ML040920446
| ML040920446 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/2004 |
| From: | Solymossy J Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-P1-04-031 | |
| Download: ML040920446 (85) | |
Text
NMC
Committed to Nuclear els MAR 2 5 2004 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC L-PI-04-031 1 OCFR50.4 U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKETS 50-282 AND 50-306 LICENSE NOS. DPR-42 AND DPR-60 PRAIRIE ISLAND EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Furnished with this letter are the recent changes to the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures F3. Enclosure 1 provides a brief summary of the Emergency Action Level (EAL) changes associated with these changes. These changes have been reviewed and do not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan and these procedures.
This submittal includes the following documents:
INDEX:
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Table of Contents REVISIONS F3-2 Classifications of Emergencies Rev. 34 ADDITIONS:
None DELETIONS:
None TEMPORARY CHANGE DELETIONS:
None INSTRUCTIONS:
Instructions for updating the manual are included.
oc(s 1717 Wakonade Drive East. Welch, Minnesota 55089-9642 Telephone: 651.388.1121
USNRC L-PI-04-031 Page 2 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.
As per 10 CFR 50.4, two copies have also been provided to the NRC Region III Office and one to the NRC Resident Inspector. If you have any questions, please contact Steve Skoyen at 651-388-1121 Extension 4156.
ph M. Solym Vice President, rairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant CC Steve Orth, USNRC, Region III (2 copies)
NRC Resident Inspector-Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (w/o attachment) - Summary of EAL Changes Summary of EAL ChanQes (4 pages follow)
Summary of EAL Chanaes EAL Reference Description of differences between F3-2 Rev. 33 Number and F3-2 Rev. 34 Changes:
11B
- 1. Removed 'Pressurizer Pressure (2/3) < 2335".
- 2. Added 'Pressurizer PORV Line High temp", "Pressurizer Safety Line A or B High temp",
and "Pressurizer Safety/Relief valve flow" annunciators.
- 3.
Removed Pressurizer Relief Tank level, temperature and pressure parameters.
- 4. Acoustic monitors were combined with flow annunciators as an alternative Changes:
2A
- 1. Removed 'Reactor power reduction or cooldown has been initiated"
- 2. Added new Technical Specification (TS) reference.
Changes:
2B
- 1. Removed mode limitation
- 2.
Removed Shift Supervisor (SS)/Shift Manager (SM)/Emergency Director (ED) opinion Changes:
2C
- 2.
Removed mode limitation.
- 3. Added "All available pumps running indicated by the red light(s) at switch" and 'No pressurizer level as indicated" Changes:
2D
- 1. Removed mode limitation
- 2. Removed SSISMIED opinion
- 3. Revised to say "Containment pressure is high" instead of "high and increasing".
Changes:
2E
- 1. Removed mode limitation.
- 2. Removed SS/SM/ED opinion.
- 3.
Revised to say "Low subcooling margin" instead of "low subcooling margin and decreasing".
- 4.
Revised from 1 OOOR/hr to 200R/hr for Radiation Monitor R48 or R49.
Changes:
5C
- 1. Added Inadequate Subcooling (<10 degrees F)"
Changes:
6
- 1. Removed the mode restriction (Cases 1 thru 5)
Chances:
6
- 1. Revised from lOOOR/hr to 200R/hr for Radiation Monitor R48 or R49.
(Case 1)
Changes:
7A
- 1. Changed logic to allow SS opinion to make classification
- 2.
Added "Steam line pressure safety injection signal"
- 2.
Removed "indication of Steam Line Break (SLB) downstream of Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) logic tree"
EAL Reference Description of differences between F3-2 Rev. 33 Number and F3-2 Rev. 34 Changes:
7B
- 1. Change Initiating Condition (shaded box) to reflect"> 50 gpd" instead of ">10 gpm"
- 2. Changed "Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation to >150 gpd" to match TS.
Changes:
7C
- 1. Change Initiating Condition (shaded box) to reflect">150 gpd" instead of">10 gpm"
- 2. Changed "Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation to >150 gpd" to match T.S.
Changes:
7D
- 1. Added "Primary sample Dose Equivalent 1-131 (> 300 pCi/cc)" into and added 'OR' box with Radiation Monitor R48 or R49.
Changes:
7E None Changes:
8A
- 1. Removed the need for confirmation and setup logic such that either a sample or portable or installed monitors exceeding setpoint will require classification.
Changes:
8B
- 1. Setup logic such that either a sample or portable or installed monitors exceeding setpoint will require classification.
Changes:
8D
- 1. Changed logic to an 'OR' so that confirmation is not required. Both the installed or portable monitors (R22 and/or R50) are viable methods to determine high radiation Changes:
BE None Changes:
8G
- 1. Removed SS/SM/ED opinion Changes:
9B
- 1. Removed when required by TS Changes:
9E
- 1. Removed the mode restriction such that this EAL is applicable at all times.
Changes:
9F
- 1. Removed SS opinion.
Changes:
11A
- 1. Added a logic tree that includes a "Fire confirmed within the plant" and adds to an 'OR' box with a logic tree that specifies locations in the plant.
Changes:
11 B
- 1. Changed from "physical observation" to "Observation that a fire could affect safety systems"
EAL Reference Description of differences between F3-2 Rev. 33 Number and F3-2 Rev. 34 Changes:
12B
- 1. Revised initiating condition to state "Nonfunctional indications or alarms in the Control Room requiring a plant shutdown" instead of only addressing a loss of alarms in the Control Room.
- 2.
Added to the logic tree "SS or SM opinion that annunciators or indications are nonfunctional" Changes:
12C
- 1.
Removed mode restriction.
- 2.
Changes:
12D
- 1.
Removed the note defining plant transient.
- 2.
Removed the mode restrictions.
- 3.
Removed SS or SM opinion that annunciators are non-functional.
- 4.
Revised the loss of annunciator logic to 'OR' instead of 'AND' Changes:
121
- 1.
Removed SS opinion.
Changes:
12J
- 1.
Removed SS opinion.
- 2.
Added 'Reactor or turbine trip due to turbine failure" Changes:
1 6A
- 1.
Added 'Per the Security Plan" Changes:
1 6B
- 1.
Added 'Per the Security Plan" Changes:
1 6C
- 1.
Added 'Per the Security Plan" Changes:
1 6D
- 1.
Added 'Per the Security Plan" Changes:
17A
- 1.
Eliminated unusual threatening aircraft activity over facility.
- 2.
Changed crash on site to 'Visual observation by plant personnel and/or security personnel" Changes:
17D
- 1.
Removed visually observed evidence of an unplanned/unexplained explosion within the owner controlled fence but not affecting plant safe operation.
- 2.
Added "Visual observation by plant personnel and/or security personnel" Changes:
17E
- 1.
Removed visually observed evidence of an unplanned explosion directly affecting plant safe operation.
- 2.
Added "Visual observation by plant personnel"
- 3.
EAL Reference Description of differences between F3-2 Rev. 33 Number and F3-2 Rev. 34 Changes:
17G
- 1. Removed all references to safe shutdown systems.(ie. Si, Steam Dump, RX Trip, Steam Generator Safeties, and PORVs, Main Feedwater and AuxilIary Feedwater)
- 2.
Removed visual observation of missile impact or explosion and left only "Visually observed evidence by plant and/or plant security personnel" Changes:
1 7H
- 1.
Removed "widespread" in terms of toxic gas presence.
- 2.
