ML040760667

Revised Minutes of Internal Meeting of Davis-Besse Oversight Panel (Revised RAM Closure Attachment)

ML040760667
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	03/16/2004
From:	Grobe J NRC/RGN-III
To:
References
Download: ML040760667 (23)

Text

March 16, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: Davis-Besse Oversight Panel FROM: John A. Grobe, Chairman, Davis-Besse Oversight Panel /RA/

SUBJECT:

REVISED SEPTEMBER 16, 2003 MINUTES OF INTERNAL MEETING OF THE DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL (Revised RAM Closure Attachment)

The implementation of the IMC 0350 process for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station was announced on April 29, 2002. An internal panel meeting was held on September 16, 2003. Attached for your information are the minutes from the internal meeting of the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel, the closed Restart Action Matrix items, and the Open Action Items List.

Attachments: As stated cc w/att: H. Nieh, OEDO J. Caldwell, RIII G. Grant, RIII S. Reynolds, DRP R. Gardner, DRS B. Clayton, EICS G. Wright, DRP DB0350

MEMORANDUM TO: Davis-Besse Oversight Panel FROM: John A. Grobe, Chairman, Davis-Besse Oversight Panel

SUBJECT:

REVISED SEPTEMBER 16, 2003 MINUTES OF INTERNAL MEETING OF THE DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL (Revised RAM Closure Attachment)

The implementation of the IMC 0350 process for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station was announced on April 29, 2002. An internal panel meeting was held on September 16, 2003. Attached for your information are the minutes from the internal meeting of the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel, the closed Restart Action Matrix items, and the Open Action Items List.

Attachments: As stated cc w/att: H. Nieh, OEDO J. Caldwell, RIII G. Grant, RIII S. Reynolds, DRP R. Gardner, DRS B. Clayton, EICS G. Wright, DRP DB0350 DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML040760667.wpd To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:"C" = Copy without enclosure "E"= Copy with enclosure"N"= No copy OFFICE RIII RIII RIII NAME RBaker CLipa JGrobe DATE 03/11/04 03/15/04 03/16/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

MEETING MINUTES: Internal IMC 0350 Oversight Panel Meeting Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station DATE: September 16, 2003 TIME: 12:30 p.m. Central ATTENDEES:

J. Grobe D. Hills M. Phillips W. Ruland V. Mitlyng A. Muniz-Gonzalez S. Thomas R. Baker M. Holmberg J. Hopkins C. Lipa A. Mendiola J. Stang D. Passehl Agenda Items:

1. Discuss/Approve Todays Agenda The Panel approved the agenda, but added additional items. THE APPROVED AGENDA REFLECTS THE ORDER LISTED IN THESE MINUTES.

2. Discuss Radio Call-In Participation Mr. Grobe discussed the request made to NRC to participate in a National Public Radio (NPR) call-in format. The station had changed the format to allow for NRC participation.

The details were being finalized, but the schedule was to air the program on September 26th.

3. Discuss Licensee Event Report on Core Flood Tank ESF actuation Mr. Grobe led a discussion into the event report filed by FENOC this morning. At the conclusion of the discussion, the Panel decided to recommend issuance of a Preliminary Notification (PN) to clarify the event and NRCs monitoring of the licensees actions.

[This was later changed to a morning report, which was issued on September 17, 2003]

4. Discuss Plant Status and Inspector Insights and Emergent Issues List Mr. Thomas provided a briefing of current plant status, and the licensees plans for near term completion of various tests.

5. Discuss Air Operated Valve Review Status (LER 2003-001)

Mr. Holmberg discussed the status of the review of the LER, and indicated that there was a potential for a greater than green finding to be identified.

6. Discuss Communication Status Mr. Stang led a discussion on status of the Panel's draft Communication Plan. The Communication Plan was under final review and scheduled to be issued shortly.

7. Discuss 1000s of Letters The Panel discussed the content of the response letter. The plan was to have the letter through the concurrence process by the end of the week so that the final issuances could begin next week.

8. Discuss Restart Action Matrix (RAM) Closure Forms Mr. Phillips presented and the Panel discussed a list of RAM items for closure. THE RAM ITEMS APPROVED FOR CLOSURE ARE ATTACHED TO THESE MINUTES.

9. Discuss New Allegations Mr. Phillips informed the panel that no new allegations had been received since the last Panel meeting. Mr. Grobe requested that the Panel meeting two weeks from today include a discussion of each restart-related allegation and its status, and a discussion of the remaining allegations still open and awaiting closure.

10. Discuss Any Allegations for Which an Extension Was Requested Mr. Phillips informed the Panel that there were no allegations for which an extension was requested.

11. Discuss CAL Update Letter The Panel discussed the concurrences for the CAL Update letter. The goal was to issue this letter to the licensee by the end of the week.

12. Discuss New/Potential Licensing Issues Mr. Hopkins informed that Panel that there were no new licensing issues.

13. Discuss Status of Inspection Issues Ms. Lipa led a discussion of the status of inspection issues involving the basis for the normal operating pressure test, the high pressure injection pump modification task interface agreement, status of the corrective action team inspection, and an Appendix R Exemption issue.

