ML032320167

Draft/Final - Section C Operating

ML032320167
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek  (NPF-057)
Issue date:	06/25/2003
From:	Reid J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-354/03-302, 50-354/OL-03-302
Download: ML032320167 (90)

Text

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE L-SCENARIO TITLE:

NRC EXAM SCENARIO SCENARIO NUMBER:

I EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION:

REVISION NUMBER:

PROGRAM:

1 Hour L.O. REQUAL r\\

INITIAL LICENSE

-1 OTHER REVISION

SUMMARY

NRC SCENARIO I

.DOC

1.

OBJECTIVE( S) :

Enabling Objectives A.

The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crew's ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions.

(Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an 'I *.")

'v II.

MAJOR EVENTS:

A.

Alternate RACS pumps B.

Reactor Building isolation C.

D.

E.

F.

HPCl auto start failure Loss of station power transformer T-4 and 1 OAI 10 Recirculation pump high vibrations and subsequent trip LOCA with Loss of Feedwater 111.

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario begins at 70% Rx power with a Reactor startup in progress. RClC is unavailable due a system maintenance outage. After alternating RACS pumps, a spurious isolation of RBVS occurs (HD-9414 B closure) requiring FRVS to be placed in service to maintainhestore Rx building AP. Shortly after reactor building AP is restored, station power transformer T-4 and 7.2KV bus 10Al 10 trip and lockout resulting in a loss of the " A RR pump and other 7.2KV loads. After conditions have stabilized, high vibrations on the "B" RR pump occur requiring the crew to secure the pump and initiate a manual Rx scram. If the crew delays in securing the 'B' Recirc pump the high vibration condition will cause the pump to trip. When the scram is initiated, a small LOCA occurs coincident with a trip of the "B" and "C" primary condensate pumps. HPCl fails to auto initiate at 1.68 psig and must be manually initiated to provide sufficient makeup capacity to maintain RPV water level above -1 90".

The scenario may be terminated when the crew has stabilized RPV water level, and containment parameters are improving.

c-IV.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

INITIAL IC:

Initialize the simulator to 74% power IC; MOL, 100% rod line Insert Groups 10A and 1OC to 00.

Place Recirculation pumps in Master Manual L'

Raise power to approximately 70%(736 Mwe), and ensure PCP runback unarmed.

NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC Page 2 of 17 Rev.: 06

PREP FOR TRAINING: (Le., computer set points, procedures, bevel covers)

I Initial I Description I. Mark up HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 is complete through step 5.4.20, and step 5.4.22.

2. WCD for RClC system outage. Close RClC CST suction and secure RClC Jockey pump.

3. COMPLETE Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist" of v

NC.TQ-DG.ZZ-O002(Z).

EVENT TRIGGERS:

I lnitial I Description

1. EVENT ACTION: et-array(2) >= 1 && rrlwr <= 12.5 COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

2. EVENT ACTION: zcrpsudn MALFUNCTION

SUMMARY

I I

I I

I I

lnifial I Description 1 Delay I Ramp I RemotelEvent I Initial I Final

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

7.

8.

9.

v-

6.

HPOI HPCl System Auto Start Failure ED02T4 T4 Station Power Transformer Failure ED03 loss of 7.2kv bus 1 OAl 10 RR26B Recirc Pump B high vibrations RR13B Recirc pump BP201 motor bearing failure FWOI B Primary Condensate Pump B Trip FWOIC Primary Condensate Pump C Trip RR31A2 Variable LOCA i-NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC Page 3 of 17 300 60 Preinsert 3/None 3/None 3/None 4/None None/l None11 Nonell 3

Rev.: 06

REMOTEIF I ELD FU NCTl ON SUM MARY:

I I

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I I

lnitial I Description 1 Delay I Ramp I RemoteIEvent 1 Initial I Final Rack

1. ET015 RClC INBRD STEAM IS0 F007 Preinsert Close Rack

2. ET016 RClC INBRD STEAM BYP IS0 F076 Preinsert Close Rack

3. ET017 RClC OUTBRD STEAM IS0 F008 Preinsert Close

4. RC12 HV-F059 Steam Exhaust lsol Vlv Preinsert TAGGED

5. HVOI Reactor Building Exhaust Fan A Hand Switch 2INone STOP

6. HV02 Reactor Building Exhaust Fan B Hand Switch 2INone STOP

7. HV03 Reactor Building Exhaust Fan C Hand Switch 2/None STOP

8. HV04 Reactor Building Supply Fan A Hand Switch 2lNone STOP

9. HV05 Reactor Building Supply Fan B Hand Switch 2/None STOP I O. HV06 Reactor Building Supply Fan C Hand Switch 2lNone STOP v -

I/O OVERRIDE

SUMMARY

I I

I I

I I

Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I RemotelEvent I Initial I Final

1.

2.

3.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

I O.

4.

.v. -

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

b.

1A175 E OVDl HD-9414B open-outbd exh-RB 1A175 F OVDl HD-9414B close-outbd exh-RB 9S12 A OVLO HV-F012 overload power/fail 9S13 B OVLO HV-F012 open indicator 9S36 A OVLO AP-HV-FOIO overload power/fail 9837 B OVLO AP-HV-FOIO closed indication 9DS32 B OP219 PUMP stopped indication 9827 A OP220 PUMP overload power/fail 9DS31 B OP220 PUMP stopped indication 9S50 A OVDl BP228 OVLD/PWR FAIL 9S30 B OVDl OP219 STOP 9829 A OVLO OP219 OVLDIPWR FAIL 9S13 C OVLO HV-F012 OPEN 9843 B OVLO HV-F031 CLOSED 9842 B OVLO HV-F031 OPF 9DS39 B BP228 STOPPED 9DS33 B HV-F059 CLOSED 9S31 A HV-F059 overload power/fail 9DS26 B HV-F025 CLOSED 9DS27 B HV-F026 CLOSED 60 l/None 60 I/None P re i nse rt Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert P reinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert OFF ON ON OFF ON OFF OFF ON OFF ON OFF ON OFF OFF ON OFF OFF ON OFF OFF NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC Page 4 of 17 Rev.: 06

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent Response 0

CRS directs alternating RACS pumps to A and B pumps in service in accordance with HC. OP-SO. ED-000 1.

Comments NOTE: Report as EO, 0

PO transfers RACS pumps in RACS Pump C normal on start.

by:

accordance with CRS directions

- Ensures that RACS PMP 1AP209 BKR 52-41011 CLOSED is on. (10C650E)

AUXILIARIES COOLING PUMP A START PB (10C651A), and observes that START comes on.

- Observes AI-6460 REACTOR AUXILIARIES COOLING PUMP A MOT AMPS settles at c I80 amps and is approximately the same as the other I/S RACS pumps' motor amps.

- Presses the REACTOR Crew recognizes RBVS problem OHA E6-C5 and EI-F5 CRlDS digital alarms:

D3960 RBVS EXH RMT PNL C382 D3961 RBVS SPLY RMT PNL C382 B7164 RX BLDG DlFF PRESS and informs CRS.

NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC 0

Crew recognizes loss of RBVS via Rx bldg AP decreasing on SPDS and informs CRS.

Page 5 of 17 Rev.: 06

Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Report as EO after an appropriate time delay that low flow alarms are present for all RBVS fans. Report that all RBVS fans have tripped. ACKNOWLEDGE E6-C5, using Remote Function.

If dispatched, report as RBEO report that damper HD-9414B is shut and there are no indications of any problems.

Comments If requested as RBEO, secure RBVS by inserting RT-2 NOTE:

Tech Spec 3.6.5.1 may not be referenced if Rx bldg AP is maintainedhestored negative.

NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC 0

CRS directs actions in accordance with AB.CONT-003:

- Verify dampers HD-9414NB and HD-937OA/B are open.

0 PO determines that HD9414B is closed and informs the CRS.

0 RO/PO dispatches EO to investigate problem with RBVS.

RO/PO dispatches RBEO to check damper HD-94148 and FRVS ready for start.

0 CRS directs FRVS placed in service IAW AB-CONT-003.

0 RO/PO places FRVS in service in accordance with CRS direction to maintain Rx bldg AP.

- Start 1 FRVS Vent Fan

- Remove the Reactor Building Ventilation System from service

- Closes the following dampers

+ HD9370A

+ HD9414A

+ HD9370B Fans

- Start 4 FRVS Recirculation 0

OS/CRS evaluates Tech Specs Sections 3.6.5.1 & 3.6.5.2 for applicability; determines 3.6.5.1 and 3.6.5.2 are applicable.

0 CRS directs actions to investigate cause of damper H D-94 1 4B closure.

Page 6 of 17 Rev.: 06

Event i Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response If I&C is dispatched, 0

RO/PO dispatches maintenance Repod as lac that there is personnel to determine cause of a logic trip output to damper HD-9414B closure IAW damper HD-9414B and it CRS direction.

will take a few hours to investigate. Inform the CRS a troubleshooting plan will be developed and submitted before work is commenced.

b Comments Crew recognizes electrical ma Ifu nctions :

- OHA E3-A1, E3-A2, E3-B1, E3-Cl I

- Informs CRS of loss of 1OA and transfer of all other applicable loads to 1 BX501 1BX502, and lBX503.

and I10 I

0 RO/PO recognizes/reports loss of the following to the CRS:

- TB chiller AKI 1 1

- Air compressor 10K107

- APCP

- ASCP

- A RR pump and MG set 0

CRS implements:

- AB.RPV-002, conditions A or B, and C

- AB.RPV-003 condition A to investigate switchgear, IAW CRS direction.

As yard operator report 0

RO/PO dispatches yard operator lockout on station power transformer T-4.

switchyard/ transformer problems If dispatched, report as TBEO 1 OAl10 differential current lockout is tripped.

L, NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC Page 7 of 17 Rev.: 06

Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantIStudent Response 0

CRS directs actions IAW AB. RPV-003:

- Insert Control Rods to clear APRM Upscale Alarms.

- Ensure that the Recirc MG Drive Motor Breaker has TRIPPED for the tripped Pump approximately 5 minutes, and then re-open.

+ DL.ZZ-0026 Att. 3n (as

- Close HV-F031A for

- Implement the following:

required)

+ DL.ZZ-0026Att. 3~

- Direct the Reactor Engineer to develop a Rod Sequence to achieve an 80% Rod Line

- Implement 10-6 requirements Comments for Single Loop operations.

RO inserts control rods per CRS directions.

RO/PO shuts discharge valve for "A'

RR pump IAW CRS direction.

CRS implements:

- AB.COMP-001

- AB.RPV-002, AB.RPV-003, AB.RPV-004 a

Crew determines loss of normal Instrument Air compressors:

- OHA A2-AII and A2-A2

- Lowering IA pressure CRIDS

\\-

NRC SCENARIO I

.DOC CRS directs PO to start the Standby or Emergency Instrument Air Compressor in accordance with H C. 0 P-AB.ZZ-0001.

PO starts the Standby or EAlC in accordance with CRS instructions.

Page 8 of 17 Rev.: 06

Event i Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response NOTE: Operation will stabilize inside the EXIT region.

L Comments NOTE: If control rods are inserted so that operation is below the 70% rod line, the crew may reduce the speed of the operating Recirculation Pump in an attempt to lower vibration levels.

L NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC e Crew evaluates Rx power and flow, determines operation is currently in the exit region, and monitors for power to flow oscillations.

0 Crew monitors for power oscillations.

0 CRS directs actions to exit the EXIT region by:

- Inserting Control Rods, or

- Raising Recirculation flow 0

RO inserts Control Rods per Reverse order of the pull sheet or the Stuff Sheet, and CRS directions in order to clear APRM Upscale alarms and/or to exit the EXIT region.

0 Crew ensures proper operation of the Service and Instrument Air system to maintain air pressures.

0 Crew ensures that Feedwater system maintains RPV level 0

Crew makes preparation to enter Single loop operations IAW 12.5-54 HC. OP-IO.ZZ-0006.

Page 9 of 17 Rev.: 06

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response 0

Crew recognizes rising vibrations on B RR pump:

Comments

- CRIDS Display 85, and/or

- OHA C 1 -E4 and informs CRS.

Note: Lower Recirculation CRS directs actions IAW HC.OP-entry into the SCRAM

- If Danger Level is reached, region.

remove the RR pump from service flow may cause intentional AR. ZZ-00 08 0

CRS directs actions to scram and trip RR B NOTE: The crew may 0

• CREW manually scrams the scram before tripping the Rx within 60 seconds following RR pump. That will satisfy trip of both RR pumps.

this Critical Task.

