ML050950082

Draft - NRC Comments on Draft Licensee - Developed Exam Material (Folder 2)

ML050950082
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	11/17/2004
From:	Roy D Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-443/03-301, ES-401, ES-401-9 50-443/03-301
Download: ML050950082 (59)

Text

ORIGINAL ES 40 1-9, FOR DRAFT WRITTEN EXAM

ES-401 Written Examination Form ES-401-9 Review Worksheet E

5. Other

?

Distractors C & D seem implausible.

Consider deleting "to reduce burden on EDGs during design basis accident" from C.

Consider deleting "to prevent damage to the pump" from D.

Both of these phrases make those distractors easily eliminated.0 JIWS

6. I E

S S

S

7.

Explanation The answer is the only choice that includes increasing. Please revise distractors B & C to include some variation of increasing. Suggestion:

C:

INCREASING STABLE What result if PZR Pressure < shutoff head to start?

Explanation of distractor B may be wrong. Saturation Pressure for 532°F is 900.34 psia.

Distractor C may be more plausible as "NOT be stopped because adverse containment conditions [dc-NWJ exist".

WA is unclear - "Knowledge of the Interrelations between the and the following Large Break LOCA: Pumps".

Uncertain if this is really difficult enough to be an RO/SRO question.

Could be a GFE question.

Wrestling with LOD. Distractors A & C seem easy to eliminate while distractor D seems a little too close to a correct answer.

S S

The answer is the shortest choice. This could be a specific determiner.

The WA reference s/b "APE.026.AA2.06" v. "APE026A2.06".

3.

5. Other - 6.

7.

Explanation

4. Job Content Flaws Ainutia -

sack-ward -

u/E/s Specific Determiner - the answer (C) is the only choice that refers to "Vital Instrument Power". Consider adding that phrase to distractors A. 120 VAC Vital Instrument Power from redundant inverters in the B. 48 VDC Vital Instrument Power from power distribution busses in the D. 15 VDC Vital Instrument Power from redundant power supplies in the SSPS cabinets.

SSPS cabinets.

SSPS cabinets The WA tests "Knowledge of the physical connections andor cause effect relationships between the RPS and the following systems: 120V vitalhnstrument power system". This question asks for a power supply but does not test knowledge of the cause-and-effect relationship.

Plausibility of distractor A seems weak. How about "Manually align valves and start pumps as necessary to increase EFW flow to greater than 880 gpm until at least two steam generators are greater than 25%

wide range".

Distractor C may be eliminated because it is grammatically incorrect -

first it says one steam generator, then it says two steam generators.

Shouldn't the distractors say 'steam generator water levels" to be precise?

C & D are easily eliminated because only high RCS pressure can worsen this accident. Consider the following:

C. HIGH HIGH MINIMUM OPEN D. HIGH LOW MINIMUM SHUT Distractor B is a bit weak. How about a stuck open PORV or PZR Safety?

Fairly straightforward - too easy?

Be sure this portion of the Tech Specs is redacted.

Is this the normal band or the required band?

Is this based on an actual event? If so, it may be too easy.

Is it possible for an Applicant to argue that the stem does not clearly indicate that the normal battery charger (1 -EDE-BC-1 A) was NOT connected to buss 11 A?

Distractor C - any chance the EDG would start on a loss of DC?

Distractor D - too easy to eliminate because the parenthetical "(fails open)" is implausible.

3. Psychometric Flaws

7.

Cred.

Dist.

d -

Explanation Possible to eliminate A & B because they are safety related and D because it is not a SW load. Are there any non-safety related SW loads that could be a credible distractor?

H 3

3 S

S S -

If you know from an actual event that CW is the first affected by a loss o IA, why not amend the Loss of IA procedure to reflect that knowledge?

The WA is misstated as Al.03 v. AA1.03.

H H

H -

3 2 -

2 2

E Seems fundamental - GFE question May be vulnerable to a challenge on the meaning of "Final Reactor Power" and "Little Change".

Uncertain about the WA match - I interpret it to mean given a rod drop, how does the effect of rod movement on reactivity and power differ?

d L

H S Plausibility of B is weak. Why would you select channel 4 6 1 1 s if LT-460 failed?

OS1201.07, Step 5.c is not as simple as merely opening RC-LCV-460.

Step 5.c.l) requires the Operator to align PCCW to the LDHX. Is this necessary given the question stem? Step 5.c.2) requires the Operator tc close CS-HCV-189 & 190. What effect does this have?

Note - I disagree with the LOK of this question. This is not the first one, only the first time I thought to mention it.

S -

E S -

Consider making more difficult by stating the IR power level instead of giving it away as above P-6.

L 1

d A & C are easily eliminated because an AUTO reopening is implausible.

This is the 2d or 3" question involved a liquid release; possibly a release of the Waste Test Tank H

3 How can this be? You don't require the Operators to verify AT before calling NC!?

I w

3. Psychometric Flaws m

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other I 6.

7.

Explanation May match the WA better if we ask how much longer to swap over if SI Pps failed.

Is this really modified? Just swapped trains.

Both distractors A & B can be ruled out by knowing that the Train B surge tank has no effect on Train A.

Would D be more plausible if you just said the Train B ClVs closed?

See, first page of the lesson plan.

May be safer to say level drops to some value BELOW 42% and above 36% in the stem. Do we know the tolerance?

Both C & D can be eliminated by knowing that a plant trip is not required How about changing D to: "Trip 'D RCP, close the #1 seal leakoff valve after the pump has stopped, [continue to operate up to 75% / commence a plant shutdown /continue to operate UD to 50%1?

Press ! - Compress - Level 1 AND Orifice d/p 1 - Letdown T both effects cause makeup to rise to maintain PZR Lvl -

can VCT Level (distractor A) be arguably correct?

See my calc. indicating volume change of 300 to 500 gallons Given that A may be correct, the stem asks for the parameter "MOST" affected. Can an Applicant make this determination?

Operational Validity? How would Operator be expected to respond to PZR vapor space temperature changes?

WA match? Weak link to "expansion of liquids as temperature increases".

The stem tells me that these are CIVs. All I need to know is that a T signal is the isolation signal. Any choice that leaves a valve open is implausible.

May be answerable without reference to the stem. Is there a legitimate condition that could cause one valve to close and the other to remain open?

~

4. Job Content Flaws

7.

5. Other lack-Ainutia Explanation

red.

Dist. -

3 d

2 d

2 3

3 4

2 The stem tells the Applicant that max pressure was 35 psig. This makes the issue of CTMT Pressure a simple recall exercise. Consider deleting the word "Highest". The Applicant should know that only one train is necessary to prevent exceeding CTMT design pressure.

Similarly, by providing equivalent suction pressures, the stem alerts the Applicant to determine which discharge pressure is normal. Would it be reasonable to give 59 psig and 60 psig?

Consider keeping the original question's requirement to determine if the malfunctioning Pp is above or below design flow. This raises the LOD and LOK even though it's a bank item.

c/b confusing. Consider rewording the call of the question to "Based on the above parameters determine which CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP is pumping normally, the condition of the malfunctioning CONTAINMEN1 SPRAY PUMP, AND whether CONTAINMENT PRESSURE exceeded its design basis".