Regarding the normal operating pressure test basis, NRR will be issuing its memorandum providing the results of its review of the licensees position that there is no pressure boundary leakage, and thus entry into Mode 4 is acceptable. In addition, there is a question on what the acceptance criteria should be for the NRC inspectors planning to evaluate the results of the normal operating pressure test. This should also be addressed in the memorandum to the region.

Regarding the high pressure injection pump modification, Region III inspectors submitted a task interface agreement to NRC Headquarters requesting guidance on the acceptability of the licensee's proposed modifications and guidance on what the proper post-modification testing should be. Panel members at NRC Headquarters reported that the NRC technical staff was still reviewing the task interface agreement. At some point,

Panel meeting will be set up with the NRR technical staff reviewing the TIA to discuss the acceptance testing methodology. In the interim, a meeting is being planned with the licensee at some future date to discuss the modification.

Regarding the corrective action team inspection, the Panel agreed that a public exit should be held to discuss the results of the inspection, and that a separate Panel meeting should be held with the team to go over the inspection results in detail before closing the associated Restart Checklist Item 3.a. Tentative plans are to have Christine give the public exit on the System Health Inspection and Ron Gardner to do the same for the CATI during the morning of October 1st; however, neither individual has yet been contacted to determine if this is feasible. Arrangements for this need to be worked out.

Regarding the 10 CFR Appendix R exemption issue, this pertained to Action Item 193,

""Consider TIA on an issue pertaining to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III-L, "Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability." Mr. Stang is working with the NRR technical staff to determine if this is an immediate safety issue, or whether it can be addressed on a normal schedule. Mr. Stang committed to provide the Panel a date by when the decision will be reached later this week.

14. Discuss Commitment in LER 03-07 Regarding Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value for the 90% Undervoltage Essential Bus Feeder Trip Relays Being Incorporated into Technical Specifications in December 2005 Ms. Lipa and Mr. Hopkins discussed the timing of the issue, and whether it would be acceptable to wait until December 2005 to address. The Panel agreed to address this issue with the licensee during the upcoming call with the licensee.

15. Discuss Action Items The Panel reviewed all the open Action Items and had the following comments:

Item 24a (Open) - Mr. Mendiola committed to have the items reviewed and released publicly by September 30, 2003.

Item 73 (Open) - Ms. Lipa was to request a date extension to January 1, 2004.

Item 136 (Open) - The NOP memorandum was to be issued by the end of this week.

Item 147 (Open) - Ms. Lipa committed to provide the Panel the list of items by the end of next week for review.

Item 186 (Open) - Since the 2.206 final decision had been issued, this item was changed to reflect removal of Dennis Kucinich from the standard distribution list on documents for Davis-Besse as of December 15, 2003. A related discussion was held on the new 2.206 petition, and a new action item (see 208) was added to address distribution of documents for that 2.206 petition.

Item 189 (Open) - The Panel agreed to put this item on the schedule for the September 30th panel meeting for closure.

Item 195 (Open) - The action was reassigned to Mr. Grobe, who committed to complete the action by September 30, 2003.

Item 196 (Open) - Mr. Grobe committed to complete the action by September 30, 2003.

Item 201 (Open) - This item was reassigned to Mr. Passehl, who was developing a communication plan that would include addressing the apparent difference between the NRCs final HPI Pump determination and the June 13, 2003, Letter from Chairman Diaz to Representative Kaptur.

Item 202 (Open) - The item related to putting a discussion of the actions the NRC had taken to respond to review the concerns about the reactor coolant pumps in the August 2003 newsletter. This had not been done, although a discussion of the fact that the NRC would be responding to the numerous letters and e-mails it had received was placed in the newsletter. This item remains open.

Item 208 (Open) - Evaluate the need to call back CI regarding Allegation RIII-2002-A-0177 (D-B) after the OI Investigation is complete. This is a transfer from the RAM. The Panel requested Mr. Phillips to determine the origin of this item and why it is being treated differently from the normal allegation process. If it needs to be treated differently, the communication plan for OI report issuance needs to be modified.

NEW ITEM 209 (Open) - Add 2.206 petitioners to distribution for all Davis-Besse docket correspondence and remove 90 days after issuance of final Directors Decision. At PRB meeting with petitioners tomorrow, a determination will be made of who the contact for the petition will be and what address will be utilized.

16. Discuss Items for Licensee Weekly Call The Panel discussed items to be added to the agenda for the call with the weekly call with the licensee.

17. Discuss/Update Milestones and Commitments The Panel reviewed and discussed upcoming milestones and commitments.

RAM Item No. - E-20 Closed: Y Date of E-Mail - 02/06/03 at 4:27 pm Author - Lochbaum Description of Issue - Given the as-found condition of the sump reported by FENOC in LER 2002-005, was D-B in conformance with its design and licensing basis?

Restart Checklist Item: 2.c.1 Description of Resolution - No, the opening in the containment sump screen did not conform to the design basis. Additionally, Section 4OA3.2 of Inspection Report 03-15 discusses the as-found condition of both the sump and the containment. Based on the results of the NRCs inspection into this LER, the NRC staff concluded the issue warranted a Yellow finding and associated Notice of Violation, in that the sump may not have performed its full safety function in the event of a LOCA given the unqualified coatings in containment, and that the coatings in containment did not conform to the design and licensing basis for the containment. The Notice of Violation was issued by letter dated October 7, 2003.

