Text

Documents Related to Initial Exam Submittal and NRC Comments on Operating Test and ES-401-9 for NRC Comments on Written Exam for Byron Initial Examination - December 2003
	ML040280021
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	12/01/2003
From:	Lanksbury R; NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:	;
References
	50-454/03-301, 50-455/03-301
	Download: ML040280021 (36)
	v • d • e

DOCUMENTS RELATED TO INITIAL EXAM SUBMITTAL AND NRC COMMENTS ON THE OPERATING TEST AND ES-401-9 FOR THE NRC COMMENTS ON THE WRITTEN EXAM FOR THE BYRON INITIAL EXAMINATION - DEC 2003

Submitted Examinationflest with NRC Comments Contains the following:

Letter ES-301-3 Operating Test Quality Checklist ES-301-4 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist ES-401-6 ES-401-9 Written Examination Review Worksheet Memorandum Byron Initial Exam Operating Test Comments List Letter Exelon Cover letter transmitting the initial license examination materials Written Examination Quality Checklist (RO/SRO)

References to be provided to applicants taking the written examination Exelon Cover Letter transmitting WAS suppressed from random selection Submitted written examinations and operating test submitted to DRS Secretaries.

ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES-301-3 Facility: Byron Generating Station Date of Examination: 12/1/2003 Operating Test Number: 2003-301

1. GENERAL CRITERIA I-

a.

The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution).

b.

There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination.

The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s)(see Section D.1.a).

Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits.

It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level.

C.

d.

df

e.

2. WALK-THROUGH CRITERIA

a.

Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:

- initial conditions

. initiating cues

. references and tools, including associated procedures

. reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific

. specific performance criteria that include:

designation if deemed to be time critical by the facility licensee

- detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature

- system response and other examiner cues

- statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant

- criteria for successful completion of the task

- identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards

- restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable i:

b.

Repetition from operating tests used during the previous licensing examination is within acceptable limits (30% for the walk-throuqh) and do not compromise test integrity.

At least 20 percent of the JPMs on each test are new or significantly modified.

C.

3. SIMULATOR CRITERIA

a.

The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached.

a. Author

b. Facility Reviewer(*)

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)

d. NRC Supervisor Initials g Date NOTE:

The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests

IndeDendent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c: chief examiner concurrence is reauired.

NUREG-1 021, Draft Revision 9 24 of 27

ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Form ES-301-4

~

Facility: Byron Generating Station Date of Exam: 12/01/2003 Scenario Numbers: 1 / 2 / 3 Operating Test No.: 2003-301 I Initials QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES

1.

The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.

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~~

2.

3.

The scenarios consist mostly of related events.

Each event description consists of the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position) the event termination point (if applicable)

4.

5.

6.

No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

7.

If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates. Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. Cues are given.

a

8.

The simulator modeling is not altered.

7?&

9.

The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios.

Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-301.

10.

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11.

12.

All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).

Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).

k 11 13.

The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position.

I&

11 TARGET QUANTITATIVE AllRlBUTES (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d)

I Actual Attributes I --

II 1-

._ Total malfunctions (5-8)

I 7 / 1 1 / 8 I&

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Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)

&=

Abnormal events (2-4) 2 1 2 1 4 &

2 1 5 1 2 II 4.

Major transients (1 -2)

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EOPs enterewrequiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 1 1 / I EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1 1 1 1 0 jg)7 II 7.

Critical tasks (2-3) d-I 25 of 27 NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Applicant Type OPERATING TEST NO.: 2003-301 Evolution Minimum Scenario Number Type Number 1

I 2

I 3

4 I

I 15?I I

I RO Reactivity As RO I

1*

1 Normal Instrument I Component 0

2*

234 Reactivity Normal Instrument I Component Major 1*

1 0

2 2*

234 1

56, 7

7 SRO-I I

Reactivity Normal Instrument /

Com ponent Major As

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0 I*

1 1

1 2"

273, 2,3,

283, 43 4 3,

415, 6 3 6,8 1

53, 7

7 7

SRO Instructions: (1)

Enter the o erating test number and Form ES-D-1 ewnt numbers for each evolu P ion type.

abnorma Y conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be signifcant per replaced with addi P ional instrument or component malbnctions on a one-4 (2)

Reactivit manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled Section C.2.a of A pendix D.

Reactivity and normal evolutions may be for-one basis.

t and component malfrnctions should wrifiable actions that provide insi ht nt tomrd the minimum requiremen.

