ML032650586

Final - Section C Operating

ML032650586
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	08/01/2003
From:	Roush K Susquehanna
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-387/03-301, 50-388/03-301
Download: ML032650586 (58)

Text

L c 3 IMF AV04:N11016B 0 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SSES Scenario No.: PCOl7-102 Op-Test No.:

I L-5 6

Examiners:

Operators:

IMF TC193016 130 M

IMF RD155017 M

bat RPB.HYDAlWS-1 Initial Conditions: IC-20 Both Units at 100% Power EOL Turnover: B Service Air Compressor out of service for preventative maintenance. The compressor will not be returned to service this shift. Decrease Dower to 90% for rod adjustments IAW OP-AD-338 (Attachment C) then call Reactor Enqineerinq. Prior to starting power reduction perform SO-155-006, QUARTERLY ARI MANUAL TRIP CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type*

IMF RL02:E411K17 N

R I

4 l IMF SL153001A IMF SL153001 B C

IMF MV06:HV155F006

+---P-Event Description Perform ARI surveillance 10% Power reduction to 90%

HPCl CST low level switch failure B Recirc pump MG set HYD FLUID CTRL TCV (TIC-11016B) failed closed. B Reactor Recirc Pump trip (Auto trips at 210°F as a result of TIC-11016B failure).

TURBINE EHC PRESSURWFLOW GAIN UNIT FAILURE (1 30%) - MSlV Closure Hydraulic ATWS SBLC Squib valves fail to fire.

HPCl injection Auto Open failure I

I NUREG 102 1 Draft Rev. 9 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 1

Prepared By:

Instructor PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA Date SIMULATOR SCENARIO Reviewed By:

Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor I

Scenario

Title:

NRC INITIAL LICENSE OPERATOR EXAMINATION Date Scenario Duration: 90 Minutes Approved By:

Supervising ManagerKhift Supervisor Scenario Number: PCO17-102 Revision/Date:

Rev 0,5/1/2003 Date Course:

PCOl7, Senior Reactor Operator License PCOI 8, Reactor Operator License Operational Activities:

1 Surveillance Activity 2 Power Change 3 HPCl CST Level Switch Failure 4 MG B HYD Fluid TCV Fail Closed 5 Turbine EHC System Malfunction 6 ATWS 7 SBLC Squib Valve Fail to Fire 8 HPCl F006 Auto Logic Failure F

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STCP-QAS12A Rev. 0, (04/98)

Page 1 of 15 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 2 Scenario PCOl7-102 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0, (04/98)

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Page 3 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario begins with the plant operating at 100% power. The " B Service Air Compressor is out of service for preventive maintenance and will not be returned to service this shift. Unit 2 is in MODE 1 at 100%

power.

After assuming the shift, the crew will perform a surveillance activity on the Alternate Rod Insertion system.

Upon completion of the surveillance the crew will commence a power decrease requested by Reactor Engineering for a rod pattern adjustment. While meeting this request, a HPCl system CST low level switch fails; HPCl suction source will swap to the suppression pool and Technical Specifications will be addressed.

Upon resumption of the power decrease a failure of the "B" Reactor Recirc MG set lube oil TCV-11016B occurs; the valve will fail shut, resulting in elevated lube oil temperatures to the MG set. This will cause "Ba reactor recirc pump to eventually trip. The crew will take actions IAW General, Off-Normal and Operating procedures as well as address Technical Specifications for Single-Loop operation.

Following crew response to the tripped recirculation pump, the EHC Pressure/Flow Gain Unit will fail, causing all Main Turbine Bypass and Control valves to open. Reactor pressure will rapidly decrease to cause a MSlV isolation and reactor scram signal. When the reactor scram signal is received, one Scram Discharge Volume will become blocked, resulting in a hydraulic ATWS.

The crew will enter the LeveVPower Control procedure to mitigate the ATWS. The crew will initiate SLC, but the Squib valves will fail to fire, requiring alternate SLC injection with RCIC. Since initial ATWS power level is above 5%, the crew will lower RPV level and stabilize in the target band of -60" to -1 Io". When HPCl is initiated the injection valve will fail to open, placing the control switch to open will allow injection flowpath. As RPV water level is being maintained between -60" and -1 10" crew attempts to insert control rods manually and by resetting/rescramming will be successful. The crew should exit LeveVPower Control and re-enter RPV Control to slowly restore and maintain level between +13" to +W.

When all control rods are inserted and actions are in progress to restore RPV water level to +13" to +54", the scenario will be terminated.

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STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04198)

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Page 5 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 i

SCENARIO OBJECTIVES The SRO will:

1. Ensure initiation of ESF equipment if automatic operation was not properly initiated (00.AD.131).

2. Inform other shift members and plant management of changes in plant status, potential plant problems or limitations (00.AD.131).

3. Ascertain the need to notify the Duty Manager when a plant event develops and ensure the notification is made (00.AD.131).

4. Implement Loss of Reactor Recirculation Flow (64.ON.010).

5. Implement Turbine EHC Malfunction (93.0N.005).

6. Implement Main Turbine Trip (93.0N.006).

7. Implement Scram (00.ON.018).

8. Implement RPV Control (00.E0.026).

9. Implement LeveVPower Control (00.E0.031).

IO. Implement Primary Containment Control (00.E0.027).

11. Implement Boron Injection Via RClC (50.E0.009).

12. Implement RPS and ARI trip bypass (58.E0.006).

13. Ensure required actions per Technical Specifications are met when a LCO is not met (00.TS.002).

1. Perform normal operation of RHR in the Suppression Pool Cooling Mode (49.0P.003).

2. Perform automatic/manual startup of RClC system (50.0P.010).

3. Perform manual startup of HPCl (52.0P.012).

4. Perform maximizing CRD flow (55.0P.001).

5. Perform initiation of Standby Liquid Control System (53.0P.003).

6. Perform inserting manual scram with CRD system in service (55.0P.006).

7. Perform shutdown of Recirculation Pump for Single Loop operation (64.0P.002).

8. Perform inhibiting ADS (83.0P.005).

9. Implement Loss of Reactor Recirculation Flow (64.ON.010).

I O. Implement Turbine EHC Malfunction (93.0N.005).

11. Implement Main Turbine Trip (93.0N.006).

12. Implement Scram (00.ON.018).

13. Implement RPV Control (00.E0.026).

14. Implement LeveVPower Control (00.E0.031).

15. Implement Primary Containment Control (00.E0.927).

16. Implement Boron Injection Via RClC (50.E0.009).

The ROs will:

Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04198)

Page 5 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

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Page 6 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 7 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 CRITICAL TASKS 03 ATWS 06 LEVEL / POWER CONTROL Lowers RPV level to <-60" but >-161".

Safety Sign if icance Core damage due to unstable operation can be prevented or at least mitigated by promptly reducing feedwater flow so that level is lowered below the feedwater spargers.

Consequences for Failure to perform Task A General Electric Company study (NEDO-32047) indicates that the major threat to fuel integrity from ATWS is caused by large-amplitude power/flow instabilities. The power oscillations can become large enough to cause melting of fuel in high-power bundles.

Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Lowering of reactor pressure and closure of MSlVs with NO reactor scram signal.

Performance Criteria Lower reactor water level by controlling injection rate from RClC using the RCIC speed controller.

NOTE: Manual HPCl control may be required based on initiating power of failure to scram event. If initiating event is from high power HPCl injection will be required to maintain reactor water level above Top of Active Fuel (TAF).

Performance Feedback Lowering water level to -60 to -1 10 inches will result in power level lowering as indicated on the Average Power Range Monitors.

Inject SLC Safety Significance Early boron injection has the following benefits:

Stop or prevent large-magnitude Limit Cycle Oscillations which can lead to core damage.

Limit fuel damage from uneven flux patterns that could result from partial rod inserts.

Consequences for Failure to perform Task Failure to inject Boron can result in Cycle Oscillations which can lead to core damage.

Fuel damage from uneven flux patterns that could result from partial rod inserts.

Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0, (04/98)

Page 7 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 8 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 IndicationslCues for Event Requiring Critical Task Lowering of reactor pressure and closure of MSlVs with NO reactor scram signal.

NO SLC Flow indicated performance of SLC injection steps.

Performance Criteria Inject SLC by inserting key into keylock switch and turning to start SLC pumps, fire the Squib valves and close the Reactor Water Cleanup isolation valve.