Reference Material - Inspection Report 03-15 (ADAMS Accession No. ml032120360) and final significance determination and Notice of Violation letter dated October 7, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ml032801706).

RAM Item No. - E-21 Closed: Y Date of E-Mail - 02/06/03 at 4:27 pm Author - Lochbaum Description of Issue - Given the as-found condition of the sump reported by FENOC in LER 2002-005, would the ECCS have been able to prevent reactor core damage?

Restart Checklist Item: 2.c.1 Description of Resolution - The NRC did not review the capability of the sump given no problems with containment coatings, so we can not answer this question. However, if the as-found condition of the containment coatings are also considered, then the NRC staff concluded the issue warranted a Yellow finding and associated Notice of Violation, in that the sump may not have performed its full safety function in the event of a LOCA given the unqualified coatings in containment, and that the coatings in containment did not conform to the design and licensing basis for the containment. The details are contained in Section 4OA3.2 of Inspection Report 03-15.

Reference Material - Inspection Report 03-15 (ADAMS Accession No. ml032120360) and final significance determination and Notice of Violation letter dated October 7, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ml032801706).

RAM Item No. - E-26 Closed: Y Date of E-Mail - 3/07/03 Author - Lochbaum to Grobe Restart Checklist Item: N/A Description of Issue - Has the NRC examined how FENOC is performing at risk changes to the facility? and if so, is the NRC comfortable with FENOCs at risk changes?

Description of Resolution - As stated in the Modifications Program review contained in Inspection Report 03-09 the inspection team concluded that the ARC [at risk change]

procedure, if properly implemented has adequate controls to assure a quality modification.

Regarding implementation of at risk changes, the NRC inspected the installation of the new containment sump, which was performed as an ARC. Per Inspection Report 03-06, we concluded that the recirculation sump design modification was consistent with design and licensing basis requirements and based on field walkdowns the modification installation was adequately implemented consistent with the design. However, the same report noted that design calculations performed by vendors for the modification contained several errors that were not identified by the licensees initial design review. This deficiency was placed into the licensees corrective action system, and a subsequent inspection determined that the licensees corrective actions were adequate to address the inspectors concern.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report Nos. 03-06 and 03-09.

RAM Item No. - E-32 Closed: Y Date of E-Mail - 05/21/03 at 10:29 am Author - Lochbaum Description of Issue - Grobe to address to Lochbaum: How does the 0350 Panel intend to assure that any findings from the ongoing investigation are indeed addressed before restart?

Restart Checklist Item: N/A Description of Resolution - The response was provided to Mr. Lochbaum by letter from Grobe dated August 1, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ml0321306630).

Reference Material - ADAMS Accession No. ml0321306630.

RAM Item No. - L-36 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 07/03/02 Author - Lochbaum - UCS-14a

Description of Issue - Will the NRC require FENOC to conform with UFSAR 5.2.3.2 or revise 5.2.3.2 to match what the company does before restart?

Restart Checklist Item: 3.d Description of Resolution - The NRC does not intend to take any actions with regards to Davis-Besse that are different with those required of the rest of the nuclear industry. Section 5.2.3.2 of the UFSAR states the following:

All materials exposed to the reactor coolant exhibit corrosion resistance for the expected service conditions. The materials used, as given in Table 5.2-10, are 304SS, 316SS, Inconel (Ni-Cr-Fe), or weld deposits with corrosion resistance equivalent to or better than the other materials listed. These materials were chosen because they are compatible with the reactor coolant. The RCPB contains no furnace-sensitized, wrought austenitic stainless steel. Sensitized stainless steel weld overlay (cladding) is permitted.

The RC System is a controlled addition, closed loop which is not conducive to contaminant introduction. In addition, purification systems are provided to maintain the contaminant levels within the limits specified in Table 9.3-4 and Table 9.3-5. The materials in the RC System are not adversely affected by expected contaminants or radiolytic products.

The NRC staff recognizes that primary water stress corrosion cracking has occurred throughout the nuclear industry to reactor head nozzles made of Inconel 600, and this is the reason that Bulletins 2002-01 and 2002-02 were issued. While we expect licensees to take appropriate actions to address the potential for cracking of nozzles, including those made up of Inconel, we are not requiring licensees to amend their UFSAR to remove reference to Inconel as a compound that is corrosion resistant.

Reference Material - UFSAR Section 5.2.3.2, which is restated above.

RAM Item No. - L-37 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 07/03/02 Author - Lochbaum - UCS-14b Description of Issue - If the NRC truly believes that FENOC lacks a regulatory commitment to clean the reactor vessel head of highly corrosive material that can cause catastrophic failure, shouldnt the agency undertake getting that regulatory commitment?

