ML063130446
| ML063130446 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/07/2006 |
| From: | Hamrick S, Sherwin Turk NRC/OGC |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Byrdsong A T | |
| References | |
| 50-271-OLA, ASLBP 04-832-02-OLA, RAS 12493 | |
| Download: ML063130446 (70) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE,
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Docket No. 50-271-OLA LLC and ENTERGY NUCLEAR
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OPERATIONS, INC.
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ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA
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(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)
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NRC STAFFS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING NEC CONTENTION 3 (LARGE TRANSIENT TESTING)
Sherwin E. Turk Steven C. Hamrick Counsel for NRC Staff November 7, 2006
-i-TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION.................................... 1 II.
FINDINGS OF FACT.................................................. 9 A.
Background:
The Issues Raised in NEC Contention 3................... 9 B.
Applicable Legal Standards....................................... 11 C.
Evidence Adduced at Hearing..................................... 13 1.
Witnesses Presented...................................... 13 2.
NRC Regulatory Guidance for the Performance of Large Transient Testing....................... 20 3.
Entergys Request for an Exception from Large Transient Testing; Reviews Conducted by the Staff and ACRS.................................... 24 4.
Entergys Justification for an Exception from Large Transient Testing................................ 27 a.
Large Transient Testing Would Not Provide Useful Information......................... 27 (1)
The MSIV Closure and Turbine Generator Load Rejection Tests.................. 27 (2)
Prior Large Transient Testing at Vermont Yankee
........................... 32 b.
Vermont Yankee Transient Analyses.................... 34 c.
BWR Operational Experience.......................... 45 d.
Industry Experience With Large Transient Testing.......... 50 e.
Vermont Yankees Operating History.................... 52 f.
System and Component Testing........................ 54 g.
Similarities in the Pre-and Post-EPU Plant Design and Physical Configuration................. 57
-ii-h.
Potential Adverse Impacts of Large Transient Testing....... 61 5.
Summary of Findings...................................... 63 III.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
............................................. 64
1 Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Opportunity for a Hearing, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,976 (July 1, 2004).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE,
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA LLC and ENTERGY NUCLEAR
)
OPERATIONS, INC.
)
ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)
)
NRC STAFFS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING NEC CONTENTION 3 (LARGE TRANSIENT TESTING)
I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 1.1.
These findings and rulings address all outstanding issues with respect to the application for a license amendment filed on September 10, 2003, by Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (collectively, Entergy or Applicant) for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee or VYNPS). The amendment would change the Vermont Yankee operating license to increase the maximum authorized power level from 1593 megawatts thermal ("MWt") to 1912 MWt. The requested change, designated an Extended Power Uprate (EPU), represented an increase of approximately twenty percent above Vermont Yankees then current maximum authorized power level. The proposed amendment would also change the VYNPS technical specifications to provide for implementing uprated power operation.
1.2.
Notice of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)s receipt and consideration of the VYNPS license amendment application was published in the Federal Register on July 1, 2004.1 The Notice advised the Applicant and any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding of their right to request a hearing by filing such a request and a petition for leave to intervene. In response to the Notice, petitions for leave to intervene were timely filed by the New England Coalition (NEC) and the Vermont Department of Public Service (State or DPS). The petitioners timely filed several contentions that they sought to litigate in this proceeding.
1.3.
On September 14, 2004, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board was established to rule on petitions for hearing and for leave to intervene and to preside over any adjudicatory proceeding that might be held in connection with the license amendment application. 69 Fed.
Reg. 56,797 (2004).
1.4.
On November 22, 2004, the Licensing Board issued its Memorandum and Order (Rulings on Standing, Contentions, and State Reservation of Rights), in which the Board determined, among other things, that NEC and the State of Vermont had demonstrated their standing to intervene in this matter, and that four of their contentions, in whole or in part, satisfied the Commissions requirements for admission as contested issues in this proceeding.
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 553-54, 558-648, 571-73 (2004).
1.5.
Specifically, in its initial ruling on standing and contentions, the Licensing Board admitted two contentions filed by the State of Vermont, which it restated as follows:
State Contention 1: Entergy has claimed credit for containment overpressure in demonstrating the adequacy of ECCS pumps for plant events including a loss of coolant accident in violation of draft General Design Criteria 44 and 52 and therefore Entergy has failed to demonstrate that the proposed uprate will provide adequate protection for public health and safety as required by 10 C.F.R. § 50.57(a)(3).
State Contention 2: Because of the current level of uncertainty of the calculation which the Applicant uses to demonstrate the adequacy of ECCS pumps, the Applicant has not demonstrated that the use of containment overpressure to provide the necessary net positive suction head for ECCS pumps will provide 2 See Vermont Department of Public Service Request for Leave to File a New Contention, dated October 18, 2004.
adequate protection for the public health and safety as required by 10 C.F.R. § 50.57(a)(3).
Id. at 580.
1.6.
In addition, in its ruling, the Licensing Board admitted two contentions filed by NEC, which it restated as follows:
NEC Contention 3: The license amendment should not be approved unless Large Transient Testing is a condition of the Extended Power Uprate.
NEC Contention 4: The license amendment should not be approved because Entergy cannot assure seismic and structural integrity of the cooling towers under uprate conditions, in particular the Alternate Cooling System cell. At present the minimum appropriate structural analyses have apparently not been done.
Id.
1.7.
On October 18, 2004, the State filed a motion seeking leave to file a new contention, which challenged the lack of verification of the applications assumption, used for purposes of the safe shutdown capability analysis (SSCA), that the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system can be made operable in sufficient time to permit the operator to perform the required actions before core uncovery. 2 The Licensing Board admitted this new contention, to be designated State Contention 6. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C.
and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Memorandum and Order (Admitting Intervenors New Contention) (unpublished), slip op. at 5 (Jan. 11, 2005).
1.8.
On February 11, 2005, Entergy filed a motion to dismiss State Contention 6 as moot, or alternatively, for summary disposition, on the grounds that no genuine issue of 3 See Entergys Motion to Dismiss as Moot, or in the Alternative, for Summary Disposition of Department of Public Service Contention 6, dated February 11, 2005.
4 See Entergys Motion to Dismiss as Moot, or in the Alternative, for Summary Disposition of New England Coalition Contention 4, dated July 13, 2005.
5 See New England Coalitions Request for Leave to File a New Contention, dated September 21, 2005.
material fact remained.3 Upon consideration of Entergys motion and the responses thereto, the Licensing Board determined that Entergy had conducted the verification process at issue and, accordingly, the Board dismissed State Contention 6. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station),
Memorandum and Order (Granting Motion to Dismiss State Contention 6) (unpublished), slip op. at 5 (March 15, 2005).
1.9.
On July 13, 2005, Entergy filed a motion to dismiss NEC Contention 4 as moot, in which it demonstrated that it had performed the analyses sought by this contention, thereby rendering the contention moot.4 On September 1, 2005, the Licensing Board granted Entergys motion and dismissed NEC Contention 4. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station),
LBP-05-24, 62 NRC 429, 432 (2005) (Given that the contention was based on the need for Entergy to perform a seismic and structural analysis, now that Entergy has performed this analysis, the contention is moot.).
1.10.
On September 21, 2005, NEC filed a request for leave to file a new contention, challenging the adequacy of Entergys seismic and structural analysis of the Vermont Yankee Alternate Cooling System cooling tower cell.5 On December 2, 2005, the Licensing Board granted NECs motion and admitted new NEC Contention 4. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 6 In addition, on January 31, 2006, the Licensing Board denied Entergys motion for summary disposition of NEC Contention 3, finding that the motion failed to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 119-28 (2006). Testimony concerning this contention was subsequently considered by the Board in evidentiary hearings, and is addressed in the findings of fact and conclusions of law presented infra.
7 See Letter from Graham B. Wallis (Chairman, ACRS) to Nils J. Diaz (Chairman, NRC), dated January 4, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML060090125) (Entergy Exh. 22).
Station), LBP-05-32, 62 NRC 813, 819-25 (2005). The Licensing Board then restated the contention, to read as follows:
The Entergy Vermont Yankee [ENVY] license application (including all supplements) for an extended power uprate of 20%
over rated capacity is not in conformance with the plant specific original licensing basis and/or 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S, paragraph I(a), and/or 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, because it does not provide analyses that are adequate, accurate, and complete in all material respects to demonstrate that the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Alternate Cooling System [ACS] in its entirety, in its actual physical condition (or in the actual physical condition ENVY will effectuate prior to commencing operation at EPU), will be able to withstand the effects of an earthquake and other natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform its safety functions in service at the requested increased plant power level.
Id. at 827.6 1.11.
Throughout this period, Entergys EPU license amendment application was reviewed by the NRC Staff and by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).
On November 2, 2005, the Staff published its Draft Safety Evaluation concerning the requested amendment. On November 15-16 and 29-30, 2005, the ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates held meetings to receive input from the Applicant, the Staff, and members of the public on Entergys EPU amendment application; and, on December 7, 2005, the full committee of the ACRS held public meetings on the application. On January 4, 2006, the ACRS sent a letter to the Commission recommending approval of Entergys EPU application.7 8 Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station; Final Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact Related to the Proposed License Amendment To Increase the Maximum Reactor Power Level, 71 Fed. Reg. 4,614 (Jan. 27, 2006).
9 Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Amendment No. 229 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28, Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Docket No. 50-271" (March 2, 2006) (ADAMS Accession No. ML060050028 (non-proprietary version)) (Staff Exh. 2); Id. (proprietary version) (Staff Exh. 1).
10 Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Notice of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,682 (March 8, 2006).
11 As the Commission noted, its denial of NECs request for a stay of the license amendment did not constitute an expression of the Commissions views on the validity of the amendment. CLI-06-8, 63 NRC at 238 n.9.
12 See New England Coalitions Request for Leave to File New Contentions, dated April 6, 2006.
1.12.
On January 26, 2006, the Staff published in the Federal Register an Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact concerning the proposed VYNPS EPU license amendment.8 On March 2, 2006, the Staff issued its Safety Evaluation for the VYNPS EPU license amendment,9 along with a Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration.10 At the same time, consistent with 10 C.F.R. § 50.91(a)(4), the Staff issued the requested license amendment, effective immediately. Id. One day later, on March 3, 2006, the Commission denied NECs request that the license amendment be stayed pending the completion of evidentiary hearings on the requested amendment in this proceeding. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-06-8, 63 NRC 235 (2006).11 1.13.
On April 6, 2006, NEC filed a motion seeking leave to file three new contentions.12 NECs proposed new contentions involved allegations of (1) incorrect calculation of radiological consequences following a design-basis accident under EPU conditions; (2) the applications lack of a discussion of compliance with certain regulations in the event of the failure of small lines carrying primary coolant outside of containment; and (3) the applications 13 The Licensing Board further found that two of these nontimely contentions failed to meet the six-part admissibility test in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309)f)(1). LBP-06-14, 63 NRC at 582, 586; cf. id. at 589 n.35.
14 See New England Coalitions Request for Leave to File a New Contention, dated April 20, 2006; New England Coalitions Request for Leave to File a Supplement to New England Coalitions Request for Leave to File New Contention, dated June 23, 2006.
failure to provide adequate protection against the dynamic effects of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), with specific reference to potential stresses on the steam dryer. On May 25, 2006, the Licensing Board rejected these proposed contentions, finding each of them untimely and inadmissible under the nontimely contention standards set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309( c).
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-14, 63 NRC 568, 579-81, 585-86, 588-89 (2006).13 1.14.
On April 20, 2006, NEC filed a motion seeking leave to file an additional new contention, which it then sought to supplement on June 23, 2006.14 NECs proposed new contention alleged that the failure of modeling to predict steam dryer cracking in the Quad Cities Unit 2 steam dryer indicated that the VYNPS methodology cannot reliably predict steam dryer performance under EPU conditions. On July 7, 2006, the Licensing Board rejected this proposed contention, finding it untimely and inadmissible under the Commissions late-filed contention standards. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Admissibility of Additional NEC Contention and on Request to Supplement Additional Contention) (unpublished), slip op. at 9, 11 (July 7, 2006).
1.15.
On May 2, 2006, the State filed a notice of withdrawal and request for dismissal of its two remaining contentions (State Contentions 1 and 2), based upon a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which it had reached with the Applicant concerning the issues raised in 15 See Notice of Withdrawal and Request for Dismissal of Contentions of the Vermont Department of Public Service, dated May 2, 2006.
16 See Amended Notice of Withdrawal and Request for Dismissal of Contentions of the Vermont Department of Public Service, dated May 9, 2006.
17 In rulings issued in March and April, 2006, the Licensing Board clarified the scope of NEC Contention 4. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Memorandum and Order (Clarifying the Factual Scope of NEC Contention 4... ) (unpublished) (March 24, 2006); Id., Memorandum and Order (Clarifying the Legal Scope of NEC Contention 4) (unpublished) (April 24, 2006).
18 Such documents were submitted by Entergy and the Staff, in accordance with the Licensing Boards Order (Regarding Submission of Supplemental Documents) dated June 5, 2006; NEC did not submit copies of any documents.
the contentions.15 The Licensing Board conducted a prehearing conference call with the parties concerning this matter on May 3, 2006. In response to concerns expressed by the Licensing Board regarding the parties compliance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.338, the State filed an Amended Notice and Addendum to the MOU on May 9, 2006.16 On June 23, 2006, the Licensing Board approved the modified agreement reached between Entergy and the State, dismissed State Contentions 1 and 2, and accepted the States withdrawal from the proceeding.
See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-18, 63 NRC 830, 832 (2006). Further, the Licensing Board denied NECs request that the Board adopt the contentions sua sponte. Id. at 843.
1.16.
As a result of these actions and rulings, two contentions remained for litigation in the proceeding: NEC Contention 3, concerning the need for large transient testing, and NEC Contention 4, concerning Entergys seismic analysis of the VYNPS Alternate Cooling System cooling tower.17 In accordance with scheduling Orders issued by the Board, on May 17, 2006, the parties filed written testimony concerning NEC Contentions 3 and 4, and on June 19, 2006, Entergy and the Staff filed copies of the documents cited or relied upon in their testimony.18 1.17.
