table 1
SUMMARY
OF SENSITIVITY REVIEW OF PHASE I SCREENED SAMA REVIEW OF ITEMS SCREENED DUE TO COST (C) OR COST EXCEED BENEFIT (F) FOR NO. SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION PHASE I DISPOSITION SCREENING REVIEW 14 Post an Operator at In the event that afire in the Main Control C - The cost of implementation for this The benefit of this SAMA is difficult to
,the ASDS Panel Full Room requires evacuation to the ASDS SAMA Is based on an estimated base quantify because it intends to improve Time - panel, having a full time operator at the salary and the cost of benefits for 5 an already excellent operating panel would allow for a more rapid additional licensed operators. Five capability. A complete reduction in transition to alternate reactor control. This operators are justified considering -that Class IA events would produce a delta is important for loss of Injection cases personnel are required to cover all CDF of 2.46E-6/yr.
where there Is currently not enough time shifts, 7 days a week and that 20 for the operators to evacuate the main percent of operator time is spent in This level of risk-reduction is less than control room and assume control at the training. Assuming that an operator's that noted for SAMA 130. SAMA 130 ASDS panel (Class 1A). salary and benefits cost $100,000 per yields an averted cost of $747,000.
year and that the panel will be Using this averted cost as a surrogate manned for the 20 year license to estimate, the benefit of SAMA 14 renewal period, the cost of and multiplying this by a factor of 2.5, implementation would be $10 million, to bound both the RDR and 95th not including raises. This cost is - - sensitivities, a value that is still far above the maximum averted cost for below the implementation cost is Oyster Creek. obtained (i.e., $1,867,500 versus
$10,000,000). Therefore, this SAMA remains not cost beneficial despite the use of the conservatively biased sensitivity Inputs.
The change in curb configuration would have no more than a 0.58%
change and the conclusion would remain the same.
32 Use fuel cells SAMA would extend DC power availability I, F - Oyster Creek has diverse battery Due to competing risks and the instead of lead-acid In an SBO. design presently. The system is availability of a more conventional batteries. already reliable. Evaluation of a option (i.e., SAMA 109), this SAMA Is portable DC charger Is viewed as more not c6nsidered cost-beneficial.
beneficial. See Item 109. Also, -note that the fuel cell option is new The change in curb configuration technology, never used in such a would have no more than a 0.58%
manner. It is judged expensive. A change and the conclusion would small, engine driven charger is remain the same. -
considered a more cost-efficient and proven approach.
8 C67060002-7361-1 1/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Table 1
SUMMARY
OF SENSITIVITY REVIEW OF PHASE I SCREENED SAMA REVIEW OF ITEMS SCREENED DUE TO. COST (C) OR COST EXCEED BENEFIT (F) FOR NO. SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION PHASE I DISPOSITION SCREENING REVIEW 44 Install an This SAMA would decrease the probabilitv F - IC provides an alternate method of A comolete reduction in Class II independent of loss of containment heat removal. DHR that eliminates heat discharge to events would produce a delta CDF of method of the torus for non-LOCA scenarios. 1.65E-6/yr.
suppression pool Development of another means -
cooling. beyond containment spray is viewed This level of risk-reduction is less than as limited benefit compared to a high that noted for SAMA 130. SAMA 130 cost for such a modification. An yields an averted cost of $747,000.
independent system is judged to cost Using this averted cost as a surrogate
$5,000,000. This is in excess of the to estimate the benefit of SAMA 44 maximum averted cost. and multiplying this by a factor of 2.5, to bound both the RDR and 9 5 th sensitivities, a value that is still far below the implementation cost is obtained (i.e., $1,867,500 versus
$5,000,000). *Therefore, this SAMA remains not cost beneficial despite the use of the conservatively biased sensitivity Inputs. -
The change in curb configuration would have no more than a 0.58%
change and the conclusion would remain the same.
45 Install a filtered This SAMA would provide an alternate F - Cost is high at > $4M as assessed Regardless of the assumptions used to containment vent decay heat removal method for non-ATWS for Shoreham. The benefits in dose assess the value of risk-reduction, this to remove decay events, with the released fission products reduction are limited because of the SAMA is not judged cost-beneficial heat. being scrubbed. Mark I shell failure mode and ATWS because the potential for improvement Option 1: Gravel Bed Filter challenges that would fail over the current capabilities is small.
Option 2: Multiple Venturi Scrubber containment. Considering the high cost, the small variations in quantification SAMA would not address core damage characterization do not-point to and does not address Noble gas altering the conclusion for this-SAMA.
release. This was not found cost-beneficial for Peach Bottom. The change In curb configuration Estimated to cost In excess of the would have no more-than a 0.58%
maximum averted cost. change and the conclusion would remain the same.