RECOGNIZE SLC squib valves did not fire (NO Flow indicated) and initiating alternate SLC injection using RCIC (ES-150-002) (Will not be completed during scenario)

Performance Feedback Successful SLC injection would be indicated by a lowering SLC tank level and a corresponding power level decrease.

Inserts control rods IAW EO-100-1 13 Sht. 2.

Safety Significance Control rod insertion initiates power reduction immediately Consequences for Failure to perform Task Failure to insert control rods allows power to remain elevated with resultant power oscillations and potential core damage.

L-Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Lowering of reactor pressure and closure of MSlVs with NO reactor scram signal.

Performance Criteria Insert Control Rods by the following methods:

Maximize CRD to drift control rods (Will not be successful)

Drive control rods after bypassing RWM and RSCS (Will be successful)

Resetting and Scramming again by performing ES-158-002 Bypass RPS logic trips (Will be successful)

Performance Feedback Successful insertion of control rods will be indicated by:

Rod position for manual insertion of control rods Rod position full in after resetting scram, draining scram discharge volume and rescram Manually open HPCl injection HV-155-FOO6.

This critical task is dependent on the power level at which the failure to scram occurs. If the failure to scram transient begins from 100% power, opening the HPCl injection valve will be a critical task.

L FOn STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 8 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 9 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 If the failure to scram occurred from 100% power, opening the HPCl injection valve is considered a critical task based on ability to control water level above Top of Active Fuel. The MSlVs close preventing the use of the Feedwater system to control water level. The high pressure feed systems available are RCIC, and CRD. If the transient begins from 100% power, the CRD system does not have the capacity to maintain water level by itself. The RCIC system by procedural guidance is to be lined up for Boron injection leaving no high pressure feed system other than HPCI.

To ensure water level is controlled above Top of Active Fuel, HPCl injection is required and operator intervention is required for HPCl injection.

Safety Significance Unable to maintain reactor water level above top of active fuel.

Consequences for Failure to perform Task Potential core damage due to insufficient heat removal.

Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Lowering of reactor level below target level of -60 to -1 10 inches.

Performance Criteria Manually open HPCl injection HV-155-FOO6.

Verify HPCl pump discharge pressure 100 psig greater than reactor pressure.

Operate control switch for HPCI injection HV-155-FOO6, observe HPCl flow and level control..

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Performance Feedback Reactor water level being maintained above the top of active fuel between -60 and -1 10 inches.

Denotes Simulator Critical Task Form STCP-QA-61 2A Rev. 0. (04198)

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Page 10 Of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 11 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 SCENARIO REFERENCES

1. SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY SO-155-006 OP-AD-004 QUARTERLY ARI MANUAL TRIP CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, REV. 8 OPERATIONS STANDARDS FOR ERROR AND EVENT PREVENTION, REV. 5

2. POWER CHANGE GO-I 00-012 POWER MANEUVERS, REV. 17 OPERATIONS STANDARDS FOR SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT OPERATION, REV.5 COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR REACTIVITY MANIPULATIONS, REV. 1 N DAP-QA-338 REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT AND CONTROLS PROGRAM, REV. 6 OP-AD-001 OP-AD-338

3. HPCl SYS CST LO LEVEL SWITCH FAILURE AR-114-EO1 CST LO WATER LEVEL, REV. 22 STANDARDS FOR SHIFT OPERATIONS, REV. 9 TS 3.3.5.1 ECCS INSTRUMENTATION, AMENDMENTS 178 & 204 OP-AD-002 NDAP-QA-0702 ACTION REQUEST AND CONDITION REPORT PROCESS, REV. 12

4. MG B HYD FLUID TEMP CONTROL VALVE FAIL CLOSED / RRP B TRIP AR-102-CO5 AR-102-CO6 AR-102-905 RECIRC MG SET A/B BRG OR FLUID DRIVE OIL HI TEMP, REV. 21 RECIRC MG B FLUID DRIVE OIL HI-LO TEMP, REV. 21 RECIRC MG B DRIVE MTR TRIP, REV. 21 1.-

ON-I 64-002 LOSS OF REACTOR RECIRCULATION FLOW, REV. 20 TS 3.4.1 TR 3.2 RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING, AMENDMENT 178 COLR SECTION 8, 3/15/02 GO-100-009 SINGLE RECIRCULATION LOOP OPERATION, REV. 13

5. TURBINE EHC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION / MSlV ISOLATION ON-I 56-001 ON-I 93-001 UNEXPLAINED REACTIVITY CHANGE, REV. 14 TURBINE EHC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, REV. 10

6. ATWS / LEVEUPOWER CONTROL / RPV CONTROL ON-100-101 SCRAM, REV. 9 EO-I 00-1 02 EO-I 00-1 13 ES-150-002 ES-158-002 EP-PS-100 RPV CONTROL, REV. 1 LEVEL-POWER CONTROUCONTROL ROD INSERTION, REV. 1 BORON INJECTION VIA RCIC, REV. 13 RPS AND ARI TRIP BYPASS, REV. 4 EMERGENCY PLANT POSITION-SPECIFIC (ED), REV. 16 Continued on next page:

Form STCP-QA-61%

Rev. 0, (04/98)

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Page 12 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003

7. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL EO-I 00-1 03 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 2

8. OTHER BWROG SIMULATOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINE, TEMPLATE RPV-6 Form STCP-QA-6124 Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 12 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 13 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 MALFS 63 : 63 L

SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS REMFS OVRDS TRIGS 1

3: 3 0

1. Initialize the simulator to IC-20 (Both Units 100% Power, EOL).

2. Set up the simulator for the scenario by performing the following:

Place the " B Service Air Compressor control switch on 1 C668 to OFF.

3. Type restorepref YPP.PCO17-102; verify the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments:

Verify the Environment Window:

IOR ZAlM2J115HD5 15 MCFL POT AT 100%

MRF PM091K108B OUT "Br SERVICE AIR COMPRESSOR BKR RACKED OUT IMF RD155017 PARTIAL SCRAM (BROWNS FERRY EVENT)

IMF MV07:PVl46F003 8.7 CRD PRESS VLV F003 FAILED, 8.7%

IMF MV06:HV155F006 AUTO LOGIC FAILURE TO OPEN IMF SL153001A IMF SL153001B SQUIB VALVE XV-C41-F004A FAILS TO FIRE SQUIB VALVE XV-C4l-F004B FAILS TO FIRE bat RPB.HYDATWS-I

[P-I] IMF RL02:E411K17 HPCl SYS CST LO LEVEL SWITCH FAILURE

[P-21 IMF AV04:TV11016B 0

[P-31 IMF TC193016 130 TURBINE EHC PRESSURE/FLOW GAIN UNIT FAILURE (130%)

[P-4] MRF RD155017 0 146F034 CRD CHARGING WTR IS0 VLV CLOSED

[P-5] bat RPB.DISABLARI OPENS ARI BKRS IAW ES-158-002

[P-61 bat RPB.ES158002 BYPASSES RPS IAW ES-158-002

[P-8] bat RB P. HYAlW-CLR DELETE HYD ATWS MG B HYD FLUID CTRL TCV (TIC-I 1016B) FAILED CLOSED

[P-71 DMF RD155017 PARTIAL SCRAM - DELETED

4. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:

a. "B' Service Air Compressor out of service for preventive maintenance. The system will not be returned to service this shift.

b. Decrease power to 90% for rod adjustments IAW OP-AD-338 (Attachment C) then call RE.

c. Prior to starting power reduction perform SO-155-006, QUARTERLY ARI MANUAL TRIP CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

d. Unit 2 is in MODE 1 at 100% power.

5. Setup board annunciators with tags indicating surveillance preparations.

6 reduced to 90% at l%/min.

Prepare a power change with Recirc (form OP-AD-338, Attachments A & C) indicating power to be

7.

and a surveillance coversheet.

8.

Prepare a copy of SO-I 55-006, QUARTERLY ARI MANUAL TRIP CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Make a copy of shift assignments.

Form STCP-QA-61ZA Rev. 0, (04/98)

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Page 14 Scenario PCOI 7-1 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04198)

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STCP-QA812A Rev. 0. (04/98)

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Page 16 Scenario PCOl7-102 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 the start of the 5-minute panel EVENT TIME 1

05 2

20 3

25 4

35 5

55 6

60 1

7 65 8

75 90 SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM walk down.