Added the toxic gas and explosive limits Changes:
171
- 1. Revised Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured within a large area of the plant at the breathing zone to "Toxic gaseous concentration being measured within the plant" and removed at a distance >10 ft. from the source.
Changes:
17J
- 1.
Removed any reference to major portions of a vital area to just read "in a vital area" Changes:
19A
- 1. Removed confirmation from off-site sources, earthquake felt by plant personnel and SS/SM opinion. Also eliminated "confirmed" from the gray box.
- 2. Revised to now need only a "Seismic Event Annunciator on the Seismograph Alarm Panel" Changes:
19B
- 1. Removed confirmation from off-site sources, earthquake felt by plant personnel and SSISM opinion.
- 2. Revised to now need only "Operational Basis Earthquake Annunciator received on the Seismograph Alarm Panel" Changes:
19C
- 1. Removed confirmation from off-site sources, earthquake felt by plant personnel and SS/SM opinion.
- 2. Revised to now need only 'Design Basis Earthquake Annunciator received on the Seismograph Alarm Panel" Changes:
1 9D
- 1.
Revised Shaded box to say "Any tornado visible from site", vice; "Any tornado visible on site" Changes:
1 9J
- 1. River intake elevation now says "approximately 669.5 ft" rather than <669.5 ft.
Changes:
19K
- 1.
Changed <666.5 ft. to "approximately 666.5 ft"
Mfst Num:
2004 -
0138 Date
- 02/26/04 FROM
- Bruce Loesch/Mary Gadient Loc
- Prairie Island TO
- UNDERWOOD, BETTY J Copy Num: 515 Holder : US.NRC DOC CONTROL DESK SUBJECT : Revisions to CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS Procedure #
Rev Title Revisions:
F3-2 34 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES UPDATING INSTRUCTIONS Place this material in your Prairie Island Controlled Manual or File. Remove revised or cancelled material and recycle it.
Sign and date this letter in the space provided below within ten working days and return to Bruce Loesch or Mary Gadient, Prairie Island Nuclear Plant, 1717 Wakonade Drive E.,
Welch, MN 55089.
Contact Bruce Loesch (ext 4664) or Mary Gadient (ext 4478) if you have any questions.
Received the material stated above and complied with the updating instructions Date
l PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR
Title:
l GENERATING PLANT Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC l
I I
lEffective Date : 02/26/04 l
NOTE: This set may contain a partial distribution l
I tj L l
lL of this Document Type. Please refer to the CHAMPS jApproved By:_
l Module for specific Copy Holder Contents.
l E
BPA Designee l
Document #
Title Rev F3-1 ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 21 F3-2 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES 34 F3-3 RESPONSIBILITIES DURING A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL 18 EVENT F3-4 RESPONSIBILITIES DURING AN ALERT, SITE AREA, 29 OR GENERAL EMERGENCY F3-5 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 22 F3-5.1 SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR DUTIES 8
F3-5.2 RESPONSE TO-FALSE SIREN-ACTIVATION 10 F3-5.3 RESPONSE TO RAILROAD GRADE CROSSING BLOCKAGE 8
F3-6 ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 18 F3-7 ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT 17 CENTER (OSC)
F3-8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 20 F3-8.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR 13 THE ON-SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR /SHIFT MANAGER F3-9 EMERGENCY EVACUATION 19 F3-10 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY 20 F3-11 SEARCH & RESCUE 8
F3-12 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CONTROL 15 F3-13 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION 15 F3-13.3 MANUAL DOSE CALCULATIONS 11 F3-13.4 MIDAS METEOROLOGICAL DATA DISPLAY 7
F3-13.5 ALTERNATE METEOROLOGICAL DATA 5
Page 1 of 3
PRAIRIE ISLAND-NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Title : Emergency Plan Implementing
-Procedures TOC Effective Date : 02/26/04 Document #
F3-13.6 F3-14.1 F3-14.2 F3-15 F3-16 F3-17 F3-17.1 F3-17.2 F3-18 F3-19 F3-20 F3-20.1 F3-20.2 F3-21 F3-22 F3-23 F3-23.1 F3-24 F3-25 F3-26.1 F3-26.2 F3-26.3 Title-WEATHER FORECASTING :INFORMATION ONSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING OPERATIONS EMERGENCY SURVEYS RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE LIQUID RELEASE CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT CORE DAMAGE DETERMINATION LONG TERM CORE COOLING THYROID IODINE BLOCKING AGENT (POTASSIUM IODIDE)
PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT MONITORING & DECONTAMINATION DETERMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASE CONCENTRATIONS DETERMINATION OF STEAM LINE DOSE RATES DETERMINATION OF SHIELD BUILDING VENT STACK DOSE RATES ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECONDARY ACCESS CONTROL POINT PRAIRIE ISLAND RADIATION PROTECTION GROUP RESPONSE TO A MONTICELLO EMERGENCY EMERGENCY SAMPLING EMERGENCY HOTCELL PROCEDURE RECORD KEEPING DURING AN EMERGENCY REENTRY OPERATION OF THE ERCS DISPLAY RADIATION MONITOR DATA ON ERCS ERDS -
NRC DATA LINK KIj Rev 12 11 10 24 17 11 0
0 10 8
1 8
\\
9 9
10 17 19 13 7
8 7
7 1
Page 2 of 3
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Title :,Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC Effective Date : 02/26/04 Document #
F3-29 F3-30 F3-31 F3-32 Title EMERGENCY SECURITY PROCEDURES TRANSITION TO RECOVERY RESPONSE TO SECURITY RELATED THREATS REVIEW OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DURING OR AFTER NATURAL DISASTER EVENTS Rev 18 6
8 2
Page 3 of 3
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 0
0 Procedure segments may be performed from memory.
Use the procedure to verify segments are complete.
Mark off steps within segment before continuing.
Procedure should be available at the work location.
O.C. REVIEW DATE:
OWNER:
EFFECTIVE DATE M. Werner 2 - z
- ° St Page 1 of 14
fI~
v Wl PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR CjENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:-
CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 REV:
34
'<)
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE.........................................
3 2.0 APPLICABILITY.........................................
3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS.........................................
3 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES.........................................
4 5.0 DISCUSSION.........................................
4 5.1 Definitions 4...................
4 5.2 Emergency Action Levels
- .6 5.3 The Emergency Classification/Dec-aration/Implementation Process..........6 5.4 Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs.................................... 8 5.5 Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events...................................
9 5.6 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number 10 6.0 PREREQUISITES............
10 7.0 PROCEDURE............
1 1 LIST OF ATTACHMENTS - Summary of Emergency Action Levels Page 2 of 14
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EEMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to specify the Emergency Action Levels that indicate an emergency condition exists and to properly classify the emergency into one (1) of the four.(4) graded levels of emergency classifications. This procedure partially satisfies the requirement of 1 OCFR50.47 concerning the existence of an emergency classification and action level scheme.
2.0 APPLICABILITY This instruction SHALL apply to all Shift Managers (SM), Shift Supervisors (SS), Control Room Operators (CR0), Emergency Directors (ED) and Emergency Managers (EM).
3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 This procedure SHALL be entered whenever there is indication of an Emergency Action Level being exceeded. -
3.2 Attempt to verify the indications by checking secondary or coincident indicators.
3.3 An emergency classification should be made based on current plant conditions described in Attachment 1 of this procedure.
3.4 These emergency classifications do not apply to offsite transportation incidents that do NOT affect safe operation of the plant. Currently, the Radiation Protection group is responsible for offsite transportation incident assessment involving plant related shipments.