Author:

NRC Reviewer:

NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9 24 of 26

ES-301 Competencies 'Checklist Form ES-30 1-6 1-8 1-8 N/A 1-8 1-8

[

Competencies 1

2 3

1-8 1-8 1-8 1-8 N/A N/A 1-8 1-8 1-8 1-8 3'5 2,5

$6 Interpret / Diagnose Ewnts and Conditions Comply With and Use Procedures (1 )

Operate Control Boards (2)

,4 6-8

'Communicate and Interact 2,3, 4,7

~~

~

Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

SRO >

/

SCENARIO -

4 RO 1 I

SCENARIO 437 6-8 4,7 6-8 Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

I NiAl BOP SCENARIO 1

1 2 1 3 1 4 N/A I N/A I N/A I Instructions:

Circle the applicant's license t p e and enter one or more ewnt numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for e Author:

NRC Reviewer:

27 of 27 NUREG 1021, Drafl Revision 9

ES-401 Written Examination Form ES-401-6 Qualitv Checklist 11 Facility: Byron Generating Station Date of Exam: 12/01/2003 Exam Level: RO/SRO Item Description

1.

2.

3.

Questions and answers technically accurate and applicable to facility

a. NRC WAS referenced for all questions SRO questions are appropriate per Section D.2.d of ES-401

b. Facility learning objectives referenced as available

4.

5.

Question section and duplication from the last two NRC licensing exams appears consistent with a systematic sampling process.

Question duplication from the license screenindaudit exam was controlled as i dicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:

the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or

-the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started: or the examinations were developed independently; or the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain) from the bank at least 10 Dercent new, and the

!i

6.

Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New I 3515 I 714 I 33/16 rest modified); enter the actual RO/ SRO-only question distribution at right I

I Memory C/A

7.

Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are written at the comprehension /

analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected WAS support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right References/handouts provided do not give away answers 3418 41 117

a.

9.

Question content conforms with specific WA statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the Tier to which they are assigned; deviations are justified Question psychometric quality and format meet ES, Appendix B, guidelines The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; the total is correct and agrees with value on cover sheet

10.

11.

Initial 7-p

b. Facility Reviewer (*)

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)

NUREG -1 021, Draft Revision 9 30 of 34

ES-401 Written Examination Form ES-401-9 Review Worksheet The first 20 Qs & first 10 SRO Qs were the 30 selected for the initial review. All questions reviewed for WA conformance.

Q#

1M 26 36 4N 58 6N 78

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

7.

1.

2.

LOK LOD Cred. Partial Job-

/

Back-Q= SRO u/us Explanation Link Minutia units ward WA Only (F/H)

Focus Stem Cues T/F

Dist, H

2

/

S H

2

/

S Q t WA the question does not involve a loss of or malfunction of the Changed distractor, stem, selected new WA.

H 2.5 g

U RHR heat exchanger. it involves flow through the heat exchanger.

H 2.5

/

S change the current tank pressure to something greater that 6 psig to RY469 under the given conditions. Ok as writfen for Byron.

H 2.0 d

E ensure a correct answer. the applicant cant predict the position of H

2.0 US this is a memory question Not memory - decision based on indications.

H 2.5

/

S

[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix 6 for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]

II 11 1.

Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

11 2.

Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).

3.

Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e& unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).

The stem or distractors contain cues (Le., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).

The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

Onesor more ++m-medistractors is not credible.

One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

4.

Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:

The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid WA but, as written, is not operational in content).

The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (Le., it is not required to be known from memory).

The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5.

6.

Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved WA and those that are designated SRO-only (WA and license level mismatches are unacceptable).

Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

11

7.

At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-9 Flaws -

red.

Dist. -

4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I I

7.

/ I Back-I Q= ISRO I inits ward WA Onlv I

Explanation I 14 es this is a memory question. tests the opposite of the k/a statement I Acceptable as written.

Q f WA this question does not test ability to perform, but recognition of need to perform actions. Modified Q to meet WA.

finding the correct answer does not require the stem. (T/F statements)

Station agrees. Modified question.

S I

1) Need to state in stem that all systems are in their normal lineup (so that one can infer that the steam dumps are in steam pressure mode).

2) With the steam dumps failed full open due to the failure high of 2PT-507, Tave would probably drop to 550" F and close the steam dumps before any action could be taken by an operator to manually close the steam dump valves. Placing the steam dumps to" OFF/Reset' or 'Tave" is probably the only way to quickly close the steam dump valves. It appears that no answer is correct. The question was correct for Byron technology.

1) Distractors B and D are not plausible (for the CDICB pumps to autostart before their aux lube oil pumps start). 2) Add other potential distractors as follows: (With " B as the correct answer)

A. Standby CD/CB pump autostarts, GS condenser bypass valves close

6. HD pump discharge valves fully open, CD pump recirc valve closes.

C. Standby CD/CB pump autostarts, HD pump recirc valves close.

D. GS condenser bypass valves fully open, condenser makeup valves close. Enhancement not necessary.

US E

S

ES-40 1 3

Form ES-401-9 8N 9M

!OB 116

!2B

3N 148

!5B

!6B

!7N

!8N

!9B H

2 F

2 H

4 F

3 H

3 F

2 H

3 H

3

3. Psychometric Flaws Cred.

ues 71 T/F

Dist, X

4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other qiz

-ink

7.