DESCRIPTION SURVEl LLANC E ACTIVITY POWER CHANGE HPCl SYSTEM CST LO LEVEL SWITCH FAILURE MG B HYD FLUID TEMP CONTROL VALVE FAIL CLOSED / RRP B TRIP TURBINE EHC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION / MSlV ISOLATION AWSlLEVEL POWER CONTROURPV CONTROL SBLC SQUIB VALVE FAIL TO FIRE HPCl INJECTION F006 AUTO LOGIC FAILURE TO OPEN TERMINATION CUE

Page 17 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

1,293 Brief

Description:

Surveillance Activity / Power Change / HPCl Sys CST Lo Level Switch Failure POSITION us PCOP us TIME NOTE STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reviews and authorizes performance of SO-1 55-006.

Performs SO-1 55-006.

The timing of the relays in the next step is normally done with 2 timing devices due to the complexity of the evolution. If the crew determines the timing to be UNSAT, roleplay the second timer and inform the crew that the timing was SAT at 28 seconds Place collar of ARI DIV 1 MAN TRIP HS-147103A1 to ARMED position.

Confirm ARI MAN TRIP DIV 1 SWITCH ARMED annunciator ALARMS.

Perform following in immediate succession:

Depress ARI DIV 1 MAN TRIP HS-147103A1 and Release.

AND Simultaneously Start timing 25 second time delay relay which inhibits system reset.

THEN Depress and Hold ARI DIV 1 RESET HS-147103A2 push button.

Confirm and Record Attachment A the following:

Confirm ARI TRIP DIV 1 annunciator ALARMS at Panel 1C651.

Stop timing relay when following occurs:

AND Confirm ARI TRIP DIV 1 annunciator CLEARED at Panel 1C651.

Release ARI DIV 1 RESET HS-147103A2 pushbutton.

Record ARI DIV 1 time delay for resetting system logic on Attachment A.

Place collar of ARI DIV 1 MAN TRIP HS-147103A1 to DISARMED position.

Confirm ARI MAN TRIP DIV 1 SWITCH ARMED annunciator CLEARED.

Independently Verify collar of ARI DIV 1 MAN TRIP HS-147103A1 is in DISARMED position.

ARI DIV 1 SCRAM AIR HDR VENT SV-14799 OPEN.

ARI DIV 1 SCRAM AIR HDR BLOCK SV-147101 CLOSED.

ARI DIV 1 SCRAM AIR HDR VENT SV-14799 CLOSED.

ARI DIV 1 SCRAM AIR HDR BLOCK SV-I47101 OPEN.

REPEAT for DIV 2

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Reviews and approves the Reactivity Manipulation Package.

Conduct a reactivity briefing in accordance with OP-AD-338.

Directs power reduction per GO-I 00-012.

From GO-1 00-01 2:

Decrease power using; Approved Reactivity Manipulation Package provided by Reactor Engineering.

Form STCP-QA-6lZA Rev. 0. (04198)

File No. R11-3 Page 17 of 23.

2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2

Page 18 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 PCOM PCOP us

• Denotes Critical Task Commences power decrease at 1 % per minute with Reactor Recirculation Flow Control in accordance with OP-AD-338 and GO-100-012.

Reports CST LO WATER LEVEL alarm.

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Refers to AR-I 14-EOI,. CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LO WATER LEVEL From AR-114-EOI:

Verifies PUMP SUCT FROM SUPP POOL HV-155-F042 OPENS.

Verifies PUMP SUCT FROM CST HV-155-FO04 CLOSES.

Checks CST A level on OC653, LR-O0812.(red pen still at 75%)

Determines/Reports CST A level is NOT low.

Dispatch Plant Operator to investigate.

Contacts Work Week Manager concerning CST level switches.

Refers to TS 3.3.5.1, Table Function 3.d, enters Condition A & D.

From TS 3.3.5.1:

One or more channels inoperable.

Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1 for the channel. Immediately Makes notifications IAW OP-AD-002, STANDARDS FOR SHIFT OPERATION.

Identifies a CR is required.

II 11 NOTES:

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STCP-QA-61%

Rev. 0. (04/98)

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Page 19 Scenario PCOI 7-1 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

1.2.3 Brief

Description:

Surveillance Activity I Power Change I HPCI Sys CST Lo Level Switch Failure INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

When reactor power is reduced -2%, insert HPCl system CST low level switch failure, Depres P-I:

[P-I] IMF RL02zE411 K17 CST LO WTR LEVEL LSLL-E41-1 NO02 FAILURE NOTE: Monitor sim diagram MW3 to report local CST A level from OC518A.

ROLE PLAY:

As Plant Operator sent to HPCI CST low level switches, wait -2 mins. and report there is no visible indication of either switch having a problem.

As Plant Operator sent to CST A, wait -2 mins. and report there is no visible leakage or loss of CST level.

.--,.__- As FIN Team/l&C sent to investigate the level switch problem, wait - 5 mins. and report LSLL-E41-1 NO02 has failed, it will take -6 hours to replace and calibrate the switch.

FOm STCP-QA-61%

Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 19 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rli-3

Page 20 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 TIME SCENARIO EVENT FORM L-STUDENT ACTIVITIES Event No:

4 Brief

Description:

MG B HYD Fluid Temp Control Valve Fail Closed I RRP 6 Trip

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POSITION PCOM us Recognizes/reports AR-102-CO5, RECIRC MG SET AIB BRG OIL FLUID DRIVE HI TEMP, and AR-102-C06, RECIRC MG B FLUID DRIVE OIL HI-LO TEMP alarms.

From AR-102-CO5 Operator Actions:

DETERMINE temperature element causing alarm by observing following on Recirc MG Panel 1 C614: Sets A&B Gen/Drive Motor Winding Temp TRS-B31-1 R625:

CHECK TIC1 1016A(B) for proper opergtion. Control in MANUAL if system allows or THROTTLEICONTROL oil temperature as necessary using TIC1 1016A(B)

BPV 1 10041 (1 10038)

I Attempts manual control of TIC-1 10016B; reports failure of TV-110016B.

I Manual or Automatic trip of " B Recirc pump.

I Recognizes/reports loss of " B Recirc pump.

I Depress B MG drive motor breaker stop pushbutton, HS-14001 B per the AR.

Performs actions of ON-I 64-002, LOSS OF REACTOR RECIRCULATION FLOW.

From ON-164-002:

Plot position on Power/Flow Map, Form NDAP-QA-0338-1 O.(Determines region 2)

Ensure thermal power REDUCED to < 70% rod line.

Comply with COLR Section 8.0 Limits in TRM.

Comply with Tech Spec LCOs 3.4.1.

For stopped pump, Place RECIRC A(B) MOV OL BYPS HV-143-F03lA(B)/FO32A(B) key switch to TEST position.

Close RECIRC PUMP A(B) DSCH HV-143-F031A(B).

Within 5 minutes, Open RECIRC PUMP A(B) DSCH HV-143-F031A(B).

AFTER 2 minutes, Place RECIRC A(B) MOV OL BYPS HV-143-F031A(B)/F032A(B) key switch to NORM position.

1 Directs Work Week Manager about failure of N-l10016B.

I Directs actions of ON-164-002.

I Contacts Reactor Engineer Refers to GO-I 00-01 2, POWER MANEUVERS and GO-I 00-009, SINGLE RECIRCULATION LOOP OPERATION.

Refers to T.S. 3.4.1, Recirculating Loops Operating and COLR section 8.0 in TRM section 3.2.

I From TS 3.4.1 One recirculation loop may be in operation provided the following limits are applied when the associated LCO is applicable with a THERMAL POWEWcore flow condition outside of Regions I and II of Figure 3.4.1.I.

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Page 21 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003

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Directs I&C to perform Flow-Bias Scram setpoint changes for Single Loop operation.

Makes notifications IAW OP-AD-002, STANDARDS FOR SHIFT OPERATIONS.

Jc Denotes Critical Task Form STCP-QABlZA Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 21 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 22 Scenario PCOI 7-1 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

4 Brief

Description:

MG B HYD Fluid Temp Control Valve Fail Closed I RRP B Trip INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

When power reduction is resumed, wait one minute then activate the failure of TIC-I 1016B: (Ensure this malfunction is entered prior to reaching -95% power, this will subsequently ensure the power level for ATWS actions later), Depress P-2:

[P-21 IMF AV04:TV11016B 0 MG B HYD FLUID CTRL TCV (TIC-I 1016B) FAIL CLOSED NOTES:

0 Refer to Simulator P&ID SW3 for TV-I 10016B status; refer to P&ID RR6 for "B" Recirc MG Set Oil temperatures.

0 RECIRC MG B BRG OR FLUID DRIVE OIL HIGH TEMP alarm (AR-102-C05, 140°F) takes -2 minutes to annunciate.

0 RECIRC MG B FLUID DRIVE OIL HIGH TEMP alarm (AR-102-C06, 190°F) takes -5 minutes to annunciate.

The MG Set trips at 210°F in -6 minutes.

