Text

Final - Section C Operating (Folder 3)
	ML050460352
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	01/24/2005
From:	Roush K; Susquehanna
To:	Caruso J, Conte R; NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
	Conte R
References
	A14-13D, PLA 005859
	Download: ML050460352 (69)
	v • d • e

Susquehanna Learning Center 707 Salem Boulevard P.O. Box 467 Berwick, PA 18603-0467 570-542-3353 January 24, 2005 Mr. John Caruso USNRC Chief Examiner USNRC Region 1 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-141 5 Susquehanna Learning Center Proposed Examination Materials PLA 005859 File A14-13D

Dear Mr. Caruso:

Enclosed for your review and approval are Proposed Examination Materials for the PPL Susquehanna, LLC Initial Licensed Operator Examination scheduled to begin Thursday, February 3, 2005. These materials are submitted in accordance with NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors" Revision 9. The following materials are enclosed:

0 0

0 Form ES-201-3, Examination Security Agreement (Up to Date Copy)

Form ES-301-3, Operating Test Quality Checklist - Rev. 2 (Signed)

Form ES-301-4, Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist - Rev. 2 (Signed)

Form ES-301-5, Transient and Event Checklist - Rev. 2 (Signed)

Form ES-301-6, Competencies Checklist - Rev2 (Signed)

Form ES-D-I, Scenario Outline - Rev. 2 Examination Scenarios - Rev. 2 All Proposed Examination Materials have been revised to incorporate your feedback comments and revalidated by Licensed Operations personnel in accordance with the guidance provided within NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors" Revision 9.

January 24,2005 Page 2 PLA 005859 File A14-13D We request these materials be withheld from public disclosure until after the completion of the exam. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at 570-542-3326 or Rich Brooks at 570-542-1 891.

Sincerely,

&v?-.?J.

Kenneth M. Roush Manager-Nuclear Training

Response

No

Enclosures:

Listed cc:

R. R. Boesch R. R. Sgarro Ops Letter File Nuc Records-Site rb revised 45 day letternpl - 2005 RB/KMR/va h

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 3

4 Facility:

SSES Scenario No.: ILO-503A (ATC )

Op-Test No.:

C A RFP High Vibration C

RRP B Upper Seal Failure Examiners:

Operators:

6 7

8 9

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 at 69% power EOL, Unit 2 in Mode 1.

C HPCl Auto Start Failurenrip C

D/G Start Failure C, M Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP)

C 1A201 Bus Lockout Turnover: The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 69% power, rod sequence B2/SU step 550 and RX Enqineer is finalizing instructions for increasing power. Instrument Air compressor By is out of service for rebuild. SRV R is leaking. Unit 2 is at 100% power. Fuel handling is in progress in Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool.

I I

Event No.

Event Description I

R I Control Rod Drift OUT 2

1 I

C I RRP B Lower Seal Failure 5

1 I

C, M I LOCA Inside Drywell lo I I

M I Rapid Depressurization I

I I

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 NRC RE-Exam Rev. 2 Susquehanna Facsimile

PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER SIMULATOR SCENARIO Scenario

Title:

ILO CERTIFICATION / NRC EXAM SCENARIO

~

~~

Scenario Duration:

90 Minutes Scenario Number:

ILO-503A Revision/Date:

Rev 2, 1/22/2005 Course:

PCOO71PCOO8, Initial License ROlSRO Certification Examination PCO17/PCO18, Initial License ROlSRO NRC Examination Operational Activities:

1. Control Rod Drift Out

2. RRP B # I (lower) Seal Failure

3. A Feedpump High Vibration

4. RRP B #2 (upper) Seal Failure

5. LOCA Inside Drywell

6. HPCl Auto Start Failure I Trip Prepared By:

Reviewed By:

Approved By:

7. Diesel Generator Fail to Start

8. Loss Of Offsite Power

9. lA201 Bus Lockout I O. Rapid Depressurization Instructor Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor S u perv is i ng Man ager/S h if? Supervisor 1/22/05 Date Date Date Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 1 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rll-3 Rev. 2 Page 76 of 76 NTP-31.5 OPERATlONS/TRAlNlNG APPROVAL OF INITIAL LICENSE OPERATOR CERTIFICATION EXAMINATION AND NRC LICENSE EXAMINATION MATERIALS The Douglas Murphy NRC Re-Exam i nation (Exam Name) exam materials have been designed, developed, and validated in accordance with the guidance provided in NTP-31.5, Initial License Operator Certification and NRC License Examination Development. The Validation process of this procedure utilizes extensive Training and Operations subject matter expertise. By utilizing this expertise throughout the design, development, and validation of these materials, Training and Operations management have a high level of confidence that these materials will provide the intended job relevant evaluation.

Therefore, Training and Operations management approve these materials for use on the Douglas Murphy NRC Re-Examination (Exam Name)

Exam.

1 /30/03-0 rati s Management T r a z a %

Date Form NTP-31.5H Rev. 0, (01/05)

Page 1 of 1

Page 2 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 2 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 3 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005

/I SCENARIO

SUMMARY

II The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 69% power, rod sequence B2/SU step 550 and RX Engineer is finalizing instructions for increasing power. Instrument Air compressor B is out of service for rebuild.

SRV R is leaking. Unit 2 is at 100% power. Fuel handling is in progress in Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool.

Shortly after the crew assumes shift responsibilities, Control Rod 42-55 will drift out, resulting in a small power change. The crew will respond by implementing ON-155-001, CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS, and applying the appropriate Technical Specification Required Action(s). When notified, the Reactor Engineer will direct the shift to insert three other control rods in order to maintain core symmetry.

When the Rod Drift event has been completed, the Reactor Recirc pump B # I (lower) seal failure will occur. The crew will monitor Seal Cavity Temperatures and pressures as well as any changes in leakage into the Drywell Equipment Drain Tank.

After the lower seal failure event has been completed, the A Reactor Feedwater Pump vibration will occur (3 to 4 mils) which will require removing the RPF from service IAW OP-145-001.

Once the A RFP is secured and the plant has been stabilized, the Reactor Recirc pump B #2 (upper) seal will fail, resulting in Drywell temperature and pressure increase. The crew will implement ON-164-003 REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP DUAL SEAL FAILURE. The crew will evaluate plant conditions and decide to trip Reactor Recirc Pump B or perform an orderly shutdown of the pump. Once the pump is stopped the crew will isolate the pump to reduce leakage. When the crew attempts to close the suction valve F023B, it will fail to close. This will result in an unisolable leak and a continuation of the rise in Drywell temperature and pressure. The crew will be expected to perform ON-100-101 SCRAM, SCRAM IMMINENT and place the Mode Switch to Shutdown.

Condensate and Feedwater will initially be available to maintain RPV water level, but will become unavailable when Plant Auxiliary Load Shed logic is initiated concurrent with Hi Drywell Pressure. HPCl fails during initiation and cannot be recovered. RClC and CRD can be started for injection. D/G C will fail to auto start on Hi Drywell pressure and will not be available for the remainder of the scenario.

When RClC has been initiated to restore and maintain RPV water level, A LOOP occurs that results in loss of Division 1 RHR and Core Spray systems. Additionally, a Bus Lockout will occur on the 1A ESS Bus 1A201. Division 2 RHR and Core Spray systems will be available after DIGS energize the remaining ESS buses. Primary Containment Control will require use of Suppression Chamber Sprays for pressure and temperature control. The leakage rate will eventually increase beyond RClC and CRD makeup capability and RPV level will decrease below TAF. Rapid Depressurization will be required to recover Adequate Core Cooling using Low Pressure ECCS systems.

The scenario will be terminated when the Reactor is depressurized, Reactor water level is restored to +I3 to +54 inches, and EO-I 00-103 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL actions are being addressed.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 3 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 4 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I

11 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 4 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R l l - 3

Page 5 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 II SCENARIO OBJECTIVES It The objective of this scenario is to evaluate the licensed operator candidates ability to respond to the scenario events. These events will require each candidate to demonstrate the following:

Knowledge of integrated plant operations Ability to diagnose abnormal plant conditions Ability to work together as a team Ability to mitigate plant transients that exercise their knowledge and use of ONs and EOPs Ability to utilize Technical Specifications (SRO Only)

To meet this objective, the licensed operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency in the following competencies:

Reactor Operator Candidates:

1. Interpretldiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings

2. Comply with and use procedures, references, and Technical Specifications

3. Operate the control boards

4. Communicate and interact with other crew members Senior Reactor ODerator Candidates:

1. Interpret/diagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings

2. Comply with and use procedures and references

3. Operate the control boards (N/A to upgrade candidates)

4. Communicate and interact with the crew and other personnel

5. Direct shift operations

6. Comply with and use Technical Specifications Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 5 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 6 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I

11 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 6 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R l l - 3

Page 7 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 CRITICAL TASKS

Perform Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -161 inches Safety Significance RPV leakage or loss of injection systems impacts the ability to provide continued adequate core cooling through core submergence based on inventory loss.

Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions will result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.

SSES EOP Basis for:

The following steps provide the operating crew guidance to line up injection systems as available to maintain level >-129. If these actions are unsuccessful, the crew receives additional direction when it is determined that level can not be maintained above TAF.

RC/L4RESTORE AND MAINTAIN LVL BETWEEN

+13 AND +54 USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS RCIL-5 IF LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > +13 MAINTAIN LVL > -129 USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS AUGMENTING AS DESIRED WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS RC/L-10 IRRESPECTIVE OF VORTEX LIMITS WITH TABLE 3 SYSTEMS PERFORM ALL 1

LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2

STARTPUMPS 3

INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX RC/L-11 IF LESS THAN 2 TABLE 4 SUBSYSTEMS CAN BE LINED UP COMMENCE LINING UP AS MANY AS POSSIBLE TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 7 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R11-3

Page 8 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 CRITICAL TASKS 11 RC/L-13 WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS PERFORM ALL:

1 LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2

STARTPUMPS 3

INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX RC/L-16 WHEN LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > -161 GO TO RAPID DEPRESS Rapid Depressurization is not initiated until RPV water level has dropped to -1 61 I (TAF) because:

Adequate core cooling exists so long as RPV water level remains above -1 61 I (TAF).

The time required for RPV water level to decrease to -1 61 I (TAF) can best be used to line up and start pumps, attempting to reverse the decreasing RPV water level trend before Rapid Depressurization is required to assure continued adequate core cooling.

(

Reference:

SSES-EPG C1-4 and second override before C3-1)

Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Reactor water level trending downward, eventually indicating less than the top of active fuel height on the Fuel Zone Level Indicator.

Performance Criteria Perform a Rapid Depressurization per EO-100-1 12 when water level reaches the TAF -161 as read on the Fuel Zone Instrument.

Initiate ADS / Manually Open all 6 ADS valves Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise on the Fuel Zone and Wide Range level instruments.

Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure and rising reactor water level.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 8 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 9 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 CRITICAL TASKS

Secure Suppression Chamber Spravs before Suppression Chamber pressure drops to 0 psig Safety Significance Operation of drywell 1 suppression chamber sprays is stopped before drywell / suppression chamber pressure decreases to 0 psig to assure that primary containment pressure is not reduced below atmospheric. A positive primary containment pressure precludes air from being drawn in through a primary containment path (which may have been opened for control of primary containment hydrogen and oxygen). It also assures that a margin to the negative design pressure of the primary containment exists.

Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Potential exists for air to be drawn in through a primary containment path (which may have been opened for control of primary containment hydrogen and oxygen). Could also exceed the negative design pressure of the primary containment.

Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Drywell / Suppression Chamber pressure decreasing toward 0 psig.

Performance Criteria Secures spray flow to the Drywell 1 Suppression Chamber IAW OP-149-004.

Performance Feedback Drywell / Suppression Chamber spray isolation valves indicate closed.

Spray flow to the Drywell / Suppression Chamber indicates 0 gpm.

Drywell / Suppression Chamber pressure > 0 psig and no longer decreasing.

Denotes Simulator Critical Task Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 9 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 10 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 10 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3

Page 11 Scenario i LO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO REFERENCES

1. CONTROL ROD 42-55 DRIFT AR-104-H05 ROD DRIFT REV. 21 ON-155-001 TS 3.1.3 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY AMMEND. 178 CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS REV. 22

2. RRP B #I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE AR-102-GO5 ON-I 64-003 SO-100-006 RRP B SEAL STAGE HVLO FLOW, REV. 23 RRP B DUAL SEAL FAILURE, REV. 16 SHIFTLY SURVEILLANCE OPERATING LOG, REV. 44

3. A RFPT High Vibration AR-101 -AI 6 OP-I 45-00 1 A RFPT HIGH VIBRATION RFP AND RFPT LUBE OIL SYSTEM

4. RRP B #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE AR-102-GO4 GO-100-009 TS 3.4.4 TS 3.4.1 SEAL LEAKAGE HI/LO, REV. 23 SINGLE RECIRC LOOP OPERATION, REV. 14 RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE, AMMEND. 178 RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING, AMMEND. 178

5. RRP B # I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE ON-164-003 ON-100-101 EO-100-102 RPV CONTROL, REV. 2 EO-100-103 RRP B DUAL SEAL FAILURE, REV. 16 SCRAM, SCRAM IMMINENT, REV. 12 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 7

6. HPCl AUTO START FAILURE /TRIP OP-I 52-001 HPCl SYSTEM, REV. 32 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 11 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R11-3

Page 12 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 I

SCENARIO REFERENCES 1

7. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ON-I 04-001 UNIT 1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, REV. 13

8. ON-I 04-201

9. AR-015-DO8 LOSS OF 4KV ESS BUS 1A (1A201) REV. 5 4KV BUS 1A BUS LOCKOUT RELAY TRIP, REV. 29 IO. RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION EO-100-112 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION, REV. 2 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 12 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R l l - 3

Page 13 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 MALFS 8:8 II SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS II REMFS OVRDS TRIGS 11 4:4 6

1. Initialize simulator to IC-17, 69% power.

2. Snapshot to an available IC (currently IC-I 14).

3. Place a Pink Tag on IA Compressor B control switch.

4. Type restorepref YPP.IL0-503A; verify the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments.

Verify the Environment window:

5. Activate Auto Exercise OPRMSIS PRC

[P-I

[P-2

[P-3

[P-4

[P-5

[P-6

[P-7

[ P-8

[ P-9

[P-I GRAM BUlTONS 1 IMF RD1550054255 DMF RD1550054255 MRF RDI 550074255 IMF RR164003B (NONE 0 0) 5 45:45:00 0 IMF FW145007A 4 10 0 IMF RR164004B 10 1O:OO 0 MRF RRI64041 CLOSE bat DSB.LOOPT21 IMF DS104001A I] MMF RRI64010 100 4:OO I

[P-231 bat FWB.IOIALARM

[P-241 bat FWB.102 ALARM

[P-25] bat FWB.103 ALARM CONTROL ROD 42-55 DRIFT OUT DELETE CONTROL ROD 42-55 DRIFT OUT HYDRAULICALLY DISARM HCU 42-55 B # I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE RFPT High Vibration to 4 mils over 10 seconds B RECIRC PUMP #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE ISOLATE CRD SEAL PURGE TO B RECIRC PUMP LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER 1A ESS BUS LOCKOUT INCREASE BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAKAGE FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 13 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 14 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 I

SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

6. Add the CRC package to the shutdown section.

7. Verify LEFM is selected as the Feedwater flow input to PlCSY IAW OI-TA-021.

8. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:

0 0

Reactor power at 69%.

0 0

Power ascension is on hold until repair of RWCU HX End Bell work completed.

When RWCU work completed, notify RE, and re-commence power ascension.

Rod Sequence is B2/SU step 550.

1 B Instrument Air Compressor O/S for rebuild.

E & R SRVs Tailpipe Temperatures are elevated.

Unit 2 is in MODE 1 at 100%

Common

9. A RW Chiller O/S I O. SCC D/G Over-temperature alarm received during manual run. Waiting on parts from procurement.

11. New Fuel Inspection in progress on Refuel Floor 81 8. Brian Forge in charge of evolution.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 14 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R11-3

Page 15 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM initial Conditions: Initialize the Simulator to IC-114. Place the Simulator to RUN. Ensure the Proqram Buttons are assianed as indicated on the Special Instructions sheet via the approwiate Preference File. Assinn Shift Dositions; direct the start of the 5-minute panel walkdown.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 15 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 DESCRIPTION CONTROL ROD 42-55 DRIFT RRP 'B' #1 (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE RFPT HIGH VIBRATION TO 4 MILS OVER 10 SECONDS RRP 'B' #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE / DUAL SEAL FAILURE LOCA INSIDE DRYWELL HPCl AUTO START FAILURE / TRIP LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER 1A ESS BUS LOCKOUT D/G FAILS TO START RAP I D D E PRESS U R IZAT I 0 N File No. Rll-3

Page 16 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 16 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 17 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

1 Brief

Description:

Control Rod 42-55 Drift Out TIME POSITION PCOM PCOM us PCOM/PCOP us PCOM/PCOP Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Recognizes/reports ROD DRIFT alarm AR-104-H05 Monitors Reactor Power for power increase.