Restart Checklist Item: 3.d Description of Resolution - The NRC does not believe that FENOC lacks a regulatory commitment to clean the reactor vessel head of highly corrosive material that can cause catastrophic failure. Rather, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI provides a regulatory requirement for the licensee to institute corrective actions to prevent recurrence and to promptly correct significant conditions adverse to quality. Both the failure to address the leakage of reactor coolant through the pressure boundary and flange and the resultant failure to remove

residual boric acid from the reactor vessel head are examples of the apparent violations identified in the NRCs red finding regarding the reactor vessel head degradation.

Reference Material - Preliminary red finding letter (ADAMS Accession No. ml030560426) and final red determination (Inspection Report 03 ADAMS Accession No. ml031490778) issued on May 29, 2003.

RAM Item No. - L-49 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 07/15/02 Author - UCS Description of Issue - If boric acid was the root cause of the damage to RC-262, should NRC have evaluated the temporary modification in context of RC-2 damage?

Restart Checklist Item: 3.d & 3.f Description of Resolution - Based on an inspectors review of the applicable documentation to address the damage to RC-262, the inspector concluded that boric acid was not the root cause of the damage. The threaded packing gland and plug involved in the leakage from RC-262 were stainless steel (not carbon) and there was no evidence of boric acid damage noted.

Since boric acid did not damage the valve, there was no basis to re-evaluate the subsequent use of the Furmanite seal used to isolate the leak. During the subsequent outage, the valve bonnet was replaced to effect permanent repair of the valve.

Reference Material - Licensee Work Order 00-002293-004.

RAM Item No. - L-67 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 09/07/02 Author - Gurdziel Description of Issue - Is the Plant Operations Review Group competent, i.e., the head degradation wasnt identified by PORC despite the process taking many years to get to the point when it was found.

Restart Checklist Item: N/A Description of Resolution - At Davis Besse, the Station Review Board (SRB) is the group that would perform the role traditionally performed at other plants by a Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC). However, significant deficiencies were found with the conduct of the Station Review Board in the licensees Root Cause Analysis Report entitled Lack of Operations Centrality in Maintaining, Assuring, and Communicating the Operational Safety Focus of Davis-Besse and Lack of Accountability of Other Groups to Operations in Fulfilling that Role. As noted in that report, there was no requirement that someone from the operations department be a member of the SRB, and in fact, the SRB had functioned for one and a half years with no

Operations Department membership. In addition, it was the management review board that categorized condition report significance, and the corrective action review board then evaluated the root causes and corrective actions associated with those condition reports. Neither of these groups required Operations personnel be in attendance. Finally, the root cause report stated that senior management failed to ensure that a safety conscious work environment was established and maintained in Operations and that there was a lack of senior management support for Operations leadership role in assuring plant safety. The report then identified many examples of corrective actions that were initiated to address the findings identified in the report.

The adequacy of the report and associated corrective actions was inspected by NRC staff and documented in Inspection Report 02-18. The NRCs inspection report concluded that FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Companys overall assessment was of appropriate depth and breadth to develop actions to correct and prevent recurrence of the management and human performance deficiencies associated with the reactor head degradation; that if properly implemented and monitored, the corrective actions will appropriately address the issues identified in the assessments; and that the scheduling and implementation of the corrective actions have been appropriate.

Reference Material - None.

RAM Item No. - L-94 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 02/10/03 Author - Lochbaum Description of Issue - The 0350 panel should remain in place until all LLTF issues are resolved and D-B performance indicators are valid and the NRCs inspections have verified adequate performance.

Restart Checklist Item: N/A Description of Resolution - This issue is identical to item B.6.e in the 2.206 Petition submitted by Congressman Kucinich. As stated in the NRCs proposed Directors Decision response to Item B.6.e of that petition, if the NRC does approve a restart of the Davis-Besse facility, the NRCs Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, which governs the NRCs Enhanced Oversight Process, specifies that enhanced NRC oversight will continue after restart until such time that the NRC Davis-Besse Oversight Panel determines that the licensee has demonstrated acceptable performance. Post-restart enhanced oversight will not be terminated unless the NRC Davis-Besse Oversight Panel recommends to the appropriate NRC Regional Administrator that the plant be returned to monitoring under the normal Reactor Oversight Process. That Regional Administrator, in consultation with the NRC Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the Office of the Executive Director for Operations, will decide whether a return to the normal Reactor Oversight Process is warranted.

The recommendation of the NRC Davis-Besse Oversight Panel to return Davis-Besse to the normal Reactor Oversight Process would also provide the basis for the panels conclusion that the plant can be returned to routine monitoring. The NRCs evaluation process to reach such a conclusion will include the use of an inspection plan that is specifically tailored to the particular

circumstances of the Davis-Besse plant. Under that plan, critical licensee performance areas of concern, for example Management and Human Performance, will be inspected. A return of the Davis-Besse facility to the normal Reactor Oversight Process would include an assessment of the plants performance and a determination of whether significant additional NRC oversight is required in accordance with the normal Reactor Oversight Process guidance.

