NL-04-126, License Amendment Request, Fuel Storage Building Single-Failure-Proof Gantry Crane

License Amendment Request, Fuel Storage Building Single-Failure-Proof Gantry Crane

ML043140282
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	11/01/2004
From:	Dacimo F Entergy Nuclear Northeast
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-04-126, TAC MB4739
Download: ML043140282 (33)

Text

Entergy Nuclear Northeast Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, Suite 1

.1 R0. Box 249 1intel / Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Fred Dacimo Site Vice President Administration November 1, 2004 Re: Indian Point, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 NL-04-126 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station O-Pl-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR) - Fuel Storage Building Single-Failure-Proof Gantry Crane

References:

1) Letter dated November 21, 2003 from USNRC to Mr. Michael Kansler Indian Point Generating Station Unit No.2 Amendment Re: Conversion to Improved Technical Specification (TAC No.

MB4739)

Dear Sir/Madam:

Entergy Nuclear Northeast Inc. (ENN) submits an amendment to the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 operating license DPR-26. The amendment would allow use of a new gantry crane, to be installed in the Unit 2 Fuel Storage Building, for moving spent fuel casks up to 110 tons into and out of the spent fuel pit. The crane and its associated handling system have been designed to meet the single-failure-proof requirements of NUREG-0612 and NUREG-0554. ENN has evaluated this change in accordance with the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 and concluded that there are no significant hazards considerations involved as discussed in Attachment 1.

Indian Point Unit 2 has a commitment currently in the Improved Technical Specification (Reference 1) which was transferred from Technical Specification 3.8.C.1. This statement requires; 'The spent fuel cask shall not be moved over any region of the spent fuel pit until the cask handling system has been reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and found to be acceptable". ENN requests approval of the license amendment by July 29, 2005. Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented within 30 days. This schedule allows a review by the NRC and supports Entergy's schedule for moving spent fuel into dry storage in October 2005.

There are commitments contained in this letter identified in Attachment 2. They pertain to implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612 with regard to the new Fuel AD1

Docket No.50-247 NL-04-126 Page 2 of 3 Storage Building gantry crane: (1) establishment of safe load paths; (2) development of procedures; (3) training and qualification of crane operators; (4) selection of special lifting devices; (5) selection of slings; and (6) inspection, testing and maintenance.

Pursuant to 28 USC 1746,1 declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on DObele,- 1, 2,04.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Patric Conroy, Manager, Licensing, at 914-734-6668.

Sincerely, Fred R. Dacimo Site Vice President Indian Point Energy Center Attachments:

1) LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST

2) NUREG-0612 General Guidelines Compliance

3) Ederer Topical Report EDR-1 (NP)-A, Appendices B and C

4) Structural Summary Report, Gantry Crane

5) Structural Summary Report, Anchorage System for Gantry Crane cc: See page 3

Docket No.50-247 NL-04-126 Page 3 of 3 cc: Mr. Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator - Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1498 Mr. Patrick D. Milano, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Licensing Project Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-8-C2 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Indian Point Unit 2 P.O. Box 59 Buchanan, NY 10511 Mayor, Village of Buchanan 236 Tate Avenue Buchanan, NY 10511 Mr. Paul Eddy State of NY Public Service Commission 3 Empire Plaza Albany, NY 12223-1350 Mr. William M. Flynn, President NYSERDA Corporate Plaza West 286 Washington Ave. Extension Albany, NY 12223-6399

ATTACHMENT 1 TO NL-04-126 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Fuel Storage Building Single-Failure-Proof Gantry Crane

Attachment I Docket No 50-247 NL-04-126 Page l of 7 Fuel Storage Building Gantry Crane Description and Analysis Description of the New Gantry Crane A new traveling single failure proof gantry crane with a design rated capacity of 110 tons will be installed in the IP-2 Fuel Storage Building (FSB). The crane will be used to move dry cask storage equipment into and out of the spent fuel pool. The crane design and associated handling equipment conform to the requirements of NUREG-0554, Single- Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants, and NUREG'0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants for heavy load lifts over the spent fuel pit. The new crane will be provided by Ederer LLC (Ederer) and is designed to lift the fully loaded Holtec HI-TRAC 100 spent fuel transfer cask and associated components. The FSB Gantry Crane will not handle the Holtec HI-Storm 100 Overpack and lid.

The NRC has approved the Ederer Generic Licensing Topical Report, EDR-1 (NP)-A, Revision 3, concerning the eXtra Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM) crane design confirming that it meets the requirements of NUREG-0554. Entergy decided to install the new FSB Gantry Crane since the existing 40-ton FSB overhead crane does not have the capacity to handle the HI-TRAC 100 spent fuel transfer cask. Ederer report references the requirements in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.104, which was replaced by NUREG-0554. NUREG-0612 does not require load drop consequence analysis for heavy loads handled by a crane that meets the single failure-proof guidance or NUREG-0554. The IP-2 FSB Gantry Crane information regarding the interfacing requirements is provided in Appendices B and C to the Ederer Topical Report in Attachment 3.

The current 40-ton FSB overhead crane is not single failure proof and is restricted from handling spent fuel casks over spent fuel in the spent fuel pit. The 40-ton crane will remain in place, however as it is utilized for other load handling activities in the FSB.

Background

1. Requirement for Submittal General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 specifies, in part, that structures, systems and components important to safety shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles, that may result from equipment failures. GDC 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," specifies, in part, that structures, systems and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes. GDC 61 Fuel Storage and handling and radioactivity control, Safe Section 9.1.5,

'Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems," of NUREG-0800, "NRC Standard Review Plan,"

references the guidelines of NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,"

and NUREG-0554, Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," for implementation of these criteria in the design of heavy load handling systems.

Attachment I Docket No 50-247 NL-04-126 Page 2 of 7 In a letter dated December 22, 1980, "Control of Heavy Loads' as supplemented by Generic Letter (GL) 81-07, "Control of Heavy Loads" dated February 3, 1981, the NRC requested that all licensees describe the extent to which the guidelines of NUREG-0612 were satisfied at their facilities and what additional modifications would be necessary to fully satisfy the guidelines. The IP-2 response to NRC's request to satisfy the Phase I guidelines of NUREG-0612 is dated June 22, 1981 (Reference 1). In the response it was stated that no specific type of spent fuel cask had yet been chosen to use and no heavy loads were planned to be moved by the Fuel Storage Building crane in the immediate future. Therefore, the Fuel Storage Building crane was not reviewed by the NRC staff in response to NUREG-0612 guidelines for handling spent fuel casks.