Restores power to previous level if necessary using Recirc Flow.

Performs ROD DRIFT AR-104-H05 Operator Actions:

Selects Display Rods Drifting to determine rod 42-55 is drifting.

Selects Control Rod 42-55 via Rod Select Matrix to determine rod is drifting out.

0 Promptly insert Rod to 00.

0 Direct performance of ON-I 55-001 CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS 0

0 Declares Control Rod Inoperable.

0 Notify Reactor Engineer 0

Reports rod staying at position 00 after being hydraulically disarmed Refer to TS 3.1.3 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY (Condition C)

Contacts Work Week Manager for assistance/investigation 0

0 Perform ON-155-001, CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS Section 3.4.

Directs NPO to Hydraulically Disarm HCU 42-55.

When instructed by reactor engineering, direct the crew to insert the 3 symmetrical control rods 18-55, 18-07, 42-07 to position 00.

~~

When directed by Reactor Engineer, Insert rods 18-55, 18-07, 42-07 to 00 Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 17 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 18 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

1 Brief

Description:

Control Rod 42-55 Drift Out INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

Once the crew assumes shift duties, or upon Evaluator direction, cause Control Rod 42-55 to Drift out by de pressing :

[P-I] IMF RDI 550054255 CONTROL ROD 42-55 DRIFT OUT After PCOM has begun inserting that control rod, delete the malfunction by depressing:

[P-21 DMF RD1550054255 DELETE CONTROL ROD 42-55 DRIFT OUT When directed to hydraulically disarm HCU 42-55, depress:

[P-31 MRF RD1550074255 HYDRAULICALLY DISARM HCU 42-55 ROLE PLAY:

1. As Work Week Manager/l&C dispatched to investigate, wait 10 minutes and report as I&C:

There appears to be a failure in the HCU Transponder Card, and it will take at least an hour to get a replacement. After replacement well have to perform some checks before we can feel certain that the Transponder card is the only problem with the HCU.

2. As NPO dispatched to the HCU, report no unusual conditions at the HCU if asked.

As NPO dispatched to the HCU, report HCU Hydraulically Disarmed following activation of [P-31

3. As Reactor Engineer, report no problems with the current rod pattern, but direct crew to insert the following 3 control rods to position 00 for the purposes of core symmetry: 18-55, 18-07, 42-07 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 18 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R11-3

Page 19 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 POSITION TIME SCENARIO EVENT FORM STUDENT ACTIVITIES Event No:

2 Brief

Description:

RRP B #I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE PCOM Recognizes/reports AR-102-GO5 Recirc Pump B SEAL STAGE HI-LO FLOW Monitors seal cavity pressures on SIP PANEL 1 C652 and diagnoses #1 (lower) seal failed us II I

I Monitors seal cavity temperature for trend on 1 C614 Directs continuous monitoring for changes in leakage rate and containment parameters Refers to ON-164-003, RRP DUAL SEAL FAILURE, and briefs crew on actions if second stage seal failure and potential for single loop operations II I

I Monitors DWEDT level recorder for a change in leakage rate on 1 C601 Monitors Containment radiation levels on Panel 1 C693 Notifies Work Week Manager and System Engineer of Recirc pump seal failure II I

I

Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 19 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 20 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

2 Brief

Description:

RRP 'B' #I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

After the 3 symmetrical rods have been inserted, initiate the RRP 'B' #I (lower) seal failure malfunction by depressing:

[P-4]IMF RRl64003B (NONE 0 0) 5 45:OO 0 RRP 'B' #I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE Monitor seal parameters on RR4.

ROLE PLAY:

As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 20 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 21 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

3 Brief

Description:

A Reactor Feedpump High Vibration TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES 0

0 Determine A RFP vibration at 4 mils Respond to High Vibration alarm, AR-101-A16 Observe A RFP parameters by changing panel display to A feed pump.

Directs entry into OP-145-001 to remove the 1A RFP from service.

0 Enters OP-145-001, Section 2.6 0

0 0

Directs Shift Technical Advisor to SELECT Feedwater venturies as input to PlCSY Core Thermal Power Heat Balance Directs removal of Hydrogen Injection String IAW OP-145-002 Places A RFP speed control in manual Slowly Adjusts RX FEED PUMP A RECIRC FLOW FIC-10604A in MANUAL to - 40% demand Lowers A RFP Speed using speed controller (SIC-C32-1 R601) until RFP discharge pressure is 100 psig below RPV pressure Throttles FV-10604A using RX FEED PUMP A RECIRC FLOW FIC-10604A in MANUAL to maintain RFP A FLOW FI-I 0604A indication greater RFP A MIN FLOW SET PT FI-I 061 2A indication.

Close Disch Is01 Valve (HV-10603A).

Close Startup Is01 Valve (HVI 0651A)

Monitors RPV water level.

Lower Speed to LLS Trip the A RFP After the feed pump is tripped, proceed to the next event.

Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

(1) Ensure the Surrogate US directs Murphy to remove the RFPT from service.

(2) After the feed pump is tripped, proceed to the next event.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 21 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R i 1-3

Page 22 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

3 Brief

Description:

"A" REACTOR FEEDPUMP HIGH VIBRATION.

AFTER the lower seal failure has been addressed, initiate a vibration of 4 mils on the A" Reactor Feed pump by depressing:

[PB 51: IMF FWl45007A 4 10 0 "A" RFP High Vibration (4 mils ramped over 10 seconds)

Note: As A RFP speed is lowered, vibration may be modified 3 mils, but returned to 4 in order to force the crew to remove the pump from service.

ROLE PLAY:

As the NPO dispatched to the A Feedwater Pump observe the following:

Feed Pump sounds a lot noisier than usual, but all other indications are normal.

As FUS, report vibrations are real, and highly recommend removal of RFPT promptly to prevent any further damage Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 22 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 23 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

4 Brief

Description:

RRP '6' #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE / DUAL SEAL FAILURE POSITION

~

PCOM us PCOM NOTE 1 NOTE 2 TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Recognizes/reports RECIRC PUMP B SEAL LEAKAGE HI FLOW

~

Refers to AR-102-GO4, reports RECIRC PUMP B SEAL LEAKAGE HI FLOW Refers to AR-102-G03, reports RECIRC PUMP MOTOR HI TEMPERATURE Directs implementation of ON-I 64-003, RRP DUAL SEAL FAILURE Directs PCOP to monitor Drywell parameters Directs PCOP to calculate RCS leakage Directs the shutdown and isolation of RRP 'B' Refers to TS 3.4.4, RCS Operational Leakage Notifies Reactor Engineering and Plant Management of intent to S/D and isolate RRP 'B'

~

Complies with COLR Section 8.0 Limits in TRM

~

Complies with Tech Spec LCOs 3.4.1

~ _ _ _

~

Refers to ON-164-003, RRP DUAL SEAL FAILURE:

1,

2.

3.

4.

Trips Recirculation Pump 1 P401A(B)

Plots position on Power/Flow Map, Form NDAP-QA-0338-10 Verifies operating pump speed to 80% rated pump speed (80% = 1344 rpm)

Isolates Recirc pump 1P401A(B) by closing following valves in the specified order:

RECIRC PUMP B SUCT HV-143-FO23B RWCU SUCT LOOP B HV-144-F106 Place MOV OL BYPS to TEST RECIRC PUMP B DSCH HV-143-FO31B RECIRC PUMP B DSCH BYPS HV-143-FO32B

5.

Recognizeslreports the loss of position indication on suction valve HV-143-FO23B

6.

After 2 minutes, returns MOV OL BYPS HV-143-F031 B keyswitch to NORMAL CRD WTR SUPPLY TO RRP B SEAL WATER IS0 VLV 143F008B

Denotes Critical Task I/

NOTES:

I (1 ) The crew should continue with isolation of RRP 'B' as directed in ON-1 64-003.

11 1

(2) Per AR-102-G03, if Seal Cavity temperature reaches 200°F, the pump should be tripped.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 23 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rl l-3

Page 24 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

4 Brief

Description:

RRP B #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE I DUAL SEAL FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

1. When the crew has completed tripping of A RFP, insert the RRP B #2 (upper) seal failure by depressing:

[P-61 IMF RRl64004B 10 1O:OO 0 B RECIRC PUMP #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE 10 GPM NOTE: Inserting the previous malfunction will slowly raise Drywell pressure and eventually require a manual reactor scram.

