ML042730356
| ML042730356 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/2004 |
| From: | Roush K PPL Generation |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| 50-387/04-302, 50-388/04-302 | |
| Download: ML042730356 (172) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No.
Facility: Susquehanna Scenario No.: ILO-301 Op-Test No.:
N/A I/
Malf. No.
Event Examiners:
9 10 11 Operators:
C M
Rap id Depressurization C
RWCU Pump Room High Temperature 2 ADS SRVs Fail to Open Initial Conditions: Unit 1 at 30% power EOL, Unit 2 at 100% power EOL Turnover: Unit 1 is at 30% power with the startup on hold for a Feedwater heater drain valve solenoid replacement. Control rod sequence B2 is currently at step 450. A small leak in the RWCU pump room is being monitored with a video monitor. The leak is on B RWCU pump suction valve 144-F005B.
Extraction steam is to be removed from C Feedwater heater strinq immediately after assuming the shift to avoid spurious valve closures durinq replacement of solenoid SV-70204B in panel 1 C103.
I I
Event Description
I I
N Remove Extraction Steam from C FW HTR String 2
1 MTLO Temperature Element Failure Control Rod Drifts In Loss of (Reactor Building) Zone 1 HVAC Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum RPS A Scram Failure RClC Steam Line Break RClC Isolation Failure I
I I
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2004 NRC Exam Rev. 1 Susquehanna Facsimile
PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER Prepared By:
Instructor SIMULATOR SCENARIO Date Scenario
Title:
ILO CERTIFICATION / NRC EXAM SCENARIO Scenario Duration:
90 Minutes Reviewed By:
Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor Scenario Number:
ILO-301 Date RevisionlDate:
Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 Approved By:
Supervising ManagerKhift Supervisor Course:
PCOO7/PCOO8, Initial License RO/SRO Certification Examination PCOI 7/PC018, Initial License RO/SRO NRC Examination Date Operational Activities:
- 1. Remove Ext Steam from C Fw Htr String
- 7. RClC Steam Line Break
- 2. MTLO Temperature Element Failure
- 8. RClC Isolation Failure
- 3. Control Rod Drifts In
- 9. RWCU Pump Room High Temperature
- 4. Loss of Zone 1 HVAC I O. Rapid Depressurization
- 5. Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum 11.2 ADS SRVs Fail to Open Form NTP-QA-32.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 1 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 2 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 Ll Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 2 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. Rl l-3
Page 3 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 L--
The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 30% power and Unit 2 at 100% power. A small leak on the suction isolation valve for B RWCU pump is being remotely monitored with video equipment in the Reactor Building. The startup is on hold and Extraction Steam will be removed from Feedwater Heater string C immediately after assuming the shift to allow Maintenance to replace a solenoid in panel 1 C103.
A temperature sensor element failure in the main turbine lube oil control loop will cause an oil temperature increase resulting in manual operation of the service water temperature control valve to reduce and stabilize oil temperature. A control rod will drift in several notches; the crew will implement an off-normal procedure and fully insert the drifting rod while an investigation and recovery plan is made.
A loss of Reactor Building HVAC will result in a loss of Zone 1 dip and require the crew to implement an off-normal procedure. The Technical Specification for Secondary Containment integrity will not be met requiring entry into Condition A. In addition, the loss of Reactor Building HVAC will cause RWCU pump room temperatures to increase faster than normal due to the small steam leak.
A loss of main condenser vacuum will lead the crew to perform a manual reactor scram. RPS A does not trip when the mode switch is taken to shutdown and no control rods insert. The crew will implement actions for failure to scram and when either division 1 manual scram pushbutton is armed and depressed all control rods will fully insert. A loss of Feedwater occurs when the reactor mode switch is placed to shutdown forcing the crew to restore and maintain Reactor water level with RCIC. As condenser pressure continues to increase the MSIVs will automatically close and Reactor pressure will be controlled with SRVs.
When RClC is initiated a steam line break occurs in the RClC pump room. RClC room temperatures will increase to the auto isolation setpoint but the isolation valves fail to close and isolate the leakage. Manual isolation attempts will not be successful. The RWCU temperatures will also rise to the isolation setpoint uccessfully isolate either manually or automatically. At this point two secondary temperatures have exceeded maximum safe values and a primary system is discharging requiring the crew to perform Rapid Depressurization.
During Rapid Depressurization 2 ADS SRVs will fail to open requiring the crew to open additional SRVs until 6 valves are open to accomplish the blowdown. The scenario will be terminated after the Reactor is depressurized and actions are in progress to implement Suppression Pool Cooling.
L. _.-,
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 3 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 4 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 1/
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 4 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3
Page 5 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 L./
SCENARIO OBJECTIVES The objective of this scenario is to evaluate the licensed operator candidate's ability to respond to the scenario events. These events will require each candidate to demonstrate the following:
0 0
Knowledge of integrated plant operations Ability to diagnose abnormal plant conditions 0
0 Ability to work together as a team Ability to mitigate plant transients that exercise their knowledge and use of ONs and EOPs Ability to utilize Technical Specifications (SRO Only)
To meet this objective, the licensed operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency in the following competencies:
Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. lnterpret/diagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures, references, and Technical Specifications
- 3. Operate the control boards
- 4. Communicate and interact with other crew members Senior Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. InterpreUdiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures and references
- 3. Operate the control boards (N/A to upgrade candidates)
- 4. Communicate and interact with the crew and other personnel
- 5. Direct shift operations
- 6. Comply with and use Technical Specifications
~L-'
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 5 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 6 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 w
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 6 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1
il File No. RII-3
Page 7 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 CRITICAL TASKS li
- Recoqnize failure to scram and initiate a manual scram Safety Significance Control rod insertion initiates power reduction immediately.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to insert control rods allows power to remain elevated with resultant power oscillations and potential core damage.
Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Exceeding an RPS scram setting with NO reactor scram signal, or RPWARI fails to fully insert all control rods.
Performance Criteria Manually insert a reactor scram by arming and depressing the manual scram pushbuttons.
Performance Feedback Successful insertion of control rods will be indicated by rod position full-in indication.
- Perform Rapid Depressurization when two Secondary Containment areas exceed max safe temperature Safety Significance A high-energy leak in the Secondary Containment area impacts the integrity of Secondary Containment. Failure of the Secondary Containment directly relates to the 10CFR100 design criteria of dose to the General Public.
Action is taken to isolate systems that are discharging into Secondary Containment to terminate possible sources of radioactivity release. Minimizing radioactive release to Secondary Containment also helps accomplish the objective of precluding a radioactive release outside Secondary Containment under conditions where Secondary Containment integrity cannot be maintained. Previous containment control actions have not, for whatever reason, mitigated the event and now potentially large areas of the Secondary Containment have been challenged.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 7 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R11-3
Page 8 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004
- /
CRITICAL TASKS Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take actions to mitigate the energy released to the Secondary Containment directly affects the radiation dose to the General Public.
scrr-9 WHEN RB AREA TEMP EXCEEDS MAX SAFE IN 2 OR MORE AREAS RAPID DEPRESS IS REQ'D Should Secondary Containment area temperatures/radiation/water levels continue to increase to their Max Safe values in more than one area with a primary system discharging into Secondary Containment, the RPV must be rapidly depressurized. Depressurizing the RPV promptly places the primary system in its lowest possible energy state, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and reduces the driving head and flow of primary systems that are un-isolated and discharging into the Secondary Containment.
The criteria of "2 or more areas" identifies the increase in temperature (radiation or water level) trend as a wide spread problem which may Fose a direct and immediate threat to Secondary Containment integrity, equipment located in the Secondary Containment, or continued safe operation of the plant.
IndicationslCues for Event Requiring Critical Task Increasing Steam Leak Detection System temperatures and alarms indicating levels at Max Safe values.
Performance Criteria Perform a Rapid Depressurization per EO-000-1 12 when two or more RB areas exceed max safe temperatures per EO-000-1 04 Table 8.
Initiate ADS / Manually Open all 6 ADS valves Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower which lowers the driving force of any primary system breach.
Verify ADS valves are open using red light indication, acoustic monitoring, lowering Reactor pressure and rising Reactor water level.
Denotes Simulator Critical Task w
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 8 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 9 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 L-.-
SCENARIO REFERENCES
- 1. REMOVE EXT STM FROM C FW HTR STRING OP-147-001 FEEDWATER HEATERS, REV. 16 TS 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO, AMMEND. 178
- 2. MTLO TEMPERATURE ELEMENT FAILURE AR-123-HO5 MAIN TURB L-0 COOLER DSCH HI TEMP, REV. 16 AR-105-CO5 TURB GEN BRG HI TEMP, REV. 17
- 3. CONTROL ROD DRIFTS IN AR-104-HO5 ROD DRIFT, REV. 19 0 P-1 55-00 1 ON-I 55-001 TS 3.1.3 CONTROL ROD HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, REV. 35 CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS, REV. 20 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY, AMMEND. 178
- 4. LOSS OF ZONE 1 HVAC AR-127-CO9 ON-1 34-002 TS 3.6.4.1 RB ZONE 1 NO VENT, REV. 14 LOW REACTOR BUILDING DIFFERENTAIL PRESSURE, REV. 5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT, AMMEND. 178 LA-1275-CO5 ZONE 1 HI-LO DlFF PRESS, REV. 11
- 5. LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM AR-121 -F02 AR-121-GO1 AR-105-BO2 OP-I 93-001 ON-143-001 ON-1 00-1 01 SJAE CONDENSER DISCHARGE HI PRESS, REV. 12 SJAE SECONDARY EJECTOR DISCHARGE HI PRESS, REV. 12 CONDENSER HIGH PRESSURE, REV. 17 MAIN TURBINE OPERATION, REV. 24 LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM, REV. 15 SCRAM, REV. 11
- 6. RPS A SCRAM FAILURE AR-103-A01 EO-000-1 02 RPS CHANNEL Al/A2 AUTO SCRAM, REV. 25 RPV CONTROL, REV. 1 i d -
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 9 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R I 1-3
Page I O Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 2-d SCENARIO REFERENCES
- 7. RClC STM LINE BREAK AR-016-G 15 AR-SP-00 1 AR-SP-002 AR-108-EO5 AR-108-F04 AR-108-F05 EO-000-1 04 FIRE PROTECTION PANEL OC650 SYSTEM TROUBLE, REV. 35 FIRE SUP X228 27 ALM, REV. 8 FIRE DET X l 0 9 Z 8 ALM, REV. 10 RClC LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP/HI DlFF TEMP, REV. 17 RClC LEAK DETECTION LOGIC A HI TEMP, REV. 17 RClC LEAK DETECTION LOGIC B HI TEMP, REV. 17 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 1
- 8. RClC ISOL FAILURE
- 9. RWCU PUMP RM HI TEMP AR-101 -A04 RWCU SYSTEM PRE-ISOLATION HI-TEMP/DIFF TEMP, REV. 30 AR-1 01 -A02 AR-1 01 -A03 EO-000-1 12 EO-000-1 03 RWCU LEAK DET IS0 LOGIC A HI TEMP, REV. 30 RWCU LEAK DET IS0 LOGIC B HI TEMP, REV. 30 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION, REV. 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 2
-L-.
I O. 2 ADS SRVs FAIL TO OPEN L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 10 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 11 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 MALFS 7 : 7 u
SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS REMFS OVRDS TRlGS 0
2 : 2 5
- 1. Set up the simulator for the scenario by performing the following:
- a. Initialize to IC-15.
- b. Insert RWCU pump room leakage; IMF CUI61007 0.005 0 0.001
- c. Snapshot to an available IC (currently IC-104).
- 2. Initialize the simulator to IC-104, Unit I at 30% power EOL and Unit 2 at 100% power EOL.
- 3. Type restorepref YPPJLO-301; verify the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments.
Verity the Environment window:
MALFUNCTIONS CUI61007 0.005 MV08:HV144F001 I00 MV08: HV1 UFO04 100 MV07:HVl49F007 100 RPI 58007A RVO4:PSV141Fl3L 0 RVO4:PSVI41 F13M 0 REMOTE FUNCTIONS NONE OVERRIDES AN:AR106BI 4 AN:ARI 06C15 TRIGGERS I ACTIONS E l RPE.MSWNOTRUN E l = MMF MC143001 10 0 0.2 E l = bat FWB.TRIPFW E2 RPE.MANPBA E2 = DMF RP158007A E3 RCE.RCICSTART E3 = IMF RC150004 60 20:OO E4 RCE.RCICISOL E4 = bat YPB.IL0-301 B RWCU SUCTION BREAK O/S CONTAINMENT RWCU IB ISOL VALVE (FOOI) LEAKAGE RWCU OB ISOL VALVE (F004) LEAKAGE RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP SRV L FAIL TO OPEN SRV M FAIL TO OPEN RCIC ISOL FAILED AT 100% OPEN (Not associated with scenario setup)
(Not associated with scenario setup)
WHEN MODE SW NOT IN RUN E l IS TRUE INCREASE LOSS OF VACUUM TRIP ALL FW PUMPS WHEN A I OR A2 SCRAM PB DEPRESSED E2 IS TRUE DELETE RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP WHEN RClC INITIATES E3 IS TRUE RClC PUMP RM STEAM LEAK WHEN RClC ISOL SIGNAL E4 IS TRUE INSERTS RClC STEAM LEAK, INCREASES RWCU LEAK
~\\--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 11 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 12 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS PROGRAM BUlTONS
[P-I] IMF AV02:HVl0244C
[P-2] IMF TR03:lTl 1932 -75 08~00 ASlS
[PA] bat YPBJLO-301A
[P-5] IMF MC143001 0.2 CLOSE RFP DRNS TO 5C FWH MTLO TEMPERATURE ELEMENT FAILURE LOSS OF ZONE 1 HVAC LOSS OF COND VACUUM
[P-3] IMF RD1550044615 (NONE 0 00:30) 2 ROD 46-15 DRIFT TO 42
[P-61 MRF RD1550074615 DISARM HYDRAULIC DISARM HCU 46-15
- 5. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:
- a. Unit 1 is at 30% reactor power, 281 MWe.
- b. GO-100-002 is in progress at step 5.70.
- c. Control rod pull sequence B2 S/U at step 450.
- d. A small steam leak in RWCU pump room is being monitored with a video monitor. Leak is on 144-F005B, suction isolation for 'B' RWCU pump.
- e. The startup is on hold and Extraction Steam should be removed from Feedwater Heater string C immediately after assuming the shift. This is to avoid spurious opening of any valves during replacement of solenoid SV-I0204B, FW HTR 3B EXTR STM DRN BEFORE BTV. The work package estimates it will take 15 minutes to change out the solenoid.
- 6. Prepare the following documents:
- a. Complete GO-I 00-002 up to step 5.70.
- b. Complete SO-156-007 for current control rod pattern in sequence B2 S/U step 450.
.-.,/-.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 12 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 13 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 EVENT TIME 1
SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM W -
DESCRIPTION REMOVE EXT STM FROM C FW HTR STRING Initial Conditions: Initialize the Simulator to IC-104. Place the Simulator to RUN. Ensure the Program Buttons are assigned as indicated on the Special Instructions sheet via the appropriate Preference File. Assian shift positions; direct the start of the 5-minute panel walkdown.
2 L-MTLO TEMPERATURE ELEMENT FAILURE 4
LOSS OF ZONE 1 HVAC 3
1 6
I CONTROL ROD DRIFTS IN RPS A SCRAM FAILURE 7
8 5
1 RCIC STM LINE BREAK RCIC ISOL FAILURE I LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM 9
I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION 11 2 ADS SRVs FAIL TO OPEN L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 13 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
~~
Page 14 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM L-Event No:
1 Brief
Description:
REMOVE EXT STM FROM C FW HTR STRING POSITION us PCOP TIME PCOM
- Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Enters TS 3.2.2 for MCPR Limit prior to removing Feedwater Heaters from service.
Contacts Reactor Engineer to check the Core Performance Log and ensure the margin to the MCPR operating limit is > 0.03.
Directs removal of extraction steam from C Feedwater Heater string.
Notifies PCOM prior to removing extraction steam from any Feedwater Heater.
Monitors AT across heaters using PlCSY.
~~
Removes extraction steam from C Feedwater heater string IAW OP-147-001:
CLOSE I-A SUP ISO to HV-102446 (1251475).
0 OPEN drain petcock on 1 IA-PCV-10244C.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
CLOSES HTR 5C HP EXTR IS0 HV-10242C CLOSES MSEP A DRN TO HTR 4C HV-10213C CLOSES MSEP B DRN TO HTR 4C HV-10216C CLOSES HTR 4C LP EXTR IS0 HV-10241 C CLOSES HTR 3C LP EXTR IS0 HV-1024OC CLOSES SSE DRN TO HTR 2C IS0 HV-10270C
~~
Monitors reactor power and feedwater temperature.
NOTES:
.4 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 14 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 15 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004
~~
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
1 Brief
Description:
REMOVE EXT STM FROM C FW HTR STRING INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When directed to close RFP seal bleed of HV-I 02446 at 1 C153B-A, Depress P-I :
[P-I] IMF AV02:HV10244C NOTE:
Monitor position of HV-10244C on Simulator Diagram W 2 2.
Monitor PlCSY FWHT.
ROLE PLAY:
As Reactor Engineer called to check the Core Performance Log, report the margin to the MCPR operating limit is > 0.03.
As Plant Operator dispatched to panel 1 C103 to check indication status of HV-I 0244C, report the valve indicates full closed.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 15 of 31 2004 NRC Exam. Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 16 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 NOTES:
SCENARIO EVENT FORM v-Event No:
2 Brief
Description:
MTLO TEMPERATURE ELEMENT FAILURE (I)
May report PlCSY alarm for L-0 COOLER OUTLET HI TEMP.
PO!3L:pON 1 TIME NOTE 1 PCOM PCOP us I
STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports alarm MAIN TURB L-0 COOLER DSCH HI TEMP; refers to AR-123-H05.
Observes status of TIC-1 0955 and monitors oil and bearing temperatures using PICSY.
From AR-123-H05:
- 1. Checks L-0 temps on TR-11931 on 1 C668.
- 2. Checks L-0 cooler temperature controller TIC-10955 maintaining between 110°F and 120°F.
- 3. Determines oil temperature is high and controller is malfunctioning.
- 4. Transfers TIC-I0955 to manual and depresses the OPEN button to lower oil temperatures.
- 5. Directs a Plant Operator to check TI-I 1932 local indication.
- 6. Directs Plant Operator to check service water alignment to oil coolers.
Reports alarm TURB GEN BRG HI TEMP; refers to AR-105-CO5.
From AR-105-CO5:
- 1. Checks turbine/generator bearing temperatures on TR-11980 on 1 C652 and compares reading with PlCSY reading.
- 2. Checks L-0 cooler temperature controller TIC-I0955 maintaining between 11 0°F and 120°F.
- 3. Determines oil temperature is high and controller is malfunctioning.
Directs response to high oil temperature: take manual control of TIC-10955 to restore oil cooling.
Contacts Work Week Manager to investigate problem with TIC-1 0955.
Jr Denotes Critical Task
~. --:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 16 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 17 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES
\\u Event No:
2 Brief
Description:
MTLO TEMPERATURE ELEMENT FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When extraction steam is removed from the C FW HTR string, insert failure of main turbine lube oil temperature sensor; Depress P-2:
[P-2] IMF TR03:lT11932 -75 08:OO ASIS NOTE:
PlCSY alarms in -30 seconds.
Alarm AR-123-HO5 is 125°F occurs in -1 minute.
Alarm AR-105-CO5 is 190°F occurs in -5 minutes.
Monitor Simulator Diagram TU4 for oil system parameters.
ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator sent to check MTLO local outlet temperature on TI-1 1932, wait 2 minutes and report temperature as indicated on TU4. If sent to check the temperature control valve, report it appears to be operating properly.
.d Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 17 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 18 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 NOTES:
SCENARIO EVENT FORM J
Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
CONTROL ROD DRIFTS IN (1) May respond to PlCSY RPlS rod drift alarm and refer to OP-155-001 Section 2.6.
POSITION PCOM NOTE 1 us PCOM us PCOM TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports rod drift condition.
Refers to AR-104-H05, ROD DRIFT:
- 1. Determines <3 rods have drifted/scrammed from their target positions.
- 2. Refers to ON-155-001.
Directs response to rod drift.
Directs PCOM to implement ON-I 55-001.
~~~~
Notifies Reactor Engineer about rod drift condition.
~ ~ _ _ _ _ _
~~
From ON-155-001, section 3.4:
- 1. Selects Display Rods Drifting and determine rod 46-1 5 is drifting.
- 3. Selects rod 46-1 5 and reports position value.
- 4. Determines rod position should be position 48.
- 5. Observes PDI-(212-1 R603 and FI-(212-1 R605 for cooling water d/p and cooling water flow and determines indications are normal.
- 6. Inserts rod 46-15 to position 00.
- 7. Depresses Rod Drift Reset pushbutton to verify rod drift alarm clears.
~
Declares rod 46-1 5 inoperable, refers to TS 3.1.3:
- 1. Determines LCO is not met and enters Condition C.
- 2.
Identifies rod 46-15 must be fully inserted within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and disarmed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Directs PCO to hydraulically disarm rod 46-1 5 using OP-155-001 Directs Plant Operator to hydraulically disarm rod 46-15 IAW OP-155-01, Section 2.19.
- Denotes Critical Task File No. RII-3
Page 19 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
CONTROL ROD DRIFTS IN INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When actions for MTLO temperature element failure are complete, insert rod drift for rod 46-1 5, Depress P-3:
[P-31 IMF RD1550044615 (NONE 0 00:30) 2 NOTE: Rod 46-1 5 will drift from position 48 to 42.
When directed to hydraulically disarm HCU 46-1 5, wait - 5 minutes then Depress P-6:
[P-6] MRF RD1550074615 DISARM ROLE PLAY:
As Reactor Engineer state I will run a thermal monitor and verify thermal limits are not challenged. I will then investigate the problem and work on a corrective action plan.