GL 85-11, 'Completion of Phase II of Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0612," dated June 28, 1985, dismissed the need for the NRC to review the Phase II responses received from licensees, based on the improvements observed during review of the Phase I responses. However, GL 85-11 encouraged licensees to implement actions they perceived to be appropriate to provide adequate safety.

In NRC Bulletin 96-02, "Movement of Heavy Loads over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," dated April 11, 1996, the NRC staff addressed specific instances of heavy load handling concerns and requested licensees to provide specific information detailing their extent of compliance with the guidelines and their licensing basis.

IP-2 responded to Bulletin 96-02 by letter dated July 12, 1996 (Reference 2). This letter reiterated the lack of current need to handle spent fuel casks over the spent fuel pit in the Fuel Storage Building and identified Technical Specification 3.8.C.1 as prohibiting the handling of a spent fuel cask without prior NRC review and approval. This requirement was relocated to the bases of Section 3.9.C in the Technical Requirements Manual during the conversion to Improved Technical Specifications.

2. Technical Analysis Background for Fuel Storage Building. Spent Fuel Pit and Current FSB Overhead Crane All systems and components of the IP-2 facility are classified according to their importance.

Those items vital to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor or whose failure might cause or increase the severity of a loss-of-coolant accident or result in an uncontrolled release of excessive amounts of radioactivity are designated Class I. Those items important to reactor operation but not essential to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor or control of the release of substantial amounts of radioactivity are designated Class II. Those items not related to reactor operation or safety are designated Class Ill.

The fuel storage building for IP-2 consists of the spent fuel pit constructed of reinforced concrete and founded on rock. The spent fuel pit is a Class I structure. The fundamental frequency of the pit is approximately 22 cps and therefore can be considered rigid. The steel superstructure above the pit encloses the pit and supports the existing 40-ton overhead crane. This superstructure was designed as a Class Ill structure. The FSB was evaluated and the building

Attachment I Docket No 50-247 NL-04-126 Page 3 of 7 superstructure was determined to be adequately designed to carry the seismic load defined for the site.

Spent Fuel Storage Pit The spent fuel storage pit is described in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 9.5.2.1.4.

It is designed for the underwater storage of spent fuel assemblies, failed fuel cans if required, and control rods after their removal from the reactor.

The spent fuel storage pit is constructed of reinforced concrete and is seismic Class I design.

This structure was analyzed to determine compliance with ACI-318(77), and SRP 3.8 of NUREG-0800. In addition to the mechanical loadings, the pool structure was also analyzed to include temperature-induced loadings.

The pit is lined with a leak-proof stainless steel liner. All welds were vacuum-box tested during construction to assure a leak tight membrane. The effect of a thermal gradient would be to compress the liner. A review of the stress factors resulting from the finite element analyses demonstrates that an adequate design margin exists for the spent fuel pit liner walls and basemat.

Storage racks are provided to hold spent fuel assemblies and are erected on the pit floor. Fuel assemblies are held in a square array, and placed in vertical cells. Fuel inserts are stored in place inside the spent fuel assemblies. An area of the pit is set aside for the placement of spent fuel casks.

New 11 0-Ton FSB Gantry Crane The installation of a new 110-ton Fuel Handling Building gantry crane will facilitate handling of the transfer cask for the Holtec HI-STORM 100 Cask System. The crane main hoist has a 110-ton capacity while an auxiliary hoist has a 45-ton capacity. Each hoist meets the single-failure-proof requirements of NUREG-0554. The new crane will allow the spent fuel cask handling process to proceed efficiently and with high load-handling reliability. The new crane will also allow removal of the existing restriction regarding moving spent fuel casks over the spent fuel pit as a result of the current 40-ton overhead crane not being single-failure-proof or being considered in the NUREG-0612 compliance review. As part of the installation of the new gantry crane, the FSB floor in the truck bay was modified to enable anchoring the crane. The modified floor was analyzed consistent with the loading due to the new crane.

In order to meet the single-failure-proof requirements of NUREG-0544 and the guidelines of NUREG-0612, design acceptance criteria are consistent with the IP-2 FSAR for safe shutdown earthquake loads. Standards and guides, which have been used for determining allowable stress limits and other acceptance criteria, are consistent with industry practice similar applications.

These include the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Manual 9th Edition, the Crane Manufacturers Association of America (CMAA) Specification No. 70 (2000), the American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318-02, "Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete," the

Attachment I Docket No 50-247 NL-04-126 Page 4 of 7 American Welding Society (AWS) D1.1 Standard, and the American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NOG-1-2002, "Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes."

The crane will utilize a gantry that can traverse a portion of the FSB truck bay and a cantilever girder-mounted trolley that extends to the spent fuel pit. The trolley will house an Ederer X-SAM hoist, which is a single-failure-proof design. The capacity of 110 tons is provided to lift the Holtec HI-TRAC 100 transfer cask planned for use at IP-2, which has a fully loaded weight of approximately 100 tons including the lifting device. An auxiliary hoist of 45-ton capacity is also provided to handle ancillary components associated with the HI-STORM 100 Cask System. The auxiliary hoist is also an Ederer X-SAM design.

NUREG-0612 Compliance With a single-failure-proof crane, the guidelines of NUREG-0612 for control of heavy loads are satisfied without additional actions, such as load drop analyses, beyond implementation of the general measures specified in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612. Attachment 2 discusses how the objectives and general guidelines of NUREG-0612 are satisfied following installation of the new gantry crane. Attachment 2 describes implementation of the general guidelines with regard to: (1) establishment of safe load paths; (2) development of procedures; (3) training and qualification of crane operators; (4) selection of special lifting devices; (5) selection of slings; (6) inspection, testing and maintenance of cranes; and (7) application of standards to crane design.

Administrative controls will continue to ensure that unauthorized movement of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool will be prevented for the existing 40-ton overhead crane.

NUREG-0554 Compliance In a letter dated August 26, 1983, the NRC staff approved Ederer's Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1 (NP)-A, 'Ederer's Nuclear Safety Related eXtra Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM)

Cranes," Revision 3 dated October 8, 1982, as an acceptable method of meeting the guidelines of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612. In accepting EDR-1 (NP)-A for reference in plant-specific licensing actions, the NRC staff noted that the acceptance applied only to the features described in the topical report, and did not constitute acceptance of the total crane handling system or the requirements which may be necessary to assure the safe application of the crane system within the nuclear power plant. The plant-specific information required, as identified in Appendices B and C of EDR-1 (NP)-A, is included in Attachment 3. Appendix B summarizes the plant specific crane data supplied by Ederer. Appendix C summarizes the regulatory positions to be addressed. The plant specific information relates to the design of the hoist, the adequacy of specific components, the response of the crane to potential component failures, and the test information demonstrating satisfactory performance of the overall crane.