2. When the RO attempts to close Recirc suction valve HV-I43F023B, verify trigger E5 initiates:

MMF RR164004B 50 1:OO IMF MVOI:HV143F0236 (NONE 30 0)

RRP B #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE 50 GPM LOSS OF POWER TO 1 F023B MOV

3. When directed, close CRD WTR SUPPLY TO RRP B SEAL WATER IS0 VLV 143F0088 by depressing:

[P-71 MRF RR164041 CLOSE ISOLATE CRD SEAL PURGE TO B RECIRC PUMP

4. Monitor Instructor Display RR4 for Seal Purge Valve position.

ROLE PLAY:

As Plant Operator sent to check the status of the Recirc suction valve breaker ( I B24601 I),

report the breaker is tripped. If directed to reset the breaker, report the breaker will not reset.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 24 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 25 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

596 Brief

Description:

LOCA INSIDE DRYWELL I HPCl AUTO START FAlLURElTRlP STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports DW pressure is increasing at a faster rate May Enter ON-100-101 SCRAM, SCRAM IMMINENT and directs scram imminent actions before scramming Directs manual Reactor scram before Drywell pressure reaches 1.72 Enters EO-I 00-1 02, RPV CONTROL May Transfer Aux Buses 1 1A and 1 1 B to Tie Bus if Scram Imminent actions were entered.

Manually scrams Reactor:

1. Places Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN

2. Verifiedreports all rods fully inserted Inserts SRMs and IRMs Aligns FW for Startup Level Control Reports Drywell pressure >I.72 psig Recognizes/reports HPCI failed to start, attempts component by component start of HPCl and reports HPCI trips on start up and cannot be recovered.

Recognizes/reports D/G 'C' has failed to start; selects lsoch and presses start pushbutton, recognizes reports D/G 'C' starts then trips

~

Verifies ESW cooling to D/Gs Initiates RClC injection to maintain +I 3" to +54" if Feed and Condensate trip on Plant Aux Load Shed Directs RPV water level control +13" to +54" with RCIC and CRD Directs RPV pressure control e1087 psig with Bypass Valves NOTES:

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 25 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R l l - 3

Page 26 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

5, 6 Brief

Description:

LOCA INSIDE DRYWELL I HPCl AUTO START FAILURE/TRIP INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

NOTE: After the reactor scram Drywell pressure increases more rapidly as leakage rate increases.

1. When the Mode Switch is placed in shutdown, ensure trigger E6 actuates to insert the bottom head drain line leak:

IMF RR164010 1 30 BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK

2. When HPCl is started component by component, ensure trigger E l actuates to insert a HPCl turbine trip when flow is greater than 2000 gpm:

IMF HP152015

3. Ifwhen requested to attempt a local start of 'C' D/G, wait =2 minutes then transfer D/G 'C' to LOCAL by inserting IOR QD143CMC LOCAL D/G 'C' TO LOCAL ROLE PLAY:

1, As NPO sent to DIG 'C' to attempt a local start, after transferring to local call the control room and report the local start was not successful.

2. As Electrical Maintenance dispatched to DIG 'C', wait =5 minutes and report no cause for the failure can be located and we will continue to investigate.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 26 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R l l - 3

Page 27 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 POSITION us SCENARIO EVENT FORM TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs local start of D/G 'C' Directs cooldown at < I OO°F/hr Event No:

7989 9 Brief

Description:

DIG FAILS TO START I LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER I 1A201 BUS LOCKOUT PCOP