(WA 202001 A2.04 3.713.8)

(WA 212000 A4.01 4.6/4.6) 0 RO places the Rx mode switch in shutdown and takes actions IAW AB.ZZ-0001:

0 RO performs the following IAW AB.ZZ-0001:

- Announces, Crew - Standby for Scram Report.

- Locks the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

L NRC SCENARIO I

.DOC Page 10 of 17 Rev.: 06

Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response L

NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC Comments

- Announces the following:

+ Rod Motion status

+ APRM Downscale status

+ Reactor Shutdown status

- WHEN the above actions are complete, then announces Scram Report Complete.

- Inserts the SRMIIRMs

- Selects IRM chart recorders.

- When Main Generator output reaches zero Mwe, then trips the Main Turbine.

- Locks Out the Main Generator

- Ensures the Reactor Scram has been announced (over PA)

- Reports All Scram Actions Complete RO determines the Rx is shutdown by verifying all control rods are fully inserted and informs CRS 0

CRS enters and directs HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101, RPV Control, to restore and maintain Rx parameters.

0 CREW recognizes increasing DRWL pressure:

OHA A7-E4 SPDS indication and informs CRS.

0 RO/PO determines RPV level, pressure and containment parameters and informs the CRS.

Page 11 of 17 Rev.: 06

Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Crew recognizes DRWL pressure

- OHAA7-D4, C5-B5, and LOCA initiation signals and informs CRS.

L at 1.68# :

Comments c

CRS enters and directs HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102, Containment Control, to control containment oarameters.

I

- ~-

PO verifies the RHR and CS pumps auto-start.

RO/PO verifies EDGs auto-start.

CRS directs actions to restore:

- Instrument gas

- RACS

- CRD RO/PO restores systems to service IAW CRS direction.

CRS directs action to initiate supp chamber sprays.

PO places the "A" RHR loop in supp chamber spray IAW CRS direction.

• Crew inhibits ADS if RPV water level reaches

-129".

(WA 218000 A4.04 4.114.1)

(WA 295031 EAI.06 4.414.4)

6. HPCl auto start failure PO recognizes failure of HPCl to inject at 1.68 psig:

Closed indication:

HV-F001 HV-FOO6 HV-8278 and informs CRS.

0 PO manually initiates HPCl to inject when directed by the CRS.

NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC Page 12 of 17 Rev.: 06

Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlanffStudent Response 0

• Before RPV water level reaches -1 go, crew manually initiates HPCl by opening HV-FOOI, HV-FOOG, and HV-8278 to maintain RPV water level above

-1 90 and prevent an Emergency Depressurization.

(WA 295031 EA1.02 4.514.5) 0 When supp chamber pressure exceeds 9.5# and adequate core cooling is assured, CRS directs action to secure DRWL cooling and initiate one loop of DRWL spray after ensuring compliance with the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit (DSIL) and supp pool level below 125.

0 PO places the A1 RHR loop in DRWL spray IAW CRS direction.

PO prevents injection from low pressure ECCS not required to assure adequate core cooling IAW CRS direction.

Comments L

NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC Page 13 of 17 Rev.: 06

VI.

SCENARIO

REFERENCES:

A.

Conduct of Simulator Training.

B. NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards C. JTA Listing D. Probabilistic Risk Assessment E. Technical Specifications F. Emergency Plan (ECG)

G. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

H. Inservice and Surveillance Test procedures I.

HC.OP-AB.COMP-0001 Instrument and/or Service Air J.

HC.OP-AB.CONT-0003 Reactor Building K. HC.OP-AB.RPV-0002 Reactor Power Oscillations L. HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003 Recirculation System M. HC.OP-AB.RPV-0004 Reactor Level Control N. HC. OP-AB.ZZ-000 1 Transient Plant Conditions

0. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101 RPV Control P. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102 Primary Containment Control Q. HC. OP-SO.AE-0001 Feedwater System Operation R. SH.OP-AS.ZZ-000 1 Operations Standards v

L, NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC Page 14 of 17 Rev.: 06

VII.

ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL ESG-001 / 00

- I.

(KIA 202001 A2.04 3.7/3.8)

(KIA 212000 A4.01 4.6/4.6)

• CREW manually scrams the Rx within 60 seconds following trip of both RR pumps.

The abnormal procedure requires a manual scram to be initiated if in Condition 1 and no RR pumps are in operation. The resulting high power and low flow conditions provide an unstable operating envelope for the Rx. The sixty-second time limit provides a reference for the immediate nature of the required action.

2.

0

• Before RPV water level reaches -190, Crew manually initiates HPCl by opening HV-FOOI, HV-FOO6, and HV-8278 to maintain RPV water level above -190 and prevent an Emergency Depressurization.

(KIA 295031 EA1.02 4.514.5)

The HPCl system has failed to automatically initiate upon either low RPV water level or high drywell pressure. Manual initiation of the HPCl system will prevent RPV water level from reaching -1 90 and will therefore prevent a required emergency depressurization and subsequent transient on the RPV.

3.

0

• Crew inhibits ADS if RPV water level reaches -129.

(KIA 218000 A4.04 4.114.1)

(KIA 295031 EA1.06 4.414.4)

Given the current operating conditions in this scenario, an automatic RPV depressurization is not warranted based upon the directions provided in the EOPs.

Therefore, in hibiting ADS actuation prevents an emergency depressurization and subsequent transient on the RPV.

L NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC Page 15 of 17 Rev.: 06

ESG-001 / 00 HOPE CREEK ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM LJ EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT YtN EVENT TRANS1 ENTS:

SPECIAL INITIATORS:

Turbine Trip Loss of ssw X

Loss of Feedwater Loss of SACS MSlV Closure Loss of RACS Loss of Condenser Vacuum Inadvertent Open SRV Loss of Instrument Air Loss Of Offsite Power Station Black Out ATWS X

LOCA COMPON ENTlTRAl N/SY STEM U N AVAILABI LlTY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN HPCl One SRV EDG A One SSW Pump / Loop EDG B Circulating Water System - 4 pumps TACS Class I E 12OVAC Bus - A Train i,

X RClC Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - D Train OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal Initiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACS/SSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

NRC SCENARIO I

.DOC Page 16 of 17 Rev.: 06

1 HoDe Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet Protected Equip Emergent Issues WIN Team Workarounds FOR TRAINING USE ONLY HPCI, HPCI 250 VDC, EDG A, switchgear and logic panels Abnormal noise from C RACS Pump motor. Troubleshooting planned when pump is 00s.

Oncoming Shift: Days [XI Nights [ ]

Op Con: 1 Rx Pwr: 70% Gen Output: 736 MWe Work Window: B Risk Color: Green NotiWDate I

Description Major activities accomplished on the last shift:

Maintenance continuing on RClC Major activities scheduled for this shift Place RACS Pump A in service and remove RACS Pump C from service Withdraw Groups 1OC and 1OA control rods to 100% rod line then continue raising power to 100% using RR flow @ s 15%lhr.

HC.OP-10.22-0003 is complete through step 5.4.22, except withdrawing control rods per RE guidance to 100% rod line Immediate Mitigation Additional Action I

Assignee I

Date 1 Operations Superintendent issues:

SIM-001 I Yes I

3.7.4 I

RClC Turbine Maintenance

+ I O days None DEFICIENCY Number I

ASSIGNED I

DUE Compensatory Actions in Effect (Required by CRODKRFA for Operability)

Number I

DEFICIENCY I

COMPENSATORY ACTIONS I

DUE I

I I

I L

Reactivity Controls:

MOL, Step 1 on Sheet 77, beginning of 1OC rods Standby Safety Systems:

RClC CIT for Maintenance. ETR 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Balance of Plant:

C RACS Pump abnormal noise RestrictedlEmeraency Use Onlv Equipment:

0 0

0 Electrical:

0 Chemistry:

0 Coolincl Water:

0 Computer:

Radiation Monitorinq Systems:

Cold Weather Issues:

Administrative:

0 0

NRC SCENARIO 1.DOC Page 17 of 17 Rev.: 06

SIMULATOR EXAMINA TION SC E NA RI 0 G U I DE W

SCENARIO TITLE:

NRC EXAM SCENARIO SCENARIO NUMBER:

2 EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION:

1 Hour REVISION NUMBER:

00 PROGRAM:

n L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE REVISION

SUMMARY

L NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

I.

OBJECTIVE(S):

Enabling Objectives A.

The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crew's ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions.

(Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an " *.")

e II.

MAJOR EVENTS:

A.

B.

Stuck Control Rod C.

lnerting the Containment D.

Loss of 1A-D-482 inverter E.

F.

G.

Raise Reactor Power with Control Rods Steam leak in the steam tunnel Small break LOCA /RHR Room Flood(Fai1ure to isolate)

Emergency Depressurization/SRV Failure to open 111.

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario starts with the plant at approximately 17%. The crew will withdraw Control Rods to 15% load. During the Rod withdrawal, a Rod will stick. The crew's efforts to unstick the Rod will be successful. The crew will then commence inerting the drywell.

The 1A-D-482 inverter will develop a fault resulting in TACS isolation requiring restoration, and loss of various indications. Once TACS has been restored, the plant will develop a steam leak in the steam tunnel requiring the unit to be shutdown and the crew to close the Main Steam Isolation Valves.

A LOCA will develop due to the pressure transient from closing the MSIVs. When an RHR Pump D is started, a Suppression Pool leak develops on the suction piping to the pump.

Attempts to isolate the leak and to makeup will be unsuccessful, requiring an Emergency Depressurization of the RPV. An SRV will fail to open when required and the crew will be required to open an additional SRV.

The scenario will be terminated when the Reactor is depressurized and level is above

-190 inches.

u IV.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

INITIAL IC:

Initialize the simulator to IC-07; 23% power, MOC. Pull step 487 Insert control rods through step 481.

Deinert containment to >4% 02. Secure lineup, but leave H202 analyzer in service.

Ensure lineup to inert containment is up to 5.1.9 of HC.OP-SO.GS-0001.

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 2 of 22 Rev.: 00

PREP FOR TRAINING: (i.e., computer set points, procedures, bevel covers)

I

/ M a / I Description

.d -

1. Markup HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 to Step 5.4.1 3.

2. Markup HC.OP-SO.GS-0001 to Step 5.1.8.

3. Markup HC.OP-AP.ZZ-0104 Forms 1 and 2 to support inerting containment.

4. Complete Attachment 2 Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist.

EVENT TRIGGERS:

I M i a / I Description

1. EVENT ACTION: ZLRHPMR(4)

- COMMAND:

IMF RHO7D PURPOSE:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

3. EVENT ACTION: LCPNEPOI >= 300 COMMAND:

DMF CD031835 PURPOSE:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

HV-F004D Switch to CLOSE Inserts flooding malfunction when RHR D pump is running

2. EVENT ACTION: ZLMS20A CLOSED light for A MSlV Deletes malfunction when drive pressure is 300 psig

4. EVENT ACTION: ZDRHFOC(20)

L MALFUNCTION

SUMMARY

I I

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Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

7.

6.

8.

CD031835 Control Rod 18-35 stuck AD02EC ADS/Relief valve F013E sticks closed ED09A2 Loss of 120Vac Class 1 E instr bus 1AD482 MS04A Steam line A leak in tunnel RH07D RHR leak via pump D suction PC06 Suppression Pool Break RR31A2 Recirc Loop A large break RR31 B2 Recirc loop B large break Preinsert Preinsert 1 /None 600 2/None 100 None/l Nonell 10 300 None/2 3

300 None/2 3

REMOTE/FIELD FUNCTION

SUMMARY

I I

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Mia1 I Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final 1, RH21 D HV-F004 RHR pump D suction valve None14 TAGGED

2.

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 3 of 22 Rev.: 00

l/O OVERRIDE

SUMMARY

I I

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I I

lnifial I Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 4 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event 1 Instructor Activity CRS directs the RO to raise Reactor power with Control Rods in accordance with RE guidance.

with Control Rods:

Expected PlanVStudent Response Comments

\\.

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC RO withdraws Control Rods in accordance with HC. OP-SO. SF-0001 and CRS directions.

- Selected rod PB comes ON (bright white)

FOUR ROD DISPLAY indicates the control rod position (lOC65OC).

- The associated Full Core Display (white) numbered rod identification light comes ON (1 OC650C).

- At the ROD SELECT MODULE, simultaneously press and hold both the WITHDRAW PB AND the CONTINUOUS WITHDRAW PB and observe the following:

+ The INSERT (white) light

+ The WITHDRAW (white) light

- CONTROL ROD POSITION comes ON momentarily.

comes ON and the CONTINUOUS WITHDRAW (white) light comes ON.