If crew elects to take OP-164-001 Single Loop actions and is subsequently required to manually scram the reactor due to operation in Region I of the Power/Flow map, perform the next event via [P-31 as outlined on page 19 BEFORE the crew places the Mode Switch to Shutdown.

--e ROLE PLAY:

1. As RE, direct crew to insert control rods per OP-AD-338 Attachment E in CRC Book. You will run the core monitor and report results shortly.

2. If directed as NPO to investigate TV-I 1016B, wait -2 minutes and report that the valve is closed; the valve stem appears to be bent.

3. If directed to bypass TV-11016B by opening 110038, wait -2 minutes and report that the valve is stuck; you can not get the valve open.

4. If directed as FIN Team to investigate failure of TV-I1016B, wait -5 minutes and report that the valve is jammed on it's closed seat; it will take some time to free the valve. You have no time estimate for completion of repairs at this time.

5. As I&C directed to perform Flow-Bias Scram setpoint changes for Single Loop operation, acknowledge the order and perform no further actions.

Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 22 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 23 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 TIME SCENARIO EVENT FORM STUDENT ACTIVITIES Event No:

5, % 7 Brief

Description:

Turbine EHC System Malfunction / MSlV Isolation / ATWS / Squib Valve Failure NOTE 1 Directs initiating SLC and inhibiting ADS per LQ/Q-3.

Attempts to initiate SLC per OP-153-001, notifies US of SLC Squib valves failure.

POSITION NOTES:

PCOM NOTE 1 : This event is classified as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY due to ATWWSLC failure IAW PCOP us PCOP PCOP I Observes TCVs and BPVs open and SCRAM.

Recognizes failure of all control rods to fully insert and announces failure to scram to crew..

Performs ON-I 00-1 01, SCRAM:

0 0

0 Inserts SRMs and IRMs.

Tripslverifies tripped "A" Recirc Pump.

Place Mode Switch to S/D.

Arm and Depress manual scram pushbuttons.

I Maximize CRD flow I Recognizelreports MSlV closure.

I Initiates ARI.

Enters EO-100-1 02, RPV CONTROL and exits to EO-1 00-1 13, LEVEUPOWER CONTROL.

From OP-I 53-001 PLACE SBLC MANUAL INITIATION keylock control switch to START.

OBSERVE following pumps START OBSERVE following:

SBLC SQUIB READY A-B White indicating lights for both explosive valves EXTINGUISH indicating explosive valves fired (NOTE: Squib valves do not fire)

Observes NO FLOW indicated for SLC injection and reports to US RWCU INLET OB IS0 HV-144-F004 CLOSES.

Directs alternate SLC injection 1A W ES-150-002, Boron Injection Via RCIC.

(Feedback will not be evident during scenario, as this evolution takes more than 30 minutes to locally perform)

I Inhibits ADS as directed per OP-183-001.

• Denotes Critical Task 1

I1 Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04198)

Page 23 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 24 Scenario PCOI 7-1 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 c-INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

536, 7 Brief

Description:

Turbine EHC System Malfunction I MSIV Isolation I ATWS I Squib Valve Failure INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

1. When the actions for the loss of "B' Recirc pump are complete (pump tripped and single loop operations discussed), fail the in service EHC pressure transmitter, Depress P-3:

[P-31 IMF TC193016 130 TURBINE EHC PRESSURE/FLOW GAIN UNIT FAILURE (130%)

NOTE: Boron injection via RClC will not be done in this scenario.

ROLE PLAY:

1. As NPO dispatched to investigate SLC, wait -3 minutes and report that the SLC pumps are running and the discharge relief valves are chattering. Pump discharge pressure on the local gage is cycling between -1250 psig and 1450 psig.

2. As FUS, acknowledge direction to perform ES-150-002, Boron Injection Via RClC but take no further action. If the crew requests a status update role play as necessary since boron injection is not going to be permitted.

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STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04198)

Page 24 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

POSITION Page 25 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 TIME SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

6 8 Brief

Description:

ATWS / Level Power Control / RPV Control / HPCI F006 Auto Logic Failure

't M S

1. COP PCOP STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs RPVlevel lowered to e-60" but >-16In. per EO-I 00-1 13 Directs establishing RPV level target band of -60" to -1 10" Directs controlling RPV pressure between 800 and 11087 psig.

Directs PCOM to insert control rods IA W EO-100-113 Sht. 2, CONTROL ROD INSERTION.

Directs bypassing RSCS/RWM and manually inserting control rods.

Directs implementation of ES-758-002, RPS, ARI TRIP BYPASS Lowers and controls RPVlevel to G60" but >-161" using HPCI and RCIC injection systems.

Lowers RCIC saeed controller Reports HPCI Injection F006 failure to open.

Establishes RPV level in target band of -60" to -1 IO" using RClC & HPCI.

NOTE: This step is only critical if RClC injection systems are unable to keep level above -161 inches.

Manually OPENS HPCI Injection valve F006.

Lowers HPCI speed controller Maintains RPV pressure between 800 and 1087 psig using SRVs in alphabetical order per LQ/P6 of EOP-100-113 From EOP Stabilize press < 1087 psig using BPV's Augmenting press control with any:

SRV's Open SRV's using opening sequence a b c I

200 psig indicated on either ads N2 bottle header supp pool Ivl > 5' Place all SRV switches to off

• Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

1 F O n STCP-CIA-61%

Rev. 0, (04/98)

File No. R11-3 Page 25 of 23.

2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2

Page 26 Scenario PCOI 7-1 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 I

INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

698 Brief

Description:

ATWS I Level Power Control I RPV Control I HPCl F006 Auto Logic Failure INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

1. When the PCOM directs closing 146F034 to isolate the CRD Charging header, wait m2 minutes and Depress P-4:

[P-41 MRF RDI 5501 7 0 146F034 CRD CHARGING WTR IS0 VLV CLOSED ROLE PLAY:

As NPO directed to close CRD Charging Water Isolation Valve 146F034, report the valve has been closed.

INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

2. When the PCOM has manually inserted -10 control rods and RPV water level has been stabilized between -60 and -1 1 0, call the Unit Supervisor on the page and ask permission to open ARI breakers 1 D614006 & 1 D624016 IAW ES-158-002 wait -2 minutes, Depress P-5:

[P-5] bat RPB.DISABLARI OPENS ARI BKRS IAW ES-158-002 i-,

ROLE PLAY:

As FUS, report that the ARI breakers have been opened IAW ES-158-002. You are continuing with bypassing RPS at this time.

INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

3. After disabling ARI above, call the Unit Supervisor on the page and ask permission to bypass RPS trips IAW ES-158-002 wait -3 minutes and complete ES-158-002 Depress P-6:

[P-61 bat RPB.ESI58002 BYPASSES RPS IAW ES-158-002 ROLE PLAY:

As FUS, report that RPS has been bypassed and ES-158-002 is now completed.

Form STCP-QA-612 Rev. 0. (04198)

Page 26 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 27 Scenario PCOl7-I 02 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 PCOP SCENARIO EVENT FORM Restores RPV water level to +I 3 to +54.

Event No:

6 Brief

Description:

ATWS I Level Power Control I RPV Control POSITION APCOM TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Inserts control rods IAW EO-100-113 Sheet 2.

0 Bypasses RSCS/RW.

0 0

0 Resets scram.

0 Directs 146FO34 closed, as necessary.

Commences manual control rod insertion.

Drains SDV and inserts another scram.

Verifies and reports all control rods in.

us I

I Acknowledges all control rods inserted.

Exits EO-1 00-1 13 and re-enters EO-I 00-1 02.

Directs RPV water level be restored to +I 3 to +54 per EO-1 00-1 02..

Enters EO-1 00-1 03, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.

Directs Suppression Pool Cooling maximized.

~

~

PCOP Places both loops of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling per OP-149-005.