3.5 Continuously monitor the Control Room instrumentation, radiation monitors, or any other developments which would be indicative of further system degradation. Be
-prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification.
Page 3 of 14
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES v
NUMBER-CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES
- FREV:_34_
2 REV:
4 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Duty Shift Manager has the responsibility to authorize the initial emergency classification.
4.2 Shift Supervisor of the unaffected unit has the responsibility to assist-the Shift Manager as necessary including authorization of an emergency classification.
4.3 Shift Supervisor of the affected unit has the responsibility to direct activities related to the operation of the affected unit.
4.4 Emergency Director has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification whenever an Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency is declared and the EOF is not activated.
4.5 If the EOF is activated and fully functional, the Emergency Manager has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification.
4.6 Control Room Operators and affected unit Shift Supervisor have the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager or unaffected unit Shift Supervisor in the identification and verification of control board indications.
5.0 DISCUSSION 5.1 Definitions 5.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event - events that are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
Page 4,of 14
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT...........
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES vCLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES17-5.1.2 Alert - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. It is the lowest level of emergency classification when some necessity for emergency planning and offsite response is necessary.
Any releases expected are limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
5.1.3 Site Area Emergency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely. major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public.
Any releases are not expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.
5.1.4 General Emergency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with a potential for loss of containment integrity..
Releases during a General Emergency can be reasonably expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.
5.1.5 Emergency Action Levels (EAL) - specific instrument readings, surface or airborne contamination levels or radiation dose rates that designate a specific emergency class requiring emergency measures for that class.
5.1.6 Safety System(s) - refers to systems that are required to be functional during and following a design basis accident or transient to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition; or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents, which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the guidelines of 10CFR1 00; or the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. The structures and components of a Safety System are "Safety Related SSC."
Page 5 of 14
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REV:
34 l 5.2 Emergency Action Levels (EALs)
Attached to this procedure is a Summary of Emergency Action Levels,. This summary identifies the four emergency classifications, the initiating condition(s), emergency action levels for each classification, and, where applicable, specific instruments and indications to be used to detect and classify an emergency.
The emergency action levels for each classification and the instrument readings and indications listed do not reflect a complete list of instrumentation that will show abnormal indications but does list those key parameters useful in classifying the event.
The Summary of Emergency Action Levels lists are based on the initiating conditions as required by Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, accidents analyzed in the Prairie Island USAR, and the NRC Branch Position on Acceptable Deviations From NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.
5.3 The Emergency Classification/Declaration/limplementation Process There are three distinct phases to consider: Classification, Declaration and Implementation.
5.3.1 Classification
The act of assessing the EALs to determine the appropriate classification for which the ongoing events are categorized.
Classification is expected to be made promptly following indication that the conditions have reached an emergency threshold in accordance with the EAL scheme. Promptly is a period not to exceed 15 minutes.
5.3.2 Declaration
The act of formally declaring the classification based on the assessment of EALs.
This is the point at which the classification time is set and the 1 OCFR50, App. E 15-minute offsite notification clock starts.
5.3.3 Implementation
The act of making the notification and/or augmentation ofi-the emergency organizations.
Page 6 of 14
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:
CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 REV:
34 5.3.4 Classification Timeliness:
Guidance for classification timeliness is provided in NRC Branch Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions, EPPOS No. 2 and the NRC endorsed Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, NEI 99-02. The guidance is summarized as follows:
Classification is expected to be made promptly following indications that conditions have reached an emergency threshold in accordance with the EAL'scheme. Promptlyis a period not to exceed 15 minutes. This 15-minute criterion is a reasonable' period of time for assessing and classifying emergencies.
5.3.5 Ideally, the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) should be filled out to near completion while the classification phase is being conducted. Once the declaration is made by the SM/ED/EM, the 15-minute offsite notification time starts. The SM/ED/EM should review the contents of the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) to ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator (or Offsite Communicator in EOF) to implement the E-Plan notifications.
5.3.6 Per 10CFR50.72 (a)(3) NRC notification is required immediately after the notification of the state and local agencies (which is completed within about 15 minutes) and not later than one hour after the emergency declaration.
'Page 7 of 14
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
.,1, j.
NUMBER:
-CLASSIFICATIONSOF EMERGENCIES F3-2 REV:
34 5.4 Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs 5.4.1 In some cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits (e.g., RCS leakage, reactor coolant activity, etc.) is considered to be precursors to more serious events and warrant declaration of an NUE.
5.4.2 In other cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits for the period designated in the T.S. ACTIONS Table is an analyzed condition of the plant and does not, by itself, represent an emergency. These events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 as a non-emergencies.
However, if the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable Technical Specifications action statement time limit T.S. ACTIONS Table COMPLETION Time, then a declaration of an Unusual Event should be declared.
5.4.3 With regard to Emergency Plan classifications, Operations should handle a J Technical Specification required shutdown in the following manner:
A.
The conditions of the plant should come first. That is, if the condition warrants initiating power reduction immediately, do so. The E-Plan classification can appropriately, follow..
B.
Following the initiation of the reduction in power or temperature, the classification phase of the E-Plan is started. Review of the EALs should be done to assess for proper classification. Once the Shift Manager has determined the appropriate classification for the event, the Shift Manager should declare the classification and note the time of declaration (this begins the 15-minute offsite notification clock).
C.
Once the declaration is made, the Shift Manager should review the contents of the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) to ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator to implement the E-Plan notifications.
Page 8 of 14
.PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT X-E EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
.. I 5.5 Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events In the case of an event that rapidly escalates then de-escalates or begins at a higher emergency class then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.
It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.
The NRC should be informed of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC notification via the ENS phone. The Shift Manager should ensure that this notification be performed by an appropriate individual other than the SEC using PINGP Form 666, Event Notification Worksheet.
To avoid possible confusion, other'offsite authorities will be informed of the current classification during the initial notification and then given the full description of the highest emergency classification reached during the first update on'the follow-up notification. In those cases where no classification is declared, then 5AWI 3.6.4, Notifications Regarding Plant Media Sensitive Events or Conditions, should be utilized to make proper calls to the state and local government organizations regarding the rapidly escalating and de-escalating event.
Page 9 of 14
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 5.6 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant has prepared a written manual (EAL Reference Manual) to provide general information about Emergency Action Levels to offsite authorities who are involved in nuclear plant emergency planning. This manual provides a description with text and drawings of the various conditions that might cause the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant to classify an event. By understanding what a particular condition or event means, emergency workers at the various offsite agencies should develop a clear idea of what is occurring at the plant during the emergency.
Each initiating condition in this procedure is followed by a cross reference number that corresponds to the appropriate classification condition in-the EAL Reference Manual. When the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) is completed, the initiating condition statement and the EAL Reference Manual cross reference number should be included on the form by using the label from "Emergency Initiating Conditions Labels - PINGP 1189" or writing this information as it appears in the shaded box on the appropriate page in the Summary of Emergency Action Levels.
6.0 PREREQUISITES An off-normal condition corresponding to one of the initiating events described in of this procedure is occurring or has occurred.
Page 1 0 of 14
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMR C P
.N...M.E RE EMERGEN.CY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.0 PROCEDURE 7.1 Any significant event that may be classified as an emergency condition SHALL be reported to the Shift Supervisor, Shift Manager and/or Emergency Director immediately.