Technical Evaluation of Structural Impacts Design criteria, loads and loading combinations, analytical methodology, and the acceptance criteria for the analytical results relate to the new gantry crane and supporting structure. The loading considered included various combinations of dead, live, lifted, impact, and seismic loads.

Attachment I Docket No 50-247 NL-04-126 Page 5 of 7 A summary report of the structural analysis of the new gantry crane, including interfaces with the floor anchorage system discussed below, is contained in Attachment 4.

The design of the new gantry crane includes a cantilevered girder for the main hoist trolley that will extend over the spent fuel pit cask laydown area. From the spent fuel pit the transfer cask is moved to the FSB truck bay where multi-purpose canister (MPC) drying, inerting and sealing activities occur prior to transferring the MPC to the HI-STORM 100 overpack. The gantry crane requires provisions to ensure stability against overturning. This is accomplished via a new floor anchorage system with fixed-in-place hold-down features that oppose crane uplift forces. A summary report of the structural analysis of the anchorage system is contained in Attachment 5.

The maximum critical load (MCL) is considered as the design rated load (DRL) for crane components. This load is 110 tons. Only the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) seismic load case has been evaluated. Since the IP-2 Fuel Storage Building is a Class IlIl structure it was not designed for OBE or SSE loads. SSE loads were considered in the design of the new crane and floor anchorage system so that conformance to NUREG-0612 and NUREG-0554 would be demonstrated. This is consistent with IP-2 FSAR Section 1.11.1 for seismic Class I structures.

3. Regulatory Analysis The new 110-ton Fuel Storage Building gantry crane will handle the HI-TRAC 100 transfer cask for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System. The crane meets the single-failure-proof requirements of NUREG-0554. As part of the installation of the new crane, a new floor anchorage system was designed to oppose uplift forces imposed by the crane cantilevered trolley. Entergy commits to implementing the general guidelines of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 and 5.1.6 as described in Attachment 2. These combined provisions satisfy NUREG-0612 guidance in assuring a heavy load handling system that is sufficiently reliable to preclude the consideration of load drops.

In order to meet the single-failure-proof requirements of NUREG-0554 and the guidelines of NUREG-0612, design acceptance criteria consistent with IP-2 FSAR Section 1.11.1 for seismic Class I components and structures as applied to the safe shutdown earthquake were used.

Standards and guides which have been used for determining allowable stress limits and other acceptance criteria are consistent with industry practice for similar applications. These include the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Manual 9t Edition, the Crane Manufacturers Association of America (CMAA) Specification No. 70 (2000), the American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318-02, "Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete," the American Welding Society (AWS) D1.1 Standard, and the American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

NOG-1-2002, "Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes."

The Ederer quality assurance (QA) program was invoked on the new gantry crane. The Ederer QA program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B and American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ASME NQA-1. The program encompasses the procurement of basic components from approved suppliers and the dedication of commercial-grade items by Ederer for use in safety related applications. This dedication was done in accordance with Electric Power Research Institute NP-5652, "Guideline for the Utilization of Commercial Grade

Attachment I Docket No 50-247 NL-04-126 Page 6 of 7 Items in Nuclear Safety Related Applications (NCIG-07)." Upon arrival on site, the Entergy Quality Assurance Program Manual will be invoked for the installation process using the engineering design change process. The gantry crane and trolley meet the NDE requirements as reflected in EDR-TOP-1 Appendix A, as applicable.

The new single-failure-proof handling system allows the spent fuel cask handling process to occur without significant restraints associated with handling of loads. It also allows for the removal of existing prohibitions regarding handling spent fuel casks over the spent fuel pit, No Significant Hazards Consideration Evaluation Entergy has determined that this proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10CFR 50.92(c), as discussed below:

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility, in accordance with the amendment, would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), Entergy provides its analysis below.

1. The proposed amendment would allow the use of the new IP-2 FSB gantry crane for loads up to 110 tons, and the new crane will prevent the load from being dropped given a single malfunction or failure of a portion of the crane. The handling of a loaded spent fuel cask is below the maximum load that the crane is designed to handle.

This change does not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated because the probability of a load drop is eliminated. The new crane system is designed in accordance with NUREG -0554 and Ederer's Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1 (NP)-A, that ifa portion of the crane lifting devices malfunctions or fails, the load will move a limited distance downward prior to backup restraints becoming engaged. The change does not increase the consequences of an accident.

Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The process for transporting a cask with the new crane is limited from the FSB truck bay floor to the cask pit area of the spent fuel pool. Once a cask is loaded with spent fuel, it is lifted from the spent fuel pit, and lowered into the truck bay. The cask is never carried over spent fuel in the spent fuel pit.

Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Attachment I Docket No 50-247 NL-04-126 Page 7 of 7

3. The IP-2 FSB gantry crane has been installed to comply with the single-failure-proof requirements of NUREG-0554 and NRC-approved Ederer Topical Report EDR-1, Revision 3, dated October 8, 1982. The installation provides additional load carrying capability up to 110 tons and additional safety features to prevent a cask drop. The safety margins provided by the new crane prevent failure of the crane or any lifting devices associated with it. The implementation of NUREG-0612 general guidelines for the FSB gantry crane provides further assurance that safe load paths, procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection and maintenance activities will be established to ensure crane operation is performed in a consistently reliable manner.

Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Conclusions Based on this evaluation, Entergy has concluded that the proposed change will not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously analyzed; will not result in a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed, and does not result in a reduction in any margin of safety, therefore, operation of Indian Point Unit No. 2 in accordance with the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration. In addition, both the Onsite Safety Review Committee (OSRC) and the Safety Review Committee (SRC) have reviewed the proposed change. Both committees concur that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Environmental Assessment An environmental assessment is not required for this proposed change because the requested change conforms to the criteria for "actions eligible for categorical exclusion," as specified in 10CFR51.22(c)(9). The requested change will have no impact on the environment. The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as discussed in the preceding section.

The proposed change does not involve a significant change in the types of significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite. In addition, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational exposure.