L,-
L-Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 19 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 20 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 11 NOTES: I SCENARIO EVENT FORM L-Event No:
4 Brief
Description:
LOSS OF ZONE 1 HVAC I
POSITION PCOM PCOP us PCOP TIME
Reports alarm HVAC RX BLDG FAN RM EL779-1 C275 TROUBLE.
Reports alarm HVAC DIVISION 1 PANEL 1 C681 SYSTEM TROUBLE.
Dispatches Plant Operator to local panel 1 C275 and 1 C276.
Reports alarm RB ZONE 1 NO VENT; refers to AR-127-CO9.
Performs ON-1 34-002.
Observes Zone 1 dlp on OC681 indicator PDI-07554A1, reports building pressure is zero and not negative 0.25 wg.
Directs response to loss of zone 1 HVAC.
Contacts Work Week Manager to assist with restoration of Zone 1 HVAC.
Refers to TS 3.6.4.1 :
- 1. Determines LCO is not met and enters Condition A.
- 2. Identifies Secondary Containment integrity must be restored within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Refers to ON-1 34-002:
- 1. Identifies if Zone 1 is not in service for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, be in hot shutdown within next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- 3. Starts RB cooling:
Starts both loops of ESW.
Starts all individual room cooler fans in Zone 1 and Zone 3.
- 4.
Monitors Secondary Containment temperatures.
- 5. Attempts to restore Zone 1 HVAC.
1
-v-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 20 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R11-3
Page 21 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES L-Event No:
4 Brief
Description:
LOSS OF ZONE 1 HVAC INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When actions for the drifting rod are complete, insert a loss of zone 1 HVAC, Depress P-4:
[PA] bat YPBJLO-301 A ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator sent to 1 C275 and 1 C276, wait 2 minutes and report no zone 1 fans are in-service, fan failed annunciators are in alarm for both trains, and HI-LO differential pressure annunciators are in alarm for zone 1. Fan 1V205A indicates tripped and based on the d/p indications the alarms are due to low d/p.
Alarms at IC275 (LA-1275-001) - Simulator display LPlC275 RB ZONE 1 SUPPLY SYSTEM FAN 1V202A FAILED (A01)
RB ZONE I EXHAUST SYSTEM FAN 1V205A FAILED (Dol)
ZONE I HI-LO DlFF PRESS (C05)
RB ZONE I EXHAUST SYSTEM FAN 1V205B FAILED (D02)
Alarms at IC276 (LA-1276-001) - Simulator display LPlC276 CIRCULATION SPACE HI-LO DlFF PRESS (CIO)
As Plant Operator directed to attempt start of zone 1 HVAC, wait -5 minutes and report neither subsystem A or 6 could be started.
As Work Week Manager contacted to support restoration of zone 1 HVAC, state you will send a team out to Unit 1 Reactor Building and have them contact the RB Plant Operator.
As maintenance support for zone 1 HVAC, wait -7 minutes and report zone I fans have trip signals present and more time will be needed to troubleshoot the problem after the electrical prints arrive from the shop.
As Plant Operator sent to perform post-start checks of ESW pumps, wait - 3 minutes and report the pumps are running normally.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 21 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 22 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 POSITION SCENARIO EVENT FORM
- -/
Event No:
5 Brief
Description:
LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM TIME NOTES:
I PCOM (1) Recirc Pumps are already at minimum speed.
PCOM I
NOTE (I)
STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports alarm SJAE CONDENSER DISCHARGE HI PRESS; refers to AR-121-FO2.
From AR-121-FO2:
- 1. Ensures condensate flow and temperature are IAW OP-144-001.
- 2. Ensures HV-10702 is OPEN.
- 3. Monitors SJAE CDSR DSCH FLOW FI-10724 ON 1C668.
- 4.
Performs ON-143-001.
Directs response to loss of condenser vacuum IAW ON-I 43-001.
Directs power reduction to maintain backpressure 23.8 HgA (or within the limits of Attachment H of OP-193-001).
Contacts Work Week Manager for assistance with the loss of vacuum.
Reduces power IAW CRC book to maintain backpressure 23.8 HgA.
Reports alarm SJAE SECONDARY EJECTOR DISCHARGE HI PRESS.
Refers to AR-121-GOI:
- 1. Checks pressure on PI-1 0720 on 1 C668.
- 2. Ensures HV-10721 is OPEN on 1 C668.
- 3. Ensures HV-16912 is OPEN on OC673.
- 4.
Dispatches a Plant Operator to OC145 to check Recombiner operation.
Directs scram imminent actions.
Starts MSP and TGOP.
-k Denotes Critical Task
Page 23 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
5 Brief
Description:
LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When actions for loss of zone 1 HVAC are complete, insert a slow loss of main condenser vacuum; Depress P-5:
[P-5] IMF MC143001 0.2 NOTE:
AR-121-F02 alarms in - 1 minute.
AR-121-GO1 alarms in - 1.5 minutes.
AR-105-BO2 alarms in - 5 minutes and condenser backpressure reaches the limit of Attachment H Of OP-I 93-001.
Monitor main condenser on Simulator display MCI; and on PlCSY display MNCOND.
ROLE PLAY:
L--' As Plant Operator sent to OC145, wait -2 minutes and report Unit 1 Recombiner is in-service with several high pressure annunciators in alarm.
'U' Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 23 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 24 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM b-Event No:
6 Brief
Description:
RPS A SCRAM FAILURE STUDENT ACTIVITIES I
\\__-
- Denotes Critical Task Shifts Aux busses to the startup busses.
Notifies GCC.
Directs mode switch to shutdown.
Places the reactor mode switch to shutdown.
Recognizes and reports failure to scram.
Arms and depresses manual scram pushbuttons.
Reports all control rods are fully inserted.
Reports trip of all RFPTs (loss of all high-pressure feed).
Reports MSlV closure.
Enters EO-000-1 02, RPV CONTROL.
Directs PCOs to ensure all PC isolations, ECCS initiations and DG starts.
Directs PCOP to restore / maintain RPV water level +I 3 to +54 using RCIC.
Directs PCOP to stabilize RPV pressure 4087 psig with SRVs.
Directs PCOM to reset Main Generator lockout relays.
Directs PCOM to place Feedwater in startup level control.
Directs RHR placed in Suppression Pool Cooling.
Restores / maintains RPV water level +I 3 to +54 using RCIC.
NOTES:
u Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 24 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 25 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L--
Event No:
6 Brief
Description:
RPS A SCRAM FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When RX Mode Switch is placed to SHUTDOWN, ensure event trigger E l actuates to trip all RFPTs (bat FWB.TRIPMI) and increase Condenser air in-leakage (MMF MC143001 10 0 0.2).
When RPS manual scram pushbutton A I or A2 is depressed, ensure event trigger E2 actuates to trip RPS A (DMF RP158007A).
When RClC initiates, ensure event trigger E3 actuates to insert RClC steam line break in RClC pump room (IMF RC150004 60 20:OO).
ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 25 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 26 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 POSITION PCOP SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
7,899 Brief
Description:
RClC STM LINE BREAK I RClC ISOL FAILURE I RWCU PUMP RM HI TEMP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Controls Reactor pressure with SRVs.
Places RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling.
Recognizes and responds to the following alarms:
0 FIRE SUP X228-27 ALM (Panel OC650) 0 FIRE D E I X109-28 ALM (Panel OC650)
Reports high / rising temperatures in RClC room.
Reports alarm RClC LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP/HI DlFF TEMP; refers to AR-108-E05.
Attempts to manually isolate / close HV-F007 and HV-F008.
Reports inability to isolate RCIC.
Contacts maintenance to attempt to manually close HV-F007 and/or HV-F008.
FIRE PROTECTION PANEL OC650 SYSTEM TROUBLE; AR-016-GO5 us PCOM us Enters EO-000-1 04, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, and directs crew response.
Reports alarm RWCU SYSTEM PRE-ISOLATION HI TEMPIHI DlFF TEMP; refers to AR-Reports alarms RWCU LEAK DET IS0 LOGIC A/B HI TEMP; refers to AR-IOl-A02/A03.
Ensures RWCU automatically isolates (or manually isolates RWCU).
101 -A04.
Determines two areas (RCIC and RWCU) above max safe temperature.
NOTES:
'W' Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 26 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 27 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L
a Event No:
7,8,9 Brief
Description:
RCIC STM LINE BREAK I RClC ISOL FAILURE I RWCU PUMP RM HI TEMP INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the RClC isolation setpoint is reached, verify HV-F007 remains full open (IMF MV07:HV149F007 100 0 100) and ensure event trigger E4 actuates to run bat YPBJLO-301B to prevent HV-F008 isolation (IMF MV07:HV149F008 83) and increase RWCU leakage (MMF CUI61007 0.5 0 0.005).
NOTE: If the crew lowers RPV pressure, the RClC leak will need to be increased in order to exceed MAX NORMAL TEMPERATURE in the RClC Room: MMF RC150004.
Type PIC61408 to monitor RClC temperatures on Panel 1C614.
ROLE PLAY:
When contacted to attempt manual closure of RClC outboard isolation valve, wait - 3 and report that the India team has been dispatched to attempt closure If/when contacted to check the breakers for RClC isolation valves, wait - 3 then report the OB valve DC breaker (1D254031) is closed. Wait another 3 minutes and report the IB valve AC breaker (lB246022) is also closed.
\\
A Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 27 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 28 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 POSITION
- us
- PCOP SCENARIO EVENT FORM l 4 -
TIME Event No:
I O, 11 Brief
Description:
RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION I2 ADS SRVs FAIL TO OPEN STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs Rapid Depressurization when two Secondary Containment areas exceed max safe temperature.
- 1. Enters EO-000-1 12, RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION.
- 2. Directs preventing uncontrolled Condensate injection.
- 3. Verifies Suppression Pool level > 5 feet.
Performs Rapid Depressurization by opening all ADS SRVs.
- 1. Arms and depresses Division 1 and/or Division 2 ADS manual pushbuttons and verifies 6 red lights lit for ADS solenoids,
- 2. Places individual control switch to open for each ADS SRV (G, J, K, L, M, & N) and verifies red light lit and amber light not lit for each valve solenoid.
0 0
Observes RPV pressure decrease.
0
- 4. Recognizes and reports SRVs L and M failed to open.
Observes 6 ADS SRVs open on acoustic monitor status light indication.
Observes elevated tail pipe temperatures on TRS-B21-1 R614.
Directs RPV level restored and maintained +I 3 to + 5 4 with available systems.
Enters EO-000-1 03, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, due to Suppression Pool temperature > 90°F.
Directs both loops of RHR placed in Suppression Pool Cooling.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 28 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 29 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 v
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
I O, 11 Brief
Description:
RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION / 2 ADS SRVs FAIL TO OPEN INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 29 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 30 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM v
Event No:
I O, 11 Brief
Description:
RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION / 2 ADS SRVs FAIL TO OPEN POSITION PCOP us TIME j, Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Places both loops of Suppression Pool Cooling in service IAW OP-149-005, RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING.
- 1. Places ESW in service.
- 3. Opens Suppression Chamber test shutoff valve HV-151 -F028A / B.
- 4. Starts RHR pump IP202A(C) / B(D).
- 5. Throttles open test line control valve HV-F024A / B to achieve 11 0,000 gpm on
- 6. Observes minimum flow valve HV-151-FO07A / B closes at - 3000 gpm.
- 7. Closes heat exchanger bypass HV-151 -F048A / B.
- 8. Checks RHR pump room coolers 1V21 OA(C) / B (D) started.
FI-E1 1-1 R603 A / B.
After the scenario is complete, classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY under EAL FSl due to a Potential Loss of the RCS Bam'er and a Loss of the Primary Containment Barrier.
NOTES:
I' L--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 30 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 31 Scenario ILO-301 Rev. 0, 2/12/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES ZIJ Event No:
I O, 11 Brief
Description:
RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION I 2 ADS SRVs FAIL TO OPEN INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary TERM1 NATl ON CUE:
The Reactor is depressurized, level is restored to +13 to +54 and actions are in progress to implement Suppression Pool cooling.
EVENT CLASSIFICATION:
After the Scenario is complete, have the US classify the scenario for the HIGHEST EAL. Provide the US with any requested information needed to perform the classification.
d Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 31 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R I 1-3
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No.
1
~~
Facility: Susquehanna Scenario No.: ILO-501 Op-Test No.:
N/A Malf. No.
Event Event Type*
Description N
Transfer Bus 1A202 to Normal Source Examiners:
8 9
10 Operators:
C I
M B Core Spray Pump Trip Breaker 1 A20404 Auto Logic Failure Rapid Depressurization / RPV Flooding Initial Conditions: Unit 1 in Mode 2 at -5% power EOL. Unit 2 at 100% power EOL 2
1 I Main Steam Tunnel Temperature Detector Failure 3
1 I
C Reactor F e e d h n p A Bearing High Temperature 4
1 1 IRM G Fails Upscale / IRM Division I Bypass Failure 5
1 I
C 1 LOOP / Scram / I Rod Fails to Insert l
M 1 Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident 7
1 I B RHR Pump Auto Logic Failure I
I I
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2004 NRC Exam Rev. 1 Susquehanna Facsimile
PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER SIMULATOR SCENARIO I
Scenario
Title:
ILO CERTIFICATION / NRC EXAM SCENARIO Scenario Duration:
90 Minutes Scenario Number:
ILO-501 RevisionIDate:
Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 Course:
PCOO7/PCOO8, Initial License RO/SRO Certification Examination PCOl7/PCO18, Initial License RO/SRO NRC Examination Operational Activities:
- 1. Transfer Bus lA202 to Normal Source
- 6. Small Break LOCA
- 2. MS Tunnel Temperature Detector Failure
- 7. B RHR Pump Auto Logic Failure
- 3. RFP A Bearing High Temperature
- 8. B Core Spray Pump Trip
- 4. IRM G UpscalellRM Div I Bypass Failure
- 9. Breaker 1A20404 Auto Logic Failure
- 5. LOOP/Scram/l Rod Fails to Insert I O. Rapid DepressurizationlRPV Flooding Reviewed By:
Approved By:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 1 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 2 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK cc-
\\/
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 2 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 3 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The scenario begins with Unit I in MODE 2 at - 5% power and Unit 2 at 100% power. ESS Bus 1A202 is aligned to alternate; the crew will transfer bus 1A202 to its normal power source following routine breaker maintenance.
A Reactor Building steam tunnel leak detection instrument failure results in an isolation instrumentation channel failure for the MSIVs. Technical Specifications require declaring the instrument inoperable and taking the actions for Condition A. A high bearing temperature on Reactor Feedwater Pump A will require the crew to transfer feedwater injection to RFP B and shutdown or trip RFP A.
An upscale failure of IRM G will result in a half scram condition; the crew will bypass IRM G and recognize the bypass was unsuccessful preventing reset of the half scram condition.
A loss of offsite power (LOOP) will occur along with numerous onsite ESS bus and diesel generator failures that result in only one 4KV bus (1A202) being energized from the emergency diesel generator. A small recirculation system suction line break occurs inside the drywell along with the power loss. Following the automatic reactor scram and isolation one control rod fails to insert. The loss of power results in a loss of feedwater injection capability and HPCl injection is prevented by a steam supply valve failure. The only high pressure injection source is RCIC. Inventory loss from the break exceeds makeup capacity while reactor pressure remains above the discharge head of low pressure ECCS injection systems and reactor water level drops below TAF (-161). Logic failure will prevent automatic start of the B RHR pump. Control room manual operation of the failed RHR pump will allow injection from B loop of RHR. The crew will perform Rapid Depressurization and permit low pressure ECCS injection from B RHR and CS pumps.
During reactor water level recovery an automatic trip of Core Spray pump B occurs and the crew will be unable to recover the pump. Following the reactor depressurization, when drywell instrument run temperatures exceed SAT curve limits, the US will declare reactor water level indeterminate and enter EO-000-1 14, RPV Flooding.
With only B RHR injection capacity flooding pressure can not be achieved. Maintenance assistance will allow recovery of emergency diesel generator D. A failure will prevent the automatic closure of breaker 1A20404 from the diesel generator to the bus. The crew can manually close breaker 1A20404 and provide RHR and Core Spray injection using the D pumps. The crew will maximize injection sources to establish RPV pressure 281 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure.
The scenario will be terminated when the crew has established RPV pressure 281 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure.
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 3 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 4 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 4 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. R11-3
Page 5 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO OBJECTIVES Y '
The objective of this scenario is to evaluate the licensed operator candidate's ability to respond to the scenario events. These events will require each candidate to demonstrate the following:
0 Knowledge of integrated plant operations Ability to diagnose abnormal plant conditions Ability to work together as a team Ability to mitigate plant transients that exercise their knowledge and use of ONs and EOPs Ability to utilize Technical Specifications (SRO Only)
To meet this objective, the licensed operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency in the following competencies:
Reactor ODerator Candidates:
- 1. InterpreVdiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures, references, and Technical Specifications
- 3. Operate the control boards
- 4. Communicate and interact with other crew members Senior Reactor Operator Candidates:
1, InterpreVdiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures and references
- 3. Operate the control boards (N/A to upgrade candidates)
- 4. Communicate and interact with the crew and other personnel
- 5. Direct shift operations
- 6. Comply with and use Technical Specifications Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 5 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 6 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 L--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 6 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3
Page 7 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004
\\_.-
CRITICAL TASKS
- Perform Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -1 61 inches Safety Significance RPV leakage or loss of injection systems impacts the ability to provide continued adequate core cooling through core submergence based on inventory loss.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions will result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.
The following steps provide the operating crew guidance to line up injection systems as available to maintain level >-129". If these actions are unsuccessful, the crew receives additional direction when it is determined that level can not be maintained above TAF.
h RC/L-4 RC/Ld RC/L-10 RC/L-11 RC/L-1 3 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 7 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 RESTORE AND MAINTAIN LVL BETWEEN
+13" AND +54" USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS IF LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > +13" MAINTAIN LVL > -129" USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS AUGMENTING AS DESIRED WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS IRRESPECTIVE OF VORTEX LIMITS WITH TABLE 3 SYSTEMS PERFORM ALL 1
LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2
STARTPUMPS 3
INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX IF LESS THAN 2 TABLE 4 SUBSYSTEMS CAN BE LINED UP COMMENCE LINING UP AS MANY AS POSSIBLE TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS PERFORM ALL:
1 LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2
STARTPUMPS 3
INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX File No. Rll-3
Page 8 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 L
2 CRITICAL TASKS RC/L-16 WHEN LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > -161" GO TO RAPID DEPRESS Rapid Depressurization is not initiated until RPV water level has dropped to -167" (TAF) because:
Adequate core cooling exists so long as RPV water level remains above -167" (TAF).
The time required for RPV water level to decrease to -161
'I (TAF) can best be used to line up and start pumps, attempting to reverse the decreasing RPV water level trend before Rapid Depressurization is required to assure continued adequate core cooling.
(
Reference:
SSES-EPG Cl-4 and second override before C3-I)
IndicationdCues for Event Requiring Critical Task Reactor water level trending downward, eventually indicating less than the top of active fuel height on the Fuel Zone Level Indicator.
Performance Criteria Perform a Rapid Depressurization per EO-000-1 12 when water level reaches the TAF -1 61" as read on the Fuel Zone Instrument.
L-Initiate ADS / Manually Open all 6 ADS valves Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise on the Fuel Zone and Wide Range level instruments.
Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure and rising reactor water level.
u' Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 8 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 9 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004
=*-
CRITICAL TASKS Declare RPV level indication indeterminate due to violation of the RPV Saturation Curve Restore power to ESS Bus lA204 bv manuallv closing breaker lA20404 Perform RPV Flooding when RPV level becomes indeterminate bv increasinq iniection flowrate to raise RPV pressure to 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure Safety Significance Adequate core cooling may be challenged if core submergence can not be verified due to indeterminate RPV level indication.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions may result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.
RC/L-2 IF LVL CANNOT BE DETERMINED GO TO RPV FLOODING If RPV water level cannot be determined, the actions specified in the subsequent [EO-l02]
steps cannot be performed since RPV water level and water level trend information is required for determining which actions to take. The transition to 0-000-1 14, RPV Flooding, is necessary to assure continued adequate core cooling under conditions where RPV water level cannot be determined.
RF-12 COMMENCE AND IRRESPECTIVE OF VORTEX LIMITS INCREASE INJECTION TO ESTABLISH:
RPV PRESS NOT DECREASING AND RPV PRESS 2 81 PSlD ABOVE SUPP CHMBR PRESS USING ANY:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 9 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 CORESPRAY 0
0 COND 0
CRD MAXIMIZED LPCl WITH FLOW THROUGH HX ASAP FIRE SYSTEM IAW ES-013-001 RHRSW X-TIE FROM EITHER UNIT File No. RII-3
Page 10 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 CRITICAL TASKS ECCS KEEP-FILL CRD X-TIE TO OTHER UNIT 0
SLC BORON TANK SLC DEMIN X-TIE These systems consist of all motor-driven systems which are available to flood the RPV. As many of these systems as necessary must be used to establish and maintain the conditions required to verify RPV flooding. Establishing adequate core cooling conditions dictates that adherence to Vortex limits not be required.
Three conditions must be satisfied to verify RPV flooding without direct indication of RPV water le vel:
I.
At least 4 SRVs must be open. This ensures that adequate steam flow will exist for cooling any un-submerged portion of the core when RPVpressure is 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
.2. RPVpressure must not be decreasing. This ensures that the required steam flow will be maintained.
- 3. RPVpressure must be greater than Suppression Chamber pressure by at least 81 psid, the Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure (MRFP).
The MRFP is defined to be the lowest differential pressure between the RPV and the Suppression Chamber at which steam flow through 4 SRVs is sufficient to remove decay heat. The assumed decay heat generation rate is ten minutes after shutdown from full power. Since ten minutes is the earliest that RPV flooding could reasonably be expected to be needed, establishing and maintaining RPV pressure above the MRFP assures that more than enough steam flows through the SRVs to carry away all core decay heat.