Additionally, some of the Lessons Learned Task Forces near-term recommendations are already being functionally accomplished through the NRCs enhanced oversight of Davis-Besse. For example, the Lessons Learned Task Force recommendations included development of inspection guidance (a) to ensure that reactor vessel head penetrations nozzles and the reactor pressure vessel head area are periodically reviewed by the NRC during licensee inservice inspections activities and (b) provide for timely periodic inspections of pressurized water reactor boric acid corrosion control programs. The NRCs Restart Checklist for Davis-Besse includes the adequacy of the reactor pressure vessel head replacement and the adequacy of the Davis-Besse Boric Acid Corrosion Management Program as issues that must be satisfactorily addressed before the NRC will consider a plant restart. Thus, for these examples, the issues are being addressed as part of the NRC Davis-Besse Oversight Panels activities and, in the short-term, the associated recommendations of the Lessons Learned Task Force will be functionally accomplished even though the NRCs programmatic implementation of the NRC Lessons Learned Task Force recommendations may not be fully implemented at the time a decision regarding restart of the Davis-Besse plant is made.

Reference Material - None.

RAM Item No. - L-106 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 06/13/03 Author - Gurdziel (G-22)

Description of Issue - Are licensees bolting and torquing practices acceptable to the NRC?

Restart Checklist Item: N/A Description of Resolution - An NRC inspection (Inspection Report 03-15) into work being performed identified several problems with the licensees practices. Specifically, torquing of bolts was not performed in accordance with procedural steps, or procedures failed to identify the correct torquing amount, making it possible to severely over-torque a bolt and cause its failure. Two non-cited violations were identified and placed into the licensees corrective action system for resolution. The first violation involved the failure of the procedure to adequately provide torquing guidance associated with installation of the High Pressure Injection Pump Cap screws, and the second involved the failure of plant staff to comply with the procedure that specified the correct torquing of the RTD mechanical joints. Based on these inspection results, the inadequate torquing practices identified were a violation of NRC requirements, and as such, not acceptable to the NRC. The licensee is taking corrective actions to address the concerns.

Reference Material - Inspection Report No. 03-15 (ADAMS Accession No. ml032120360).

RAM Item No. - C-06 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Review concrete shield building low oxygen content. (NCR # 017).

Restart Checklist Item: 2.b Description of Resolution - Although the concern is described as low oxygen the real issue with the acceptance of the concrete had to do with low air content. The delivery of the initial load of concrete was observed by the NRC inspectors, licensee QA personnel, and contractor QA personnel. The licensee QA personnel questioned the assumptions made by the contractor regarding the reduction in air content as the concrete was pumped from the truck to the point of placement. The concrete used for shield building restoration was required to meet acceptance criteria of Specification 12501-C-321, Technical Specification for Purchase of Safety Related Ready Mix Concrete, for slump and air content at the point of delivery. After 1/3 of the first concrete truckload was placed inside the forms for the access opening, the licensee contractor made the measurements for slump and air content used to accept the concrete. The contractor measured the air content at 2.8 percent, which was below the required range of 3 to 6 percent.

The licensee contractor subsequently resampled the concrete from the same wheelbarrow used for the first sample, and got an acceptable reading of 3.4 percent. The licensee issued nonconformance report number 017 to record the initial out of specification reading. The inspector noted that in accordance with ASTM C 94/C 94M-00, Standard Specification for Ready-Mix Concrete, paragraph 16.6, if the second sample had been outside specified limits, the concrete shall be considered failed. Because the second sample passed, the licensee considered the concrete acceptable. However, the licensee conservatively chose to not install the remaining 2/3 of the first truckload of concrete. The inspectors discussed this issue with cognizant NRR staff and no technical concerns were identified with the licensees acceptance of the already-installed concrete. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees vendor report 150-20129-34, Report of Tests on Cylinder Compressive Strengths, which documented the shear strength of the concrete cylinder samples from concrete used in restoration of the shield building. In this report, the licensees vendor documented the that these concrete cylinder samples had compressive shear strength in excess of 5000 psi after only 7 days. This value exceeded the minimum 4000 psi minimum strength required at 28 days as discussed in Section 3.8.2.7, Materials, of the UFSAR. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the strength of the concrete used in the containment shield building restoration exceeded the minimum design requirements.

Reference Material - Inspection Report No. 02-07 (ADAMS Accession No. ml023370100).

RAM Item No. - C-09 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Poll staff for differing opinions Description of Resolution - This item is already addressed in Section B.5.b.1 of the Process Plan, which states Determine That No Restart Objections from NRC Staff Exist. In addition, Item 136 of the open Action Item List specifies that the NOP/NOT acceptance criteria and methodology will be provided to NRC staff for dissenting views. This item is being removed

from the Restart Action Matrix as it is duplicated by the above process plan and action item list entries.

Reference Material - None.

RAM Item No. - C-10 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Evaluate the need to call back CI regarding Allegation RIII-2002-A-0177 (D-B) after the OI Investigation is complete.

Description of Resolution - This item has been moved to the action item list as item 208, and is being closed on the RAM since it duplicates the Action Item.

Reference Material - None.

RAM Item No. - C-11 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Evaluate Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test Results Description of Resolution - Per inspection report 03-05, the containment passed the Integrated Leak Rate Test and met the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50.

Reference Material - Inspection Report No. 03-05 (ADAMS Accession No. ml032230339).

