ML031690273
| ML031690273 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/2003 |
| From: | Olshan L NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2 |
| To: | Rosalyn Jones Duke Energy Corp |
| Olshan L N, NRR/DLPM, 415-1419 | |
| References | |
| TAC MB6667, TAC MB6668, TAC MB6669 | |
| Download: ML031690273 (17) | |
Text
June 18, 2003 Mr. Ronald A. Jones Vice President, Oconee Site Duke Energy Corporation P. O. Box 1439 Seneca, SC 29679
SUBJECT:
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 RE: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MB6667, MB6668, MB6669)
Dear Mr. Jones:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 332, 332, and 333 to Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, respectively, for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated October 24, 2002, as supplemented by letters dated November 21, 2002, and February 19, 2003.
The amendments revise TS 3.5.3, Low Pressure Injection, Condition A, to change the Completion Time from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 7 days. This revision will allow longer corrective maintenance to be completed at power, without requiring a plant shutdown. It will also reduce shutdowns due to a Limiting Condition for Operation requirement.
A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions biweekly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Leonard N. Olshan, Senior Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 332 to DPR-38
- 2. Amendment No. 332 to DPR-47
- 3. Amendment No. 333 to DPR-55
- 4. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page
June 18, 2003 Mr. Ronald A. Jones Vice President, Oconee Site Duke Energy Corporation P. O. Box 1439 Seneca, SC 29679
SUBJECT:
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 RE: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MB6667, MB6668, MB6669)
Dear Mr. Jones:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 332, 332, and 333 to Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, respectively, for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated October 24, 2002, as supplemented by letters dated November 21, 2002, and February 19, 2003.
The amendments revise TS 3.5.3, Low Pressure Injection, Condition A, to change the Completion Time from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 7 days. This revision will allow longer corrective maintenance to be completed at power, without requiring a plant shutdown. It will also reduce shutdowns due to a Limiting Condition for Operation requirement.
A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions biweekly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Leonard N. Olshan, Senior Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 332 to DPR-38 DISTRIBUTION:
- 2. Amendment No. 332 to DPR-47 PUBLIC PDII-1 R/F LOlshan CHawes
- 4. Safety Evaluation WBeckner GHill(6)
RHaag,RII JRivera cc w/encls: See next page Package: ML031780085
- NLO w/change ADAMS Accession No: ML031690273
- No major changes to SE Tech Spec Patges: ML031710773 OFFICE PDII-1/
Intern PDII-1/PM PDII-1/LA SPSB/SC*
SRXB/SC*
RORP/SC OGC**
PDII-1/SC NAME JRivera LOlshan CHawes MRubin FAkstulewicz KKavanagh Acting SC RHoefling JNakoski DATE 6/10/03 6/4/03 6/6/03 4/24/03 3/3/03 5/27/03 6/3/03 6/17/03
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-269 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 332 Renewed License No. DPR-38
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility)
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated October 24, 2002, as supplemented by letters dated November 21, 2002, and February 19, 2003, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:
B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 332, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
332 Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: June 18, 2003
DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-270 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 332 Renewed License No. DPR-47
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility)
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated October 24, 2002, as supplemented by letters dated November 21, 2002, and February 19, 2003, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:
B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 332, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
332 Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: June 18, 2003
DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-287 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 333 Renewed License No. DPR-55
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 (the facility)
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated October 24, 2002, as supplemented by letters dated November 21, 2002, and February 19, 2003, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:
B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 333, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
333 Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: June 18, 2003
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 332 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38 DOCKET NO. 50-269 AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 332 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47 DOCKET NO. 50-270 AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 333 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55 DOCKET NO. 50-287 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications and associated Bases with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert 3.5.3-1 3.5.3-1 B 3.5.2-1 B 3.5.2-1 B 3.5.2-2 B 3.5.2-2 B 3.5.2-3 B 3.5.2-3 B 3.5.2-4 B 3.5.2-4 B 3.5.2-5 B 3.5.2-5 B 3.5.2-6 B 3.5.2-6 B 3.5.2-7 B 3.5.2-7 B 3.5.2-8 B 3.5.2-8 B 3.5.2-9 B 3.5.2-9 B 3.5.2-10 B 3.5.2-10 B 3.5.2-11 B 3.5.2-11 B 3.5.2-12 B 3.5.2-12 B 3.5.2-13 B 3.5.2-13 B 3.5.2-14 B 3.5.2-14 B 3.5.3-1 B 3.5.3-1 B 3.5.3-2 B 3.5.3-2 B 3.5.3-3 B 3.5.3-3 B 3.5.3-4 B 3.5.3-4 B 3.5.3-5 B 3.5.3-5 B 3.5.3-6 B 3.5.3-6 B 3.5.3-7 B 3.5.3-7 B 3.5.3-8 B 3.5.3-8 B 3.5.3-9 B 3.5.3-9