+ CONTROL ROD POSITION FOUR ROD DISPLAY indicates control rod movement.

- Prior to reaching the desired control rod position, simultaneously release both the WITHDRAW PB and the CONTINUOUS WITHDRAW PB and OBSERVE the following:

Page 5 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event / Instructor Activity

+ The WITHDRAW (white) light goes OUT.

Expected PlantfStudent Response Comments

+ The SETTLE (white) light comes ON for = 6 seconds, then goes out.

+ CONTROL ROD POSITION FOUR ROD DISPLAY indicates the control rod has settled to the desired position.

+ At position 48 the applicable Full Core Display FULL OUT (red) light comes on Perform a control rod coupling integrity check IAW HC.OP-ST. BF-0001 NOTE: LPRM downscale 0

Perform the following while giving alarms can be expected. As the selected Control Rod a RE, inform crew alarms are continuous wit hd raw sig nal :

expected for this rod pattern.

- Observe the following as indication of the Control Rod being coupled:

+ ROD OVERTRAVEL alarm does NOT annunciate.

+ Red Full Out light illuminates on the Full Core Display.

+ RPlS indicates the Control Rod is full out (48).

+ Proper response of the Nuclear Instrumentation while withdrawing the Control Rod.

0 Indicates the completion of the movement on the Pull Listing.

L NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 6 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments RO determines that Control Rod 38-31 is stuck by observing no change in Rod motion on the 4 Rod Display or the RWM and informs the CRS.

2. Stuck Control Rod:

Preinserted.

CRS directs actions in accordance with HC. OP-AB. IC-0001, Condition I.

0 0

RO performs actions in accordance with CRS directions:

- Verifies no Rod Blocks are present.

- Attempts to operate the drive in both directions to determine the exact condition of the Control NOTE: Crew may request RE guidance. Respond that a withdraw signal then an insert signal may be attempted.

Rod.

- Verifies drive water flow fluctuates normally.

- Verifies proper operation of the SETTLE, INSERT, AND WITHDRAW lights.

- Performs the following:

+ Raises the drive water pressure in approximately 50 psid increments, not to exceed 500 psid

+ Attempts to notch in notch out the Control Rod at the new pressure increment.

0 RO observes Rod Movement as indicated on the 4 Rod Display or RWM, and notifies the CRS.

0 RO returns the drive water pressure to the normal operating range (260-270 psid on A3015).

L NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 7 of 22 Rev.: 00

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent Response Comments 0

CRS directs the PO to inert the containment in accordance with HC.OP-SO.GS-0001 starting at 5.1.8.

0 PO commences inerting the containment in accordance with CRS directions by:

L NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Opening the following valves:

+ HV-4978

+ HV-5035

+ P-KH-V9973, Liquid NZ To Vaporizer (local)

+ GU-HD-9372A

+ HV-4958

+ HV-4952

+ HV-4950 Establishes communications between the Main Control Room AND an operator stationed at TI-3955 Log start time on Gaseous Effluent Release Permit Presses the FV-4971 ON push-button.

Presses the FIC-4971 I NZ FLOW, AUTO push-button.

Intermittently presses FIC-4971 attain the desired nitrogen flow rate as indicated on FR-4971-1, Intermittently OPEN one of the Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breakers, using the TEST OPEN push-button approximately every 15 minutes.

N2 RAISE SETPOINT PB to N2 FLOW (UP to 150,000 scfh).

PSV-4946A (B, C, D, E, F, G, H)

Page 8 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Crew identifies and communicates the loss of TACS to the CRS.

RO/PO informs CRS that RPV power, level and pressure are stable.

Comments NOTE: HC. 0 P-AB.ZZ-000 1 0

CRS orders TACS placed on the may be referenced also for the transfer of TACS.

AB. COOL-0002.

B SACS loop IAW HC.OP-PO performs HC.OP AB-COOL-0002 as directed by the CRS 0

PO ensures the standby SACS pump starts.

Ensures BOTH pairs of TACS supply and return valves on the Standby loop open to supply Ensures TACS supply AND return valves on the loop that WAS supplying TACS are 0

Determines that the HV-2522E TACS. (HV-2522/2496)

CLOSED. (HV-2522/2496) and HV-2522F are closed THEN re-opens them as follows:

- Verifies no large break has occurred in TACS by observing SACS expansion tank levels.

- Determines that no large break in TACS has occurred, then simultaneously presses and holds the HV-2522E and/or HV-2522F OPEN PBs until the valves indicate open.

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 9 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response WHEN dispatched to the IA-D-482 as an operator, THEN REPORT the inverter output breaker CBIO is open, the AC Reg Output breaker CB302 is open and the Static Switch cabinet is de-energized.

WHEN dispatched to the 1A-D-482 as maintenance, THEN REPORT there appears to be a fault in the Static Switch cabinet and you will need to inverter tagged.

NOTE: If dispatched to investigate H2 Seal Oil System, respond that alarm due to low pressure. Using Remote Function acknowledge a la rm.

Note: If dispatched to the lsophase System, alarm was due to high temperature.

Using Remote Function acknowledge alarm.

Comments WHEN dispatched to SACS or SSW, THEN REPORT the equipment is ready for starting or post start checks are SAT.

L-.

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC 0

Crew identifies the loss of the 1AD482 inverter

- OHA D3-E3 12OVAC UPS TROUBLE

- CRIDS 0

CRS implements HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0136, Attachment 5 0

Crew recognizes loss of RWCU via OHA and trip of both RWCU pumps due to a loss of HV-F001 i nd icatio n.

RO/PO refers CRS to HC.OP-AB.RPV-0007 in accordance with H C. 0 P-AR.ZZ-0008.

CRS directs actions to be taken in accordance with HC.OP-AB.RPV-0007, Condition B.

CRS recognize Tech Specs action

- 3.8.3.1.a.l.e and action A applies.

- 3.6.3 Action a (Containment Isolations)

Page 10 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity WHEN dispatched to perform BOP-0005 actions, REPORT:

Action A.3: Steam Tunnel supply and return back draft dampers - both sets are open.

Action A.4: Place Both Steam Tunnel cooling fans in service by placing REMOTE FUNCTION HVI 1 and HV12 in run.

WHEN dispatched as ABEO, and 9395B are closed.

THEN REPORT GU-HD9395A Expected PlantfStudent Response Comments Crew recognizes temp rising:

A2541 StmTun temp in alarm.

Steam Tunnel ne1 Clr Inlet 0

CRS implements HC.OP-AB.BOP-0005, Condition A:

- Isolate the source of the leak if known.

- Monitor the following to determine the source of leak:

+ Main Steam Flow indication

+ Feedwater Flow indication

+ RWCU System

- Ensure proper positioning of Steam Tunnel Supply AND Return Backdraft dampers 0

CRS assigns a crewmember to monitor Steam Tunnel temperature.

0 CRS implements HC.OP-AB.CONT-0004, Condition A, AND Condition C.

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 11 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity NOTE:

0 This alarm may not be received.

High alarm is 2.5 mR/hr.

0 Expected PlantfStudent Response Comments The CRS may take 0

conservation action and scram before 145 degrees.

a V

0 i

L NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Crew responds to RM-11 High Alarm for 9RX620 for the Tech Support Center ARM.

CRS briefs the crew on plant conditions and contingencies for a rising Main Steam Tunnel temperature.

Crew monitors HC.OP-AB. BO P-00 05 Retain men t Override.

CRS directs a manual Scram when Steam Tunnel temperature

> 145 degrees IAW the Retainment Override.

RO takes actions to manually scram the reactor IAW HC.OP-PO takes action to control, restore and maintain RPV level with Feedwater.

CRS implements EOP-101 based on entry condition of 12.5 and directs actions to stabilize the plant.

RO performs the following IAW AB.ZZ-0001, HC. OP-AB.ZZ-000 1 :

Announces, Crew - Standby for Scram Report.

Locks the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

Announces the following:

+ Rod Motion status

+ APRM Downscale status

+ Reactor Shutdown status Page 12 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlanffStudent Response

- Inserts the SRMIIRMs

- Selects IRM chart recorders.

Comments NOTE:

The MSlVs m y aut e

e e

matically close on an isolation signal.

e e

L NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

- When Main Generator output reaches zero Mwe, then trips the Main Turbine.

- Locks Out the Main Generator

- Ensures the Reactor Scram has been announced (over PA)

- Reports All Scram Actions Complete CRS transfers level and pressure control to RClC and SRVs in anticipation of MSlV closure.

RO/PO coordinate transfer of Reactor Pressure and RPV level control.

Crew places B RHR in Suppression Pool cooling to support RCIC/SRV operation.

CRS directs closing MSlVs and drains to isolate steam leak.

PO closes the MSlVs and drains The CRS directs the PO to restore and maintain RPV level /

pressure with HPCl and/or RClC and SRVs.

CRS implements HC.OP-AB.BOP-0002, Condition A:

- Verify the Main Turbine valves are CLOSED

- Ensure the Motor Suction Pump and Turning Gear Oil Pump are running

- When Main Turbine Speed e900 rpm, ensure all Main Turbine Lift Pumps running.

Page 13 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity c

Expected PlantIStudent Response Comments L-NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC 0

Crew recognizes LOCA condition:

RM-11 DLD monitors.

Rising Drywell Pressure.

OHA A4-F5, A7-E4, C6-C2.

0 CRS directs actions for the high Drywell pressure IAW HC.OP-

- Maximize Drywell Cooling by AB.CONT-0001.

ensuring:

+ All Drywell Fan Cooling Coils are Open

+ All Drywell Fans are running in Fast Speed

+ Turbine Bldg. Chill Water system is operating properly

+ Check Reactor Recirc. Pump

+ Check SRV Tailpipe 0

PO maximizes Drywell cooling

- Perform the following:

Seals Temperatures and checks proper operation of TB Chillers.

0 Crew recognizes HI-HI Drywell pressure of 1.68 psig 0

CRS reenters EOP-101, enters HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102, and directs actions to mitigate the leak.

sprays are required based upon DRWL temperatures / pressure.

0 CRS determines that drywell Page 14 of 22 Rev.: 00

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event I Instructor Activity Expected PIantlStudent Response Comments 0

CREW may recognize Suppression Pool leak via decreasing Suppression Pool level indications on SPDS and annunciator A6-A5 and informs the CRS.

CREW determines leak to be in RHR pump D room via SPDS and/or CRlDS alarms D2971 and D2939.

investigate cause of RHR pump room flooded alarm.

As RBEO, two minutes RO/PO notifies RBEO to after being dispatched report leak at D pump suction with approximately two inches of water on floor.

NOTE:

Role-play as the building EO to support implementation of EOP 300 level procedures.

Do NOT implement EO-315, use Remote Functions CS02 or CS04.

Although, REPORT completion of lineup to the MCR.

NOTE:

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC CRS enters and directs actions Reactor Building and Rad Release to isolate the leak.

0 CRS directs actions to isolate RHR Pump D suction by closing PO attempts to close HV-F004D, observes that the OVLD/PWR FAIL illuminates, and informs the CRS.

0 When Suppression Pool Level drops below 74.5 inches, CRS reenters HC. OP-EO.ZZ-0 I 02,

Primary Containment Control, and directs actions to restore suppression pool level using RCIC, Core Spray, or Service Water.

of HC.OP-EO.ZZ-O103/4, HV-F004 D.

0 CREW closely monitors Torus level decrease and determines Page 15 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response level decrease and determines that a major failure of the Torus has occurred.

Once Crew determines a major failure of the Torus has occurred and level Comments cannot be maintained, they may stop makeup efforts.

0

• CREW determines that Suppression Pool water level cannot be maintained above 38.5 inches and initiates an emergency depressurization in accordance with H C. 0 P-EO.ZZ-0202.

(WA 295030EA2.01 4.1/4.2) e Note: This task is 0

completed satisfactorily if Em erg e ncy Depressurization occurs before 38.5 of SPL is reached L

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC C RS implements H C. 0 P-E 0. ZZ-0202, Emergency RPV Depressurization, when torus level cannot be maintained above the 38.5.

PO opens 5 ADS valves IAW CRS direction.

PO recognizes failure of SRV F013E to open via closed indication on 10C650C and informs CRS.

CRS directs PO to open other SRV(s) until 5 SRVs are open.

PO opens additional SRV per CRS instructions

• CREW recognizes via acoustic and temperature indications that F013E, ADS SRV, has failed to open and opens an additional SRV before Suppression Pool level has been below 38.5 inches for 1 minute.