On August 11, 2006, NEC unilaterally withdrew its Contention 4 regarding the VYNPS Alternate Cooling System, based upon its determination that the Applicant had 19 See New England Coalitions Notice of Withdrawal of its Contention Regarding Inadequate Analysis of the Vermont Yankee Alternate Cooling System Performance Under Conditions of Extended Power Uprate, dated August 11, 2006, at 1-2.
20 In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station); Notice of Hearing and of Opportunity To Make Oral or Written Limited Appearance Statements Concerning Proposed Uprate, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,549 (April 14, 2006).
addressed most of its concerns and that its remaining concerns could be better addressed through other means.19 Inasmuch as this withdrawal did not involve a settlement agreement, the Licensing Board did not need to approve this withdrawal or address the factors in 10 C.F.R. § 2.338. See Tr. 332.
1.18.
An evidentiary hearing with respect to the one remaining contention, NEC Contention 3, was then held in Newfane, Vermont on September 13-14, 2006, in accordance with a notice of hearing published in the Federal Register.20 Witnesses appeared on behalf of Entergy, the Staff, and NEC, as summarized below. In addition, in accordance with the aforesaid Notice, limited appearance statements were received from members of the public, in special sessions held in Brattleboro, Vermont on June 26-27, 2006.
1.19.
These proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law present the Licensing Boards findings of fact with respect to the evidence presented at the 2006 hearings concerning NEC Contention 3, and the Boards conclusions of law with respect thereto.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT A.
Background:
The Issues Raised in NEC Contention 3 2.1.
In its EPU license amendment application, Entergy sought to be excused from performing certain tests, referred to as Large Transient Testing. NEC Contention 3 challenges the Applicants justification, provided in Attachment 7 to the EPU application, for not 21 See Attachment 7 to Entergys EPU application, Justification for Exception to Large Transient Testing, dated September 10, 2003 (Entergy Exh. 5).
22 In this regard, Mr. Gunderson referred to a May 9, 2001, NRC Staff request for additional information, directed to the Duane Arnold licensee, which stated, in part, that:
The NRC-approved ELTR-1 [General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDC-32424P-A, Generic Guidelines for General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Extended Power Uprate (ELTR1), dated February 1999]
requires the MSIVC [main steam isolation valve closure] test to be performed if the power uprate is more than 10% above previously recorded MSIV closure transient data. The topical report also requires the GLR [generator load rejection] test to be performed if the uprate is more than 15% of previously recorded data.
The Duane Arnold EPU application is inapposite here, as discussed infra, at 47 n.47.
performing such large transient testing as a condition of the EPU license amendment.21 As admitted by the Licensing Board, NEC Contention 3 asserted:
The license amendment should not be approved unless Large Transient Testing is a condition of the Extended Power Uprate.
LBP-04-28, 60 NRC at 580.
2.2.
In support of this contention, NEC provided the Declaration of Mr. Arnold Gunderson, dated August 30, 2004, which asserted that in his opinion, Entergy must be required to perform Large Transient Testing (Gunderson Declaration at 3). In support of this claim, Mr. Gunderson (1) argued that Entergys request for an exception ignores the Staffs decision to require such testing for the Duane Arnold EPU (id. at 4);22 (2) challenged the Applicants citation of operational experience in the nuclear industry, as a basis for taking an exception to large transient testing at EPU conditions; (3) challenged Entergys statement that
[i]f performed, these tests would not confirm any new or insignificant aspect of performance that is not routinely demonstrated by component level testing during steady-state plant operation (id. at 5); and (4) questioned whether Vermont Yankees experience with full power load rejections at 100% of the original licensed power level bear on performance at 120% (id.).
23 See Entergys Motion for Summary Disposition of New England Coalition Contention 3, dated December 2, 2005.
2.3.
On December 2, 2005, Entergy filed a motion pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.1205(a),
seeking summary disposition of NEC Contention 3.23 As noted in n.6, supra, the Licensing Board denied Entergys motion on January 31, 2006, finding that Entergy had failed to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 124-28 (2006).
2.4.
As litigation on this contention progressed, a dispute arose between the parties as to which transient tests were properly within the scope of this contention. The Licensing Board addressed this matter in an Order issued on April 17, 2006. Based upon a review of the contention, the Applicants request for an exception (which is the subject of the contention),
other pertinent documents, as well as the parties briefs, the Licensing Board clarified that the Large Transient Testing at issue in NEC Contention 3 involves two specific transient tests:
(a) the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure test, and (b) the turbine generator load rejection test. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Memorandum and Order Clarifying the Scope of NEC Contention 3 (unpublished), slip op. at 3 (April 17, 2005).
B.
Applicable Legal Standards 2.5.
Testing requirements for nuclear power reactors are derived from 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.34(b)(6)(iii) and the quality assurance program that is incorporated into the operating license for each reactor pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(b)(6)(ii) and implemented pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(a). In accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B (Quality Assurance),
Criterion XI, the quality assurance program must include a test program to assure that testing, necessary to provide reasonable assurance that structures, systems and components (SSCs) 24 The Introduction to Appendix B, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, acknowledges that [n]uclear power plants
... include structures, systems, and components that prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents that could cause undue risk to health and safety of the public. The Introduction then goes on to state that [t]his appendix establishes quality assurance requirements for the design, construction, and operation of those structures, systems, and components.
(as defined in the Introduction to Appendix B) will perform satisfactorily in service, is identified and performed.
2.6.
Specifically, Criterion XI of Appendix B provides as follows:24 A test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. The test program shall include, as appropriate, proof tests prior to installation, preoperational tests, and operational tests during nuclear power plant or fuel reprocessing plant operation, of structures, systems, and components. Test procedures shall include provisions for assuring that all prerequisites for the given test have been met, that adequate test instrumentation is available and used, and that the test is performed under suitable environmental conditions.
Test results shall be documented and evaluated to assure that test requirements have been satisfied.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI.
2.7.
Thus, the legal standard for determining whether the Vermont Yankee EPU amendment should be approved without the performance of the two transient tests at issue in this contention is whether, in the absence of such large transient testing, Entergys EPU test program complies with Criterion XI by demonstrating that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service at the EPU power level. As discussed below, the Commission has developed specific regulatory guidance, addressed in the Staffs and Applicants testimony, which provides useful guidance in understanding and applying these requirements to the EPU license amendment application at issue in this proceeding.
25 Testimony of Craig J. Nichols and Jose L. Casillas on NEC Contention 3 - Large Transient Testing, dated May 17, 2006 (Entergy Dir.), Post Tr. 1175; Rebuttal Testimony of Craig J. Nichols and Jose L. Casillas on NEC Contention 3 - Large Transient Testing, dated June 14, 2006 (Entergy Rebuttal), Post Tr. 1175.
C.
Evidence Adduced at Hearing 1.
Witnesses Presented 2.8.
Evidentiary hearings on this contention were held on September 13-14, 2006. A total of eight witnesses appeared on behalf of Entergy, the Staff, and NEC, as set forth below.
All of the witnesses were found to be qualified to present testimony on the matters they addressed. Prefiled testimony was submitted by each of the witnesses; in addition the witnesses for Entergy and NEC provided prefiled rebuttal testimony. All of the witnesses also provided oral testimony in response to questioning by the Licensing Board.
2.9.
The Applicant presented a panel of two witnesses in support of its license amendment application.25 They were: (1) Mr. Craig J. Nichols, an Electrical Engineer, who was Entergys Project Manager for the VYNPS EPU and who was the manager responsible for implementing the Vermont Yankee EPU; and (2) Mr. Jose L. Casillas, a Mechanical Engineer, who is the Plant Performance Consulting Engineer in the Nuclear Analysis group of the Engineering organization of General Electric ("GE") Nuclear Energy and is responsible for boiling water reactor (BWR) plant performance design and analyses, including evaluations in support of EPU applications. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 1-3.
2.10.
Applicant witness Craig Nichols received a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from Northeastern University. Id. at 2; Entergy Exh. 1, at 2. Mr. Nichols has over twenty years of professional experience working in various technical and managerial capacities at VYNPS. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 1-2. As Entergys project manager for the Vermont Yankee EPU, Mr. Nichols was responsible for managing all engineering, analysis, modifications, implementation, and fiscal aspects of the EPU. Id. In this regard, he was responsible for overseeing the plant modifications needed to implement the upgrade and the performance of the technical evaluations and analyses required to demonstrate Vermont Yankees ability to operate safely under uprate conditions. He is familiar with Vermont Yankees operating history, current plant operations, and the anticipated operating conditions after the uprate. Id. at 2-3. The Licensing Board finds Mr. Nichols to be well-qualified as an expert witness on the subject of BWR operation and the response of BWRs to transients. In addition, the Licensing Board finds Mr. Nichols to be familiar with the VYNPS EPU generally and, more specifically, with Entergys justification for not performing the Large Transient Testing at issue in NEC Contention 3; the plant modifications at VYNPS associated with the EPU; the history of transients at VYNPS; and the history of transients at other comparable BWRs.
2.11. Applicant witness Jose Casillas received a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of California, Davis. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 3; Entergy Exh. 2. Mr. Casillas is the Plant Performance Consulting Engineer in the Nuclear Analysis group of the Engineering organization of General Electric ("GE") Nuclear Energy.
Mr. Casillas is responsible for BWR plant performance design and analyses, including evaluations in support of EPU applications and the development and application of computer codes used to predict BWR plant performance. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 3. Mr. Casillas has over 32 years of direct technical experience working in all aspects of plant performance at GE Nuclear Energy, including transient analysis. Mr. Casillas is familiar with the analytical codes used to predict BWR plant response to operational transients and with the industry experience regarding the response of BWRs to large transients. Id.; Entergy Exh. 2. He presented testimony which addressed, inter alia, industry experience regarding the response of BWRs to large transients. The Licensing Board finds Mr. Casillas to be well-qualified as an expert witness on the subjects of: BWR plant system performance evaluation; BWR transient 26 NRC Staff Testimony of Richard B. Ennis, Steven R. Jones, Robert L. Pettis, Jr., George Thomas, and Zeynab Abdullahi Concerning NEC Contention 3, dated May 17, 2006, as revised September 8, 2006 (Staff Dir.), Post Tr. 1383.
and LOCA analysis; and thermal hydraulic design and evaluation of BWR fuel. In addition, the Licensing Board finds that Mr. Casillas is familiar with industry experience regarding the response of BWRs to large transients.
2.12.
The Staff presented a panel of five witnesses concerning this contention. These were: (1) Mr. Richard B. Ennis; (2) Mr. Steven R. Jones; (3) Mr. Robert L. Pettis, Jr.;
(4) Mr. George Thomas; and (5) Ms. Zena Abdullahi.26 2.13.
Staff Witness Richard B. Ennis is employed as a Senior Project Manager in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing in the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). Mr. Ennis served as the Senior Project Manager for the Staffs review of the Vermont Yankee EPU. As part of his official responsibilities, he coordinated the Staffs evaluation of the Vermont Yankee EPU; assisted in preparation of the Staffs draft Safety Evaluation for the EPU application (Draft SE), issued to the ACRS in October 2005 (Rev. 0), and to the public in November 2005 (Rev. 1); and coordinated the Staffs preparation of the Final Safety Evaluation for the EPU application (Final SE), issued on March 2, 2006. Mr. Ennis received a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from Bucknell University, and has over 28 years of engineering experience in the nuclear power industry, including project management; design and licensing basis documentation; nuclear facility design verifications and modifications; software development and validation; and instrument setpoint and loop uncertainty calculations and methodologies. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 1-2, 4; Ennis Professional Qualifications (Prof.
Qual.), Post Tr. 1383, at 1. The Licensing Board finds Mr. Ennis to be well-qualified as an expert witness on the subjects of Entergys EPU license amendment application, NRC regulatory requirements and guidance pertaining to BWR EPU applications, the need for large transient testing in connection with such applications, and the bases for Staff approvals of licensee requests for exceptions to such requirements and/or guidance.
2.14.
Staff Witness Steven R. Jones is employed as a Senior Reactor Systems Engineer in the Division of Engineering, NRR, and served as Acting Chief of NRRs Balance of Plant Branch. As such, he is responsible, inter alia, for evaluating the functional requirements, design, and performance of auxiliary, support and balance of plant systems (main steam and turbine, feedwater and condensate, diesel generator support, auxiliary feedwater, spent fuel pool cooling, circulating water, open and closed cycle cooling water, and reactor coolant leakage detection systems) for both current and planned nuclear plants. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 1-2. As part of his official responsibilities, Mr. Jones supervised the Staffs safety review of mechanical systems other than those directly associated with the nuclear steam supply system (i.e., Balance-of-Plant systems), to evaluate the effects of the proposed EPU on such systems; these include the condensate, feedwater, main steam, main turbine, and turbine bypass systems that are involved in the plants response to transients, as described in Sections 2.5 and 2.12 of the Staffs Final SE (Staff Exhs. 1 and 2). Id. at 4. Mr. Jones received a Bachelor of Science degree in Marine Engineering from the United States Naval Academy, and has over twenty years of experience in nuclear engineering and regulation, including experience as a Senior Resident Inspector. Jones Prof. Qual., Post Tr. 1383, at 1-2. The Licensing Board finds Mr. Jones to be well-qualified as an expert witness on the subject of the impacts of EPU operation on Balance-of-Plant systems, NRC regulatory requirements and guidance pertaining to BWR EPU applications, and the need for large transient testing in connection with such applications, as pertinent to Balance-of-Plant systems.
2.15.
Staff Witness Robert L. Pettis, Jr., is employed as a Senior Reactor Engineer in the Division of Engineering, NRR. As such, he is responsible for the technical review of several EPU and license renewal amendment requests. As part of his responsibilities, Mr. Pettis was responsible for evaluating the power ascension and testing plan section of the Vermont Yankee EPU application. He coordinated the Staffs review of the overall power uprate testing program of the Vermont Yankee EPU application, including preparation of Section 2.12 in the Staffs Final SE. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 1-3. Mr. Pettis received a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering and a Master of Science Degree in Civil Engineering from Northeastern University. He has over 30 years engineering experience in the commercial nuclear power industry, including significant experience in the following areas: engineering management; technical writing; nuclear facilities audits, inspections, and design verifications; structural engineering and design; software quality assurance, verification and validation; EPU reviews; and professional engineer reviews of ASME Class I component supports. Pettis Prof. Qual.,
Post Tr. 1383, at 1. The Licensing Board finds Mr. Pettis to be well-qualified as an expert witness on the subject of NRC regulatory requirements and guidance pertaining to nuclear power plant operational testing, and the need for large transient testing in connection with BWR EPU applications.