RAM Item No. - C-30 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Instrument Uncertainty Calculations. Davis-Besse historical setpoint methodology has, for the most part, limited the treatment of uncertainty to Limited Safety System Settings. Other safety related setpoints did not have calculations that factored in uncertainties. This instrumentation included those relied upon in the Technical Specifications (TS), the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), and the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP).

Description of Resolution - During the Electrical Issues Inspection conducted July 7 Through July 18, 2003, this issue was reviewed. This item was addressed and dispositioned for resolution primarily under CR 02-06407.

Davis-Besse is not committed to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.105, Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation. However, based upon reviews performed for CR 02-06407, the licensee determined that Davis-Besses treatment of instrument uncertainty was not consistent with current industry codes and standards and the rest of the nuclear industrys current practice.

This conclusion led the licensee to conclude that there was a possibility that values recorded in Surveillance Test Procedures (STP) may not comply with the Technical Specification limits if instrument uncertainty were factored into the acceptance criteria.

Additionally, the licensee determined that a more acceptable approach for treating instrument uncertainties. This new approach would be contained in the licensees Design Criteria Manual for instrumentation. This updated policy would use draft standard ISA-dTR67.04.09, Graded Approaches to Setpoint Determination. This standard recommends that issues of higher safety significance be treated with greater rigor and issues of lower safety significance be treated with less rigor. This variation in rigor would be based on the safety significance of the instrument function. The changes to the Design Criteria Manual ensured that in the future this graded approach would be applied to the following:

• Setpoints for RPS, SFAS, and SFRCS;

• Instruments required to demonstrate compliance with Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements Manual Surveillances;

• Instrumentation used to demonstrate compliance with high-tier licensing basis documents such as the ODCM and COLR;

• Instrumentation used to demonstrate compliance with design basis documents (but not reflected in the Technical Specifications);

• Instrumentation used for critical decision points in emergency and abnormal operating procedures;

• Instrumentation used to alert operators to degrading plant conditions, e.g., annunciators, computer alarms, etc.;

• Non safety-related instrumentation used to protect major plant equipment and provide for reliable long-term operation.

To address instrumentation in regard to Technical Specification and TRM parameters for the interim period, the licensee performed a review of applicable parameters in the Technical Specifications and the TRM under Corrective Action Number 6 of CR 02-06407. For each evaluated parameter, the affected instruments were identified and the degree of uncertainty associated with the measurement was both qualitatively and quantitatively assessed. These reviews determined with reasonable assurance that, in all but 10 cases, sufficient margin was available to ensure operability. In the 10 cases, the licensee determined that since the margin could not be readily demonstrated, detailed calculations or engineering evaluations would have to be performed. The inspectors questioned the licensee in regard to the conclusions drawn by these calculations and/or evaluations. The licensee stated that all had been completed and determined that sufficient margin was available.

Based upon review during the Electrical Issues Inspection, the inspectors concluded that the licensees resolution of the overall instrumentation uncertainty issue was acceptable. The inspectors determined that both the licensees interim and long term resolutions were reasonable and properly focused on plant safety.

Reference Material - CR 02-06407, Instrument Uncertainty in Calibration and Surveillance of Instrumentation, and Inspection Report 03-10.

RAM Item No. - C-31 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Appendix R Thermohydraulic calculations and safe shutdown procedure. Based upon the licensees review of the Fire Protection Program, numerous changes to the Davis-Besse Appendix R Thermal Hydraulic calculations and Appendix R

procedures were required. The new calculation and changes to affected procedures were to be reviewed by Region III Technical Staff.

Description of Resolution - During the Electrical Issues Inspection conducted July 7 through July 18, 2003, the new Thermal Hydraulic Calculations as well as the most bounding Appendix R Operations Procedure, Serious Control Room Fire, were reviewed. Based upon this inspection, the thermal hydraulic calculations appear to be comprehensive and adequate for their application at Davis-Besse. Based upon reviewing a sample of assumptions and conclusions from the thermal hydraulic calculations, the inspection team determined that the Serious Control Room Fire procedure adequately incorporated the bounding conditions of the thermal hydraulic calculations. Based upon these inspection results, RAM Item C-31, Appendix R Thermohydraulic calculations and safe shutdown procedure, can be closed.

Reference Material - C-NSA-064.02-032, Davis-Besse Appendix R Overheating Summary Report, C-NSA-064.02-033, Davis-Besse Appendix R Overcooling Summary Report, and DB-OP-02519, Revision 07, Abnormal Procedure, Serious Control Room Fire, and Inspection Report No. 03-10.

RAM Item No. - SUP-61 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Compare the team's findings with previous performance indicator and inspection program data to determine whether sufficient warning was provided to identify a significant reduction in safety. Evaluate whether the NRC assessment process appropriately characterized licensee performance based on previous information. The findings from this inspection requirement will not be contained in the inspection report associated with this inspection, but should be documented in a separate report, co-addressed to the appropriate Regional Administrator and the Director of NRR.