Explanation

6.

u/us

1) It appears that distractors A and D are both correct per the Step Description Table for ES-0.1 for Step 1. [Refer to the Plant-Specific Information (Setpoint S.02) on page 13 of the ES-0.1 Background Document]. Modified distractor d.

S

1) Add to end of distractors B and C to make them more plausible: and during loss of all AC power. 2) Add the word only to distractors A and D before the word during. After discussion w/ Nick, this may have no correct answer. After discussion with utility - question is correct as written.

US S

I S

I Distractor B could be considered incorrect, in that one could dispatch a local operator to align FP water to the SAC with the SAC running and prevent the SAC oil temperature from reaching temperature limits required for shutdown. After discussion w/Nick, there may be no correct answer. Question is correct as written - cant be done, physically impossible.

t)s S

I To more align the correct answer with the EOP Background Document, change distractor C to state: Since could be directed to BEP ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization and encounter more restrictive SI termination criteria than necessary.

E

ES-401 4

Form ES-401-9

C T

2 Li U

I I:

r:

3 J

t r;

I I

4 W

'r X

hl I

X

'r

ES-401 6

Form ES-401-9 S

US

7.

Explanation

6.

u/E/s The title of ES-0.3 gives away the situation that one would use ES-0.3 instead of ES-0.2. Modified question.

Level of difficulty is 1. Question allowed. this is a Dlant Droblern.

E

1) In the question stem, delete the sentence "The NSO is questioning the ECCS valve alignment" and replace with "1S18811 A, Train A SI Recirc Sump Isolation Valve, did NOT automatically open."

2) Change distractor A to a different valve (other than 1518812A; e.g. an RHR puml to SI pump supply valve being closed). Left as-is. If changed, change would give away the answer.

~~

Change distractor D to "Increasing RCS temperature" to make it more

~ plausible. Change not necessary.

include item (1) from distractor A and item (2) from distractor B.

3) Change distractor D to include item (2) from distractor A and item (1) from distractor B. 4) In all the distractors, where it only says to make an annoucement over the plant page, add the word"0nly" as the first word. Left distractors as-is, change not needed for Byron.

S I

ES-401 7

Form ES-401-9 wlinutia T units E

S E

U U

U E

d d

S d

us d

S d

S

7.

Explanation ll Per 10CFR55.43(b)(2) this is an SRO level question. In order to use this question for ROs need to have an RO Learning Objective related to this item. Change question so bases is not referenced. Question modified.

~~

The noun name of the MOO39 valves should be listed in the stem.

Noun name added.

Q # WA. The question asks for a definition of TEDE, which does not relate to the knowledge of the facility A U R A program. LOD = 1.

Question replaced.

Two correct answers provided based on allowable assumptions.

Question modified to eliminate second correct answer.

1) Per 10CFR55.43(b)(5) this is an SRO level question. In order to use this question for ROs need to have an RO Learning Objective related to this item. 2) Distractor B is not plausible. Is there a BOA for low RCS pressure that can be inserted here instead?

For symmetry change distractor D to "upper case letters". Not necessary, Byron station has "diamonds. "

1) Q ?c WA. The WA is not related to Tech Specs and shutdown risk assessments are not related to the WA.

2) The revised 10CFR50.59 process has changed the questions asked to determine if an unreviewed safety question exists. Therefore, suggest that a new WA is selected.

New WA selected. The old WA was invalid for Byron Station.

ES-401 8

Form ES-401-9

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Ot

1.

Explanation

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Distractor D is not plausible (i.e. to require a transition to ES-0.0). There is no transition to this procedure, it is a discretionary entry based on SRO needs. Being discretionary is what makes the distractor plausible, but there are correct steps that eliminate the need to enter this ES.

I)

The question stem states that the immediate actions of BEP-0 are being performed. However, the reference for the correct answer of D refers to step 24.b RNO of BEP-0. Step 24 of BEP-0 would only be entered following an SI actuation (otherwise one would kick out of BEP-(

and go to ES-0.1 for only a Reactor Trip). Thus distractor A could be interpreted to be correct also (for an uncontrolled depressurization of the RCS). 2) Also, the Q z KIA, since closing an open PZR PORV is not an immediate action step of an EOP. Modified Distractor A, this is an immediate action step in another procedure & required to be memorized.

ES-401 9

Form ES-401-9

~~

I

2. I

3. Psychometric Flaws I 4. Job Content Flaws ~ I 5. 0

1.

-1' I

H 3

F 2

4 i-

7.

Explanation Question is not SRO only, since it does not satisfy any of the seven requirements for an SRO question per 10CFR55.43(b).

1) Question is not SRO only, since it does not satisfy any of the seven requirements for an SRO question per 10CFR55.43(b).

is not plausible. Replaced question.