2.16.
Staff Witness George Thomas is employed as a Senior Reactor Systems Engineer in the Division of System Safety, NRR. As such, he is responsible for reviewing and evaluating design, process design parameters, and performance of reactor thermal-hydraulic systems for BWR designs, including advanced reactor designs and combined operating licenses associated with the reactor coolant system and normal and emergency core cooling systems under steady-state, transient, and accident conditions. In addition, he is responsible for reviewing the analysis of anticipated operational occurrences, postulated accidents, and actual operating experience from the viewpoint of systems operation and transient dynamics; and he conducts evaluations of the effects of changes to licensed thermal power, license renewal, and other technical specification changes related to BWR reactor systems. Staff Dir.
Post Tr. 1383, at 2-3. As part of his responsibilities, Mr. Thomas conducted the reactor systems review of the transient analyses submitted by Entergy for the Vermont Yankee EPU, including preparation of Section 2.8.5 in the Staffs Final SE. Id. at 5. Mr. Thomas received a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics from Kerala University (India), and he has over 37 years of BWR experience including 26 years at the NRC. His experience includes a broad range of functions related to the design, engineering, testing, operations, and evaluation of BWR systems. Thomas Prof. Qual Post Tr. 1383, at 1-2. The Licensing Board finds Mr. Thomas to be well-qualified as an expert witness on the subjects of BWR thermal-hydraulic system performance, the dynamics of BWR transients, and the analysis of transients related to BWR reactor systems.
2.17.
Staff Witness Zena Abdullahi is employed as a Senior Reactor Systems Engineer in the BWR Systems Branch of the NRR Division of System Safety. As such, she is responsible for evaluating the impacts of proposed license amendments on reactor response during steady state, transient and accident conditions. Her areas of responsibilities include evaluating design basis safety analyses supporting BWR operation (e.g., reactor fuel and core performance, transients, emergency core cooling system (ECCS) loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs), and instabilities), the capabilities of reactor safety coolant systems (e.g., ECCS, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)) to perform their safety functions, and the adequacy of nuclear monitoring and safety system actuation and trip setpoints during steady state, transient and accident conditions. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 2-3; Abdullahi Prof. Qual. at 1.
Ms. Abdullahi conducted the Staffs review of the analytical methods used in the Vermont Yankee EPU application to perform the reactor neutronic and thermal/hydraulic analyses, as described in Section 2.8.7 of the Staffs Final SE. Id. at 5. Ms. Abdullahi received a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of California, Davis and a Master of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Maryland. She has over 13 years experience at the NRC and in the nuclear power industry, including considerable 27 See Prefiled Written Testimony of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld Regarding Contention 3, dated May 17, 2006 (Hopenfeld Dir.), Post Tr. 1511; Declaration of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld in Support of New England Coalitions Response to the Statements of Position of Entergy and NRC Staff, dated June 14, 2006 (Hopenfeld Rebuttal), Post Tr. 1511.
experience in evaluating nuclear reactor core and fuel performance during steady-state, transient and accident conditions. Abdullahi Prof. Qual. at 1. The Licensing Board finds Ms. Abdullahi to be well-qualified as an expert witness on the subjects of neutronic and thermal/hydraulic analyses, including transient and accident analysis.
2.18.
NEC presented one witness, Dr. Joram L. Hopenfeld, in support of its contention.27 Dr. Hopenfeld has had 44 years of professional experience, which has included the publication of 14 papers in peer-reviewed journals, and the design and conduct of tests related to thermal hydraulics, materials/coolant compatibility and reactor safety. His career has included work for the NRC, where he was responsible for a test program designed to benchmark thermal hydraulic codes for pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear reactors.
Dr. Hopenfeld received a Bachelor of Science degree, a Master of Science degree and a Ph.D.
in Engineering from the University of California, Los Angeles, with emphasis in fluid flow, heat transfer and electrochemistry. Hopenfeld Dir. Post Tr. 1511, at [unnumbered] 1-3. The Licensing Board finds Dr. Hopenfeld to be qualified as an expert witness on the subject of thermal/hydraulic analyses.
2.19.
As more fully set forth below, having considered the testimony and other evidence presented by the parties, we find that the evidence supports a conclusion that large transient testing, specifically the MSIV closure test and generator load rejection test, are not necessary to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service at the EPU power level at Vermont Yankee, and that Entergys proposed test program satisfies the requirements of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, specifically, Criterion XI.
28 See Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Review Standard for Extended Power Uprates, RS-001, Rev. 1 (Dec. 2003) (Staff Exh. 5).
2.
NRC Regulatory Guidance for the Performance of Large Transient Testing.
2.20.
Commission guidance for initial plant testing is discussed in NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.68, Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2, dated August 1978. Staff Exh. 4. This regulatory guide describes the general scope and depth of initial test programs that the NRC Staff has found acceptable during the review of initial operating license applications. Appendix A of RG 1.68 describes a set of tests acceptable to demonstrate that the plant will operate in accordance with design specifications both during normal steady-state conditions and, to the extent practical, during and following anticipated operational occurrences, such as MSIV closure and generator load rejection tests. Most necessary testing is performed at the component or system level, but initial test programs include integrated transient tests. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 7.
2.21.
NRC regulatory guidance for EPUs is contained in RS-001, Review Standard for Extended Power Uprates, which was developed primarily to increase the standardization and effectiveness of EPU reviews performed by the NRC Staff.28 This review standard provides the Staffs reviewers with references to existing review criteria (i.e., applicable Standard Review Plan (SRP) sections, branch technical positions, information notices and bulletins, generic letters, NUREGs, industry standards, applicable generic topical reports, etc.), and includes a template safety evaluation. Safety evaluation template Section 2.12, Power Ascension and Testing Plan, indicates that the NRCs acceptance criteria for a proposed EPU test program are based on the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 8; see also Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 8.
2.22.
As indicated in RS-001, Matrix 12, specific review criteria and NRC Staff guidance for assessing the extent of testing necessary for EPU applications is described in 29 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0800.
30 Entergys EPU application, submitted in 2003, was prepared by the Applicant and was reviewed and approved by the Staff, in accordance with the regulatory guidance contained in Section 14.2.1, Draft Revision 0, published in December 2002 (Entergy Exhibit 4). Entergys conformance with the draft guidance was addressed in the parties testimony and in this decision. Nonetheless, we note (as did the Staff) that in August 2006, five months after the Vermont Yankee EPU license amendment was issued, the draft guidance was superseded by the issuance of a final version of Section 14.2.1 (Generic Guidelines for Extended Power Uprate Testing Programs). See Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 8 n.5. We overruled NECs objection to the Staffs reference to this fact in its testimony; as we observed, the revised guidance was not introduced as evidence and it does not affect our decision. See Tr. 1381-83.
NUREG-0800,29 SRP Section 14.2.1, Generic Guidelines for Extended Power Uprate Testing Programs, Draft Revision 0, dated December 2002. Entergy Exh. 4.30 Subsection III.A, Review Procedures, of SRP Section 14.2.1, provides staff guidance for a comparison of the proposed EPU test program to the initial plant test program. Subsection III.B provides guidance for a review of EPU post-modification testing requirements. Attachment 2 to SRP Section 14.2.1 provides a generic listing of transient tests drawn from RG 1.68 that are typically included in initial plant test programs that may be affected by modifications associated with an EPU. The two large transient tests that are the subject of this contention, MSIV closure and generator load rejection, are included in Attachment 2 and are listed therein as Dynamic Response of Plant for Full Load Rejection, and Dynamic Response of Plant to Automatic Closure of All Main Steam Isolation Valves, respectively. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 8-9; see Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 8.
2.23.
Under SRP Section 14.2.1, licensees may propose an EPU test program that does not include all of the power ascension testing (including large transient testing) that would be identified by application of the review procedures in Subsections III.A and III.B of SRP Section 14.2.1. Subsection III.C of Section 14.2.1, Use of Evaluation to Justify Elimination, provides for such proposals and lists the following factors to be considered when assessing the adequacy of the licensees justification:
previous operating experience; introduction of new thermal-hydraulic phenomena or identified system interactions; facility conformance to limitations associated with analytical analysis methods; plant staff familiarization with facility operation and trial use of operating and emergency operating procedures; margin reduction in safety analysis results for Anticipated Operational Occurrences; guidance contained in vendor topical reports; and risk implications.
SRP Section 14.2.1, at 7-10; Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 9.
2.24.
Thus, the regulatory guidance permits an applicant to propose an EPU test program that does not include large transient testing; the NRC, however, has not issued a generic approval for BWR EPU license applicants to obtain an exception to such testing requirements. In this regard, two topical reports submitted by General Electric Company (GE), the nuclear steam supply system vendor for VYNPS, are of interest.
2.25. In developing guidelines for BWR extended power uprates, GE first submitted General Electric Licensing Topical Report ELTR-1, Generic Guidelines for General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Extended Power Uprate, which was issued in February 1999 following NRC Staff approval. Topical Report ELTR-1 provides generic guidelines for BWR EPUs.
Section 5.11.9 and Appendix L.2.4 of ELTR-1 state that: (1) a MSIV closure test, equivalent to that conducted in the initial startup testing, will be performed if the power uprate is more than 10% above any previously recorded MSIV closure data; and (2) for uprates of more than 15%,
a generator load rejection test, equivalent to that conducted in the initial startup testing, will be performed if the power uprate is more than 15% above any previously recorded generator load rejection transient data. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 9-10. The approach described in ELTR-1 31 The CPPU methodology, which maintains the same reactor operating pressure as originally licensed, greatly simplifies the engineering analyses, equipment and procedural changes required to achieve uprated conditions. It also assures that the plant's performance during transients will be analogous to that before the uprate. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 5.
32 Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, GE Nuclear Energy Licensing Topical Report, NEDC-33004P, Revision 1" (March 31, 2003). Sections 3.4 and 10.5 of this SE are found in Entergy Exh. 30 (pp. 35-36, 76-82), and Entergy Exh. 25 (pp. 35-36, 76-82).
was based on the assumption that the maximum reactor operating pressure would be increased under EPU conditions. Id. at 10.
2.26.
Subsequently, GE developed a different approach to uprating reactor power in BWRs that does not increase the maximum reactor operating pressure. This approach is described in GE Licensing Topical Report NEDC-3300P-A, Revision 4, dated July 2003, Constant Pressure Power Uprate [CPPU] (Entergy Exh. 30P). The CPPU approach forms the basis for the Vermont Yankee EPU application. Id. at 10; Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 5.
2.27.
In the CPPU topical report, GE proposed that large transient tests (MSIV closure and generator load rejection) - which had been included in topical report ELTR not be performed for uprates following the CPPU approach. GE provided a generic justification for not performing these tests and concluded that they are not needed to demonstrate the safety of plants implementing a CPPU. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 10.31 2.28.
The NRC Staff reviewed and approved the CPPU topical report, as described in a Safety Evaluation (CPPU SE) dated March 31, 2003 (Entergy Exhs. 25, 30P).32 However, the Staff did not approve GEs proposed generic exception from large transient testing; instead, the Staff concluded that it would continue to consider the need to conduct these tests on a plant-specific basis. In evaluating GEs generic justification to not perform the two large transient tests, the Staff considered: (1) the modifications made to the plant for a CPPU that are related to the two tests; (2) component and system level testing that will be performed either as part of the licensees power ascension and test plan or to meet technical specification 33 The regulatory guidance developed by the Staff following issuance of its CPPU Safety Evaluation is discussed in n. 30, supra.
surveillance requirements; (3) past experience at other plants; and (4) the importance of the additional information that could be obtained from performing the two tests with respect to plant analyses. The conclusions in the Staffs CPPU SE Section 10.5.9 (Entergy Exhs. 25, 30P) stated, in part, that the Staff has previously accepted not performing large transient tests on a plant-specific basis and that the Staff was developing guidance to generically address the requirement for conducting large transients tests in conjunction with power uprates.33 Therefore, the Staff was not prepared at that time to accept GEs generic proposed elimination of large transient tests for CPPU type uprates. The Staff also stated that information obtained from the MSIV closure and generator load rejection tests could be useful to confirm plant performance, adjust plant control systems, and enhance training material. Finally, the CPPU SE indicated that, for BWRs utilizing the CPPU approach, licensees may submit and the Staff will continue to consider, on a plant-specific basis, the need to conduct these tests. Staff Dir.
Post Tr. 1383, at 10-11; Entergy Exh. 25 (SE at 3 through 87 of 213); Entergy Exh. 30 (SE at 3 through 87 of 309).
3.
Entergys Request for an Exception from Large Transient Testing; Reviews Conducted by the Staff and ACRS 2.29.
The Vermont Yankee EPU request was prepared following the guidelines contained in the CPPU Topical Report. Implementation of the guidance contained in the CPPU Topical Report results in an increase in reactor power without an increase in reactor operating pressure (i.e., a constant pressure power uprate). Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 5; Tr. 1270-72. Consistent with the Staffs CPPU Safety Evaluation, as part of its application, Entergy provided plant-specific information to justify not performing large transient testing for Vermont Yankee. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 11. In particular, Entergy included with its EPU Application as Attachment 7, its "Justification for Exception to Large Transient Testing (Entergy Exh. 5). Entergy subsequently supplemented its justification for the requested exception, in a submittal dated October 28, 2003 (Entergy Exh. 6); additional information was provided, inter alia, on February 24, April 22, and August 1, 2005, respectively (Staff Exhs. 9, 10, and 11), as well as in submittals dated October 2004 and September 2005. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 10-11; Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 11.
2.30.
In its justification, Entergy followed the guidance in SRP Section 14.2.1, and addressed the factors outlined therein as justifying not performing large transient testing.
These included: (1) Vermont Yankees general response to unplanned transients; (2) analyses of specific transients; (3) the impact of EPU modifications; and (4) relevant industry experience.
Further, Entergy stated in its testimony that, if performed, the MSIV closure and generator load rejection tests would not confirm any new or significant aspect of performance that is not routinely demonstrated by component level testing and demonstrated through analyses; and it stated that the EPU transient analyses for Vermont Yankee were performed assuming operational configurations and component/system failures that are impractical to replicate during a testing program and are unlikely to be seen during actual plant operations, and therefore bound (i.e., represent more severe conditions than) the transients that would occur during actual plant operations or during large transient testing. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 8, 10-11.