N-TIt is an expectation that the emergency declaration will be made p romptly (within 15 minutes) upon reaching the EAL threshold.;
l Expectations for use of '.SS, SM or ED. Opinion" EAL statements:
- l l
l"SS, SM or ED Opinion" means that the decision maker is to ensure the declaration is made when conditions meet the EAL initiating condition statement. The "opinion" is NOT a reason to dismiss any valid conditions that meet an EAL threshold value. Judgment is to be
-used for any condition not explicitly detailed as a set of EAL threshold values, which is a potential degradation in the level of l
safety of the plant. Classification of an emergency is not to be l
delayed pending an extended evaluation of possibilities and 7.2 Attempt to verify the initial indication by comparing the indication to redundant instrument channels or to other related parameters, visual observations, and field reports-as applicable. -
7.3 The Shift Manager, unaffected unit Shift Supervisor or Emergency Director SHALL assess the situation and determine the emergency classification, using the guidelines of Attachment 1.
7.4 In those cases when an event rapidly escalates, then de-escalates or begins at a higher classification, then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.
7.4.1 Inform the NRC of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC ENS notification.
Pg.11 Page 1 of 14
I PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES t
6 l
i..
.NUMBER:
M CLASSIFICATIONS.OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 7.4.2 It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.
7.4.3 In those cases where no classification is declared, then 5AWI 3.6.4, Notifications Regarding Plant Media Sensitive Events or Conditions, should be utilized to make proper calls to state and local government organizations regarding the event.
7.5 The Shift Supervisor of the affected unit should take immediate actions, using applicable plant operating procedures to return the plant to normal (or Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, if determined to be necessary).
7.6 IF the EOF is not activated, THEN the Shift Manager or Emergency Director SHALL declare the appropriate emergency classification and perform actions as specified in the appropriate responsibility procedure applicable to emergency classification:
7.6.1 For a Notification of Unusual Event, proceed to F3-3.
7.6.2 For an Alert, Site or General Emergency, proceed to F3-4.
IF the EOF is activated, THEN contact the Emergency Manager for consultation on whether or not to change the emergency classification. The Emergency Director is responsible to formulate the new classification while the Emergency Manager is responsible to authorize the reclassification.
7.7 Continue to assess and watch for changing parameters or visual indication of further system degradation and be prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification as indicated by the Emergency Action Levels in.
Page 12 of 14
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.8 As plant conditions stabilize during a Notification of an Unusual Event (NUE) or Alert, consider terminating the event classification.
7.8.1 For the NUE and Alert classifications, the event may be terminated once the following criteria are met:
A.
The plant is in stable condition with at least one fission product barrier intact, and.
B.
Radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent are being controlled within the following limits:
- 1.
Gaseous effluent release rates (or resulting dose rates) are within plant limits as defined in Section 3.1 of1H4, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and
- 2.
Liquid effluent release rates (or resulting concentrations) are within the 'plant limits as defined in "Old 10CFR20 Appendix B in Table II, Column 2.(April 1992)" located in H4, ODCM, Table 4.3 and C.
The potential for future degradation of plant conditions is small.
7.8.2 Termination of an NUE classification may be performed by the Shift Manager. Review.of 5AWI 1.13.0, Plant Event Investigation and Recovery, should be completed to determine if this procedure needs to be implemented and the Plant Manager informed of the review.
7.8.3 Termination of an Alert classification may be performed by the Emergency Director when the EOF is not activated. Once the EOF is fully functional, the Emergency Manager SHALL terminate the Alert classification when the conditions are met for termination.
Page 13 of 14
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLAINT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.8.4 Termination of an Alert classification includes the dismissal of the site Emergency Response Organization. Any necessary in-plant or on-site follow-up activities should be coordinated and managed by the normal plant site organization. In some cases, conditions may require the establishment of a Recovery Organization in which case the Emergency Director and Emergency Manager should make this determination based on the extent of damage or other considerations. In this case 5AWI 1.13.0 should be reviewed and implemented as determined appropriate.
7.9 As plant conditions stabilize during a Site Area or General Emergency, consider transition to the Recovery phase.
7.9.1 Transiti the Site Area Emergency event does not require significant repairs or analysis beyond the capabilities of the normal plant site organization and the conditions of 7.8.1. A, l
B. & C are met, THEN the Site Area Emergency may be Se tr-minated without a transition to Recovery. However review 7
R e
and implementation of AAW W
1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate.
7.9.1 Transition to Recovery should be directed by the Emergency Manager with coordinated recovery planning by the site Emergency Response Organization.
7.9.2 See F3-30, "Recovery", for instruction! on transition to Recovery.
7.9.3 Review and implementation of 5AWI 1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate.
Page 14 of 14
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER:
F CLASSIFICATION OF. EMERGENCIES F3-2 ATTACHMENT 1 _I REV:
-_34
SUMMARY
OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Definition of logic symbols:
AND symbol =
-OR symbol Page 1 of 60
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
.EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE INITIATING CONDITION INDEX No.
Condition Description Pame 1
Safety System Functions 3
2 Abnormal Primary Leak Rate 4
3 Deleted 8
4 Abnormal Primary/Secondary Leak 9
5 Core Fuel Damage 13 6
Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers 15 7
Secondary Coolant Anomaly 21 8
Radiological Effluents 26 9
Major Electrical Failures 31 10 Control Room Evacuations 35 11 Fires 36 12 Plant Shutdown Functions 38 13 Fuel Handling Accidents 44 14 Deleted 46 15 Deleted 46 16 Security Threats 47 17 Hazards to Plant Operations 48 18 ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) Events 53 19 Natural Events 54 20 Other 59 Page 2 of 60
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 3 of 60 Condition 1: Safety.System Functions I
ir o7a sa e o
e fef aiveih a fe rela ed.s stem toc ose olfo ing r ction of ap cable pressure (EAL Ref Manual 1 B)
Q.-
a la) 0.
to a 0'-
"a)
Visual and/or audible indication at discharge of open steam generator safety or relief valve As determined by SS or SM l
- Notification of Unusual Event a) 2a) a)
I-0 cto a)Pi a)
X.
0 f4-a)a)L Pressurizer safety valve outlet temperature, Tl-436 Pressurizer safety valve outlet temperature, TI-437 Pressurizer relief valve outlet temperature, TI-438 Annun Pressurizer PORV Line High Temp Annun Pressurizer Safet Valve Line A or B High Temp Annun Pressurizer Safety/Relief Valve flow Acoustic Monitors indicate flow from either the pressurizer PORV's or safeties
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 4 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak lekate riunetifed orI Wo!~orcseceineci (EAL Ref Manual 2A)
Primary system leak rate, other than controlled leakage sources, exceeds T.S.3.4.14 Requires a unit shutdown, as determined by the SM or SS Notification of Unusual Event Prjm ~ S cool Want la atf-,,greater tha 5Op' (EAL Ref Manual 2B )
Sum of charging line flow + seal injection flow >50 gpm more than the A Flows >50 m
sum of letdown flow + RCP seal leakoff flow
- Decreasing pressurizer level, as indicated by LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R2 (Containment Area Rad Mon)
> ' 50 Rlhr R7 (Containment Area Rad Mon) 0 R-11 (Containment Vent Rad Mon) > sx1o 4 cpm
[Containment Position]
R-12 (Containment Vent Rad Mon) l> 6x 3 cpm
[Containment Position]
Alert
- Note A rapid temperature decrease in the RCS results in the same indications
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES IATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 5 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak I-1, (EAL Ref Manual 2C)
SI Actuated annunciator illuminated WA SG is not depressurizing In an uncontrolled manner
'B' SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure RCS Pressure No Si Flow Subcooling No pressurizer level as indicated by U-426, L-427, LI-428 All available pumps running indicated by red light(s) at switch Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 6 of 60 I
Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak (EAL Ref Manual 2D)
General Emergency Containment temp has become excessive, and is still rising Containment pressure is high Operating containment spray pumps Operating containment fan coil unit trains
F3-2. CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1
- REV. 34 Page 7 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak 1re of.ECCS to rioie e
era t
fro.
ia al eofC an en1 (EAL Ref Manual 2E)
?4 _ 8 o o t,
-I L
qa U) r1.