Question is not SRO only, since it does not satisfy any of the seven requirements for an SRO question per 10CFR55.43(b). Replaced Question.

2) Distractor D

~

Question is not SRO only, since it does not satisfy any of the seven requirements for an SRO question per 10CFR55.43(b). After review of station requirements, this is SRO Only at Byron Station.

BYRON INITIAL EXAM OPERATING TEST COMMENTS Section Scenario 2 JPM a JPM a JPM b JPM f

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JPM i JPM k AJPM

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AJPM Location n/a p 3 Note 4 p4 Note all all cue cue A.4 (SRO)

A.4 (RO)

Comment Event 1 &. 2 should be reversed. The plant would probably not increase power with a failed feed reg valve. Fail the feed reg valve to terminate the power increase. Resolution - facility re-arranged the scenario w/ reactivity change first.

typo - should not be operated gJ the same time. Fixed typo.

~~~

shutting down 1 WOO1 PB appears to be a critical task - check.

Resolution - Facility did not agree it was a critical task at the Note. After exam administration, it was determined that it was a critical task.

difficult to follow - may need more clarification after validation.

Resolution - facility made additions to clarify the ipm.

may need additional guidance in the cue to understand the task being assigned. Resolution - facility made additions to clarify the jpm.

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they should not be cued as non-licensed operators - there are not enough NLOs so the applicant is being assigned to perform this task. Resolution - Facility replaced cue.

another time critical JPM should be started when the first is completed. this one should monitor the time that it takes to complete the NARS forms and provide it to the communicator for notifying state/local. Resolution - Facility agreed.

the communicator will not have 15 minutes to make this transmission. most of the time will be used up by the SRO in Filling in the NARS and getting signature permission to transmit.

find a more realistic allowable time. Facility agreed. Five minute time limit was assigned to this time critical JPM.

REFERENCES PROVIDED FOR THE WRITTEN EXAMINATION REACTOR OPERATOR EXAMINATION Byron Station Technical Specifications SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR EXAMINATION Byron Station Technical Specifications Q# 76 OP-AA-106-101 Q# 78 OU-AP-104 p 63 Q# 79 BOL 11.b Q# 84 Q#86 BRP 5820-1 2, Attachment B (pgs 11 -1 5)

BOP AWPR-2T1 BOP AWPR-2T2 BOP AWPR-5T1 U-2 PTLR Fig 2.3 Significant Event Reporting Manual Safety Assessment Flowchart (Attachment 9)

LCOAR - Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Requirments Manual Process Radiation Monitors Rad Monitor Power Supplies Sort By EPN Rad Monitor Power Supplies Sort By MCC Breaker Number Monitor Cross Index Table Byron U-2 Maximum Allowable Nominal PORV Setpoints for the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System Applicable for the First 15.5 EFPY U-2 PTLR Table 2.2 Data Points for Byron U-2 Maximum Allowable PORV Setpoints for the LTOP System Applicable for 15.5 EFPY

Exe I n SM Exelon Generation Company, LLC www.exeloncorp.com Byron Station 4450 North German Church Road Byron, IL 61010-9794 June 6,2003 Nuclear LTR:

BYRON 2003-0049 File:

2.07.0200 James E. Dyer, Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region Ill 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351 Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 NRC Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455

Subject:

Submittal of Knowledge and Abilities (WAS) that will be Suppressed from the Random Examination Generation Process It is our intent to develop the upcoming initial license exam scheduled for December 1, 2003 to December 12,2003 in accordance with NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, as part of the established pilot program.

In accordance with NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Byron is submitting for your review the list of WA statements that will be suppressed from the random exam generation process in support of our December 11,2003 license exam.

If there are any questions or comments regarding this matter, please contact W. Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (81 5) 406-2800.

RBpectf u I I y,

Site Vice President Byron Nuclear Generating Station R P UDD/d I cw

Enclosure:

Braidwood and Byron Suppressed WAS cc:

Dell McNeil, Lead Examiner - NRC Region I l l (with attachments)

Chief, NRC Operator Licensing Branch (without attachments)

NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Byron Station (without attachments)

bee:

Site Vice President - Byron Station (without attachments)

Vice President - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs (without attachments)

Director - Licensing - Midwest Regional Operating Group (without attachments)

Manager, Licensing - Braidwood & Byron Stations (without attachments)

Regulatory Assurance Manager - Byron Station (without attachments)

Byron Nuclear Licensing Administrator (without attachments)

Human Resources - Byron Station (without attachments)

Training Manager - Byron Station (without attachments)

Exelon Document Control Desk Licensing (Hard Copy)

Exelon Document Control Desk Licensing (Electronic Copy)

Braidwood and Byron Suppressed K A s (4/24/03)

Viewed KA Category Statement RA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal AK1.14 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Interaction of ICs control stations as well as 3.4 3.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.0 2.9 Not applicable to PA1.06 ByronlBraidwood.

as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICs emergency task:

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following Rod transfer switches as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal ;

003 Dropped Control Rod AKI.I3 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod emergency task:

Knowledge of the following components:

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod:

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod:

AK2.03 AK3.01 AK3.03 AK3.04 AA1.04 3.2 Interaction of ICs control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICs Metroscope 3.1 3.5 When ICs logic has failed on a dropped rod, the load must be reduced until flux is within specified target bank Turbine automatic runback with reactor in order to balance power output 3.8 3.8 Actions contained in EOP for dropped control rod Control rod drive safety rod out limit bypass switch or key 3.4 005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod AA1.03 Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Metroscope PA2.02 AKI.04 Ability to determine or interpret:

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the inoperablelstuck control rod emergency task:

Difference between jog and run rod speeds, effect on CRDM of stuck rod Definitions of axial imbalance, neutron error, power demand, actual power tracking mode, ICs AK2.03 Knowledge of the following components:

Metroscope 008 Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Sluck Open)