2.31.
The Staff reviewed and approved Entergys request for an exception to performing the two large transient tests as part of the Vermont Yankee EPU amendment.
Consistent with the guidance provided in SRP Section 14.2.1, the Staff found that the performance of those large transient tests was not necessary to demonstrate that SSCs important to safety would perform acceptably in service. This conclusion was based on the scope of the post-modification and power ascension test programs, the limited scope of physical modifications made to the plant, previous operating experience, the lack of significant new thermal-hydraulic phenomena associated with a constant-pressure power uprate, conformance with limitations associated with analytical analysis methods, and the absence of a significant change in the results of safety analyses. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 11-12.
2.32.
The Staff presented its evaluation of Entergys proposed power ascension and testing plan in Section 2.12 of its Final Safety Evaluation for the Vermont Yankee EPU. Staff Exhs. 1P and 2, at 260-74. In this regard, based on its review, the Staff reached the following conclusion regarding Entergys proposed test program, including transient testing:
The staff concludes that the proposed EPU test program, including the testing required by [a staff-imposed condensate and feedwater system license condition], provides reasonable assurance that the plant will operate in accordance with design criteria and that SSCs affected by the proposed EPU, or modified to support the proposed EPU, will perform satisfactorily in service.
Further, the staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that the EPU testing program satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed EPU test program acceptable.
Staff Exhs. 1P and 2, at 274.
2.33.
Further, in its Safety Evaluation, the Staff reached the following specific conclusion regarding Entergys request for an exception from large transient testing:
Based on its review of the information provided by the licensee, as described above, the NRC staff concludes that in justifying test eliminations or deviations, other than the condensate and feedwater system testing discussed in SE Section 2.5.4.4, the licensee adequately addressed factors which included previous industry operating experience at recently uprated BWRs, plant response to actual turbine and generator trip tests at other plants, and experience gained from actual plant transients experienced in 1991 at the VYNPS. From the EPU experience referenced by the licensee, it can be concluded that large transients, either planned or unplanned, have not provided any significant new information about transient modeling or actual plant response. As such, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that the VYNPS SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service under EPU conditions. The staff also noted that the licensee followed the NRC staff approved GE topical report guidance which was developed for the VYNPS licensing application.
Id. at 270.
2.34.
As noted above, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards conducted a review of the Vermont Yankee EPU license amendment application. In that review, the ACRS reached the following conclusion regarding Entergys request for an exception from performing large transient testing :
Load rejection and main steam isolation valve closure transient tests are not warranted. The planned transient testing program adequately addresses the performance of the modified systems.
Entergy Exh. 22, at 1.
- 4.
Entergys Justification for An Exception From Large Transient Testing.
2.35.
Entergy presented five reasons in support of its justification for not conducting large transient testing as part of its EPU application. These are addressed seriatim, below.
- a.
Large Transient Testing Would Not Provide Useful Information.
(1) The MSIV Closure and Turbine Generator Load Rejection Tests 2.36.
The MSIV Closure and Generator Load Rejection tests (i.e., the Large Transient Testing at issue in NEC Contention 3) are defined in the CPPU Topical Report as applicable to EPU operations. The NRC Staff has accepted these two tests as verifying that plant performance after implementation of an EPU will be as predicted. See SRP Section 14.2.1, Generic Guidelines for Extended Power Uprate Testing Programs, Subsection III.C.2.f.
(Entergy Exh. 4). When conducted during plant operation, these tests are similar to counterpart tests performed during initial plant startup testing. SRP Section 14.2.1 specifies that these tests are to be performed in a similar manner to the testing that was performed during initial startup testing of the plant. SRP 14.2.1,Section III.A.1. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 8.
These two tests, and the events which they are intended to simulate, are described below.
34 As we have previously observed, the term "SCRAM" means "the sudden shutting down of a nuclear reactor, usually by rapid insertion of control rods, either automatically or manually by the reactor operator. May also be called a reactor trip. It is actually an acronym for "safety control rod axe man," the worker assigned to insert the emergency rod on the first reactor (the Chicago Pile) in the U.S." LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 127 n.14 (2006), citing http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/scram.html.
The MSIV Closure Test 2.37.
An MSIV closure transient involves the sudden closure of all Main Steam Isolation Valves at power. This is an Abnormal Operational Transient, as described in Chapter 14 of the Vermont Yankee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 8-9. Vermont Yankee has eight main steam isolation valves (MSIV), two on each of the main steam lines. Tr. 1180. As designed, all of these valves shut when any two valves are less than 90 percent open. Tr. 1181. MSIV closure initiates a reactor SCRAM.
Tr. 1182.34 Hence, this transient is known as the MSIV Closure with position scram. Tr. 1180, 1192. The closure of the MSIVs results in the isolation of the main condenser, causing a pressure increase. This causes an addition of positive reactivity. Tr. 1183. The reactor SCRAM drives in all 89 of Vermont Yankees control rods, which reduces power. Tr. 1183.
The power reduction offsets the positive reactivity caused by the MSIV closure, and the reactor shuts down. Tr. 1183. The rods start moving approximately 200 milliseconds into the event.
Tr. 1250. Because the control rods insert so quickly, the instantaneous flux will start decreasing to a very low level by the time the MSIVs close sufficiently to cause a rise in pressure. Id. A slight increase in pressure will be offset, as necessary, by operators opening safety relief valves, or, if the pressure set point is reached, by automatic operation. Tr. 1183.
2.38. The MSIV closure with flux SCRAM or delayed SCRAM is used for the licensing basis analysis. Tr. 1192, 1227. This event is similar to the MSIV closure with position SCRAM, with an added conservatism: The position SCRAM is ignored. Tr. 1192-93. In this event, the SCRAM does not occur until much later, when the valves are much further closed, and the pressurization event has started. Id. This results in positive reactivity while the plant is still at 35 In response to Board questioning, Mr. Nichols stated that the MSIV closure with position scram transient does cause a minimal pressure increase in the upper dome. Tr. 1188-89. However, when the position scram occurs, the pressure increase does not even come close to the lowest safety valve set point. Tr. 1189.
very high power. Id. Eventually, the average power range monitors provide the SCRAM signal.
Id. This is the design-basis event, and is considered bounding for vessel pressurization, but it is not the way in which the plant is designed to respond. Id.
2.39.
The MSIV closure test requires the fast closure (within 3.0 to 5.0 seconds) of all eight MSIVs from full rated power. The MSIV closure test is intended to (1) demonstrate that reactor transient behavior during and following simultaneous full closure of all MSIVs is as expected; (2) check the MSIVs for proper operation; and (3) determine or confirm MSIV closure time at full power. The transient produced by an MSIV closure (with Flux SCRAM) is the most severe abnormal operational transient from the standpoint of increase in nuclear system pressure. However, for the full licensing basis transient to take place it is necessary that the direct SCRAM signals from the valve position switches that would cause a reactor trip do not occur and that the SCRAM be delayed until the high flux signal is received. For this reason, Entergy explained, an MSIV closure test performed as part of LTT would not result in an appreciable transient because the SCRAM signals would issue from the MSIV position switches and cause a SCRAM. The prompt SCRAM would significantly reduce the pressure transient that would otherwise occur in an actual event. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 9. 35 2.40. In this regard, Mr. Nichols testified that a MSIV closure test would be performed in accordance with the plants design, i.e., with the position SCRAM. Tr. 1194-95. Mr. Casillas agreed that the test would be performed with the position SCRAM, because the purpose of the test is to confirm that the system is responding in the manner in which it is expected to respond, not to determine the maximum structural response. Tr. 1195, 1228. Mr. Ennis noted the Staffs agreement on this point, because SRP Section 14.2.1 states that [l]icensees should propose appropriate testing and acceptance criteria that ensure that the plant responds within design predictions. Tr. 1400. Further, Attachment 2 to SRP 14.2.1 provides acceptance criteria for the MSIV closure test. Tr. 1398-99. The first acceptance criterion listed for this transient is performance in accordance with design. Entergy Exh. 4, at 14.2.1-18. Thus, Mr. Ennis stated that [e]ven though... the accident analysis may assume the flux scram, [the] plant [i]s design[ed to] scram when the valve goes about ten percent closed. That is the way you have to run the test. Tr. 1400. NECs witness, Dr. Hopenfeld, agreed that the purpose of transient tests is to verify that a plants performance is consistent with design. Hopenfeld Rebuttal Post Tr. 1511, at 5.
2.41.
Accordingly, we find that an MSIV closure test performed in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.68 and SRP Section 14.2.1 would be performed with the position SCRAM, consistent with the plants design. As such, we find credible Entergys assertion that the MSIV closure test would not result in an appreciable transient and would not duplicate the MSIV closure with Flux SCRAM (i.e., the full licensing basis transient) - which would present a greater challenge to the plant from the standpoint of an increase in nuclear system pressure.
The Generator Load Rejection Test 2.42.
A Generator Load Rejection From High Power Without Bypass (GLRWB)
(commonly referred to as a "turbine generator load rejection" or a "generator load rejection") is an Abnormal Operational Transient as described in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR. Entergy Dir.
Post Tr. 1175, at 9. This transient is considered in the design-basis analysis. Tr. 1222. A generator load rejection transient is initiated by a rapid closure of the turbine control valves after a load rejection. A generator load rejection transient provides a bounding challenge to the fuel thermal limits, assuming none of the bypass valves open; in other words, for the full licensing 36 Mr. Nichols explained that Vermont Yankee has ten bypass valves, affording one of the highest bypass capacities in the country. Tr. 1219. At the uprated power level, the plant has approximately 86 percent bypass capacity. Tr. 1220. For the generator load rejection transient, under pre-uprate conditions, two, three, or five bypass valves may have opened in response to the transient; following the EPU, there would be more decay steam, so that three, five, or seven bypass valves might open. Tr. 1220.
basis transient to take place, it is necessary that all bypass valves fail to open. Entergy Dir.
Post Tr. 1175, at 9-10.36 2.43.
Mr. Nichols described the generator load rejection event sequence, in accordance with the Vermont Yankee plant design. The generator load rejection transient occurs when for some reason, typically an electrical fault, the load on a generator goes away.
This causes the turbine control valves to close in approximately 100 milliseconds, or one-tenth of a second. The fast closure of the turbine control valves energizes an acceleration relay, which causes a reactor scram. Tr. 1219. As the turbine control valves close, the steam path to the turbine begins to close. In response, the bypass valves open following a control valve closure to provide a path for steam to the condenser for plant cooldown and to maintain reactor pressure control. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 9-10.
2.44.
The purpose of a generator load rejection test is to determine and demonstrate reactor response to a generator trip, with particular attention to the rates of change and peak values of power level, reactor steam pressure and turbine speed. However, a generator load rejection test performed as part of LTT would result in bypass valve opening. Therefore, the test would provide information as to how the plant would respond to a generator load rejection with bypass event, but it would provide no comparable information as to how the plant would respond to an actual generator load rejection without bypass transient. Id. at 10. In other words, because the bypass valves would open in the test, the test would not provide useful information as to how the plant would respond to the design basis transient - i.e., a generator load rejection without bypass event. See id.
2.45.
Thus, like the MSIV Closure test, the Generator Load Rejection test would be performed in accordance with the plants design. Entergys witnesses confirmed that Entergy wouldnt do a large transient test without bypass; further, Mr. Nichols stated that to his knowledge, no other plants had done this test without bypass. Tr. 1221, 1222; see also Tr. 1262-63. As discussed above, Mr. Ennis, testifying for the Staff, noted that SRP Section 14.2.1 (Entergy Exh. 4) states that [l]icensees should propose appropriate testing and acceptance criteria that ensure that the plant responds within design predictions. Tr. 1400.
Further, Attachment 2 to SRP Section 14.2.1 provides acceptance criteria for the generator load rejection test. Tr. 1398-99. The first acceptance criterion listed for this transient test is performance in accordance with design. Entergy Exh. 4, at 14.2.1-17. As noted above, Dr. Hopenfeld agreed that the purpose of transient tests is to verify that the performance of a given plant is consistent with design. Hopenfeld Rebuttal Post Tr. 1511, at 5.
2.46.
Accordingly, we find that a generator load rejection test performed in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.68 and SRP Section 14.2.1 would be performed with bypass, consistent with plant design. As such, this transient test would be less severe that the transient considered in the design-basis licensing analysis, in which all bypass valves fail to open. See Entergy Dir.
Post Tr. 1175, at 9-10.
(2) Prior Large Transient Testing at Vermont Yankee 2.47.
Large transient testing has been performed at Vermont Yankee previously. In this regard, large transient tests were performed at Vermont Yankee at startup in 1974, in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.68. Tr. 1572. A turbine trip test was performed at Vermont Yankee on January 24 of that year, at 98 percent power. Subsequently, after the plant was back online, an MSIV closure test was performed at 92.7 percent power, on February 23, 1974, and a generator load rejection test was performed at 98 percent power, on March 29, 1974.
Tr. 1573.
37 Mr. Casillas also testified that there is little difference in the plants ability to acquire transient data from a test and its ability to acquire transient data from a transient event. Nuclear power reactors today have acquisition systems that start taking data very accurately as soon as a disturbance occurs.
The only complication in an unplanned event is that it is initiated by a disturbance, so the event does not constitute a clean test. Tr. 1206.
2.48.
Mr. Casillas, testifying on behalf of Entergy, opined that the performance of a further LTT at Vermont Yankees new maximum power level would provide nothing new.
Tr. 1197. The testing requirements found in Reg. Guide 1.68 were established for initial testing programs. Staff Ex 4. When a plant is first built, it constitutes an entirely new system, and there is an interest in determining the behavior of the plant under different conditions. Once a plant has been running for 10 or 20 years, and has experienced several events at a range of power levels, licensees have a much greater understanding of the behavior of the plant.
Therefore, in his opinion, to perform another test at the new maximum power would be an academic exercise and would not provide useful new information. Tr. 1196-97.37 2.49.
NECs witness, Dr. Hopenfeld, agreed that large transient tests would probably provide the same information as the plant would gain from an actual transient event. Tr. 1525.