References

1. Letter dated June 22, 1981 from John D. O'Toole (Consolidated Edison) to Darrel G.

Eisenhut (NRC).

2. Letter dated July 12, 1996 from Stephen E. Quinn (Consolidated Edison) to USNRC, Response to NRC Bulletin 96-02, "Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety Related Equipment."

ATTACHMENT 2 TO NL-04-126 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Fuel Storage Building Single-Failure-Proof Gantry Crane NUREG-0612 General Guidelines Compliance

Attachment 2 Docket No. 50-247 NL-04-126 Pagel of 2 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Fuel Storage Building Gantry Crane Discussion of Compliance to NUREG-0612 General Guidelines - Section 5.1.1 To aid in assuring that the guidelines in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, General, are met, the following areas will be satisfied for handling heavy loads over the spent fuel pit with the IP-2 fuel storage building gantry crane. Since heavy load lifts over the spent fuel pit will be accomplished with a single-failure-proof handling system the additional guidelines of Section 5.1.6 are also considered.

1) Safe load oaths (Commitment No. 1)

The FSB gantry crane by design will be unable to move spent fuel casks over any area of the spent fuel pit where spent fuel is stored. Nonetheless, safe load paths will be determined, analyzed, and documented in procedures for control of heavy loads handled by the FSB gantry crane to minimize the potential for a heavy load impacting irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pit. There Isno safe shutdown equipment in the FSB. The load paths will be defined in procedures and shown on equipment layout drawings. Deviations from defined load paths will require written alternative procedures reviewed and approved in accordance with IP-2 procedures.

2) Procedures (Commitment No. 2)

Gantry crane operating procedures utilized for cask and cask component lifts will be prepared to include: identification of required equipment; Inspections and acceptance criteria required before load movement; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe load path; and other precautions. A specific cask loading and handling procedure will provide additional details for controlled movement during cask handling operations.

3) Crane operators (Commitment No. 3)

Crane operators receive training that includes the provisions of Chapter 2-3 of ANSI 830.2.0

- 1976. Inaddition, completion of a crane-specific on-the-job-training qualification card is required.

4) Special lifting devices (Commitment No. 4)

The HI-TRAC lifting yoke isthe only special lifting device that is required to meet the guidelines of ANSI-N14.6. Itcomplies with ANSI-N14.6-1993 and the additional guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(1)(a).

Attachment 2 Docket No. 50-247 NL-04-126 Page2 of 2

5) Lifting devices that are not specially designed (Commitment No. 5) i Other lift components, utilized with the HI-STORM 100 Cask System, meet ANSI-B30.9-1971 I

.1 requirements including the additional guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(1)(b).

jI

6) Crane inspection, test and maintenance (Commitment No. 6)

The FSB gantry crane will be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976 and the additional guidance contained in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(6) regarding frequency of inspections and test.

7) The crane should be designed to Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976 and to CMM 70 The FSB gantry crane is designed in accordance with the requirements of the Crane Manufacturers Association of America (CMAA Specification #70-2000) and NUREG-0554 for single-failure-proof cranes. Attachment 3 provides site specific information regarding compliance with the Ederer Generic Topical Report for single-failure-proof X-SAM cranes.

The design of the new crane follows the guideline of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(2).

Interfacing lift points The HI-TRAC 100 cask trunnions and other lift points for associated components comply with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(3). The HI-STORM 100 overpack and lid will not be handled by the FSB gantry crane.

ATTACHMENT 3 TO NL-04-126 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Fuel Storage Building Single-Failure-Proof Gantry Crane Ederer Topical Report EDR-1 (NP)-A Appendices B and C

EDR-1 APPENDDI B ElSUPPLEMENT Pagci APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT TO GENERIC LICENSING TOPICAL REPORT EDR-1

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C.2b III.C (C2.b) 1. THE MAXIMUM EXTENT OF LOAD MOTION AND THE MAIN HOIST WAS DESIGNED SUCH III.E.4 THE PEAK KINETIC ENERGY OF THE LOAD THAT THE MAXIMUM VERTICAL LOAD FOLLOWING A DRIVE TRAN FAILURE. MOTION FOLLOWING A DRIVE TRAIN FAILURE IS LESS THAN 1.5 FOOT AND THE MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY OF THE LOAD IS LESS THAN THAT RESULTING FROM ONE INCH OF FREE FALL OF THE MAXIMUM CRITICAL LOAD.

THE TRANSER HOIST WAS DESIGNED SUCH THAT THE MAXIMUM VERTICAL LOAD MOTION FOLLOWING A DRIVE TRAIN FAILURE IS LESS THAN 1.5 FOOT AND THE MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY OF THE LOAD IS LESS THAN THAT RESULTING FROM 2.5 INCHES OF FREE FALL OF THE MAXIMUM CRITICAL LOAD.

2. PROVISIONS FOR ACTUATING THE 2. PROVISIONS FOR AUTOMATICALLY EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE PRIORTO ACTUATING THE EMERGENCY DRUM TRAVERSING WITH THE LOAD, WHEN BRAKE PRIOR TO TRAVERSING WITH THE REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE THE LOAD LOAD ARE NOT REQUIRED SINCE USE OF MOTION FOLLOWING A DRIVE TRAIN FAILURE. EXISTING LOAD PATHS PREVENT LOAD TRAVERSING OVER SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT. THE LOAD WILL BE ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED TO MAINTAIN > 1.5 FEET WHEN TRAVERSING THE FLOOR.

O AND M MANUAL REVISION 0 EDERER LLC S. 0. NO. F-2725 V215103

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1-.Vwll-c.,;:.l EDR-I APPENDIX BSUPPLEMENr Pxp2 REG.GUIDE TOPICAL 1.104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POS1TION SECTION C.3.e III.C (C.3.e) 1. THE MAXIMUM CABLE LOADING FOLLOWING 1. THE MAXIMUM CABLE' LOADING A WIRE ROPE FAILURE IN TERMS OF THE FOLLOWING A WIRE ROPE FAILURE IN THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN MAIN AND TRANSFER HOISTS MEET THE SECTION IILC (Cl3e). MAXIMUM ALLOWED BY THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN SECTION IILC (C3.e).

C.3.f - 1. MAXIMUM FLEET ANGLE. 1. 3.5 DEGREES, MAIN AND TRANSFER HOISTS EXCEPT FOR THE LAST 3.0 FEET OF MAXIMUM LIFT.