~~

~~~~

Enters EO-I 00-1 03, Primary Containment Control Directs placing one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray Contacts Work Week manager to investigate failure of D/G 'C' Ensure Murphy assists in PCOP activities as can be reasonably performed Dispatches NPO to attempt local start of D/G 'C' Recognizes/reports Loss of Offsite Power Recognizes 4KV Bus I N 0 1 BUS LOCKOUT PCOP II Starts CRD pump 'B' as directed Maintains RPV pressure <I 087 psig with SRVs Verifies available low pressure ECCS pumps start when level drops below -1 29" Transitions to Fuel Zone Level indication when wide range level drops below -145" Reports corrected Fuel Zone RPV level is < -161" 1 Reports 4KV Buses 1 B and 1 D are energized I Directs a IC601 walk down for Isolations, ECCS Initiations, and D/G starts II 7

I Directs restarting CRD pump ' B Directs maintaining RPV pressure < I 087 psig with SRVs Contacts TCC and Electrical Maintenance to investigate the loss of power ll

Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 27 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 28 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES I

Event No:

7, & 9 Brief

Description:

D/G FAILS TO START / LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER / I N 0 1 BUS LOCKOUT INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

After Drywell pressure exceeds 1.72 psig and RClC has been initiated to restore and maintain RPV level, insert a LOOP and a 1A BUS LOCKOUT by depressing:

[P-81 bat DSB.LOOPT21

[P-91 IMF DS104001A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER 1A ESS BUS LOCKOUT When the crew completes the assessment of the electric plant lineup, increase the leakage from the RPV.

[P-IO] MMF RR164010 100 4100 1 INCREASE BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAKAGE to 100%

ROLE PLAY:

As TCC contacted for offsite power information, report a breaker failure in the Montour switchyard is responsible for loss of the 230 KV line.

The 230-500 KV tie line has Supervisory Information that indicates a fault on AutoTransformer T-21. Hazleton Dispatch reports sending a crew to the 230 KV switchyard to investigate why the 230 KV breakers 1 W and 1 T failed to auto re-close.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 28 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R11-3

Page 29 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

10 Brief

Description:

RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION Surrogate SRO Directs Depressurization

PCOPlM E

TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -1 61 inches.

1. Enters EO-100-1 12, RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION.

2. Directs preventing uncontrolled Condensate injection.

3. Verifies Suppression Pool level > 5 feet.

4.

Directs opening all ADS SRVs.

5. Verifies all ADS SRVs are open.

6. Directs maximizing ECCS injection to restore RPV level > -161" Performs Rapid Depressurization by opening all ADS SRVs.

1. Arms and depresses Division 1 and/or Division 2 ADS manual pushbuttons and verifies 6 red lights lit for ADS solenoids, g

2. Places individual control switch to open for each ADS SRV (G, J, K, L, M, & N) and verifies red light lit and amber light not lit for each valve solenoid.

3. Verifies 6 ADS SRVs are open:

0 0

Observes RPV pressure decrease.

4. Verifies Core Spray and LPCl injection valves open when RPV pressure decreases to

~ 4 2 0 psig.

5.

Reports Core Spray and LPCl injection flow to the RPV.

6.

Restores RPV level above -161" with low-pressure ECCS injection systems.

Transfers to wide range level indication when fuel zone indication is >-I I O "

Observes 6 ADS SRVs open on acoustic monitor status light indication.

Observes elevated tail pipe temperatures on TRS-B21-1 R614.

Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 29 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R11-3

Page 30 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

10 Brief

Description:

RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

As necessary ROLE PLAY:

As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 30 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rl l-3

Page 31 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

8 Brief

Description:

RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION POSITION us PCOP TIME

us NOTE: 1

PCOP us I

Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs throttling injection to restore and maintain RPV level +I 3" to +54" Directs Core Spray injection for RPV level control Directs placing 'B' loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray Places one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray IAW OP-149-004, RHR CONTAINMENT SPRAY.

1. Places ESW in service.

2. Places LOCA OVERRIDE MANUAL OVERRIDE switch to OVERRIDE.

3. Closes LPCl injection valve HV-151 -F017B.

4. Opens Suppression Chamber test valve HV-151 -F028B.

5. Starts RHR pump IP202B(D).

6. Throttles open Suppression Chamber spray valve HV-151-FO27B to maintain 5 500 gpm as indicated on FI-15120B.

7. Places RHRSW in service to RHR heat exchanger B.

Directs securing Suppression Chamber sprays before Suppression Chamber pressure drops to 0 psig.

Secures Suppression Chamber sprays before Suppression Chamber pressure drops to 0 psig.

Throttles closed Suppression Chamber spray valve HV-151 -F027B.

After the scenario is complete, classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY under EAL FSI due to a Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier and a Loss of the RCS Barrier.

NOTES:

(I)

Depending on the timing sequence of operator actions, it is possible to exceed the SAT curve, and require RPV flooding. If this occurs, the 2"d critical task will be to establish

> 81 psid flooding pressure. (I of 3 crews that validated this scenario crossed the SAT curve and required RPV flooding).

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 31 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 32 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

10 Brief

Description:

RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

N/A ROLE PLAY:

As necessary TERM I NATlO N CUE:

The Reactor is depressurized, RPV level is restored +I 3" to +54",

and containment control actions are being addressed in accordance with EO-1 00-103 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.

EVENT CLASSIFICATION:

After the Scenario is complete, have the US classify the scenario for the HIGHEST EAL. Provide the US with any requested information needed to perform the classification.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 32 of 32 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

~

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

SSES Scenario No.: ILO-502A (SRO)

Op-Test No.:

Examiners :

Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 at 51 % power EOL, Unit 2 is at 100% power..

Turnover: Startup Bus 10 is currently supplied from Startup Bus 20 with Tie Breaker OA10502 closed The shift will be directed to restore the electric plant lineup to normal by transferrinq Startup Bus 10 to Startup Transformer IO. Following restoration of the electric plant lineup, the crew will continue with power ascension by pullinq control rods and raise power 40%. Standby Liquid Control Pump 1 B is inoperable while maintenance investiqates a hish motor vibration.

Event Malf.

Event No. I No. I Type*

I N

3 1

Event Description Transfer SUB 10 to SUT 10 Increase Reactor Power Loss of,IY125 Instrument Bus Steam Leak Detection Failure / HPCl Isolation Loss of Instrument Air Recirc Loop B Suction Line Break Auto ADS Logic Failure Rapid Depressurization LPCl Injection Valve HV-FO15B Fails to Auto-Open RPV Flooding

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 NRC RE-Exam Rev. 2 Susquehann; I Facsimile

PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER SIMULATOR SCENARIO Scenario

Title:

ILO CERTIFICATION / NRC EXAM SCENARIO Scenario Duration:

90 Minutes Scenario Number:

ILO-502A II RevisionlDate:

Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 Course:

PCOO71PCOO8, Initial License ROlSRO Certification Examination PCOl7/PCOI 8, Initial License ROlSRO NRC Examination Operational Activities:

I. Transfer SUB 10 to SUT 10

6. Recirc Loop B Suction Line Break

2. increase Reactor Power

7. Auto ADS Logic Failure

3. Loss of Instrument Bus 1Y125

8. Rapid Depressurization

4. Steam Leak Detection Failure / HPCl

9. LPCl Injection Valve HV-F015B Fails to Isolation Auto-Open

5. Loss of Instrument Air I O. RPV Flooding Prepared By:

Reviewed By:

Approved By: II Instructor Nuclear Operations Traininn Supervisor Supervising ManagerEhif? Supervisor 0 1/22/05 Date Date Date Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 1 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3 Rev. 2 Page 76 of 76 NTP-31.5 OPERATIONSflRAINING APPROVAL OF INITIAL LICENSE OPERATOR CERTIFICATION EXAMINATION AND NRC LICENSE EXAMINATION MATERIALS The Douglas Murphy NRC Re-Exam in ation (Exam Name) exam materials have been designed, developed, and validated in accordance with the guidance provided in NTP-31.5, Initial License Operator Certification and NRC License Examination Development. The Validation process of this procedure utilizes extensive Training and Operations subject matter expertise. By utilizing this expertise throughout the design, development, and validation of these materials, Training and Operations management have a high level of confidence that these materials will provide the intended job relevant evaluation.

Therefore, Training and Operations management approve these materials for use on the Douglas Murphy NRC Re-Examination (Exam Name)

Exam.

Form NTP-31.5H Rev. 0, (01/05)

Page 1 of 1

Page 2 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 2 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R I I - 3

Page 3

Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 It SCENARIO

SUMMARY

1 1

Unit 1 is approximately 51% power and Unit 2 is at 100% power. Power ascension was suspended to allow Electrical Maintenance to perform an inspection of Startup Transformer 10 following a report of a small oil leak. Startup Bus 10 is currently supplied from Startup Bus 20 with Tie Breaker OAl0502 closed.

Electrical Maintenance has successfully completed the repair and inspection of Startup Transformer 10.

The shift will be directed to restore the electric plant lineup to normal by transferring Startup Bus 10 to Startup Transformer I O.

Standby Liquid Control Pump 1 B is inoperable while maintenance investigates a high motor vibration.

Following restoration of the electric plant lineup, the crew will continue with power ascension by pulling control rods to raise power approximately 10%.

After Reactor power has been raised with Control Rods, breaker 1 D624030 will trip open, resulting in a loss of power to Inverter ID125 which subsequently provides power to Instrument Bus 1Y125. This will require the crew to implement ON-I 17-001, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS 1 Y125, section 3. I O. The crew will be directed to transfer instruments to ALTERNATE Instrument power. The crew may augment their investigation through the use of ON-145-004 RPV WATER LEVEL ANOMALY in order to determine the power source for the instruments. Technical Specifications for PAM Instrumentation will have to be addressed due to the loss of Division 2 of SPOTMOS and RPV Water Level instruments.

When ALTERNATE power has been re-established for the 1Y125 Instruments, a failure in the HPCl Steam Leak Detection System causes the HPCl Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve HV-155-F003 to automatically close, making the HPCl system inoperable. HPCl will not be restored for the remainder of the scenario. Technical Specifications for HPCl INOPERABLE as well as PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION will have to be addressed.

After the Steam Leak Detection problem, the Instrument Air header will develop a leak. The leak will be unisolable and worsen over time. The crew will implement ON-I 18-001, Loss of Instrument Air and manually scram the Reactor before Instrument Air header pressure reaches 65 psig. Due to the design of the Condensate and Feedwater valves, the loss of IA prevents feed to the RPV and recirculates flow back to the main Condenser. Additionally, RPV pressure control will be limited to the SRVs. Main Turbine BPV will be available until the air-operated outboard MSIVs fail closed. MSL drains may be used to augment pressure control up to the point when RPV level reaches -129. At that point MSL drains will auto isolate.

Following the manual scram and stabilization of plant parameters, a small Recirc loop suction line break will occur requiring the crew to implement EO-I 00-1 03, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL. Shortly after the crew initiates Suppression Chamber Spray, the leak will increase in size and will eventually require the crew to perform EO-100-1 12 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION due to water level reaching TAF.

The combination of high Drywell temperature and low RPV pressure causes violation of the RPV Saturation Temperature Curve, requiring the crew to perform EO-I 00-1 14, RPV FLOODING. Additionally, Fuel Zone water level may decrease below the useable value limit of -290 which also requires entry into RPV Flooding. The injection valve on the B loop of RHR will fail to auto-open, requiring the crew to manually open the valve in order to achieve flooding pressure.

The scenario will be terminated when the crew has established RPV pressure 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber Pressure.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 3 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 4 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 Page 4 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3

Page 5 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 I

SCENARIO OBJECTIVES The objective of this scenario is to evaluate the licensed operator candidates ability to respond to the scenario events. These events will require each candidate to demonstrate the following:

Knowledge of integrated plant operations 0

Ability to diagnose abnormal plant conditions 0

Ability to work together as a team 0

Ability to mitigate plant transients that exercise their knowledge and use of ONs and EOPs Ability to utilize Technical Specifications (SRO Only)

To meet this objective, the licensed operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency in the following competencies:

Reactor Operator Candidates:

1, Interpret/diagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings

2. Comply with and use procedures, references, and Technical Specifications

3. Operate the control boards

4. Communicate and interact with other crew members Senior Reactor ODerator Candidates:

1. Interpret/diagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings

2. Comply with and use procedures and references

3. Operate the control boards (N/A to upgrade candidates)

4. Communicate and interact with the crew and other personnel

5. Direct shift operations

6. Comply with and use Technical Specifications Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 5 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R l l - 3

Page 6

Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I

11 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 6 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 7 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 I

CRITICAL TASKS Jr Perform Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -161 inches Safety Significance RPV leakage or loss of injection systems impacts the ability to provide continued adequate core cooling through core submergence based on inventory loss.

Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions will result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.

SSES EOP Basis for:

The following steps provide the operating crew guidance to line up injection systems as available to maintain level >-129. If these actions are unsuccessful, the crew receives additional direction when it is determined that level can not be maintained above TAF.

RC/L-4 RC/L-5 RC/L-10 RC/L-11 RC/L-13 RESTORE AND MAINTAIN LVL BETWEEN

+13 AND +54 USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS IF LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > +13 AUGMENTING AS DESIRED WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS MAINTAIN LVL > -129 USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS IRRESPECTIVE OF VORTEX LIMITS WITH TABLE 3 SYSTEMS PERFORM ALL 1

LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2

STARTPUMPS 3

INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX IF LESS THAN 2 TABLE 4 SUBSYSTEMS CAN BE LINED UP COMMENCE LINING UP AS MANY AS POSSIBLE TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS PERFORM ALL:

1 LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2

STARTPUMPS 3

INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 7 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 8 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 I1 CRITICAL TASKS II RC/L-16 WHEN LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > -161 GO TO RAPID DEPRESS Rapid Depressurization is not initiated until RPV water level has dropped to -161 (TAF) because:

Adequate core cooling exists so long as RPV water level remains above -161 (TAF).

The time required for RPV water level to decrease to -161 (TAF) can best be used to line up and start pumps, attempting to reverse the decreasing RPV water level trend before Rapid Depressurization is required to assure continued adequate core cooling.

(

Reference:

SSES-EPG C1-4 and second override before C3-I)

Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Reactor water level trending downward, eventually indicating less than the top of active fuel height on the Fuel Zone Level Indicator.

Performance Criteria Perform a Rapid Depressurization per EO-I 00-1 12 when water level reaches the TAF -1 61 as read on the Fuel Zone Instrument.

Initiate ADS / Manually Open all 6 ADS valves Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise on the Fuel Zone and Wide Range level instruments.

Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure and rising reactor water level.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 8 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 9 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 CRITICAL TASKS il Sr Declare RPV level indication indeterminate due to violation of the RPV Saturation Curve

Perform RPV Floodincr when RPV level becomes indeterminate by increasinq injection flowrate to raise RPV pressure to 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure

Manually open RHR F015B valve to iniect to the RPV (Division 2 RHR is needed forinjection and the injection valve fails to auto open)

Safety Significance Adequate core cooling may be challenged if core submergence can not be verified due to indeterminate RPV level indication.

Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions may result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.

SSES EOP Basis for:

RCIL-2 IF LVL CANNOT BE DETERMINED GO TO RPV FLOODING If RPV water level cannot be determined, the actions specified in the subsequent [E0-102]

steps cannot be performed since RPV water level and water level trend information is required for determining which actions to take. The transition to EO-100-1 14, RPV Flooding, is necessary to assure continued adequate core cooling under conditions where RPV water level cannot be determined.

RF-12 COMMENCE AND IRRESPECTIVE OF VORTEX LIMITS INCREASE INJECTION TO ESTABLISH:

RPV PRESS NOT DECREASING RPV PRESS 2 81 PSlD ABOVE SUPP CHMBR PRESS USING ANY:

AND CORESPRAY COND CRD MAXIMIZED LPCl WITH FLOW THROUGH HX ASAP FIRE SYSTEM IAW ES-013-001 RHRSW X-TIE FROM EITHER UNIT Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 9 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 10 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 CRITICAL TASKS II ECCS KEEP-FILL CRD X-TIE TO OTHER UNIT 0

RHR SDC SUCTION FILL 0

SLC BORON TANK SLC DEMIN X-TIE These systems consist of all motor-driven systems which are available to flood the RPV. As many of these systems as necessary must be used to establish and maintain the conditions required to verify RPV flooding. Establishing adequate core cooling conditions dictates that adherence to Vortex limits not be required.

Three conditions must be satisfied to verify RPV flooding without direct indication of RPV water le vel:

I. At least 4 SRVs must be open. This ensures that adequate steam flow will exist for cooling any un-submerged portion of the core when RPV pressure is 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.

2. RPV pressure must E t be decreasing. This ensures that the required steam flow will be maintained.

3. RPV pressure must be greater than Suppression Chamber pressure by at least 8 1 psid, the Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure (MRFP).

The MRFP is defined to be the lowest differential pressure between the RPV and the Suppression Chamber at which steam flow through 4 SRVs is sufficient to remove decay heat. The assumed decay heat generation rate is ten minutes after shutdown from full power. Since ten minutes is the earliest that RPV flooding could reasonably be expected to be needed, establishing and maintaining RPV pressure above the MRFP assures that more than enough steam flows through the SRVs to carry away all core decay heat.

This requires that a sufficient quantify of water reach the core to carry away decay heat by boiling, which in turn requires that RPV water level increase. Maintaining this above the minimum pressure (81 psid) assures that the RPV will ultimately flood to the main steam lines.

Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Violation of the RPV Saturation Curve is indicated by PlCSY format (RPVSAT) showing purple indication on the curve, plot on the unsafe side by the Crew and/or RPV level instrumentation failing in the upscale direction.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 10 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 11 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 II CRITICAL TASKS II Performance Criteria Recognize failure of RPV level indicators due to reaching saturation conditions on the instrument runs, initiate rapid depressurization by opening ADS valves and then increasing RPV injection until RPV pressure is NOT decreasing and is 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.

Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise to the point that RPV pressure will increase to a value that is 81 psid above Suppression Chamber. At this point injection should be stabilized to maintain the DP.

Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure.

Verify injection from available systems raises RPV pressure to a value that is 81 psid above Suppression Chamber.

Denotes Simulator Critical Task Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 11 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R l l - 3

Page 12 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I

i1 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 12 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 13 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO REFERENCES

1. TRANSFER STARTUP BUS 10 TO STARTUP TRANSFORMER 10 OP-003-00 1 13.8KV COMMON ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, REV. 6

2. INCREASE REACTOR POWER CORE REACTIVITY CONTROL BOOK GO-1 00-002 0 P-AD-3 38 PLANT STARTUP, HEATUP AND POWER OPERATION, REV. 46 COMMU N ICATION REQU I REMENTS FOR REACTIVITY MAN I PU LATIONS, REV. 1

3. LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS 1Y125 ON-I 17-001 TS 3.3.3.1 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS, REV. 24 PAM INSTRUMENTAION, AMMENDMENT 178

4. STEAM LEAK DETECTION FAILURE / HPCl ISOLATION AR-114-COZ AR-114-F05 AR-114-BO5 TS 3.5.1 TS 3.3.6.1 HPCl TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID ENERGIZED, REV. 23 HPCl LEAK DETECT LOGIC B HI TEMP, REV. 23 HPCl OUT OF SERVICE, REV. 23 ECCS OPERATING, AMMENDMENT 178 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION, AMMENDMENT 21 3

5. LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR AR-124-A01 AR-124-BO1 AR-124-EO1 ON-I 18-001 ON-1 00-1 0 1 INSTRUMENT AIR LOOP A LO PRESSURE, REV. 3 INSTRUMENT AIR HEADER LO PRESSURE, REV. 4 SERVICE AIR LO PRESSURE, REV. 4 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR, REV. 15 SCRAM, REV. 12

6. RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK / RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION / RPV FLOODING EO-I 00-102 EO-I 00-1 03 OP-149-004 RPV CONTROL, REV. 2 PRIMARY CONTRAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 7 RHR CONTAINMENT SPRAY, REV. 18 AR-112-DO3 AR-104-BO3 DRWL/SUPP CHAMBER HI-LOW PRESS, REV. 26 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HI-LO PRESS, REV. 19 EO-I 00-1 12 EO-1 00-1 14 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION, REV. 2 RPV FLOODING, REV. 3 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 13 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R l l - 3

Page 14 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 14 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rl l-3

Page 15 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 MALFS 3 : 3 I

SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS REMFS OVRDS TRIGS 10 2 : 2 1

1. Initialize the simulator to IC-I 6: Unit 1 at 51 % power EOL, Unit 2 at 100% power EOL.

2. Set up the simulator for the scenario by performing the following:

a. Remove SUT 10 from service.

Supply SUB 10 from SUB 20 with the Tie Breaker OA10502 closed.

Open SUT 10 MOAB 1 R105.

Transfer 4KV buses to SUB 20.

b. Perform GO-1 00-002 step 5.73.

c. Withdraw rod 42-47 (Step 539) from 12 to 36.

3. Take a snapshot to an available IC (currently IC-102).

4. Insert Auto exercise OPRMIS file to install OPRM program.

5. Type restorepref YPP.IL0-502

6. Place simulator in run and verify the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments.

7. Verify the Environment window:

MALFUNCTIONS MVO6:HVI 51 FOI 5B RLOI :B21C1 K5A RLOI : B21 C1 K5B REMOTE FUNCTIONS DB106723 OPEN OVERRIDES AN:AR106814 AN:ARI 06C15 TRIGGERS / ACTIONS E l IL0502MTGLO E l = MMF IAl18002 20 RHR INJ F015B FAILS TO AUTO OPEN DIV 1 ADS AUTO LOGIC FAILURE DIV 2 ADS AUTO LOGIC FAILURE BKR FOR 1 B SLC PUMP OPEN (Not associated with scenario setup)

(Not associated with scenario setup)

E l IS TRUE WHEN MTGLO PUMP STARTED INCREASES INSTRUMENT AIR LEAK RATE Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 15 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rl l-3

Page 16 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 II SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS II PROGRAM BUlTONS

[P-I] MRF DC102114 OPEN

[P-21

[p-31

[p-41

[p-51

[p-71

[P-61 POWER TO INVERTER 1D125/1Y125 OPEN IMF TH02:TEE41N24B 350 0 ASlS IMF IA118002 5 MMF IAI 18002 20 IMF RR16401 I B 0.5 300 MMF RR16401 I B 40 300 0.5 MMF RRI 6401 I B 5 120 40 TSH-E41-1N006B FAILS HIGH - HPCl AREA IA COMMON HEADER RUPTURE - 5%

IA COMMON HEADER RUPTURE - 20%

RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BRK - 0.5%

RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BRK - 40%

RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BRK - 5%

[P-231 bat FWB.IO1ALARM

[P-241 bat FWB.102 ALARM

[P-251 bat FWB.103 ALARM FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET

8. Verify LEFM is selected as the Feedwater flow input to PlCSY IAW 01-TA-021.

9. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:

a.

b.

C.

d.

e.

f.

g.

Unit 1 is at 51% power; Unit 2 is at 100% power EOL.

Power ascension on Unit 1 on hold to allow Electrical Maintenance to inspect Startup Transformer T I 0 following a report of a small oil leak.

Startup Transformer T I 0 was removed from service IAW OP-003-001 section 2.7 approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ago, Maintenance has now completed the inspection of Startup Transformer T10. All Clearances are closed.

Restore Startup Bus 10 to Startup Transformer 10 IAW OP-003-001 Section 2.8. The pre-job brief has been completed, personnel are in place to support this restoration.

DO NOT transfer 4Kv buses to normal lineup until Maintenance calls back and concurs with that activity.

When T10 is returned to service, continue with the power ascension by pulling Control Rods starting at GO-100-002 step 5.74, Startup Sequence 82 at step 540. Reactor Engineering is on site and available if needed.

1 B SLC pump O/S for Maintenance to investigate high motor vibration.

Common 0

A RW Chiller OIS C&D Collection Tank Discharge Valve failed to open. Solenoid is to be replaced by FIN under 575842.

e SCC D/G Generator Over Temperature alarm received during manual run. Waiting on procurement of parts.

10. Prepare an LCO sheet (TS 3.8.1) identifying that Startup Transformer 10 has been out of service for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months and a Repetitive Required Action Completion Sheet.

11. Prepare an LCO sheet (TS 3.1.7 and 3.3.6.1, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Function 5.e) identifying that SBLC has been out of service for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

12. Prepare a Loss of Safety Function Work Sheet for PClV Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 16 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R11-3

Page 17 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 EVENT TIME 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM DESCRIPTION TRANSFER SUB 10 TO SUT 10 INCREASE REACTOR POWER LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTER ID125 (FOR INSTRUMENT BUS 1Y125)

STEAM LEAK DETECTION FAILURE I HPCl ISOLATION LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE RAPID DEPRESSUIRZATION LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-FO15B FAILS TO AUTO-OPEN RPV FLOODING Initial Conditions: Initialize the Simulator to IC-102. Place the Simulator to RUN. Ensure the Program Buttons are assigned as indicated on the Special Instructions sheet via the appropriate Preference File. Assign Shift positions; direct the start of the 5-minute panel walkdown.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 17 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rl l-3

Page 18 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

132 Brief

Description:

TRANSFER SUB 10 TO SUT 10 I INCREASE REACTOR POWER POSITION us PCOP us PCOM PCOP TIME

Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES

~~

~

~~

Directs PCOP to transfer Startup Bus 10 to Startup Transformer I O.

~~

~

Implements OP-003-001, 13.8KV COMMON ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, Section 2.8.

1. Notifies Transmission Control Center.

2.

Closes MOAB 1R105.

3.

Places SU XFMR 10 TO BUS 10 SYNC SEL HS-00014 to ON.

4. Verifies SUT 10 and SUB 10 voltages are matched and in phase.

5. Closes breaker OA10301.

6. Verifies Tie Breaker OA010502 OPENS.

7.

Places SU XFMR 10 TO BUS 10 SYNC SEL HS-00014 to OFF.

8. Aligns all control switch flags to actual breaker position.

9.

Notifies Transmission Control Center SUT 10 is in service.

~

Directs continuing the power ascension with Control Rods.

Briefs the crew for the upcoming power increase.

Directs implementation of Reactor Engineer Instruction in the CRC Book.

~~