This requires that a sufficient quantity of water reach the core to carry away decay heat by boiling, which in turn requires that RPV water level increase. Maintaining this above the minimum pressure (81 psid) assures that the RPV will ultimately flood to the main steam lines.
IndicationslCues for Event Requiring Critical Task Violation of the RPV Saturation Curve is indicated by PlCSY format (RPVSAT) showing purple indication on the curve, plot on the unsafe side by the Crew and/or RPV level instrumentation failing in the upscale direction.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 10 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 11 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 b
CRITICAL TASKS Performance Criteria Recognize failure of RPV level indicators due to reaching saturation conditions on the instrument runs, initiate rapid depressurization by opening ADS valves and then increasing RPV injection until RPV pressure is NOT decreasing and is 81 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure.
Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise to the point that RPV pressure will increase to a value that is 81 psid above Suppression Chamber. At this point injection should be stabilized to maintain the DP.
Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure.
Verify injection from available systems raises RPV pressure to a value that is 81 psid above Suppression Chamber.
rt Denotes Simulator Critical Task u
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 11 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. I File No. Rl l-3
Page 12 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1
11 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 12 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 13 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO REFERENCES
- 1. TRANSFER BUS 1A202 TO NORMAL SOURCE OP-104-001 4 W ELECTRICAL SYSTEM, REV. 7
- 2. MAIN STEAM TUNNEL TEMPERATURE DETECTOR FAILURE AR-112-BO2 AR-1 I 1 -BO3 AR-I 1 1 -E01 TS 3.3.6.1 STEAM TUNNEL LOGIC BID HI TEMP, REV. 26 MN STEAM LINE LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP, REV. 27 MSIV LOGIC B/D IS0 INITIATED, REV. 27 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION, AMEND. 21 3
- 4. IRM G UPSCALE FAILURE / IRM DIV 1 BYPASS FAILURE AR-103-A01 AR-104-A05 TS 3.3.1.I RPS CHANNEL AI/A2 AUTO SCRAM, REV. 25 IRM CHAN A/C/E/G UPSCALE TRIP OR INOP, REV. 19 RPS INSTRUMENTATION, AMENDMENT 178 AR-104-BO5 IRM UPSCALE, REV. 19
- 5. LOOP / LOCA / 1 ROD FAILS TO INSERT ON-100-101 ON-004-002 ON-I 04-001 ON-I 04-201 ON-I 04-203 ON-I 04-204 EO-000-1 02 EO-000-1 03 SCRAM, REV. 11 ENERGIZING DEAD 4KV ESS BUS, REV. 16 UNIT 1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER, REV. 13 LOSS OF 4KV ESS BUS 1A (1A201), REV. 5 LOSS OF 4KV ESS BUS I C (1A203), REV. 5 LOSS OF 4KV ESS BUS 1 D (1A204), REV. 5 RPV CONTROL, REV. 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 2
- 6. B RHR PUMP AUTO LOGIC FAILURE
- 7. B CORE SPRAY PUMP TRIP AR-113-BO3 AR-157-CO1 CORE SPRAY PUMP B TRIP, REV. 21 PUMP B AUTO TRIP, REV. 5
.~
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 13 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 14 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO REFERENCES
- 8. BKR 1A20404 AUTO LOGIC FAILURE ON-004-002 ENERGIZING DEAD 4KV ESS BUS, REV. 16
- 9. RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION / RPV FLOODING EO-000-1 12 EO-000-1 14 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION, REV. I RPV FLOODING, REV. 1
.-e Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 14 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 15 Scenario I LO-50 1 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 MALFS L--
SC E N ARlO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS REMFS OVRDS TRlGS I.
Initialize the simulator to IC-I 1 : Unit 1 in MODE 2 at 9% power EOL and Unit 2 at 100% power 7 : 7 I
0 3 : 3
- 2. Set up the simulator for the scenario by performing the following:
- a. Lower reactor power to -5%; insert control rods to step 322 in B2 S/U sequence.
- b. Transfer ESS Bus 1 B (1A202 to alternate source (Transformer I 1 ; Breaker 1A20201) see OP-I 04-001, section 3.1.4.
OR Run Auto Exercise file: IL0501 SETUP 4
- 3. Take a snapshot to IC-101.
- 4. Type restorepref YPP.IL0-501; verify that the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments.
Verity the Environment window:
MALFUNCTIONS BR04:1A20404 L
d DG024001 C DG024001 D MV07: HVI 55F001 0 MV09: HV151 FOI 6B 2 PM04:l P202B RDI 550062239 48 REMOTE FUNCTIONS NONE OVERRIDES ZDIC5120S06 OFF AN:AR106Bl4 AN:ARlO6C15 TRIGGERS / ACTIONS E l RFP.ATRIP BKR 1A20404 AUTO LOGIC FAILURE D/G C FAILURE TO START D/G D FAILURE TO START HPCl Fool FAIL CLOSED B DW SPRAY OB SOL VALVE FAILS TO OPEN B RHR PUMP AUTO START FAILURE ROD 22-39 STUCK @ 48 FAILURE OF G IRM BYPASS JOYSTICK (Not associated with scenario setup)
(Not associated with scenario setup)
WHEN RFPT A IS TRIPPED E l IS TRUE E l = MMF FW145005A 130 30:OO ASlS E2 BCSFLOW E2 = IMF CS151006B E3 IL0501RFP E3 = MMF FWl45005A 250 20:OO ASlS REDUCE RFP A HI BRG TEMPERATURRE WHEN B CS FLOW -3800 GPM E2 IS TRUE TRIP By CORE SPRAY PUMP WHEN BEARING TEMP AT 190 DEG F E3 IS TRUE SLOW RAMP OF BEARING TEMP INCREASE Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 15 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 16 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 I\\---
SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS E4 IL0501 RHRB E4 = DMF PM04:l P202B
- P-l
- p-2
- p-3
- PA
- P-5
- P-6
- P-7
- P-8 2
1
- RAM BUlTONS MF TH02
- TEB21 N14B 350 MF FW145005A 250 1O:OO ASlS WMF FWI 45005A 130 30:OO ASlS MF NMl78004G 125 3at YPBJLO-SOIA OR QD143CMC LOCAL OR QD143CMD LOCAL DMF DG024001 D WHEN B RHR CONTROL SWITCH TO START E4 IS TRUE DELETES AUTO START FAILURE MN STM TUNNEL TEMP DETECTOR FAILURE A
RFP HP BRG HI TEMPERATURE REDUCE A RFP HP BRG HI TEMPERATURE G IRM FAILURE UPSCALE LOOP/LOCA BATCH FILE D/G C TO LOCAL D/G D TO LOCAL DELETE DIG D START FAILURE
- 6. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:
- a. Using start-up rod sequence 82 starting at step 322.
- b. ESS bus 1A202 is selected to alternate source. Maintenance has completed routine breaker maintenance on the normal supply breaker. Transfer Bus 1A202 to normal power source.
- 7. Prepare the following scenario support documentation:
- a. Reactivity control package for the start-up using 82 S/U sequence at step 322.
- b. Rod coupling surveillance SO-I 56-007.
- c. GO-100-002 marked up to step 5.49.7.
- d. Prepare to provide plant status specifically RFPs.
- e. Prepare OP-104-101 for bus transfer.
- f. Control Room Phone list.
- g. Shift Assignment Sheet.
- 8. Acknowledge all PlCSY Alarms W
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 16 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R11-3
Page 17 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM L-Initial Conditions: Initialize the Simulator to IC-101. Place the Simulator to RUN. Ensure the Program Buttons are assigned as indicated on the SDecial Instructions sheet via the apuroDriate Preference File. Assign shift positions; direct the start of the 5-minute panel walkdown.
DESCRIPTION TRANSFER BUS lA202 TO NORMAL SOURCE MS TUNNEL TEMP DETECTOR FAILURE
~~
~
RFP A BRG HI TEMP IRM G UPSCALE FAILURE / IRM DIV I BYPASS FAILURE LOOP / SCRAM / 1 ROD FAILS TO INSERT SMALL BREAK LOCA B RHR PUMP AUTO LOGIC FAILURE
~
~~
B CORE SPRAY PUMP TRIP BKR IN0404 AUTO LOGIC FAILURE RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION / RPV FLOODING Y
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 17 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 18 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM
-v-Event No:
1 Brief
Description:
TRANSFER BUS 1A202 TO NORMAL SOURCE POSITION us PCOP TIME k Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES
~~
Directs PCO to transfer Bus lA202 to normal (preferred) source per OP-104-001
~
Transfers Bus 1A202 to normal (preferred) source IAW OP-I 04-001 :
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
ENSURE SU Bus 20 Xfmr 21 1 Bkr OA10412 CLOSED.
OBSERVE ESS Transformer 21 1 secondary supply line voltage on Voltmeter XI-00041 is nominally 4200V.
ENSURE loads to be picked up by ESS Transformer 21 1 will not overload Transformer 21 1.
INSERT key and PLACE Xfmr 21 1 -Bus 1 B Sync Sel keyswitch to ON.
CHECK two voltages MATCHED by OBSERVING Diff AC Volts XI-00036 reads less than 297 volts.
CHECK two sources IN PHASE by OBSERVING Synchroscope XI-00037 is at 12 o'clock position.
CLOSE Xfmr 21 1 to Bus 1 B Bkr 1A20209 by PLACING switch to CLOSE.
OBSERVE Xfmr 21 I to Bus 1 B Bkr 1A20209 CLOSES.
When Xfmr 21 1 to Bus 1 B Bkr 1A20209 CLOSES, OBSERVE Xfmr I 1 1 to Bus 1 B Bkr 1A20201 AUTOMATICALLY OPENS.
- 10. OBSERVE voltage indication on ESS BUS 1 B (1A202). (PICSY Display - 4KV) 1 1. ENSURE Transformer 21 1 not overloaded by monitoring ESS Xfmr 21 1 current
- 12. RETURN Xfmr 21 I-Bus 1 B Sync Sel keyswitch to OFF and REMOVE key.
- 13. ALIGN all control switch flags to actual breaker positions.
indication.
NOTES:
u Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 18 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 19 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
I Brief
Description:
TRANSFER BUS 1A202 TO NORMAL SOURCE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 19 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 20 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 TIME SCENARIO EVENT FORM STUDENT ACTIVITIES Event No:
2 Brief
Description:
MS TUNNEL TEMPERATURE DETECTOR FAILURE POSITION PCOP Reports alarm STEAM TUNNEL LOGIC B/D HI TEMP; refers to AR-I 12-B02.
Reports alarm MAIN STEAM LINE LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP; refers to AR-111 -B03.
~
~~
~
Reports alarm MSIV LOGIC BID IS0 INITIATED; refers to AR-I 11 -E01.
~~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
From AR-11 I
-BO3 or AR-I 12-B02:
- 1. Verifies status of leak detection instrumentation on panel 1 C614.
- 2. Reports TSH-B21-1 N600B for Reactor Building steam tunnel is tripped.
- 3. Checks temperature module for proper operation and alarm setpoint.
Places module switch to read.
Places module switch to set.
Reports module is reading -350°F.
Verifies B MSlV isolation status light is LIT us
~~
Refers to TS 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation:
- 1. Table 3.3.6.1 requires 2 channels per trip system operable for function 1.e.
- 2. In division 2 only one channel is operable, therefore entry into Condition A is required.
- 3. Required action A.l is applicable: place channel in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Contacts Work Week Manager (WWM) and requests I&C investigate failure of TSH-B21-1 N600B.
A. Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 20 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R11-3
Page 21 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
2 Brief
Description:
MS TUNNEL TEMPERATURE DETECTOR FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
After 1A202 bus transfer is complete, activate Reactor Building main steam line tunnel temperature switch failure, Depress: P-I :
[P-I] IMF TH02zTEB21N14B 350 ROLE PLAY:
As Work Week Manager acknowledge the instrument failure and state it will be investigated.
Irr' Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 21 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 22 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM
-x Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
RFP A BEARING HI TEMPERATURE POSITION PCOP us PCOM I
TIME I
STUDENT ACTlVlTl ES Reports alarm from PlSCY or RFPT/RFP A, B, C BRG HI TEMP; refers to AR-120-BOI :
- 1. Observes temperatures on TR-11966 on panel 1 C668.
- 2. Determines A RFPT HP bearing has high oil drain temperature indication from TR-1 1966 or PlCSY format data.
Dispatches a Plant Operator to check RFPT A oil drains.
Warms 'C' RFP per OP-145-001 Section 2.2.3.b-e.
Directs actions to establish feedwater iniection with B RFP.
Directs reducing load on A RFP or manually tripping A RFP.
Contacts Work Week Manager (WWM) to investigate RFP A.
Refers to OP-145-001, Section 2.5, to establish feed with B RFP:
- 1. Establishes RFP B discharge pressure 50 -100 psig below reactor pressure by:
0 Increasing speed using SIC-C32-1 R601 B controller.
Throttles RFP 6 recirc flow valve FV-106046 in manual to maintain flow greater than min flow setpoint indication on 1C651.
- 2. Checks B RFP discharge temperature is approximately equal to A RFP temperature using TR-10608 on 1C652.
- 3. Feeds vessel with RFP B:
0 0
Increases speed using SIC-C32-1 R601 B until pump just begins to feed.
Reduces minimum flow in manual using FIC-C32-10604B and observes:
J RFP B minimum flow decreasing J RFP B discharge flow increasing Reduces RFPT A speed and/or trips A RFPT as directed.
.k Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
+-
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0. (03/04)
Page 22 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 23 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L-Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
RFP A BEARING HI TEMPERATURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When actions are complete for Reactor Building steam tunnel temperature element, insert RFPT A bearing high temperature; Depress P-2
[P-2] IMF FW145005A 250 I0:OO ASlS NOTE:
Setpoint for AR-120-BO1 is 195°F bearing metal temperature.
PlCSY oil drain temp alarm is 160°F.
PlCSY metal drain alarms is 190°F.
PlCSY alarms in -3 minutes.
Monitor temperatures on PlCSY page RFPTA.
When RFP A is shutdown tripped ensure the RFPT bearing high temperature malfunction is modified to reduce bearing temperature. Trigger El is set to modify the malfunction if the A RFP is tripped, otherwise Depress P-3:
b-
[P-31 MMF FW145005A 130 30:OO ASlS ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator sent to investigate the A RFP, wait -2 minutes and report no visible problems exist at A RFPT.
NOTE: No oil drain sight boxes or local oil drain temperatures are available for the RFPT As Work Week Manager acknowledge the RFPT high bearing temperature and state it will be investigated.
Form NTP-QA-31.?A Rev, 0, (03/04)
Page 23 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 24 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
4 Brief
Description:
IRM G UPSCALE FAILURE I IRM DIV I BYPASS FAILURE j, Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES
~
~
~~
~
~
Recognizes/reports IRM upscale trip and RPS Channel AI/A2 auto scram annunciation.
~
~~~
~~
Refers to AR-104-A05, IRM CHAN NCIEIG UPSCALE TRIP OR INOP:
- 1. Determines IRM G indication is upscale.
- 3. Ensures ranae switch is set to range IO.
Dispatches a Plant Operator to check condition of IRM drawer switches and indication.
Contacts Work Week Manager (WWM) and requests I&C investigate the IRM upscale condition.
Refers to TS 3.3.1.I and determines LCO is met with 3 operable IRM channels.
Directs PCOM to manually bypass IRM channel G.
Directs PCOM to reset RPS half scram condition.
Bypasses IRM G by placing channel bypass joystick to G position.
Determines IRM G was not bypassed based upon any of these indications:
- 1. BYPASS indication lamp for IRM G not lit.
- 2. IRM upscale and trip annunciators not 'slow flashing'.
- 3. Rod Block annunciator not 'slow flashing'.
Contacts Work Week Manager (WWM) and requests I&C investigate the IRM channel bypass failure condition.
"4' Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 24 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 25 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES
+
Event No:
4 Brief
Description:
IRM G UPSCALE FAILURE I IRM DIV I BYPASS FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When RFP B is feeding and RPV and water level control is stable, insert IRM G upscale failure; Depress: P-4:
[P-4] IMF NM178004G 125 ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator sent to investigate IRM G upscale failure, wait -2 minutes and report IRM G drawer switch is in Operate and I have both the upscale and trip lights on the drawer lit.
As Work Week Manager acknowledge the upscale failure of IRM G and IRM Channel Bypass failure and state they will be investigated.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 25 of 37 2004 NRC Exam. Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 26 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
5 Brief
Description:
LOOP / SCRAM / I ROD FAILS TO INSERT 1-'
POSITION PCOM PCOP us TIME k Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Performs actions for reactor scram:
- 1. Places reactor mode switch to shutdown.
- 2. Verifies/reports rod positions.
- 3. Reports all rods full-in except rod 22-39 at position 48.
~~
~~
~~
~
~
~
~
Reports electric plant status:
- 2. D/G A running, not connected to bus 1A201.
- 3. Bus 1A201 has a bus lockout, AR-Ol5-DO8.
- 4. D/G B is running and connected to bus 1A202.
- 5. D/G C and D/G D failed to start.
- 6. Buses 2A201 and 2A202 are energized from D/G.
- 7. Aux Buses 11A & 11 B de-energized.
Enters ON-100-101, SCRAM:
Directs implementation of ON-004-002, ENERGIZING DEAD 4KV ESS BUS.
Directs implementation of ON-1 04-001, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER.
Directs implementation of ON-104-201, LOSS OF 4KV ESS BUS 1A (1A201).
Directs implementation of ON-104-203, LOSS OF 4KV ESS BUS I C (1A203).
Directs implementation of ON-104-204, LOSS OF 4KV ESS BUS 1 D (1A204).
I1 ll L-.
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 26 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 27 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L-Event No:
5 Brief
Description:
LOOP I SCRAM I 1 ROD FAILS TO INSERT INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the actions for IRM G are complete, insert a LOOP and LOCA, Depress P-5:
[P-5] bat YPBJLO-SOIA ROLE PLAY:
As necessary I
v Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 27 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 28 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM
~
Event No:
5,6 Brief
Description:
\\--
POSITION PCOP us TIME j l Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Attempts to energize dead buses I C (1A203) and 1D (1A204).
From ON-004-002 and buses 1 C and 1 D:
- 1. Confirms normal, alternate, and D/G breakers are open.
- 2. Checks status of bus lockout relays.
- 3. Ensures breakers on Attachment C are open.
- 4.
Performs start attempt from OC653:
0 Depresses the start pushbutton.
- 5. Reports manual start attempt from OC653 was not successful.
- 6. Dispatches Plant Operator to perform local start attempt.
Verifies ESW pump B starts to supply cooling to D/Gs.
Dispatches Plant Operator to investigate relay status for bus 1 A (1 A201 )
Reports drywell pressure is M.72 psig and drywell temperature is >150°F.
Places governor mode selector switch to ISOCH.
Ensures the voltage regulator mode switch in AUTO.
Enters EO-000-1 02, RPV CONTROL, and EO-000-1 03, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, when drywell pressure exceeds 1.72 psig:
I. Directs PCOs to perform panel walkdown for:
Isolations Initiations D/Gstarts
11 NOTES: I ll L.-
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 28 of 37 2004 NRC Exam. Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 29 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
596 Brief
Description:
LOOP I SMALL BREAK LOCA INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
If directed to perform local start of D/G C, wait -2 minutes and transfer the control mode switch to local, Depress P-6:
[P-61 IOR QD143CMC LOCAL If directed to perform local start of DIG D, wait -2 minutes and transfer the control mode switch to local, Depress P-7:
[P-7] IOR QD143CMD LOCAL ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator sent to DIGS C & D, wait -3 minutes and report the following conditions are present for both D/Gs:
Panel OC521C & D alarms:
DIG BAY HVAC TROUBLE LUBE OIL CIRCUL PUMP MALFUNCTION MCC NOT PROPER FOR AUTO OPERATION All other conditions appear normal.
As Plant Operator sent to bus 1A201, wait -2 minutes and report bus lockout relays 86A-201 and 86A1-201 are tripped. Also bus relay 87A1 for Bus Primary Differential OC is tripped.
As Plant Operator sent to attempt local start of D/G C, wait -30 seconds after transferring D/G C to local and report the local start attempt was not successful.
As Plant Operator sent to attempt local start of D/G D, wait -30 seconds after transferring DIG D to local and report the local start attempt was not successful.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 29 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 30 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 NOTES:
SCENARIO EVENT FORM L-Event No:
5, 6 Brief
Description:
LOOP I SMALL BREAK LOCA (1) Failure of RHR pump B will also be experienced if the US were to direct manual
-v-POS IT1 0 N PCOP us PCOP NOTE 1 TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES
~~~
Reports panel 1 C601 status:
- 1. CRD pumps not running.
- 2.
RClC is injecting to the RPV.
- 3. Div. 1 RHR and Core Spray system inoperable.
- 4. Div. 2 Core Spray available with B pump only.
- 5. Div. 2 RHR available with B pump only.
- 6.
HPCl is not injecting; valve Fool failed to open and will not manually open.
- 7. MSlVs are shut.
- 8. Isolation signal for 1.72 psig and/or -38.
Reports RPV LEVEL is lowering.
Contacts Work Week Manager to investigate:
- 1. D/G C & D start failure.
- 2. Bus 1A201 lockout condition.
- 3. HPCl Fool valve failure to open.
~
~
~
~
~
Contacts TCC for information concerning loss and restoration of offsite power.
Directs maintaining RPV LEVEL >-I 2 9 when RPV LEVEL can not be maintained >+13.
Directs Core Spray and RHR systems:
- 1. Lined up for injection
- 2. Pumps started Reports Core Spray pump B auto start when RPV LEVEL drops to <-129 inches.
Reports RHR pump B auto start failure when RPV LEVEL drops to <-I29 inches.