(KIA 223001A2.11 3.6/3.8)

(WA 218000A2.04 4.114.2)

Page 16 of 22 Rev.: 00

Event t Instructor Activity PO maintains/restores RPV level

>-I90 inches in accordance with CRS instructions.

0 PO initiates Suppression Pool cooling IAW CRS direction.

Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments L

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC 0

Page 17 of 22 Rev.: 00

VI.

SCENARIO

REFERENCES:

A.

L B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

0.

P.

Q.

R.

S.

T.

U.

V.

w.

X.

Y.

Conduct of Simulator Training.

NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards JTA Listing Probabilistic Risk Assessment Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)

Alarm Response Procedures (Various) lnservice and Surveillance Test procedures HC.OP-AB.BOP-0002 Main Turbine HC.OP-AB.BOP-0005 Main Steam Tunnel Temperature H C. 0 P-AB. CO NT-000 1 HC. OP-AB. CO NT-0004 HC.OP-AB.COOL-0002 Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System HC.OP-AB. IC-0001 Control Rod HC.OP-AB.RPV-0007 Reactor Coolant Conductivity H C. 0 P-AB.ZZ-0 00 1 HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0 136 H C. 0 P-EO.ZZ-0 I 0 1 HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102 Primary Containment Control HC.OP-EO.ZZ-O103/4 H C. 0 P-E 0.ZZ-02 02 HC.OP-SO.AE-000 I Feedwater System Operation HC, OP-SO. SF-000 1 HC. OP-ST. BF-000 1 SH.OP-AS.ZZ-0001 Operations Standards D rywel I P ressu re Radioactive Gaseous Release Transient Plant Conditions Loss of 120 VAC Inverter RPV Control Reactor Building and Rad Release Emergency RPV Depressurization Reactor Manual Control Control Rod Drive Exercise - Weekly

~L NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 18 of 22 Rev.: 00

VII.

ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL L

ESG-002 / 00

1.

• CREW determines that Suppression Pool water level cannot be maintained above 38.5 inches and initiates an emergency depressurization in accordance with HC.OP-EO.22-0202.

(WA 295030EA2.01 4.1/4.2)

EOPs direct action to emergency depressurize the Reactor if Suppression Pool level cannot be maintained above 38.5 inches. This level represents the Suppression pool level that results in uncovering the downcomer pipes and a loss of the pressure suppression function of the Primary Containment.

2.

• CREW recognizes via acoustic and temperature indications that F013E, ADS SRV, has failed to open and opens an additional SRV before Suppression Pool level has been below 38.5 inches for 1 minute.

(WA 223001A2.1 I 3.613.8)

(WA 218000A2.04 4.1/4.2)

The Minimum Number of SRVs required for Emergency Depressurization (MNSRED) is

5. The MNSRED is utilized to assure the RPV will depressurize and remain depressurized when Emergency Depressurization is required.

L L

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 19 of 22 Rev.: 00

ESG-002 / 00 HOPE CREEK ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE L

Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT TRANSIENTS:

SPECIAL INITIATORS:

Turbine Trip Loss of ssw Loss of Feedwater Loss of Condenser Vacuum Inadvertent Open SRV Loss of SACS X

MSlV Closure Loss of RACS Loss of Instrument Air Loss Of Offsite Power Station Black Out ATWS LOCA Y/N COMPONENTlTRAlNlSYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENTl SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENTl SYSTEM, OR TRAIN HPCl Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - A Train RClC Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - D Train One SRV EDG A One SSW Pump / Loop EDG B Circulating Water System - 4 pumps TACS OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION X

Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal hitiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACS/SSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

L-NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 20 of 22 Rev.: 00

2 d

Hope Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet Oncoming Shift: Days [XI Nights [ ]

Rx Pwr: 17% Gen Output: 126 MWe Work Window: D Risk Color: Green SMD: none Protected Equip Emergent Issues WIN Team Activities completed last shift:

Major activities scheduled for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Continue with Startup by withdrawing Control Rods @ <15%/hour.

Continuous rod withdraw is allowed. RE-Some LPRM downscale alarms may occur during withdraw of rods. Contact RE for guidance.

Commence inerting the containment IAW HC.OP-SO.GS-0001 step 5.1.9.

Reactor Startup in progress to step 5.4.13 of 10-3 Containment inerting lineup in progress through step 5.1.8 of SO-GS-0001.

0 0

NotiflDate I

Description Immediate Mitigation I Workarounds I

Additional Action I Assignee 1 Date Number I

DEFICIENCY I

I I

I I

I COMPENSATORY ACTIONS I

DUE Follow-up Operability Assessments (CRFA) Assigned Number I

DEFICIENCY I

ASSIGNED I

DUE I

Reactivitv Controls:

Rod pull step 481 Safety Systems:

Balance of Plant:

0.

Electrical:

Coolina Water:

0 Rad Monitorinn:

0 Emernencv Use Equipment:

0 Computer:

Administrative:

0 NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 21 of 22 Rev.: 00

3 FORM 2 (This Form page 1 of I)

CONTAINMENT PREPURGE CLEANUP, INERTING, OR PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE PERMIT SECTION A 3ate:

Today 3aseous Effluent Permit #:

020030001 NOTE: This permit is valid only until 2400 of this date SECTION B HOURS VALVESLINES OPEN PREVIOUS YEAR (Note 1)

Calculate Total Hours Open During Previous Year (Note 1)

DATE NUMBER OF HOURS (1) Max. allowed for 365 days (admin limit)

(2) Total previous year (Note 1) 452 hrs

(-1 0

Hours available this date (line 1 minus line 2 OR 24, whichever is less)

Hours authorized this date (max 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)

NCO performing calculation 7ohn Smith OS/CRS verification and authorization 3 ndrew Jones

(=)

24 Datemime Today/OlOO Daterrime Today/Ol30 SECTION C VALVE/LINE OPEN TIME (Note 2)

START TIME STOP TIME TOTAL HOURS Time at which valve/line was closed or Condition 4 or 5 was entered with valve/line rime at which valve/line was open or 2ondition 1,2, or 3 was entered with rralve/line open opened Total number of hours valve/line opened this cycle Total number of hours valves/line open this permit:

NCO performing calculations Date/Ti m e OS/CRS Closing permit Date/Time NOTE 1 : The previous year includes the period from 2400 on todays date back to 0001 on the same date one year earlier.

NOTE 2: Completed Form 2 should be filed in the AP-104 binder in the control room.

b NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 22 of 22 Rev.: 00

L SCENARIO TITLE:

NRC EXAM SCENARIO SCENARIO NUMBER:

3 EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION:

1 Hour REV1 SI ON NUMBER :

00 PROGRAM:

T I

L.O. REQUAL F

I INITIAL LICENSE REV IS I ON SUM MARY:

u NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC

I.

OBJECTIVE(S):

Enabling Objectives A.

The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crews ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions.

(Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an I *.)

Lc II.

MAJOR EVENTS:

A.

B.

C.

RWCU Pump Trip D.

E.

F.

G.

RClC turbine overspeed Lower Reactor Power with Recirculation Flow Secondary Condensate Pump Trip/Failure of Recirculation Pump to Runback Loss of Station Power Transformer, and then a loss of offsite power Failure of B EDG, and failure of A EDG breaker to auto close HPCl steam leak with failure to automatically isolate 111.

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario begins with the plant at 95% power and reducing power for a forced outage.

The B PClG compressor and BS 5-1 are out of service for maintenance. As the shutdown is commenced, Secondary Condensate Pump C trips. This failure will cause an Intermediate Runback on one Recirculation pump, requiring a manual runback of the other.

Following a report of severe weather warnings in the Salem county area, a RWCU Pump Trip will occur. The operator will be required to adjust RWCU system flow to prevent pump damage.

A total loss of offsite power occurs following a lightning strike. The B EDG fails to start and will be unavailable for the duration of the scenario. The A EDG Output Breaker fails to automatically close, and will require manual closure (at 1 OC651) to energize 1 OA401.

RClC trips on overspeed upon system initiation and water accumulation in the HPCl steam line will result in a steam line leak in the HPCl room. The HPCl System will fail to automatically isolate. The crew will have to manually isolate HPCl to terminate leakage into the secondary containment. RClC may be restored to service following local reset of the overspeed trip device.

The scenario may be terminated when RPV water level is being maintained above -190.

b, IV.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Initialize the simulator to 1OOoh power IC; MOL, 100% rod line C o m p I e t e Attach me n t 1 IS i m u I at o r Re ad y - fo r-T ra i n i n g / Exa m i nation C heck I is t. I L

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC Page 2 of 17 Rev.: 01

OTHER CONDITIONS: (i.e., computer set points, procedures, bevel covers)

I Initial I Description Place B PClG compressor in manual and place red bezel cover over compressor; close HV-5162 and HV-5160B, place red bezel covers over controls. Place Instrument Gas Loop B in Man Byp on Panel lOC650D.

Acknowledge Annunciator A I -A5 using Remote AN01 to Normal. (If required)

Set CRIDS point D4498 to 1 Place RR in Master Manual and lower power to 95%

Markup and ensure conditions satisfy HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, through step 5. I

.2.

Utilizing Monitor set MSTSRVL(12) = 255. This raises F013M tailpipe temperature to 255F.

Acknowledge OHA.

EVENT TRIGGERS:

I Initial I Description EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

1.

MALFU NCTlON

SUMMARY

I I

I I

I I

Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I RemotelEvent I Initial I Final

4.

5.

7.

9.

6.

8.

IO.

11.

12.

RCOI RClC turbine overspeed HPlO HPCl valves HV-F002 & F003 fail to auto isolate DG02B Diesel generator B failure DG08A Diesel generator A failure to auto close AN-A1A2 A1A2 Instrument Gas System 6 trouble AN-Dl 63 Containment Isolation Valve OPF FWO4C Secondary condensate pump CP137 trip CUOIA RWCU pump A trip ED01 16 Station Service Transformer 1 BX501 failure HP09 HPCI steam line break inside the HPCl RM 41 1 I EGI 2 Loss of all offsite power RR30A Recirc system A failure fo intermediate runback Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert I/None 2/None 420 3/None 740 300 3/None 5

40 720 3/None Preinsert REMOTE/F I ELD FU NCTl 0 N

SUMMARY

I I

I I

I I

Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I RemotelEvent I Initial I Final

1.

2.

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC Page 3 of 17 Rev.: 01

I/O OVERRIDE

SUMMARY

I I

I I

lnitial Description Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final 10A3 B LO BK-202 MAN-INSTRUMENT GAS 1 OA3 F LO BK-202 STOP-INSTRUMENT GAS 10S4 A DI HV-5162 OPEN-INSTRUMENT GAS 10S4 B LO HV-5162 CLOSED-INSTRUMENT GAS lOS7 A LO OVLD/PWR FAIL-INSTRUMENT GAS HV-51608 10DS2 B LO HV-5160B CLOSED-INSTRUMENT GAS HV-5160B 10S8 C DI OPEN HV-5160B 7DS4 A LO CH D INBD-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES-MOV OVLDIPWR FAIL 10S3A A OVLO OVLO/PWR FAIL-INSTRUMENT GAS Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert OFF OFF OFF OFF ON OFF OFF ON ON L-NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC Page 4 of 17 Rev.: 01

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event f Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent L

Response

Comments 0 CRS directs reduction of Reactor with Recirculation Flow power in accordance with RE guidance and HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0004.

0 RO reduces Reactor power using Recirculation pumps in accordance with CRS directions.

i NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC a I PO recognizes Secondary condensate pump C trip via:

- Alarm CONDENSATE TRAIN

- Intermediate runback on both C TROUBLE (A6-F3)

REACTOR RECIRC pumps and informs CRS.

.CRS implements HC.OP-AB.RPV-0004 and directs actions to maintain RPV water level between level 4 and level 7.

PO ensures FWLC maintains water level between level 4 and level 7

.CRS directs the following in accordance with HC.OP-

- Ensure Feedwater and AB. RPV-0004:

Recirc. Pump Runbacks have occurred.

- Ensure Reactor Power is within Feedwater delivery capability.

- Close HV-1651 C for tripped pump*

- Bypass the Reactor Feedwater Runback when conditions permit Page 5 of 17 Rev.: 01

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event I Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student L

Response

Comments

.L NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC 0 RO observes that Recirculation Pump A failed to runback, informs the CRS and coordinates running back A pump with the PO.

bypasses the FW runback in accordance with CRS directions.

CRS directs the following in accordance with HC.OP-

.PO closes HV-1651C and AB.RPV-0001:

- If APRM Upscale alarms are received, then insert control rods to clear APRM Upscale alarms.