~~~

~ _ _

Directs the implementation of GO-100-102, PLANT STARTUP, HEATUP AND POWER OPERATION.

~~

~

~~

~

~~

Increases reactor power as directed by the US and CRC Book.

Plots power change on the power-to-flow map.

Maintains LOAD SET 4 00 MWe above existing load.

Notifies GCC before the power increase begins.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 18 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 19 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

192 Brief

Description:

TRANSFER SUB 10 TO SUT 10 I INCREASE REACTOR POWER INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

As necessary ROLE PLAY:

Transmission Control Center: ready to re-energize Startup Transformer I O ; all inspections in the Switchyard have been completed and power is available to Startup Transformer IO.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 19 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 20 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

3 Brief

Description:

LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTER ID125 (lY125 INSTRUMENT BUS)

POSITION PCOM/P us PCOP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports AR-107-C06, BIS SYS DIV 2 INOP ECCS/ESF SYS Reports AR-150-DO1 CONTN INSTR GAS SYSTEM Recognize and report loss of multiple instruments:

0 Post Accident Monitoring RPV Water Level 0

SPOTMOS Division 2 Directs PCO to perform ON-I 17-001, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS Section 3.10 Contacts Work Week Manaaer to provide assistance with investigation Refers to TS 3.3.3.1 table 3.3.3.1-1 Determines Reactor Vessel Level and Suppression Chamber Water Temperature required Channels are not met.

Enters CONDITION A. REQUIRED ACTION A.l:

Restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days Implements ON-1 17-001, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS Section 3.1 0:

(May implement ON-145-004 RPV WATER LEVEL ANOMALY to determine power source to RPV Level Instruments.)

Refer to Attachment N for functions/instrumentation lost and recommended actions.

Ensure 1 D624030 CLOSED.

Dispatch Operator to 1 D125.

Observe 1 D125 Master Unit Indicating Light ILLUMINATED.

Observe 1 D125 Slave Unit Indicating Light ILLUMINATED.

IF 1 D125 Indicating Lights EXTINGUISHED:

At 1C661-B1, PLACE HSE-112505 in ALTERNATE position.

At 1 C690B, PLACE HSE-112502 in ALTERNATE position.

At IC601-22B, PLACE HSE-112501 in ALTERNATE position.

Denotes Critical Task Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 20 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 21 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

3 Brief

Description:

LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTER ID125 (1Y125 INSTRUMENT BUS)

INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

After Reactor power is raised to = 60%, or when directed by Lead Examiner, insert a loss of power to Inverter 1 D125 by depressing:

[P-I] MRF DC102114 OPEN Open feeder breaker 1 D624030 ROLE PLAY:

1. As NPO dispatched to 1 D125, report that both Master and Slave Units are extinguished.

2. As NPO dispatched to 1 D624030, report that the breaker is tripped open.

3. If requested to re-close the breaker, report that the breaker will not re-close.

4. When dispatched to URR to 1C661-B1, PLACE HSE-112505 in ALTERNATE position by either:

0 0

MRF DBI 57002 ALTERNATE Go to Simulation Diagram DB17 and click on Transfer Switch to transfer to Alternate

5. As Work Week Manager, assemble team to diagnose problem, and take no further action.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 21 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 22 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

4 Brief

Description:

STEAM LEAK DETECTION FAILURE I HPCl ISOLATION STUDENT ACTIVITIES ReDorts HPCl LEAK DETECT LOGIC B HI TEMP, refers to AR-114-FO5.

ReDorts HPCl TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID ENERGIZED refers to AR-114-CO2.

Reports HPCI OUT OF SERVICE, refer to AR-114-B05.

Reports HPCl STM SUPPLY OB IS0 valve HV-155-FO03 is CLOSED.

Determines TSH-E41-I N600B is tripped and indicates 350°F.

Dispatches Plant Operator to HPCI Equipment Room to investigate potential high temperature condition, using appropriate safety precautions.

Contacts I&C to investigate TSH-E41-1 N600B.

Declares HPCl System inoperable.

Refers to TS 3.5.1, ECCS-Operating; determines Condition D applies.