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 332 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-38 AMENDMENT NO. 332 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-47 AND AMENDMENT NO. 333 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-55 DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270, AND 50-287
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated October 24, 2002, as supplemented by letters dated November 21, 2002, and February 19, 2003, Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise TS 3.5.3, Low Pressure Injection (LPI), Condition A, to change the Completion Time (CT) from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 7 days. The supplement dated November 21, 2002, did not change the scope of the October 24, 2002 application; however it did change the licensees proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination (NSHCD). The supplement dated February 19, 2003, provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the October 24, 2002, application nor the initial proposed NSHCD.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
The Commissions regulatory requirements related to the contents of the TS are set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.36. This section ensures that each Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) specified in the TS are consistent with the assumed values of the initial conditions set forth in the licensees safety analyses. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.36, the NRC staff and the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) owners groups developed Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) that meet requirements in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)ii and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3). The licensee is using the guidance from the NRC-approved NUREG - 1430, Revision 1, Standard Technical Specifications B&W Plants, and the guidance from NUREG - 800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, as appropriate for its plant.
The LPI system consists of two redundant trains and provides emergency core cooling injection from the borated water storage tank (BWST) to the primary system during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). It also recirculates water between the primary system and the reactor building sump to provide long-term cooling. The TS require both LPI trains to be operable in MODES 1, 2 and 3. This ensures that 100 percent of the core cooling requirements can be provided, even in the event of a single active failure. Only one train is required to be operable in MODE 4, without considering a single failure, on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
The Babcox and Wilcox (B&W) Owners Group performed a study on the TS requirements for the LPI and reactor building spray (RBS) systems. This study included both a deterministic and probabilistic assessment of all B&W plants. In October 1998, the B&W Owners Group submitted for NRC staff review Topical Report BAW-2295, Revision 1, Justification for Extension of Allowed Outage Time for Low Pressure Injection and Reactor Building Spray Systems. The results of this report showed that the risk significance of extending the proposed CT for an inoperable LPI train from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 7 days was small and within the acceptance criteria set forth in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174 and RG 1.177. The NRC staff approved the B&W Owners Group request to extend the CT for the LPI from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 7 days based on the following compensatory measures that would lower the risk impacts and based on probabilistic risk assessment insights.
Compensatory Measures 1.
Avoid simultaneous outages of additional risk-significant components during the CT of the LPI and RBS system trains. These components, whose simultaneous outages are to be avoided (in addition to current TS requirements) include both the emergency feedwater system (EFW) trains, both of the high pressure injection (HPI) trains (for reasons other than inoperability due to the associated LPI train), and all three reactor building cooling trains.
2.
Define specific criteria for scheduling only those preventive maintenance activities that can be completed within the 7-day CT.
3.
Assure that the frequency of entry into the Condition and the average maintenance duration per year remain within the assumed values in the topical report.
4.
Take measures to assure that, when maintaining the LPI and RBS trains, both trains are not made unavailable unless it is necessary.
The licensee made a commitment to implement these compensatory measures prior to implementing this amendment. The NRC staff determined that this commitment forms part of the staffs basis for accepting the proposed amendment.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Insights TIER 1 - Calculation of Risk Impact of Proposed TS Change The following table contains the licensees documented risk impacts for internal and external events (including seismic). These values meet the acceptance guidelines in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177. CDF is the Core Damage Frequency, LERF is the Large Early Release Frequency, ICCDP is the Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability with an LPI train out of service, and ICLERP is the Incremental Conditional Large Early Probability with an LPI train out of service, as discussed in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177.