.0 a
0
-4 High Head SI failure Low Head SI failure High dose equivalent 1-131 as determined by sample analysis Valid high radiaiton R-48 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)
Valid high radiaiton R-49 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)
Decreasing RCS pressure Low subcooling margin
'A SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner
'B SG is nQt depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner Pressurizer Low Pressure Trip RCS pressure decreasing uncontrollably High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity General Emergency High containment pressure
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 3: Abnormal Coolant TemperaturelPressure REV. 34 Page 8 of 60 DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviations From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.
,F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
'ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 9 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary / Secondary Leak S
i (EAL Ref Manual 4A)
SG primary to secondary lekg.~ed
> 150 GPD through any 1 SG leakage exceeds T.S.3.4.14 limits
+ Notification of Unusual Event realerKlnanlaui.uum_
As -I (EAL Ref Manual 4B)
Ž1
'_s' Of. 4..-Ls^'>aJ2.f
{FM Wv Au WI__-9 -W.r
-e ---------
. "e, T.S. >200 F Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Decreasing pressurizer level LU-426, LI-427, LI-428 R15 (Air Ejector Rad Mon)
Sum of charging line flow plus seal injection greater than 50 gpm more than the sum of Letdown Flow and RCP Seal Leakoff flow Alert SS, SM, ED opinion
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 10 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary ISecondary Leak lgen t;ubS,'YQShn
%i;
'StSW actatin
-4w (EAL Ref Manual 4C)
"Si Actuated " annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, P1-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 213 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Alert Unexpected Rise in either SG level
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 11 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak (EAL Ref Manual 4D)
"SI Actuated " annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel Site Area Emergency c
I..
(A) 0 Li
.0 Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; Pl-429,PI-430, P1-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least I >5%
2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, L-428 I R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor b
R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor i
Unexpected Rise in either SG level Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of the ruptured Steam Generator MSIV Failure of ruptured Steam Generator MSIV to close with indications of steam line break downstream of MSIV
-Ruptured SG safety or relief valve opens and then fails to reseat indicated by visual and/or audible indication at discharges As determined by SS, SM, or ED Ir I
If steam break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel failure, this may be a General Emergency. See Condition # 6, Case 2.
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 12 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak
- 1 nI:
. I 1
.- c -
- _.. ii~.
iz.es WVtA'W 31
§ est
"' E M BE
- 'W"';SM Et ' -'
ler
-4
"- A 1
1
k' (EAL Ref Manual 4E)
,oa 0tu U;
u, Co Q
a to 0
1.
U, a,.
9X 0
to 0
-J
'SI Actuated ' annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel I Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, Pl-431
< 1815 psig PZR level cannot be maintained on at >s 5%
least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 I R-51 Steam Une Rad Monitor l 9
Site Area I
xEmergency R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor,
Unexpected Rise in either SG level I 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]
< 3 V
4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]
< 3 4 <K3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 13 [23],4119306 14172806) 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]
D1 [D5] Tach 900 rpm 11200 D1 [D5] Gen Volts 4000 - 4400 volts Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-211 D2 [D6 ] Tach 900 rpm 1 200 rpml D2 [D6] Gen Volts 4000 -4400 volt Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16] I
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 13 of 60 Condition 5: Core Fuel Damage E1;u1;4 Damge1.ndcaflon~t ~
v: 'i-i a-'-
(EAL Ref Manual 5A)
R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon in alarm R-91 R9 confirmed by portable I instrumentation High coolant activity sample exceeding T.S.3.4.17 for total specific activity in primary coolant High coolant activity sample exceeding T.S.3.4.17 limit on primary coolant iodine activity which requires a unit shutdown.
lI> 1 R/hr Notification of Unusual Event V,W
-- 'M
,g 1 1 ss'No - ]["c I id lp I
--_1.T,-:77z
.-AN-(EAL Ref Manual 5B)
Dose equivalent 1-131 l R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon) in alarm R-9l R-9 confirmed by portable instrumentation l Alert
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 14 of 60 Condition 5: Core Fuel Damage o
(EAL Ref Manual 5C) i egra e
=
,d'cr bit Wj osslo e.
AlFr 3-5Ed S
a t
e.t J
l Ios k,coolbigrgeoietryd J tQ0 SS, SM, or ED opinion Core Delta T increasing No core Delta T Dose Equivalent 1-131 Core exit thermocouples RVLIS full range Inadequate Subcooling Site Area Emergency r
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
.ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier. (EAL Ref Manual 6)
GENERAL EMERGENCY REV. 34 Page 15 of 60
- 1. Three permutations exist for loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier; A. Failure of cladding and primary coolant boundary with potential loss of containment.
B. Failure of cladding and containment with potential loss of primary coolant boundary.
C. Failure of containment and primary coolant boundary with potential loss of cladding.
These 3 permutations are represented in the following 5 cases, each with its own set of EAL's:
I
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 16 of 60 I
Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers oft cIad, iossrimiiiaryIr coorant
` '
peaorlos oft (EAL Ref Manual 6) 4; 0
a I J~
Zo 0
-J 0
C.)
Co E
0 V)
VA I-0 tZ To o.
CU 4-0 0~
-j So 9:0u Valid high radiation R-48 (Containment High Range Area
, 2c Rad Mon)
Valid high radiation R-49 2
(Containment High Range Area
> 2c Rad Mon)
Dose equivalent 1-131 Pressurizer low pressure trip
23 design pressure and increasing I Control Room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SM, or ED opinion Operating containment Zero spray pumps Operating containment fan <One coil unit trains
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 17 of 60 Condition' 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission'Product Barriers
-Gtue.P (EAL Ref Manual 6) z W
Sc E c o.
r C
.0
'IO-C, ci 00
-J Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of the ruptured SG MSIV Failure of ruptured SG MSIV to close with indications of steam line break Ruptured SG stuck open safety or relief valve indicated by visual and/or audible steam relief As determined by SS, SM, or ED R-51 (Loop A Steam Line)
R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)
R-15 (Air Ejector)
Unexpected Rise in either SG level SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel SI flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure P1-429, P1-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 Dose equivalent 1-131 General Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 18 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers oea(EAL Ref Manual 6) o o Dose equivalent 1-131 l
Emer enc Emergency Cold leg temperature decrease in th
> 100oF last 60 minutesM RCS cold leg temperature <250'F Steam line break betweeni containment and the MSIVI Steam line break downstream o MSIV I E
MSIV open-close indicator(s) sho open or partially openl o
Control room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SM,or ED opinion
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 19 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers bu ary OCA lossof ntameiitdhigi jo eti1o loss of ladding (EAL Ref Manual 6)
-.. ~
c 0 r to 'r Q)oto a
K> n fiaO t Co Control room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SM,or ED opinion RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples General Emergency RCS pressure decreasing uncontrollably
-J at C',-
(3
.0 0toto "A' SG is not depressurizing L in an uncontrolled manner 1 "Bt SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 20 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers (EAL Ref Manual 6)
Q) 0 I=
.4-I uz 420 ok 0
L.