Ability to determine or interpret:

AA2.04 High-temperature computer alarm and alarm type 3.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.9 NIA to BylBwd 4.1 NIA to BylBwd 4.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.3 NIA to BylBwd 3.4 3.4 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.5 3.0 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.0 3.4 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.1 3.3 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

NIA to BylBwd 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.7 NIA to ByIBwd AA2.09 Ability to determine or interpret:

PZR spray block valve controls and indicators

009

.\\.

EA1.03 EA1.18 EA2.09 EA2.22 EA2.35 EK3.25 EK3.27 01 I EA1.02 EA1.09 EA1.16 EA2.11 EA2.12 EK3.07 015 AA1.04 AA1.19 AA2.09 AK1.03 AK3.04 AK3.05 Small Break LOCA Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to determine or interpret:

Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

Large Break LOCA Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to determine or interpret:

Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Balancing of HPI loop flows Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Charging flow trend recorder Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling spray Monitoring of in-core T-cold Manual depressurization or HPI recirculation for sustained high pressure Reflux boiling sump level indicators Core flood tank initiation Balancing of HPI loop flows Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling Stopping charging pump bypass flow spray Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunctions Ability to operate and monitor the following:

RCP ventilation cooling fan run indicators Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Power transfer confirm lamp Ability to determine or interpret:

When to secure RCPs on high stator temperatures Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the RCP malfunctions emergency task:

Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

power-to-flow limit Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the The basis for operating at a reduced power level when one RCP is out of service Reduction of power to below the steady state Shift of T-ave sensors to the loop with the highest following:

flow 3.2 3.4 2.8 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.3 3.5 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.

3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.3 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.3 NIA to BylBwd 4.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

4.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

4.3 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodIB yron.

4.3 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.

3.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.5 2.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.9 3.0 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.4 3.5 Braidwood and Byron have no procedural requirement to stop RCPs based on Stator Temperature.

3.0 4.0 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.1 3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.

2.8 3.0 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

017 AA1.04 AA1.19 AK1.03 AK3.04 024 AA1.01 AA1.OB AA1.I 1 AA1.24 025 AA1.05 AA1.19 AA1.22 AA2.05 AK2.04 026 AA1.03 AA1.04 AK3.01 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfinctions (Loss of RC Flow)

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the RCP malfunctions emergency task:

Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

Emergency Boration Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

RCP ventilation cooling fan run indicators Power transfer confin lamp The basis for operating at a reduced power level when one RCP is out of service Reduction of power to below the steady state power-to-flow limit Use of spent fuel pool as backup to BWST Pump speed controlled to protect pump seals BIT suction and recirculation valves BIT inlet and outlet valve switches and indicators Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Raw water or sea water pumps Block orifice bypass valve controllers and indicators Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Obtaining of water from BWST for LPI system Ability to determine or interpret:

Limitations on LPI flow and temperature rates of change Knowledge of the following components:

Raw water or sea water pumps Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

SWS as a backup to the CCWS Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

CRDM high-temperature alarm system The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and closing of the SWS isolation valves to the CCWInuclear service water coolers 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.9 3.1 2.4 3.6 2.7 3.2 2.5 3.0 4.0 3.2 3.4 3.0 2.7 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.8 3.5 2.4 3.6 2.8 3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

No flowpath available for BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.

027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfiinction AA1.04 AA1.05 AA2.13 Ability to determine or interpret:

Seal return flow Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Pressure recovery, using emergency-only heaters Transfer of heaters to backup power supply 3.9 3.3 2.8 3.6 3.2 2.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Seal return flow not impacted by Pzr pressure changes at BraidwoodByron.

028 Pressurizer(PZR) Level Control Muljiinction AA2.13 Ability to determine or interpret:

The actual PZR level, given uncompensated level with an appropriate graph Change in PZR level with power change, even though T-ave constant, due to loop size difference AK3.04 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

2.9 2.9 3.2 3.0 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

029 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

EA1.04 BIT inlet valve switches 3.9 3.7 3.1 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

EA1.05 EA2.10 Ability to determine or interpret:

Positive displacement charging pumps EK3.03 EK3.04 EK3.05 Ability to operate and monitor the following:

BIT outlet valve switches Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

valves Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

valve Opening BIT inlet and outlet valves Closing the normal charging header isolation Closing the centrifugal charging pump recirculation Loss of Source Runge Nucleurlnstrum~ntution 032 AA2.03 AA2.09 Ability to determine or interpret:

Ability to determine or interpret:

Expected values of source range indication when High voltage is automatically removed Effects of improper HV setting 2.8 2.5 3.1 2.9 Not applicable to Byron SR instruments.

Not applicable to Byron SR fission chamber detectors.

Not applicable to Byron SR fission chamber detectors AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications Of the following concepts:

Effects of voltage changes on performance 2.5 3.1 033 Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclearlnstrumentution AA2.11 Ability to determine or interpret:

