ML052620170

E-mail from S. Barber of USNRC to M. Ferdas and M. Gray of USNRC, Regarding Hc Issues

ML052620170
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	05/03/2004
From:	Barber S NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
To:	Marc Ferdas, Mel Gray Reactor Projects Branch 3
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0314
Download: ML052620170 (2)

Text

GlennMeyer - RE: HC Issues Page 1 From: Scott Barber)

To: Marc Ferdas; Mel Gray Date: 5/3/04 4:36PM

Subject:

RE: HC issues Just to add a different angle to the discussion. We have an allegation response in which we questioned adequate oil supply in LO bubblers for various HC pumps. Tom Lake's response indicated that 42 bubblers were checked and there were no significant problems. Sounds like the original issue that was raised in the allegation may have more validity than was mentioned in the PSEG response.

Mel - do you or Marc think we should be highlighting this to them and get them to submit a revised response or is this truly an isolated case?

>>> "Schoppy, Joseph G CDR" <joseph.schoppy~navy.mil> 04/29/04 10:18AM >>>

Thanks for the update. Relative to the H2 issue: yeah, when all was said and done they determined that hydrogen remained below the detonation limit in that pipe. However, all the conditions were present for the phenomenon to occur except for a continuous leakage path or a mechanism to allow hydrogen to accumulate over time. Engineering's subsequent investigation revealed that they did in fact have a leakage path back through the 52B valve to the HPCI drain pot following HPCI depressurization. Based on soundings though, the hydrogen pocket at the high point is not large enough to be of concern. I'm back to repeating my comments from an earlier e-mail: if they had the detonation event (which they were very-close.to-havingall the necessaryvingredientsfor) then we would send an SIT or AIT and try to fit toa yellow or red finding. But because they were fortuitous (through no action or evaluation of their own) and te to the point of a detonation trigger, then thewholeisueinot more than minor?" Double or ibthingll There's somethingravely wrong with our assessment process. As always the inspector is left hanging out tring to work within our p gt the licensee to "do the right thing" but God forbid something happens (like a Davis Besse near miss) and everyone wants to know "where was theNRC?" Who'sassessmeent process is it anyway? Bottom line: I'm fine with making it a PI&R sample (a wkoraround Just to get the issue in the report) and not making it a corrective action violation.

I Mel - my comments concerning our assessment process were not aimed at you. I feel better for having stated my opinion and am moving on in search of other windmills to battle.

Don Q.

-- Original Message-From: Mel Gray [mailto:MXG3@nrc.gov1 Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 9:09 To: Schoppy, Joseph G CDR

Subject:

Re: HC issues Sorry, I've been swamped with emegent equipment issues here. Your issues not forgotten or discarded.

Quickly., on H2 issue, got some internal NRC pushback that more than minor threshold based on if left uncorrected, could be more significant..." This is time based and looks like, after all said and done with much prodding, would not have h2 potential conflaguration. I proposed to my mgt that we this be PIR sample in this IR since it has much insight into that area. Also some corrective actions still in progress (beleive they fixed HPCI leka a week ago). So its fair game to keep tracking.

Second, C booster pump. PS?ops saw the light and cut a notification on operator performance in monitoring protected equipment, not just oil leak rrends. There is performance deificiency. I was reviewing more than minor threshold yesterday morning by going to MR a4 violation examples in the OEM/.

Section 8.1.11 (draft still?) for gauidance when it all hit the fan around here. AM pulling PS MR a4

I Glenn.Meyer - RE: HG issues Page 2 I procedures also. Have it on my board as an issue to be pushed through 0612 to see where it falls.

Mel

>>> "Schoppy, Joseph G CDR" <joseph.schoppy@navy.mil> 04/29/04 07:47AM >>>

Mel, What did you decide about the hydrogen buildup in the SCM piping (1R12 in report ending 3/31/04)? I believe that their engineering folks are expecting at least a corrective action violation.

What do you think about the C spray water pump oil bubbler issue? It's definitely a case of weak PI&R (poor Identification of empty bubbler, poor SRO follow-up (ust an N2 for trending, and slow resolution of oil leakage issue) but is it more than minor? This one seems like it could either way (and to think that our process is purely objective). Glenn likes to use the following measure to break ties for these type of issues: what message are we trying to send, what has their performance been in this area, do they get it?

We've certainly have been beating on operators for lack of attention-to-detail and poor questioning attitude in the performance of their rounds (especially for protected equipment). Here's a case where they got a lot a bit closer to adversely impacting operability - do they want to be good or just lucky? Do they get it yet - look at the SRO's response for a hint (NRC inspector calls you from the field to inform you that a protected pumphiis a bone dryToil bubbler and the extent of your aactions are to have a NEO add oil and initiate a N2 for trending).

Do you think that they'll ever get back to full power?

Please send response to my NRC e-mail.

Joe CC: Daniel Holody; Fred Bower; Glenn Meyer; Joseph Schoppy; Lawrence Doerflein; Raymond Lorson; Schoppy, Joseph G CDR