U 4b..
0 r o I.
- 0 1=12 it Q,
Steam line break between containment and the ruptured Steam Generator MSIV General Emergency Stuck open ruptured SG PORV or Safety valve Steam line break downstream of ruptured Steam Generator MSIV MSIV open-close indicator shows open or partially open RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples R-51 (Loop A Steam Line)
R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)
R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel SI flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure PI-429, PI-430, P1-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 21 of 60
- 1.
I Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly
- io
. Ia(EAL Ref Manual 7A)
Steam line pressure safety injection signal I Notification of Unusual Event SS or SM opinion that a rapid reduction in secondary pressure occurred Steam Generator AN1 pressure 1, ooDsg differential Increasing Containment Pressure I Indications of a steam line break outside of containment l Failed open Steam Dump, SG PORVI I or SG Safety Valve I Hi Steam Flow l >.745 X 106 Ib/hI Lo-Lo Tavg l<540F
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 22 of 60 I
Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly (EAL Ref Manual 7B)
High containment pressure R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading Steam Line Monitor reading above normal background on faulted SG Unexpected rise in faulted SG level Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation Steam generator A/B pressure differential Valid Steamline low pressure safety injection signal Hi steam flow Alert Lo-Lo Tavg
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 23 of 60 Condition i:
Secondary Coolant Anomaly h
10g r(EAL Ref Manual 7C)
Indications of unisolable steam line break outside containment Site Area Emergency R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading
> 2x104 c Steam Line Monitor reading above normal background on faulted SG
& d; -
Unexpected rise in faulted SG level Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation l 150 Steam generator A/B pressure
.100 psi differential I Q
Valid Steamline low pressure safety I < 500 psig injection signal I Hi steam flow !.745x108 lb/hr U)
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 24 of 60 I
Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly (EAL Ref Manual 7D)
If steam line break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel failure, this may be a General Emergency. See condition # 6, case 2 Primary to Secondary Leakage Valid high radiation R-48 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)
Site Area Emergency Valid high radiation R-49 (Containment High Range Area :
Rad Mon)
Primary sample Dose I >300 Equivalent 1-131 Steam generator ANB pressure
>100 pi differential I High containment pressure
Ž4 psit Valid steamline low pressure < 50o p safety injection signal I Hi steam flow [-x 4C U'
U'.
Cu U'
Lo-Lo Tavg
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 25 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly an condensflated ys;c~stem (pi`nc al ha remov s,1&tn r it en l i re of ova ede 1eor (EAL Ref Manual 7E)
Condensate and Main Feedwater cannotI be established to either SG Aux Feedwater flow cannot be established to either SG High Head Safety Injection flow cannot be !
established to the RCS I 30 minutes have elapsed since implementation of step in FR-H.1 requiring
>30 minutes actuation of SI No Condensate or Main Feedwater flow to either SG No Auxiliary Feedwater flow to either SG No High Head Safety Injection flow to the RCSI General 40,e Emergency I
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 26 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents Techinical Specifications exceededK4 t,, jWw o,.j~u,5,ai'jeeS g j,,~h.>
a, F'£ia' (EAL Ref Manual 8A)
Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 3.1 limits as determined by Rad Protection Total gaseous activity measured by Rad Chemist that a 300 second marinelli gas grab sample analysis from 112]R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Valid 1 R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Notification of Unusual Event ILquidfRadiologicaweffluentjechnica1*
Speifi-ati~on limrits exedd.i (EAL Ref Manual 8B)
-7 Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as determined by Rad Protection Liquid release exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4,0DCM, Sect. 2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)
>High Alarm setpoint R-1 8 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon)
>High Alarm setpoint R-1 8 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) >High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)
Notification of Unusual Event 42 4:
i R-19 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents REV. 34 Page 27 of 60 W
(EAL Ref Manual 8C)
Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations L
Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as determined by Rad Protection Liquid release exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect.
2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon) L
> 10 times High Alarm setpointI R-1 8 (Waste Uquid Discharge Rad Mon)> L 10 times High Alarm setpointI R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) L isolation valve fails to close R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) > 10 times High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)
R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation L valve fails to close I Alert 10 4-I PA"Iffar.i.pir-1411001-ffillafl "INVIVIR, R-M PI MINNIOMIM, MWTV. age,%, W-4
3p ificat o
C i~1 tan fiffi tt"1'-matt-m lbh-iii ours~~ ~~
ISNTVi't,bu rm i~
~ tesi incayu er e~geetEWnOt W
D~~1;lj (EAL Ref Manual 8D)
Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed 10 times Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 3.1 limits as determined by Rad Protection.
Alert Local measured count rate on 1[2]R-50
,3000cpm (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon) gas chamber by RPS.
4-O ao 0
tn grz co Valid 1 R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Valid 1 R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon)
Valid 2R-50 (Shield
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 28 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents ao rMuor
~pij~tes~or
~ r(EAL Ref Manual 8E)
Qq)
U) tu.
n )
0
[ >50 mR/hr for 1/2 hr-LN Radiation survey teams measure gamma dose rates at site boundary Radiation survey teams measure field data at site boundary corresponding to Thyroid CDE Valid 1 R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
I, 500 mR/hr for 21
^
Site Area
_IEmergency
> 250 mrem/hr for 1/2 hr l> 2500 mrem/hrfo2 i
i I > 70 mR/hr I >
I > 70 mR/ihr SE!
I >250 Qmremhr for 112 hr
-1 Thyroid ODE offsite dose projections
[
at the site boundarv I >2500mremnhrfori2mmin
_Jw I
50 mrem/hr for 1/
> 500 mrem/hr for?2 min TEDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES 173-2 -CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents REV. 34 Page 29 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual BF)
M a
la Z'U Radiation survey teams measure gamma dose rates at or beyond the site boundary Radiation survey teams measure field data at the site boundary, corresponding to Thyroid CDE Valid 1 R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
U)
.0 aU en TEDE offsite dose projections at the site c) boundary m Thyroid CDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 30 of 60 I
Condition 8: Radiological Effluents (EAL Ref Manual 8G)
I Ina-n-ntnA
- nrnsen f
-l rIrE.,
-nn l
m u -nn Wi monitors Alert despread unexpected iodine or particulate > 1000 DAC airborne concentrations as per 10CFR20 appendix B table 1, Column 3.
Widespread unexpected contamination in >
' 000.000 dpm/1 0cm2 beta-gamma the Auxiliary Building > 50.000 d m/lr00=
2 alpha activity
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 31 of 60 Condition 9 Major Electrical Failures (EAL Ref Manual 9A)
L..
w k
a 0
0 0
0
-J 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]
<3500Volts 4.16 KV Bus 12 122], 4119305 [4172805]
<3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]
<3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807i
<3500 Volts D1 [Ds5 Tach,l90rmr2 Dl D1 [D5] Gen Volts 4°00 - 4400 N Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-2]
D2 [D6] Tach 900 rpm j1l20 D2 [D6 ] Gen Volts Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16]
Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 9B)
Loss of D1 & D2 [D5 & D6]
diesel generators Notification of Unusual Event
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 32 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures (EAL Ref Manual 9C)
Cl) to 0
co to0
-J I.-
0t.