- Denotes Critical Task
=J Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 30 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 31 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
5,6 Brief
Description:
LOOP I SMALL BREAK LOCA INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 31 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. I File No. RII-3
Page 32 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM
\\.--
Event No:
7, I O Brief
Description:
B RHR PUMP AUTO LOGIC FAILURE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION POSITION PCOP PCOP
- us
- PCOP NOTE I TIME
.k Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Manually starts RHR pump B:
- 1. Places and holds control switch for RHR pump B to start position.
- 2. Observes DumD red liaht lit and amber light not lit.
Transitions to Fuel Zone level indicator when WR RPV level indication drops below -145.
Reports corrected fuel zone RPV water level indication.
Reports fuel zone level is <-I 61 (TAF).
Directs Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -161 inches.
- 1. Enters EO-000-1 12, RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION.
- 2. Verifies Suppression Pool level > 5 feet.
~~
Performs Rapid Depressurization by opening all ADS SRVs.
- 1. Arms and depresses Division 1 and/or Division 2 ADS manual pushbuttons and verifies 6 red lights lit for ADS solenoids,
- 2. Places individual control switch to open for each ADS SRV (G, J, K, L, M, & N) and verifies red light lit and amber light not lit for each valve solenoid.
Observes RPV pressure decrease.
- 4. Verifies Core Spray and LPCl injection valves open when RPV pressure decreases to
~ 4 2 0 psig.
- 5.
Reports Core Spray and LPCl injection flow to the RPV.
Observes acoustic monitor status light indication; sees only 3 ADS SRVs open.
Observes elevated tail pipe temperatures on TRS-B21-1 R614.
NOTES: I (1) Div 1 acoustic monitor does not have power, therefore status light indication is not available for 3 ADS SRVs.
4 Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 32 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 33 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L
Event No:
7, 10 Brief
Description:
B RHR PUMP AUTO LOGIC FAILURE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
NOTE: When uncorrected Fuel Zone Level indicates --200 inches, corrected RPV LEVEL should be --I61 inches.
ROLE PLAY:
As necessary
\\--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 33 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 34 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM i--
Event No:
8,9,10 Brief
Description:
B CORE SPRAY PUMP TRIP I BRK lA20404 AUTO LOGIG FAILURE I RPV FLOODING POSITION PCOP us
- us PCOP
- PCOP TIME
- us STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports RPV water level trend.
Reports Core Spray pump B trip.
Dispatches Plant Operator to investigate Core Spray pump B and breaker 1A20205.
Plots drywell instrument run temperature and RPV pressure on the SAT curve.
Declares RPV level indication indeterminate due to violation of the RPV Saturation Curve.
- 2. Verifies:
0 MSlVs and MSL drains closed RClC isolation valves HV-149-F007 and HV-149-F008 closed Reports D D/G started; breaker 1A20404 did not auto close to energize bus 1A204.
Restores power to ESS Bus 1A204 by manually closing breaker 1A20404:
- 1. Verifies all synchroscope switches are OFF on OC653.
- 2. Inserts key into synch switch and place to ON.
- 3. Places breaker 1A20404 control switch to CLOSE.
- 4. Verifies breaker indicates closed and bus 1A204 power available.
- 5. Places svnch switch to OFF.
Reports RHR pump D auto starts.
Reports Core Spray pump D auto starts.
Reports ESW pump D auto starts.
Directs RPV Flooding by increasing injection flowrate to raise RPV pressure to 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
.k Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
.-./-.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 34 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 35 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
8, 9, I O Brief
Description:
B CORE SPRAY PUMP TRIP I BRK IN0404 AUTO LOGIG FAILURE I RPV FLOODING INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
Ensure the trigger E-2 actuates to trip Core Spray pump B when flowrate reaches -3800 gpm.
After RPV Flooding procedure is entered and if permission is granted by the control room to start DIG D, Depress P-8:
[P-81 DMF DG024001 D ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator sent to Core spray pump B, wait -3 minutes and report no abnormal conditions are visible around the pump area.
As Plant Operator sent to breaker 1A20205, wait -3 minutes and report feeder overcurrent relay 50/51 is tripped.
After RPV Flooding procedure is entered, call the control room as maintenance sent to investigate the D/G failures and report you have found a problem with D/G D and need permission to try a start attempt for D D/G.
Following the D/G D start, as maintenance call the control room and state the DIG should function normally from this point. We will continue trouble-shooting DIG C.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 35 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 36 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM
-w Event No:
10 Brief
Description:
RPV FLOODING POSITION
- PCOP us us TIME STUDENT ACTlVlTl ES Increases injection flowrate to raise RPV pressure to 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
- 1. Ensures maximum injection flowrate from Division 2 Core Spray and LPCl pumps.
- 2.
Reports RPV pressure and Suppression Chamber pressure.
Determines RPV pressure 2 81 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure.
Records time conditions are met.
Contacts TSC to enter EP-DS-003, RPV LEVEL DETERMINATION.
After the scenario is complete, classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY under EAL FSl due to a Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier and a Loss of the RCS Barrier.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 36 of 37 2004 NRC Exam. Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 37 Scenario ILO-501 Rev. 0, 2/17/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES
\\---
Event No:
I O Brief
Description:
RPV FLOODING INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary TERMINATION CUE:
The crew has established injection to raise RPV pressure 281 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure.
EVENT CLASSIFICATION:
After the Scenario is complete, have the US classify the scenario for the HIGHEST EAL. Provide the US with any requested information needed to perform the classification.
I Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 37 of 37 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Event No.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Malf. No.
Event Event Type*
Description Facility: Susquehanna Scenario No.: ILO-601 Op-Test No.:
N/A I1 2
Examiners :
I Operators:
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 at 90% power EOL, Unit 2 at 100% power EOL I
N 3
1 I
C 4
1 I
R 5
1 I
C 6
1 I
M 7
1 I
C Secure 1A RHRSW Pump RHRSW Radiation Monitor Fails Upscale Loss of Stator Cooling Power Reduction Generator Lockout / Turbine Trip RPS B Failure to Trip / ARI Failure / ATWS SLC System Squib Valves Fail 1A EHC Pump Trip (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2004 NRC Exam Rev. 1 Susquehanna Facsimile
PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER Instructor Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor SIMULATOR SCENARIO Date Date Scenario
Title:
ILO CERTIFICATION / NRC EXAM SCENARIO Supervising ManagerKhift Supervisor Scenario Duration:
90 Minutes Date Scenario Number:
ILO-601 Revision/Date:
Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 Course:
PCOO7/PCOO8, Initial License RO/SRO Certification Examination PCOI 7/PC018, Initial License RO/SRO NRC Examination Operational Activities:
- 1. Secure 1A RHRSW Pump
- 5. Generator Lockout I Turbine Trip
- 2. RHRSW Rad Monitor Fails Upscale
- 3. Loss of Stator Cooling
- 4. Power Reduction (33)
- 8. I A EHC Pump Trip Prepared By:
Reviewed By:
Approved By:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 1 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 2 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK i--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 2 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 3 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 90% power EOL and Unit 2 at 100% power EOL. 1 B EHC pump is out of service for breaker maintenance. RHR loop A has just been secured from Suppression Pool cooling and 1A RHRSW pump is running for maintenance to record vibration data. The crew will shutdown 1A RHR SW pump.
Following shutdown of ?A RHRSW the RHRSW radiation monitor will fail upscale. The crew will direct Chemistry to obtain a grab sample of RHRSW to validate the indicated high radiation condition. The US will declare the RHRSW radiation detector inoperable and enter TR 3.1 1.I
.5.
The Stator Cooling TCV-10183 will fail closed causing a loss of Stator Cooling. Investigation will determine that the TCV is operating erratically and investigation/repairs is on going. Stator Cooling temperatures will increase and the crew will decrease generator load IAW Alarm Response ON-197-001.
Even with generator load reduced, Stator Cooling will continue to rise causing a Main Turbine Trip if the crew does not remove the unit from service before hand. A failure of RPS B to trip will result in an Electrical ATWS and all control rods will fail to insert. ARI will not properly actuate, further inhibiting control rod insertion. When the crew initiates SLC a failure of the squib valves to fire will prevent SLC injection. The crew will initiate action to inject boron with the RClC system and inhibit ADS. The crew will decrease core power by lowering RPV water level to c -60 but > -161 using Feedwater. A loss of 1A EHC pump will result in a loss of EHC hydraulic fluid pressure causing the TBVs to close. SRV operation will raise Suppression Pool water temperature requiring the crew to enter the Primary Containment Control procedure and maximize Suppression Pool cooling. Actuation of SRVs will eventually cause Drywell pressure to increase > 1.72 psig resulting in a loss of Condensate and Feedwater injection due to initiation of Plant Aux Load Shed circuitry. The crew will restore and maintain RPV water level with HPCl and RClC systems.
The crew will be unsuccessful at rod insertion by maximizing CRD and drifting control rods. Manually driving rods and venting the scram air header will be successful for rod insertion.
The scenario will be terminated when all control rods have been inserted and actions are in progress to maximize Suppression Pool cooling and restore RPV water level to +13 to +54.
v Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 3 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 4 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 4 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3
Page 5 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 SCENARIO OBJECTIVES w
The objective of this scenario is to evaluate the licensed operator candidates ability to respond to the scenario events. These events will require each candidate to demonstrate the following:
0 0
Knowledge of integrated plant operations Ability to diagnose abnormal plant conditions 0
Ability to work together as a team 0
Ability to mitigate plant transients that exercise their knowledge and use of ONs and EOPs 0
Ability to utilize Technical Specifications (SRO Only)
To meet this objective, the licensed operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency in the following competencies:
Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. Interpret/diagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings L d -
- 2. Comply with and use procedures, references, and Technical Specifications
- 3. Operate the control boards
- 4. Communicate and interact with other crew members Senior Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. Interpret/diagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures and references
- 3. Operate the control boards (N/A to upgrade candidates)
- 4. Communicate and interact with the crew and other personnel
- 5. Direct shift operations
- 6. Comply with and use Technical Specifications Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 5 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 6 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 6 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3
Page 7 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 CRITICAL TASKS
- Recognize failure to scram and iniect SLC and inhibit ADS Safety Significance Early boron injection has the following benefits:
Stop or prevent large magnitude Limit Cycle Oscillations which can lead to core damage.
Limit fuel damage from uneven flux patterns that could result from partial rod inserts.
Inhibiting ADS prevents uncontrolled injection of large amounts of relatively cold, unborated low pressure ECCS water when the reactor is not shutdown with control rods.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to inject Boron can result in Cycle oscillations which can lead to core damage.
Fuel damage from uneven flux patterns that could result from partial rod inserts.
Failure to inhibit ADS can result in large amounts of positive reactivity addition due to boron dilution and cold water injection.
LQ/Q-3 IF INITIAL ATWS PWR > 5%
OR CANNOT BE DETERMINED INJECT SLC AND INHIBIT ADS When scram and ARi have failed, reactor power must be considered to determine if immediate boron injection is required. If initial ATWS power was greater than 5%, then a relatively large number of control rods have failed to insert. The seriousness of this condition requires immediate injection of boron to positively terminate the A 7WS event.
ADS initiation may result in the injection of large amounts of relatively cold, unborated water from low-pressure injection systems. With the reactor either critical or shutdown on boron, the positive reactivity addition due to boron dilution and temperature reduction through the injection of cold water may result in a reactor power excursion large enough to cause substantial core damage.
Preventing ADS is therefore appropriate whenever boron injection is required.
IndicationslCues for Event Requiring Critical Task ATWS with initial reactor power level greater than 5% APRM power.
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 7 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 8 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 CRITICAL TASKS Performance Criteria Inject SLC by inserting key into keylock switch and turning to start SLC pumps, fire the Squib valves and close the Reactor Water Cleanup isolation valve.
Alternate SLC injection using RClC (ES-150-002)
Inhibit ADS by placing IC601 keylock switches to INHIBIT Performance Feedback Successful SLC injection would be indicated by a lowering SLC tank level and a corresponding power level decrease.
Successful ADS inhibiting is indicated by Green Indicating Light at switch illuminating.
- Insert control rods IAW EO-000-1 13, Sheet 2, Control Rod Insertion Safety Significance Control rod insertion initiates immediate power reduction.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to insert control rods allows power to remain elevated with resultant power oscillations and potential core damage.
Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Exceeding a RPS scram setting with NO reactor scram signal, or RPS/ARI fail to fully insert all control rods.
Performance Criteria Insert Control Rods by one or more of the following methods:
Maximize CRD to drift control rods Drive control rods after bypassing RWM and RSCS Reset and Scram again by performing ES-158-002, Bypass RPS Logic Trips De-energizing RPS solenoids by performing ES-158-001 Local venting of scram air header Performance Feedback Successful insertion of control rods will be indicated by:
Rod position full-in indication for manual insertion of control rods, venting scram air header or de-energizing RPS solenoids Rod position full-in after resetting scram, draining scram discharge volume and re-scram Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 8 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 9 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 L
CRITICAL TASKS
- Lower RPV level to e -60 inches but > -161 inches Safety Significance Core damage due to unstable operation can be prevented or at least mitigated by promptly reducing feedwater flow so that level is lowered below the feedwater spargers.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task A General Electric Company study (NEDO-32047) indicates that the major threat to fuel integrity from ATWS is caused by large-amplitude power/flow instabilities. These density-wave instabilities will most likely develop in the non-isolation ATWS where the feedwater system is still available for makeup to the RPV. In this event, the feedwater system maintains normal water level, but feedwater heating is lost due to tripping of the turbine. Without preheating of the feedwater, high levels of core-inlet subcooling develop which can drive the reactor into a highly unstable mode of operation. General Electric calculations indicate that power oscillations become large enough to cause melting of fuel in high-power bundles.
LQ/L-13 MAINTAIN LVL BETWEEN -60" AND -161" USING TABLE 15 SYSTEMS BYPASSING INTERLOCKS AS NECESSARY IAW ANY:
The purpose of this step is to uncover the feedwater spargers sufficiently to reduce core inlet subcooling.
In the non-isolation ATWS event, core damage due to unstable operation can be prevented or at least mitigated by promptly reducing feedwater flow so that level is lowered below the feedwater spargers. Once level drops below the sparger nozzles, which are located at -24': the feedwater is sprayed into a region occupied by saturated steam. Steam will then condense on the injected feedwater, and the coolant will be heated as it falls to the liquid surface within the downcomer.
Heating of the feedwater by steam condensation limits the buildup of core inlet subcooling and can prevent the onset of severe power/flow instabilities.
This step identifies the widest acceptable water level control band. Although level fluctuations within this band are safe, it is very desirable to maintain level within the more restrictive tarqet area of -1 10" to -60". The target area and expanded band are shown in Figure 8, Water Level Operation Guidance. The intent of this step is to remain within the target band at all times unless prohibited by system perturbations, and remain within the expanded band at all times.
\\--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 9 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 10 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 CRITICAL TASKS Operation outside the target area has the following disadvantages:
The basis for an upper level of -60" is given above.
A lower level of -1 IO" is specified for the following reasons:
I.
Provides a margin for core coverage.
- 2.
Avoids operation near TAF where core power is more responsive to RP Vpressure fluctuations.
- 3.
Makes level control easier by maintaining level above the narrow region of the downcomer.
Below -1 10" the downcomer free area reduces from 300 magnitude of indicated level oscillations.
to 88 e resulting in increased
- 4.
Maintains sufficient core flow to carry liquid boron from lower plenum upward into the core.
As level is decreased below -1 IO, boron mixing efficiency is reduced because the natural circulation flow rate through the jet pumps is reduced and is not as efficient at carrying the injected boron from the lower plenum upward into the core.
At very low downcomer water levels near or below top of active fuel, there is little water available in the region above the jet pump throat for mixing with boron injected via RCIC. In this situation, there is concern that boron may accumulate in the stagnant region of the downcomer which is below the jet pump throat.
- 5.
Water level can be determined from wide range level instrumentation.
- 6.
Avoids MSlVisolation setpoint of -129".
RP V level below TAF is nof, by itself, a determination of whether or not level can be maintained
> -161". The determination that level cannot be maintained > -161" must be made based upon:
availability of high pressure injection systems, and, present level trend This decision must not be made prematurely since depressurization of a critical core results in destabilizing affects and has a potential to cause core damage.
Controlling reactor pressure, power and level with condensate and SRVs at 500 psig is difficult because all 3 parameters affect each other. Therefore, rapid depressurization is recommended when high pressure injection cannot be obtained.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 10 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 11 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004
\\,
CRITICAL TASKS The initial influence of reactor depressurization is stabilizing since the additional flashing of liquid phase required for depressurization introduces excess voids in the reactor core which can essentially terminate the fission process if the rate of depressurization is high enough. Once the depressurization is complete, however, the result is the immediate initiation of power excursions.
Core damage is expected to occur from high clad stresses induced by: temperature excursions above the rewet temperature, PCI, cyclic fatigue, burnout or having the fuel enthalpy exceed the cladding failure threshold.
Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task ATWS with initial reactor power level greater than 5% APRM power Performance Criteria Lower reactor water level by manually controlling injection rate from Feedwater, HPCl and/or RCIC.
Preventing injection such as RCIC and HPCl as level drops below -30" and -38" respectively may be required when Feedwater is available.
The preferred systems for use in controlling RPV water level are those Table 75 Systems which inject into the feedwater sparger or outside the core shroud. These are used because cold water is preheated by steam and the flow path outside the core shroud mixes the relatively cold injected water with the warmer water in the lower plenum prior to reaching the core. Injection from SLC and CRD are always permitted during ATWS events. The operator throttles existing injection except CRD and SLC and prevents unwanted injection as necessary to decrease level.
Performance Feedback Lowering water level to -60 to -1 10 inches will result in power level lowering as indicated on the Average Power Range Monitors.
Denotes Simulator Critical Task L:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 11 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 12 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 1-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 12 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1
I1 File No. RII-3
Page 13 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 SCENARIO REFERENCES
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
L--
- 5.
- 6.
SECURE 1A RHRSW PUMP SO-I 16-A03 OP-054-001 QUARTERLY RHRSW SYSTEM FLOW VERIFICATION DIVISION I, REV. 0 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM, REV. 21 TR 3.8.2.1 MOV THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION - CONTINUOUS, 4/2/02 RHRSW RAD MONITOR FAILS UPSCALE AR-109-FO1 TR 3.11.1.5 RHRSW A HI RADIATION, REV. 23 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID PROCESS MONITORING INSTR, 9/1/98 LOSS OF STATOR COOLING AR-106-EO4 AR-106-BO4 AR-106-EO9 OP-I 97-001 ON-197-001 STATOR COOLING WATER PANEL IC125 SYSTEM TROUBLE, REV. 28 STATOR COOLING WATER OUTLET HEADER HI TEMP, REV. 28 GEN CORE MONITOR STATOR/FIELD OVERHEATING, REV. 28 STATOR COOLING SYSTEM, REV. 20 LOSS OF STATOR COOLING, REV. 8 POWER REDUCTION GO-I 00-01 2 OP-AD-338 POWER MANEUVERS, REV. 19 COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR REACTIVITY MANIPULATIONS, REV. 1 GENERATOR LOCKOUT / TURBINE TRIP ON-100-1 01 SCRAM, REV. 11 EO-000-1 02 RPV CONTROL, REV. 1 RPS B FAILS TO TRIP / ATWS / SQUIB VALVES FAIL / I A EHC PUMP TRIP EO-000-1 13 ES-150-002 ES-150-001 ES-158-001 AR-105-103 EO-000-1 03 OP-149-005 OP-184-001 TS 3.1.7 LEVEL POWER CONTROL / CONTROL ROD INSERTION, REV. 1 BORON INJECTION VIA RCIC, REV. 13 RCIC TURBINE ISOLATION AND TRIP BYPASS, REV. 14 EHC HYD FLUID PUMP DSCH LO PRESS, REV. 17 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 2 RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING, REV. 21 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM, REV. 19 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEM, AMMEND. 178 DE-ENERGIZING SCRAM PILOT SOLENOIDS, REV. 6 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 13 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 14 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
'\\.--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 14 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 15 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 MALFS 6 : 6 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS REMFS OVRDS TRIGS 1
2 : 2 3
- 1. Set up the simulator for the scenario by performing the following:
- a. Initialize the simulator to IC-20, both Units at 100% power EOL.
- b. Insert rods to step 555 USING S/D Sequence B2, adjust total core flow for -90% power.
- c. Place 1A RHRSW pump in service per SO-I 16-A03.
- e. Place handswitch to STOP for 1B EHC pump.
- 2. Snapshot to an available IC (currently IC-103).
- 3. Initialize the simulator to IC-103.
MALFUNCTIONS PM01:lP113B OFF RL03:63XI14725Dl RL03:63X214725DI SL153001 A SL153001 B G
RPI 580078 REMOTE FUNCTIONS PMI 01 P I 13B OUT OVERRIDES AN : ARI 06B14 AN:ARlO6C15 1B EHC BKR CONTROL POWER RPS B FAIL TO TRIP ARI FAILURE ARI FAILURE SQUIB VALVE A FAIL SQUIB VALVE B FAIL 1 B EHC PUMP BKR RACKED OUT (Not associated with scenario setup)
(Not associated with scenario setup)
TRIGGERS I ACTIONS TRG E l = MRF RD155023 0 TRG El = IMF PM03:1P113A TRG E2 IL0601 RHRSWA TRG E2 = IMF TR02:RITSll216A (NONE 30 0) lE+6 0 ASlS TRG E l BAAA26409 EVENT TRIGGER - MODE SWITCH TO SHUTDOWN THROTTLE CRD MAN IS0 CLOSED WHEN E l IS TRUE 1A EHC PUMP TRIP WHEN A RHRSW PP SWITCH TO OFF E2 IS TRUE RHRSW RAD MONITOR FAILS UPSCALE
\\.-
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 15 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 16 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS PROGRAM BUlTONS
[P-I] IMF AV04:TCV10183 99 20~00 84 STATOR COOLING TCV-10183 FAIL
[P-2] bat YPBJLO-601A
[P-4] IMF PM03:1P113A
[P-5] bat RDB.VSAH
[P-6] bat RDB.RSAH
[P3] MRF RD155023 0 ACKNOWLEDGE AND RESET LOCAL IC125 ALARMS THROTTLE CRD MAN IS0 CLOSED 1A EHC PUMP TRIP VENT SCRAM AIR HEADER RESTORE SCRAM AIR HEADER
- 6. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:
- a. Unit 1 is at 90% power EOL; Unit 2 is at 100% power EOL.