Loss of compensating voltage AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications Of the following concepts:

Effects of voltage changes on performance 3.1 2.5 3.4 3.1 Not applicable to Byron IR instruments.

Not applicable to Byron IR fission chamber detectors

056 AA1.I5 AA1.20 AA2.02 AA2.11 AA2.29

~ ~ 2. 3 8 057 AA2.02 062 AA1.04 068 AA1.20 AK3.05 AK3.16 074 EA1.03 EA1.14 Loss of Ofsite Power Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Service water booster pump Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Speed switch room ventilation fan Ability to determine or interpret:

ESF load sequencer status lights Ability to determine or interpret:

Operational status of service water booster pump Ability to determine or interpret:

Service water booster pump ammeter and flowmeter Ability to determine or interpret Load sequencer status lights Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus Ability to determine or interpret:

Core flood tank pressure and level indicators Loss of Nuclear Service Water Ability to operate and monitor the following:

CRDM high-temperature alarm system Control Room Evacuation Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Indicators for operation of startup transformer Knowledge of the reasons for the following Responses:

Repositioning valves to isolate and drain the AFW pump turbine and steam supply header Knowledge of the reasons for the following Responses:

evacuation Inadeauate Core Cooling Fail-open of the control room doors for personnel Ability to operate and monitor the following:

The alternate control station for turbine bypass valve operation Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Alarm for loss of subcooling margin 2.7 3.0 3.5 2.9 3.0 3.7 3.7 2.7 3.2 2.5 2.8 3.9 4.1 2.9 3.0 3.6 2.9 3.2 3.8 3.8 2.8 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.9 4.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

001 A1.10 Control Rod Drive System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CRDS controls:

Ability to predict andlor monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CRDS controls:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations and (b) use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations and (b) use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CRDS and the following systems:

Knowledge of CRDS design feature(s) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the CRDS:

Location and operation of controls and indications for CRDS component cooling water 2.9 2.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron Prepower dependent insertion limit and power dependent insertion, detemined with metroscope 4.0 4.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodIB yron A1.13 Loss of CCW to CRDS 2.9 A2.08 3.3 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron Isolation of left coil on affected rod to prevent coil burnout 2.6 A2.20 3.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodfByron Controls for CCWS Part-length rod position Power source transfer check 3.1 3.9 3.3 A4.01 A4.04 A4.07 A4.09 K1.01 2.9 3.6 3.3 3.1 3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

ccws ccw 2.8 3.0 CCWS must be cut in before energizing CRDS 2.8 Kl.09 3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

t K4.04 K5.11 Circuitry and principle of operation for LVDT or reed switch Relationship between reactivity worth of power-shaping control rod group and other control rod groups (power-shaping, or part-length, rods have much less reactivity than full-length control 2.5 3.1 Effects on power of inserting axial shaping rods 3.4 2.8 3.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the CRDS:

K5.12 K5.76 K5.79 4.1 3.7 3.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Effects on power of inserting axial shaping rods 3.3 Effects of positioning of axial shape rods on SDM 3.0

?

002 A3.02 A4.05 K5.16 003 K3.05 004 K1.09 006 A2.07 A4.03 K1.07 K1.10 K2.03 K4.19 K4.20 K4.29 007 A4.04 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCS, including:

Containment sound-monitoring system Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

refueling cavity Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the RCS:

Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the RCPS will have on the following:

The HPI system when it is used to refill the Reason for automatic features of the Feedwater control system during total loss of reactor coolant flow ICs Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

Knowledge of the physical connections andlor cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems:

Relationship between CVCS and RPlS Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

tank Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-eff ect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems:

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Knowledge of ECCS design feature@) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of ECCS design feature@) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Loss of heat tracing Transfer from boron storage tank to boron injection MFVJ System Safety injection tank heating system Heat tracing Interlocks to storage tank makeup valve Automatic closure of common drain line and fill valves to accumulator BIT recirculation Pressurizer Relief TanWQuench Tank System (PRTS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

PZR vent valve 2.6 2.8 3.5 3.6 2.2 2.8 3.5 2.9 2.6 2.3 3.0 3.2 2.5 2.6 2.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

4.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.1 Not applicable to Braidwaodl0yron.

3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.3 Not applicable to BraidwoadIByron.

2.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

2.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron, 3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron 2.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

00s K3.02 A4.04 01 0 K4.02 CornponsntCooling Wuter System (CCWS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following:

Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room:

three-way control switch CADS CCW pump recirculation valve and its Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

Knowledge of PZR PCS design featUre(S) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Prevention of uncovering PZR heaters 01 1 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

cause-effect relationships between the PZR LCS and the following systems:

Knowledge of PZR LCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

A2.08 Loss of level compensation K1.05 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Reactor regulating system K4.03 Density compensation of PZR level 01 2 Reactor Protection System K6.07 Knowledge of the applicable performance and Core protection calculator design attributes of the following RPS components:

K6.09 Knowledge of the applicable performance and CEAC design attributes of the following RPS components:

2.9 3.0 3.0 2.6 3.4 2.6 2.9 3.6 3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodJByron.

2.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.4 prevention of uncovering pressurizer heaters is covered by level control circuitry and is addressed by WA 01 1000K4.01 2.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.