9 C67060002-7361-1 1/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Table 1
SUMMARY
OF SENSITIVITY REVIEW OF PHASE I SCREENED SAMA REVIEW OF ITEMS SCREENED DUE TO COST (C) OR COST EXCEED BENEFIT (F) FOR NO. SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION PHASE I DISPOSITION SCREENING REVIEW 46 Install a Assuming that injection is available, this F - Cost is high and benefits, in terms Completely removing the ATWS containment vent SAMA would provide alternate decay heat of dose reduction, are limited because contribution would lead to a delta CDF large enough to removal In an ATWS event. of the small ATIWS contribution to the of 1.81E-7/yr. This level of benefit remove ATWS risk profile. Containment vent size Is does not lead to any significant decay heat. sufficient to prevent containment - averted cost for this SAMA even if it failure as long as reactivity could completely eliminate all ATWS management tasks are completed as risk.
modeled in the PRA (i.e., RPV level control and SLC initiation). ATWS Therefore, the implementation cost far power levels without reactivity control outweighs the small averted cost and would be in the range of 10% to 40% the SAMA is not cost beneficial even of full power. This requires a for these conservatively biased substantially larger containment vent assumptions.
than the current hard pipe vent. To achieve an operational "ATWS Vent'of The change in curb configuration hard pipe configuration and adequate would have no more than a 0.58%
size Is estimated to cost in excess of change and the conclusion would
$2M. This is above the benefit to be remain the same.
achieved for elimination of the small ATWS contribution to risk at Oyster Creek.
48 Install a passive. This SAMA would provide redundant F - High cost modification. Gravity Due to competing risks and the containment spray containment spray method without high feed system would provide limited availability of a more conventional system. cost. benefit beyond that considered in Item option (i.e., SAMA 111), this SAMA Is 111 and would likely Increase Internal not considered cost-beneficial.
flooding risk.
The change in curb configuration would have no more than a 0.58%
change and the conclusion would remain -the same.
10 C67060002-7361- 11/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Table 1
SUMMARY
OF SENSITIVITY REVIEW OF PHASE I SCREENED SAMA REVIEW OF ITEMS SCREENED DUE TO COST (C) OR COST EXCEED BENEFIT (F) FOR NO. SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION PHASE I DISPOSITION SCREENING REVIEW 49 Construct a building This SAMA would provide a method to C - This item is viewed as having a Regardless of the assumptions used to to be connected to depressurize containment and reduce very large cost (> $10 Million) and is assess the value of risk-reduction, this primary/secondary fission product release. well beyond the maximum averted SAMA is not judged cost-beneficial containment that Is cost for Oyster Creek. because the potential for improvement maintained at a over the current capabilities is small.
vacuum. Considering the high cost, variations in quantification assumptions do not point to altering the conclusion for this SAMA.
The change in curb configuration would have no more than a 0.58%
change and the conclusion would remain the same.
51 Providean This SAMA would increase the reliability C - Cost of an additional building and The EDGs have a risk reduction worth additional diesel and availability of onsite emergency AC diesel Is estimated at more than $5M. (RRW) importance of 1.14. This generator. power sources. This is greater than the maximum cost suggests a potential delta CDF of averted benefit. 1.47E-6/yr_(1.05E-5*"1.14-1)). This level of risk-reduction is less than that noted for SAMA 130. SAMA 130 yields an averted cost of $747,000. Using this averted cost as a surrogate to estimate the benefit of SAMA 51 .and multiplying this by a factor of 2.5, to bound both the RDR and 95t" sensitivities, a value that is still far below the implementation cost remains not cost beneficial despite the use of the conservatively biased sensitivity inputs.
The change in curb configuration would have no more than a 0.58%
change and the conclusion would remain the same.