TERMINATION CUE:

All control rods are inserted and actions are in progress to restore RPV water level to +I 3 to +54.

j, Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

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STCP-QA-61%

Rev. 0, (04/98)

Page 27 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R l l - 3

Page 28 Scenario PCOl7-102 Rev. 0, 5/1/2003 L

INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

6 Brief

Description:

ATWS I Level Power Control I RPV Control INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

1. When the PCOM resets the scram, delete the ATWS malfunction, Depress P-7 and P-8:

[P-7] DMF RD155017 PARTIAL SCRAM - DELETED

[P-81 bat RBP.HYATW-CLR DELETES HYD ATWS NOTE: It takes -7 minutes for RPS AI/A2 (BI/B2) SCRAM DSCH VOL HI WTR LEVEL TRIP annunciators (AR-103/104-F02) on 1 C651 to clear. Monitor P&ID Display RD-5 for SDV status.

ROLE PLAY:

As necessary.

\\-.

TERMINATION CUE:

All control rods are inserted and actions are in progress to restore RPV water level to +13 to +54.

FOm STCP-QA-61ZA Rev. 0, (04/98)

Page 28 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No.

I( Facility: SSES Scenario No.: PCOI 7-1 03 Op-Test No.:

Malf. No.

Event Type*

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: IC-723 Unit 7 30% Power EOLd4) Unit 2 start-up in progress, - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from svnchronizinq to the wid.

1 2

3 Turnover: HPCl is out of service for repairs to oil pump breaker and oil channeout.(5) The system will not be returned to service this shift. Mechanical vacuum pump is out of service for a seal replacement. The system will not be returned to service this shift. Perform SO-054-AO3, QUARTERLY ESW FLOW VERIFICATION LOOP A. Maintenance is standing bv for vibration data.