Nonetheless, he argued that performing the tests at this time would be of value, in order (1) to comply with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, (2) to validate the ODYN code, (3) to verify that maximum pressure does not exceed the original criteria, (4) to determine whether components can initiate severe component vibration, and (5) to assess general component functionality. Tr. 1527-29.
2.50.
We have considered Dr. Hopenfelds views as to the potential benefits of performing large transient testing in connection with the Vermont Yankee EPU. As discussed infra, however, any requirement that LTT be performed as a condition for issuance of the Vermont Yankee EPU amendment must rest upon a determination that LTT is necessary to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service at EPU power levels at Vermont Yankee, in accordance with Criterion XI of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B; as discussed infra, we have concluded that large transient testing is not required at Vermont Yankee in order to demonstrate compliance with this regulation. Further, we find that whatever the potential benefits of large transient testing at this time, they are insufficient to warrant imposition of a mandatory requirement that such testing be performed.
2.51.
In sum, we find that large transient testing was performed at Vermont Yankee in connection with the initial start-up of the plant; further, we find that the performance of large transient testing at Vermont Yankee EPU power levels would fail to replicate the conditions that would be experienced in an actual MSIV closure or generator load reject without bypass transient. Accordingly, we conclude that the performance of LTT at the maximum EPU power level would not provide useful new information as to how the plant would respond to such an event under EPU conditions.
b.
Vermont Yankee Transient Analyses 2.52.
As part of its rationale for not performing large transient testing for the Vermont Yankee EPU amendment, Entergy relies upon the transient analyses that have been performed for the plant. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 18. Entergy states that these analyses, using the NRC-approved One-Dimensional DYNamic (ODYN) Core Transient Model, predict and bound the behavior of safety-related and non-safety-related systems in the plant during operational transients. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 12; see Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 17.
2.53.
The Staffs witnesses related that Vermont Yankee had analyzed the limiting transients for each fuel cycle using ODYN, as part of the NRC-approved standard reload process for BWRs. In its justification for not performing these tests for the EPU amendment, Entergy stated that the MSIV closure pressurization transient analysis (that bounds, from a pressurization standpoint, the load reject without bypass pressurization event) had been performed at Vermont Yankee for EPU conditions using the ODYN code. Further, Entergy stated that the analyses assumed worse conditions than would be experienced during an actual transient, and the results of the analyses showed that the response of the plant to this bounding transient to be acceptable. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 18.
2.54.
Similarly, Mr. Casillas testified for Entergy that transient analyses have been performed for MSIV closure and generator load rejection transients at Vermont Yankee occurring under EPU operation that bound the plant's behavior during those transients. In December 2005, GE prepared an updated Supplemental Reload Licensing Report ("SRLP")
containing analyses of the performance of Vermont Yankee under EPU conditions. The SRLP contained the results of licensing basis GLRWB and MSIV closure simulations conducted using the ODYN code. See Entergy Exh. 8. The results of these simulations verified that: (1) these transients remain the limiting transients from the perspective of the selected parameters, and (2) the results remain within the design and license limits. Based on the benchmark results, the peak pressures calculated by ODYN would be overpredicted (conservatively high). These analyses still show significant margin to the limits. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 16. This type of analysis is performed as part of the core design for each operating cycle. Id.
2.55.
The reliability of Vermont Yankees transient analyses was disputed by NECs witness Dr. Hopenfeld, who asserted that: (1) Entergy had not shown that the ODYN code has been benchmarked for the type of transients that were analyzed at EPU conditions, or for steady state operations, Hopenfeld Dir. Post Tr. 1511, at 5; (2) ODYN is only useful for predicting peak pressure, and provides no information concerning transient-induced stresses on SSCs, Hopenfeld Rebuttal Post Tr. 1511, at 4-8; and (3) unless Entergy provides further details supporting its use of ODYN, large transient testing should be required. Id. at 4-9.
2.56.
The ODYN code is a proprietary General Electric licensing code designed to simulate selected fast transients of boiling water reactors. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 12; Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 17. ODYN was developed by GE and approved by the NRC in 1981 for use in the analysis of GE BWR plant response to pressurization transients. Entergy Dir.
38 See Safety Evaluation for the [GE] Topical Report Qualification of the One-Dimensional Core Transient Model for [BWRs], NEDO-24154 and NEDE-24154-P (June 1980) (Entergy Exh. 26, at 4-109),
as supplemented by Supplemental Safety Evaluation for the [GE] Topical Report Qualification of the One-Dimensional Core Transient Model for [BWRs], NEDO-24154 and NEDE-24154-P (Jan. 1981)
(Entergy Exh. 26, at 110-125).
Post Tr. 1175, at 12.38 In particular, the NRC approved ODYN for application to a number of transients including, inter alia, generator load reject, turbine trip, MSIV closure, and MSIV closure with position switch failure (MSIV flux scram). Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 18. Over the last 20 years, the ODYN model has been upgraded to include greater modeling detail (such as increased nodes, advanced physics correlations, and more representative control systems),
which has improved the accuracy of the code and reduced the uncertainty in its predictions when compared against the qualification tests. Recently, the ODYN model has been approved by the NRC for application to all GE BWR plant transients. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 12.
2.57.
The ODYN model consists of an integrated one-dimensional reactor core model which is coupled to the recirculation and major system control models. The recirculation and control systems are integrated in the code to analyze the plants response to fast pressurization transients. ODYN also models the steamline pressure wave response in the main steam line, which includes modeling of the main turbine control valves and bypass valves. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 17.
2.58.
The ODYN code uses plant-specific core neutronic and thermal-hydraulic conditions as inputs. Id. The ODYN code models the behavior of BWRs such as Vermont Yankee during large transients by modeling BWR vessel physical components, mechanical equipment functions, control systems and nuclear/thermal-hydraulic phenomena. The simulation involves describing the physical plant in the model (i.e., volumes, flow paths, resistances), establishing the desired operating conditions (i.e., water level, power, pressure) and introducing a disturbance (i.e., valve closure, pump trip, control action). The ODYN model predicts the plant response behavior based on its physical model correlations. Entergy Dir.
39 Best estimate codes are computer simulation models applied in analyses intended to accurately predict the actual behavior of a nuclear power plant (or portions thereof) during normal operations, transients, or design basis accidents. In contrast, design codes are computer simulation models applied in analyses to ensure that the structures, systems and components in a nuclear power plant discharge their intended function during normal, transient and accident conditions; as such, design codes incorporate appropriate margins of conservatism. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 13.
40 Entergys witnesses stated that the ODYN model is based on physical correlations that are applicable over a wide range of parameters, even beyond the acceptable licensing ranges. Therefore, the ODYN code is fully qualified for the Vermont Yankee pressurization transients. Performance of large transient tests at Vermont Yankee would not challenge the facility nearly as much as the Peach Bottom tests used in the ODYN qualification. Entergy Rebuttal Post Tr. 1175, at 6. Several Vermont Yankee transients have been compared against ODYN predictions over the years to assess the specific BWR licensing basis. All of these comparisons determined that the ODYN predictions are bounding and that the plant equipment response is consistent with its design basis. Id. at 8-9; see Entergy Exhs. 9-16.
Post Tr. 1175, at 13. The ODYN analyses assume operational configurations and component/system failures that bound (i.e., represent more severe conditions than) the transients that would occur during normal plant operations or design basis events, including large transients. Id.
2.59.
The ODYN code is accepted as a best estimate code,39 although it includes some conservative biases due to simplified aspects of the model. GE has qualified the ODYN code against all significant plant transients, and the NRC has accepted that the ODYN code is a dependable best estimate code. As a best estimate code benchmarked against all significant transients, Mr. Casillas stated that ODYN is capable of predicting accurately the plant behavior during transients occurring at higher EPU power levels. Id. at 13-14.40 2.60.
As noted above, the NRC has approved the use of ODYN for BWR transient analyses. The NRC Staffs approval of ODYN included evaluation of the performance of the codes analytical models by quantifying the accuracy of the codes predictions (e.g.,
uncertainties) to be accounted for in the transient simulation. Some of the ODYN analytical models evaluated include: the recirculation loop model, the control systems model, the steam separator model, the upper plenum, vessel dome and bulkwater model, the steam line core thermal-hydraulic model (e.g., drift flux and mechanistic boiling), the core physics model, and the fuel heat transfer model. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 18-19.
2.61.
The Staff compared specific models in ODYN against separate effects test data.
The specific model assessment included code-to-code comparisons (e.g, ODYN thermal-hydraulic model against 3-D core simulator), ODYN comparisons to plant measurement data and separate effect test data. These assessments were used to establish the potential uncertainties and biases associated with the specific models in order to account for any potential under-predictions or conservatism in the codes simulation of plants transient response. The Staffs assessment of ODYN also included comparisons of the codes predicted integral response against the integral test data (e.g., three transient tests at Peach Bottom Unit 2 (PB-2"), and one transient test at the Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant (KKM) (a BWR located in Switzerland). Id. at 19, 20.
2.62.
Finally, the Staffs assessment of ODYN included comparisons of its simulation of specific transients against the predictions of independent confirmatory analyses (BNL-TWGL and RELAP-3B). The confirmatory codes were benchmarked against the PB-2 transient test.
The Staff evaluated differences between the PB-2 transient test results and the ODYN predictions. Based on the confirmatory analyses/ODYN code-to-code comparisons and the comparisons of ODYN predictions against the integral test data, the Staff quantified the uncertainties in ODYNs predictions that must be accounted for in the simulations of the plants transients. The Staff found the use of ODYN acceptable for performing design bases transients, in a safety evaluation issued in 1981. In November 1985, the Staff approved an 41 See Letter from Cecil O. Thomas (NRC) to J. S. Charnley (GE), Acceptance for Referencing of Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A, Rev. 6, Amendment 11, [GE] Standard Application for Reactor Fuel (GESTARII)) (Nov. 5, 1985) (Staff Exh. 17); Letter from Gus. C. Lainas (NRC) to J. S.
Charnley (GE), Acceptance for Referencing of Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A, GE Generic Licensing Reload Report, Supplement to Amendment 11" (March 22, 1986) (Staff Exh. 18).
updated version of ODYN that incorporated improvements in the specific models stemming from some of the differences observed in the PB-2 integral tests comparisons.41 Id. at 19-20.
2.63.
As stated above, integral tests were performed to validate ODYN, at the Peach Bottom Unit 2 and KKM nuclear plants. These integral tests were as follows.
2.64.
Peach Bottom 2 Integral Tests. In April 1977, three integral tests were performed at PB-2. These tests involved turbine trip transients with the turbine valve fast closure scram disabled. The tests were initiated from power levels of 47.4, 61.6 and 69.1 percent, and core flow rates of 100, 82.1 and 100 percent, respectively. Each transient test was initiated from a different control rod pattern and the results were compared against the axial power distribution shift in order to assess the one-dimensional nuclear model. One of the PB-2 tests included a control rod pattern selected to assess the ODYN models capability to simulate the core wide radial power distribution effect. For each of the transient tests, the turbine stop valve scram was disabled and the reactor scrammed on high neutron flux. This is a conservative test because the delayed scram results in higher power response in comparison to the plant power response for direct stop valve closure scram. This was done to obtain transient results comparable in severity to licensing analyses. Id. at 20.
2.65.
KKM Integral Tests: Integral tests were also performed at the Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant (KKM) in Switzerland. KKM is smaller than Peach Bottom Unit 2, and has a unique steamline/turbine configuration. The KKM plant has two turbines and two sets of steamlines with a reheater line in each steamline. These differences require spatial modeling considerations for the ODYN simulations. Consequently, GE developed a special version of ODYN that models the KKM configuration. In addition, KKM differs from domestic BWRs in terms of measurement capability and actuation of the turbine stop valve and bypass. Again, the ODYN model and valve actuations were adjusted in order to simulate KKM valve actuations.
The KKM turbine trip transient was initiated from 77% power at 86.5% core flow. The reactor was at end-of-cycle (EOC), all rods out, conditions. The KKM transient test resulted in milder pressurization response than the PB-2 tests; accordingly, most of the ODYN code validations that have been performed use the PB-2 tests. Id. at 20-21.
2.66.
In assessing the ODYN code, the Staff compared the integral test results for key parameters against the ODYN predictions. In addition, the Staff evaluated the adequacy of the ODYN 1D Thermal-Hydraulic model against the integral tests by evaluating the Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) flux reading and power distribution at a given axial location against the predictions. The change in critical power ratio (CPR) values predicted by ODYN for a given test were compared against the CPR obtained in the integral tests by using the measured core parameters. The measured jet pump P, measured pressure, and the measured power during the transient were used to predict the CPR of the test. Id. at 21.
2.67.
The Staff found that the ODYN code demonstrates good prediction against existing test data obtained from separate effects and integral plant tests (e.g., PB-2 and KKM).
Comparisons of the PB-2 and KKM integral test data against the ODYN predictions indicate that the results are within the calculated uncertainties. The Staff found that the CPR calculation from the ODYN code set is neither conservative nor non-conservative, but that it predicts the available data well and within the expected uncertainty range. Based on the PB-2 tests, the Staff determined that ODYN is a best estimate code for CPR calculations. Id.
2.68.
Subsequent to the initial comprehensive assessment of the ODYN performance, GE incorporated improved analytical methods and revised specific models that provided input to ODYN. See footnote 9 above. The improved ODYN code set comparisons against the PB-2 tests yielded closer predictions to the test results than the original comparison. As specific 42 Letter from R. M. Krich (Exelon) to NRC, Additional Testing Information Supporting the License Amendment Request to Permit Uprated Power Operation at Dresden Nuclear Power Station and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, RS-01-104 (May 18, 2001) (Staff Exh. 19). This letter was cited in the Staffs approval of the Dresden power uprate applications. See Safety Evaluation by the Office of
[NRR] Related to Amendment No. 191 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-19, and Amendment No.
185 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-25, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3, Dockets No. 50-237 and 50-249 (Dec. 21, 2001) (Staff Exh. 20), at 90-98.
input models are revised or improved, the fuel vendor has assessed the code against the original PB-2 test data in order to confirm that the codes performance is acceptable. Id. at 22.
2.69.
