ML051450519

MD 8.3 Evaluation - March 15, 2004 Trip

ML051450519
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	03/22/2004
From:	James Trapp NRC Region 1
To:	Blough A, Doerflein L, Brian Holian, Jenison K, Silas Kennedy, Kevin Mangan, Nerses V, Reis T, Schmidt W, Schneider M Division of Reactor Safety I
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0208
Download: ML051450519 (1)

Text

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Si,as -Kennedy_- Millstone Unit 2 - MD 8.3 Evaluation - March 15, 2004 Trip

' _ .. _ .. a.. .. s ... ... _.rn... _ _ Ad, _ .................. , - ,__L_= , ., . ,. I I Paae 1 Silas Kennedy-Millstone Unit 2 MD 8.3 Evaluation March 15, 2004 Trip Paae 1l From: James Trapp To: A.Randolph Blough; Brian Holian; Kenneth Jenison; Kevin Mangan; Lawrence Doerilein; Max Schneider; Silas Kennedy; Terrence Reis; Victor Nerses; Wayne Schmidt Date: Mon, Mar 22, 2004 2:44 PM

Subject:

Millstone Unit 2 - MD 8.3 Evaluation - March 15, 2004 Trip Based on the attached MD 8.3 evaluation, Branch 6 has determined that no special reactive inspection is needed for the March 15, 2004 reactor trip. This conclusion is based on the deterministic criteria not being met; additionally, the CCDP associated with the trip is low (low E-6). This trip along with 3 others in the past 12 months will be reviewed as part of a 95001 Inspection, due to the reactor trip PI exceeding the greenAvhite threshold.

On March 15, 2004, the UBE SGFP tripped during surveillance testing. The cause for the SGFP trip was determined to be a trip blocking switch that was not held completely in the block position for the duration of the test. The trip of the SGFP resulted in a low S/G level reactor trip. All safety systems responded as expected with two exceptions noted below.

Complications following the trip were main steam safety valves opening and torn enclosure building boots on the safeties. The licensee has verified the safety setpoints are in an acceptable range. They are currently evaluating the transient/safety setpoints to verify this Is a desired response following a loss of feedwater. The resident Inspectors will follow this activity. The enclosure boots were evaluated and found they were not needed for operablity.

CC: Neil Perry R ;D,I