REQUIRED ACTION D.l: Verify by administrative means RClC System is OPERABLE Immediately D.2: Restore HPCl System to OPERABLE status within 14 days Verifies RClC is OPERABLE by Administrative means.

Refers to TS 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation; determines Condition A applies.

REQUIRED ACTION:

A.l: Place channel in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Sr Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 22 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 23 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

4 Brief

Description:

STEAM LEAK DETECTION FAILURE I HPCl ISOLATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

After Instrument power has been restored, and upon direction from Lead Evaluator, initiate Steam Leak Detection failure and HPCl auto isolation by depressing:

[P-21 IMF TH02:TEE41N24B 350 0 ASlS TSH-E41-1N006B FAILS HIGH - HPCl AREA ROLE PLAY:

1. As Plant Operator sent to investigate HPCl Equipment Area, wait 2 minutes and report all conditions in the HPCl room are normal.

2. A I&C sent to investigate TE-E41-1 N600B, acknowledge the direction to investigate; no further actions will be taken.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 23 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. R l l - 3

Page 24 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

5 Brief

Description:

LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR 11 POSITION TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports lowering Instrument Air pressure.

Reports SERVICE AIR LO PRESS; refers to AR-124-EOI.

Reports INSTRUMENT AIR LOOP A LO PRESS; refers to AR-124-AOI.

Dispatches a Plant Operator to investigate IA system.

Implements ON-1 18-001, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.

Directs performance of ON-1 18-001, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR Directs/ensures PCOM to scram the Reactor when IA header pressure 2 65 psig.

Ensures local investigation of air system to determine severity of leak.

Ensures/Reduces Recirc flow to = 65 Mlbm/hr.

~~

Shifts Aux Buses 1 1 All I B to S/U Buses Enters EO-I 00-1 02, RPV CONTROL when RPV Level goes below 4.1 3.

Directs RPV level maintained + I 3 to +54" with available systems.

Directs RPV pressure stabilized 4 087 psig using available systems 0

For RPV Level Control, Condenseate and FW will not be available due to Air Operated valves failing open/closed such that feed is not directed to RPV. CRD, RCIC, LP ECCS and other secondary systems will be available.

For RPV Pressure Control, MT BPV will be available until OB MSlVs close, requiring use of SRVs in. May also use MSL drains until -1 2 9 isolation removes that capability.

0 Places Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN.

Performs actions of ON-100-101, SCRAM, SCRAM IMMINENT Inserts SRMs and IRMs

Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 24 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 25 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

5 Brief

Description:

LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

1. When the crew has completed addressing Steam Leak Detection System failure and HPCl Isolation, insert an instrument air leak by depressing:

[P-31 IMF IAl18002 5 IA COMMON HEADER RUPTURE - 5%

2. When the crew performs Scram Imminent Actions, verify trigger E l (TGOP pump started) fires to increase the severity of the IA leak, OR increase the severity of the rupture to 20% by depressing

[P4] MMF IAl18002 20 IA COMMON HEADER RUPTURE - 20%

ROLE PLAY:

1. As Plant Operator sent to IA, wait 2 minutes and report that all IA and SA compressors are running, the SA cross tie appears to be operating normally but IA pressure is slowly decreasing. If asked, inform the crew that I will investigate the system for a possible leak.

2. As Plant Operator sent to IA, report I have located a large air leak at the common IA header piping just downstream of the receivers; I do not see any way to isolate the leak, and header pressure is dropping rapidly.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 25 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 26 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

6, 7 Brief

Description:

RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK / AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE POSITION PCOP us PCOP us PCOP/M TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports increasing Drywell Pressure and Drywell Temperature.

~

EO-I 00-1 03, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.

Directs one loop of RHR placed in Suppression Chamber Spray Places one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray IAW OP-149-004, RHR CONTAINMENT SPRAY.

1. Places ESW in service.

2. Places LOCA OVERRIDE MANUAL OVERRIDE switch to OVERRIDE.

3. Closes LPCl injection valve HV-151-FO17A (B).

4. Opens Suppression Chamber test valve HV-151-FO28A (B).

5. Starts RHR pump 1 P202A(B)(C)(D).

6. Throttles open Suppression Chamber spray valve HV-151 -F027A (B) to maintain 5 500 gpm as indicated on FI-l5120A(B).

7. Places RHRSW in service to RHR heat exchanger A (B).

Reports rapidly decreasing RPV water level.

Re-enters EO-100-102 due to high Drywell pressure.

Directs injection with all available systems.

Attempts to maintain RPV water level + I 3 to +54 with available systems.

p~

I Verifies isolations, ECCSiitiations, and DG staGas directed Reports RPV water level is approaching/at -1 61.

Recognizes and reports ADS did not auto initiate.

Denotes Critical Task NOTES: I Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 26 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rl l-3

Page 27 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

6, 7 Brief

Description:

RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK /AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

When the crew scrams the Reactor and RPV water level is stable at +13 to +54, initiate a small break inside the primary containment by depressing:

[P-5] IMF RRI 6401 I B 0.5 300 RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK - 0.5%

After the crew has commenced Suppression Chamber Spray, increase the severity of the Recirc loop rupture to 40% by depressing:

[P-6] MMF RR164011B 40 300 0.5 RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK - 40%

ROLE PLAY:

As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 27 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rl l-3

Page 28 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

7, 8 Brief

Description:

AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE / RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION POSITION

us

PCOPlM TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -161 inches.

1. Enters EO-100-1 12, RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION.

2.

Directs preventing uncontrolled Condensate injection.

3. Verifies Suppression Pool level > 5 feet.

4.

Directs opening all ADS SRVs.

5. Verifies all ADS SRVs are open.

Performs Rapid Depressurization by opening all ADS SRVs.

1.

2.

3.

Arms and depresses Division 1 and/or Division 2 ADS manual pushbuttons OR Places individual control switch to open for each ADS SRV (G, J, K, L, M, & N) and verifies red light lit and amber light not lit for each valve solenoid.

Verifies 6 ADS SRVs are open by observing :

0 0

RPV pressure decrease.

Suppression Pool Temperature rise.

6 ADS SRVs open on acoustic monitor status light indication.

SRV Tailpipe temperatures rise on TRS-B21-1 R614.

Denotes Critical Task NOTES: I Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 28 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 29 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, It2212005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

7,a Brief

Description:

AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

As necessary ROLE PLAY:

As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)

Page 29 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. RII-3

Page 30 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 NOTES:

SCENARIO EVENT FORM NOTE 1: Fuel Zone level may decrease e-290 requiring entry into RPV Flooding.

Event No:

9,IO Brief

Description:

LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-FO15B FAILS TO AUTO-OPEN I RPV FLOODING POSITION us

us (Note 1)

us (Note 2) i

PCOP us us TIME Ir Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Plots Drywell Instrument Run Temperature and RPV Pressure on the SAT curve.

Declares RPV level indication indeterminate due to violation of the RPV Saturation Curve.

~~

Performs EO-100-1 14, RPV FLOODING Directs increasing injection to RPV in order to raise RPV Pressure 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.

Verifies:

0 0

MSlVs and MSL drains closed RClC isolation valves HV-149-F007 and HV-149-F008 closed Manually opens RHR F015B to inject to the RPV after identifying RHR F015B failed to auto-open.

Increases injection to raise RPV pressure to 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.

1. Ensures maximum injection from Core Spray and LPCl pumps.

2. Reports RPV pressure and Suppression Chamber pressure.

3. Controls injection flowrate to maintain RPV Flooding Pressure.

Determines RPV pressure 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.

Records time conditions are met.

Contacts TSC to enter EP-DS-003, RPV LEVEL DETERMINATION.

After the scenario is complete, classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY under EAL FSl due to a Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier and a Loss of the RCS Barrier.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 30 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rl l-3

Page 31 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 2, 1/22/2005 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

9, I O Brief

Description:

LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-FO15B FAILS TO AUTO-OPEN I RPV FLOODING INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

When the crew has commenced RPV flooding with RHR FOI 5B open, decrease the size of the Recirc rupture to allow achieving flooding pressure by depressing:

[P-7] MMF RRI64011B 5 120 40 RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK - 5%

ROLE PLAY:

As necessary TERMINATION CUE:

The crew has established injection to raise RPV Pressure 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber Pressure.

EVENT CLASSIFICATION:

After the Scenario is complete, have the US classify the scenario for the HIGHEST EAL. Provide the US with any requested information needed to perform the classification.

Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)

Page 31 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 2 File No. Rll-3

ML050460352

Text

Dear Mr. Caruso:

Response

Enclosures:

Title:

SUMMARY

Reference:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Title:

SUMMARY

Reference:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Navigation menu

Search