Further, after its initial validation, ODYN was assessed against actual EPU plant transient responses. Several domestic BWRs that had implemented extended power uprates subsequently experienced transient events; in addition, a foreign plant, Liebstat (KKL) that had undergone an EPU performed large transient tests. In all transient events and tests at the EPU power levels, the plants responded as expected, without indicating any significant changes in the fidelity of the analytical models and codes at the EPU conditions. Id. at 22.
2.70.
Specifically, the Staff observed that Exelon Generation Company (Exelon) had submitted an assessment of such events in a letter supporting the EPU applications for its Dresden and Quad Cities plants in May 2001.42 Exelon reported that Hatch Unit 2, with an EPU totaling 13% above the original licensed thermal power (OLTP), experienced a generator load reject at 98% of uprated power; this transient was reviewed by Exelon, which reported that all key parameters that are important to transient response were less than or equal to the values predicted by ODYN. Id. at 22-23. Second, Exelon reported that the Liebstat (KKL) plant (a European BWR) performed a turbine trip test at 10.5% above OLTP; the results of this transient test were reviewed by Exelon, which reported a close match between the predicted ODYN calculations and the measured plant response. Id. at 23.
43 See Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3, Licensee Event Report 2004-002-00, dated March 30, 2004 (Entergy Exh. 15).
2.71.
In addition, the Staff observed that in January 2004, Dresden Unit 3 experienced an inadvertent turbine trip at 97% of reactor power, after having implemented an EPU.43 GE reviewed this event (see Entergy Exh. 33), and concluded that the predicted trends and timing predicted in the ODYN response were consistent with the actual trends and timing of the plant response, for key parameters such as neutron flux, reactor peak pressure and reactor vessel level. GE concluded that the Dresden 3 turbine trip comparisons demonstrate that ODYN as used for reload licensing analyses for plants that have undergone an EPU will conservatively predict the overpressure and minimum critical power ratio response. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 23-24; Entergy Exh. 33.
2.72.
The Staff noted that it has not reviewed the benchmarking performed for the Hatch and Liebstat data, discussed in Exelons May 2001 report, but its preliminary assessment of GEs July 2005 evaluation of the Dresden 3 turbine trip (Entergy Exh. 33) indicates that, overall, the ODYN predictions appear to be generally consistent with the timing and trends of the plants instrumentation readings. Specifically, for the key parameters important in pressurization response, the ODYN predictions are consistent with measured data. Further, the Staff observed that EPU plants which were analyzed with ODYN, that have experienced transient events (i.e., Brunswick, Dresden), have responded as analyzed, indicating no significant change in the overall accuracy of the ODYN code. Therefore, comparisons of ODYN against plant data at EPU conditions provide reasonable assurance that use of the ODYN code will acceptably simulate plant response to limiting pressurization response, in terms of peak pressure and change in the MCPR. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 24.
2.73.
Entergy witness Mr. Casillas likewise testified that the ODYN code has been benchmarked against all significant plant transients including turbine trip (which is equivalent in 44 Mr. Casillas further observed that the ODYN model was initially developed exclusively for the prediction of, and benchmarked against, fast pressure transients such as MSIV closure, turbine trips or GLRWBs. However, since that time, GE has expanded its qualification and application to include all other significant transients, such as recirculation flow and coolant temperature disturbances. The code has been determined to accurately predict plant behavior in those transients. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 15.
its effects to a generator load rejection test) and main steam valve isolation events at operating facilities. The turbine trip data were obtained from the Peach Bottom and Muehleberg (KKM) plants; the MSIV closure data were obtained from the Hatch plant. The qualification of ODYN against the plant pressurization transients involved modeling each plant description and simulation of the transient. The ODYN code-predicted parameters were compared against the measured data, and the results of the comparison are used to determine the application basis of the ODYN results to licensing analyses. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 14.
2.74.
Mr. Casillas stated that the results of these benchmark assessments demonstrate the ability of the ODYN code to accurately predict plant performance during large transients. The Peach Bottom turbine trip tests date back to the late 1970s and form the initial benchmark for pressurization transients and uncertainty margins for the ODYN code. All subsequent advanced versions of the ODYN code have been assessed against these tests and continue to form the basis for the code's accuracy. The current version of the ODYN code continues to accurately predict the overpower magnitude and slightly overpredict the overpressure magnitude vis-a-vis the Peach Bottom tests. The ODYN model was also qualified against MSIV transient data and determined to predict the peak pressure results conservatively, consistent with its approved application basis. Id. at 14-15.44 2.75.
The ODYN model is applied using bounding equipment performance and limiting initial conditions to predict the plant behavior. The resulting predicted parameters - principally pressure histories - are used to confirm that the reactor components and vessel meet the loads used in their design. With respect to large transients, the parameter of interest is the peak vessel pressure, which has a design value of 1375 psig. The overpressure transient analysis is performed to confirm that the predicted peak pressure remains below this design value. No other loads on the vessel or its components are derived from the overpressure transient analyses. Therefore, stresses on components are not direct outputs of the ODYN simulations.
Id. at 15-16.
2.76.
In sum, Mr. Casillas believes it is reasonable to conclude that the ODYN simulations of Vermont Yankee's behavior in large transients during EPU operation accurately predict the actual plant response to those transients. The ODYN model is qualified for the analysis of this type of transient, and the resulting parameters are within the applicable physical correlations of the model for the bounding licensing analysis. Also, Mr. Casillas noted that a Vermont Yankee large transient test at the increased power condition at constant pressure would be significantly milder than the ODYN analyses. Several plant transients have been compared against ODYN predictions over the years to assess the specific BWR licensing basis; all of these comparisons determined that the licensing predictions are bounding and that the plant equipment response is consistent with its design basis. Further, GE has simulated in detail some of the transients for the purpose of revising the equipment response or setpoints in order to improve the plant response; none of these simulations has shown any ODYN model deficiency with respect to its licensing and qualification basis. Therefore, Mr. Casillas observed, GE does not expect any model qualification benefit from performing the Vermont Yankee tests.
Id. at 16-17.
2.77.
In his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Hopenfeld disagreed with the Staff and Entergy witnesses, stating that Entergy provided no direct justification for using ODYN and that the Staff accepts Entergys conclusions without apparent scrutiny. Hopenfeld Rebuttal Post Tr. 1511, at 5. Without directly addressing either Entergys or the Staffs discussion of the Peach Bottom transients, Dr. Hopenfeld simply stated that Entergy should provide information regarding the turbine trips at Peach Bottom. Id. at 9. Dr. Hopenfeld also noted that ODYN is capable of 45 In his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Hopenfeld expressed his understanding that Entergys justification for not performing large transient testing rested largely on the analyses provided by the ODYN code. See, e.g., Hopenfeld Rebuttal Post Tr. 1510, at 6. While reliance on the ODYN code constitutes an important factor in Entergys justification for not performing LTT, it is certainly only one of many factors relied upon by Entergy, as discussed infra. Further, while SRP Section 14.2.1, Subsection III.C (Entergy Exh. 4) lists numerous factors which the Staff may consider in determining whether to require LTT, Staff witness Abdullahi testified that the most important factor is operating experience. Tr. 1431, 1435.
predicting only the maximum pressure, which, he argued, is insufficient to assure performance of SSCs. Id. at 7.
2.78.
The Licensing Board finds that the ODYN code, which has been approved by the NRC and used for the analysis of transients at BWRs for over 20 years, constitutes a reliable best estimate code for predicting BWR response to generator load reject and MSIV closure events. Further, the evidence supports the conclusion that Vermont Yankees transient analyses, using the ODYN code, assume worse conditions than would be experienced in an actual transient at EPU power levels; moreover, those analyses bound the response of the plant to any large transient testing which would be conducted for the requested EPU amendment. The ODYN codes focus on peak pressure is appropriate, as this factor is of primary importance in assessing the ability of SSCs to perform satisfactorily in the event of an MSIV closure or GLRWB transient; further, even if large transient testing was to be performed, it would not provide the data on stresses sought by Dr. Hopenfeld. Accordingly, we find Entergys reliance upon the Vermont Yankee transient analyses, in its request for an exception to performing LTT in connection with its EPU application, is reasonable.45
- c.
BWR Operational Experience.
2.79.
As its third rationale for not performing large transient testing for the Vermont Yankee EPU amendment, Entergy cites the operational experience elsewhere in the nuclear industry. In this regard, Entergy states that in every instance in which plants similar to Vermont Yankee experienced large transients following their implementation of an EPU, the plants responses were as predicted and were bounded by the corresponding ODYN analysis, and no new phenomena were exhibited. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 18-20. In contrast, NEC witness Dr. Hopenfeld believes this operational experience at other plants, without further analysis and an assessment of stresses on key components, cannot be relied upon as a substitute for large transient testing; in his view, system performance can only be predicted by considering the stresses on key reactor components during the transients. Hopenfeld Rebuttal Post Tr. 1511, at 13-14.
2.80.
Entergy provided a detailed description of the operational experience of other plants in support of its rationale for not performing large transient testing. Entergy stated that EPUs have been implemented for 13 BWRs that are similar to Vermont Yankee in all significant respects that bear on large transient performance, utilizing the CPPU approach (i.e.,
without increasing reactor operating pressure). Id. at 6-7; see Entergy Exh. 38. These plants (and their respective EPUs) were as follows:
Hatch Units 1 and 2 (1998) 105% to 113% of OLTP; previously had 5%
stretch uprates to 105% OLTP Monticello (1998) 106% OLTP Muehleberg (KKM) (1993) 105% to 116% OLTP Leibstadt (KKL) (2000) 104% to 119.7% OLTP Duane Arnold (2001) 104.1% to 119.4% OLTP; previously had a 4.1% stretch uprate to 104.1% OLTP Dresden Units 2 and 3 (2001) 100% to 117% OLTP Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 (2001) 100% to 117.8% OLTP Clinton (2002) 100% to 120% OLTP Brunswick Units 1 and 2 (2002) 105% to 120% OLTP; previously had 5%
stretch uprates to 105% OLTP.
46 Entergy provided detailed information concerning the Brunswick plant, stating that Brunswick Units 1 and 2 are both BWR/4 plants with Mark 1 containments, like Vermont Yankee. Brunswick and Vermont Yankee were shown to be similar in key parameters such as power density, steam relief and bypass capacities that would affect the large transient performance of the plants. Entergy Dir. Post Tr.
1175, at 6-7; see Entergy Exh. 38.
47 The Staffs witnesses observed that the Staff may require large transient testing for an EPU application currently under review, largely because the plant has not been operated during the past 25 years; further, the Staffs witnesses observed that the Staff required LTT for the Duane Arnold EPU, which had followed the ELTR-1 approach. Tr. 1454, 1467-68. The ELTR-1 approach includes certain conditions where an MSIV closure test and a generator load rejection test should be performed as part of the EPU test program - in contrast to the CPPU approach, in which licensees may submit plant-specific information to justify an LTT exception (as Entergy has done for Vermont Yankee). NECs reference to the Duane Arnold EPU (and the Staffs RAI for that EPU), is therefore irrelevant. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 16-17.
Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 5-6.46 Entergy stated that none of the U.S. BWR plants similar to Vermont Yankee that implemented EPUs without increasing reactor operating pressure has been required to perform LTT at EPU power levels. Id. at 6. The Staff confirmed that the agency has not required large transient testing to be performed for any of the 15 or so BWR EPU applications that have been granted to date. Tr.1453-54.47 2.81.
Of the thirteen BWR plants that have implemented EPUs without increased reactor operating pressure, four (Hatch Units 1 and 2, Brunswick Unit 2, and Dresden Unit 3) have experienced one or more unplanned large transients from uprated power levels. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 18. Specifically:
Hatch Unit 2 (a BWR/4 plant with a Mark I containment, like Vermont Yankee) experienced a post-EPU unplanned transient that resulted in a generator load rejection from approximately 111% OLTP (98% of uprated power) in May 1999.
All systems functioned as expected and no anomalies were seen in the plant's response to this transient. See Entergy Exh. 9.
Hatch Unit 2 also experienced a post-EPU reactor trip on high reactor pressure as a result of MSIV closure from 113% OLTP (100% of uprated power) in 2001.
All systems functioned as expected and designed, given the conditions experienced during the transient. See Entergy Exh. 10.
Hatch Unit 1 experienced two post-EPU turbine trips from 112.6% and 113% of OLTP (99.7% and 100% of uprated power). See Entergy Exhs. 11-12. Again, the behavior of the primary safety systems was as expected. No new plant behaviors for either plant were observed.
Brunswick Unit 2 (which is very similar in design to Vermont Yankee) experienced a post-EPU unplanned transient that resulted in a generator/turbine trip due to loss of generator excitation from 115.2% OLTP (96% of uprated thermal power) in 2003. Entergy Exh. 13. No anomalies were experienced in the plant's response to this transient, and no unanticipated plant behavior was observed.
Dresden Unit 3 (which is similar to Vermont Yankee and has a Mark I containment) experienced two turbine trips from 112.3% and 113.5% of OLTP (96% and 97% of uprated power), in January 2004. See Entergy Exhs. 14-15.
The plant response was as predicted in the transient analyses, which used the same methodology as those performed at Vermont Yankee.
Dresden Unit 3 also experienced a loss of offsite power, which resulted in a turbine trip on Generator Load Rejection from 117% of OLTP (100% of uprated power) in May 2004. Similar plant response was observed. See Entergy Exh. 16.
Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 18-20.
2.82.
In sum, Mr. Casillas testified that in every instance in which an unplanned large transient from EPU power levels was experienced at the Hatch, Brunswick and Dresden plants and an analysis of the scenario involved in the transients existed, the plants response was bounded by the analyses performed using ODYN and no new phenomena were exhibited in the response. Id. at 20. The analytical models that were used for these plants are the same as those in use at Vermont Yankee; for each of these plants, the analytical models used for the transient analyses were shown to be capable of accurately predicting transient plant behavior at EPU conditions. Because these plants, all of which are similar in design to Vermont Yankee, experienced no anomalous response to large transients from EPU operating levels, and responded as predicted by their transient analyses, Entergy concluded that the basic transient analysis methodology used at Vermont Yankee has been confirmed, and that Vermont Yankee should also respond as predicted to large transients during EPU operation. Id. at 18-20; Tr. 1272.
2.83.