- b. 1 B EHC pump is out of service for breaker maintenance and will not be returned to service this shift.
- c. RHR Loop 1A has just been secured from Suppression Pool cooling and 1A RHRSW pump is running for vibration data. Vibration recording is complete, shutdown RHRSW.
- d. ESW pumps A & B are in service to support Suppression Pool cooling operation. Remove pumps from service when RHRSW surveillance is completed.
- e. Chemistry and Reactor Engineering investigating spike in Off Gas activity during last Control Rod Exercising Surveillance.
- 8. Markup SO-I 16-A03 Quarterly RHRSW System Flow Verification Division I through step 5.1.2.
- 9. Prepare an OD-7 for the current rod pattern.
- 10. Prepare an OP-AD-338, Attachment E CONTROLLED SHUTDOWN / UNPLANNED POWER REDUCTION form. Enter 65 in step S-3 and enter 463 step S-4 3).
- 11. Insert the OD-7; OP-AD-338, Attachment E; and page 01 of the Shutdown Control Rod Sequence B2 into the CRC Book.
- 12. Prepare an OP-149-005, Attachment C entry for the Special Log Book for biocide injection. Indicate injection was performed 4 days previous to today, the exam date.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 16 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 17 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM Initial Conditions: Initialize the Simulator to IC-103. Place the Simulator to RUN. Ensure the Pronram Buttons are assinned as indicated on the Special Instructions sheet via the appropriate Preference File. Assiqn shift positions; direct the start of the 5-minute panel walkdown.
DESCRIPTION SECURE 1A RHRSW PUMP RHRSW RAD MONITOR FAILS UPSCALE LOSS OF STATOR COOLING (FAILURE OF TCV-10183)
POWER REDUCTION GENERATOR LOCKOUT / TURBINE TRIP RPS B FAILURE TO TRIP / ATWS SLC SYSTEM SQUIB VALVES FAIL 1A EHC PUMP TRIP Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 17 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 18 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM II \\.-
Event No:
I Brief
Description:
SECURE 1A RHRSW PUMP POSITION us PCOP TIME
- Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES
~
Directs shutdown of 1A RHRSW pump IAW SO-1 16-A03.
Complies with TR 3.8.2.1, MOV THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION-CONTINUOUS.
~~~
Implements SO-I 16-AO3, Quarterly RHRSW System Flow Verification Division I, Step 5.1.3.
- 1. Verifies the last biocide injection date in the Special Log Book.
- 2. Notifies US to comply with TR 3.8.2.1.
- 3. Reduces RHRSW flow to 1500 gpm by throttling close HV-11210A.
- 4. Stops RHRSW pump lP506A.
- 5. Closes HX Inlet valve HV-11210A.
- 6. Closes HX Outlet valve HV-11215A.
- 7. After 2 minutes returns motor overload bypass switch HS-11210A1 to OPERATE on OC697.
- 8. Ensures RHRSW pump Supply Fan 1V506A stops.
- 9. Dispatches Plant Operator to confirm 1A RHRSW pump discharge check valve external indicating arm in CLOSED position.
IO. Shuts down ESW pumps A & B IAW OP-054-001.
NOTES:
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 18 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 19 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004
-.-I/
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
1 Brief
Description:
SECURE 1A RHRSW PUMP INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As the Plant Operator sent to confirm 1A RHRSW pump discharge check valve external indicating arm in the CLOSED position, wait 5 minutes then report the external indicating arm is in the CLOSED position.
V I
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 19 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 20 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM b-Event No:
2 Brief
Description:
RHRSW RAD MONITOR FAILS UPSCALE STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports alarm RHR SW A HI RADIATION; refers to AR-109-FOl.
Checks indication for RR-Dl2-1 R606 on 1C600.
Dispatches Plant Operator to check operation of indicator and trip unit RITS-11216A.
Notifies Chemistry to obtain grab sample.
Contacts WWM to investigate RHRSW Rad Monitor problem.
Refers to TR 3.1 1.I 5,
RADIOACTIVE LIQUID PROCESS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION:
Declares RHRSW Rad Monitor inoDerable: enters Condition B of TR 3.1 1.I
.5.
Contacts WWM/Maintenance about failed RHRSW Rad Monitor
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 20 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R I 1-3
Page 21 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES
\\....-j Event No:
2 Brief
Description:
RHRSW RAD MONITOR FAILS UPSCALE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When 1A RHRSW pump is stopped verify after =30 seconds the RHRSW radiation monitor failure upscale, TRG E2 = IMF TR02:RITSII216A (NONE 30 0) 1E+6 0 ASlS RHRSW RM A FAIL UPSCALE ROLE PLAY:
As Chemistry contacted to obtain a grab sample of Unit 1 RHRSW, acknowledge the request to obtain a grab sample. No further information will be provided.
As Plant Operator sent to the indicator and trip unit, wait 2 minutes and report that a high radiation condition is indicated.
As WWM, acknowledge the request to investigate the RHRSW radiation monitor. No further information will be provided.
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 21 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 22 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 POSITION SCENARIO EVENT FORM TIME Event No:
394 Brief
Description:
LOSS OF STATOR COOLING (FAILURE OF TCV-10183) I POWER REDUCTION PCoM I
us I
- PCOP I I
- Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTlVlTl ES Reports alarm STATOR COOLING WATER PANEL 1C125 SYSTEM TROUBLE; refers to AR-1 06-E04.
Reports alarm STATOR COOLING WATER OUTLET HEADER HI TEMP; refers to AR-106-B04.
Verifies Stator Cooling water temperatures on PlCSY format and/or indication lights on 1 C668.
Dispatches Plant Operator to investigate loss of Stator Cooling.
Refers to OP-197-001, STATOR COOLING SYSTEM.
Directs Plant Operator to monitor/report Stator Cooling water temperatures and investigate Panel 1 C125 TROUBLE alarm.
Refers to ON-1 97-001, LOSS OF STATOR COOLING:
Directs generator load lowered to reduce temperature rise of Stator Coolina water Directs implementation of GO-100-01 2, POWER MANEUVERS.
Directs power reduction using instructions from the CRC Book.
Contacts WWM/Maintenance to investigate the loss of Stator Cooling.
Notifies ChemistwlHealth Physics Dower chanaed bv 15%.
Notifies System Engineer to perform temPerature trendina and evaluation.
Directs Scram Immanent actions per ON-I 00-1 01.
Implements GO-1 00-01 2, POWER MANEUVERS; reduces aenerator load as directed.
Plots power changes on the power to flow map; maintains core flow >65 mlbm/hr Notifies GCC power reduction is required due to loss of Stator Cooling.
II I
II NOTES:
I' JI
'v Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 22 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 23 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004
'i-INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
394 Brief
Description:
LOSS OF STATOR COOLING (FAILURE OF TCV-10183) / POWER REDUCTION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When actions are complete for RHRSW Rad Monitor failure insert a failure of Stator Cooling TCV-10183, Depress P-I :
[P-I] IMF AV04:TCV10183 99 20:OO 84 STATOR COOLING TCV-10183 FAIL Monitor PlCSY GENB or MNGEN or GSTOI and GSTO2 for indications and alarm status.
Monitor EC3 and LPI C12502 on Instructor Console for Stator Cooling parameter status.
To acknowledge alarms on local panel 1 C125, Depress P-2:
[P-2] bat YPB.IL0-601A ACKNOWLEDGE AND RESET LOCAL IC125 ALARMS ROLE PLAY:
The first alarm received in the Control Room will be STATOR COOLING WATER PANEL IC125 SYSTEM TROUBLE (AR-106-E04).
0 As Plant Operator sent to IC125 wait 2 minutes and report that the INLET TEMP HIGH (LA-I 125-002-A03) alarm is in and TISH-10183B is -
OF (read from EC3). Further investigation indicates heat exchanger delta p is -50 psid and TIC-I 01 83 is set at 108 OF.
In approximately 10 minutes, the second alarm received in the Control Room will be STATOR COOLING WATER OUTLET HEADER HI TEMP (AR-106-B04).
As Plant Operator at IC125 report that the OUTLET TEMP HIGH (LA-I 125-002-B01) alarm is in and TISH-10183A is greater than 165 OF. Investigation indicates TCV-10183 appears to be binding.
In approximately 8 more minutes, the third alarm received in the Control Room will be GEN CORE MONITOR STATOWFIELD OVERHEATING (AR-106-E09).
As Plant Operator at I C125 report that the GENERATOR PROTECTION CIRCUIT ENERGIZED (LA-I 125-002-COI) alarm is in and temperature from the stator is greater than 174 O F.
If directed by PCO transfer heat exchangers per OP-I 97-001.
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03;04)
Page 23 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 24 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 POSITION us PCOM
- PCOM SCENARIO EVENT FORM L-.
TIME Event No:
5, 6, 7, 8 Brief Descriotion:
GENERATOR LOCKOUT/TURBlNE TRIP I RPS By FAILURE TO TRlPlATWS I SLC SYSTEM SQUIB VALVES FAIL I I A EHC PUMP TRIP PCOP I
us I
- us 1
- PCOP PCOM
- PCOP 1
- us
- Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs manual scram BEFORE Generator Lockout occurs.
Places mode switch to SHUTDOWN.
~~
Recognizes and reports failure to scram.
Arms and depresses manual scram initiation pushbuttons.
Reports generator lockout and main turbine trip condition.
Initiates ARI; reports ARI has failed.
Ensures PC isolations, ECCS initiations, and Diesel Generator starts.
Enters EO-000-1 02, RPV CONTROL, and exits to EO-000-1 13, LEVEL POWER CONTROL.
Directs SLC initiated and ADS inhibited.
Initiates SLC.
- 1. Places SBLC manual initiation Keylock control switch to START.
- 2. Observes SBLC pumps 1 P208A and B start.
- 4. Verifies RWCU outboard isolation valve HV-144-FO04 closed.
Inhibits ADS.
Places ADS A and B Logic Control kevlock switches to INHIBIT.
Directs boron injection with RCIC IAW ES-150402, BORON INJECTION WITH RCIC.
NOTES:
5--..
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 24 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 25 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
5,6,7,8 Brief
Description:
GENERATOR LOCKOUTlTlJRBlNE TRIP I RPS B FAILURE TO TRlPlATWS I SLC SYSTEM SQUIB VALVES FAIL I 1A EHC PUMP TRIP INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When TSHIOI 83 is greater than 174 O F for 70 seconds the Main Turbine will trip.
When the mode switch is placed to SHUTDOWN, verify event trigger actuates to cause the CRD pressure throttling valve manual isolation valve to fail closed and trip 1A EHC pump.
NOTE: If trigger E l fails to actuate, Depress P-3 to cause the CRD pressure throttling valve manual isolation valve to fail closed preventing drifting control rods with CRD.
[P-31 MRF RDI55023 0 THROTTLE CRD MAN IS0 CLOSED NOTE: If trigger E l fails to actuate, Depress P-4 to insert a trip of 1A EHC pump.
[Pa] IMF PM03:1P113A 1A EHC PUMP TRIP ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 25 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 26 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
6,7,8 Brief
Description:
RPS By FAILURE TO TRlPlATWS / SLC SQUIB VALVES FAIL / 1A EHC PUMP TRIP L-POSITION PCOM
- us
- PCOM
Reports TBVs have CLOSED ( 2 minutes after EHC pump trip).
Directs insertion of control rods IAW EO-000-I 13 Sht. 2, Control Rod Insertion.
- 1. Directs maximizing CRD to drift control rods.
- 2. Directs bypassing RSCS and RWM and establishing normal CRD system parameters to manually drive control rods.
- 4. Directs pelformance of ES-158-001, DE-ENERGIZING SCRAM PILOT SOLENOIDS.
Inserts control rods IAW EO-000-1 13 Sht. 2, Control Rod Insertion.
- 1. Maximizes CRD to drift control rods.
- 2. Bypasses RSCS and RWM; attempts to establish normal CRD system parameters for manual rod insertion.
- 4. Recognizes/reports inability to establish normal CRD system parameters but continues with actions for manual rod insertion.
- 5. ReDorts manual control rod insertion is successful.
Directs lowering RPV water level to < -60 inches but > -161 inches.
Gives a target level band of -60 inches to -1 10 inches using Feedwater.
Directs overriding HPCl and RClC system injection.
Directs RPV Dressure stabilized below 1087 psin with SRVs.
Directs bwassinn MSlV and CIG interlocks.
Contacts WWM to investigate SLC system problem.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
L-Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 26 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 27 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
6, 7,8 Brief
Description:
RPS By FAILURE TO TRlPlATWS / SLC SQUIB VALVES FAIL I 1A EHC PUMP TRIP INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary NOTE:
Drywell pressure reaches 1.72 psig in 4 5 minutes.
Suppression Pool temperature reaches =I 50 O F in 16 minutes.
ROLE PLAY:
As necessary L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 27 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 28 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
6,798 Brief
Description:
RPS By FAILURE TO TRlPlATWS I SLC SQUIB VALVES FAIL I 1A EHC PUMP TRIP POSITION
- PCOM PCOP PCOP us PCOP TIME PCOM 1
STUDENT ACTIVITIES
~~
Lowers RPV water level to -60 inches but > -161 inches.
Overrides HPCl and RClC system injection by reducing flow controller setpoints.
~~~
Stabilizes RPV pressure below 1087 psig with SRVs.
Bypasses MSlV and CIG interlocks IAW OP-184-001, MAIN STEAM SYSTEM.
Reports Suppression Pool water temperature exceeds 90 OF.
~~
Enters EO-000-103, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, when SPT exceeds 90 O F.
Directs placing both loops of RHR in Suppression Pool cooling IAW OP-149-005, RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING.
Places both loops of Suppression Pool Cooling in service IAW OP-149-005, RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING.
- 1. Places ESW in service.
- 3. Opens Suppression Chamber test shutoff valve HV-151-FO28A I B.
- 4. Starts RHR pump 1 P202A(C) / B(D).
- 5. Throttles open test line control valve HV-F024A I B to achieve 51 0,000 gpm on
- 6. Observes minimum flow valve HV-151 -F007A / B closes at - 3000 gpm.
- 7. Closes heat exchanger bypass HV-151-F048A/ B.
- 8. Checks RHR pump room coolers 1V21OA(C) / B (D) started.
FI-Ell-1 R603 A I B.
Reports loss of Condensate and Feedwater when Drywell pressure exceeds 1.72 psig.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
\\-
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 28 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 29 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Lc Event No:
6 7 3 Brief
Description:
RPS B FAILURE TO TRlPlATWS I SLC SQUIB VALVES FAIL I 1A EHC PUMP TRIP INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When Suppression Pool water temperature reaches 4 50 OF, or 15 minutes after requested to vent the Scram Air Header, Depress P-5:
[P-5] bat RDB.VSAH VENT SCRAM AIR HEADER NOTE:
Monitor P&ID RD6 for status of ventinglrestoring scram air header.
Monitor HCTL curve on PlCSY to ensure the SAH is vented in time to prevent violating this curve.
ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator venting the scram air header, inform the control room that you have closedkhecked-closed 147002A/B and uncapped and opened 147007. Air has rushed out of the header and has now stopped.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 29 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 30 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
6, 738 Brief
Description:
RPS By FAILURE TO TRIPIATWS I SLC SQUIB VALVES FAIL / I A EHC PUMP TRIP
- Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Re-enters EO-000-1 13 when Drywell pressure exceeds 1.72 psig.
Directs RPV level control with HPCI and RCIC; level band < -60 inches but > -161 inches with a target level band of -60 inches to -1 10 inches.
Restoreslmaintains RPV level control with HPCl & RCIC between -60 inches and -161 inches (-1 10 inches).
Verifies control rod insertion as the scram air header is vented; reports all rods fully inserted.
Directs restoration of scram air header.
Directs stopping actions for ES-150-002, BORON INJECTION WITH RCIC.
Directs stopping actions for ES-158-001, DE-ENERGIZING SCRAM PILOT SOLENOIDS.
Exits EO-000-1 13 Sheets 1 and 2; re-enters EO-000-1 02.
Directs establishing RPV water level +13 to +54.
Establishes RPV water level +13 to +54 with HPCVRCIC.
~
Directs Plant Operator to restore the scram air header.
After the scenario is complete, determines TS 3.7.7 RA C. 7 is applicable for the failure of both SLC subsystems. If RA C. 7 not completed within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, the unit must be in Mode 3 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
After the scenario is complete, classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY under EAL MS3 due to RPS and ARI failure.
NOTES:
v Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 30 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 31 Scenario ILO-601 Rev. 0, 2/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
6,7,8 Brief
Description:
RPS B FAILURE TO TRIPIATWS I SLC SQUIB VALVES FAIL / 1A EHC PUMP TRIP INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
NOTE:
If directed to restore the scram air header following venting, wait 2 minutes then, Depress P-6 Monitor P&ID RD6 for status of venting/restoring scram air header.
[P-6] bat RDB.RSAH RESTORE SCRAM AIR HEADER ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator directed to restore the scram air header, wait 2 minutes and report that you have closed and capped 147007 and re-opened 147002A, which was the supply valve that was previously open.
TERMINATION CUE:
-._... All control rods have been inserted and actions are in progress to maximize Suppression Pool cooling and restore RPV water level to +13 to +54.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DETERMINATION:
After the scenario is complete, have the US determine any Technical Specification requirements due to the failure of SLC to inject.
EVENT CLASSIFICATION:
After the Scenario is complete, have the US classify the scenario for the HIGHEST EAL. Provide the US with any requested information needed to perform the classification.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 31 of 31 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I (1 Facility: Susauehanna Scenario No.: ILO-302 Op-Test No.:
NIA Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 at 80% Dower EOL, Unit 2 in Mode 4 Turnover: CRD pump 1B is out of service for breaker maintenance and is not expected to return this shift. Condensate Dump 1B has a possible qround, requirinq the crew to remove 1B Condensate pump from service for inspection. No surveillance activities are planned or due during the shift.
Chemistry and Reactor Enaineerinn are investiaatinn a spike in Off-Gas activity during the last Control Rod Exercise Surveillance.
I I
I Malf. No.
Event Event No. I I
N Event Description Shutdown I B Condensate Pump 2
C Condensate Minimum Flow Recirc Valve Failure 3
I A
Narrow Range Level Instrument Fails Upscale C
Fuel Clad Failure I
C I
C RPS A Failure to Trip D Main Steam Line Failure to Isolate Main Steam Line Leak in Turbine Building Radioactivity Release Rapid Depressurization L (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2004 NRC Exam Rev. 1 Susquehanna Facsimile
PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER Prepared By:
Instructor Reviewed By:
Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor Approved By:
Supervising ManagedShift Supervisor SIMULATOR SCENARIO Date Date Date Scenario
Title:
ILO CERTIFICATION / NRC EXAM SCENARIO Scenario Duration:
90 Minutes Scenario Number:
ILO-302 Revision/Date:
Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 Course:
PCOO7/PCOO8, Initial License ROISRO Certification Examination PCOl7/PCOl8, Initial License ROlSRO NRC Examination Operational Activities:
- 1. Shutdown 1B Condensate Pump
- 6. D MSL Failure to Isolate
- 2. Cond Min Flow Recirc Valve Failure
- 7. MSL Leak in Turbine Building (5)
- 3. A NR Level Instrument Fails Upscale (15)
- 8. Radioactivity Release (14)
- 4. Fuel Clad Failure (4)
- 9. Rapid Depressurization
- 5. RPS A Failure to Trip Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 1 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 2 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004
---.I Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 2 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. I THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3
Page 3 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 L.
SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 80% power EOL and Unit 2 in MODE 4. 1B CRD pump is out of service for breaker maintenance. Condensate pump 1 B has a possible ground; the crew will shutdown Condensate pump 1 B for inspection. The crew will recognize the Condensate pump minimum flow recirc valve failed open and will manually close the valve to maintain proper condensate pump header pressure.
Following the shutdown of 1 B Condensate pump the A Narrow Range Level instrument will fail upscale.
Feedwater level control system response will stabilize RPV water level at x +23 in automatic. The crew will implement an Off-Normal procedure to transfer RPV water level control from averaged level control to selected level control and return RPV water level control to automatic.
Following the water level perturbation a fuel clad failure will result in Turbine Building area high radiation and increasing main steam line radiation. The crew will respond by decreasing Reactor power. Radiation levels will continue to rise requiring the crew to manually scram the Reactor and manually close the MSlVs and MSL drains. When the mode switch is placed to shutdown a failure to scram will occur when RPS A fails to trip. The control rods will insert when the crew initiates ARI.
Following the scram a main steam line break will occur in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel. The D MSL fails to isolate resulting in a sustained release to the Turbine Building. Release rates from the Turbine Building Vent Stack will increase above the ALERT level requiring entry into Radioactive Release Emergency Operating Procedure, EO-000-1 05. The crew will request performance of dose calculations and conduct a Reactor cooldown at < I OO°F/hr. When off-site dose calculations exceed the General Emergency level the crew will rapidly depressurize the Reactor.
The scenario will be terminated when the crew has performed a Rapid Depressurization and restored RPV water level to +13 to +54.