4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]
<3500 Volts Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]
<3500 Volta Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]
<3500 Volts Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]
<3500 Volts Bus 15 [25), 4191801 [4190401]
<4000 Volts Bus 16 [261, 4192401 [4192301]
<4000 Volts 0
9Alert DI1 oq) to-(EAL Ref Manual 9D)
.2 0
0 to
_l)0
-J 3
I.-
4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV Blackout duration Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]
Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]
Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [41726061 Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]
Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401 1 Bus 16 [261, 4192401 [41923011 Site Area Emergency a'I-14 Eq a
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 33 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures o er
.E)
A=
(EAL Ref Manual 9E) q0
. 0
-J o Co I~2 Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater pump unavailable Motor Driven Aux Feedwater pump from other unit unavailable 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]
4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]
4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]
4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]
4.16 KV Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401]
4.16 KV Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301]
General Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 34 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures wer(,
Site (EAL Ref Manual 9F)
"SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DC I FAILURE" 47018-0501 [47518-0501]1 W
Alert
'SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DC FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-0502]1 (EAL Ref Manual 9G)
'SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DC I FAILURE" 47018-0501 [47518-0501]
"SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DC FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-0502]
Loss of DC power has lasted more than l> 15 min.
15 minutes Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES 173-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIESI.
ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 10: Control Room Evacuations co(EAL Ref Manual 1 OA)
REV. 34 Page 35 of 60 SS,SM, or ED determines evacuation of Control Room is anticipated or required with control of shutdown systems established from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations Alert If reason for evacuation is fire in Control Room or Relay Room, see initiating condition 11 C, "Fire compromising the functions of safety systems" for possible reclassification.
0 ot is1:
S IU ow nl 7-4~a sa n wti mnes-IE 1,
W (EAL Ref Manual 10B)
Evacuation of Control Room conducted Site Area Emergency Control of shutdown systems not established >.15 min from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stationss15.m..
within 15 minutes
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 36 of 60 I
Condition 11: Fires W
(EAL Ref Manual 11A)
FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
Notification of fire or fire detection alarm in the Control Room Fire confirmed within the Reactor Bldg.,
Auxiliary Bldg., Turbine Bldg., Service Bldg., Rad Waste Bldg., Plant Screen House, D5/D6 Bldg., Cooling Tower Equip.
House, Transformers, or on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask in the ISFSI Area Fire confirmed within the plant Fire not extinguished within 1 0-minutes of alarm or notification Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 1 B)
FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
Observation that a fire could affect [
safety systems I h
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 37 of 60 Condition 11: Fires (EAL Ref Manual 1 IC)
FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
Physical observation of a fire that is affecting both trains of a safety system for the same unit SS, SM, or ED opinion Site Area Emergency
- a.
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 38 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions (EAL Ref Manual 12B) c0 a c
SS or SM opinion that annunciators or indications are nonfunctional Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and loss of plant computer Loss of BOP Annunciator System and loss of plant computer (ERCS)
Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and BOP Annunciator System Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 12C)
-, /
Loss of plant computer (ERCS)
Loss of NSSS Annunciator System Alert 0)
I-0 Loss of BOP Annunciator System
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 39 of 60 Condition 12: Plant'Shutdown Functions (EAL Ref Manual 12D)
I ItCZ IX 0 a~ -. c SS, SM, or ED opinion that a transient has occurred or is in progress Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and loss of plant computer Loss of BOP Annunciator System and loss of plant computer (ERCS)
Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and BOP Annunciator System Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 40 of 60 Condition 12 Plant Shutdown Functions lc de (EAL Ref Manual 12E)
Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Interruption of RHR core cooling Entry into procedure E4, Core Cooling Following Loss of RHR flow Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 12F)
Mitigation actions are unable to prevent RCS temperature
>200 F exceeding 200 OF Alert (EAL Ref Manual 12G)
Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Total loss of RHR system cooling Mitigating actions unable to restore makeup flow greater than inventory loss Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 41 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions (EAL Ref Manual 12H)
Mode 1, 2, or 3 Inadequate hi pressure injection capability (i.e., loss of 2/2 SI pumps and loss of all charging pumps for more than 15 minutes)
SS, SM, or ED opinion that plant functions required to maintain Mode 3, Hot Standby not available All steam generator safety valves inoperable Both steam generator PORVs inoperable All steam generator steam dump to atmosphere valves inoperable Steam generator steam dump to condenser valve inoperable No Condensate or Main Feedwater flow No Auxiliary Feedwater flow Wide range level in both SG's Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 42 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions p
(EAL Ref Manual 121)
Reactor or turbine trip due to turbine failure [
Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 12J)
As determined by visual inspection Reactor or turbine trip due to turbine failureI Alert Ir
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 43 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions rte~Tho (EAL Ref Manual 12K)
-Any valid reactor trip setpoint has l been exceeded I Intermediate range detector I
output not decaying
'1 Alert (EAL Ref Manual 12L)
Failure to bring reactor subcritical with control rods inserted No indication of core damage SS, SM, or ED opinion that a transient is in progress Site Area
'Emergency T~ftreqVU-n-g op-eratljio-ic res~Ifi
~o iligeo (EAL Ref Manual 12M)
I-4 o
,to Failure to bring reactor subcritical with control rods inserted RCS pressure Rapidly increasing containment pressure and temperature General Emergency Dose equivalent 1-1 31
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 44 of 60 Condition 13: Fuel Handling Accidents (EAL Ref Manual 13A)
During refueling operations SS, SM,or ED opinion Valid R2 (containment area)
Valid R7 (containment area)
Containment vent monitor in the Containment Position Valid R1 1 (containment vent)
Valid R12 (containment vent)
Alert (EAL Ref Manual 13B)
SS, SM, or ED opinion Valid Spent Fuel Pool Area rad monitor R5 Valid R-22 (shield bldg vent)
Valid R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
I I=
- Alert l > 350 mP~hr l
> 5;x104 cl~r
-11 I
t~Rthr Fl *~
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 13: Fuel Handling Accidents REV. 34 Page 45 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual 13C) lb c
SS, SM, or ED opinion E c Valid R48 (containment area l;
3c hi range) hi Alarm I
° Valid R49 (containment area hi range) hi Alarm Site Area Emergency Z -
thtorz
-1 t'O 9x
Valid R5 (SFP area)
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 46 of 60 Condition 14: Coolant Pump DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.
Condition 15: Contaminated Injured Person DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 47 of 60 Condition 16: Security
.,eat Security determines the threat to be credible [
Threat would have an adverse impact on safe [
operation or shutdown capability of the plant I Security discovers an unauthorized attempted entry by force or stealth (secret) into the plant's protected area (EAL Ref Manual 16A)
I
)ONotification of Unusual Event The FBI confirms that an act of attempted sabotage did occur to vital plant equipment or l security equipment Low Credible Security Threat notification !
received I Per the Security Plan I I
. (EAL Ref Manual 16B)
Security Safeguards Contingency event that results in unauthorized personnel commandeering an area within the plant protected area, but not controlling shutdown capability or any vital areas Bomb device discovered within plant protected L area and outside of any vital area I High Credible Security Threat notification [
received I Per the Security Plan I-Alert plant (EAL Ref Manual 16C)
Physical attack on the plant involving imminent occupancy of the Control Room, auxiliary shutdown panels or other vital areas Bomb device discovered within a vital area Per the Security Plan Site Area Emergency tLossof 4 pbysicalontroLofihepIantwti LAW3WW1 (EAL Ref Manual 16D)
Physical attack on the plant has resulted in unauthorized personnel occupying the Control General Room or any other vital areas.