3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

2.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 013 K4.05 K4.14 K4.21 K4.24 AI.03 014 Al.01 A2.06 A2.07 A4.03 K4.01 K4.02 K4.05 K6.03 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

Knowledge of ESFAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of ESFAS design feature@) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of ESFAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of ESFAS design feature@) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ESFAS controls including:

Rod Position Indication System (RPIS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RPlS controls including:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPlS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Knowledge of RPlS design feature@) and/or interlock@) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of ESFAS design feature(s) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of ESFAS design feature@) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following RPlS components:

Core spray actuation signal reset 4.0 Upper head injection accumulator isolation 3.7 Reason for starting an additional service water booster pump for train not being tested and stopping the pump on train under test Reason for disabling of BIT so it will not function 3.0 during ESF sequencer test Feedwater header differential 2.6 3.1 Metroscope reed switch display Loss of LVDT Loss of reed switch Primary coil voltage measurement Upper electrical limit Lower electrical limit Rod hold interlocks Metroscope 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 3.1 2.1 4.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

4.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.3 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoocUByron.

3.0 Not applicable to BraidwoocUByron.

2.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.3 Not applicable to B raid wood1B yron.

2.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

c 015 K1.05 Nuclear Instrumentation System Knowledge of the physical connections andor cause-effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems:

Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the NIS will have on the following:

Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of NIS design feature@) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the NIS:

ICs 3.9 3.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Reactor regulating system K1.06 3.1 3.4 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

ICs Reactor regulating system Source-range detector shutoff at high powers Slow response time of SPNDs Discriminatoricompensation circuits 3.4 2.9 3.1 3.4 2.6 K3.04 K3.06 K4.01 K4.04 K6.02 4.0 3.2 3.3 3.6 2.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to Byron.

022 K1.02 Containment Cooling System (CCS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-eff ect relationships between the CCS and the following systems:

Knowledge of CCS design feature@) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

SEC/remote monitoring systems Cooling of control rod drive motors 3.7 3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

K4.04 2.8 3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

025 AI.01 Ice Condenser System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Ice Condenser System controls including:

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Ice Condenser System controls including:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use 3.0 3.0 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Temperature chart recorders Glycol expansion tank level Al.02 2.5 2.2 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Glycol flow to ice condenser air handling units Al.03 2.5 2.5 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers A2.01 Trip of glycol circulation pumps 2.2 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers

/,

i A2.02 HigNlow floor cooling temperature 2.7 3.0 2.5 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.2 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers A2.03 Opening of ice condenser doors

procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Ice Condenser System, including:

A2.04 Containment isolation A2.05 Abnormal glycol expansion tank level A2.06 Decreasing ice condenser temperature A3.01 Refrigerant system A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Ice Condenser System, including:

Isolation valves A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Ice condenser isolation valves A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Containment vent fans A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Glycol circulation pumps K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Containment ventilation cause-eff ect relationships between the Ice Condenser System and the following systems:

cause-effect relationships between the Ice Condenser System and the following systems:

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Refrigerant systems K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Containment sump system K2.01 Containment ventilation fans and dampers K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Refrigerant systems K2.03 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Isolation valves 3.0 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.7 2.7 3.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 3.2 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.0 3.4 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.7 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers

I 026 039.

K3.01 K4.01 K4.02 K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K6.01 K1.02 K3.02 A4.04 K3.03 K4.07 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the Ice Condenser System will have on the following:

Knowledge of Ice Condenser System design feature(s) andor interlwk(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of Ice Condenser System design feature(s) andor interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Ice Condenser System:

Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following Ice Condenser System components:

Containment Spray System (CSS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CSS and the following systems:

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CSS will have on the following:

Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the MRSS will have on the following:

Knowledge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Containment Glycol expansion tank levels and ice condenser system containment isolation valves System control Relationships between pressure and temperature Heat transfer Gas laws Upper and lower doors of the ice condenser Cooling water Recirculation spray system Emergency feedwater pump turbines AFW pumps Reactor building isolation 3.8 3.8 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.4 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.8 3.4 3.6 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 4.1 4.1 Containment Spray pumps have no cooling water at BraidwoodByron 3.9 4.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.8 3.2 3.4 3.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron 3.5 Braidwood and Byron do not have turbine driven AFW pumps.