- Verify that Reactor Power is NOT in an Instability Region on the Power to Flow Map.

- Ensure Main Generator MWe and MVAR are maintained within limits. (MA)

- Ensure Recirculation pump MG oil temperatures are maintained in the Normal band. (BB) appropriate for the power reduction.

Maneuvering T/S S u rve i I la nce requirements in SHOP-I 08.

- Implement 10-6 as

- Review the Power 0 ROlPO reset runbacks in accordance with CRS directions.

RO may observe APRM Upscale alarms, and insert control rods in accordance with the Stuff sheet, and CRS directions.

Page 6 of 17 Rev.: 01

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent L'

Response

Acknowledge orders as EOs from MCR.

Comments As TBEO, report SCP C pump motor is extremely hot, unusual odor in the area, and no fire.

Severe Weather:

CALL as System Operator; PJM has informed us of a severe thunderstorm warning is in effect for Salem county, which includes high winds and hail; If requested, report sustained winds up to 60 MPH are expected.

0 Crew verifies operation outside the Exit Region of the Power-Flow Map.

0 PO ensures:

- Main Generator MWe and MVAR are maintained within limits temperatures are maintained in the Normal band.(Dispatches EO) 0 CRS dispatches ABEO to check SCP for abnormal conditions.

- Recirculation pump MG oil 0 CRS directs maintenance to investigate problem with "C" SCP.

change has occurred and informs the CRS.

power change and informs Chemistry and Rad Pro of actions for:

0 Crew recognizes a >I 5% power 0 CRS reference SHOP-I 08 for

- T.S. 3.4.5.~.

- ODCM for 3.11.2.1.

weather warning.

0CRS informs crew of severe NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC Page 7 of 17 Rev.: 01

'v 0

Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlantIStudent Comments

Response

RO/PO determines that A RWCU pump is tripped by RWCU alarm, loss of running indication, CRIDS alarms, and informs CRS.

SYSTEM TROUBLE (CI-C2) 0 RO refers to HC.OP-AR.ZZ-0008 and takes actions to reduce RWCU pump flow to <I34 gpm by throttling HV-F042 and notify Chemistry to remove one Filter Demineralizer from service.

investigate problem with RWCU pump A.

Insert RT-3, call as System Operator; lightning SCWXIS shows lightning strikes in plant area.

RO/PO dispatches RBEO to Respond appropriately as Chemistry Tech n i ci a n.

Delay removal of Filter Demineralizer.

- Refers to Tech Spec 3.8.1. I.a due to loss of Station Service Transformer, determines HC.OP-ST.ZZ-0001 is required CRS references HC.OP-AR.ZZ-0016 for E3-A2.

Use Met Data file to RAISE and 7 to - 25 mph, THEN

.CRS implements ~ c. 0 ~ -

Wind Speed pts 1, 2, 3, RAISE again to - 59 mph.

AB.MISC-0001 and directs actions to:

- Monitor River Level every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />

- Limit outside activities

- Close outside doors

- Terminate surveillance testing 0 CRS references Tech Spec 3.7.3.

NOTE:

CRS should also recognize that a 4-hour surveillance L-is required IAW 4.7.3.b (DL-26, Att. 3J).

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC Page 8 of 17 Rev.: 01

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent d

Response

As outside operator, report after 2 min. of dispatch; lightning and extreme winds.

Comments

---../

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC 0 Crew recognizes loss of power condition via decreased lighting, alarms for Rx scram (window C-

3) and station service transformer trouble (window E-3) and informs CRS.

RO performs the following IAW HC.

OP-AB.ZZ-000 I

- Announces, Crew - Standby for Scram Report.

- Locks the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

- Announces the following:

+ Rod Motion status

+ APRM Downscale status

+ Reactor Shutdown status

- WHEN the above actions are complete, then announces Scram Report Complete.

Ensures the Reactor Scram has been announced (over PA)

Reports All Scram Actions Complete Page 9 of 17 Rev.: 01

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent v

Response

L Comments 0 CRS enters and directs HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101, RPV Control and directs actions to:

- Verify scram actions

- Verify EDGs start

- Verify ECCS actuations

- Verify PCIS/NSSSS isolations

- H2 injection isolation 0 RO/PO recognizes "B" EDG failure to start via lack of running indication(s) and "A1 EDG breaker failure to close via breaker open indication and informs CRS.

0 CRS directs RO/PO to close "A" EDG breaker.

0 RO/PO closes "A" EDG breaker and verifies loading IAW CRS direction.

0

• Crew energizes 10A401 by closing "A" EDG output breaker.

(WA 295003 MI.01 3.713.8) 0 CRS directs RO/PO to attempt start of "B" EDG.

0 RO/PO attempts start of "B" EDG IAW CRS direction and reports failure of "6" EDG to respond.

0 CRS implements HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0135 and directs actions to mitigate the loss of offsite power condition.

electrician to investigate "6" EDG failure and to attempt local start.

As ABEO, report broken oil line on "B" EDG.

Crew dispatches ABEO/Shift L

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC Page 10 of 17 Rev.: 01

L 0CRS directs PO to maintain RPV water level between + I 2.5 and

+54 using HPCl and/or RCIC.

Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Comments

Response

(Pre-inserted) 0 PO recognizes RClC turbine trip condition via alarm B1-AI, turbine trip energized indication, and informs CRS.

As RBEO, report mechanical Overspeed Of RCIC; standing by for reset attempt.

.Crew dispatches RBEO to investigate RClC turbine trip and reset turbine overspeed trip.

PO recognizes HPCl steam leak conditions via HPCl trip and alarms BI-A4 & BI-A5 and informs CRS.

0 PO recognizes HPCl failure to isolate via isolation initiation signals and failure of HV-F002 and HV-F003 to close and informs CRS.

0 CRS directs closure of HV-F002 and HV-F003 to isolate HPCI.

0 PO closes HV-F002 and HV-F003 IAW CRS direction.

O

• When the HPCl System TEMP Isolation Logic initiation signal is and/or HV-F003 to terminate source of leakage into secondary Room (41 1 I) temperature reaches 250°F.

(HA 206000 A2.10 4.0/4.1)

NOTE:

Isolation of HPCl before considered satisfactory completion of the critical step.

containment before HCPl Pump receipt of isolation signal is received, Crew shuts HV-FOO~

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC Page 11 of 17 Rev.: 01

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent

Response

Comments CLEAR malfunction RCOI. When HV-F045 and/or HV-4282 a re/is closed, RESET overspeed HC.OP-SO.BD-OOO~.

trip with Remote RC02, and as RBEO report reset of RClC turbine overspeed.

0 CRS directs actions to reset RClC trip throttle valve and to restore RClC to operation IAW 0 CRS directs PO to restore and maintain RPV water level to between +12.5 and +54.

0 PO injects with RClC to restore and maintain RPV water level between +I 2.5 and +54.

NOTE:

Crew may decide to operate two CRD pumps for RPV water level control assistance.

Support two CRD pump operating as EO using appropriate Remote Functions NOTE:

These actions occur in the event of RPV water level reaching-I 29.

(CD).

NOTE Crew may be able to maintain RPV level >-190.

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC

~ --

0 CRS directs RO to restore A CRD pump to service, and/or place SLC in service.

0 RO restores A CRD pump to service.

0 RO/PO places available SLC pump in service.

0CRS directs RO to line up and inject with two CRD pumps IAW HC, OP-SO. BF-000 1.

0 RO coordinates with the EO to start A CRD Pump and line up for two CRD pump operation IAW CRS directions.

oCRS directs inhibiting ADS when RPV level reaches -1 29.

0 PO inhibits ADS IAW HC.OP-0 If RPV water level cannot be SO.SN-0001.

maintained above -1 go, CRS orders an Emergency Depressurization by opening 5 ADS valves IAW EOP-I 01 AND 202.

Page 12 of 17 Rev.: 01

0 PO opens 5 ADS valves per CRS directions.

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent Comments

Response

0 CRS directs injection with available low pressure ECCS pumps to restore RPV level to greater than -1 90.

0 PO lines up and commences injection with available ECCS, and restores level IAW CRS instructions.

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC 0

• CREW maintains, or restores, adequate core cooling by maintaining Reactor water level above -190 inches, or emergency depressurizing by opening at least 5 ADS valves and restoring RPV level to above

-1 90 inches IAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ-01 01.

(WA 295031 EA1.08 3.813.9)

(WA 295031 EA1.03 4.4/4.4)

(WA 295031 EA1.06 4.4/4.4)

Page 13 of 17 Rev.: 01

VII.

SCENARIO

REFERENCES:

A. Conduct of Simulator Training.

B. NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards C. JTA Listing D. Probabilistic Risk Assessment E. Technical Specifications F. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

G. HC.OP-AB.MISC-0001 Acts of Nature H. HC. OP-AB. RPV-000 I Reactor Power I.

HC.OP-AB.RPV-0004 Reactor Level Control L.

J. HC.OP-AB. RPV-0007 K. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-000 1 L.

HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0135 M. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0136 N. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101

0. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102 P. H C. 0 P-EO.ZZ-0202 Q. HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 R. HC.OP-SO.AE-0001 Reactor Coolant Conductivity Transient Plant Conditions Station Blackout//Loss of Offsite Power//Diesel Generator Malfunction Loss of 120 VAC Inverter RPV Control Primary Containment Control Emergency Depressurization Shutdown From Rated Power to Cold Shutdown Feedwater System Operation S. HC.OP-SO. BD-000 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Operation T. HC.OP-SO.BF-0001 CRD Hydraulic System Operation U. SH. OP-AS.ZZ-000 1 Operations Standards

'L NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC Page 14 of 17 Rev.: 01

VIII.

ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL ESG-003 IO0 I.

• Crew energizes 10A401 by closing "A" EDG output breaker.

(WA 295003 AAI.01 3.713.8)

With the "B" EDG unavailable, restoring power to the "AI vital bus, lOA401, provides power for the "A' FRVS vent fan which is required to maintain secondary containment differential pressures. Given the HPCl leakage into the secondary containment, it is critical that the potential release path be monitored and filtered to minimize release and reduce exposure to the public. Additionally, the vital bus will provide the source of power to the "A" RHR pump for long term cooling capability.

2.

0

• When the HPCl system isolation logic initiation signal is received, Crew shuts HV-F002 and/or HV-F003 to terminate source of leakage into secondary containment before HCPI Pump Room(411 I ) temperature reaches 250°F.

(WA 206000 A2.10 4.014.1)

The HPCl system has received valid isolation signals based upon high steamline flow and a failure to isolate has occurred. Manual isolation of this release path is necessary to terminate the source of leakage into the secondary containment and prevent a possible unmonitored release via the torus room relief panels. 250°F. is the Max. Safe Temperature for Room 41 11 in HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0103.

L

3.

• CREW maintains, or restores, adequate core cooling by maintaining Reactor water level above -190 inches, or emergency depressurizing by opening at least 5 ADS valves and restoring RPV level to above -1 90 inches IAW HC.OP-EO.22-0101.

(WA 295031 EA1.08 3.813.9)

(WA 295031 EA1.03 4.4/4.4)

(KIA 295031 EAI.06 4.4/4.4)

Maintaining adequate Core cooling under these conditions is accomplished by maintaining level above -1 go", or by emergency depressurizing and restoring level to above -1 90". [-I 90" corresponds to the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (MSCRWL).]

c NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC Page 15 of 17 Rev.: 01

ESG-003 IO0 HOPE CREEK ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT TRANSIENTS:

Turbine Trip Loss of Feedwater MSlV Closure Loss of Condenser Vacuum Inadvertent Open SRV X

Loss Of Offsite Power Station Black Out Y/N EVENT SPECIAL I N IT1 AT0 RS:

Loss of ssw Loss of SACS Loss of RACS Loss of Instrument Air ATWS LOCA COMPON ENTlTRAl N/SY STE M U NAVAl LAB1 LlTY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN X

HPCl Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - A Train RClC Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - D Train One SRV EDG A One SSW Pump / Loop X

EDGB Circulating Water System - 4 pumps TACS OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION X

Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal

~~

Initiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACSISSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC

1 1

Hope Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet Protected Equip.

Emergent Oncoming Shift: Days [A] Nights [ ]

~

A PCIG, C EDG and switchgear Elevated tailpipe temperature F013M SRV Op Con: 1 Rx Pwr: 95% Gen Output: 1060 MWe Work Window: C Risk Color: Green Major activities scheduled for this shift:

Continue with shutdown IAW HC.OP-10.22-0004, currently at step 5.1.2.

RE guidance is to continue power reduction to 75% with RR Flow at 45%/Hr.