9A 96 CTMT A.

Normal design flow did exceed

8.

Normal

< design flow did NOT exceed C.

> design flow Normal did exceed D.

.Z design flow Normal did NOT exceed Good, reasonable question that matches the WA but it's a GFE level question. Is that acceptable?

In the call of the question, consider replacing "adjusted" with "lowered".

Correct answer can be determined without reference to the stem (I think). Nonetheless, still an acceptable question.

Consider putting VARIABLE and CONSTANT in all uppercase or alternative method of emphasis (italic, bold, underline)

The WA calls for knowledge of AFW automatic isolation. This question calls for knowledge of flow control. May be match for 061.K4.04.

My judgement is close enough.

H L

H L

d H

? -

Is expecting buss 1,3, & 5 to have power credible? Are any of these busses non-ES?

H

I I 1. I 2. lFmusi.

Psychometric Flaws Q#

LOK LOD (F/H)

(1-5) Stem Cues 49 F

2 5

0 F

2

/

r

/

/

4. Job Content Flaws Ainutia -

5. Other

6.

7.

Explanation

)nly S

Redundant? This is the second question whereby knowing that a loss 01 DC power prevented an engine start was necessary. First one was in the back 50.

t What effect does a loss of DC have on a running EDG?

Stem is confusing. Requires Applicant to assume that an EDG was running paralleled with a buss when the LOOP occurred. I think you mean, "how would one take the EDG off the buss once offsite power were restored and paralleled with the EDG?".

Use of ECA-0.0 is easily eliminated because it's a LOOP not a LEAC.

Therefore, distractors A h C are potentially implausible and redundant.

Would it be more plausible to have one distractor unload and disconneci per the normal EDG OP?

B c/b argued as correct - "I opened the output breaker only using the guidance of 051246.01. That guidance required me to unload the machine first".

K/A = Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, USE procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Unloading prior to securing an ED/G.

45 of 46 NUREG-1 021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

ul ul 01 P

ul h)

-n n

n N

N N

t t

t t

t rn rn rn rn

cn 0

VI 0,

VI Q) 01

-J n

I I

-I-

,x

$ 0 -

n N

N

'=r Oh) i ? o t

t t

t t

t t

t t

rn v) rn c

0 0 0 0

F F

F F

S S

H

~~

May be vulnerable to a question about WA mismatch because the question concerns TBVs instead of ADVs. I think it's a good question.

Hopefully, no one will get it wrong.

F F

F -

S S

U S

E H

F H

Distractors A and D are easily ruled out because by the Fire Type/Class category. Consider making distractor A "Class A" and distractor D "Class C".

Distractors A and D are easily rule out because the use of Halon outside doesn't make sense. Consider making the Fire Protection method Wet Pipe Sprinkler System".

For technical accuracy, should 'Dry-Pipe, Open-Head SDrinkle System" be "Dry-Pipe, Open-Head Deluge System"?

Are we certain that there are no manual actions in the IMAs of E-0 that could arguably construed as 'skill-of-the-craff and make distractor C a second correct answer?

Are we certain that C is a correct answer? The temperature reduction does add positive reactivity which reduces SDM. However, Xe concentration is rising simultaneously to add negative reactivity and raise SDM.

5. Other I 6. I

7.

U S

U S

S S

I"/"S I Weak WA link because it's too broad - relates to purpose of entire ECCt system rather than a major system component and control.

Not operational in context because Operators have no control over the ECCS design basis or 50.46 acceptance criteria.

Too easy because not sufficiently modified to make it a different question.

Question: are we certain that a train "A" radiation monitor will cause the train "B" CIV (COP-V-4) to close?

Suggestion: revise distractor D to read "Control room operators must ensure COP-V-3 automatically closed and must manually close COP-V-4 to stop the release".

Emlanation

3. Psychometric Flaws 74 H

4 75 F

3 76 H

3 77 H

3 78 F

1

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other d

d d

d

7.

6.

J/E/S Explanation S

I S

I S

I

~~

S Would distractor C be more plausible if SEAL DP > 220 PSlD were Required rather than NOT Required?

Similarly, would distractor 6 be more plausible if LIFT OIL INTERLOCK were NOT Required rather than Required?

U Too easy because it is a fundamental knowledge item and because at least two distractors are implausible. Also concerned that it is not a good WA match, that declaring the GE on the half-hour cues the Applicant to ward the answer and that this may be redundant with the Operating Exam.

A is 00:25 after the SAE is declared. To be credible, this distractor wb 00:15 or, preferably, 00:30 after the initial SAE is declared.

B is the correct answer but is not discriminatory because it is an easy and widely known memory item.

C is 00:30 after the GE is declared and may be credible.

D is 1:12 after the initial SAE and 00:53 after the GE. Neither is credible time interval nor common misconception.

WA match is weak because this tests the time in which a PAR is required and does not test the Applicant's understanding of the substantive PAR.

Using 1230 as the time for which the GE is declared signals the correct response as 8 or C.

Potentially redundant with the Operating Test if this examination include:

a JPM to make an EAL and PAR determination.

I The correct answer (D) is not grammatically complete.

Distractor plausibility is weak but no suggestions.

/

/

4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other

/

/

/

/

/

7.

Explanation An Applicant could select distractor C and argue that it is a correct answer because the stem only asks how the given conditions affect the cooldown. Could even argue that C is more correct than D based on ES-0.2, Step 8, which requires Operators to "Depressurize RCS to 1900 PSIG".

Technical Question - is it possible to cooldown without lowering RCS pressure?

Check WA match. Is this acceptable interpretation of "Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room"?

Distractors A and 6 may not be plausible if the Applicant has a fundamental understanding of SDM (presumably, these Applicants have already passed the GFEI.

~

Direct lookup from the reference provided. Therefore, no credible distractors.

The WA concerns RCS pressure, not temperature. It's unclear how this question is related to the chosen WA.

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

7.

5. Other lack-Ainutia -

1. I inits Explanation

'otential technical flaws:

I The first required announcment per OS1200.02 is at step 1.i. This comes after tripping the plant, closing MSIVs, securing RC-Ps, defeating SSPS and obtaining RSS keys. SG level shrink may be complete by this time. Therefore, level may be steady and distractor C could be correct. Level could also be rising if AFW is assumed to have actuated. Rising level makes distractor D partially correct with respect to SG level.

1 The use of OX1 400.01, Figure 1 may be inappropriate for this condition per Note 4 at the bottom of page 11 (Form A: PM Number 1-RSS-OT1OO-OOO, Sheet 4 of 5). Specifically, the TIS acceptance criteria is s 5% difference between FW-LI-501 at the MCB and LI-4310 at CP-108A. Note 4 explains that "The 5% difference between the MCB and RSS level indicators is valid for normal operating pressures. For pressures below this, refer to Figure 1 for expected RSS level indication vs. MCB level indication at various SG pressures".

The explanation arrives at the correct answer with a potentially incorrect application of OX1400.01, Figure 1: Wide Range Steam Generator Level Graph. According to the explanation, SG level is at 100%. My understanding is that SGWL at 100% power should be at program level of -44%. Accepting the explanation that SG pressure is -1,OOO psig, we can see that RSD level indication will be slightly higher than MCB level indication as indicated in the correct answer.