N/A N

IMF RD7550043823 R

(NONEO20)5 IMF PM03:OP504A C

IMF DSl04001A (NONE 10 0)

~~~

C 5

6 7

IMF MV07:HV144F100 100 C

IMF CUI 61 007 100 4:OO M

IMF MV07:HVl44F106 (102) 100 IMF MVO9:HV144FOOI (004) 98 IMF RC150011 M

IMF BR05:1A10104 (204)

Event Description Perform A ESW Loop Surveillance Rod 38-23 drifts to position 38 (6)

A ESW pump trips during surveillance Loss of 1A ESS bus/Loss of RPS/Loss of CRD RWCU F007 (7) VLV FAILED-OPEN Unisolable break on RWCU line inside Secondary Containment Loss of all High pressure feed. (Leads to loss of adequate core cooling, requiring rapid depressurization)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG 1021 Draft Rev. 9 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 1 Susquehanna Facsimile

PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER SIMULATOR SCENARIO Scenario

Title:

NRC INITIAL LICENSE OPERATOR EXAMINATION Scenario Duration: 90 Minutes Scenario Number: PCOI 7-1 03 RevisionlDate:

Rev 0; 5/1/03 Course:

PC017, SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE PC018, REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE Operational Activities:

1 Surveillance Activity 2 Inoperable ESW Pump 3 Loss of I A ESS Bus 4 RWCU FOOI Failure to Close Prepared By:

Reviewed By:

Approved By:

5 Control Rod Drift 6 RWCU Break Inside Sec Containment 7 Loss of High Pressure Feed Instructor Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor Supervising ManagedShif? Supervisor Date Date Date Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 1 of 15 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 FileNo. R 1 1 3

Page 2 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 Form STCP-QA612A Rev. 0, (04/98)

Page 2 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. R I 1-3

Page 3 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario begins with the plant operating at 30% power. HPCl is out of service for governor repair work and the Mechanical Vacuum Pump is out of service for seal replacement. A quarterly surveillance test of the "A" ESW Loop is scheduled for this shift. Unit 2 start-up is in progress, -1 hour from synchronizing to the grid.

The first event will be a control rod will drift in to position 38. The crew will insert the rod to position 00.

Then a failure of the 1A ESW Pump when started for the "A" ESW Loop Flow Surveillance. The crew will address Technical Specifications and declare the pump inoperable as well as terminate the ESW Surveillance. A loss of ESS Bus 1A will occur as a result of breaker problems with the ESW Pump. The crew will respond to the loss of the bus per Off-Normal procedures and rack-out the failed ESW pump breaker; (the bus will not be recovered for the duration of the scenario). Other actions required by the crew will include restoring CRD and resetting the RPS half-scram.

Shortly after responding to the ESS Bus fault, an unisolable break will occur on the RWCU suction piping located in Secondary Containment. The break will cause one area of Secondary Containment to approach maximum safe temperature, requiring the crew to manually scram the reactor. Upon initiating the manual scram FWLC will fail, causing RPV water level to drop. When the Main Turbine trips, the Aux Buses will fail to transfer and cannot be manually transferred resulting in a loss of Condensate/Feedwater. Main Turbine BPVs will fail shut, requiring pressure control with SRVs. RClC will trip when initiated either automatically or manually, and will be unavailable for the rest of the transient. The only high pressure sources remaining, SLC and CRD, will not be able to keep up with the rate of inventory loss from the RWCU system break and from actuating SRVs for pressure control. When RPV level can no longer be maintained above TAF, the crew will perform Rapid Depressurization and restore RPV level with low pressure systems. Automatic ADS actuation at RPV level of -129 inches (time delay) will be blocked to force the crew to manually perform rapid depressurization.

L--

When the reactor has been rapidly depressurized, RPV level has been restored to +13" to 54" and actions are in progress to initiate Suppression Pool Cooling, the scenario will be terminated.

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Page 4 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 5 Scenario PCOI 7-1 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 SCENARIO OBJECTIVES 1

The SRO will:

1. Inform other shift members and plant management of changes in-plant status, potential plant problems or limitations.

2. Implement Loss of 4KV Bus (04.ON.011).

3. Implement Loss of CRD System Flow (55.0N.014).

4. Implement Scram (00.ON.018).

5. Implement RPV control (00.E0.026).

6. Implement Primary Containment Control (00.E0.027).

7. Implement Secondary Containment Control (00.E0.028).

8. Implement Rapid Depressurization (00.E0.030).

9. Ensure that required actions per Technical SpecificationslTechnical Requirements are met when a LCORRO is entered (OO.TS.003).

10. Shutdown the reactor when it is determined reactor safety is in jeopardy, or when operating parameters exceed any RPS setpoint and scram does not occur.

The ROs will:

1. Perform LPCl injection through heat exchanger (49.0P.013).

2. Perform manual operation of Core Spray (51.OP.OOl).

3. Perform maximizing CRD System flow (55.0P.001).

4. Perform ESW system manual startup (54.0P.004).

6. Perform Scram (00.ON.018).

7. Perform RPV Control (00.E0.026).

8. Perform Primary Containment Control (00.E0.027).

9. Perform Secondary Containment Control (00.E0.028).

I O. Perform Rapid Depressurization (00.E0.030).

5. Perform Loss of 4KV Bus (04.0N.01 I).

Form STCP-QA-61 2A Rev. 0. (04198)

Page 5 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 6

. Scenario PCOl7-103 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 6 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 7 Scenario PCOI 7-1 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 CRITICAL TASKS 13 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL Manually scram the reactor before any RWCU area temperature reaches Max Safe Temperature.

Safety Significance Steam leak in the Reactor Water Cleanup Room impacts the integrity of Secondary Containment. Failure of the Secondary Containment directly relates to the 1 OCFRIOO design criteria of dose to the General Public.

Consequences for Failure to perform Task Failure to take actions to mitigate the energy released to the secondary containment directly affects the radiation dose to the General Public.

SSES EOP Basis for:

SC/T-8 GO TO RPV CONTROL BEFORE ANY RB AREA TEMP REACHES MAX SAFE Areas monitored by steam leak detection (RWCU equipment, main steam line tunnel, HPCl and RClC pipe routing, HPCl equipment, and RClC equipment) are assigned a Max Safe temperature equal to the steam leak detection isolation setpoint. The setpoints are designed to detect a leakage rate below the leak rate corresponding to critical crack size for the smallest high energy line in the room which is part of the respective system. (FSA R 5.2.5.1.3).

Instrumentation and components required for isolation are qualified up to the isolation temperature setpoints.

(

Reference:

SSES-EPG SC/T-4.1)

BWROG EPGs/SAGs, Appendix B Basis The purpose of this guideline is to:

Protect equipment in the secondary containment, Limit radioactivity release to the secondary containment, and either:

Maintain secondary containment integrio, or Limit radioactivity release from the secondary containment.

-?*.--

Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0, (04/98)

Page 7 Of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 8 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 If temperatures in any one of the areas listed in Table SC-7 of the Secondary Containment Control guideline approach their maximum safe operating value, adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operability of equipment required to perform EPG actions can no longer be assured. The RPV Control Guideline must be entered to make certain the reactor is scrammed. Scramming the reactor reduces to decay heat levels the energy that the RPV may be discharging to the secondary containment. An explicit direction to scram the reactor is not provided in this step.

Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Simplex Fire Detection Alarms indicating High temperature in RWCU Area Increasing area radiation and alarm for RWCU Area Increasing Steam Leak Detection System temperatures and alarms Performance Criteria Manually Scram the Reactor prior to Exceeding Max Safe Temperature (prior to receiving RWCU area high temperature alarm RWCU LEAK DET IS0 LOGIC B HI TEMP (AR-100-A03)

Performance Feedback Initiating a reactor scram reduces the heat load that will be absorbed and released by the Secondary Containment Rods inserted Power lowering 11 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION Perform Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -161 Safety Significance The steam leak in the Reactor Water Cleanup Room impacts the ability to provide continued adequate core cooling based on inventory loss is greater than the high pressure makeup capability.

Consequences for Failure to perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions will result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.

SSES EOP Basis for:

DEPRESS RC/L-16 WHEN LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > -161 GO TO RAPID Form STCP-QA-61%

Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 8 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 9 Scenario PCOI 7-1 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 Rapid Depressurization is not initiated until RPV water level has dropped to -161" (TAF) because:

\\.-

0 Adequate core cooling exists so long as RPV water level remains above -161" (TAF).

0 The time required for RPV water level to decrease to -161" (TAF) can best be used to line up and start pumps, attempting to reverse the decreasing RPV water level trend before Rapid Depressurization is required to assure continued adequate core cooling.

(

Reference:

SSES-EPG C1-4 and second override before C3-1)

BWROG EPGsISAGs, Appendix B Basis The first paragraph of Step Cl-3 prescribes use of available injection systems and permits use of the alternate injection subsystems. If the decreasing RPV water level trend cannot be reversed by the time the level drops to the top of the active fuel, available alternate injection subsystems must be used. While the core is expected to remain adequately cooled as long as RPV water level remains above the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level, permitting the core to become partially uncovered when it can be prevented is undesirable unless specific benefits can be gained. If available injection sources have not been sufficient to reverse the decreasing RPV water level trend before level drops to the top of the active fuel, it is unlikely that they will be sufficient after level drops below the top of the active fuel. Delaying use of the alternate injection subsystems and permitting water level to drop below the top of the active fuel are therefore unwarranted. In addition, alternate injection subsystem pumps must be started to support evaluations of available makeup capacity required in subsequent steps.

IndicationsICues for Event Requiring Critical Task Reactor water level slowly trending downward.

Performance Criteria Perform a Rapid Depressurization per EO-I 00-1 12 when water level reaches the TAF -1 61" as read on the Fuel Zone Instrument.

Manually open all 6 ADS valves Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise on the Fuel Zone and Wide Range level instruments.

Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure and rising reactor water level.

Denotes Simulator Team Critical Task F

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STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 9 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

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Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 10 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 11 Scenario PCOI 7-1 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 SCENARIO REFERENCES

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY-INOPERABLE ESW PUMP SO-054-001 AR-Ol6-AI0 QUARTERLY ESW FLOW VERIFICATION LOOP A, REV. 2 ESW PUMP A, 8, C, D TRIP, REV. 35 TS 3.7.2 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM, AMENDMENT 178 NDAP-QA-702ACTION REQUEST AND CONDITION REPORT PROCESS, REV. 12 OP-AD-002 STANDARDS FOR SHIFT OPERATIONS, REV. 9 LOSS OF ESS BUS I A TS 3.8.7 TS 3.6.1.3 PCIVs, AMENDMENT 195 ON-104-201 LOSS OF ESS BUS IA, REV. 5 DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS OPERATING, AMENDMENT 178 LOSS OF CRD/LOSS OF RPS/RWCU FOOI FAILURE ON-155-007 ON-158-001 LOSS OF CRD SYSTEM FLOW, REV. 16 LOSS OF RPS, REV. 6 ROD DRIFT AR-104-H05 ROD DRIFT, REV. 17 ON-I 55-001 CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS, REV. 18 RWCU BREAK INSIDE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AR-101-A02 AR-101-AO3 AR-101-BO2 AR-101-802 EO-I 00-1 04 ON-100-101 SCRAM, REV. 9 RWCU LEAK DET IS0 LOGIC A HI TEMP, REV. 29 RWCU LEAK DET IS0 LOGIC B HI TEMP, REV. 29 RWCU LEAK DET IS0 LOGIC A HI LEAKAGE, REV. 29 RWCU LEAK DET IS0 LOGIC B HI LEAKAGE, REV. 29 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 1 LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE FEED EO-100-102 RPV CONTROL, REV. I LOSS OF ADEQUATE CORE COOLING EO-100-1 12 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION, REV. 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL EO-I 00-1 03 OP-149-005 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 2 RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING, REV. 20 OTHER BWROG SIMULATOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINE, TEMPLATES SC-1 AND RPV-1 F

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STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0, (04/98)

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11 F

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Page 12 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 13 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 MALFS 12 :I2 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS REMFS OVRDS TRIGS 8

2:2 5

I. Set-up the simulator for the scenario by performing the following:

a.

b.

Initialize the simulator to IC-I 8 (1 00% Power, EOL).

Close and status control pink tag the HPCl FOO2 and F003 valves, place the HPCl controller in MAN set at 0%. Also, depressurize the steam supply header by opening the F054, steam trap bypass; then reclose the valve.

2. Take a snapshot to a saved IC at 30% Power

3. Initialize the simulator to IC-I36

4. Type restorepref YPP.PCO17-I 03; verify the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments.

Verify the Environment Window:

TRG E l BAAA26409 EVENT TRIGGER: MODE SWITCH TO SHUTDOWN TRG E l = IMF FW145011 FWLC MASTER CTLR FAILS LOW WHEN E l TRUE TRG E l = IMF TC193001 MAIN TURBINE TRIP WHEN E l TRUE TRG E2 GAAA00214 EVENT TRIGGER: RClC TURBINE SPEED >500 RPM TRG E2 = IMF RC150011 RClC TURBINE TRIP WHEN E2 TRUE TRG E3 CAAA00706 EVENT TRIGGER: "A" ESW PUMP START SWITCH DEPRESSED TRG E3 = IMF PM03:OP504A "A" ESW PUMP TRIP WHEN E3 TRUE TRG E3 = IMF DSl04001A (NONE I O 0) ESS 1A LOCKOUT WHEN E3 TRUE, 10 SEC. TD TRG E4 RPE.MSSHDWN Event Trigger Mode Switch to shutdown TRG E4 = MMF CUI61007 100 2:OO RWCU leak increase to 100%