The Staff agreed with Entergys view that operational history is one consideration that licensees may use to support an exception from performing certain power ascension tests 48 In this regard, Messrs. Pettis and Jones referred to a turbine trip in 2000, and a generator load reject in 2001 at Hatch Unit 1; and a generator load reject in 1999 at Hatch Unit 2. Staff Dir. Post Tr.
1383, at 12.
for an EPU amendment. Staff witnesses Pettis and Jones observed that under SRP Section 14.2.1, Subsection III.C, industry operating experience is one consideration licensees may use to support an exception to certain EPU power ascension tests. Here, Entergy had submitted information to the Staff citing both industry experience and Vermont Yankee plant-specific experience. Messrs. Pettis and Jones cited certain generator load reject and MSIV closure events experiences at Hatch Units 1 and 2 as providing the most relevant industry experience.48 They observed that both Vermont Yankee and Hatch are BWR/4 designs with Mark I containments. Hatch was granted an EPU without requiring the performance of large transient testing; the turbine trip and generator load rejection events which the Hatch plant later experienced were found to produce no anomalies in the plants response. In the Staffs view, this outcome supports the conclusion that extended power uprates at facilities of similar design are unlikely to produce new or unexpected phenomena in response to anticipated transients.
Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 12.
2.84.
The Licensing Board finds that industry operating experience supports Vermont Yankees request for an exception to large transient testing. In every instance in which unplanned large transients from EPU power levels have been experienced and an analysis of the scenario involved in the transients existed, the plant's response was bounded by the analyses performed using ODYN and no new phenomena were exhibited in the response. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that if a large transient occurs at a facility of similar design (such as Vermont Yankee), new or unexpected phenomena are unlikely to occur. Moreover, even if Dr. Hopenfeld was correct in focusing on stress rather than peak pressure - thereby challenging the accepted approach for assessing BWR transient response, which has been in place for over 25 years - the performance of large transient testing for the Vermont Yankee EPU would afford him (and NEC) no relief, because such testing is not intended to measure stresses on key components. See discussion infra, at 55-57.
d.
Industry Experience With Large Transient Testing 2.85.
In further support of its request for an exception, Entergy asserts that the nuclear industrys experience with large transient testing - specifically, the tests conducted at the KKL (Liebstat) reactor in Europe - demonstrates that large transient testing is not required at Vermont Yankee.
2.86.
The KKL power uprate implementation program was performed during the period from 1995 to 2000. Power was raised in steps from the plants previous operating power level of 104.2% OLTP to 119.7% OLTP. KKL testing for major transients involved turbine trips at 113.4% OLTP and 116.7% OLTP, and a generator load rejection test at 104.2% OLTP. The response of the KKL reactor and other plant equipment during those large transient tests was satisfactory and was bounded by the ODYN code predictions for that plant. A comparison of the KKL turbine test transient performance against the ODYN analytical predictions showed consistency between the test results and those predicted in the models qualification, as well as in other comparisons between ODYN runs and plant operating data. In all cases, the ODYN model slightly overpredicts vessel peak pressure. The KKL turbine trip test is an excellent prediction of what a test at Vermont Yankee would show, because KKL has a 2% higher power density than Vermont Yankee and both plants are of a full turbine bypass capacity design.
Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 20-21.
2.87.
In opposing Entergys motion for summary disposition of this contention, NEC alleged that KKL is a foreign reactor not subject to NRC regulation, and there is no ready means of reconciling regulatory data, even if relevant and applicable to the Vermont Yankee 49 See New England Coalitions Answer to Entergys Statement of Material Facts Regarding NEC Contention 3, dated December 22, 2005, at 5, ¶ 20.
EPU.49 Mr. Casillas disputed this allegation, stating that plant test performance is a physically observable phenomenon, which can be objectively measured and is independent of the regulatory regime. Furthermore, the same ODYN analytical model as used for Vermont Yankee was applied to simulate the KKL test. Id. at 21.
2.88.
As discussed supra, at 41-42, the Staff also provided testimony concerning the KKL testing, reporting that Exelon had submitted an assessment of that testing in a May 2001 letter supporting Exelons EPU applications for the Dresden and Quad Cities plants (Staff Exh.
19). According to Exelon, the KKL tests showed a close match between the predicted ODYN calculations and the measured plant response; the plant responded as expected, without indicating any significant changes in the fidelity of the analytical models and codes at the EPU conditions. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 22-23.
2.89.
The Licensing Board finds that the KKL large transient test supports Vermont Yankees request for an exception to large transient testing. The KKL test provides a good prediction of the response of Vermont Yankee, as the plants have similar power density and each has a full bypass design. Further, based on the evidence submitted, the KKL test demonstrated that plant response was bounded by the ODYN model prediction, which slightly overpredicted vessel peak pressure. The fact that the KKL plant is not subject to NRC regulation does not alter this conclusion, in that the plants test performance is observable and subject to objective measurement, independent of the regulatory regime. Furthermore, the same ODYN analytical model as used for Vermont Yankee was applied to simulate the KKL test. The KKL test therefore provides further support for Entergys assertion that large transient testing is not required for the Vermont Yankee EPU.
e.
Vermont Yankees Operating History.
2.90.
In further support of its justification for not performing LTT under EPU conditions, Entergy cited Vermonts operating history, in which several unplanned large transients were experienced at full (OLTP) power. Specifically, Entergy witness Mr. Nichols testified that Vermont Yankee has experienced five large transients (generator load rejections) during its operating lifetime, as follows:
On 3/13/1991, a reactor SCRAM occurred as a result of Turbine/Generator Trip on Generator Load Rejection due to a 345 kV Switchyard Tie Line Differential Fault (Entergy Exh. 17).
On 4/23/1991, a reactor SCRAM occurred as a result of a turbine/generator trip on generator load rejection due to the receipt of a 345 kV breaker failure signal.
The transient included a loss of offsite power (Entergy Exh. 18).
On 6/15/1991, a reactor SCRAM occurred due to a Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure on Generator Load Rejection resulting from a loss of the 345 kV North Switchyard bus (Entergy Exh. 19).
On 6/18/2004, a two phase electrical fault-to-ground caused the main generator protective relaying to isolate the main generator from the grid and resulted in a Generator Load Rejection reactor SCRAM (Entergy Exh. 20).
On 7/25/2005, a generator load rejection SCRAM occurred due to an electrical transient in the 345 kV Switchyard (Entergy Exh. 21).
Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 21-22.
2.91.
Each of these transients occurred at full power and resulted in a reactor scram.
Id.; see Entergy Exhs. 17-21. Vermont Yankee performed as expected in response to these transients, and no significant anomalies were seen in the plants response. Further, the performance of the plant in the transients it experienced at pre-EPU power levels was well within the bounds of the ODYN analyses. Id. at 22-23; Tr. 1271-72.
2.92.
Mr. Nichols stated that Vermont Yankee's historical response to large transients supports its request for an exception to the performance of large transient testing. In particular, the transients in 2004 and 2005 occurred after most of the modifications associated with the EPU were already implemented, including the new HP turbine rotor, Main Generator Stator rewind, the new high pressure feedwater heaters, condenser tube staking, an upgraded isophase bus duct cooling system, and condensate demineralizer filtered bypass. In each instance, the modified or added equipment functioned normally during the transient. The plant's performance during these recent transients, including that of the modified components, demonstrates that the EPU modifications do not significantly affect the plant's response during transient conditions. Id. at 23.
2.93.
The Staff agreed with Entergys view that Vermont Yankees operational experience with generator load rejections at 100% of the original licensed power supports its request for an exception from large transient testing at EPU conditions. Staff witnesses Pettis, Jones and Thomas testified that no significant anomalies were seen in the plants response to several generator load rejection events, including one that took place in 2004, after many physical modifications supporting the uprate (including modifications to the main turbine and main feedwater system) had been implemented. In addition, they cited Entergys statement that past transient and safety analyses correlate closely to results from actual transients. Thus, the Staff concluded that Vermont Yankees operating experience supports the conclusion that the plant will respond as designed to transients at EPU conditions, (a) by demonstrating that many physical modifications supporting the uprate have not adversely affected the transient response, and (b) by validating analytical methods used to predict plant response with those modifications in place. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 13.
2.94.
In contrast, NEC witness Dr. Hopenfeld opined that the Vermont Yankee operational experience at the 100% (pre-EPU) power level cannot be relied on to predict that the plant will operate safely under transients occurring at the 120% EPU power level. In his 50 See Declaration of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld Supporting [NECs] Response to ENVYs Motion for Summary Disposition (Dec. 21, 2005) at 5, incorporated by reference in Hopenfeld Dir. Post Tr.1511 at 7.
view, Entergy has not shown that the plant will operate safely when transients occur at relatively high EPU flow rates, with potentially high dynamic loads during the transient.50 2.95.
The Licensing Board finds that Vermont Yankees operating experience with large transients occurring at 100% power (OLTP) supports its request for an exception to large transient testing. The plant's performance during recent transients, after implementation of several significant EPU modifications, demonstrates that the EPU modifications do not significantly affect the plant's response during transient conditions. Further, as discussed below, large transient testing is not intended to measure component stresses. In sum, Vermont Yankees operational experience with large transients provides further support for Entergys assertion that large transient testing is not required for the Vermont Yankee EPU.
f.
System and Component Testing 2.96.
In addition to the considerations discussed above, Entergy asserted that system and component testing performed at Vermont Yankee during normal operations provides a basis for an exception to large transient testing. In this regard, Mr. Nichols explained that Technical Specification (TS)-required surveillance testing (e.g., component testing, trip logic system testing, simulated actuation testing) is routinely performed during plant operations.
Such testing demonstrates that the SSCs required for appropriate transient performance will perform their functions, including integrated performance for transient mitigation as assumed in the transient analysis. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 23.
2.97.
In particular, the main components involved in large transients are tested as follows. The MSIVs are tested quarterly. The safety relief valves and spring safety valves are tested once every operating cycle. These valves are required to perform in accordance with the design during large transients; their periodic testing assures that their performance during large transients will be acceptable. Likewise, the reactor protection system instrumentation that is relied on to mitigate large transients is tested quarterly, assuring that it will carry out its design function in the event of a large transient. Id. at 23-24.
2.98.
Mr. Nichols further stated that because the characteristics and functions of SSCs are tested periodically during plant operations, they do not need to be demonstrated further in a large transient test. In addition, limiting transient analyses (i.e., those that affect core operating and safety limits) are re-performed for each operating cycle and are included as part of the reload licensing analysis. Id. at 24.
2.99.
The Staffs witnesses generally agreed with Entergys views regarding the importance of system and component testing at Vermont Yankee. In the Staffs view, periodic testing of SSCs, during steady-state plant operation, confirms the performance characteristics of SSCs required for appropriate transient response. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 13.
2.100. Staff witnesses Ennis, Pettis, Jones, and Thomas explained that the purpose of the EPU test program is to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service at the EPU power level; it also provides additional assurance that the plant will continue to operate in accordance with design criteria at EPU conditions. Technical Specification surveillance testing of SSCs performed during steady-state conditions confirms performance of SSCs required for appropriate transient response. Id. at 13-14; Staff Exhs. 1 and 2, at 260.
2.101. The Staffs witnesses further explained that TS surveillance testing is conducted pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.36 (Technical Specifications), which requires the TSs to include items in five specific categories: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs); (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. In accordance with § 50.36(c)(2)(ii), a TS LCO must be established for each item meeting one or more of four specified criteria; two of those (Criteria 2 and 3) relate, in part, to functional performance of SSCs necessary to 51 The four criteria specified in 10 C.F.R. § 50.36( c)(2)(ii) are as follows:
Criterion 1:
Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
Criterion 2:
A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
Criterion 3:
A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
Criterion 4:
A structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
52 The Vermont Yankee TSs define operable as follows:
A system, subsystem, division, train, component or device shall be operable or have operability when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s). Implicit in this definition shall be the assumption that all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power sources, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).
Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 15, citing Vermont Yankee TSs at 2.
demonstrate that the plant response to transients is as assumed in the associated safety analyses.51 Consistent with the requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 50.36(c)(3), TS surveillance testing (e.g., component testing, trip logic system testing, and simulated actuation testing) assures that TS LCOs are met. When an LCO is met, the associated SSC is considered to be operable.52 Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 14-15.
2.102. The Staffs witnesses testified that if a SSC is determined to be operable during TS surveillance testing, that determination provides assurance that the SSC is capable of performing its specified safety functions as assumed in the plant safety analysis. For example, the reactor protection system instrumentation that is relied on to mitigate large transients by 53 See New England Coalitions Statement of Position, dated May 17, 2006, at 8.
providing a reactor scram (i.e., MSIV closure, turbine control valve fast closure, and turbine stop valve closure) is tested quarterly, assuring it will carry out its safety function in the event of a large transient. Accordingly, the Staffs witnesses concluded that the periodic testing of SSCs during steady-state plant operation can confirm performance characteristics of SSCs required for appropriate transient response. Id. at 15.
2.103. NECs initial statement of position included an argument challenging the usefulness of individual component testing in lieu of an integral test under EPU conditions,53 but it provided no testimony or documentary evidence to support its assertions. In contrast, the testimony provided by Mr. Nichols and the Staffs panel of experts established that the performance of system and component testing provides additional assurance that SSCs will satisfactorily perform their safety functions in the event of a transient at EPU power levels, and that the plants response to transients will be as assumed in the safety analyses. Accordingly, the Licensing Board finds that system and component testing at Vermont Yankee provides additional support for Entergys request for an exception to large transient testing for the EPU.
g.
Similarities in the Pre-and Post-EPU Plant Design and Physical Configuration 2.104. In further support of its request for an exception to performing LTT, Entergy witness Nichols testified that there are great similarities in design and system function between the pre-and the post-EPU Vermont Yankee plant configuration. While some operating parameters (e.g., core power distribution) have been modified to accommodate EPU operation and some setpoint changes were made, these changes do not measurably contribute to response to large transients. None of the modifications that have been made will introduce new thermal-hydraulic phenomena as a result of power uprate, nor are any new system interactions during or as the result of analyzed transients introduced. No systems have been added or changed at Vermont Yankee that are required to mitigate the consequences of the large transients that would be the subject of the large transient testing. Operationally, the EPU modifications have no significant effect on plant transient analysis because, since the uprate is a constant pressure uprate, most of the plant's systems will operate in the same manner as before the uprate. Also, the Vermont Yankee EPU is performed without a change in operating reactor dome pressure from current plant operation. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 24-25; cf.