Notwithstanding the discussion above, determining whether level was

orrect is a direct lookup from the proposed references.

As discussed above, the correct answer is vulnerable to a challenge tha answer C is more correct or more plausible.

The WA is vague. Nevertheless, I don't understand the connection between SG shrink 8 swell and control room evacuation.

H 2

S -

E S

S -

Check the WA match. It's a good question but may not be sufficiently tailored to the 'LOCA Outside Containment" situation.

F 2

2 3 -

The three distractors all begin "To ensure...". In contrast, the answer begins with "To maintain.,.". Please consider changing the word to ensure to maintain. Alternatively, reword the correct answer to "To msure DNBR remains above 1.30 during all...". Neither alternative is sufficient to change this exam bank item to a modified exam bank item.

F F -

Are distractors C 8 D credible? Is it possible that an Applicant could think OS1290.01 is the correct procedure?

H 3 -

S -

A 0

0 (D

-4 I

I n

n n

-I-

- x

$ 0 -

w N

N P

t

'c t

t t

t t

v) v)

t rn t

c v) v)

5 5 :

m

n

8. 5

ES 401-9s WITH COMMENTS FROM EXAM VALLIDATION WEEK

L F M.)Mor ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more infomation is needed, or too much needless information).

The stem or distractors contain cues (Le., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).

The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

The distractom are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.

One or more distracton is (ere) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid WA but. as written, is not operational in content).

The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).

The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

Check the appropriate box If a job content e m is identified:

Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved WA and those that are designated SRO-only (WA and license level mismatches are unacceptable).

Based on the reviewefs judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

At a minimum, explain any 'U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

ES-401, Pme 32 of 33

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-9 ES-401, Page 33 of 33

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-9 ES-401, Page 33 of 33

ES401 2

Form ES-401-9 ES-401, Page 33 of 33

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-9 ES-401, Page 33 of 33

ES-401 2

F o

~

ES-401-9 ES-401, Page 33 of 33

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-9 ES-401, Page 33 of 33

ES-401 Written Examination FOm ES-401-9 Review Worksheet 1

H 2

L 3

H 4

H 5

H 6

H 7

L 8

L 2

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I

7.

Link iZq7 units fl t

Ir' 4

"1"s I Explanation h l y I I

I I

I I

d s

o m

e variation or in-s c:

L Y

I-T g Explanation of distractor 6 may be wrong. Saturation Pressure for 532°F is 900.34 psia.

IE I Distractor C may be more plausible as "NOT be stopped because adverse containment conditions [cWKFfl exist".

C,,&

3. Psychometric Flaws -

Cred.

Dist. -

R

4. Job Content Flaws

6.

JIWS

7.

Explanation

5. Other d

Back-Stem Focus -

dinutia -

- ward -

9 10 11 12 13 14 9

6 SSPS cabinets.

SSPS cabinets.

SSPS cabinets Specific Determiner - the answer (C) is the only choice that refers to Vital Instrument Powet". Consider adding that phrase to distractors A. 120 VAC Vital Instrument Power from redundant inverters in the B. 48 VDC Vital Instrument Power from power distribution busses in the D. 15 VDC Vital Instrument Power from redundant power supplies in tht The KJA tests "Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the RPS and the following systems: 120V vitallinstrument power system". This question asks for a power supply but does not test knowledge of the cause-and-effect relationship.

E Plausibility of distractor A seems weak. How about "Manually align valves and start pumps as necessary to increase EFW flow to greater than 880 gpm until at least two steam generators are greater than 25%

wide range". 3

?\\GUS* L \\ c Distractor C may be eliminated because it is grammatically incorrect -

Shouldn't the distractors say "steam generator water levels" to be precise?

C & D are easily eliminated because only high RCS pressure can worsen this accident. Consider the following:

C. -0 HIGH MWMWtvt-OPEN D. HIGH LOW MINIMUM SHUT

'5Leu(*qt;-

it says two steam generators..W E - a A

3 E

H 2

L -

L 2 -

3 S I Is this based on an actual event? If so, it may be too easy. At &

Is it possible for an Applicant to argue that the stem does not clearly Distractor C - any chance the EDG would start on a loss of DC? L>B Distractor D - too easy to eliminate because the parenthetical "(fails open)" is implausible. &

&e!UL<-) 1 :t

2.

LOD (1-5) 2 3

3 3 -

2 2

2 -

1 3 -

3. Psychometric Flaws I 4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

7.

Q= SRO UlUS Explanation WA Only S

Possible to eliminate A & B because they are safety related and D because it is not a SW load. Are there any non-safety related SW loads that could be a credible distractor? 3 3%

Q+ aTL\\6 If you know from an actual event that CW is the first affected by a loss o IA, why not amend the Loss of IA procedure to reflect that knowledge?

The WA is misstated as Al.03 v. AA1.03. &--

S S

S

&& ;A.

cc p\\&-+-

E Seems fundamental - GFE question &a 9uK ~-

May be vulnerable to a challenge on the meaning of "Final Reactor Pow& and "Little Change".

Uncertain about the WA match - I interpret it to mean given a rod drop, how does the effect of rod movement on reactivity and power differ?

select channel 461/=

if LT-0 7 t - A OS1201.07, Step 5.c is not as simple as merely opening RC-LCV-460. '

Step 5.c.l) requires the Operator to align PCCW to the LDHX. Is this 1 I necessary given the question stem? Step 5.c.2) requires the 0 erator t close CS-HCV-189 & 190. What effect does this have? * &

>+?.-

b S

Consider making more difficult by stating the IR power level instead of giving it away as above P-6. C 5 -

hi$

& c y 1' rk.cc E

A & C are easily eliminated because an This is the 2"d or 3d question involved a I,.

of the Waste Test Tank

1.

LOK

F/H) -

L

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

7.

lack-

• 11 dinutia -

ry h

Explanation Stem

'OCUS -

would require transition to ES-0.3 (RVLIS<100%).

L -

L 2 -

3 2 -

L H -

3 Please consider 'The margin to Departure from Nucleate Boiling will be f 5

H H - 3 4 -

I pump flow is unchanged.

L,

3. Psychometric Flaws I

4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other

6.

JIEIS

7.

hes TIF

red.

Dist. -

Explanation Link S -

S S

E May match the WA better if we ask how much longer to swap over if SI PDS failed.

Is this really modified? Just swapped trains.

Both distractors A 8 B can be ruled out by knowing that the Train.

surge tank has no effect on Train A.

45-g Would D be more plausible if you just said the Train B ClVs closed? /

See, first page of the lesson plan.

May be safer to say level drops to some value BELOW 42% and above 36% in the stem. Do we know the tolerance?

L 2

d

/'

H H

H -

L 3

4 5 -

2 S

Operational Validity? How would Operator be expected to respond to PZR vapor space temperature changes?

WA match? Weak link to 'expansion of liquids as temperature increases".

H L -

H -

3 1 -

3 -

The stem tells me that these are CIVs. All I need to know is that a T signal is the isolation signal. Any choice that leaves a valve open is implausible.