RE will evaluate at 75% power.

Major activities accomplished on the last shift:

Commenced plant shutdown due to elevated temperatures on F013M B

PCIG compressor was CTT for maintenance to replace the suction filter last shift.

v Problems WIN Team Operator Workarounds Operations Superintendent Issues:

Number I

DEFICIENCY COMPENSATORY ACTIONS I

Due Date Number I

DEFICIENCY ASSIGNED I

Due Date I Follow-up Operability Assessments (CRFA) Assigned Reactivity Controls:

MOL 100% rod line Standby Safety Systems:

Balance of Plant:

RestrictedlEmerqencv Use Only Equipment:

Electrical:

Chemistry:

Coolinq Water:

Computer:

Radiation Monitorina Systems:

Cold Weather Issues:

Administrative:

0

~u NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC Page 17 of 17 Rev.: 01

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE v

SCENARIO TITLE:

NRC EXAM SCENARIO SCENARIO NUMBER:

4 EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION:

REVISION NUMBER:

PROGRAM:

1 Hour

-1 L.O. REQUAL 1

7 1

INITIAL LICENSE n

OTHER REVISION

SUMMARY

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC

1.

OBJECTIVE(S):

Enabling Objectives A.

U' The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crew's ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions.

(Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an " *.")

11.

MAJOR EVENTS:

A.

B.

C.

D.

Full-core ATWS E.

Turbine Bypass Valve failure F.

Raise power with Control Rods APRM failure upscale with single rod scram Failure of Main Turbine to runback following loss of Stator Water Cooling SLC Failure to Automatically Initiate / SLC Pump A trip Ill.

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 40% power during power escalation. The B EDG is inoperable.

During preparations for power ascension, APRM C fails upscale, resulting in a half-scram and a single rod scram (02-27) due to a blown fuse. When the APRM is bypassed and the half-scram reset, a loss of Stator Water Cooling occurs with a failure of the turbine to runback.

As the crew is attempting to manually reduce Main Generator load, the turbine trips, and a full-core ATWS occurs. In addition, BPVs fail to respond and control RPV pressure, requiring SRVs for pressure control. In responding to the ATWS condition, the SLC System fails to automatically initiate, This requires the operators to manually initiate SLC.

Following SLC start, the A SLC pump will trip. With SRVs controlling RPV pressure, Suppression Pool temperature will begin to rise, eventually requiring intentional lowering of RPV level to control power. The Crew should implement HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0320 to insert control rods and complete the scram.

.--/

IV.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

INITIAL IC:

Initialize the simulator to 36% power IC, rod sequence sheet 57.

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 2 of 17 Rev.: 00

PREP FOR TRAINING: (i.e., computer set points, procedures, bevel covers)

I lnitial 1 Description

1. Ensure plant conditions support Reactor Startup IAW 10-003 through step 5.4.21, N/A step 5.4.19.C.

2. Raise Reactor power with Recirc flow to 40% power.

3, Complete Attachment 2 Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist.

4.

EVENT TRIGGERS:

I Initial I Description 1, EVENT ACTION: zdrp05nx(2) // Reset RPS Logic A2

- COMMAND:

dmf cd060227 PURPOSE:

This command will delete Malf CD-06 on Rod 02-27

2. EVENT ACTION: Icvposb(1) <= 700 /I Rod 18-03 Position COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

Inserts left and right ATWS to stick rods.

3. EVENT ACTION: et-array(2) // Event Trigger #2 COMMAND:

SET lclsdv = 700 PURPOSE:

Fills the scram discharge volume on the scram

4. EVENT ACTION: zlslpmas // SLC A pump ON COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

Initiates trip of SLC A pump c

MALFUNCTION

SUMMARY

I I

1 I

I I

120 100 lnitial 1 Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final

1. TCOI-10 All Turbine BPV fail to open Preinsert

2. SL04A Failure of SLC to auto initiate Preinsert

3. SL04B Failure of SLC to auto initiate Preinsert

4. TC06 Failure of main turbine automatic runback Preinsert

5. NM21C APRM C fails upscale l/None

6. CD060227 Control rod 02-27 scrams 1/None

7. EG04A Stator cooling pump A trip 2/None

8. TC03 Main Turbine trip 3/None

9. SLOIA SBLC injection pump AP208 failure None/4

10. RP06 Half-Core ATWS - Left Side NoneR

11. RP07 Half-Core ATWS - Right Side None12 L,

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 3 of 17 Rev.: 00

REMOTE/FI ELD FUNCTION

SUMMARY

I I

I I

I I

lnitial Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final

1. EG-01 B B Stator Water Cooling Pump Preinsert OFF

-2.

FW21 HWCl Status Preinsert Running

3. AN10 A4-B3 HWCl System Trouble Preinsert Norm

4. RM03 Main steam rad monitor set points Preinsert High

5. FW05 Demineralizer E Preinsert IN

6. FW06 Demineralizer F Preinsert IN

7. CW15 TACS clg vlv AE126 to Recirc m/g set A Preinsert 50

8. CW16 TACS clg vlv BE126 to Recirc m/g set B Preinsert 50 Description I Delay I Ramp I RemotelEvent I Initial I Final I/O OVERRIDE

SUMMARY

I I

I I

I I

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 4 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlanUStudent Response Comments v

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC I. Raise power with Control Rods:

CRS directs power rise using Recirc flow/rod withdrawals per HC.OP-IO.ZZ-003 and RE directions.

0 CRS informs Load Dispatcher of continued power ascension.

0 RO raises Reactor Power with Control Rods in accordance with CRS directions.

RO / PO recognizes /takes actions IAW C3-A3, C4 & D4, C6-A1, C7-D3 & D4, and informs CRS.

- Determines APRM C upscale

- Monitors Rx

- Verifies feed flow/ temperatures

- Checks non-upscale APRMs, verifies only one channel upscale

- Verifies half scramlrod block in press u re/p owe rlleve I 0

RO / PO recognizes control rod 02-27 single rod scram, informs CRS.

CRS enters / directs actions IAW HC.OP-AB.IC-0001 and HC.OP-AB. IC-0004.

0 PO checks APRM C on back panels, verifies upscale and other APRMs normal.

Page 5 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity NOTE:

Verify ET-I becomes Active when RPS Logic A2 is reset. This will clear the Scrammed Rod Malfunction and insert Ma If u nct ion RP-04.

NOTE: EO requested to investigate, report that the Scram Valves for 22-27 are open (if RPS is not reset)

Expected PlanVStudent Response Comments CRS observes requirements of TIS 314.3.1 and TIS 314.3.6 CRS directs I&C to investigate single rod scram 0

CRS directs APRM C bypassed and half scram reset.

CRS enters I directs actions IAW C6-E3; directs NE0 to check HCU for scrammed rod, notifies RE, and directs fuse replacement and control rod recovery.

RO I PO takes action IAW C6-E3:

- Verifies only one control rod scrammed and fully inserted

- Verifies that thermal limits are within acceptable constraints using the Reactor Engineer to verify guidance to reposition the rod

- Have Reactor Engineer provide 0

CRS refers to T/S 314.1.3 and 314.2 and directs Reactor Engineer to verify they are within thermal limits.

L NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 6 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantIStudent Response NOTE:

Report as NE0 that no Stator Water Cooling pumps are running. If asked, report that the B Stator Water Cooling pump will not manually start, and will check breaker status.

Comments NOTE:

IF the CRS directs Recirc flow to minimum and manual scram, THEN Insert RT-3 (trips Main Turbine).

i--

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC RO / PO recognizes /takes actions IAW El-C1, informs CRS.

Immediately directs local operator to investigate Recognizes Stator Water Cooling low pressure comp point in and is not clearing uter 0

RO / PO recognizes turbine failure to runback and informs the CRS.

0 RO informs CRS of Full Reactor Recirculation Pump Runback 0

CRS enters / directs actions IAW HC.OP-AB.BOP-0002:

- Dispatches operator to local panel 1 OC120 to start both Stator Cooling Pumps and ensure tank level is normal

- Directs RO to monitor for power oscillations

- Directs PO to runback main turbine to < 7055 amps and reduce MVARs to zero PO manually runs back main turbine to less than 7055 amps and reduces generator MVARs to zero.

Page 7 of 17 Rev.: 00

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments L

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC 0

CRS monitors Reactor Power and since power is >25% and Stator Water Cooling has not been restored within 2 minutes, Directs CREW to Scram the Reactor, trip the Turbine and implements HC.OP-EO.ZZ-101.

0 RO places and locks the Rx mode switch in shutdown.

0 RO performs the following IAW HC. OP-AB.ZZ-000 1

- Announces, Crew - Standby for Scram Report.

- Locks the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

- Announces the following:

4 Rod Motion status 4 APRM Downscale status

+ Reactor Shutdown status IF the reactor is not shutdown then perform the following:

A. Initiates manual scram from

6. Initiates ARI.

C. Announces the following:

o Scram Air Header status.

o Reactor Shutdown status RPS.

- WHEN the above actions are complete, then announces Scram Report Complete.

Page 8 of 17 Rev.: 00

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments A

- Inserts the SRM/IRMs

- Selects IRM chart recorders.

- When Main Generator output reaches zero Mwe, then trips the Main Turbine.

- Locks Out the Main Generator

- Ensures the Reactor Scram has been announced (over PA)

- Reports All Scram Actions Complete L--

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC PO/RO recognizes turbine trip during runback, failure of some BPVs to open and informs CRS.

0 CRS enters / directs actions IAW 0

Directs initiation of SLC Directs RR pumps tripped 0

Directs inhibit ADS 0

Directs alternate control rod HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0 1 0 1 A; insertion methods A RO/PO record tank level, initiates SLC, and verifies RWCU isolation.

PO inhibits ADS IAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001.

Page 9 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity

• Crew prevents an uncontrolled depressurization during A W S conditions by placing ADS Actuation Timer Inhibit switches to INHIBIT position.

(WA 218000 A4.04 4.1/4.1)

(WA 218000 A4.05 4.2/4.2)

Expected Plantl Student Response Comments NOTE: Support crews requests for EOP implementation. Delay EOP-320 until level is intentionally lowered. Use Remote Functions to implement EOPS.

NOTE:

For reference, SLC A Pump Breaker is 52-21 2063 L

PO initially opens SRVs until RPV pressure drops below 935 psig then stabilizes RPV pressure below 1037 psig or as directed by CRS PO recognizes A SLC Pump trip and informs CRS Directs local operator to check A

SLC Pump and breaker CRS enters and directs action IAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102 when Suppression Pool Temperature reaches 95 OF Directs placing Suppression Pool Cooling in service PO places Suppression Pool Cooling in service CRS directs bypassing Group I low level isolation signal per HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0301, -031 1 & -

0319.

L NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 10 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event i Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response NOTE:

0

• CRS enters / directs actions When CREW is level, implement EOP-320, if it has been ordered, THEN Delete RP06 and RP07 when RPS is reset.

and CREW performs IAW

- LOWER RPV level by TERMINATING and PREVENTING injection (except for SLC, CRD and RCIC)

UNTIL RPV level drops below

-50 in OR intentionally lowering RPV HC.OP-EO.ZZ-O101A to:

- IF Supp Pool Temp > 11 0 O F,

power is >4%, and Drywell Press > I

.68 psig or SRV open or cycling, LOWER RPV level by TERMINATING and PREVENT injection (except for SLC, CRD and RCIC) until any of the following:

0 Rx Power < 4%, or 0

RPV Lvl reaches -129, or 0

All SRVs remain closed and Drywell press remains <

1.68 psig (WA 203000 A4.02 4.3/4.1)

(WA 209001 A4.01 3.8/3.6)

(WA 206000 A4.05 4.4/4.4)

CRS directs PO to maintain RPV level between -1 90 and level to which it was lowered with Preferred ATWS Injection Systems from Table 1 of HC.OP-EO.ZZ-IOIA Comments L.

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 11 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response 0

• Crew maintains or restores adequate core cooling by:

restoring/maintaining RPV level

>-I 90 inches, or emergency depressurizing by opening at least 5 SRVs and restoring level to >-I90 inches when below the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure in accordance with HC.OP-EO.ZZ-OI OIA.

(WA 295037 EA2.02 4.1/4.2)

(WA 295031 EA1.06 4.4/4.4) 0 After EOP-320 implementation, RO inserts a manual scram, observes that all rods fully inserted, and informs CRS.

• Crew implements HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0320 manually inserts all control rods.