2. NUMBER OF REVERSE BENDS. 2. NONE, OTHER THAN THE ONB BETWEEN THE WIRE ROPE DRUM AND THE FIRST SHEAVE IN THE LOAD BLOCK OF THE MAIN HOIST.

3. SHEAVE DIAMETER (MINIMUM) 3. 20 X WIRE ROPE DIAMETER, MAIN HOIST RUNNING SHEAVES.

C.3.h Ill.C (C.3.h) 1. THE MAXIMUM EXTENT OF MOTION AND PEAK 1. THE MAIN AND TRANSFER HOISTS WERE III.E.l I KINETIC ENERGY OF THE LOAD FOLLOWING A DESIGNED SUCH THAT THE MAXIMUM SINGLE WIRE ROPE FAILURE. LOAD MOTION FOLLOWING A SINGLE WIRE ROPE FAILURE IS LESS THAN 1.5 FOOT AND THE MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY OF THE LOAD IS LESS THAN THAT RESULTING FROM ONE INCH OF FREE FALL OF THE MAXIMUM CRITICAL LOAD.

C.3.i Il.C (C3.i) I. THE TYPE OF LOAD CONTROL SYSTEM 1. EDERER AC FLUX VECTOR, MAIN AND SPECIFIED BY THE APPLICANT. TRANSFER HOIST.

2. WHETHER INTERLOCKS ARE RECOMMENDED 2. THE CRANE WILL NOT BE USED TO LIFT BY REGULATORY GUIDE 1.13 TO PREVENT FUEL ELEMENTS FROM THE SPENT FUEL TROLLEY AND BRIDGE MOVEMENTS WHLE RACKS. THEREFORE, INTERLOCKS TO FUEL ELEMENTS ARE BEING LIFTED AND PREVENT TROLLEY AND BRIDGE WHETHER THEY ARE PROVIDED FOR THIS MOVEMENTS WHILE HOISTING HAVE NOT APPLICATION. BEEN PROVIDED.

O AND M MANUAL REVISION 0 EDERER, LLC S. 0. NO. F-2725 12115103

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EDR-I APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT Page 3 REG.GUIDE TOPICAL 1.104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECtTION C.3j III.C (C.3j) 1. THE MAXIMUM CABLE AND MACHINERY THE ENERGY ABSORBING TORQUE LOADING THAT WOULD RESULT IN THE EVENT LIMITERS (EATL) WERE DESIGNED SUCH OF A HIGH SPEED TWO BLOCKING, ASSUMING THAT THE MAXIMUM MACHINERY LOAD, A CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION THAT WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE EVENT A WOULD ALLOW THE FULL BREAKDOWN TWO- BLOCKING OCCURS WHILE LIFTING TORQUE OF THE MOTOR TO BE APPLIED TO THE RATED LOAD AT THE RATED SPEED THE DRIVE MOTOR SHAFT. AND THAT ALLOWS THE FULL BREAKDOWN TORQUE OF THE MOTOR TO BE APPLIED TO THE DRIVE SHAFT, WILL NOT EXCEED 3 TIMES THE DESIGN RATED LOADING. IN ADDITION, THE EATL DESIGN DOES NOT ALLOW THE MAXIMUM CABLE LOADING TO EXCEED THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN SECTION III.C (C3.e) DURING THE ABOVE DESCRIBED TWO-BLOCKINGS.

C.3.k III.C (C3.k) 1. TYPE OF DRUM SAFETY SUPPORT PROVIDED. THE ALTERNATE DESIGN DRUM SAFETY RESTRAINT SHOWN IN FIGURE II[.D.4 OF EDR-1 IS ARRANGED TO COUNTER GEAR AND BRAKE FORCES AS WELL AS DOWNWARD LOADS. THESE BRACKETS ACT ON THE DIAMETER OF THE ENDS OF THE DRUM ON THE MAIN AND TRANSFER HOISTS.

C.3.o - 1. TYPE OF HOIST DRIVE TO PROVIDE 1. AC FLUX VECTOR, ON MAIN AND INCREMENTAL MOTION. TRANSFER HOISTS.

C.3.p - 1. MAXIMUM TROLLEY SPEED. 1. 24.9 FPM.

2. MAXIMUM BRIDGE SPEED. 2. 43.6 FPM.

3. TYPE OF OVERSPEED PROTECTION FOR THE 3. OVERSPEED SWITCHES, WHICH ACTUATE TROLLEY AND BRIDGE DRIVES. THE BRAKES, ARE PROVIDED FOR THE TROLLEY AND BRIDGE DRIVES.

o AND M MANUAL EDERM LLC S. 0. NO. F-2725 REVISION 0 12)15103

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BRIDGE RAISING, BRIDGE EXTENSION AND LOCKING ARE EACH CONTROLLED ON SEPARATE PENDANTS.

IlI.D.1 1. THE TYPE OF EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE USED, 1. PNEUMATICALLY RELEASED BAND INCLUDING TYPE OF RELEASE MECHANISM. BRAKES WILL BE USED FOR THE MAIN AND TRANSFER HOISTS.

2. THE RELATIVE LOCATION OF THE 2. THE EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE ENGAGES EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE. THE WIRE ROPE DRUM OF THE MAIN AND TRANSFER HOISTS.

3. EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE CAPACITY. 3. THE MAIN AND TRANSFER HOISTS EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKES HAVE A MINIMUM CAPACITY OF 125% OF THAT REQUIRED TO HOLD THE DESIGN RATED LOAD.

Ill.D2 I. NUMBER OF FRICTION SURFACES IN EATL. 1. THE MAIN HOIST EATL HAS 21 FRICTION SURFACES. THE TRANSFER HOIST EATL HAS 21 FRICTION SURFACES.

2. EATL TORQUE SETrING. 2. THE SPECIFIED EATL TORQUE SETTING IS APPROXIMATELY 130% OF THE MAIN HOIST DESIGN RATED LOAD.

III.D.3 I. TYPE OF FAILURE DETECTION SYSTEM. 1. TOTALLY MECHANICAL DRIVE TRAIN CONTINUITY DETECTORS AND EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE ACTUATORS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX G OF REVISION 3 OF EDR-I FOR THE MAIN AND TRANSFER HOISTS.

O AND M MANUAL EDERER, LLC S. 0. NO. F-2725 REVISION 0 I12513

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EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENr Pap5 REG.GUIDE TOPICAL 1.104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECTION III.D.5 1. TYPE OF HYDRAULIC LOAD EQUALIZATION 1. THE. MAIN HOIST LOAD EQUALIZATION SYSTEM. . SYSTEM CONSISTS OF AN EQUALIZER BAR IN THE UPPER BLOCK, DAMPENED BY A HYDRAULIC CYLINDER.