L/
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 3 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 4 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 4 of 29 2004 NRC Exam. Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3
Page 5 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 v
SCENARIO OBJECTIVES The objective of this scenario is to evaluate the licensed operator candidates ability to respond to the scenario events. These events will require each candidate to demonstrate the following:
Knowledge of integrated plant operations 0
Ability to diagnose abnormal plant conditions Ability to work together as a team 0
0 Ability to mitigate plant transients that exercise their knowledge and use of ONs and EOPs Ability to utilize Technical Specifications (SRO Only)
To meet this objective, the licensed operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency in the following competencies:
Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. InterpreUdiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures, references, and Technical Specifications
- 3. Operate the control boards
- 4. Communicate and interact with other crew members Senior Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. InterpreUdiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures and references
- 3. Operate the control boards (N/A to upgrade candidates)
- 4. Communicate and interact with the crew and other personnel
- 5. Direct shift operations
- 6. Comply with and use Technical Specifications v
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 5 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page, 6 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 L-,
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 6 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I
I1 File No. RII-3
Page 7 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 CRITICAL TASKS L
It
- Recoqnize failure to scram and initiate ARI Safety Significance Initiation of ARI provides an independent and redundant means of depressurizing the reactor scram air header and operating the scram discharge volume vent and drain valves, causing rapid control rod insertion.
Rapid control rod insertion initiates an immediate power reduction and, in the case of a fuel clad failure, will quickly reduce the amount of radiation being released from the Reactor.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to insert control rods allows power to remain elevated with continued release of radiation from the Reactor and also increases the potential for additional fuel damage.
Also, OP-AD-055, Operations Procedure Program, Section 9, defines Immediate Operator Actions as: Actions required immediately after the start of an event to stop the degradation of and mitigate the consequences of conditions that threaten fuel, RPV, or primary containment.... Attachment C of this procedure lists the following Immediate Operator Actions:
MSL RAD Increasing but e
Trip Point (Fuel Clad e
Failure)
Existing Scram Condition e
e e
e e
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 7 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 Reduce Reactor Power If Power Decrease did not stop RAD increase:
- Manually Scram Reactor AND
- Isolate MSlVs and MSL Drains PLACE Mode SW to S/D OBSERVE all-rods-in If More than 1 Rod > 00
- Arm and Depress Manual Scram PBs
- Initiate ARI Insert SRMs & IRMs Ensure:
- Primary Containment Isolations
- ECCS Initiations
- DGs Start
&NJ File No. R11-3
Page 8 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004
\\-
CRITICAL TASKS IndicationslCues for Event Requiring Critical Task Manual insertion of an RPS scram with NO control rod motion.
Performance Criteria Insert control rods by manually initiating ARI.
Performance Feedback Successful insertion of control rods will be indicated by rod position full-in indication following manual initiation of ARI.
- Perform Rapid Depressurization before EPB proiected dose / dose rates reach General Emergency declaration criteria Safety Significance In order to minimize radiation exposure to the public, Rapid Depressurization of the RPV is required if a primary system is discharging and the radioactivity release rate cannot be controlled below the release rate that requires a General Emergency.
L-Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions will result in increased dose and/or dose rates at the EPB.
RR-6 BEFORE EPB PROJECTED DOSE/DOSE RATE REACHES GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARATION CRITERIA RAPID DEPRESS IS REQ'D An offsite radioactivity release rate above the General Emergency action level represents a substantial increase in the severity of the offsite radioactivity release, relative to the entry condition, and accordingly presents a more immediate threat to the continued health and safety of the public.
Rapid depressurization is directed before the release rate reaches the General Emergency level to reduce the radioactivity release rate.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 8 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 9 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 CRITICAL TASKS IndicationslCues for Event Requiring Critical Task Offsite radiation exposures and radiation release rates are obtained from dose projections normally performed by NERO personnel. The results of these projections are then transmitted to the Control Room Crew. The Crew must determine that the calculated results exceed the limits for General Emergency level releases (1 R or 1 Whour TEDE or 5R or 5Whour Thyroid CDE at the EPB) as noted on EO-000-105 Table 13.
Performance Criteria Perform a Rapid Depressurization per EO-000-1 12 when EPB dose or dose rates are projected to exceed EO-000-1 05 Table 13 values.
Initiate ADS / Manually open all 6 ADS valves.
Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower which lowers the driving force of any primary system breach.
Verify ADS valves are open using red light indication, acoustic monitoring, lowering Reactor pressure and rising Reactor water level.
Denotes Simulator Critical Task.
\\-
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 9 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 10 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 L-.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 10 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. Rl l-3
Page 11 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 SCENARIO REFERENCES
- 1. SHUTDOWN 1 B CONDENSATE PUMP / CONDENSATE MIN FLOW RECIRC VALVE FAILURE OP-I 44-00 1 CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM, REV. 31
- 2. A NARROW RANGE INSTRUMENT FAILS UPSCALE AR-101 -AI 7 ON-145-001 TS 3.3.2.2 RX WATER HI LEVEL, REV. 30 RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, REV. 14 FEEDWATER / MAIN TURBINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP, AMENDMENT 178 AR-101-Bl7 RX WATER HI-LO LEVEL, REV. 30
- 3. FUEL CLAD FAILURE AR-101-BO5 AR-101-C05 AR-103-DO1 AR-111 -C03 ON-100-101 ON-159-002 EO-000-1 02 EO-000-1 04 RX BLDG AREA PANEL IC605 HI RADIATION, REV. 30 TURB BLDG AREA PANEL IC605 HI RADIATION, REV. 30 MN STM LINE HI HI RADIATION, REV. 25 MN STM LINE RAD MONITOR HI RADIATION, REV. 27 SCRAM, REV. 11 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, REV. 22 RPV CONTROL, REV. 1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 1
- 4. RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP OP-AD-055 EO-000-1 13 OPERATIONS PROCEDURE PROGRAM, REV. 0 LEVEUPOWER CONTROL, REV. 1
- 5. D MSL FAILURE TO ISOLATE / MSL LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING AR-015-DO4 STACK MONITORING SYS OC63O/OC677 HI-HI RADIATION, REV. 29 AR-OI5-EO4 AR-111-BO3 AR-112-BO3 ON-070-001 TS 3.6.1.3 STACK MONITORING SYS OC63O/OC677 HI RADIATION, REV. 29 MN STM LINE LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP, REV. 27 MN STM LINE LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP, REV. 26 ABNORMAL GASEOUS RADIATION RELEASEEAM ALARMS, REV. 13 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES, AMMEND. 195
- 6. RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE / RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION EO-000-1 05 EO-000-1 12 EO-000-1 03 OP-149-005 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL, REV. 1 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION, REV. 1 PRIMARY COMTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 2 RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING, REV. 21 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 11 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 12 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004
-_A_
\\--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 12 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3
Page 13 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0. 2/9/2004 MALFS 4 : 4 SC E NARlO SPEC I AL INSTRUCTIONS REMFS OVRDS TRIGS 3
3 : 3 3
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Initialize the simulator to IC-18: Unit I at 80% power EOL, Unit 2 in MODE 4.
Reduce Recirc flow to 75.6 MLBM/HR to achieve -80% reactor power Snapshot to an available IC (currently IC-106).
Type restorepref YPP.IL0-302; verify the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments.
Verify the Environment window:
MALFUNCTIONS RPI 58007A AVO6:HV141 F022D I00 AV06:HVI41 F028D I00 TR02:XlT03701 2 TR02:XTT03730 2 REMOTE FUNCTIONS EN100002 2 EN100009 0.3 PM131Pl32B OUT OVERRIDES ZAOXR03705A AN:AR106B14 AN:ARI 06C15 TRIGGERS / ACTIONS E l BAAA26409 E l = IMF MS183008 0.9 E2 IL0302CONDPP E2 = IMF AV04:FV10508 10 E3 IL0302COND E3 = DMF AVO4:FVOI 508 PROGRAM BUTTONS
[P-I] IMF TR02:PDTC321N004A 60 0 ASlS
[P-2] IMF RR179003 90 1300
[P-3] bat YPB.1 LO-302A RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP MSlV F022D BIND DURING MOTION MSlV F028D BIND DURING MOTION SET WIND SPEED AT 60 M @ 2MPH SET WIND SPEED AT B/U TWR @ 2MPH SET WIND SPEED AT 2 M @ 2 MPH SET WIND SPEED VARlABLlLlTY @ 0.3 MPH 1 B CRD PUMP BKR RACKED OUT SET WIND SPEED AT 10 M @ 2 MPH (Not associated with scenario setup)
(Not associated with scenario setup)
EVENT TRIGGER MODE SWITCH IN SHUTDOWN D MSL LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING B COND PUMP STOP SWITCH STICK MIN FLOW VALVE AT 10% OPEN MIN FLOW CONTROLLER IN MANUAL REMOVE MIN FLOW VALVE MALFUNCTION NR LEVEL A FAILURE UPSCALE FUEL FAILURE 90 PINS RAMP TB SPING RELEASE RATES Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 13 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 14 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
Verify LEFM is selected as the Feedwater flow input to PlCSY IAW 01-TA-021.
Prepare a Reactor Engineering Instructions package.
Prepare/markup GO-I 00-012 up through step 5.74.
Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:
- a. Unit 1 is at 80% power EOL.
- b. CRD pump 1 B is out of service for breaker maintenance, it is not expected to return this shift.
- c. Condensate pump 1 B has a possible ground; shutdown Condensate pump 1 B for inspection immediately after shift turnover.
- d. No surveillance activities are planned or due during the shift.
- e. Chemistry and RX Engineering still investigating spike in Off-gas activity during the last Control Rod Exercise Surveillance.
- f. Unit 2 is in MODE 4.
Prepare a MIDAS DOSE
SUMMARY
REPORT form.
I O. Make a copy of shift assignments.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 14 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R11-3
Page 15 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 EVENT SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM TIME Initial Conditions: Initialize the Simulator to IC-106. Place the Simulator to RUN. Ensure the Program Buttons are assiqned as indicated on the Special Instructions sheet via the appropriate Preference File. Assign shift positions; direct the start of the 5-minute panel walkdown.
1 I
3 1
4 I
5 1
6 I
7 1
8 1
9 I
DESCRIPTION SHUTDOWN 1B CONDENSATE PUMP CONDENSATE MIN FLOW RECIRC VALVE FAILURE A
NR LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILS UPSCALE FUEL CLAD FAILURE RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP D MSL FAILURE TO ISOLATE MSL LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 15 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 16 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
I, 2 Brief
Description:
SHUTDOWN 1B CONDENSATE PUMP / MINIMUM FLOW RECIRC VALVE FAILURE STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs shutdown of 1B Condensate pump IAW OP-144-001, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM.
Implements OP-144-001, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM.
I. Depresses STOP pushbutton for 1 B Condensate pump.
Implements OP-I 44-001, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM.
- 1. Ensures 1B Condensate pump discharge valve (HV10502B) closes.
- 2. Observes Condensate header pressure to ensure greater than 530 psig.
Recognizes Condensate header pressure is less than 530 psig on PlCSY format.
Determines Condensate recirc valve FV-10508 is not fully closed.
Places Condensate recirc valve controller FIC-1 0508 in MANUAL and closes the valve.
Dispatches Plant Operator to investigate problem with FV-10508.
Notifies WCC/Maintenance 1 B Condensate pump is shutdown.
Notifies WCC of problem with Condensate recirc valve FV-10508.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
1 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 16 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 17 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES I
Event No:
192 Brief
Description:
SHUTDOWN 1B CONDENSATE PUMP I MINIMUM FLOW RECIRC VALVE FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When Condensate pump 1 B stopped, ensure event trigger E2 (IL0302CONDPP) actuates to fail recirc valve FV-10508 at 10% open (IMF AVO4:FVIO508 IO).
When Condensate recirc valve controller FIC-I 0508 placed in MANUAL, ensure event trigger E3 (IL0302COND) actuates to remove recirc valve FV-I 0508 malfunction (DMF AV04:FV10508).
Monitor the condensate system on FW7.
ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator dispatched to investigate Condensate recirc valve FV-I 0508, wait - 2 minutes and IF the valve has not yet been closed from the control room, report it sounds like there is flow in the recirc line. IF the valve has already been closed, report there is no indication on any problems associated with the valve.
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Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 17 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 18 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 POSITION TIME SCENARIO EVENT FORM STUDENT ACTlVlTl ES Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
A NR LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILS UPSCALE PCOM I
I Reports alarms RX WATER HI-LO LEVEL and RX WATER HI LEVEL.
I I Reports A NR level reading +60.
I I Observes FWLC resDonse to stabilize RPV water level.
Reports 9 and C NR level indication stabilizes at -22.5 Reports A Hi Water Level Trip green status light is ON.
Refers to AR-101-917, RX WATER HI-LO LEVEL.
Refers to AR-101-A17, RX WATER HI LEVEL.
us Directs implementation of ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.
PCOM NOTE 1 Implements ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.
- 1. Places FW LEVEL CTUDEMAND SIGNAL LIC-C32-1 R600 controller in MAN.
- 2. Adjusts LIC-C32-1 R600 to restore RPV water level to -+ 35.
- 3. Selects B NR level signal input.
- 4. Transfers from AVERAGED to SELECTED level.
- 5. Nulls FW LEVEL CTUDEMAND LIC-C32-1 R600 controller.
- 6.
Places FW LEVEL CTUDEMAND LIC-C32-1 R600 controller in AUTO.
us Contacts WWM to investigate A NR level instrument failure.
Refers to TS 3.3.2.2; declares A NR level channel inoperable, enters Condition A.
I I
- Denotes Critical Task
- 1)
NOTES:
(1) If level not restored to - 35 inches (> 30 inches) prior to transfer to B SELECTED 11 level input signal, a #2 Recirc runback will occur.
.--/
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 18 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 19 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES
--+--
Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
A NR LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILS UPSCALE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the actions are complete for the Condensate recirc valve failure, insert A NR level instrument failure upscale; Depress P-I :
[P-I] IMF TR02PDTC321 N004A 60 0 ASIS NR LEVEL A FAILURE UPSCALE ROLE PLAY:
As WWM sent to investigate A NR level problem, wait 5 minutes, and report the differential pressure transmitter is failed and must be replaced and calibrated. The repairs are expected to take approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 19 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 20 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 POSITION TIME PCOM SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
4 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports alarm TURB BLDG AREA PANEL 1C605 HI RADIATION.
Observes Turbine building area radiation reading on PICSY.
Reports increasing radiation levels: TURBINE FRONT END, SJAE RM and FEEDWATER HEATER AREA.
Refers to AR-101-CO5, TURB BLDG AREA PANEL IC605 HI RADIATION.
us II I
I Evacuates Unit 1 TB of all non-essential personnel.
Contacts HP to perform HP-TP-441.
Directs PCOP to monitor MSL and Off-gas radiation levels on PICSY and/or panel 1 C600.
PCOM 11 PCOP Reports alarm RX BLDG AREA PANEL 1 C605 HI RADIATION.
Refers to AR-101-B05, RX BLDG AREA PANEL IC605 HI RADIATION.
I Reports radiation levels are increasing for MSL and Off-gas.
I Reports alarm MN STM LINE RAD MONITOR HI RADIATION; refers to AR-111-CO3.
II I Checks MSL and Off-gas radiation monitors for indication and trend.
I Enters EO-I 00-1 04, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.
Refers to ON-I 59-002, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, ATTACHMENT F.
Directs power reduction using Recirc flow.
II I May enter ON-100-101, SCRAM and direct scram imminent actions.
11 PCOM I Reduces power by reducing Recirc flow.
II I Performs scram imminent actions if directed.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
\\
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 20 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 21 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
4 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When FWLC master controller is restored to auto insert a fuel clad failure, Depress P-2:
[P-2] IMF RR179003 90 15:OO FUEL FAILURE 90 PINS NOTE:
Turbine building area high radiation alarm is received in e1 minute.
Main steam line high radiation alarm is received in - 7 minutes.
ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 21 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 22 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 POSITION TIME PCOM PCOM us PCOM SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
435 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE I RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP STUDENT ACTIVITIES Monitors Reactor Building radiation levels on PlCSY (RADRX, RXBE).
Reports increasing radiation levels: CRD N & S, HPCl ROOM, RClC ROOM and RB SUMP AREA.
Evacuates Unit 1 RB of all non-essential personnel.
Performs scram imminent actions if directed.
Reports alarm MN STM LINE HI HI RADIATION.
Refers to AR-103-DO1, MN STM LINE HI HI RADIATION.
Directs manually scramming Reactor; enters ON-1 00-1 01, SCRAM.
Places the Reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN.
us
- us
- PCOP NOTE 1 PCOM Arms and depresses manual scram pushbuttons.
Enters EO-000-102, RPV CONTROL, and exits to EO-000-1 13, LEVEL POWER CONTROL.
Ensures ARI initiation.
Initiates ARI.
I. Arms and depresses Division 1 and Division 2 ARI pushbuttons.
- 2.
Reports ARI has actuated.
- 3.
Reports all control rods are fully inserted.
- PCOM I
NOTES:
I Recognizes and reports failure to scram.
(1) IAW Attachment C of OP-AD-055, this is an Immediate Operator Action for a scram
Page 23 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 L-INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
495 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE I RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the crew places the Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN, verify trigger E l activates to initiate a steam leak in the Steam Tunnel.
E l (BAAA26409) = IMF MS183008 0.9 ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 23 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 24 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004
~
PCOP us NOTE 1 PCOP SCENARIO EVENT FORM L-Event No:
45 6 7 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE I RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP I D MSL FAILURE TO ISOLATE I MSL NOTES:
LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING (I) A common error is Rapid Depressurization when the radiation levels on elevations POSITION I TIME
- Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Exits EO-000-1 13 and re-enters EO-000-102.
Directs closure of MSlVs and drains IAW ON-1 59-002, Attachment F.
~~
Directs RPV water level maintained +13 to +54 with RClC and CRD.
Directs RPV pressure maintained 4087 psig with SRVs.
Directs PCOM to reset main generator lockouts.
Manually closes MSlVs and drains.
Reports D MSL failed to isolate.
Verifies D MSL flow indication on 1C652 indication FI-C32-1 R603D.
Enters EO-000-1 04, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.
Contacts maintenance for the MSlV failures in D MSL.
Reports alarm STACK MONITORING SYS OC63O/OC677 HI RADIATION.
Refers to AR-015-EO4, STACK MONITORING SYS OC63O/OC677 HI RADIATION.
Checks SPING, reports increasing TB Stack Noble Gas.
Reports alarms MN STM LINE LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP DIV 1 / 2.
Verifies 1C614 temperature readings; reports high temperature in TB Steam Tunnel.
I Containment area throughout this scenario.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 24 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 25 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES
=
Event No:
4,5,6,7 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE I RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP I D MSL FAILURE TO ISOLATE I MSL LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the MSlVs and drains are closed increase TB release rates, Depress P-3:
[P-3] bat YPB.IL0302A RAMP TB SPING RELEASE RATES ROLE PLAY:
As necessary
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Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 25 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 26 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM L-Event No:
8,9 Brief
Description:
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE / RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION POSITION us PCOP
- us
- PCOP TIME
~
~
STUDENT ACTIVITIES Enters EO-000-1 05, RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE, when TB Iodine or NG release rate exceeds ALERT Level.
Reauests Off-Site Dose Calculations.
Directs Reactor cooldown c 1 OO"F/hr with SRVs.
Initiates cooldown c 100"F/hr using SRVs.
Directs Rapid Depressurization before EPB projected doseldose rate reaches the General Emergency declaration criteria.
- 1. Enters EO-000-1 12, RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION.
- 2. Directs preventing uncontrolled Condensate injection.
- 3. Verifies Suppression Pool level > 5 feet.
Performs Rapid Depressurization by opening all ADS SRVs.
- 1. Arms and depresses Division 2 ADS manual pushbuttons and verifies 6 red lights lit for ADS solenoids,
- 2. Places individual control switch to open for each ADS SRV (G, J, K, L, M, & N) and verifies red light lit and amber light not lit for each valve solenoid.
0 Observes RPV pressure decrease.
0 Observes 6 ADS SRVs open on acoustic monitor status light indication.
Observes elevated tail pipe temperatures on TRS-B21-1 R614.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 26 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 27 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L
Event No:
8 ? 9 Brief
Description:
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE / RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
Approximately 10 minutes after the crew enters EO-000-1 05 and Off-Site Dose Calculations have been requested, report to the Control Room as the TSC Dose Calculator and provide the crew the attached MIDAS report.
NOTE:
Off-Site dose is projected to reach 1.6 Rem TEDE based on existing release rate and plant conditions.
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 27 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 28 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM
-c--
Event No:
8,9 Brief
Description:
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION POSITION us PCOM PCOP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs RPV level restored and maintained +13 to +54 with Condensate.
Enters EO-000-103, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, due to Suppression Pool temperature =. 90°F.
Directs placing both loops of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling.
Restores and maintains RPV level at +13 to +54 with Condensate.
Places both loops of Suppression Pool Cooling in service IAW OP-149-005, RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING.
I.
Places ESW in service.
- 3. Opens Suppression Chamber test shutoff valve HV-151-FO28A I B.
- 4. Starts RHR pump 1 P202A(C) / B(D).
- 5. Throttles open test line control valve HV-F024A / B to achieve ~10,000 gpm on
- 6. Observes minimum flow valve HV-151-FO07A / B closes at - 3000 gpm.
- 7. Closes heat exchanger bypass HV-151 -F048A / B.
- 8. Checks RHR pump room coolers 1V21OA(C) / B (D) started.
FI-Ell-1 R603 A I B.
~
~
~
~~
~~
After the scenario is complete, determines TS 3.6.1.3 RA B. I is applicable for the failure of both MSlVs in Dmain steam line. If RA B.1 not completed within I hour, the unit must be in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
After the scenario is complete, classifies the event as a GENERAL EMERGENCY under EAL RGI due to projected dose rates exceeding the limits at the EPB.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
i Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 28 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 29 Scenario ILO-302 Rev. 0, 2/9/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES
-s Event No:
8,9 Brief
Description:
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary TERMINATION CUE:
Rapid depressurization has been performed and RPV water level has been restored to +13 to +54.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DETERMINATION:
After the scenario is complete, have the US determine any Technical Specification requirements due to the failure to isolate the D Main Steam Line.