TRG E4 = MMF TR02:RITl3708 64.2 2:OO 32.1 Area Radiation levels increase bat HPCIOOS SIMULATES HPCl 00s bat YPB.EVAL505A REMOVES MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMP FOR MAINTENANCE IMF CN03:LICC32R600 0 FWLC MASTER CONTROLLER FAILURE IN MAN IMF TC193025 ALL TURBINE BPVs FAIL CLOSED IMF MV09:HV144F001 98 RWCU INLET IB IS0 VALVE BINDING IMF MV09:HV144F004 98 RWCU INLET OB IS0 VALVE BINDING IMF BR05:lAl0104 TIE BUS TO 11A BKR FAILS AS-IS IMF BR05:lAl0204 TIE BUS TO 1 I B BKR FAILS AS-IS IMF MV07:HVI44F100 I00 RWCU FIOO VLV FAILED-OPEN IMF MV07:HV144Fl06 100 RWCU F106 VLV FAILED-OPEN IMF MV07:HVl44Fl02 I00 RWCU F102 VLV FAILED-OPEN IMF AD183001 Inhibit ADS Continued on next page:

Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 13 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rl l-3

Page 14 Scenario PCOI 7-1 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Cont.)

[P-I] MRF PC125001 OPEN IA - CIG 90# HEADER CROSS-TIE VLVS OPEN

[P-2] IMF RD1550043823 (NONE 0 20) 5

[P-3] MRF RM179024

[PA] MRF RM179026 ROD 3823 DRIFT TO POS. 38 A MSL RAD MON RESET C MSL RAD MON RESET

[P-5] MRF PMl40P504A OUT A ESW PUMP BKR 1A20108 RACKED-OUT

[P-61 IMF CUI61007 0.25 1O:OO RWCU SUCTION PIPING BREAK OUTSIDE CTMT

[P-71 IMF TR02:RlTl3708 32.1 1O:OO 1.997 RWCU PUMP ACCESS ARM INCREASES

5. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:

a.

HPCl is out of service for repairs to oil pump breaker and lube oil changeout. The system will not be returned to service this shift.

b.

Mechanical Vacuum Pump is out of service for a seal replacement. The system will not be returned to service this shift.

c.

Perform SO-054-A03, QUARTERLY ESW FLOW VERIFICATION LOOP A. Maintenance is standing by for vibration data. The prejob brief for Ops and Maintenance personnel has been completed.

Unit 2 is at 100%

d.

6. Prepare an LCO Sheet: HPCl has been out of service for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to repair a governor control-oil leak.

7. Copy the procedure SO-054-AO3, QUARTERLY ESW FLOW VERIFICATION LOOP A and prepare a surveillance covers heet.

8. Prepare Startup Rod sequence Rod coupling surveillance and GO marked up to appropriate portion of the startup.

9. Make a copy of shift assignments.

10. Place the Simulator in RUN.

Form STCP-QA-61%

Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 14 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 15 Scenario PCOI 7-1 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM Initial Conditions: Initialize the simulator to IC-136. Ensure the Preference File is executed Der the Soecial Instructions Sheet. Assinn Shift positions. Direct the Crew to benin a five minute panel walk down.

• SI--

Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0, (04/98)

Page 15 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 DESCRIPTION SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY ROD DRIFT INOPERABLE ESW PUMP LOSS OF 1A ESS BUS / LOSS OF CRD / LOSS OF RPS RWCU Fool FAILURE RWCU BREAK INSIDE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE FEED / LOSS OF ADEQUATE CORE COOLING TERMINATION CUE File No. Rll-3

Page 16 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 POSITION TIME PCOP SCENARIO EVENT FORM L-STUDENT ACTIVITIES Commences SO-054-AO3, QUARTERLY ESW FLOW VERIFICATION LOOP A.

Event No:

1,2,3,4,5 Brief

Description:

Surveillance Activity I Rod Drift In INOP ESW Pump I Loss of 1A ESS Bus I Loss of CRD Loss of RPS I RWCU Fool Failure us PCOM Y

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Directs performance of ON-1 55-001, CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS.

Depress Display Rods Drifting button for Full Core Display.

Determines rod 38-23 is drifting.

Depress Display Scram Valves Open button for Full Core Display.

Determines scram valves are not open.

Selects rod 38-23 on RMCS rod select matrix.

us PCOP us PCOP PCOM PCOM I

I Reports rod drift alarm.

Contacts Reactor Engineering.

Continues SO-054-A03, QUARTERLY ESW FLOW VERIFICATION LOOP A.

Starts "A" ESW pump, responds to AR-OI6-AlO ESW PUMPS A,B,C,D TRIP annunciator.

Directs NPO to investigate "A" ESW Pump and breaker.

Directs termination of SO-054-A03.

Contacts Work Week Manager about "A" ESW Pump trip.

Checks Technical Specifications, declares 7 day LCO IAW T.S. 3.7.2 C-1 for loss of "A" ESW pump.

Recognizesheports loss of 1A ESS Bus.

Reports half-scram,, Due to 1A ESS bus loss and resulting loss of RPS I

I Loss of 'A" CRD DumD due to 1A bus loss I

I I

I Reports rod 38-23 position.

I I Inserts rod 38-23 to position 00.

Failure of RWCU Fool valve to fully close (binding) during loss of RPS..

Form STCP-QA-612.4 Rev. 0, (04198)

Page 16 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R1i-3

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• Denotes Critical Task Page 17 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 Directs performance of ON-1 04-201, LOSS OF ESS BUS 1A.

Key Points:

Restore Containment Instrument Gas Restore RPS Restore CRD Directs performance of ON-I 58-001, LOSS OF RPS.

Key Points:

Transfer to alternate Restore Recirc pump cooling Reset MSlV Rad monitors, reset half scram.

Directs performance of ON-I 55-007, LOSS OF CRD SYSTEM FLOW.

Key Points:

Start B CRD pump.

Refers to T.S. 3.8.7 A-1, declares 8-hour LCO for loss of ESS Bus 1A. May also refer to T.S. 3.6.1.3 for containment isolation valve (Fool ) failure.

Allow candidate sufficient time to address the Tech Specs before proceeding to the next event NOTES:

F o

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STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0, (04/98)

Page 17 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R11-3

Page 18 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 i_-

INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

1,2, 3,495 Brief

Description:

Surveillance Activity I Rod Drift InllNOP ESW Pump I Loss of 1A ESS Bus I Loss of CRD Loss of RPS I RWCU FOOI Failure INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

1. As soon as ESW surveillance has begun and BEFORE crew starts "A" ESW pump insert control rod 38-23 drift in, Depress P-2:

[P-2] IMF RD1550043823 (NONE 0 20) 5 ROD 38-23 DRIFT IN TO POS 38 When the crew starts "A" ESW pump for SO-054-AO3, verify the Event Triggers activate to cause:

2. An instantaneous overcurrent trip of "A" ESW pump, AND 10 sec. later

3.

A lockout-trip of 1A ESS Bus.

ROLE PLAY:

1. If contacted as NPO to investigate accumulator 38-23 report after appropriate time delay that there is nothing obvious at the HCU.

2. As Reactor Engineer acknowledge rod 38-23 drift and insertion, reply that you will run a Core Monitor look at the control rod pattern and come to the control room in a few moments.

3.

If spray pond level is requested, report level as 678' 6".

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4. When directed as AS0 to investigate "A" ESW Pump, wait -1 min. and report that the pump is not running; it otherwise appears to be normal.

5. When directed as NPO to investigate "A" ESW Pump breaker 1A20108, wait -2 mins. and report that the breaker has a 50/51 device flag (instantaneous overcurrent). You also smell an burnt odor in the vicinity of the breaker.

6. As NPO dispatched to investigate 1A ESS Bus, report that both the Primary and Backup Lockout Relays (86A-201 and 86A1-201), are tripped. If asked to reset the lockouts, report that they will not reset.

As FIN Team dispatched to'investigate "A" ESW Pump and 1A ESS Bus, wait -3 mins. and report that breaker lA20108 for the "A" ESW Pump has failed, which was the cause for the ESS Bus 1A Lockout trip. The ESS Bus will require extensive investigation and testing prior to attempting re-energization. Also, request ESW PUMP 1 A 4.1 6kv breaker racked out.

FODT STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04198)

Page 18 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. R I 1-3

Page 19 Scenario PCOl7-103 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 TIME SCENARIO EVENT FORM STUDENT ACTIVITIES Event No:

1,2333 435 Brief

Description:

Surveillance Activity / INOP ESW Pump / Loss of 1A ESS Bus / Loss of CRD Loss of RPS / RWCU FOOlFailure / Rod Drift In us I

I Directs cross-tying Instrument Air and the CIG 90# Header.

Evaluator Note:

POSITION PCOP STAs would normally be available to support the monitoring functions for the ESW pumps Dispatches NPO to cross-tie IA and the CIG 90# Header.

Starts 2 ESW Pumps to support auto start of A Diesel Generator.

Starts " B CRD pump, restores CRD system IAW ON-1 55-007, LOSS OF CRD SYSTEM FLOW.

PCOM I

I Transfers RPS "A" to ALT IAW ON-1 58-001 I Directs resetting Main Steam Line Rad monitors I Resets half scram when Main Steam Line Monitors reset.

• Denotes Critical Task Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 19 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 20 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 5-INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

1,293, 495 Brief

Description:

Surveillance Activity / INOP ESW Pump / Loss of 1A ESS Bus / Loss of CRD Loss of RPS I RWCU FOOlFailure I INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

1. When directed to cross-tie IA and the CIG 90# header, wait -2 mins. and Depress P-I:

[P-I] MRF PC125001 OPEN IA - CIG 90# HEADER CROSS-TIE VLVS OPEN ROLE PLAY:

As NPO directed to cross-tie IA and CIG, report valves 126167 and 126172 are open and the headers have been cross-tied.

3. When directed to reset MSL rad monitors, wait - 2 mins. and Depress P-3 and P-4:

[P3] MRF RM179024 RESET A MSL RAD MON RESET

[PA] MRF RM179026 RESET C MSL RAD MON RESET ROLE PLAY:

As NPO directed to reset MSL rad monitor A & C, call on the plant page and report MSL rad monitors A & C are reset.

NOTE:

1. If directed to reset other Area and Process Rad Monitors, type: RFI RM and reset Rad Monitors as directed.

2. Recovery of RPS Bus A should be allowed to continue until cooling is restored to both RRPs.

Form STCP-QA-612A Page 20 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 Rev. 0. (04/98)

File No. R11-3

Page 21 Scenario PCOl7-103 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 POSITION SCENARIO EVENT FORM TIME STUDENT ACTlVlTl ES

~~

l P C 0 P Dispatches NPO to rack-out "A" ESW Pump breaker 1A20108.

ir us I

PCOM us I Directs reviewing ON-I 04-201, LOSS OF ESS BUS 1 A for impact of loss of ESS bus

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

Reviews ATTACHMENTS B, D, and E of ON-1 04-201 and checks equipment availability for crew during sustained power loss.

Recognizes/reports RWCU Fool valve indication lost.

Dispatches NPO to investigate RWCU Fool valve and MOV breaker 19236053.

Contacts Work Week Manager concerning RWCU Fool.

I I

jr Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 21 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rl l-3

Page 22 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 L-INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

192,354, 5 Brief

Description:

Surveillance Activity I INOP ESW Pump I Loss of I A ESS Bus I Loss of CRD Loss of RPS I RWCU F001Failure I Rod Drift In INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

When directed to rack-out breaker 1,420108, wait -2 mins. and Depress P-5:

[P-5] MRF PM140P504A OUT A ESW PUMP BKR 1A20108 RACKED-OUT ROLE PLAY:

1. As NPO directed to rack-out breaker 1A20108, report that the breaker is racked-out.

FOn STCP-QA412A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 22 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 23 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 POSITION TIME SCENARIO EVENT FORM

\\

Event No:

6 Brief

Description:

RWCU Break Inside Sec Containment STUDENT ACTIVITIES

.~

I I

PCOM 1

Recognizes/reports indications of RWCU system leak.

Fire Detection Alarm Area Radiation Alarm RWCU area temperatures increasing.

Dispatch operator to investigate Evacuates area and notifies Health Physics.

us Enters EO-1 00-1 04, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.

Directs starting of ESW, and all Room Coolers.

Directs commencing reactor shutdown due to area temps. increasing and approaching max normal.

• us Enters EO-700-702 RPV CONTROL and directs manual scram before any RWCU temperature reaches max safe.(Prior to receiving RWCU LEAK DET IS0 LOGlC B HI TEMP - AR-700-AO3 alarm) kPCOM Manually scrams reactor before any RWCU temperature reaches max safe.

Verities Rods inserted and Power lowering I NOTE Crew may have time to perform scam imminent actions, however this will not prevent reaching max safe temperature and the need to scram the reactor.

PCOP Attempts to transfer house loads to Aux Buses; reports failure of Tie Bus to 1 ?A and 11 B breakers.

When RWCU receives isolation signal due to high temperature, PCOM reports RWCU has failed to isolate; reports loss of indication on RWCU F004 valve.

3r Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

I NOTE 1 : This event is classified as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on RWCU leak IAW EP-PS-100-6, EAL 18.3.

FOWI STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04198)

Page 23 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rl l -3

Page 24 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

6 Brief

Description:

RWCU Break Inside Sec Containment INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

1. -1 min. after reporting breaker lA201108 has been racked out, insert an unisolable RWCU leak, Depress P-6 and P-7:

[P-6] IMF CU161007.25-1O:OO RWCU SUCTION PIPING BREAK OUTSIDE CTMT

[P-71 IMF TR02:RlTl3708 32.1 1O:OO 1.997 RAMPS UP RWCU PUMP AREA RADS

2. When Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN, verify event triggers activate to cause the following:

0 0

FWLC Master Controller output fails low, resulting in RPV level shrinking to -40 to -50" The Main Turbine trips, causing the Aux Buses to subsequently de-energize.

ROLE PLAY:

1. As NPO directed to investigate RWCU Fool, wait -2 mins. and report that breaker 18236053 is tripped-open. If asked to resetheclose the breaker, report that it immediately tripped-open again.

2. As NPO directed to investigate RWCU F004, wait -2 mins. and report that breaker ID274042 is tripped-open. If asked to resetheclose the breaker, report that it immediately tripped-open again.

3. As FIN Team dispatched to investigate the RWCU FOOl/F004 problems, wait -3 mins. and report that the breakers functioned properly; the problem may be with the associated valve's motor-operator.

4.

F o

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STCP-QA-GI2A Rev. 0. (04198)

Page 24 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rli-3

Page 25 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 PCOM SCENARIO EVENT FORM

-L Event No:

7 Brief

Description:

Loss of High Pressure Feed I Loss of Adequate Core Cooling Reports failure of FWLC Master Controller output.

Reports loss of Feedwater/Condensate Pumps when Turbine trips.

PCOP us PCOM/P I

I