THE TRANSFER HOIST LOAD EQUALIZATION SYSTEM CONSISTS OF A SHORT TRAVEL EQUALIZER IN THE LOWER BLOCK, DAMPENED BY ROPE ELONGATION.

III.D.6 1. TYPE OF HOOK. 1. BOTH THE MAIN AND TRANSFER HOOKS HAVE A SINGLE LOAD PATH. DUAL, EYE HOOKS.

2. HOOK DESIGN LOAD. 2. THE MAIN HOOKS DESIGN CRITICAL LIFT LOAD IS 110 TONS WITH A 10:1 FACTOR OF SAFETY ON ULTIMATE.

THE TRANSFER HOOKS DESIGN CRITICAL LIFT LOAD IS 45 TONS WITH A 10:1 FACTOR OF SAFETY ON ULTIMATE.

3. HOOK TEST LOAD. 3. THE TEST LOAD FOR EACH LOAD PATH OF THE MAIN HOIST EYE HOOKS WILL BE 110 TONS (200%).

THE TEST LOAD FOR EACH LOAD PATH OF THE TRANSFER HOIST EYE HOOKS WILL BE 45 TONS (200%).

o AND MMANUAL EDERER, LLC S.0. NO. F272S REVISION 0 12115103

EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT PW6 REG.GUIDE TOPICAL 1.104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECTION III.F.I 1. DESIGN RATED LOAD. 1. MAIN HOIST- 110 TONS TRANSFER HOIST - 45 TONS

2. MAXIMUM CRITICAL LOAD RATING. 2. MAINHOIST-110TONS TRANSFER HOIST - 45 TONS

3. TROLLEY WEIGHT (NT. 3. 101,000 LBS.

4. TROLLEY WEIGHT (WITH LOAD) 4. 321,000 LBS.

5. HOOK LIFT. 5. MAIN HOOK-44 FEET, 6 INCHES TRANSFER HOOK - 44 FEET, 6 INCHES

6. NUMBER OF WIRE ROPE DRUMS. 6. THE MAIN AND TRANSFER HOISTS EACH HAVE ONE WIRE ROPE DRUM.

7. NUMBER OF PARTS OF WIRE. 7. MAIN HOIST - 8 PARTS PER WIRE ROPE.

TRANSFER HOIST - 2 PARTS PER WIRE ROPE.

8. DRUM SIZE (PITCH DIAMETER). 8. MAIN HOIST-69 INCHES TRANSFER HOIST-24 INCHES

9. WIRE ROPE DIAMETER. 9. MAIN HOIST- I INCH TRANSFER HOIST 1/8 INCH

10. WIRE ROPE TYPE. 10. MAIN HOIST- 6 X 37 CLASS EEIPS/IWRC TRANSFER HOIST - 6 X 37 CLASS EEIPSI IWRC - COMPACTED

11. WIRE ROPE MATERIAL. 11. MAIN HOIST AND TRANSFER HOIST -

CARBON STEEL

12. WIRE ROPE BREAKING STRENGTH. 12. MAIN HOIST-I 13,800 LBS.

TRANSFER HOIST - 175,600 LBS.

13. WIRE ROPE YIELD STRENGTH. 13. MAIN HOIST-91,040 LBS.

TRANSFER HOIST- 140,480 LBS.

14. WIRE ROPE RESERVE STRENGTH. 14. MAIN HOIST- 0.56 TRANSFER HOIST - 0.57

15. NUMBER OF WIRE ROPES. 15. THE MAIN AND TRANSFER HOISTS HAVE TWO ROPES EACH.

O AND M MANUAL EDERER LLC S. 0. NO. P-2725 REVIION 0 12115/03

EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEME9T Papi APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT TO GENERIC LICENSING TOPICAL REPORT EDR-1

SUMMARY

OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER, LLC INDIAN PONT ENERGY CENTER UNIT 2 SINGLE FAILURE PROOF UPGRADE CONTRACT NO. 4500523122 EDERER, LLC S.O. NO. F-2725 PREPARED:-

PROJECT EGNE EDERER, LLC CHECKED:

EDERER, LLC REVIEWED:

QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER EDERER, LLC APPROVe ze/'1*

CHIEF ENG N RR EDERER, LLC O AND M MANlUAL REVISION 0 EDERER, LLC S. 0. NO. F-2725 12I1VS03

EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT Page {i TABLE OF CONTENTS AND REVISION STATUS DESCRIPIION PAGE NO. REVISION TITLE PAGE i 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS & REVISION STATUS .. 0 TOPICAL REPORT SECTION mIc (C.l.b(l)) I 0 ULc (C.l.b(3)) 1 0 IILc (C.1.b(4)) 1 0 m.c (C.4.d) 1 0 m.C (C.l.c) I 0 m.C (C..d) I 0 mC (C. .e) 1 0 m.c (C.l.f) 2 0 m.c (C.2.b) & II.E.4 2 0 11.c (C.2.c) 2 0 mIc (C.2.d) 2 0 MC (C.3.b) 3 0 ml1.c (C.3.t) 3 0 REG GUIDE 1.104 (C.3.u) 3 0 REG GUIDE 1.104 (C.4.a) 4 0 REG GUIDE 1.104 (C.4.b) 4 0 REG GUIDE 1.104 (C.4.c) 4 0 REG GUIDE 1.104 (C.4.d) 4 0 mq.c (C.5.a) 4 0 0 AND M MANLAL REVIS1ON 0 EDERER LLC S. 0. NO. F-725 12115/03

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Pap I EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION REPORT SECTION IILIC(C. .b.(1)) 1. THE EXTENT OF VENTING OF CLOSED 1. CLOSED BOX SECTIONS ARE NOT VENTED SINCE THE BOX SECTIONS. FUEL STORAGE BUILDING THAT HOUSES THE CRANE WILL NOT BE PRESSURIZED.

C.I.b(3) III.C(C.I.b(3)) 1. THE NONDESTRUCTIVE AND COLD 1. NOT APPLICABLE, AS NO EXISTING CRANE PROOF TESTING TO BE PERFORMED ON COMPONENTS ARE RB-USED.

C.I.b(4) IH.C(C.1.b(4))

EXISTING STRUCTURAL MEMBERS FOR C.4.d III.C(CA.d) WHICH SATISFACTORY IMPACT TEST DATA IS NOT AVAILABLE.