EVENT CLASSIFICATION:
After the Scenario is complete, have the US classify the scenario for the HIGHEST EAL. Provide the US with any requested information needed to perform the classification.
L Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 29 of 29 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility : Susq uehan na Scenario No.: ILO-401 Op-Test No.:
N/A Event Malf. No.
Event No.
Type*
Examiners:
Operators:
Event Description Initial Conditions: Unit I at 69% power EOL. Unit 2 at 100% power EOL L./
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 C
Condensate Pump C Trip / RFPT A Control Signal Failure Containment Instrument Gas Leak on PT-12643 C
M Outboard MSlV Closure C
2 SRVs Stick Open C
C HPCl Auto Start Failure C
ADS Auto Logic Failure M
Rapid Depressurization Bottom Head Drain Line Leak N
I Drywell Unit Coolers/Fans Surveillance 2
1 C
1 Trip of Drywell Fan 1V414A 2004 NRC Exam Rev. 1 Susquehanna Facsimile
PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER Reviewed By:
Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor Approved By:
Supervising ManagedShift Supervisor SIMULATOR SCENARIO Date Date Scenario
Title:
ILO CERTIFICATION / NRC EXAM SCENARIO Scenario Duration:
90 Minutes Scenario Number:
ILO-401 Revis i o n/Date :
Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 Course:
PCOO7/PCOO8, Initial License ROISRO Certification Examination PCOI 7/PC018, Initial License ROlSRO NRC Examination Operational Activities:
- 1. Drywell Unit CoolerslFans Surveillance
- 6. 2 SRVs Stick Open
- 2. Trip of Drywell Fan 1V414A
- 7. Bottom Head Drain Line Leak
- 3. Condensate Pump C Trip l RFPT A
- 8. HPCl Auto Start Failure Control Signal Failure
- 9. ADS Auto Logic Failure
- 4. CIG Leak on PT-I2643 IO. Rapid Depressurization
- 5. Outboard MSlV Closure Prepared By:
I Instructor I
Date
Page 2 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 L
2 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 2 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3
Page 3 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The plant is operating with Unit 1 at -70% power and Unit 2 at 100% power. RClC is tagged out for maintenance. The scenario begins with the crew performing the quarterly LOCA test of Drywell Area Unit Coolers and Fans IAW SO-160-001. During this test, fan 1V414A trips, resulting in a failed surveillance test and the need for the Unit Supervisor to take the required actions of Tech Specs.
After the crew responds to the failed Drywell Cooler Fan, Condensate Pump C will trip along with a simultaneous RFPT A control signal failure. The crew will respond by taking manual control of the Feedwater Level Control System.
This is followed by a leak on Containment Instrument Gas pressure transmitter PT-12643. The crew will respond to the Control Room annunciator and dispatch an operator to the field who will report the leak.
The leak causes a swap to the bottle header and requires a Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements review by the US.
After actions for the failed CIG instrument are complete, the outboard MSlVs will fail closed. This initiates a Reactor scram and the resulting RPV pressure surge causes the bottom head drain line inside the Drywell to crack. The SRVs operate to limit the pressure rise as designed; however, two SRVs (G and K) stick open, The crew will attempt to close the stuck open SRVs IAW ON-183-001, but will not be successful. However, 3-4 minutes into the event, the SRVs will close.
The crew will enter EO-000-102, RPV Control, at 1087 psig, and EO-000-103, Primary Containment Control, @ 1.72 psig and 150°F. At 1.72 psig, HPCl will fail to auto start, but when manually initiated, HPCl trips and cannot be restarted. RClC is unavailable (tagged out of service for maintenance).
Drywell pressure and temperature continue to increase. Elevated Drywell temperatures will require the crew to evaluate Figure 1, RPV Saturation Temperature to verify level instrument availability.
RPV level continues to drop due to the break on the bottom head drain line. At -38, the Recirc pumps trip, resulting in a +50 level swell. SRV operation to maintain RPV pressure c 1087 will result in inventory loss (maximized CRD is the only source of high pressure injection). When RPV level is < -161 and RPV pressure is > 125 psig (EO-000-1 02 step RC/L-15), the crew will be required to rapidly depressurize.
Condensate will not inject due to pre-inserted failures of the Feedwater Low Load Valve (HV-10641) and Bypass (HV-10640). After water level is recovered, the crew will address containment parameters.
The scenario will be terminated when RPV level is restored to + I 3 to +54 and primary containment parameters are being addressed.
L-.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 3 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 4 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK L--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 4 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 5 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 i_
SCENARIO OBJECTIVES The objective of this scenario is to evaluate the licensed operator candidates ability to respond to the scenario events. These events will require each candidate to demonstrate the following:
0 Knowledge of integrated plant operations Ability to diagnose abnormal plant conditions 0
0 0
Ability to work together as a team Ability to mitigate plant transients that exercise their knowledge and use of ONs and EOPs Ability to utilize Technical Specifications (SRO Only)
To meet this objective, the licensed operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency in the following competencies:
Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. lnterpretldiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings L.
- 2. Comply with and use procedures, references, and Technical Specifications
- 3. Operate the control boards
- 4. Communicate and interact with other crew members Senior Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. Interpretldiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures and references
- 3. Operate the control boards (N/A to upgrade candidates)
- 4. Communicate and interact with the crew and other personnel
- 5. Direct shift operations
- 6. Comply with and use Technical Specifications L--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 5 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 6 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 i--
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 6 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. R11-3
Page 7 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 CRITICAL TASKS
- Initiate D w e l l sprays when Suppression Chamber pressure exceeds 13 psig Safety Significance Maintenance of primary containment integrity.
Actions are taken to spray the Drywell during a LOCA when the Suppression Chamber pressure exceeds 13 psig. From the Susquehanna Emergency Operating Procedures basis document, EO-000-1 03, The value of 13 psig is the lowest suppression chamber pressure which can occur when 95% of the non-condensables (Nitrogen) in the drywell have been transferred to the suppression chamber. At 13 psig suppression chamber pressure, 5% of the non-condensables remain in the drywell. This 5% value is the limit established to preclude chugging - the cyclic condensation of steam at the downcomer openings of the drywell vents. Values in excess of 13 psig are indicative of more non-condensables in the drywell, meaning chugging is more probable.
Chugging (steam bubble collapse at the downcomer exit resulting in a water in-rush to fill the voided areas) induces stresses at the junction of the downcomers and the drywell floor. Repeated such stresses may result in failure of these joints, creating a direct bypass from drywell to suppression chamber.
Bypassing the suppression pool will directly pressurize the primary containment during a LOCA may result in failure.
By requiring drywell sprays at 13 psig in the suppression chamber (5% non-condensables in the drywell),
a drywell non-condensable value of >I%
will be maintained and chugging should not occur.
\\_.-
From Appendix D of NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9, the critical task listed above has essential safety action that correctly completed, will prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release and the crew will take action to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition describe in the previous paragraph.
Consequences of Failure to Perform the Task Potential failure of primary containment.
PC/P-5 WHEN SUPP CHMBR PRESS > 13 PSlG CONTl N U E
[Directions to initiate drywell sprays]
Drywell spray operation may affect the availability of electrical equipment located in the drywell.
Therefore, suppression chamber sprays are given the maximum time allowable to reduce primary containment pressure before operation of drywell sprays is required. The allowable time is determined by the suppression chamber pressure which is equated to the amount of non-condensables remaining in the drywell.
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 7 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 8 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 CRITICAL TASKS The value of 73 psig is the lowest suppression chamber pressure which can occur when 95% of the non-condensables (NJ in the drywell have been transferred to the suppression chamber. That is, at least 5% non-condensables remain in the drywell when suppression chamber pressure reaches 73 psig. This non-condensable concentration limit is established to preclude chugging - the cyclic condensation of steam at the downcomer openings of the drywell vents. A suppression chamber pressure greater than 13 psis could be indicative of a lower concentration of non-condensables in the drywell, thereby meaning that chugging is more probable.
Chugging occurs when a steam bubble collapses at the exit of the downcomers, the rush of water drawn into the downcomers to fill the void induces stresses at the junction of the downcomers and the drywell floor. Repeated occurrence of such stresses could cause fatigue failure of these joints, thereby creating a direct path between the drywell and suppression chamber. Steam discharged through the downcomers could then bypass the suppression pool and directly pressurize the primary containment. Scale model tests have demonstrated that chugging will K t occur so long as the drywell contains at least I% non-condensables. To preclude conditions under which chugging may occur, drywell sprays are conservatively required when at least 5% non-condensables remain in the drywell, Le., suppression chamber pressure reaches 13 psig.
60th wide range and narrow range suppression chamber pressure indication is available in the control room. Wide range suppression chamber pressure indication is available locally on Containment Hd02 Analyzer Panel if analyzer is selected to suppression chamber.
IndicationslCues for the Event Requiring Critical Task Multiple control board and control room indications of suppression chamber and drywell pressures.
Performance Criteria Start an operable RHR loop Perform a valve alignment to provide a flowpath for spray.
a Performance Feedback RHR pump, valve and system flow indications are available.
Multiple indications of Drywell pressure dropping
'v-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 8 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 9 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 c
CRITICAL TASKS
- Limit Drywell sway flow to between 1000 and 2800 nDm for the first 30 seconds Safety Significance Maintenance of primary containment integrity.
Actions are taken to limit the system flowrates when first initiating drywell sprays (1000 to 2800 gpm for the first 30 seconds). The reason for this restriction is to limit the magnitude of the drywell pressure reduction such that it will not go less than atmospheric (prevents air from being drawn in to containment) and ensures a margin to the negative design pressure of the containment.
The BWR Owners Group Emergency Operating Procedures Basis document discusses drywell spray limitations utilizing a Drywell Spray Initiation Limit Curve to protect against containment damage from exceeding the design drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure. From the Susquehanna Emergency Operating Procedures basis document, EO-000-1 03, A drywell spray initiation limit has been developed by PPL which provides the same protection guarantees without necessitating the use of an additional curve on the EOP flowcharts. By limiting drywell spray flow to between 1000 and 2800 gpm for the first 30 seconds of drywell spray operation, drywell sprays can be initiated without concern in all regions of the BWR Owners Group curve. After 30 seconds of operation, the drywell atmosphere contains sufficient vapor to allow full drywell sprays flow. In other words, spraying the drywell within these limits will not result in a drywell pressure rapid reduction such that the differential pressure limit would be challenged.
From Appendix D of NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9, the critical task listed above has essential safety action that correctly completed, will prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release and the crew will take action to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition describe in the previous paragraph.
Consequences of Failure to Perform the Task Potential failure of primary containment.
PC/P-7 SHUT DOWN DW COOLERS SHUT DOWN REClRC PUMPS INITIATE DW SPRAYS UNLESS PUMPS CONTINUOUSLY NEEDED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOLING LIMITING FLOW TO BETWEEN 1000 AND 2800 GPM FOR FIRST 30 SEC Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 9 of 39 2004 NRC Exam. Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 10 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 CRITICAL TASKS A DWSlL (Drywell Spray Initiation Limit) has been developed by PP&L which provides protection against containment damage from exceeding the design differential pressure, yet does not restrict operation of the drywell sprays. By limiting drywell spray flow to between 1000 and 2800 gpm for the first 30 seconds of drywell spray operation, drywell sprays can be initiated without concern in all regions of this curve. After 30 seconds, the drywell atmosphere contains sufficient vapor to allow full drywell sprays flow. For this reason, the curve is not included.
IndicationsICues for the Event Requiring Critical Task The Unit Supervisor will direct drywell sprays be initiated, limiting flow to between 1000 and 2800 gpm for the first 30 seconds. The PCO will initiate drywell sprays monitoring the flowrate on available digital and analog indications on 1 C601, limiting flow to between 1000 and 2800 gpm for at least the first 30 seconds of operation before increasing flow.
Performance Criteria Manually throttle HVI 51 -F016A and B and monitor drywell spray Use clock to determine 30 seconds has elapsed Performance Feedback Monitor Drywell spray flow indications during first 30 seconds of drywell spray operation L--
- Secure D w e l l sprays before D w e l l pressure drops to 0 psig
- Secure Suppression Chamber sprays before Suppression Chamber pressure drops to 0 psig Safety Significance Operation of drywell / suppression chamber sprays is stopped before drywell / suppression chamber pressure decreases to 0 psig to assure that primary containment pressure is not reduced below atmospheric. A positive primary containment pressure precludes air from being drawn in through a primary containment path (which may have been opened for control of primary containment hydrogen and oxygen). It also assures that a margin to the negative design pressure of the primary containment exists.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Potential exists for air to be drawn in through a primary containment path (which may have been opened for control of primary containment hydrogen and oxygen). Could also exceed the negative design pressure of the primary containment.
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 10 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R11-3
Page 11 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 CRITICAL TASKS Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Drywell / Suppression Chamber pressure decreasing toward 0 psig.
Performance Criteria Secures spray flow to the Drywell / Suppression Chamber IAW OP-149-004.
Performance Feedback Drywell / Suppression Chamber spray isolation valves indicate closed.
Spray flow to the Drywell / Suppression Chamber indicates 0 gpm.
Drywell / Suppression Chamber pressure > 0 psig and no longer decreasing.
k Perform Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -161 inches Safety Significance RPV leakage or loss of injection systems impacts the ability to provide continued adequate core cooling through core submergence based on inventory loss.
.~ -i Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions will result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.
The following steps provide the operating crew guidance to line up injection systems as available to maintain level >-129. If these actions are unsuccessful, the crew receives additional direction when it is determined that level can not be maintained above TAF.
RWL-4 RESTORE AND MAINTAIN LVL BETWEEN
+13" AND +54" USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS RC/L-5 IF LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > +13" MAINTAIN LVL > -129" USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS AUGMENTING AS DESIRED WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS L--,
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 11 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 12 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 L-CRITICAL TASKS RC/L-10 IRRESPECTIVE OF VORTEX LIMITS WITH TABLE 3 SYSTEMS PERFORM ALL 1
LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2
STARTPUMPS 3
INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX RC/L-11 IF LESS THAN 2 TABLE 4 SUBSYSTEMS CAN BE LINED UP COMMENCE LINING UP AS MANY AS POSSIBLE TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS RC/L-I3 WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS PERFORM ALL:
1 LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2
STARTPUMPS 3
INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX RC/L-16 WHEN LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > -161" GO TO RAPID DEPRESS Rapid Depressurization is not initiated until RPV water level has dropped to -1 61 (TAF) because:
0 Adequate core cooling exists so long as RPV water level remains above -161" (TAF).
The time required for RPV water level to decrease to -161" (TAF) can best be used to line up and start pumps, attempting to reverse the decreasing RPV water level trend before Rapid Depressurization is required to assure continued adequate core cooling.
(
Reference:
SSES-EPG Cl-4 and second override before C3-1)
IndicationslCues for Event Requiring Critical Task Reactor water level trending downward, eventually indicating less than the top of active fuel height on the Fuel Zone Level Indicator.
Performance Criteria Perform a Rapid Depressurization per EO-100-1 12 when water level reaches the TAF -161" as read on the Fuel Zone Instrument. Initiate ADS / Manually Open all 6 ADS valves Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise on the Fuel Zone and Wide Range level instruments.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 12 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 13 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 id CRITICAL TASKS Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure and rising Reactor water level.
Declare RPV level indication indeterminate due to violation of the RPV Saturation Curve Perform RPV Flooding when RPV level becomes indeterminate bv increasing iniection flowrate to raise RPV pressure to 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure Safety Significance Adequate core cooling may be challenged if core submergence can not be verified due to indeterminate RPV level indication.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions may result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.
RC/L-2 IF LVL CANNOT BE DETERMINED GO TO RPV FLOODING If RPV water level cannot be determined, the actions specified in the subsequent [EO-I 021 steps cannot be performed since RPV water level and water level trend information is required for determining which actions to take. The transition to EO-000-7 I#, RPV Flooding, is necessary to assure continued adequate core cooling under conditions where RPV water level cannot be determined.
RF-12 COMMENCE AND IRRESPECTIVE OF VORTEX LIMITS INCREASE INJECTION TO ESTABLISH:
RPV PRESS NOT DECREASING AND RPV PRESS 2 81 PSlD ABOVE SUPP CHMBR PRESS USING ANY:
CORESPRAY 0
COND 0
CRD MAXIMIZED LPCl WITH FLOW THROUGH HX ASAP i.-
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 13 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 14 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 CRITICAL TASKS L
FIRE SYSTEM IAW ES-013-001 CRD X-TIE TO OTHER UNIT RHRSW X-TIE FROM EITHER UNIT 0
RHR SDC SUCTION FILL SLC BORON TANK SLC DEMlN X-TIE These systems consist of all motor-driven systems which are available to flood the RPV. As many of these systems as necessary must be used to establish and maintain the conditions required to verify RPV flooding. Establishing adequate core cooling conditions dictates that adherence to Vortex limits not be required.
Three conditions must be satisfied to verify RPV flooding without direct indication of RPV water level:
I. At least 4 SRVs must be open. This ensures that adequate steam flow will exist for cooling any unsubmerged portion of the core when RPVpressure is 2 81 psid above suppression chamber pressure.
- 2. RPV pressure must E t be decreasing. This ensures that the required steam flow wi/l be maintained.
- 3. RPV pressure must be greater than suppression chamber pressure by at least 81 psid, the Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure (MRFP).
The MRFP is defined to be the lowest differential pressure between the RPV and the suppression chamber at which steam flow through 4 SRVs is sufficient to remove decay heat. The assumed decay heat generation rate is ten minutes after shutdown from full power. Since ten minutes is the earliest that RPV flooding could reasonably be expected to be needed, establishing and maintaining RPV pressure above the MRFP assures that more than enough steam flows through the SRVs to carry away all core decay heat.
This requires that a sufficient quantity of water reach the core to carry away decay heat by boiling, which in turn requires that RPV water level increase. Maintaining this above the minimum pressure (81 psid) assures that the RPV will ultimately flood to the main steam lines.
Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Violation of the RPV Saturation Curve is indicated by PlCSY format (RPVSAT) showing purple indication on the curve, plot on the unsafe side by the Crew and/or RPV level instrumentation failing in the upscale direction.
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 14 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 15 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 CRITICAL TASKS Performance Criteria Recognize failure of RPV level indicators due to reaching saturation conditions on the instrument runs, initiate rapid depressurization by opening ADS valves and then increasing RPV injection until RPV pressure is NOT decreasing and is 81 psig above suppression chamber pressure.
Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise to the point that RPV pressure will increase to a value that is 81 psid above Suppression Chamber. At this point injection should be stabilized to maintain the DP.
Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure.
Verify injection from available systems raises RPV pressure to a value that is 81 psid above Suppression Chamber.
'5*.
Denotes Simulator Critical Task.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 15 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 16 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 L.,
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 16 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I'
J File No. RII-3
Page 17 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004
'L-SCENARIO REFERENCES 1, DRYWELL UNIT COOLERWFANS SURVEILLANCE / TRIP OF FAN 1V414A SO-I 60-001 AR-127-DO1 AR-106-AI 6 OP-I 60-001 TS 3.6.3.2 QUARTERLY LOCA TEST OF DRYWELL AREA UNIT COOLERYFANS, REV. 7 DRWL FAN 1V414A FAILED, REV. 14 HVAC DIV 1 PANEL IC681 SYSTEM TROUBLE, REV. 28 DRYWELL VENTILATION SYSTEM, REV. 10 DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEM, AMMEND. 178
- 2. CONDENSATE PUMP C TRIP / RFPT A CONTROL SIGNAL FAILURE AR-10 1 -A08 AR-101 -BO8 AR-101 -B16 ON-145-001 CONDENSATE PUMP C TRIP, REV. 30 CONDENSATE PUMP C MOTOR OVERCURRENT, REV. 30 RFPT CONTROL SIGNAL FAILURE, REV. 30 RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, REV. 14
- 3. CIG LEAK ON PT-12643 AR-107-C06 AR-150-DO1 AR-111-H02 BYPASS INDICATION SYS DIV 2 INOP ECCS/ESF SYS, REV. 26 CONTN INSTR GAS SYSTEM, REV. 6 INSTRUMENT GAS HEADER A LO PRESS, REV. 27 L.
TR 3.5.3 LONG TERM NITROGEN SUPPLY TO ADS, 8/31/1998
- 4. OUTBOARD MSlV CLOSURE / 2 SRVs STICK OPEN I BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK EO-000-1 02 EO-000-1 03 ON-I 83-001 RPV CONTROL, REV. 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 2 STUCK OPEN SAFETY RELIEF VALVE, REV 20
- 5. HPCl AUTO START FAILURE OP-I 52-001 HPCl SYSTEM, REV. 30
- 6. ADS AUTO LOGIC FAILURE OP-183-001 AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM, REV. 15
- 7. RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION EO-000-1 12 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION, REV. 1 L-'
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 17 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 18 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 L'
THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK L-'
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 18 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 19 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 MALFS 9 : 9 L
SC ENARlO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS 1
REMFS OVRDS TRIGS 0
2 : 2 1
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
i--
Set up the simulator for the scenario by performing the following:
- a. Initialize to IC-17.
- b. Perform following prior to running batch file; Remove RClC from service.
RClC controller to MAN and 0% output.
0 Div. 1 / 2 00s switches to INOP.
0 Close HV-F007 and HV-F008.
Open LV-FO54 to decrease header pressure to 0 psig, then close LV-FO54.
Insert bat RCB.ILO-401SU.
- c. Snapshot to an available IC (currently IC-105).
Initialize the simulator to IC-105, Unit 1 at 69% power EOL; Unit 2 at 100% power EOL.
Type restorepref YPP.ILO-401; verify the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments.