May be answerable without reference to the stem. Is there a legitimate condition that could cause one valve to close and the other to remain open?

44

i r

iRO Inly 2

2 3

3 U/E/S Explanation 4 -

2

3. Psychometric Flaws

?

5. Other

6.

7.

9A 9B CTMT A.

Normal

> design flow did exceed B.

Normal c design flow did NOT exceed My judgement is close enough.

S S

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

JIWS

7.

Explanation E

7 U

Stem is confusing. Requires Applicant to assume that an EDG was running paralleled with a buss when the LOOP occurred. I think you mean, "how would one take the EDG off the buss once offsite power were restored and paralleled with the EDG?".

Use of ECA-0.0 is easily eliminated because it's a LOOP not a LEAC.

Therefore, distractors A & C are potentially implausible and redundant.

Would it be more plausible to have one distractor unload and disconnect t

I /

per the noma1 EDG OP?

I B c/b argued as correct - 'I opened the output breaker only using the guidance of OS1246.01. That guidance required me to unload the machine first".

WA = Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Unloading prior to securing an ED/G.

NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 i 45 of 46

ES-401 Written Examination Form ES-401-9 Review Worksheet

1.

LOK F/H) -

F F

H F -

F 3

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other IIWS 6-I

7.

Explanation Question can be answered without reference to the stem by simply c recognizing that RM-6503 closes WG-FV-1602.

Potentially implausible to expect a radiation monitor to OPEN a d component. Is closing another valve more plausible?

Stem wording is "... at the Waste..,". Should it be "... In the Waste,

,."?

E Per CP 4.1, 5 4.2.7.5.a (page lo), there is no instance of a high effluent Consider specifying the rad monitor instead of refering to it as the I 'associated" monitor.

The WA requires knowledge of the effect a losdmalfunction of CTMT system has on CTMT during normal ops. This is probably close enough but is really more of a tech spec question that a system question.

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

7.

5. Other

6.

J/WS Explanation artial s

red.

)ist.

/

fundamental knowledge. Distractor B is not so obvious and requires the Applicant to demonstrate knowledge of the RC-P seal package.

Distractor D is easy since its the letdown isolation valve - this distractor may become more plausible if seal leakoff is isolated (presuming that leakoff is then directed to the RCDT via a relief valve).

F aspect because answers A & D can be ruled out by guessing dnt raise the issue if MCC-531 had no effect on rod bottom -

FR-S.11 (this should distractor C.-

H 3

/

/

H 3

/

F F

2 2

Q#

LOK I WH) 61 H

62 H

63 F

64 F

65 F

66 F

67 H

68 F

69 F

70 F

71 H

72 F

2 3

2 2 -

4 2

3 3

3. Psychometric Flaws I

4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I

7.

II ctors A and D are easily ruled out because by the Fire Type/Class er making distractor A "Class A" and distractor D use the use of Halon outside Fire Protection method Wet-hnical accuracy, should "Dry-Pipe, Open-Head Sprinkle System" I I c Y/A 9

I I Question: are we certain that a train "A" radiation monitor will c y s e the train "B" CIV (COP-V-4) to close? Le-,..$ e + f i A - & -

I I s I

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

7.

JIEIS Explanation S

>red.

Dist. -

TIF blinutia S

S S

Would distractor C be more plausible if SEAL DP > 220 PSlD were Required rather than NOT Required?

Similarly, would distractor B be more plausible if LIFT OIL INTERLOCK were NOT Required rather than Required?

700 easy because it is a fundamental knowledge item and because at SAE is declared. To be credi C is 0O:N after the GE is d D is 1:12 after the i time interval nor co WA match is we fter the GE. Neither is credible n which a PAR is Potentially redundant with the Operating Test if this examination include!

a JPM to make an EAL and PAR determination.

E The correct answer (D) is not grammatically complete. /

Distractor plausibility is weak but no suggestions.

7.

JIEIS Explanation

1.

LOK

[F/H) -

H H

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

7.

linutia Explanation

'otential technical flaws:

The first required announcment per OS1200.02 is at step 1.i. This comes after tripping the plant, closing MSIVs, securing RC-Ps, defeating SSPS and obtaining RSS keys. SG level shrink may be complete by this time. Therefore, level may be steady and distractor C could be correct. Level could also be rising if AFW is assumed to have actuated. Rising level makes distractor D partially correct with respect to SG level.

The use of OX1 400.01, Figure 1 may be inappropriate for this condition per Note 4 at the bottom of page 11 (Form A: PM Number 1-RSS-OT100-000, Sheet 4 of 5). Specifically, the T/S acceptance criteria is L 5% difference between FW-LI-501 at the MCB and LI-4310 at CP-108A. Note 4 explains that "The 5% difference between the MCB and RSS level indicators is valid for normal operating pressures. For pressures below this, refer to Figure 1 for expected RSS level indication vs. MCB level indication at various SG pressures".

1 The explanation arrives at the correct answer with a potentially incorrect application of OX1400.01, Figure 1: Wide Range Steam Generator Level Graph. According to the explanation, SG level is at 100%. My understanding is that SGWL at 100% power should be at program level of -44%. Accepting the explanation that SG pressure is -1,OOO psig, we can see that RSD level indication will be slightly higher than MCB level indication as indicated in the correct answer.

Uotwithstanding the discussion above, determining whether level was mrrect is a direct lookup from the proposed references.

4s discussed above, the correct answer is vulnerable to a challenge thai inswer C is more correct or more plausible.

/

/ -

F 2

The three distractors all begin T o ensure...". In contrast, the answer

)egins with "To maintain...". Please consider changing the word to 3nsure to maintain. Alternatively, reword the correct answer to "To 3nsure DNBR remains above 1.30 during all...". Neither alternative isi sufficient to change this exam bank item to a modified exam bank item.

F F -

H -

2 3 -

&: - sc( 5s

-td c - - F d 4re distractors C & D credible? Is it possible that an Applicant could

hink OS1290.01 is the correct procedure?

3 -

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I

7.

c SRO I UIWS I Explanation because entering OS1252.02 seemed implausible. I also suspect that d

S d

S Is this sufficiently modified to be called modified?- &,

fa I'm struggling with the plausibility of "Notify the NRC as soon as possible". An Applicant who understands reportability may recognize that there are no ASAP NRC reports.

Distractors A & B may be implausible because RCS pressure limits do not protect the fuel. Moreover, distractor A is implausible because it indicates that protecting the fuel prevents release of radionuclides in the RCS to CTMT.

Distractors B & D are implausible because RCS pressure and fuel integrity have nothing to do with lifting of MS Safeties. The grammar of these distractors is also seems stilted.

E S

Need to verify technical aspects - From Attachment A of OS1201.09, it looks like both Train A & B PORV get open signals. From the stem, bot1 Train A & B PORVs are Impacted. The explanation of distractor B seems to indicate that only one train is affected.

Question: is the distinction between A (... on initial...) and C (...

during follow-up...) sufficient to make C an incorrect selection? Could an Applicant conceivably read them as identical? Should those phrases be emDhasized in some manner?