C.1.c III.C(C.1.c) I. THE EXTENT THE CRANES 1. NOT APPLICABLE, AS NO EXISTING CRANE STRUCTURES WHICH ARE NOT BEING COMPONENTS ARE RE-USED.

REPLACED ARE CAPABLE OF MEETING THE SEISMIC REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 129.

C.1.d III.C(C.I.d) 1. THE EXTENT WELDS JOINTS IN THE 1. NOT APPLICABLE, AS NO EXISTING CRANE CRANE'S STRUCTURES, WHICH ARE COMPONENTS ARE RE-USED.

NOT BEING REPLACED, WERE NONDESTRUCTIVELY EXAMINED.

2. THE EXTENT THE BASE MATERIAL, AT 2. NOT APPLICABLE, AS NO EXISTING CRANE JOINTS SUSCEPTIBLE. TO LAMELLAR COMPONENTS ARE RE-USED.

TEARING, WAS NONDESTRUCTIVELY EXAMINED.

C.I.e Ill.C(C.I.e) 1. THE EXTENT THE CRANE'S 1. NOT APPLICABLE, AS NO EXISTING CRANE STRUCTURES, WHICH ARE NOT BEING COMPONENTS ARE RE-USED.

REPLACED ARE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING THE FATIGUE EFFECTS OF CYCLIC LOADING FROM PREVIOUS AND PROJECTED USAGE, INCLUDING ANY CONSTRUCTION USAGE.

O AND M MANUAL REVISION 0 EDERER, LLC S. 0. NO. P-2725 I2JIS03

EDR- I APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT Poge 2 REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION REPORT SECTION C.l.f Ill.C(C.l.f) 1. THE EXT~ENT THE CRANES 1. NOT APPLICABLE, AS NO EXISTING CRANE STRUCTURES WHICH :ARE NOT BEING COMPONENTS ARE RE-USED.

REPLACED, WERE POST-WELD HEAT-TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUB ARTICLE 3.9 OF AWS DI.I, USTRUCTURAL WELDING CODE".

C.2.b III.C(C2.b) 1. PROVISIONS FOR ACCOMMODATING I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES WILL BE USED TO III.E.4 THE LOAD MOTION AND KINETIC ASSURE THAT A MINIMUM OF 1.5 FEET OF.

ENERGY FOLLOWING A DRIVE TRAIN CLEARANCE IS MAINTAINED BETWEEN THE LOAD.

FAILURE WHEN THE LOAD IS BEING AND SURFACES THAT CANNOT WITHSTAND THE TRAVERSED AND WHEN IT IS BEING KINETIC ENERGY ASSOCIAT1ED WITH FREE FALL OF RAISED OR LOWERED. THE LOAD INVOLVED.

C.2.c IlI.C(C.2.c) 1. LOCATION OF SAFE LAYDOWN AREAS 1. THE FLOOR OF THE FUEL STORAGE BUILDING IS THE FOR USE IN THE EVENT REPAIRS TO THE LOCATION OF SAFE LAYDOWN AREAS. THE CRANE ARE REQUIRED THAT CANNOT REDESIGNED FLOOR HAS BEEN ANALYZED FOR ALL BE MADE WITH-THE LOAD SUSPENDED. LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DRY CASK SYSTEM.

CI.d III.C(C.2.d) I. SIZE OF MODIFIED COMPONENTS THAT 1. THE EXISTING OPENING IN THE BUILDING IS THE CAN BE BROUGHT INTO THE BUILDING TRUCK BAY DOOR, WHICH HAS A 12'-0 BY 14'-4' FOR REPAIR OF THE CRANE WITHOUT OPENING.

HAVING TO BREAK THE BUILDING INTEGRITY.

2. LOCATION OF AREA WHERE REPAIR 2. THE FLOOR IN THE FUEL STORAGE BUILDING IS THE WORK CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ON THE REPAIR AREA AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFE CRANE WITHOUT AFFECTING THE SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY.

SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY.

3. ANY LIMITATIONS ON OPERATIONS 3. THERE ARE NO LIMITATIONS ON OPERATIONS SINCE THAT WOULD RESULT FROM CRANE THE CRANES PRIMARY FUNCTION IS THE HANDLING REPAIRS. OF LOADS DURING THE DRY CASK STORAGE PROCESS.

O AND M MANUAL REVISION 0 EDERER, LLC S. 0. NO. P-2725 121IS103

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EDR-1 APPENDIX c SUPPLEMENT Page 3 REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION REPORT SECTION C.3.b III.C(C.3.b) 1. THE DESIGN MARGIN AND TYPE OF 1. AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO A DUAL LOAD' 'PATH LIFTING DEVICES THAT ARE ATTACHED SYSTEM, THE NORMAL STRESS DESIGN FACTORS TO.THE HOOK TO CARRY CRITICAL HAVE BEEN DOUBLED. EACH LIFTING DEVICE LOADS. ATTACHED TO THE HOOK TO CARRY CRITICAL LOADS WILL SUPPORT A LOAD SIX TIMES THE STATIC PLUS DYNAMIC LOAD BEING HANDLED WITHOUT PERMANENT DEFORMATION. THE SAFETY FACTOR IS 10:1 WHEN COMPARED TO ULTIMATE. THIS. IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NUREG 0612, SECTION 5.1.6, PARAGRAPH 1(A) AND ANSI N 14.6, SECTION 7.2.1 NOTE: CUSTOMER TO CONFIRM.

C.3.t III.C(C3.t) 1. THE EXTENT CONSTRUCTION 1. NOT APPLICABLE, AS NO EXISTING STRUCTURE WILL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CRANE!S BE RE-USED.

STRUCTURES, WHICH WILL NOT BE REPLACED, ARE MORE SEVERE THAN THOSE FOR PERMANENT PLANT SERVICE.

2. THE MODIFICATIONS AND INSPECTIONS 2. NOT APPLICABLE. CRANE NOT USED FOR TO BE ACCOMPLISHED' ON THE CRANE CONSTRUCTION.

FOLLOWING CONSTRUCTION USE, WHICH WAS MORE SEVERE THAN THOSE FOR PERMANENT PLANT SERVICE.

C.3.u 1. THE EXTENT. OF INSTALLATION AND 1. THE INSTALLATION AND OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS. WILL BE UPDATED TO FULLY COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION C.3.u OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.104 AND SECTIONS 7.1 AND 9 OF NUREG-0554.