Verify the Environment window:
MALFUNCTIONS AVO1 : HVI 49F088 AV04: HVI 0640 0 AV04: LV10641 0 BRO5:lA10104 BR05:lAl0204 RC150011 RLOI :B21C1 K5A RLOI :B21ClK5B RLOl :E41 1 K2 REMOTE FUNTIONS OC188073 (part of snapshot)
D6106383 (part of snapshot)
OVERRIDES AN:ARIO6B14 AN:ARI 06C15 TRIGGERS I ACTIONS E l PAAA23524 El = IMF HP15215 RClC WARMUP VALVE FAILURE OF FEEDWATER STARTUP VALVE AUX BUS 11A FAILS AS IS AUX BUS I I B FAILS AS IS RClC TURBINE TRIP AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE HPCI AUTO START FAILURE FAILURE OF FEEDWATER LOW-LOAD VALVE OPEN BREAKER FOR RClC F007 OPEN BREAKER FOR RClC F008 (Not associated with scenario setup)
(Not associated with scenario setup)
HPCl TURBINE SPEED AT 600 RPM HPCI TURBINE TRIP Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (0304)
Page 19 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 20 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS L.4 PROGRAM BUTTONS
[P-21 bat Y P B, I LO401 A
[P-31 bat YPB.ILO-401 B
[Pa] (Not Used)
[P-5] (Not Used)
[P-61 bat YPB.ILO-401 C
[P-I] IMF PM03:1V414A
[P-7] MRF RD155028 I00 TRIP OF DWCLG FAN 1V414A COND PUMP TRIP I RFP SPD CTRL SGL FAILS CIG LEAK ON PT-12643 CLOSES OB MSlVs / OPENS 3 SRVs / RAMPS BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LEAKAGE OPEN CRD PUMP SUCTION FILTER BYPASS
- 5. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:
- a.
- b.
- d.
- e.
v
- f.
- g.
- h.
C.
Unit 1 is at 69% power EOL.
Unit 2 is at 100% power EOL.
GO-I 00-002 is in progress through step 5.74.
Rod Sequence 82; startup at step 550.
RCIC Out of Service Quarterly LOCA test of Drywell Area Unit Coolers and Fans IAW SO-I 60-001.
U-I cooling tower lights out-bad breaker-CRd SBLC Air Sparge is open for Chemistry SC
- 6. Make a copy of shift assignments.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
File No. RII-3 Page 20 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. I
Page 21 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 3
4 SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM CONDENSATE PUMP C TRIP / RFPT A CONTROL SIGNAL FAILURE CIG LEAK ON PT-12643 Initial Conditions: Initialize the Simulator to IC-105. Place the Simulator to RUN. Ensure the Proaram Buttons are assigned as indicated on the SPecial Instructions sheet via the amroDriate Preference File. Assiqn shift Dositions; direct the start of the 5-minute panel walkdown.
1 7
BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK 11 EVENT I
TIME I
II 9
I I ADS AUTO LOGIC FAILURE DESCRIPTION 10 1 DRYWELL UNIT COOLERWFANS SURVEILLANCE RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION II 2
I I TRIP OF DRYWELL FAN 1V414A II 5
I I OUTBOARD MSlV CLOSURE
~
~~
1 2 SRVs STICK OPEN ll 8
I 1 HPCl AUTO START FAILURE L-Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 21 of 39 2004 NRC Exam. Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 22 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 NOTES:
SCENARIO EVENT FORM Lo-(I)
If A Drywell Area Unit Cooler/Fan (1V41 IA) turned off the following alarms will be Event No:
132 Brief
Description:
DRYWELL UNIT COOLERSlFANS SURVEILLANCE I TRIP OF DRYWELL FAN 1V414A POSITION us PCOP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES
~
~~
Directs performance of quarterly LOCA test of drywell area unit coolers/fans.
Monitors drywell temperatures during performance of surveillance.
Performs quarterly LOCA test of drywell area unit coolerslfans IAW SO-160-001.
I. Monitors drywell temperatures during performance of surveillance.
- 2.
Confirms DRYWELL COOLING FAN A & B TEST SWITCHES in NORMAL.
- 3.
Places control switch for all Drywell Area Coolers/Fans in START HIGH and confirms red operating lights illuminate.
- 4. Places Drwl Clr lV411 B in STOP position.
- 5. Places Drywell Cooling Fan A Test Switch in TEST LOCA position.
- 6. Confirms the A Drywell Area Unit CoolerslFans (1V411A-1V418A) have stopped as indicated by their individual amber lights.
- 7. Starts the A Drywell Area Unit Coolers/Fans (1 V411 A-1 V418A) in low speed by placing their control switches in START LOW and commences timing.
- 8. Confirms the A Drywell Area Unit Coolers/Fans (1V411A-1V418A) are running in low speed as indicated by their individual red lights.
Reports alarm DRWL FAN 1V414A FAILED; refers to AR-127-Dol.
Dispatches Plant Operator to investigate the breaker for drywell cooling fan 1V414A.
Notifies US that SO-160-001 has failed due to 1V414A not running for at least 15 minutes.
Returns D w e l l Ventilation Svstem to normal oDeration IAW OP-160-001.
Reports alarm HVAC DIV I PANEL IC681 SYSTEM TROUBLE; refers to AR-106-A16.
Declares Drywell Fan 1V414A inoperable; refers to TS 3.6.3.2. Determines Condition A applies: restore drywell cooling fan to OPERABLE within 30 days.
Contacts WWM and requests maintenance investigate failure of fan 1V414A.
- Denotes Critical Task 11 ECCWESF SYS AR-107-806.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 22 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 23 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
192 Brief
Description:
DRWELL UNIT COOLERWFANS SURVEILLANCE /TRIP OF DRWELL FAN 1V414A INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
Enter P I C68102/PIC68105 on Instructor Station to monitor drywell cooler status.
After all group 1 fans are confirmed running in slow speed (step 5.8 of SO-160-OOI), insert a trip of drywell cooling fan 1 V414A; Depress P-I :
[P-I] IMF PM03:lV414A TRIP OF DWCLG FAN 1V414A Monitor drywell temperatures on PMS format CTATM:
Start: 1 18.4OF Stop: 132.1 O F
-16 minutes ROLE PLAY:
L-As Plant Operator sent to check breaker for drywell cooling fan 1V414A, wait 2 minutes and report breaker (lB236033) for fan 1V414A is tripped.
As WWM: Will investigate to determine if problem is electrical involving breaker or mechanical which would be in the Drywell, which we cant get enter at this time.
\\--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 23 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 24 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM L--
Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
CONDENSATE PUMP C TRIP I RFPT A CONTROL SIGNAL FAILURE TIME
=..+--
- Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports alarm CONDENSATE PUMP C TRIP; refers to AR-101-A08.
Reports alarm CONDENSATE PUMP C MOTOR OVERCURRENT; refers to AR-101-BO8 Ensures condensate pump C discharge valve HV-1052OC closes.
Verifies Reactor Feed pump suction greater than 264 psig.
Reports alarm RFPT CONTROL SIGNAL FAILURE; refers to AR-101-BIG.
~~
Refers to ON-145-001, RPV Level Control System Malfunction.
Dispatches Plant Operator to investigate C condensate pump and breaker and A RFPT.
~
Reports alarm TBCCW HEADER HI-LO TEMP AR-123-GO5.
Stops CONDENSATE PUMP 1 PI 02A(B)(C)(D) by depressing STOP pushbutton.
Ensures COND PP A(B)(C)(D) DSCH HV-I0502A(B)(C)(D) CLOSES.
Checks Condensate pump header pressure indicates above 530 psig if other Condensate Pumps are left running.
Implements ON-145-001, RPV Level Control System Malfunction.
Contacts WWM and requests maintenance investigate C condensate pump trip and A RFPT control signal failure.
Places RPFT A SPD CTUDEMAND SIGNAL SIC-C32-1 R601A controller in MANUAL.
- 1. Recognizes SIC-C32-1 R601A(B)(C) does not take control:
- 2. Lowers RFPT A(B)(C) MTR SPD CHANGER using HS-l2730Al(B1)(C1) slow pushbutton until RFPT Speed LOWERS.
- 3. Depresses HYD JACK RFPT A(B)(C) HS-I2772A(B)(C) ON pushbutton.
- 4. Adjusts RFPT A(B)(C) MTR SPD CHANGER HS-12730 A1 and A2 (B1 and B2) (C1 and C2) using SLOW pushbuttons to control RPV Water Level = 35 inches and equalizes discharge flows on operating pumps.
Requests a dedicated operator to control RPV level while in manual.
NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 24 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 25 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L-Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
CONDENSATE PUMP C TRIP / RFPT A CONTROL SIGNAL FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When actions are complete for the trip of drywell cooling fan 1V414A, insert a trip of the C condensate pump and a simultaneous RFPT A control signal failure; Depress P-2:
[P-21 bat YPB.ILO-401A Monitor PlCSY FWC for RFP speed control.
ROLE PLAY:
As the Plant Operator sent to investigate the trip of condensate pump C, wait -3 minutes and report the breaker (1AlOlO9) is tripped and relay 50/51 targets are dropped. The pump shaft seized and breaker tripped on over-current.
As WWM: Will send a pair of electricians to investigate the breaker and do a quick look at the pump and motor.
i.--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 25 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 26 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 I
- Denotes Critical Task SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
4 Brief
Description:
CIG LEAK ON PT-I2643 POSITION TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES PCOP 1
us I Refers to AR-107-C06, BYPASS INDICATION SYS DIV 2 INOP ECCS/ESF SYS.
Refers to TS 3.5.1 and TR 3.5.3.
Determines TR 3.5.3 Condition A applies and/or contacts System Engineer for assistance in making operability determination.
Contacts Work Week Manager to obtain support for repair of CIG leak.
Reports alarm CONTN INSTR GAS SYSTEM; refers to AR-150-Dol.
Verifies position of SV-12644 and SV-12643 on panel 1 C601.
Checks PI-12649; recognizes N2 pressure decaying on BTLlT212A.
May verify GIG compressor(s) available and attempt to reopen SV-12644.
Dispatches Plant Operator to gas bottle area to check for leaks.
Reports alarm INSTRUMENT GAS BOlTLE HEADER LO PRESS; refers to AR-111-H02.
NOTES:
L Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 26 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 27 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES iv Event No:
4 Brief
Description:
CIG LEAK ON PT-12643 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the crew has completed actions for the trip of C condensate pump and A RFPT control signal failure, insert a CIG leak on PT-12643; Depress P-3:
[P-31 bat YPB.ILO-401B Monitor Containment Instrument Gas pressures using Screen PCI.
ROLE PLAY:
As the Plant Operator sent to Reactor Building elevation 749, wait -7 minutes and report the sensing line to PT-12643 is leaking. I see an instrument root valve that should isolate the leak.
Immediately prior to the bottle header pressure reaching 1900 psig (approximately I O minutes after P-3 depressed), call the control room and report you have closed the instrument root valve to PT-12643.
L NOTE:
SV-12644 closes and SV-12643 opens-will not swap back to CIG compressor header until the leak is fixed.
c-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 27 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 28 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
5,69798 Brief
Description:
OUTBOARD MSIV CLOSURE / 2 SRVs STICK OPEN / BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK I HPCI AUTO START FAILURE POSITION PCOM us PCOP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Recognizes and reports outboard MSlV closure / Reactor scram.
~
Performs actions for Reactor scram:
- 1. Places reactor mode switch to shutdown.
- 2.
VerifiesIreports rod positions.
- 3.
Inserts SRM and IRM detectors.
~~~
~
~~
~
Recognizes and reports lowering Reactor pressure.
Enters EO-000-102, RPV CONTROL and EO-000-103, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, when drywell pressure exceeds 1.72 psig.
- 1. Directs PCOs to perform panel walkdown for:
0 Isolations 0
Initiations 0
DIGstarts
- 2. Directs RPV level band +I3 to +54 inches.
Ensures PC isolations, ECCS initiations, and Diesel Generator starts.
Recognizes and reports that G, K and L did not close as pressure lowered below setpoint.
- 1. Refers to ON-I 83-001 and places affected SRV control switches to OFF.
- 2. When valves G & K do not close with switch in OFF, affected SRV control switches taken to OPEN and then to OFF.
Reports panel 1 C601 status:
- 1. Failure of Buses I 1 A & 1 I B to transfer; attempts manual transfer.
- 2. MSlVs are shut.
- 3. Isolation signal for 1.72 psig, with DIG starts and ESW pumps in service.
- 4. HPCl did not auto start on high Drywell pressure.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 28 of 39 2004 NRC Exam. Rev. 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 29 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
5, 6,738 Brief
Description:
OUTBOARD MSlV CLOSURE I 2 SRVs STICK OPEN I BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK I HPCl AUTO START FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the crew has completed actions for the CIG leak, insert the OB MSlV Closure / 2 SRVs Stick Open /
Bottom Head Drain Leak malfunctions; Depress P-6:
[P-61 bat YPB.ILO-401C ROLE PLAY:
As necessary L4-'
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 29 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R l l - 3
Page 30 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM
\\ L-Event No:
5,6, 7,8 Brief
Description:
OUTBOARD MSIV CLOSURE I 2 SRVs STICK OPEN / BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK /
HPCl AUTO START FAILURE L--
POSITION us PCOP us TIME
- Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs entrv to ON-1 83-001 for Stuck Open SRVs.
Directs manual startup of HPCt.
Manually initiates HPCl IAW OP-152-001:
- 1. Checks HPCl suction flow path lined up via HV-155-FO04 or HV-155-FO42.
- 2. Manually initiates HPCl by arming and depressing the initiation pushbutton, ensuring:
0 0
Aux oil pump starts 0
0 0
0 0
Injection valve HV-FOO6 opens 0
- 3. HPCI turbine ramps to rated speed and flow.
- 4. Recognizes and reports HPCI tripped during start up.
ReDorts Suppression Pool Water temperature > 90°F.
Steam supply valve HV-155-FO01 opens Cooling water valve HV-156-FO59 opens Barometric condenser vacuum pump starts Steam line drain valves HV-155-FO28 and HV-155-F029 close Barometric condenser condensate pump discharge valve HV-155-F026 closes HPCl pump room unit cooler lV209A(B) starts Contacts Work Week Manager to investigate:
- 1. HPCl failure to start.
- 2. 2 SRVs stuck open.
Directs maintaining RPV level > -129 when RPV level can not be maintained > +13 by maximizing CRD and injecting SLC.
Re-enters EO-000-1 03, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, when SPT exceeds 90°F.
Directs placing one loop of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling and one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray.
NOTES: I
-\\.:-
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 30 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 31 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L-Event No:
5,6,7, a Brief
Description:
OUTBOARD MSIV CLOSURE I 2 SRVs STICK OPEN I BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK I HPCl AUTO START FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When directed to bypass the CRD pump suction filter, Depress P-7:
[P-71 MRF RDI55028 I00 OPEN CRD PUMP SUCTION FILTER BYPASS ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 31 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 32 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM
\\--
Event No:
6, 7 Brief
Description:
2 SRVs STICK OPEN I BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK POSITION
- us PCOP PCOP
- PCOP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs securing Suppression Chamber Sprays before Suppression Chamber pressure drops to 0 psig.
Places one loop of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling IAW OP-149-005, RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING.
- 1. Places ESW in service.
- 3. Opens Suppression Chamber test shutoff valve HV-I 51-F028A(B).
- 4. Starts RHR pump IP202A(B)(C)(D).
- 5. Throttles open test line control valve HV-F024A(B) to achieve 5 10,000 gpm on
- 6. Observes minimum flow valve HV-151-F007A(B) closes at - 3000 gpm.
- 7. Closes heat exchanger bypass HV-151 -F048A(B).
- 8. Checks RHR pump room coolers IV21OA(B)(C)(D) started.
Places one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray IAW OP-149-004, RHR CONTAINMENT SPRAY.
I. Places ESW in service.
- 2. Places LOCA OVERRIDE MANUAL OVERRIDE switch to OVERRIDE.
- 3. Closes LPCl injection valve HV-I51-F017A(B).
- 4. Opens Suppression Chamber test valve HV-151 -F028A(B).
- 5. Starts RHR pump 1 P202A(B)(C)(D).
- 6. Throttles open Suppression Chamber spray valve HV-l51-F027A(B) to maintain I 500 gpm as indicated on FI-l5120A(B).
FI-Ell-1 R603 A(B).
Secures Suppression Chamber Sprays before Suppression Chamber pressure drops to 0 psig.
Throttles closed Suppression Chamber spray valve HV-151 -F027A(B).
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 32 of 39 2004 NRC Exam. Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 33 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L-Event No:
697 Brief
Description:
2 SRVs STICK OPEN I BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 33 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 34 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM L
Event No:
637 Brief
Description:
2 SRVs STICK OPEN I BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK L-POSITION
- us
- us
- PCOP TIME
- PCOP #
STUDENT ACTlVlTl ES Directs initiating Drywell Sprays when Suppression Chamber pressure > 13 psig.
- 1. Directs shutting down Drywell coolers (as necessary).
- 2. Directs shutting down Recirc pumps (as necessary).
Directs limiting Drywell Spray flow to between 1000 and 2800 gpm for the first 30 seconds.
Directs securing Drywell Sprays before Drywell pressure drops to 0 psig.
Initiates Drywell Sprays IAW OP-149404, RHR CONTAINMENT SPRAY.
- 1. Places ESW in service.
- 2. Places LOCA OVERRIDE MANUAL OVERRIDE switch to OVERRIDE.
- 3. Closes LPCl injection valve HV-151 -F017A(B).
- 4. Starts RHR pump 1 P202A(B)(C)(D).
- 5. Opens Drywell spray inboard isolation valve HV-151 -F021A(B).
Limits Drywell Spray flow to between 1000 and 2800 gpm for the first 30 seconds.
- 6. Throttles open Drywell spray outboard isolation valve HV-151-F016A(B) to establish a flowrate between 1000 and 2800 gpm for the first 30 seconds as indicated on
- 7. After 30 seconds, throttles open HV-151-F016A(B) to establish 5 10,000 gpm as indicated on Fl-l5120A(B).
FI-l5120A(B).
Secures Drywell Sprays before Drywell pressure drops to 0 psig.
Throttles closed Drywell spray outboard isolation valve HV-151-FOI 6A(B).
Verifies/reports Core Spray / LPCl pumps auto start when RPV pressure drops to 426 psig or RPV level drops to -129.
Transitions to Fuel Zone level indicator when WR RPV level indication drops below -145.
Reports corrected fuel zone level is < -161 (TAF).
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
F O I ~
NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 34 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R11-3
Page 35 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004
\\--a INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
637 Brief
Description:
2 SRVs STICK OPEN / BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 35 of 39 2004 NRC Exam. Rev. 1 File No. RII-3
Page 36 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM b'
Event No:
7, 9, 10 Brief
Description:
BOTTOM HEAD D W N LINE LEAK I ADS AUTO LOGIC FAILURE I RAPID DEPRESS U RlZATlON POSITION PCOP us PCOP us TIME
- us s
STUDENT ACTIVITIES Recognizes and reports that ADS did not auto initiate.
Directs MANUAL initiation of ADS.
Manually initiates ADS IAW OP-183-001:
- 1. ARMS & DEPRESSES A & C or B & D switches.
0 0
Observes RPV pressure decrease.
0 Observes 6 ADS SRVs open on acoustic monitor status light indication.
Observes elevated tail pipe temperatures on TRS-B21-1 R614.
Directs Core Spray and LPCl lined up for injection.
Directs Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -1 61 inches.
- 1. Enters EO-000-1 12, RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION.
- 2. Directs preventing uncontrolled Condensate injection.
- 3. Verifies Suppression Pool level > 5 feet.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
L Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 36 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. R11-3
Page 37 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L-4 Event No:
7,9,10 Brief
Description:
BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK / ADS AUTO LOGIC FAILURE / RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary
\\--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 37 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 38 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0. 2/23/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
7, 9, 10 Brief
Description:
BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK I ADS AUTO LOGIC FAILURE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION POSITION
- PCOP us
- us
- us
- PCOP us TIME
- 1. Arms and depresses Division 1 and/or Division 2 ADS manual pushbuttons and verifies 6 red lights lit for ADS solenoids,
- 2.
Places individual control switch to open for each ADS SRV (G, J, K, L, M, & N) and verifies red light lit and amber light not lit for each valve solenoid.
0 0
Observes RPV pressure decrease.
0
- 4. Verifies Core Spray and LPCl injection valves open when RPV pressure decreases to
- 5. Reports Core Spray and LPCl injection flow to the RPV.
- 6. Reports RPV water level trend.
Observes 6 ADS SRVs open on acoustic monitor status light indication.
Observes elevated tail pipe temperatures on TRS-B21-1 R614.
420 psig.
~
~
~
~
Takes manual control of Core Spray / LPCl to restore/maintain RPV level +I 3 to +54.
Plots drywell instrument run temperature and RPV pressure on the SAT curve.
~
~
~
~~
~~
~~
~
~
~
If RPV Saturation Curve is violated, declares RPV level indication indeterminate; Enters EO-000-1 14, RPV FLOODING.
If EO-000-1 14 entered, directs injection with Core SpraylLPCl to establish Reactor pressure 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
If directed, injects with Core SpraylLPCl to establish Reactor pressure 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
After the scenario is complete, classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY under EAL FS?, assuming RPV level went below -?6? inches or was indeterminate.
Otherwise classifies the event as an ALERT under EAL FAI.
NOTES:
c-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 38 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 39 Scenario ILO-401 Rev. 0, 2/23/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
7,910 Brief
Description:
BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK I ADS AUTO LOGIC FAILURE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary TERMINATION CUE:
The scenario will be terminated when RPV level is restored to +13 to +54 and primary containment parameters are being addressed.
EVENT CLASS IF I CAT1 0 N :
L--
After the Scenario is complete, have the US classify the scenario for the HIGHEST EAL. Provide the US with any requested information needed to perform the classification.
<+:
FOITI NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 39 of 39 2004 NRC Exam, Rev. 1 File No. RII-3