I

Z c

n

REPLACEMENT QUESTIONS FOR WRITTEN EXAM

ES-40 1 Seabrook Written Examination Q u e $ i o n # e e e t Form ES-40 1-5 i-Examination Outline Cross-reference:

Question # 40 Level Tier #

Group #

WA #

Importance Rating RO SRO 2

2 1

1 022.K4.03 3.6 4.0 Proposed Question:

Given the following plant conditions:

CGC-V14 and CGC-V28, Containment Structure Purge Isolation Valves are open for surveillance testing.

All systems are operating as designed.

Based on these conditions, which of the following choices correctly identifies the system response to an automatically generated Train A T signal?

A. CGC-V14 and CGC-V28 BOTH CLOSE.

B. CGC-VI4 and CGC-V28 BOTH remain OPEN.

C. CGC-V14 remains OPEN and CGC-V28 CLOSES.

D. CGC-V14 CLOSES and CGC-V28 remains OPEN.

Proposed Answer:

D Explanation of answer: It is important that the operator is aware of the potential for releasing airborne activity from containment to the outside environment and should take appropriate actions if the situation warrants. In the case of containment purge, if a Train A T signal is generated only the train A valve (CGC-V14) will close. CGC-V28 will remain open.

Explanation of distractors:

B,C & A are incorrect because their combinations do not warrant a correct answer.

Technical Reference( s):

CHV Detailed System Text

~

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

WA Topic:

automatic containment isolation.

Question Source:

Modified Bank #24422 Question Cognitive Level:

Lower 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Learning Objective:

None Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) andor interlock(s), which provide for 55.41.7 L8038112RO Describe the Response of the CGC components to a T signal.

ES-40 1 Seabrook Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference:

Level RO SRO Tier #

2 2

Question # 42 Group #

1 1

WA #

026.A1.01 Proposed Question:

Importance Rating 3.9 4.2 A Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident is occurring. The following specific plant conditions exist:

0 Highest Containment Pressure = 35 psig.

RWST Level = 480,000 gallons and decreasing.

A Containment Spray Pump (CBS-P-9A) Suction Pressure = 60 psig and decreasing.

A Containment Spray Pump (CBS-P-9A) Discharge Pressure = 120 psig and decreasing.

B Containment Spray Pump (CBS-P-9B) Suction Pressure = 60 psig and decreasing.

B Containment Spray Pump (CBS-P-9B) Discharge Pressure = 265 psig and decreasing.

Based on the above parameters, which one of the following choices is correct?

A. CBS-P-9A is below its design flow; containment pressure exceeded design.

B. CBS-P-9A is pumping normally; containment pressure did NOT exceed design.

C. CBS-P-9B is below its design flow; containment pressure exceeded design.

D. CBS-P-9B is pumping normally; containment pressure did NOT exceed design.

Proposed Answer:

D Explanation of answer: Based on detailed system text and LP information, the design pressure of the CBS pump is 350 psig. As the CBS pumps do not have indicators, it is important (and is the source of common misconceptions) that the candidates be able to discern proper CBS operating characteristics. A computer alarm comes in at 300 psig to warn the operator. A low discharge pressure alarm of 62 psig is also available. With the RWST full the static head of that tank should be about 60 psig which is felt on the suction of the CBS pump. Design containment pressure is 52 psig.

Explanation of distractors:

A & C - are incorrect based on containment pressure not exceeding design alone.

B - design pressure not exceeded is correct, however, the combination of discharge pressure choices makes this choice incorrect.

Technical Reference(s):

CBS Detailed System Text, LP8035 CBS System Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None KIA Topic:

Question Source:

Modified Bank #22830 Original question attached to reference Question Cognitive Level:

Higher 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Learning Objective:

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the CSS controls including Containment Pressure.

55.41.718 L8035110RO State the design flowrate and approximate head for the CBS pumps.

ES-401 Seabrook Written Examination Question Worksheet 7 i

+

O 1

5 Examination Outline Cross-reference:

Level RO SRO Tier #

2 2

Question # 64 Group #

2 2

WA #

068.K6.10 Importance Rating 2.5 2.9 Proposed Question:

Given the following list of ProcessEffluent Radiation Monitors:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

R-6509, Waste Test Tank Discharge Monitor.

R-6514, Waste Liquid Test Tank Inlet Monitor.

R-6505, Condenser Air Evacuation Discharge Monitor.

R-65 19, Steam Generator Blowdown Flash Tank Discharge Monitor.

R-65 16, Primary Component Cooling Water Loop A Activity Monitor An automatic system isolation will occur in response to a loss of power to which of the above radiation monitor combinations?

A. 1 and 5.

B. 2and3.

C. 2and4.

D. 3 and5.

Proposed Answer:

C Explanation of answer: According to OS1252.01 as well as System Lesson L8059i, several process or effluent radiation monitors have automatic control functions associated with them. #1,2 & 4 above fall into this category. A loss of the radiation monitor will result in these control functions occurring since they are fail safe in the alarm condition. C is the only correct combination of radiation monitors listed which provide these automatic functions. These monitors are all associated with the Liquid Radwaste System. This is operationally relevant because operators should be aware of system isolation status if high radiation should occur to protect the health and safety of the general public.

Explanation of distractors: Any other combination of these detectors is either partially correct or does not have an automatic control function associated with it. All choices are plausible in that they are radiation monitors listed in Attachment A ofOS1252.01.

Technical Reference(s):

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

WA Topic:

Question Source:

Modified Bank #23206 Original question attached to reference.

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Learning Objective:

OS1252.01, Process or Effluent High Radiation, RDMS Detailed System Text Table 4.2.

None Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the radiation monitors will have on the liquid radwaste system.

55.4 1.7/13 L8059106RO Describe the auto actions (control signals) that result when the below listed monitors reach their alarm setpoints.....

COMMENT PAGES FROM EXAM VALIDATION, FOR OPERATING EXAM

FPL Seabtook Station JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LOlTOl INADVERTENT ROD WITHDRAWAL DURING REACTOR SHUTDOWN Student Name:

Badge #:

Evaluator Name:

Badge #:

Student Signature:

Date:

(optional)

Evaluator Signature:

Date:

Training Coordinator Signature Date:

(optional)

SAT UNSAT This JPM was administered for qualification:

YES NO This material is developed for FPL Energy training programs by the Training Group. Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instruction and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Nuclear Training Manager.

PREPARED BY:

DATE:

INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:

DATE:

SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT (OPTIONAL)

APPROVED BY:

DATE:

TRAl N I N G SUP E RV I SO R

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST D=Discuss ELEMENTSTEP STANDARD EVALUATION INITIALS/DATE P=Perform

=Simulate

• denotes a critical step

• denotes a critical step SAT UNSAT L

NOTE: The student may request guidance from the US on desired course of action. Also note that the RO may take control rods to AUTO in an attempt to stop rod motion which is acceptable, however will be u ns uccessfu I.

CUE: If direction is requested from US; Carry out the appropriate required action.

• 9.

P Trip the Reactor.

UE:

The JPM is complete.

-7 0.

Stop time Evaluator calculates time to complete task.

0 %SI 21 0.04, Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal Step 1 actions must be taken either from memory or by referencing the procedure 0 )CRods placed in MANUAL 0

• Verifies Control Rod withdrawal has NOT stopped o.skrips the reactor using reactor trip switches on MCB.