~~~

Maximizes CRD and initiates SLC if directed.

Directs RHR and CS systems started and lined-up for injection.

Initiates both loops of CS and RHR.

NOTE With Automatic ADS actuation blocked, it is possible for the crew to recognize this failure and commence the Rapid depressurization based on this automatic actuation failure. This will also accomplish the critical task POSITION I TIME I PCOM/P STUDENT ACTIVITIES Informs US that RPV level has reached -1 61.

us I

I Directs RPV water level restored to +13 to +54 with RCIC.

Contacts Work Week Manager concerning Aux Buses failing to transfer.

PCOP I

I Reports RClC tripped when started.

~~

Dispatches NPO to investigate RClC trip.

I Directs RPV level maintained +13 to -161 with CRD/SLC.

I Contacts Work Week Manager concerning RCIC.

-k Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04198)

Page 25 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 26 Scenario PCOl7-103 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 i-INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

7 Brief

Description:

Loss of High Pressure Feed I Loss of Adequate Core Cooling INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

None.

ROLE PLAY:

1. As FIN Team dispatched to investigate the Aux Buses, wait -3 mins. and report that the Transfer logic has failed. It will take time to troubleshoot the exact cause for the failure. You will call back when you have a better idea of repair strategy and time estimates.

2. As NPO directed to investigate the RClC trip, wait -2 mins. and report that the RClC overspeed trip mechanism is tripped and the linkage is bent. You cannot reset the overspeed trip.

Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0. (04/98)

Page 26 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 27 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 POSITION TIME

• us SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:

7 Brief

Description:

Loss of High Pressure Feed I Loss of Adequate Core Cooling STUDENT ACTIVITIES Performs Rapid Depressurization when RPVlevel drops to -161 ".

Enters EO-100-112, RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION.

Verifies Suppression Pool level >5'.

Directs Rapid Depressurization by opening 6 ADS valves.

PCOM/P Places both loops of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling IAW OP-149-005, RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING.

TERMINATION CUE:

• PCOIwP Initiates Rapid Depressurization by opening 6 ADS valves.

Verify ADS valves are open using red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure and rising reactor water level.

us I Directs restoring RPV level to +13" to +54" with RHR and CS.

PCOM/P I Restores RPV level to +13" to +W with RHR and CS.

~

~~

I Enters EO-100-103 due to high Suppression Pool temperature.

I Directs maximizing Suppression Pool Cooling.

EVALUATOR CUE Have the SRO perform the E-Plan classification Admin JPM here.

• Denotes Critical Task NOTES:

F O n STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0, (04/98)

Page 27 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3

Page 28 Scenario PCOl7-I 03 Rev. 0, 5/1/03 L

INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:

7 Brief

Description:

Loss of High Pressure Feed / Loss of Adequate Core Cooling INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:

None.

ROLE PLAY:

As necessary.

TERMINATION CUE:

Rapid Depressurization has been completed, RPV level has been restored to +13 to +W, and actions are in progress to initiate Suppression Pool Cooling.

Form STCP-QA-612A Rev. 0, (04/98)

Page 28 of 23 2003 NRC Exam Rev. 2 File No. Rll-3