3.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

041 K2.01 K2.02 K4.01 K4.15 A4.01 A4.07 045 K4.08 K4.44 059 A3.07 A4.10 K1.07 K4.02 K4.17 Steam Duwp System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass Control Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

Knowledge of SDS design feature(s) and/or interlock@) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of SDS design feature@) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System Knowledge of MT/G System design feature@)

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of MTIG System design feature@)

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Main Feedwater (MFW) System Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW System, including:

Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MFW System and the following systems:

Knowledge of MFW System design feature@)

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of MFW System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

ICs, normal and alternate power supply ICs inverter breakers RRWICS systems Measured variable readings on ICs hand-automatic stations and required action if reading is out of acceptable band ICs voltage inverter Remote gagging of stuck open relief valves The reactor bailey station and reactor diamond station in integrated control circuitry Impulse pressure mode control of steam dumps ICs ICs ICs Automatic turbineheactor trip runback Increased feedwater flow following a reactor trip 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.5 3.4 3.9 3.2 3.3 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.5 3.8 3.2 3.5 2.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlB yron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwdByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

t 061 A2.02 A3.04 K1.09 K1.09 K4.07 K4.11 K4.14 K5.04 Auxiliary /Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the A M I System, including:

Knowledge of the physical conneclions andlor cause-effect relationships between the AFW and the following systems:

Knowledge of the physical connections andlor cause-effect relationships between the AFW and the following systems:

Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of AFW System design feature@)

and/or interlock@) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the A M I System:

Loss of air to steam supply valve Automatic AFW isolation PRMS ANV turbine exhaust drains Turbine trip, including overspeed Automatic level control ANV automatic isolation Reason for warming up turbine prior to turbine startup 3.2 3.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

4.1 4.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.6 2.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

071 Waste Gas Disposal System ( WGDS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

A4.05 Gas decay tanks, including valves, indicators, sample line 2.6 2.7 2.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.1 3.3 Not applicable to BraidwoodlB yron.

2.7 2.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodJByron.

3.5 3.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.3 2.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

A4.10 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

WGDS sampling A4.11 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

WGDS startup and shutdown 2.5 2.5 A4.13 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Recovery from automatic termination of gas release due to PRM system alarm 3.0 A4.14 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

WGDS status alarms 2.8 2.6 Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank operations.

2.4 Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank operations.

2.3 Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank operations.

3.1 Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank operations.

3.0 Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to c

9 '

A4.16 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Waste gas decay tank shifts monitor or perform gas decay tank operations.

2.5 2.2 Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.

A4.17 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the Stopping transfer of radioactive liquids to WGDS tank 2.6 2.5 Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank operations.

control room:

A4.27 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Opening and closing of the decay tank discharge 3.0 2.7 Braidwood and Byron control room:

control valve control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank operations.

2.9 2.6 Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank operations.

A4.30 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Water drainage from the WGDS decay tanks 0 73 076 078 K4.02 K1.09 K2.04 K3.03 K4.01 K1.05 K2.02 Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Knowledge of PRM System design feature@)

and/or interlock($ which provide for the following:

Service Water System [SWS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems:

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the SWS will have on the following:

Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Instrument Air System [IAS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems:

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the:

Letdown isolation on high-RCS activity 3.3 Reactor building closed cooling water 3.0 Reactor building closed cooling water 2.5 3.5 2.5 Reactor building closed cooling water Conditions initiating automatic closure of closed cooling water auxiliary building header supply and return valves MSlV air Emergency air compressor 3.4 3.3 3.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

2.6

. Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

4

P 086 Al.02 A4.04 K l.Ol I03 A4.09 K1.03 Kl.07 K4.01 Fire Protection System (FPS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the FPS controls including:

Fire water storage tank level Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the FPS and the following systems:

Fire Water storage tank makeup pumps High-pressure service water Containment System Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Containment System and the following systems:

Knowledge of Containment System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Containment vacuum system Shield building vent system Containment vacuum system Vacuum breaker protection Byron Exam Author Byron Facility Representative 3.0 3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.4 3.3 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.0 3.4 Not applicable to Braid wood/Byron.

3.1 3.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.1 3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.5 3.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.0 3.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

ML040280021

Text

Subject:

Enclosure:

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