Time to complete the task I 15 minutes.

ite to Evaluator - Obtain Tear Off Sheets from student following JPM completion (Ops only).

LOITOI Page 6 of 8

Student Name:

Evaluator Name:

Student Signature:

Eva1 ua tor Signature:

FPL Seabrook Station JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE L0024J POST LOCA PORV OPERATION Badge #:

Badge #:

Date:

(optional)

Date:

Training Coordinator Signature Date:

(optional)

SAT UNSAT This JPM was administered for qualification:

YES NO This material is developed for FPL Energy training programs by the Training Group. Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instruction and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Nuclear Training Manager.

PREPARED BY:

DATE:

INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:

DATE:

SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT (OPTIONAL)

APPROVED BY:

DATE:

TRAINING SUPERVISOR

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST D = D iscus s E LE ME NT/STE P STANDARD EVALUATION INITIALS/DATE P=Perform

=Simulate

• denotes a critical step

• denotes a critical step SAT UNSAT I.

CUE:

2.

3.

P Start time Initiating cue read.

If the student requests a Peer Check any time during the JPM, respond: No one is available to peer check your actions. Please continue with the task.

P Depressurize RCS To Refill PZR:

P PZR level - LESS THAN 25%

[50% for adverse containment]

Verifies PZR level <25%

since containment pressure is <4.0 psig.

____c_

f and transition to the RNO. This is acceptable. If student opens the normal spray valve(s), -

then they I

A0-4 NOTE: The student should recognize that the fattawmg ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE cannot be achieved should subsequently be closed and transition to the RNO for a satisfactory completion of the JPM. The following CUE may be given at any time:

7 US to Student: Because RCPs are off, we cannot use normal PZR spray valves.

w Open normal PZR spray valve(s) to refill PZR available.

Verifies normal spray not

• 5.

P Use one PZR PORV Uses one PZR PORV:

• 0 OpensonePORV (with associated block valve open).

rte to Evaluator - Obtain Tear Off Sheets from student following JPM completion (Ops only).

L0024J Page 5 of 8

FPL Energy Seabrook Station JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE L0055J MAKE-UP TO THE CC HEAD TANK Student Name:

Badge #:

Evaluator Name:

Badge #:

Student Signature:

Date:

(optional)

Evaluator Signature:

Date:

Training Specialist signature:

Date:

SAT UNSAT This JPM was administered for qualification:

YES NO This material is developed for FPL Energy training programs by the Training Group. Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instruction and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Training Manager.

PREPARED BY:

DATE:

INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:

DATE:

SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT (OPTIONAL)

APPROVED BY:

DATE:

TRAINING SUPERVISOR

PERFORMANCE C W K L IST D=Discuss ELEMENTISTEP STANDARD EVALUATION INITIALWDATE P=Perform

• denotes a

• denotes S=Simulate critical step standard SAT UNSAT

1.

Start time Initiating w k a d.

CUE:

peer check your actions. Please continue wlth the task".

If the student requests a Peer Check at any time dutWg the JPM, respond: "No one h avallabie to CUE:

"DM-V-13 opens."

• 2.

S COMMENCE filling the "A" CC Commences fllHng the "A" head tank.

CC head W:

• a. Opens w V - 1 3 by COUfttW4OChViSe.

b. Informs oontrol room DM-V-$3 is open.

turning handwheel --

, f A CUE:

U& to Primary NSO, "I copy, DM-V-13 Is open. "A" CC head tank level is now sbMe at 55%.

appropriate Tech. Spec. action statement is enW#M."

NOTE: CC-V-975 and CC-V-1298 control switches are locateti at +25' north wall of PAB.

The CUE:

When student arrives at the +25' north end of the PAB to isolate the rad monitor, cue: "water is rushing from the CC piping within the A train M1s)wlitor, RM=RE-6516(6!515)." The leakage stops when CC-V-975 and CC-V-1298 are closed. Cub: "The green light for CC-V975 and CC-VI298 are lit and the red light is out."

Based on the CUE above, ensure the student does Cist become consumed with potentidly contaminated water as a deterrent to accomplishing the task of isolation.

NOTE:

• 3.

S SHUT CC-V-975 and

• Takes CGV-975 and CC-CC-V-1298.

V-1298 Switches to CLOSE.

4.

S INFORM control room the rad Informs central mom the monitor was leaking, and closing CC-V-975 and CC-V-1298 stopped the leak.

leak has stopbed.

CUE:

"The JPM is complete."

Note to Evaluator - Obtain Tear-Off Sheets from student following JPM compbtbn (Ops only).

L0055J Page 5 of 7

Student Name:

Evaluator Name:

Student Signature:

Date:

Evaluator Signature:

Date:

Training Coordinator Signature:

Date:

SAT UNSAT This JPM was administered for qualification: NO ing Group. Text of instruction and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Training Manager.

DATE:

PREPARED BY:

INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:

DATE:

SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT (OPTIONAL)

DATE:

APPROVED BY:

TRAINING SUPERVISOR

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Seabrook Scenario No.:

1 OpTest No.:

1 Examiners:

Candidates:

Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

Mode 1. Unit at 75% power. IC # 210.

The crew will take the shift and commence a rapid downpower to 50% to m o v e "A" Main Feedwater Pump from service within the next hour.

Entered TSASs for CS-P-2B being tagged out of service for planned maintenance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. Return to service expected within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

1. MANUALLY trip the reactor from the mntrol room when SSPS fails to automatically trip the reactor. [E-OJ

2. Control the EFW flow rate to not less than 25 GPM per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldovq rate before a SBVWB (orange path) challenge develops to the Critical Tasks:

Event No.

1 2

3 4

5 6

Malf. No.

NIA ptFWPT505 It RC LT459 mff H002 mff H002 (severity increases) mfRPSOOl mfRPSOO2 mfMSO51 mfRPSO19 mfRPS020 svMSV86 svMSV88 svMSV9O svMSV92 mfS1003 mv FW N42 1 4A

\\I)ormal, (R)eacti ntegrity CSF tvent Type' R (RO)

N (BOPIUS)

I (BOPIUS)

TS (US)

I (ROIUS)

TS (US)

C (BOPIUS)

M (ALL)

C (ROIUS)

M (ALL)

C (BOP)

C (RO)

C (BOPIUS)

Rapid power decrease.

PT-505 Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Controlling PZR L e d Channel LT-459 fails LOW Turbine Generator Vibrations begin to increase.

After entry into abnormal operating procedure, turbine vibrations will rapidly increase beyond automatic turbine trip setpoint resulting in a turbine trlp. The reactor fails to trip automatically when the turbine trii. The crew will have to trip the reactor manually (CT).

The combination of high turbine vibrations and turbine trip causes a catastrophic rupture of the main steam bottle (dorm stream of MSIVs). Afl fatr MSlVs will fail to close when the MSl signal is actuated. Manual actuation of MSI in the control room should be attempted, but will not cause the MSlVs to dose.