Base Case CDF 8.92E-05 per year CDF for 7 day CT 8.96E-05 per year Delta CDF 4.0E-07 per year Base Case LERF 5.864E-07 per year LERF for 7 day CT 5.869E-07 per year Delta LERF 5.0E-10 per year ICCDP 3.4E-07 ICLERP 4.4E-10 The following external events are included in the licensees PRA model and were considered in assessing the risk impact of this proposed LCO change:
- 1. Seismic The Oconee PRA plant fault model contains all evaluated internal and external events except for the seismic initiator. The seismic fault tree is generated and solved separately from the main PRA fault tree because the seismic CDF is calculated using Monte Carlo techniques, rather than by cutset manipulation. The core damage sequences that dominate the seismic results are the station blackout sequences. From a plant response perspective, these sequences look very much like the sequences that result from tornadoes and loss of offsite power (LOOP) initiated transients since the same systems are required to prevent core damage. These core damage sequences are characterized by the loss of all engineered safeguards systems as a result of the station blackout. As a result, the failure of independent components or individual train failures in mechanical systems, such as the LPI system, has little or no influence on the seismic results. The Oconee seismic CDF contribution is 3.92E-05 per year.
- 2. Tornado The dominant tornado core damage sequences involve a LOOP, a failure of the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF), and a loss of both EFW and station auxiliary service water (ASW) due to tornado damage to equipment in the turbine building or auxiliary building, or damage to the Keowee emergency power system. The leading causes of SSF failure are failure of the SSF diesel generator to run, tornado damage to SSF-related piping and cabling located in the West Penetration or Cask Decon Rooms, and failure of operators to align the SSF systems on time.
Unavailability of an LPI train has a minimal impact on tornado risk because of the vulnerability of the 4kV auxiliary power system in the turbine building. The 4kV power system provides alternating current (AC) power to the LPI pumps as well as to other pumps that are needed for cooling water.
- 3. External Flood The dominant external flood sequences involve a failure of onsite power sources and a failure of the SSF due to flooding, random SSF failures, or failure of operators to align the SSF systems. The licensee stated that unavailability of an LPI train has a minimal impact on external turbine building flood risk for the same reason as stated above in the discussion of tornadoes.
- 4. External Fire Similar to the external flood, the dominant sequences involve a failure of onsite power sources and a failure of the SSF due to random SSF failures, or failure of operators to align the SSF systems due to fire damage to equipment in the turbine building. The licensee stated that unavailability of an LPI train has a minimal impact on external fire risk for the same reason as stated above in the discussion of tornadoes.
TIER 2 - Configuration Control when in Extended LCO Tier 2 considerations provide reasonable assurance that risk-significant plant equipment outage configurations will not occur when specific plant equipment is out of service consistent with the proposed TS change. These considerations are described in the Compensatory Measures section above. The avoidance of risk-significant plant configurations is controlled by Oconee procedures NSD 415, NSD 403, WPM 608, and WPM 609 that are used to address the Maintenance Rule requirement and the On-Line Maintenance Policy requirement to control the safety impact of a combination of equipment removed from service.
An update to the Oconee ORAM-Sentinel model (the model that manages the risk associated with equipment inoperability) is planned immediately following completion of the Revision 3, Level 1, PRA analysis. The licensee stated that the proposed changes are not expected to result in any significant changes to the current configuration risk management program. The existing program uses a blended approach of quantitative and qualitative evaluation of each configuration assessed. The Oconee ORAM-Sentinel model considers both internal and external initiating events with the exception of seismic events; the impact of seismic events is evaluated separately.
Quality of the PRA The B&W Owners Group peer review identified the following four items that it deemed important and necessary to address the technical adequacy and the quality of the PRA, as well as the quality of the PRA update process. The licensee addressed these items as follows:
1)
Revision 2 of the PRA did not include an approach for methodically evaluating the dependence among human actions. The Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) for Revision 3 had not progressed to the extent that review of the evaluation of human reliability dependencies was possible.
Licensee response: The methodology to be implemented for Revision 3 was found acceptable based on a review of its implementation at another Duke nuclear station. For Oconee, a review of the cutsets that included LPI events did not identify HRA combinations. Therefore, this is not a significant issue for the LPI CT change requested.
2)
The interfacing systems LOCA (ISLOCA) frequency in Revision 2 reflects a point estimate of cutsets of valve failure modes that may have very large uncertainties. A point estimate does not represent a reliable estimate of the mean ISLOCA frequency due to uncertainty propagation through the ISLOCA cutsets.
Licensee response: PRA Revision 3 ISLOCA analysis approach was revised to determine the mean ISLOCA frequency in addition to the point estimate. This issue has no impact on the LPI change requested.