Description of Resolution - A comparison of findings with previous performance indicators was part of the task of the Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force (LLTF), which conducted a detailed analysis as to what had happened at Davis-Besse, and the contribution the NRCs inspection and licensing processes had played in the events. The LLTF issued its report to the Commission on September 30, 2002, and the document can be found in ADAMS at accession no. ml030280448. In addition, following the issuance of the NRCs Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) report, a letter was sent on May 29, 2002, from Jim Dyer to Sam Collins identifying two recommendations with the NRC baseline inspection program.

Reference Material - ADAMS Accession Numbers ml030280448 (LLTF Report) and ml021500401 (memo to S. Collins).

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL OPEN ACTION ITEM LIST Item Action Item (Date Assigned to Comments Number generated) 24a Discuss making Panel Discuss by June 30, after safety information related to significance assessment complete; HQ/licensee calls 6/27 - Invite Bateman to panel mtg. To publicly available discuss what else is needed to closeout the CAL (i.e. quarantine plan); 7/2 - NRR not yet ready to discuss; 7/16 - See if procedures have changed on CAL closeout - does JD need to send letter?; 7/18 - Discussed

- is there an applicable regional procedure?; 8/6 - Discussed. Need to determine the final approach on the core removed from the head and the final approach on the head before the quarantine can be lifted; 8/22 - Revisit action item after letter sent to licensee confirming plans with old vessel head (head may be onsite longer than originally anticipated); 8/29 - Memo to be sent to Region, with a letter to go out next week; 10/01- Discussed. 1)

Conduct NRC staff survey-due 10/7 2)Memo to NRR - due 10/11 3)

Region to issue letter; 11/07-Letter required from NRR on head quarantine status; 11/19 - Letter in draft; 01/03 - A. Mendiola to look at phone conference writeups on quarantine decision making to determine if they can be released to the public; 01/07 - discussed; 01/21 -

discussed; 01/31- A. Mendiolas action; 02/11 - Completion of Licensee Phase 3 sampling plan required; 02/21

- 17.5 Rem to cut samples, Less samples may be required; 04/03 -

Completion of Phase 3 sampling plan scheduled for late April - discuss again then; 04/08 - Revisit in June 2003; 07/01 - Nozzle specimen removal begins tomorrow; 07/22 - Await verification that all samples are received at Battelle before making public; 9/16 - A. Mendiola to complete action on this by 9/30.

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL OPEN ACTION ITEM LIST Item Action Item (Date Assigned to Comments Number generated) 73 Send feedback form on Lipa/ 8/6 - Generate feedback after panel IMC 0350 procedure to Mendiola meetings reduced to once per week; IIPB (8/6) 8/29 - Discussed - no change; 10/1 -

Discussed; 11/7 - D Passehl sent email to C Carpenter and D Coe indicating that we would be able to perform a review of the draft IMC 0350 during the first quarter of 2003; 12/3-discussed; 01/03 - 2 parts, short part-C. Lipa with P. Harris, long part- B.

Dean; 01/07 - 2nd larger response will require meeting between all parties; 01/21 - Communications with P.

Harris; 01/31-Meeting with P. Harris on Feb 4; 02/11 - Many concerns identified by the panel for inclusion; 02/21 - July 1 due date for larger input; 07/01 - Request two month extension of due date; 07/22 - Due date extended to September 1; 9/16 - C.

Lipa to request an extension to 1/1/04 to complete this item

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL OPEN ACTION ITEM LIST Item Action Item (Date Assigned to Comments Number generated) 136 NOP Test Basis (01/03) W. Ruland/ 01/07 - Item discussed. Meeting J. Grobe to send an J. Grobe summary of November 26, 2002 email week of 05/19 meeting has notation of NRR staff with question of impressions of test plan. Once whether the licensees drafted, issue will be surveyed to staff method and criteria are to determine if consensus is correct; adequate to address 01/21 - Meeting summary to discuss the TS for zero Flus System, Test agreement, and unidentified reactor future inspections; 1/31 - T. Chan fwd coolant leakage from to J. Hopkins; 2/11 - J. Jacobson the reactor coolant questions need to be folded in (chem-system. By the end of wipes); 2/21 - Polling of staff the week of 05/19 NRR discussed; 2/24 - Polling of staff by to formulate a proposed March 7; 3/25 - Staff to be polled after position for discussion. 4/4/03 meeting in headquarters, and The position by NRR meeting should address whether a will be discussed by the rational basis exists that the bottom Panel during the 05/27 head is not leaking, and whether a 0350-Panel meeting. critical flaw size will not appear during After discussing on the next operating cycle; 04/08 - J.

05/27 the issue is to be Hopkins writing mtg summary for 4/4, presented internally licensee to address additional within the NRC for questions on 4/9 telephone call; 05/16 dissenting views - Closed; 05/27 - Reopen; 06/17 -

(05/27 - Reopen) Meeting held in HQ the week of June

9. R. Barrett et. al. discussed that the licensee has no basis that the nozzles are not cracked. May need a TS Amendment. The next step is to engage the licensee; 07/01 - Phone call held 6/30 with licensee. Licensee to provide written response to J.

Jacobson; 7/29 - Licensee letter received; 08/05 - RIII sending in a draft TIA for discussion; 08/21 - Title changed; 9/16 - NRR committed to issue by end of this week.