Upon automatic actwtion of Safety Injection from the RCS coddown, the "A" Safety Injection pump will not automatically start. Procedure progression will be E-O 3 E-2 ECA-2.1 where the crew will be directed to reduce feed flow to all SGs to 25 gpm to avoid severe challenge to the Integrity CSF (CT).

The motor operator overloads for EFW flow control valve FW-FV-4214A will trip as soon as valve motion is demanded. The operator will be requkecl to utilize FW-FV-42146 to control EFW flow to A SG.

ty, (1)nstrument. (Cbmponent, (MMor, (TS)Technical Specification

RO US/BO P/RO RO RO BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP CUE RO us RO RO RO RO Adds required amount of Boron using OSlOO8.01, Figure 3 (Boration Checklist). This includes verifying proper system line-up, Placing Blender Mode Start Switch to STOP. Placing Boric Acid Blender Mode Selector Switch to BORATE, selecting desired flow rate and quantity, Placing Blender Mode Start Switch to START, verifying proper plant response, and resetting the control system to AUTO when desired amount of acid is added.

Peer checks will be provided for all reactivity manipulations.

Because of a three man crew, this peer check can be provided by the US.

As directed by US, if RCS boron concentration is being changed by greater than 50 ppm, OPERATE pressurizer heaters to force spray to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and pressurizer.

RO will manually insert/withdraw rods to maintain axial flux difference in band.

Use the LOAD SELECTOR load decrease push-button or LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer to reduce load to the desired load.

If reducing load with the load selector, FOLLOW the load set with the load limit set potentiometer and the standby load set.

Maintain generator VARs consistent with load per The Turbine Generator Capability Curve and load dispatcher's instructions.

Maintain the manual voltage regulator nulled.

Maintain speed deviations for both main feed pumps nulled.

FAILURE OF CONTROLLING PZR LEVEL INSTRUMENT VAS D4461 PZR LVL LOW & HTR INTERLOCK ACTUATED &

F4324/F4325 PZR GROUP C/D BACKUP HTR TRIPPED &

F4323 PZR CONTROL HEATERS TRIPPED annunciators are received. Also Ll-459 indication fails low.

Recognizes controlling channel (tl-459) has failed low.

Recognizes letdown has isolated. Informs US.

Enters and directs action IAW OS1201.07, "PZR Level Instrument Failure".

Takes manual control of PZR level contdler RC-LK-459 or controls level with letdown and charging flow.

Selects an alternate level channel for CONTROUBACKUP as necessarv. Selects an alternate RECORDER channel.

Resets the control group of PZR heaters.

Determines that letdown can be restored and restores letdown IAW OSf2aTT07.

USNRC Examination - Seabrodc Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1

-30f13

RO NOTE Establish normal letdown: V&@fIES CGV341 OPEN.

VERIFIES CS-TK-130 in AUTO, C L M 8 CS-HCV-189, CLOSE CS-HCV-190, OPEN RC-LCV&Q, OPEN CS-V145, establish letdown flow using letdown meontrd valves.

OS1002.08, "PZR Level C o r n System Operations" may be RO referenced to restore system, to AUTO.

Returns PZR level controller t t ~

AUTO after proper controller yhen directed by the lead examiner, the main tuwne generator vibrations will begin to increase to about 8-10 mils requiring enby into ON1231 -01, "Turbine High Vibrations". Once into the abnormal and will rapidly increase beyond the turbine trip setpaint causing an automatic turbine trip. However, the reactor will fail to trip, requiring a manual reactor trip (CT).

Immediately following reactor trip, a catastrophic failure of the MS Bottle downstream of MSlVs will occur. MSIV will not M able to dose until much later in the scenario when NSO's locally close the "A" and 'D" MISV's from the west pipe chase. Other complications will occur as follows:

step 1, Turbine Vibrations us setpoint and proper PZR lev& am established.

Verifies TS compliance 3.3.1 W e 3.3-1 item 11 and TS NOTE NOTE us 3.3.3.6, item 5, Accident MonWhg Instrumentation. Verifies redundant channel bistables NOT tripped and inform I&C of controller failure.

Table 3-3.1 item 11 : inoperable channel LT-459 tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

TS 3.3.3.6 item 5: requires thsla LT-459 be returned to operable status within 7 days.

Informs I & C of failed channel and requests assistance with troubleshooting including placing LT-459 in bypass (if desired by lead examiner) controlling PZR level instrum&

and at the discretion of the lead examiner, the main turbine generator vibrations will begin to increase as noted by VAS 85933 TURB GEN BRG 7 VIBRATION HIGH & 85935 TURB GEN BRG 8 VIBRATION HIGH.

After the crew has progressed beyond step 1 of ON1231.01, "Turbine Generator High V i b d W, the Turbine will AUTO trip as noted by RED Hardwire AWCIATOR on UA-52, "TURBINE TRIP", White Ha&

on UA-53, TURBINE TRIP",

and numerous vibration alarms are received on VAS.

Event Description :

Time Position CUE USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 MAIN GENERATOR VIBRAmNS 1 AUTO TURBINE TRIP w/o AUTO REACTOR TRfp LEADtNG TO ALL WG'S FAULTED WITH INABIUTY TO ISOLATE FAULT FROM CONTROL ROOM W I W - W E R COMPLICATIONS Applicant's Adons or Behavior After the US discusses TS mukernen& for the failure of paOe4of13 I

\\

NOTE BOP us BOP/US BOP BOP/US BOP/US CUE l 3 us RO BOP RO/BOP/

us If the crew is conservative aLIcJ decides to trip the readwhurbine based on hi@ vibrations increasing quickly, then it is important @at we hlcrease severity before they trip in order to prresenre critical tasks.

Acknowledges alarms for high turbine vibrations and puns up MPCS graphics to monitor bearing vibration.

Directs entry into ON1231.Ol, "High Turbine Vibration".

Monitors vibrations less than Mp limits. Determines that Bearing 7 & 8 are limiting at a b t 10 mils. (alarm is at 8 mils)

Checks Main Generator breabr closqd.

Directs turbine load adjusted until vibration levels are less than values needed to support extended operations. May get Engineering involved.

Checks Turbine vibrations stable or increasing. (vibrations will remain stable until lead examkr requests the severity increased)

After.trip and insertion of Main Steam Bottle rupture, the crew will hear the noise generator simulating main steam noise from Enters E-O, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" Immediate actions: Verifies reLIcfor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing, and rod bottom lights lit. Checks if SI is actuated, verifies both Wns of SI actuated.

Immediate actions: Veriies aU' turbine stop valves closed and generator breaker open, Verifies power to AC Emergency busses, verifies all emergency busses energized.

Performs ESF Actuation Verification per Attachment A of E-O.

Notes "A" SI Pump did not st& and manually starts the "A" SI pump. Informs the US that the nK SI pump did not start but was manually started. Also as part of this attachment Main Steamline isolation is checked. it should be noted all S/G pressures are less than 585 psig, that MSIV's did not close, manual attempt failed and the status should be reported to the us Checks containment pressure has remained less than 18 psig by pressure recorder.

Verify Total E M Flow - Greater than 500 GPM.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1

Facility:

Sea b roo k Scenario No.:

2 OpTestNo.:

2 Examiners:

Candidates :

Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

Mode 2. Unit is operating at 10" amps, MOL. IC# 21 1 The crew will take the shift and commence a power increase up to but not to exceed 3% power.