O AND M MANUAL EDERER, LLC S. 0. NO. F.2725 REVISION 0 1211103

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EDRt-I APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT Page 4 REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION REPORT SECTION C.4.a 1. THE EXTENT OF ASSEMBLY CHECKOUT, 1. PRIOR TO HANDLING CRITICAL LOADS, THE CRANE C.4.b TEST PROCEDURES, LOAD TESTING WILL BE GIVEN A COMPLETE ASSEMBLY CHECKOUT, AND RATED LOAD MARICNG OF THE AND THEN GIVEN A NO-LOAD TEST OF ALL MOTIONS C.4.c CRANE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES PROVIDED BY C.4.d EDERER. A NO-LOAD TEST OF ALL MOTIONS, A TWO.

BLOCKING TEST, 125% STATIC LOAD TEST AND A 100% PERFORMANCE TEST WILL BE PERFORMED BY EDERER PRIOR TO DELIVERY OF THE CRANE.

THE MAXIMUM CRITICAL LOAD IS PLAINLY MARKED ON EACH SIDE OF THE CRANE.

C.S.a lllC(c.5.a) I. THE EXTENT THE PROCUREMENT 1. NOT APPLICABLE, AS NO EXISTING STRUCTURE W1LL DOCUMENTS FOR THE CRANE'S BE RE-USED.

STRUCTURES, WHICH WILL NOT BE REPLACED, REQUIRED THE CRANE MANUFAClURER TO PROVIDE A QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM CONSiSENTw WITH THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 128.

O AND M MANUAL EDERER. LL S. 0. NO. F-2725 REVISION 0 1217513

ATTACHMENT 4 TO NL-04-126 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Fuel Storage Building Single-Failure-Proof Gantry Crane Structural Summary Report Gantry Crane

NUREG-0554 Compliance Report (Rev 1)

Indian Point Energy Center Unit 2 Fuel Storage Building Single-Failure-Proof Crane Overview and Description A new single-failure-proof (SFP) gantry crane designed and manufactured by Ederer, LLC of Seattle, Washington will be installed in the Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC)

Unit 2 Fuel Storage Building (FSB). The crane has a main hoist with a dual-hook load block designed for handling spent fuel transfer casks, and an auxiliary hoist designed for handling Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPC) associated with the transfer cask.

The main hoist rating is 110 tons Maximum Critical Load (MCL) and Design Rated Load (DRL). The auxiliary hoist is rated at 45 tons MCL and DRL. Both hoists are designed in accordance with Ederer Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1 (P)-A, Revision 3 dated 10/8/82, Amendment 3, on file at the NRC. This Licensing Topical Report (LTR) was initially accepted by the NRC for meeting the guidelines of NUREG-0554 on January 2, 1980. Revision 3 was accepted by the NRC on August 26, 1983. The structural and machinery components of the crane (together, the Gantry) are designed in accordance with the guidelines of NUREG-0554 fornew bridge crane'structures.

The entire new crane is seismically qualified by response spectrum analysis in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide' 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification" as referenced in section 2.5 of NUREG-0554, to assure that the crane structure and trolley will maintain their structural integrity, remain in place on their rails. retain control of and hold the rated load, and generate no missiles when subjected to the seismic forces equivalent to the specified Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) for the IPEC-2 FSB. A seismically qualified accelerometer and shutdown switch are provided to shut off power to the crane system in event of an earthquake greater than the specified SSE. This' ensures that the controls will not cause uncommanded crane motions and that the brakes will be de-energized, causing them to set by spring force and retain the rated load.

The SFP gantry crane is installed on new crane rails 'on a new foundation forming part of the reconstructed truck bay floor in the FSB, designed and built to withstand the static and seismic loads, including uplift forces, imposed by the new crane. Restraining lugs and anchors are provided to withstand the calculated uplift forces.

ATTACHMENT 5 TO NL-04-126 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Fuel Storage Building Single-Failure-Proof Gantry Crane Structural Summary Report Anchorage System for Gantry Crane

Attachment 5 Docket No. 50-247 NL-04-126 Page 1 of I Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Fuel Storage Building Gantry Crane Structural Summary Report Anchorage System for Gantry Crane BACKGROUND & OBJECTIVE Indian Point Unit No.2 intends to transfer the spent fuel in the existing spent fuel pool located in the Fuel Storage Building (FSB) into dry storage canisters and casks. The significant size and weight of these casks require that a new floor mounted gantry crane be installed in the building.

The gantry crane is designed to cantilever over the pool to perform the removal of spent fuel from the pool. This configuration of the crane causes significant uplift forces. As part of the design, Ederer, the crane manufacturer, is specifying turnbuckles that are to be used as tie-downs while the crane is performing any operation in the cantilever section. In order to provide a foundation system capable of resisting these uplift forces from the turnbuckles, a box made of steel and filled with steel plates will be provided to act as a counterbalance. The box will be designed not only to support the uplift forces from the turnbuckles, but will also support the maximum crane wheel reactions transmitted through the crane rail.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS The design of the steel ballast box and the sole plate system consisted of the following steps:

• The crane has been analyzed for SSE loading in accordance with NUREG-0554 and the vendor has provided the resultant uplift forces at each support point. The design is intended to provide a counterweight box embedded below the floor to resist the uplift forces. The required weight of the counterweight box (ballast box) was determined by treating the box as a foundation and providing resistance meeting the requirements of NUREG-0800, Section 3.8.5 considering both OBE and SSE loading. Determination of equivalent OBE loading was made using the relationship OBE=2/3 SSE for the horizontal loads. The conversion from 7% damping curves for SSE to 4% damping curves for OBE was made using the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment.

• Using the governing loads and the appropriate NUREG overturning factors, the box was sized to provide adequate counterbalance for the loads induced by the crane.

• The box was analyzed using ANSYS to determine stresses at the welds and at the turnbuckle connection points.

CALCULATION & BOX ANALYSIS Entergy Calculation No. FCX-00545-00, Revision 0 provides the structural analysis and evaluation of the ballast box. The analysis was performed using ANSYS Finite Element Program Version 6.1. Stress evaluations of the structure were performed in accordance with the requirements of the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) ASD - Manual of Steel Construction, 9t Edition. The calculation and analysis concludes that the steel ballast box, with the dimensions and characteristics as identified in the calculation will provide the new gantry crane (to be installed in the IP-2 FSB) with the proper support foundation.