138 Evaluate the A. 01/31 - Ongoing; 02/21 - New EDO effectiveness of the Mendiola, Comm Plan, A. Mendiola to review for Comm Plan (01/07) C. Lipa inclusion; 9/16 - Plan under review for issuance.

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL OPEN ACTION ITEM LIST Item Action Item (Date Assigned to Comments Number generated) 147 Generate a list of items D. Passehl 01/31 - working; to consider after restart 02/11 - Include dates and deadlines to as well as transition Manual Chapter 0350 restart back to the normal inspections planner; 07/01 -

0350 when terminating Discussed; 7/22 - Dave has list with the 0350 Panel. The Christines comments; 08/05 -

items should include Discussed; 9/16 - C. Lipa committed to plans to augment provide to Panel next week for review.

inspection of corrective actions, inservice inspection, and safety culture monitoring.

(01/09) 178 Determine the type of C. Lipa backlog assessment that will be performed and by whom. Two attributes need to be considered: (1) the capability of the licensee to manage the backlog in an operating environment; and (2) the impact of the backlog on equipment reliability. (03/04) 186 Add Dennis Kucinich to A. Saso 9/16 - Based on issuance, Mr.

the standard distribution Kucinich to be removed from list on documents for distribution effective 12/15/03.

Davis-Besse. Then remove Dennis Kucinich from distribution 90 days after the final NRC reply to his 10 CFR 2.206 Petition is signed out. (04/22) 189 Collect Information on J. Stang 05/27-Discussed; 07/01 - The the Regulatory Millstone Order was reviewed and the Approach to Research approach is not appropriate. Bill also the Process to Ensure look at the South Texas approach; Proper Regulatory 07/15 -Discussed, title changed; 7/22 -

Footprint upon Restart Lead changed; 9/16 - To be ready for (05/16) closure at 9/30 Panel meeting.

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL OPEN ACTION ITEM LIST Item Action Item (Date Assigned to Comments Number generated) 193 Consider TIA on an J. Stang A concern was identified for the issue pertaining to 10 shutdown function performance goal of CFR 50 Appendix R maintaining reactor coolant level. An Section III-L, NRC safety evaluation report issued in "Alternative and 1991 apparently allows the licensee to Dedicated Shutdown maintain reactor coolant level above Capability." (05/27) the top of active fuel instead of maintaining level within the range of indication in the pressurizer; 7/1 -

John Hannon to determine if a TIA is necessary or the issue is moot. Sent in draft TIA to HQa J. Stang to review licensing basis first.

195 Review worker fatigue J. Grobe 6/24 - J. Grobe took action to contact issues at the site during L. Myers and discuss; 07/22 - Scott to the current inspection update in early August; 08/21 -

period. (06/17) Discussed; 9/16 - J. Grobe has action to complete by 9/30.

196 Determine whether the J. Grobe 6/24 - Closed; 7/1 - Re-opened - see shift manager is meeting minutes for additional qualified to fulfill the information; 9/16 - J. Grobe has action shift engineer position to complete by 9/30.

in an emergency and whether there is an adverse impact on the licensee's emergency procedure Implemention. (06/17)

Item re-opened at 7/1 Panel meeting.

197 Develop a J. Stang 6/24 - Lead changed; 08/21 - Lead communication plan changed with restart Qs and As.

(06/17)

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL OPEN ACTION ITEM LIST Item Action Item (Date Assigned to Comments Number generated) 201 Coordinate with L. D. Passehl 6/24 - The Panel determined that Gerke and ask her to when the communication plan is call Rep. Kapturs staff developed for the preliminary regarding the June 13, significance determination for HPI 2003, letter from Pump issue that we consider Chairman Diaz to interfaces with those people who Kaptur. The purpose of receive the letter; 07/15 - Discussed; the call would be to 08/21 - Discussed; 9/16 - D. Passehl update Rep. Kaptur on has action to develop Com. Plan that the recent issues with will include addressing Kaptur &

the HPI Pumps and others.

provide information on NRC actions to review LER 2003-02.(06/20) 202 Put a discussion of the J. Strasma 9/16 - No action taken on this to date.

actions the NRC took in Only thing put in newsletter was reviewing concerns committment to respond to the involving the reactor thousands of letters and e-mails coolant pumps in the received to date.

August 2003 newsletter.

(07/15) 207 Write a letter in S. Burgess response to Mr.

Lochbaums letter questioning the basis for the initiating event frequency used in the preliminary yellow finding documented in inspection report 50-346/03-15. (08/05) 208 Evaluate the need to M. Phillips 9/16 - M. Phillips to get back to C. Lipa call back CI regarding with details on why this is being Allegation RIII-2002-A- treated differently from normal 0177 (D-B) after the OI allegation process.

Investigation is complete (08/21)

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL OPEN ACTION ITEM LIST Item Action Item (Date Assigned to Comments Number generated) 209 Add author of A. Saso Greenpeace 2.206 petition to the standard distribution list on documents for Davis-Besse. Then remove from distribution 90 days after the final NRC reply to the 10 CFR 2.206 Petition is signed out. (9/16)