(WA 295037 EA1.05 3.9/4.6) 0 CRS exits HC.OP-EO.ZZ-O101A and reenters HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101 at RC-1; Directs level restoration 0

PO / RO restores level to +12.5 to +54 as directed NOTE:

CRS directs:

IF RPV level cannot be maintained above -1 go, an emergency depressurization is required.

0 Securing all injection except for SLC, CRD, and RClC e Emergency depressurizes the RPV in accordance with HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0202, 0

Commencing injection to RPV when below the MARFP and raise level to >-I90 inches.

Comments NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 12 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event / Instructor Activity NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Expected PlantEtudent Response Comments Page 13 of 17 Rev.: 00

VI.

SCENARIO

REFERENCES:

A.

B.

C.

D.

1.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

0.

P.

Q.

R.

S.

Conduct of Simulator Training.

NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards JTA Listing Probabilistic Risk Assessment Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)

Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

HC.OP-AB. BOP-0002 Main Turbine HC.OP-AB.IC-0001 Control Rod HC. OP-AB. IC-0004 Neutron Monitoring H C. 0 P-AB. RPV-0002 H C. 0 P-AB.ZZ-000 1 HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0 1 0 1 HC.OP-EO.ZZ-01 OIA ATWS-RPV Control HC. OP-EO.ZZ-0 1 02 HC. OP-EO.ZZ-0320 HC. OP-EO.ZZ-0322 HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 SH. OP-AS.ZZ-000 1 Reactor Power Oscillations Transient Plant Conditions RPV Control Primary Containment Control Defeating ARI and RPS Interlocks Core Spray Injection Valve Override Startup from Cold Shutdown to Rated Power Operations Standards b

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 14 of 17 Rev.: 00

VII.

ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL ESG-073 / 00

1.

• Crew implements HC.OP-EO.22-0320 manually inserts all control rods.

(KIA 295037 EA1.05 3.914.6)

Implementation of HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0320 OR manually inserting all control rods provides the only methods for control rod insertion and substantial negative reactivity addition. It is critical for the crew to implement one of these methods to insert control rods and shut the reactor down. Failure to initiate these actions would result in requiring RPV level to be lowered to or below TAF to reduce power to < 4%. This represents a significant challenge to maintaining adequate core cooling.

2.

• Crew prevents an uncontrolled depressurization during ATWS conditions by placing ADS Actuation Timer Inhibit switches to INHIBIT position.

(KIA 218000 A4.04 4.114.1) (KIA 218000 A4.05 4.214.2)

Given the current ATWS conditions of this scenario, preventing ADS automatic operation and potential uncontrolled reactor level floodup prevents a significant transient and subsequent positive reactivity addition to the reactor. EOPs direct this action under the current conditions.

V

5.

0

• CRS enters I directs actions and CREW performs IAW HC.OP-EO.=-0101A to:

0 LOWER RPV level by TERMINATING and PREVENTING injection (except for SLC, CRD and RCIC) UNTIL RPV level drops below -50 in OR IF Supp Pool Temp > I10 OF, power is >4%, and Drywell Press > 1.68 psig or SRV open or cycling, LOWER RPV level by TERMINATING and PREVENT injection (except for SLC, CRD and RCIC) until any of the following:

0 0

Rx Power c 4%, or RPV Level reaches -129, or All SRVs remain closed and Drywell press remains c 1.68 psig (KIA 203000 A4.02 4.3I4.1) (KIA 209001 A4.01 3.813.6) (KIA 206000 A4.05 4.414.4)

Given the above scenario conditions, HC.OP-EO.ZZ-OIOIA directs actions to lower RPV water level to reduce reactor power. With the Suppression Pool temperature at or approaching 11 O°F and energy addition to the Suppression Pool in progress (the reactor not shutdown), actions must be taken to reduce Reactor power and prevent challenging the Primary Containment via the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit.

4.

• Crew maintains or restores adequate core cooling by: restoringlmaintaining RPV level 1-190 inches, or emergency depressurizing by opening at least 5 SRVs and restoring level to >-I90 inches when below the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure in accordance with HC.OP-EO.=-0101A.

(KIA 295037 EA2.02 4.114.2)

(KIA 295031 EA1.06 4.414.4)

Maintaining adequate core cooling under ATWS conditions is accomplished by maintaininghestoring RPV level 2-1 90 inches, or by depressurizing and restoring level to >-I 90 inches when below the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure.

-v NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 15 of 17 Rev.: 00

ESG-004 / 00 HOPE CREEK ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT TRANSIENTS:

SPECIAL INITIATORS:

X Turbine Trip Loss of ssw Loss of Feedwater Loss of SACS MSlV Closure Loss of RACS Loss of Condenser Vacuum Loss of Instrument Air Inadvertent Open SRV Loss Of Offsite Power Station Black Out Y/N v

Y/N X

ATWS LOCA COMPONENTITRAlN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN HPCl Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - A Train

~

RClC Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - D Train One SRV EDG A One SSW Pump / Loop EDG B Circulating Water System - 4 pumps TACS OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE OPERATOR ACTION Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal Initiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACS / SSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 16 of 17 Rev.: 00

~

k Hope Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet Op Con: 1 Rx Pwr: 40% Gen Output: 394 MWe Work Window: B Risk Color: Green Emergent Issues WIN Team Major activities accomplished on the last shift:

Major activities scheduled for this shift:

\\.-

Performed startup through step 5.4.20 of HC.OP-Continue with the startup IAW HCOP-IO.ZZ-0003 at 1o.zz-0003 step 5.4.21 Performed B EDG Surveillance. Because of slow starts, still available but inoperable HC.OP-ST.ZZ-0001 completed 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ago troubleshooting Withdraw rods to the 80% rod line @ <15%/hour C/T 8 EDG when maintenance is ready to begin NotiWDate 1

Description I

Workarounds I

Immediate Mitigation Additional Action I Assignee I Date Number I

DEFICIENCY COMPENSATORY ACTIONS DUE Follow-up Operability Assessments (CRFA) Assigned Number I

DEFICIENCY ASSIGNED.

I DUE v

I I

Reactivity Controls:

RE guidance is to raise power with rods to the 100% rod line, currently on sheet 57 Standby Safety Systems:

Balance of Plant:

RestrictedlEmerqency Use Only Equipment:

Electrical:

B EDG had slow start times during surveillance last shift. Not C/Td yet. Still available, but inoperable. All actions required by Technical Chemistry:

Specifications have been completed for the EDG.

Cooling Water:

Computer:

Radiation Monitoring Systems:

Cold Weather Issues:

Administrative:

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC Page 17 of 17 Rev.: 00

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE L

SCENARIO TITLE:

NRC EXAM SCENARIO SCENARIO NUMBER:

SPARE EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION:

1 Hour REVISION NUMBER:

PROGRAM:

T I

L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE REVISION

SUMMARY

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC

1.

OBJECTIVE(S):

Enabling Objectives A.

The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crew's ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions.

(Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an " *.'I)

II.

MAJOR EVENTS:

A.

B.

Condenser Level Transmitter failure C.

D.

E.

F.

Large Break LOCA/Downcomer Failure Transfer B RPS to the Alternate Power Supply RWCU leak, failure to automatically isolate SRV stuck open, and then closes (Similar to Audit, but modified)

Seismic Event, Loss of Chilled Water to the Drywell 111.

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario begins at 100% power. Transfer of RPS B to its alternate power supply is required for MG set maintenance. Following the transfer, the controlling Condenser level transmitter fails. The crew must select an alternate transmitter to prevent a loss of A leak will develop from the RWCU System. Manual isolation of the leak is required due to a failure of the automatic isolation circuitry.

After actions for the RWCU leak are complete, an SRV will stick open. The crew will be able to close the SRV once the operating switch has been cycled.

A seismic event will cause a loss of chilled water to the Drywell coolers. RACS, the alternate supply of cooling, will be placed in service.

A LOCA with Primary Containment failure will require an emergency depressurization of the RPV to minimize the potential for core damage and a significant off site release.

v Condenser level.

IV.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

INITIAL IC:

Initialize the simulator to IC-02; 100% power, MOL.

Close SV-4311 l'

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC Page 2 of 17 Rev.: 00

5 PREP FOR TRAINING: (i.e., computer set points, procedures, bevel covers)

I lnifial lnifial 1 Description

1. Markup HC.OP-SO.SB-0001, 5.4.1-5.4.4

2. Complete Attachment 2 Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist.

L-Description Delay Ramp RemotelEvent Initial Final EVENT TRIGGERS:

I lnifial 1 Description

1. EVENT ACTION: ZDAD13HC

- COMMAND:

DMF AD02HO PURPOSE:

Kev lock switch for FOI 3H in override 2, EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

MALFUNCTION

SUMMARY

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

v IO.

11.

12.

CUIIA RWCU isolation valve FOOI failure CUI 1 B RWCU isolation valve F004 failure MC13B Condenser LVL transmitter LT-1657B failure CU03 RWCU system leak AD02HO Relief Valve F013H sticks open PC07A Seismic Event 1 CW18A Turbine BLDG chilled water circ pump A trip CW18B Turbine BLDG chilled water circ pump B trip CW18C Turbine BLDG chilled water circ pump C trip RR31 B1 Recirc loop leak in drywell RR31 B2 Recirc loop leak in drywell PC04 Downcomer Break Preinsert Preinsert l/None 300 2/None 3/None 4/None 120 4/None 120 4INone 120 4INone 120 5INone 90 420 S/None 5/None 100 50 160 20 REMOTE/FI ELD FU NCTl ON

SUMMARY

I I

I I

I I

lnitial I Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final

1. MS12 Main steamline drain valve HV-FO19 Preinsert Tagged

2. CUI 1 Group 7A HV-F004 RWCU supply isolation Preinsert Racked Open I10 OVERRIDE

SUMMARY

I I

I I

I I

lnitial I Description I Delay I Ramp I RemotelEvent I Initial I Final L -

1.

2.

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC Page 3 of 17 Rev.: 00

0 CRS directs placing the B RPS on its alternate power supply IAW HC.OP-SO.SB-0001.

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Comments

Response

i-NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC 0

PO observes the ALTERNATE B FEED and GENERATOR B FEED is illuminated. (1 0-C610) 0 PO turns the RPS MG SET TRANSFER SW to ALT B.

PO directs the RO to refer to Section 5.3 and reset the Half Scram. RO:

- Turns RPS TRIP SYSTEM B TRIP LOGIC 61 and 62 to RESET AND RETURN to NORM LOGIC61 and B2 NORMAL/RESET lights are illuminated.

- Observes the PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOID TRIP ACTUATOR LOGICS A NORMAL AND B NORMAL lights are illuminated (Four Control Rod Groups).

- Observes the REACTOR SCRAM TRIP LOGIC B1 and 82 annunciators are de-energ ized.

(1 0-C610)

- Observes the TRIP Page 4 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Comments

Response

Note:

Respond as EO to Control Room instructions to and restore power to HV-F004 (Change Rem CUI1 TO NORMAL) and HV-FO19 (Change Rem MS12 TO NORMAL).

Note:

Respond as Chemistry that valves are closed.

L Note:

Respond as Chemistry that the valves are open.

a v

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC PO directs the RO to refer Primary Containment Isolation System Operation, and reset Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System and PCIS.

Depresses the RESET push buttons for all four channels of PClS and NSSSS.

to HC.OP-SO.SM-0001 (Q),

PO resets PAMs Recorders by pressing the High Speed Chart Drive Reset push buttons. (I OC650C)

PO directs restoration of power to the valves that were de-energized in Step 5.4.4.

PO directs Chemistry to close P-RC-V9670 RWR SAMPLE ISLN TO PANEL 1 O-C251 and I-RC-VOO6, C251 ISLN VLV.

When P-RC-V9670 and 1-RC-VOO6 are CLOSED then the PO has the RO open BB-SV-4311, Reactor Water Sample Valve PO directs Chemistry to open P-RC-V9670 RWR Sample Ish to Panel 10-C251 and 1-RC-VOO6, RWCU Sample Pnl 10-C251 Ish Vlv Crew directs EO to shutdown the B RPS MG.

RWCU SAMPLE PNL 10-Page 5 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity 0

Expected PlantlStudent Comments

Response

Crew recognizes failure of level transmitter from CRIDS POINTS A2430 and T3119, and 10C651A indications.

Per HC.OP-AR.ZZ-0004, CRS directs the PO to actions for alarms A6-F1(2,3) are to ensure proper controller operation.

Note: If the level transmitter is not noticed, eventually CONDENSATE TRAIN TROUBLE alarms will be received. If no action is taken, a low level trip of the PCPs, SCPs, RFPs, and a Reactor scram will eventually occur.

