ML030700130

Summary of Facility Changes, Tests & Experiments, Design Change No.00-004, Sections 1.0 - 4.0

ML030700130
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	03/04/2003
From:	Heacock D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML030700130 (99)

Text

Engineering Review and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change TitlelStation/Unit 2. Design Change Number 00-004 Service Water Blowdown / NAPS / Ur~its 1 & 2 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The root cause evaluation of stainless steel SW piping pitting corrosion has been performed by the SW Task Team. Category I Root Cause N-99-0587, "Pitting Corrosion of Stainless Steel SW Components" has concluded that the root cause of the pitting is abundant microbiological activity in an aggressive environment. One of the components of the aggressive environment is increased chlorides and other impurities due to the absence of SW reservoir blowdown.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION of Blowdown of the SW reservoir is recommended by the Task Team to reduce the concentration chlorides and other impurities. This DCP will provide a permanent piping pathway which will allow the implementation of SW reservoir blowdown to reduce the concentration of the SW impurities.

The blowdown will be implemented with the installation of a 6" pipe which will allow a blowdown rate of approximately 900 gpm from the SW return header into the Unit 2 circulating water discharge tunnel. One screen wash pump will operate during the blowdown cycle, which is approximately 28 days (estimated time to reduce SW chloride concentration from 180 ppm to 50 ppm). The duration and frequency of the periodic blowdown will be controlled by Station Chemistry and Engineering. SW reservoir level will be maintained between 314"-0" and 315"-0" during the cycle. The capacity of one screen wash pump is approximately equal to reservoir losses plus blowdown at proposed rate of 900 gpm, therefore, the reservoir level is expected to remain the same during the blowdown cycle.

2.1 Proposed Design Configuration The SW system will operate in its normal mode (one SW pump on each header and CCHXs in normal alignment and throttled in accordance with the operating procedures) to implement the proposed resolution (see above).

A six inch SS line (6"-WS-G114-163-Q3) will connect SW lines 24"-WS- 59-151-Q3 and 24"-WS 58-151-Q3 in accordance with drawings N-00004-0-IFMO78A sh.5 and N-00004-0-M-400 sh.l. A six inch globe valve 1-SW-1 351 and flow indicator 1-SW-FS-113 will be installed on the six inch blowdown line. The recommended blowdown rate is 900 gpm. The flow indicator range is 0-1300 gpm. The blowdown rate will be controlled by throttling globe valve 1-SW-1351. One screenwash pump (1-CW-P-2B or 2-CW-P-2A) will operate during the blowdown cycle to supply the necessary makeup. Note that the blowdown will be performed through return header "A", line 24"-WS-59 151-Q3, therefore makeup will be aligned to header "B". It is evaluated that at this blowdown rate (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change TitlelStation/Unit 2. Design Change Number Service Water Blowdown I NAPS I Units 1 & 2 00-004 SW level in the reservoir will be maintained approximately the same. Therefore, initial reservoir level should be between 314'-0" and 315'-0". The blowdown will be achieved by opening valves 2 SW-MOV-220A, 1-SW-MOV-120B and 1-SW-1351. It is calculated that it will take approximately 28 days to reduce SW chloride concentration from 180 ppm to 50 ppm.

It is recommended that two SR screen wash pumps are available prior to starting the blowdown cycle and no maintenance of the pumps is planned for the-cycle period (approximately 28 days). If a DBA (LOCA plus LOOP) occurs and makeup water is lost, blowdown may be terminated by closing one of the following valves: 2-SW-MOV-220A or 1-SW-MOV-120B (from the Main Control Room) or 1-SW-1351 manually. Estimated time to close these valves without losing SW inventory is 45 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br /> from the initiation of the DBA. It is recommended to establish this time as 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> from the initiation of the event. Blowdown will be terminated immediately if radiation monitor 1 SW-RM-108 detects radiation. The blowdown will be terminated within 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> if the operating screen wash pump failed and second one cannot be started.

Calculation ME-0605 supports all the above data.

The blowdown piping and its supports were analyzed and the piping integrity was verified in calculations CE-1519 and CE-1524.

The basic SW system functions and configuration are not altered as a result of this modification.

Applicable piping design and construction code B31.7 will be satisfied. This modification will not adversely affect the basic functions of the SW system and will not create an accident of a different type than was previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The environmental impact of the discharge of SW to the discharge tunnel has been reviewed by the Environmental Compliance group and determined to have no significant adverse environmental impact. The discharge of the SW reservoir to Outfall 108 of the current VPDES permit has already been analyzed and is an approved discharge path.