GEmergency Per the Security Plan I
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 48 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations LAr~wrs oni
-nsa
-icrQ (EAL Ref Manual 17A)
1
>Notification of Visual observation by plant personnel and/or I
Unusual Event security personnel (EAL Ref Manual 17B)
Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash I Alert in the protected area (EAL Ref Manual 17C)
Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash within protected area and affecting vital structures by impact or fires with either unit in Mode 1, 2, 3 or4 Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES 173-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Co n diio H
- o.
P Condition 17 : Hazards to Plant Operations REV. 34 Page 49 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual 17D)
Visual observation by plant personnel and/or I security personnel Notification of Reported to the SS or SM l
Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 17E)
Visual observation by plant personnel e
Alert
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 50 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations on faci ~ifi t"
(EAL Ref Manual 17F)
Visually observed evidence by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of missile impacts on facility from whatever source Alert (EAL Ref Manual 17G)
Site Area Emergency Visually observed evidence by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 51 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations gas (EAL Ref Manual 17H)
Toxic or flammable gaseous hazard being experienced or projected onsite (outside of plant) leading to evacuation or sheltering of personnel outside the plant Receipt of recommendation by Local, County or State Officials to evacuate personnel from site based on an offsite hazardous or flammable gaseous release event Explosive gas concentrations being measured I, explosive limits or projected onsite (outside of plant) I
.X Notification of e w
- Unusual Event
.I 50 nnm hvdrazine Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured or projected onsite (outside of plant)
> 300 ppm ammonia l
t
> 50 ppm hydrochlorc acid l
> 1400 ppm morpholine
> 30 ppm ethanolamine (ETA)
> IDLH for any toxic gas (see D14.4 AOP 1)
Note: tD H nmnedtately Dangerous to Uie or Health.
1DU-
Reference:
NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards. June 1994.
try n othe a enviro sofioxcor gases (EAL Ref Manual 171)
Explosive gas concentrations being measured within the plant.
Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured within the plant Alert Note: IDOH mrmnedlately Dangerous to Ufa or Health.
IDOLH
Reference:
NiOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards.Jurre 1994.
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 52 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations 0
p fivn aar dasowrvith*Dlanj 'n.
j n'M e;'
1 t "A '
~00 (EAL Ref Manual 17J)
Mode 1, 2, 3, or 41 T.S. >200 F Explosive gas concentrations being measured in a vital area from an unisolable source such that further access to the vital area is being prevented at a time when it is needed Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured in a vital area at the breathing zone such that further access to the vital area is being restricted at a time when it is needed Site Area Emergency
> explosive limits
> 50 ppm hydrazine
> 300 ppm ammonia l
> 50 ppm hydrochloric acid
> 1400 ppm morpholine
> 30 ppm ethanolamine (ETA)
> IDLH for any toxic gas (see DI 4.4 AOP 1)
Note: IDLH = Immediately Dangerous to Ufe or Health. IDLH
Reference:
NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, June 1994.
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 53 of 60 Condition 18 :ISFSI Events
ISFSI
hi gi
kteakag
(EAL Ref Manual 18A)
Loaded cask tipped over or droppedI Overpressure monitoring tank o si pressure decreasing to 0 psig
.- Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 18B) 0 E..
vat 1*
%Q;)
t c
Z :E While loaded cask is outside the plant protected area A radiation field near ISFSI cask increase by a factor of 1000 above the ambient radiation field (background plus the normal radiation field from the cask(s))
Widespread contamination outside the ISFSI protected area Alert
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 54 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events
-
1
Anfearthquake2.
-.,,
-
(EAL Ref Manual 19A)
'Seismic Event' Annunciator received [
on the Seismograph Alarm Panel F Notification of Unusual Event a
~:
Op,,'I 0i l~
as1 qilak -
(EAL Ref Manual 19B)
"Operational Basis Earthquake" Annunciator received on the Seismograph Alarm Panel Alert
- Eaith keg eia i r~
Sa~~ia9-97'§t'iP (EAL Ref Manual 19C)
Modes 1, 2, 3, or 41 I
Site Area "Design Basis Earthquake' Emergency Annunciator received on the I Seismograph Alarm Panel
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV.:34 Page 55 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events om site (EAL Ref Manual 19D)
Reported to the SS or SM I Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security I Notification of Unusual Event Ai1 to a the (EAL Ref Manual 19E)
Reported to the SS or SM, or ED I I
X1 Visual observation by plant I personnel and/or plant security I Alert
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 56 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events I
50YearFIood 4
''
(EAL Ref Manual 19F)
River Intake Elevation I > 686 ft Notification of Unusual Event
~v 1 (EAL Ref Manual 19G)
River Intake Elevation -
(USAR 2.4.3.5) - requires both units to
, 692 ft be shut down to Mode 2, 3, 4 or 5 Alert Swith ~plant not hi n6de' VI i'
5e ClaktdwI (EAL Ref Manual 19H)
Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 1 T.S. >200'F AL.
Site Area II Emergency River Intake Elevation - Power operation design level (highest level transformers will function)
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 57 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events ence or LPr6fectiieYondusuaR (EAL Ref Manual 191)
River intake elevation (11/21 Cooling I < 672.5 ft Water Pump - Low Water Level Trip) I Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 19J)
River intake elevation I apprOdmately 669.5 ft Alert (EAL Ref Manual 19K)
Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 River intake elevation corresponding to loss of Lock &
Dam#3 Major vital equipment failure Site Area Emergency River Intake Elevation
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 58 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events I
'-pr oIhl' Mt he es,-
ei4,:>
I (EAL Ref Manual 19L)
Sustained wind speed indicated by
>90 mph met tower
-e Alert (EAL Ref Manual 19M)
T.S. >200F Modes 1. 2. 3. or A.
vv I,
vn -i A.
I Sustained wind speed indicated by
> 100 mph met tower Site Area Emergency
,hs e~lamae 'lant 4`04 enviIffl3wo;suit~fti~ia'.$f
,.t-.Lk.X,.g~.<a~S
+-w-uieA02,-n-U~i' rtx v
ti-4 fa (EAL Ref Manual 19N)
As determined by the SS, SM, or ED [
General Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 20 Other 9ati9es oIS R Mnahe a2of e
atg~n rinp~a
,~(EAL Ref Manual 20A)
REV. 34 Page 59 of 60 SM and SS concurrence that plant [
conditions warrant increased awareness I 0 Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 20B)
T.S.ACTION TABLE not met I h
requires plant shutdown or cooldown I
..a Reactor power reduction or cooldown requirements have been exceeded Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 20C)
Reactor power reduction or cooldown has been initiated Emergency Safeguard Function equipment did NOT perform its function if required Cooldown rate exceeded Tech Spec Limit SS or SM opinion that lack of control of shutdown or cooldown warrants offsite agency notification Notification of Unusual Event
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 34 Page 60 of 60 Condition 20: Other Ir~
Sergekn arra ilz ri i
chnia l
A s up.,p.
rt-.
e
.. ~ e: vaind ihe,-.
iteo!:!zu (EAL Ref Manual 20D)
Alert (EAL Ref Manual 20E)
Site Area Emergency (EAL Ref Manual 20F)
General Emergency