NOTE: If requested to respond to the control room and asked for guidance on transmitter failure, request the crew to select another transmitter input.

select another condenser level transmitter.

P o selects the directed condenser level transmitter and informs the CRS L

u NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC 0

Crew determines that a leak exists from RWCU by:

Observing CRlDS displays CRlDS Alarms RWCU STM LK ISLN TIMER INITIATED (D3-B3)

RO notices RWCU DlFF Time FLOW HI (Cl-A2) annunciator in alarm RO determines failure of RWCU to automatically isolate.

Page 6 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity 8

RO completes Immediate Time Operator Actions in accordance with HC.OP-

- Closes HV-F001 and F004

- Informs the CRS AB.CONT-0002:

Expected PlantlStudent Comments

Response

Closure of Fool and F004 before receiving C1 -A2 satisfies this Critical Task.

8

• CREW isolates the RWCU system by shutting BG-HV-FOOI and/or BG-HV-F004 within two minutes following receipt of annunciator C1 -A2.

(WA 223001A4.01 3.6/3.5)

WA 223001A4.06 3.6/3.7)

CRS directs the following in accordance with HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002:

- Ensure that the isolation is effective

- Direct Chemistry to isolate the Cleanup Filter Demin In let 0

RO informs CRS of loss of continuous conductivity monitoring when OHA C1-F2 is received.

8 L

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC CREW recognizes SRV F013A is open via annunciator C1 -A3 and SRV F013A OPEN indication ( I OC650C).

CREW verifies SRV F013A Time is open by checking Mwe drop, steamlfeed flow mismatch, acoustic monitor, and/or SRV tailpipe tem perat u re rising.

Page 7 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent

Response

L If the Crew manually CRS implements HC.OP-AB.RPV-0006 and directs scrams the reactor during actions for the SRV failing open, insert RT-4 actions to:

Comments e

e Verify malfunction AD02HO clears when PO cycles correct SRV.

- Reduce power to 95%

- CYCLE the SRV control switch to attempt to close the SRV RO reduces power with Recirculation pumps to 95%.

PO cycles the F013H control switch and closes the F013H.

• CREW initiates actions Time and closes PSV-F013H by positioning key lock CLOSE/AUTO/OPEN control switch to the CLOSED position on 1OC65OC within 2 minutes of determining that FOI 3H is open.

(WA 239002A2.03 4.114.2)

(HA 239002A4.01 4.4/4.4) e e

NOTE:

e Required Test is HC.OP-ST.GS-0004; required within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

c NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC RO monitors: RPV pressure, water level power.

CREW recognizes SRV F013H is closed based upon SRV closed indication (1 OC650C), Mwe restoration, and proper steam/feed flow indication.

CRS references Tech.

Spec. 4.6.4.1.b.l for Suppression Cham ber-DW vacuum breaker s u Neil la nce req u i rernen ts following steam discharge to the Suppression Chamber and verifies SRV operability (Tech Spec 3.4.2.1, 3.4.2.2)

Page 8 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event / Instructor Activity Report as the ABEO that the seismic switch has tripped (Amber light on power supply drawer is on) and that the tape recorders are advanced but not running. The Event indicator is white.

L Expected PlantlStudent Comments

Response

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC 0

RO/PO recognizes alarm condition, informs the CRS, and refers to alarm response procedure HC.OP-AR.ZZ-000 I.

CRS implements HC.OP-AB.MISC-0001 and directs actions to:

- Terminate activities on the

- Determine the Seismic Refuel Floor Event Level IMMEDIATELY following a Seismic Event by comparing the measured response spectra to the Operating Basis Earthquake (0.lg)

- Thoroughly inspect systems essential for safe shutdown

- Make a visual inspection of the plant to ensure structural integrity

- Verify that the Security System is intact CRS dispatches the auxiliary building EO to investigate the alarm at panel 10C673.

Page 9 of 17 Rev.: 00

t.

Event 1 Instructor Activity If the National Earthquake 0

Center is called, report seismic activity of 6.0 on Richter scale centered on Wilmington, Delaware.

Expected PlanWStudent Comments

Response

0 CRS evaluates the Response Spectrum annunciator ( I OC65OC),

and determines that a plant shutdown is required IAW Crew recognizes that Turbine Bldg Chilled Water has been lost by observing E5-E1, and E5-F1 annunciators in alarm Crew recognizes that Drywell pressure is rising.

CRS implements HC.OP-AB.CONT-0001 and directs actions to:

HC. OP-IO.ZZ-0004.

- Align RACS to the Chill Water System in accordance with Action C 0

PO aligns RACS to the Drywell in accordance with Action B:

- Closes HV-9532-1 and

- Presses LOOP A HV-9532-2.

PLY/RTN OPEN RACS PB.

SPLY/RTN OPEN RACS PB.

indications:

CLOSED CLOSED

- Presses LOOP B

- Observes the following

+ HV-9530A1 /A3

+ HV-9530BI/B3

+ HV-9530A2/A4 OPEN

+ HV-9530B2/B4 OPEN

- Opens HV-9532-1 and HV-9532-2.

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC Page 10 of 17 Rev.: 00

u.

PO reports status of aligning RACS to the Drywell Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlanffStudent Comments

Response

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC CREW recognizes /takes action for rising DAN press /

temp, OHAs C6-B1, A7-E4

& D4, C5-B5, and informs CRS.

CRS directs actions for the high Drywell pressure IAW HC.OP-AB. CONT-000 1.

- Maximize Drywell Cooling by ensuring:

+ All Drywell Fan Cooling Coils are Open

+ All Drywell Fans are running in Fast Speed

- Perform the following:

+ Check Reactor Recirc.

Pump Seals

+ Check SRV Tailpipe Temperatures 0

PO maximizes Drywell cooling.

0 Crew recognizes HI-HI Drywell pressure of 1.68 Psig 0

CRS reenters HC.OP-EO.ZZ -01 01, enters HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102, and directs actions to mitigate the leak.

Page 11 of 17 Rev.: 00

Event I instructor Activity a

Expected PlantlStudent Comments

Response

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC RO places the Rx mode switch in shutdown and takes actions IAW HC.OP-RO performs the following AB. ZZ-000 1 IAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001:

Announces, Crew -

Standby for Scram Report.

Locks the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

Announces the following:

Rod Motion status APRM Downscale status Reactor Shutdown status WHEN the above actions are complete, then announces Scram Report Complete.

Inserts the SRMARMs Selects IRM chart recorders.

When Main Generator output reaches zero Mwe, then trips the Main Turbine.

Locks Out the Main Generator Ensures the Reactor Scram has been announced (over PA)

Reports All Scram Actions Complete RO/STA determines the Rx is shutdown by verifying all control rods are fully inserted and informs CRS Page 12 of 17 Rev.: 00

Note: If the CREW avoids exceeding the PSP curve by anticipating Em erg en cy Depressurization and/or in it iatin g Drywell Sprays, this critical task is considered to be met.

Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlanffStudent Comments

Response

Crew determines that containment pressure cannot be maintained below the Action Required area of the PSP curve.

emergency depressurize the RPV in accordance with PO opens 5 ADS valves

• CREWemergency CRS directs actions to HC. OP-EO.ZZ-0202 IAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001.

depressurizes the RPV by opening at least 5 SRVs when Suppression Chamber level and pressure cannot be maintained below the PSP curve before Suppression Chamber pressure reaches 40 psig.

(WA 295024EA2.04 3.9/3.9)

(WA 223001A2.02 3.9/4.1)

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC Page 13 of 17 Rev.: 00

VI.

SCENARIO

REFERENCES:

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

0.

P.

Q.

R.

S.

T.

i

~L Conduct of Simulator Training.

NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards JTA Listing Probabilistic Risk Assessment Technical Specifications Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

Inservice and Surveillance Test procedures HC.OP-AB.CONT-0001 HC. OP-AB. CONT-0002 HC.OP-AB. M ISC-000 1 HC.OP-AB. RPV-0006 HC. OP-AB.ZZ-000 1 HC. OP-EO.ZZ-0 1 0 1 HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101 A HC. OP-EO.ZZ-0 1 02 HC. OP-EO.ZZ-0202 HC.OP-SO.SB-000 1 HC.OP-SO. SM-000 1 SH. OP-AS.ZZ-000 1 L-NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC Drywell Pressure Primary Containment Acts of Nature Safety/Relief Valve Transient Plant Conditions RPV Control ATWS-RPV Control Primary Containment Control Emergency RPV Depressurization Reactor Protection System Operation Isolation Systems Operation Ope rat io n s Stand a rd s Page 14 of 17 Rev.:

00

VII.

ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL ESG-SPARE / 00 I.

• CREW isolates the RWCU system by shutting BG-HV-F001 and/or BG-HV-F004 within two minutes following receipt of annunciator CI-A2.

(KIA 223001A4.01 3.6/3.5)

KIA 223001A4.06 3.6/3.7)

The RWCU System has failed to isolate automatically. Failure of the Crew to manually isolate the system will result in a bypass of the Primary Containment boundary and release of radioactive materials to the Reactor Building. Two minutes is deemed adequate time to affect isolation from the time confirmation of failure of the automatic isolation function is received.

2.

• CREW initiates actions and closes PSV-F013H by positioning key lock CLOSE/AUTO/OPEN control switch to the CLOSED position on lOC650C within 2 minutes of determining that F013H is open.

(KIA 239002A2.03 4.1/4.2)

(KIA 239002A4.01 4.4/4.4)

Crew actions prescribed in the Abnormal procedure provide the success path to preclude insertion of a manual scram. Abnormal procedures and Technical Specifications require a Reactor scram if unable to close the SRV within 2 minutes of opening. 2 minutes is sufficient time to attempt to close the SRV.

L'

3.

• CREW emergency depressurizes the RPV by opening at least 5 SRVs when Suppression Chamber level and pressure cannot be maintained below the PSP curve before Suppression Chamber pressure reaches 40 psig.

(KIA 295024EA2.04 3.913.9)

(KIA 223001A2.02 3.9/4.1)

If suppression chamber pressure cannot be maintained below the pressure suppression pressure, EOPs direct actions to emergency depressurize the reactor. A LOCA condition while in the action required region of the Pressure Suppression Pressure curve, could cause design containment limits to be exceeded. Based upon the rate of pressure increase in this scenario, the upper limit of 40 psig is established to give the operator time to evaluate conditions and direct emergency depressurization actions.

i NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC Page 15 of 17 Rev.: 00

ESG-SPARE IO0 HOPE CREEK ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE e

Y/N EVENT TRANS I EN TS :

Turbine Trip Loss of Feedwater MSlV Closure Y/N EVENT SPECIAL INITIATORS:

Loss of ssw Loss of SACS Loss of RACS Loss of Condenser Vacuum Loss of Instrument Air X

Inadvertent Open SRV Loss Of Offsite Power Station Black Out ATWS X

LOCA COMPON E NT/TRAl NlSY STEM U NAVAl LAB1 L ITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN HPCl

~

C RClC One SRV Class I E 12OVAC Bus - A Train Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - D Train EDG A

~~

One SSW PumD / LOOD EDG B

~~

~

Circulating watkr Svstem - 4 DurnDs TACS OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION X

Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal Initiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACS/SSW restoration after total loss of both systems

~

Avoiding loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC Page 16 of 17 Rev.: 00

_ _ _ ~

Hope Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet Rx Pwr: 100% Gen Output: 11 14 MWe Work Window: B Risk Color: Green SMD: none Activities completed last shift:

Continued 100% power operations Major activities scheduled for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Transfer B RPS to Alternate power supply and remove the MG from service. Inform maintenance when removed from service.

Continue 100% power operations Made preparations to transfer B RPS power to Alternate. HC.OP-SOSB-0001 complete through 5.4.4. Operators are standing by at the breakers 1

Operations Superintendent Issues:

1 Protected Equip Emergent Issues WIN Team 0

Workarounds Safety Issues: Safety Issue Hot Line Call SAFE (extension 7233)

NotiWDate 1

Description Immediate Mitigation Additional Action I Assignee I Date I

I I

I I

I I

Compensatory Actions in Effect (Required by CRODlCRFA for Operability)

Number I

DEFICIENCY COMPENSATORY ACTIONS, I

DYE I

I Follow-up Operability Assessments (CRFA) Assigned Number f

DEFICIENCY ASSIGNED I

DUE

\\

I I

Reactivity Controls:

100% power MOL Safety Systems:

0 0

Balance of Plant:

0 Electrical:

Cooling Water:

0 0

Rad Monitorinn:

0 Ernerqency Use Equipment:

0 Computer:

0 Administrative:

0 Page 17 of 17