Tr. 1264-66.
2.105. Further, Mr. Nichols testified that there have been no major equipment modifications or new hardware installations at Vermont Yankee that could result in large transient performance different than that predicted by the analyses and the plant's prior operating history. Id. at 25. In this regard, Entergy introduced a Table (Entergy Exh. 39) that provided the following information:
(a) a listing of EPU plant modifications, all of which were implemented during Vermont Yankee's last two Refueling Outages (RFO 24 and RFO 25, in Spring 2004 and Fall 2005, respectively);
(b) a determination of whether the modifications have an effect on the plant transient analysis;
( c) a determination of whether the modifications are modeled in the transient analyses; (d) an indication of completed post modification testing; (e) an indication of subsequent power ascension and/or power operation confirmatory testing and monitoring; and (f) a determination of whether the modified function would be tested/verified during large transient testing.
Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 25; Entergy Exh. 39. Mr. Nichols stated that most of the EPU modifications were made to non-safety-related components, which are not credited in licensing basis transient analyses. Incidental modifications associated with EPU, such as alarms, indications, and scaling changes, also do not impact transient response. Entergy Dir. Post Tr.
1175, at 25.
2.106. Mr. Nichols concluded that the number of modifications and new equipment installations included in the Vermont Yankee EPU support an exception to LTT. In his view, the equipment modifications and additions are relatively few, and none of these modifications will introduce any new thermal-hydraulic phenomena as a result of the power uprate. Nor are any new system interactions during or as the result of analyzed transients introduced. Id. at 25-26.
2.107. Entergys witnesses further testified that the operation of Vermont Yankee after the EPU will result in different operating parameters (e.g., feedwater flow, moisture carryover),
but will not result in any new thermal-hydraulic phenomena in the event of a transient. The modifications that were implemented have no significant effect on plant transient analysis because, since the EPU is a constant pressure uprate, most of the plants systems will operate in the same manner as before the uprate. Id. at 28. The Staffs witnesses agreed that the physical modifications made to the plant were of limited scope, and that no significant new thermal-hydraulic phenomena would be introduced by the uprate. See Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 12; Tr. 1394-95.
2.108. Dr. Hopenfeld questioned Entergys assertion that the EPU will introduce no new thermal hydraulic phenomena. Hopenfeld Dir. Post Tr. 1510, at 4-5. He cited modifications to the steam dryer and asserted that its structural integrity could be affected by the EPU, because the 20% increase in flow velocity at EPU conditions increases turbulence and vortex shedding frequencies and loads on the dryer. Id. In response to Board questioning, however, Dr.
Hopenfeld could not cite any observations or calculations to support his claims regarding the possibility of new thermal hydraulic phenomena, and he admitted that he had no knowledge that such phenomena have in fact been introduced. Tr. 1514-16. His claims, therefore, lack sufficient support to refute the substantial testimony provided by the Entergy and Staff witnesses on this point.
54 Entergy witness Mr. Nichols provided further information in response to Board questioning. He testified that the front face of the steam dryer is directly opposite the main steam line nozzles, and it would be the first component hit by a pressure wave coming back through the main steam lines. The steam dryer front face was strengthened prior to implementing the Vermont Yankee EPU, and gussets were added for additional strengthening. This change was made due to normal steady state flow vibration, not due to any transient concerns. The load on the steam dryer associated with the transient pressure wave is not a long-term flow induced vibration load; it is a short term load and is well within margins. Entergy performed a structural analysis which indicated that the stresses were very low. Tr. 1289, 1576-77.
2.109. In addition, Dr. Hopenfeld testified that the component of greatest concern to him is the steam dryer. In particular, he stated that [b]ecause of the increase in flow velocity at EPU conditions, steady state temperature and pressure fluctuations will increase the fatigue usage factor of the steam dryer. Hopenfeld Dir. Post Tr. 1510, at 6. In his view, this increase in fatigue must be considered together with the increase in fatigue during transients, to show that the cumulative fatigue factor at EPU conditions will remain below A.S.M.E. allowable limits."
Id. However, in response to Board questioning, Dr. Hopenfeld conceded that while oscillation could excite resonant vibration, he had no evidence of any actual increase in vibration during a BWR transient. Tr. 1517-18.
2.110. Entergy witness Mr. Casillas refuted Dr. Hopenfelds assertion that large transient testing should be required in order to assure the proper performance of the steam dryer during a transient at EPU conditions. Thus, Mr. Casillas testified that the MSIV closure and the generator load rejection tests provide no information relevant to the steam dryer fatigue usage factor. Large transient testing provides information on the peak reactor vessel pressure and power level (i.e., temperature increase) resulting from the pressurization caused by the large transients. Performance of large transient testing would not provide information that could be used in deriving fatigue factors on the steam dryer or the loadings to which the dryer will be subjected. Entergy Rebuttal Post Tr. 1175, at 12; Tr. 1290. 54 2.111. The Staffs witnesses agreed that large transient testing would not provide useful information concerning stresses on the steam dryer. In particular, Staff witness Mr. Ennis testified that SRP Section 14.2.1 indicates that stress or structural integrity issues pertain to a 55 The Staffs SE for the CPPU topical report, dated March 31, 2003 (Entergy Exh. 25, pp. 3 through 87); Entergy Exh. 30, pp. 3 through 87), discusses an acceptable methodology for evaluating the stresses on various components subject to increased loadings due to power uprate conditions for plants using the CPPU approach to power uprate such as Vermont Yankee. Specifically, Section 3.2 of the CPPU SE discusses the reactor pressure vessel and its internals, and Section 3.4 discusses piping systems and the associated components (e.g., nozzles, anchors, pumps, valves, supports). As described in those sections of the CPPU SE, the loads and load combinations are evaluated for normal operation, upset (i.e., transient), emergency, and faulted conditions to determine if the calculated stresses and fatigue usage factors are less than the code allowable limits. For Vermont Yankee, specific details regarding how stresses were analyzed for the reactor pressure vessel and its internals (other than the steam dryer) are discussed in Section 2.2.3 of the Staffs Final SE (Staff Exhs. 1 and 2). Specific details regarding how stresses were analyzed for the steam dryer are discussed in Section 2.2.6 of the Final SE.
Section 2.2.2 of the Final SE discusses how stresses were analyzed for piping systems and components.
Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 15-16.
steady state condition.55 Accordingly, any testing that would be necessary to resolve stress and structural integrity issues (e.g., vibration testing and monitoring of reactor vessel internals, and reactor coolant systems containments), such as questions related to the Quad Cities steam dryer cracking referred to by Dr. Hopenfeld, would be conducted under steady-state conditions, not transient conditions. Tr. 1478-79; see Entergy Exh. 4, at 14.2.1-14.
2.112. The Licensing Board finds that similarities in the design and system function, between the pre-and the post-EPU Vermont Yankee plant configuration, support Entergys request for an exception to large transient testing. The EPU modifications which have been made are of limited scope, and no significant new thermal-hydraulic phenomena are introduced by the uprate. We further find that Dr. Hopenfelds concerns regarding EPU-induced stresses are misplaced, in that such stresses are associated with steady-state operation; further, his concerns would not be ameliorated by the performance of large transient testing.
h.
Potential Adverse Impacts of Large Transient Testing 2.113. In its rationale for not performing large transient testing, Entergy further asserts that such testing could have an adverse impact on the plant. Specifically, Entergys witnesses testified that the performance of a SCRAM from high power, such as those that take place during large transient testing, results in an undesirable transient cycle on the primary system.
The occurrence of primary system transient cycles should be minimized, since they introduce 56 Costs would also be incurred by the actual performance of the test. Mr. Nichols testified that an additional 25-30 personnel would be needed for the test, in addition to contracting with GE to obtain an analysis of the results. Tr. 1244-45. Based upon his experience leading other tests at Vermont Yankee, Mr. Nichols estimated that it may cost $25,000 to prepare the test procedure. Tr. 1246.
57 Neither Dr. Hopenfeld nor the Staffs witnesses addressed the cost of performing LTT at Vermont Yankee. Staff witness Jones noted, however, that Reg. Guide 1.68 instructs that testing should be accomplished in a cost-effective manner. Tr. 1421, citing Reg. Guide 1.68 (Staff Exh. 4) at 1.68-2.
unnecessary stresses on the primary system components. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 26; Tr. 1233. Vermont Yankee is designed for 270 lifetime scram cycles; to date, the plant has experienced between 70 and 100 scram cycles. Tr. 1292. In the opinion of Messrs. Nichols and Casillas, the undesirable effects of performing the tests outweigh the benefits of any limited additional information that may be gained from them. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 26.
2.114. Further, Messrs. Nichols and Casillas pointed to the financial costs of performing large transient testing. They testified that the performance of each large transient test causes a plant shutdown. Any plant shutdown results in a generation outage for a period of time (typically 2-3 days) for the plant. Id. Mr. Nichols testified that the minimum plant shutdown would be 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, but that most often there would be complications; while the complications he described would have no safety impact, they could extend the outage time to three, four, or five days. Tr. 1247-48. This outage time would represent a significant loss of generation for the State of Vermont, as well as a cost to ratepayers and Entergy. Mr. Nichols testified that, assuming the best case 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> shutdown, Entergy would lose close to $1.5 million in revenue because of the test. Id.56 Messrs. Nichols and Casillas concluded that since there are no measurable safety benefits to be derived from the performance of the tests, the loss of generation revenue and other costs associated with the performance of the tests cannot be economically justified. Entergy Dir. Post Tr. 1175, at 26.57 2.115. We are cognizant of the potential adverse impact that may result to the plant by the conduct of large transient testing, as well as the potential economic costs which such testing may occasion. We need not consider those factors further, however, having found, based on the substantial evidence presented, that no significant benefit would be obtained by requiring the performance of such testing at Vermont Yankee.
5.
Summary of Findings 2.116. In its testimony filed in this proceeding, the Staff concluded that Entergy has provided acceptable information regarding its startup test program, and its relationship to the proposed EPU power ascension test program, which provides adequate justification for not performing the two large transient tests addressed in NEC Contention 3. Based upon its review, the Staff concluded that Entergy has adequately justified not performing the MSIV closure test and generator load rejection test at Vermont Yankee under EPU conditions.
Further, the Staff concluded that the Vermont Yankee EPU testing program satisfies the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 1383, at 25.
2.117. We agree, in general, with the Staffs conclusions. We find there are several sound technical bases that support Entergy's request for an exception from performing large transient testing at Vermont Yankee under uprate operations, including (1) the demonstrated ability of the methodology used in Vermont Yankees transient analyses to predict, and bound, BWR response to MSIV closure or generator load rejection transients; (2) the behavior of other plants that have experienced large transients during EPU operations; (2) the results of large transient testing conducted at a European plant similar to Vermont Yankee; (3) Vermont Yankee's responses to unplanned transients; (4) the regime of periodic component and system testing at Vermont Yankee; and (5) the similarity in Vermont Yankee's pre-and post-EPU design configuration and system functions. Further, the evidence supports a conclusion that the transient analyses performed for the Vermont Yankee EPU demonstrate that all safety criteria are met under uprate operating conditions. On the other hand, large transient testing would provide no meaningful new information, and would cause an undesirable transient cycle on the stations systems. Accordingly, we conclude that the effects of a large transient at EPU conditions at Vermont Yankee can be analytically determined on a plant-specific basis without the need for actual transient testing.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 3.1.
The Licensing Board has considered all of the evidence presented by the parties on NEC Contention 3. Based upon a review of the entire record in this proceeding and the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties, and based upon the findings of fact set forth above, which are supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record, the Board has decided all matters in controversy concerning this contention and reaches the following conclusions.
3.2.
Pursuant to Criterion XI of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Entergy is required to establish a test program sufficient to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that systems, structures, and components will perform satisfactorily in service following the EPU, is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents.
3.3.
Entergys test program for the Vermont Yankee EPU does not include large transient tests (specifically, the MSIV closure and generator load rejection tests). We conclude that Entergy has adequately justified not performing the MSIV closure test and generator load rejection test at Vermont Yankee under EPU conditions, and that these tests are not necessary to demonstrate that systems, structures, and components will perform satisfactorily in service following implementation of the Vermont Yankee EPU.
3.4.
Therefore, we conclude that Entergys test program complies with Criterion XI of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, in that it includes all testing necessary to demonstrate that systems, structures, and components will perform satisfactorily in service. As such, there is no legal justification for this Licensing Board to require Entergy to perform a MSIV closure test or a generator load rejection test in conjunction with its EPU.
Respectfully submitted,
/RA/
Sherwin E. Turk Steven C. Hamrick Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 7th day of November, 2006
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
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ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE
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Docket No. 50-271-OLA LLC and ENTERGY NUCLEAR
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OPERATIONS, INC.
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ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA
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(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of NRC STAFFS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING NEC CONTENTION 3 (LARGE TRANSIENT TESTING), in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class; or as indicated by an asterisk (*), by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions internal mail system; and by e-mail as indicated by a double asterisk
(**), this 7th day of November, 2006.
Alex S. Karlin, Chair**
Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: ask2@nrc.gov Dr. Anthony J. Baratta**
Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: ajb5@nrc.gov Lester S. Rubenstein**
Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 4760 East Country Villa Drive Tucson, AZ 85718 E-mail: lesrrr@comcast.net Office of the Secretary**
ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Mail Stop: O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: HEARINGDOCKET@nrc.gov Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication*
Mail Stop: O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Marcia Carpentier, Esq.**
Law Clerk Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 (E-mail: MXC7@nrc.gov)
John M. Fulton, Esq.
Assistant General Counsel Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 Terence A. Burke**
Associate General Counsel Entergy Services, Inc.
1340 Echelon parkway Jackson, MS 39213 E-mail: tburke@entergy.com Jay E. Silberg, Esq.**
Matias Travieso-Diaz, Esq.**
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N St., NW Washington, DC 20037-1128 E-mail: jay.silberg@pillsburylaw.com, and matias.travieso-diaz@pillsburylaw.com Raymond Shadis**
Staff Technical Advisor New England Coalition P.O. Box 98 Edgecomb, ME 04556 E-mail: shadis@prexar.com, shadis@ime.net
/RA/
Sherwin E. Turk Counsel for NRC Staff