.11 C67060002-7361-1 1/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Table 1
SUMMARY
OF SENSITIVITY REVIEW OF PHASE I SCREENED SAMA REVIEW OF ITEMS SCREENED DUE TO COST (C) OR COST EXCEED BENEFIT (F) FOR NO. SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION PHASE I DISPOSITION SCREENING REVIEW 62 Modify Reactor This SAMA would provide an additional C - The RWCU system is currently A complete reduction in Class II Water Cleanup source of decay heat removal. proceduralized and used "as is" to events would produce a delta CDF of (RWCU) for use as provide decay heat removal over a 1.65E-6/yr. This level of risk-a decay heat portion of the spectrum of shutdowns. reduction is less than that noted for removal system However, the RWCU system has very SAMA 130. SAMA 130 yields an and proceduralize small heat removal capability and averted cost of $747,000. Using this use. therefore, does not have the capability averted cost as a surrogate to to provide a significant benefit. estimate the benefit of SAMA 62 and multiplying this by a factor of 2.5, to No options for significant capacity bound both the RDR and 95h improvement have been identified.that sensitivities, a value that is still far would cost less than $4M. below the implementation cost is obtained (i.e., $1,867,500 versus
$4,000,000). Therefore, this SAMA remains not cost beneficial despite the use of the conservatively biased sensitivity Inputs.
The change in curb configuration would have no more than a 0.58%
change and the conclusion would remain the same.
.12 C67060002-7361- 11/3/2006
Examination of SAMA J Table 1 -
SUMMARY
OF SENSITIVITY REVIEW OF PHASE I SCREENED SAMA REVIEW OF ITEMS SCREENED DUE TO COST (C) OR COST EXCEED BENEFIT (F) FOR NO. SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION PHASE I DISPOSITION SCREENING REVIEW 68 Improved Vacuum This SAMA reduces the orobabllitv of a F - Ovster Creek has 14 sinale torus to A complete reduction in Class III (i.e.,
Breakers stuck open vacuum breaker. drywell vacuum breakers arranged In LOCA) events would produce a delta (redundant valves 7 parallel lines, which can impact CDF of 1.42E-6/yr. This level of risk-In each line) vapor suppression. Adding valves in reduction is less than that noted for series is highly expensive and reduces SAMA 130* SAMA 130 yields an the success probability for the open on averted cost of $747,000. Using this demand function. Benefit impacts averted cost as a surrogate to only low frequency accident estimate the benefit of SAMA 68 and sequences. Added redundancy has multiplying this by a factor of 2.5, to only minor impact on the risk profile. bound both the RDR and 95th Cost estimated by system manager to sensitivities, a value that is still below be $2,000,000. the Implementation cost is obtained (i.e., $1,867,500 versus $2,000,000).
Therefore, this SAMA remains not cost beneficial despite the use of the conservatively biased sensitivity inputs.
The change in curb configuration would have no more than a 0.58%
changeand the conclusion would remain the same.
105 Improve loss of The plant could be modified to provide an F - More costly than Item 104 with SAMA 104 was not determined to be circulating water auto-swap from circulating water to service similar benefit. See Item 104 for cost-beneficial under the RDR and 9 5th response water. disposition. percentile cases documented in Tables F.7-1 and F.7-2. With a higher cost (See also Item 104) and similar benefit, this SAMA cannot be considered cost-beneficial under an set of. analysis assumptions.
The change in curb conTiguration would have no more than a 0.58%
change and the conclusion would remain the same.
13 C67060002-7361-1.1/3/2006
Examination of SAMA Ro Table 1
SUMMARY
OF SENSITIVITY REVIEW OF PHASE I SCREENED SAMA REVIEW OF ITEMS SCREENED DUE TO COST (C) OR COST EXCEED BENEFIT (F) FOR NO. SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION PHASE I DISPOSITION SCREENING REVIEW 135 Increase structural The water supply to makeup to-the Iso C - The Oyster Creek IPEEE analysis The 1.79E-7/yr risk reduction Integrity of IC Condensers is neither safety related nor included IC performance during - discussed in the Phase I disposition is makeup- piping seismic. Upgrade of the Condensate seismic events. Using the EPRI hazard far less than that noted for SAMA 130.
Transfer System supply to the ICs would curves, the IC contributed 4.970% to SAMA 130 yields an averted cost of.
possibly Increase their long term the overall CDF of 3.6E-6/yr. If the IC $747,000. Using this averted cost as availability. could be made perfect, it would reduce a surrogate to estimate the benefit of contribution by a value of 1.79E-7/yr SAMA 135 and multiplying this by a (3.6E-6*4.87%). Considering such a factor of 2.5, to bound both the RDR modification is expected to cost at and 95th sensitivities, a value that is least $5,000,000, this option is still far below the implementation cost considered not cost-beneficial. is obtained (i.e., $1,867,500 versus
$5,000,000). Therefore, this SAMA remains not cost beneficial despite the use of the conservatively biased sensitivity inputs (i.e., $1,867,500 versus $5,000,000).
The change in curb -configuration would have no more than a 0.58%
change and the conclusion would remain the same.
- 14 C67060002-7361-1 11/3/2006