The "C" Primary Component Water pump is tagged out for bearing replacement. The motor experienced high vibrations during quarterly surveillance.

Seismic Event occurred two shifts ago.

1. MANUALLY actuate at least one train of Containment Spray or start one train of Containment Spray Building Equipment prior to step 7 of E-0 following Large Break LOCA. [E-O]

2. PERFORM TRANSFER to cold leg recirculation when automatic swapover occurs or 115,OOO Critical Tasks:

gr Event I Malf. No.

No.

1 NIA I ltFwLT529 3

ptRCPT455 4

mf RC024A mfCBSOO4 mfCBSOO5 mfFCS002 mfFW039 svMSlV395 bkFWP37B I

5 I NIA 1

• (Nbrmal, (R)eacti Event Type' R (RO)

N (BOPWS)

TS (US)

I (BOPWS)

TS (US)

I (RO/US)

TS (US) ons in the RWST, whichem occurs first. [ES-1.31 Event Description Raise reactor power from lo4 amps to approximately 3% power.

Place Electric EFW Pump (P-37B) in PTL after SM informs crew that it is reported to be inoperable and address TS.

FW-LT-529 Fails LOW causing the "B" Feedwater Regulating Bypass valve to fail open.

Controlling PZR pressure channel fails HIGH.

Large Break LOCA occurs leading to automatic reactor trip with failure of Containment Spray pumps to automatically start upon Phase 'B" actuation. The crew will have to manually start at least one Containment Spray pump (CT). Upon completion of immediate actions, all RCPs should be tripped based on E-O Operator Action Summary. The "B" CCP pwnp will not automatically start, and should be manually started as part of E-O, Attachment A actions.

The SUFP will trip after reactor trip and MS-V395 will close after the Steam Driven EFW Pump Auto Starts, causing it to shutdown. It should be recognized by the BOP that there is no EFW flow.

Procedure progression wilt be E-0 to E-1 to FR-P.1 (Red) to FR-Z.l (Orange) to E-1 to ES-1.3.

Perform transfer to cold leg recirculation per ES-1.3 when the automatic swapover occurs or 115,000 gallons in the RWST, whichever occurs first. (CT)

RO RO/US RO RO RO/BOP BOP RON S RO RO/US NOTE RO/BOP/

us us ROlUS RO RO RO BOP Check PZR PORV and Block Valve&

Check if ECCS flow should be reduced. Based on insuPficient subcooling, the US will proceed to step 7.

Check if containment spray pumps should be stopped. If containment pressure has dropped below 4 psig than reset Phase B isolation and containment spray signals, stop CBS pumps and place in standby.

Check if RHR pumps should be stopped. Determine RCS pressure is < 260 psig and do not stop RHR pumps.

Check RCS and SG Pressure. If SG pressure is NOT-stable or NOT INCREASING OR RCS Pressure is NOT stable or NOT DECREASING than the crew will loop back to Step 1 of E-1 until these conditions are met. If and when they are met continue with following steps..

Check if EDG should be stopped. Reset Si, verify all AC busses energized by offsite and unload EDG by depressing both emergency stop pushbuttons, after EDG stopped, reset for auto start and isolate SW to EDG.

Evaluate plant status by verifying coldrecirculation capability.

Check if RCS cooldown and depressurization required.

Check if transfer to cold leg recirculation is required (auto swapover actuated or RWST 115,000 nallons). When from UATs or-RATs, stop conditions are met transition to ES-1.3-May take awhile to get here based on Spray Pumps being secured when containment pressure decreases less than4 Dsia.

accomplish this critical task the following items must be accomplished:

Transition to ES-1.3, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation".

Within three minutes of receiving RWST Lo-Lo Level Alarm, Reset SI, Verify CBS-V8 and V14 FULL OPEN, Simultaneously close CBS-V2 and V5.

Verify RHR pumps at least one running.

Place running RHR pump switches in normal after start Dosition.

Close SI pump mini-flow valves (Sl-V89,90, & 93)

Energize MCC-E522 & E622.

c USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material -Scenario 2 PqpSofll

I Discharge to cold legs 1 & 2 (RH-V14) d CCP suctions (CSV460,461, & 475)

OpflHR supplies to SI and CCP suctiins (RH435 & 36)

Start any pump that was stopped due to RWST empty alarm.

Isolate RWST feed to CCPs and SI pumps (dose CBS-V47 &

51, CS-LCV-1120 & 112E, De-energize CS-LCV-1 12D &

112E.

Deenergize MCC-E522 & E622.

Place the simulator in freeze at Lead Examiner discretion.

Upon completion of follow-up questioning, the SRO will perform JPM LO1108 (Post EAL Determination and Event Classification)

They should declare a SAE based on EAL-l5d, but this will be determined by the staff based on the endpoint of the scenario.

USNRC Examination - Seabrcok S t a h January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 paSeIof11

Candidates:

Initial Conditions:

Mode 1. Unit is operating at 100% power. IC# 21

• The ASOV for the 'D" Steam Generator (MS-PV-3004) is tagged out of service due to a podtkner air leak. Entered TSAS 3.3.3.5 action c, 3.6.3 action c and 3.7.1.6 action 8, two hours ago. Expected outage time is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The Prelrsurizer control group heaters are tagged out of service. The control circuit for the heaters has failed to zero output. A troubleshootirlg plan has been developed and Electrical Maintenance is investigating the problem. The heaters have bean out of service for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Backup Heater Group " B is ON.

1. MANUALLY trip the reactor from the control room when SSPS fails to automatically trip the reactor. [Ea]

2. MANUALLY trip the main turbine before a severe (Orange Path) challenge devdops to either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF, or before transition to ECA-2.1, whichever happens first. [E-0]

3. MANUALLY trip the 'C" and "D" RCPs when subcooling is e40 F such that an Orange path on Core Cooling does not occur when forced circulation in the I

Critical Tasks:

• (N Malf. No.

mfHD027 NIA ttRCTT411 mfED001 m f RPSOO 1 mfRPS002 mfRPS003 mfRCO16 mfRCO19 mfRC049D mal, (R)eacti Event Type*

Event Description

'A" Heater Drain Pump Trips on overcurrent As a result of the heater drain pump trip, a loss of feedwater preheating will result in positive reactivity and subsequent power increase. The crew will need to take positive control to restore power less than 100%.

Loop 1 Tc Instrument Fails HIGH Loss of 13.8kV Bus 1 causes a Loss of *A" & "B" RCP's with a Failure of an automatic reactor trip (CT) and main turbine trip (CT) to occur. Note that although Safety Injection should actuate, ALL Safety Injection pumps will be prevented from manual start (malfunction numbers are not shown since no credit is taken for these failures)

Subsequent to reactor trip, the Reactor Vessel will develop a flange leak. The crew will need to trip the remaining "C" and "D" RCPs based on loss of RCS subcooling (CT). Once tripped, the RCS leak will become significantly larger to force the crew into FR-C series procedures. The "A" CCP will also trip on Dvercurrent.

ty, (t)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specification