3)
Key contributions to LERF in Revision 2 may have been underestimated. Primary issues identified relate to the quantification of the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event tree and with mapping of SGTR cutsets to an appropriate plant damage state.
Licensee response: The Oconee estimated LERF, which is dominated by the ISLOCA, would not be significantly impacted by the proposed change. ISLOCA goes to core damage that the LPI system cannot mitigate. Therefore, there is no impact on the LPI CT change requested.
The dominant sequences requiring LPI in the SGTR analysis are those where cooling for normal decay heat removal is the desired end state. Failure to establish normal decay heat removal is dominated by failures of the valves that must open to align the reactor coolant system (RCS) to the LPI pump suction and not the LPI pump trains.
Early Containment Failure (ECF) is a relatively small issue for pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants with large dry containments. The extended LPI CT has no impact on the ECF probability. This contribution to LERF would be expected to be roughly proportional to the change in CDF and a small fraction of its value.
4)
The completeness in modeling common cause basic events in the Revision 2 PRA model was potentially inadequate. No justification was provided for omitting a number of common cause component groups, such as check valves and batteries, typically found in other PRAs.
Licensee response: For the LPI system, the only failure mode of interest for common cause consideration is failure of check valves to open on demand. A review of the industry database found only one Common Cause Failure (CCF) event of LPI check valves to open, indicating a minor susceptibility to CCF. There were only a handful of events among boiling water reactor (BWR) plants in their residual heat removal systems, and all of these were check valves in the injection header side of the system. Given this information, it was concluded that the LPI injection header check valves 3LP-47 and 3LP-48 should be modeled for CCF in conjunction with the core flood check valves 3CF-12 and 3CF-14. Including these CCF events in the model does not impact the change in risk associated with the CT extension.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees proposed license amendment to TS 3.5.3, Condition A, including its responses regarding the quality of the licensees PRA. The NRC staff finds that the impact on plant risk of allowing a 7-day CT for a single LPI train is very small, considering both internal and external events. Allowing a 7-day CT meets the acceptance guidelines in RGs 1.74 and 1.777, as well as 10 CFR 50.36, and the terms and conditions approved in BAW-2295A Revision 1. In addition, the licensee has committed to implement the compensatory measures delineated in BAW-2295A, Revision 1. Based upon insights from the PRA peer review and licensee resolution of peer review findings, the NRC staff judges that the Oconee PRA is of sufficient quality to support this LCO change request.
The extension of the LPI CT from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 7 days for one LPI train inoperable does not impact any assumptions and inputs in the safety analyses. The increased CT will allow longer corrective maintenance to be completed at power without requiring a plant shutdown and will reduce shutdowns due to a LCO requirement. The NRC staff, therefore concludes that the risks associated with the proposed licensee amendment are acceptable.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the South Carolina State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (67 FR 78577). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: K. Desai M. L. Wohl Date: June 18, 2003
Oconee Nuclear Station cc:
Ms. Lisa F. Vaughn Legal Department (ECIIX)
Duke Energy Corporation 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006 Anne W. Cottingham, Esquire Winston and Strawn 1400 L Street, NW Washington, DC 20005 Manager, LIS NUS Corporation 2650 McCormick Drive, 3rd Floor Clearwater, Florida 34619-1035 Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7812B Rochester Highway Seneca, South Carolina 29672 Mr. Henry Porter, Director Division of Radioactive Waste Management Bureau of Land and Waste Management Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201-1708 Mr. Michael A. Schoppman Framatome ANP 1911 North Ft. Myer Drive Suite 705 Rosslyn, VA 22209 Mr. L. E. Nicholson Compliance Manager Duke Energy Corporation Oconee Nuclear Site 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, South Carolina 29672 Ms. Karen E. Long Assistant Attorney General North Carolina Department of Justice P. O. Box 629 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Mr. C. Jeffrey Thomas Manager - Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Duke Energy Corporation 526 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006 Mr. Richard M. Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection North Carolina Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources 3825 Barrett Drive Raleigh, North Carolina 27609-7721 Mr. Peter R. Harden, IV VP-Customer Relations and Sales Westinghouse Electric Company 6000 Fairview Road 12th Floor Charlotte, North Carolina 28210 Mr. Ronald A. Jones Vice President, Oconee Site Duke Energy Corporation P.O. Box 1439 Seneca, SC 29679