2 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Service Water Blowdown I NAPS / Units 1 &2 00-004 3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.2.1 of the UFSAR describes SW system. Periodic blowdown of the SW reservoir is not described in this section or any other section of the UFSAR. The six inch SW blowdown line will be installed to crossconnect SW discharge lines 24"-WS-58-151-Q3 and 24"-WS-59-151-Q3 between the return header MOVs that discharge to the Unit 2 circ. water discharge tunnel (see drawing N 00004-0-1FM078A, sh.4). The blowdown rate will be maintained at 900 gpm during the blowdown implementation. Calculation ME-0605 shows that design basis flows and the SW reservoir inventory will be maintained to mitigate a design basis event.

UFSAR Change Request FN 99-032 is included in Appendix 1-1.

3.3 Fire Protection / Appendix "R" This DCP involves the modification of the flow path of the SW return lines during periodic SW reservoir blowdown. The Appendix "R" Design Summary Checklist has been reviewed. Drawing 11715-DAR-078A, sh. 4 is affected and shall be revised per corresponding DCP drawings. The proposed modification does not affect equipment performance and flow rates including the ability of equipment to perform safety functions in case of a fire.

3.71nservice Inspection I Inservice Testing A six inch SW blowdown line will be installed to crossconnect SW discharge lines 24"-WS-58-151 Q3 and 24"-WS-59-151-Q3 between the return header MOVs that discharge to the Unit 2 circ.

water discharge tunnel (see drawing N-00004-0-1 FM078A, sh.4). The new piping will be leak tested in accordance with ASME Code Case N-416-1. Note that the use of this code case requires additional NDE of Class 3 welds and documentation on a NIS-2 form. The ISI system pressure test program and the IWV program are affected since the piping configuration has been changed. The requirements of VPAP-0307 are applied.

3.8 Seismic The Service Water System is a Safety Related Seismic Class 1 System and is designed in accordance with the ANSI B31.7 code of 1969 with addendum through 1970, Class 3.

New SW pipes and pipes modified under this DCP are qualified to loading conditions which include Operational Basis Earthquakes (OBE) and Design Basis Earthquakes (DBE) in addition to 3

(May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design 0

VIRGINIA POWER

-IST - oNo

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change Title/StationlUnlt 00-004 Service Water Blowdown I NAPS I Units 1 & 2 for all conditions to normal operating conditions. The piping and pipe supports were analyzed conditions ensure the piping structural integrity under normal operational and accident (Calculations CE-1519 and CE-1524).

3.22 Equipment Data System will be added as a result A SW blowdown line with a six inch globe valve, drains and flow indicator were prepared to reflect of the incorporation of this DCP. EDS card numbers 15255 and15392 the above changes.

3.27 Inventory OptimizationlSummary of Equipment Added or Removed SW system. The line A six inch line for periodic SW reservoir blowdown line will be added to the 1-4 for the Table of will be equipped with a globe valve and a flow indicator. See Appendix Equipment added/removed.

3.28 System and Plant Design Basis Document reservoir. Calculation This DCP adds a 6" dia SW blowdown line for periodic blowdown of the SW CE-1524 verify ME-0605 determines the blowdown rate and duration. Calculations CE-1519 and Therefore, corresponding adequacy of the piping stresses and supports for the design conditions.

will be included in DBD figures will be revised per the DCP drawings. The above calculations of the Chapter 25 of SDBD-NAPS-SW and the DCP description will be added to Table 20.1-1 Section 14.1.20.

DBD. The periodic SW blowdown flow indicator will be added to Chapter 14, See Appendix 1-2 for the DBD Change Request 3.30 Environmental Impact (Non-radiological) amine The activity will result in the release of low concentrations of Calgon's H-1 30 (quantentary The biocide), H-901G (oxidizing biocide), and TRC-256 (molybdate corrosion inhibitor).

at a Environmental Compliance group has reviewed the proposed chemical and biocide release concluded it will rate of 9000 gpm and an overall volume of 40 Mgal during three days and have have a negligible environmental impact due to the existing low concentrations of the chemicals with the CW and Biocides, the short half-lives of the Biocides, and the dilution of the SW discharge flow (on the order of 1000 times).

Since the proposed discharge rate under this DCP is 900 gpm, ten times less than the initially evaluated rate, with approximately the same overall release volume (40 Mgal), the release (900 gpm during 29 days) is bounded by the above evaluation. Also, the Environmental Compliance 4

(May 97)

Engineering Review and Design VIRGINIA POWER

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 00-004 Service Water Blowdown / NAPS / Units I &2 Group stated that VPDES permit does not require discharged SW to be diluted with the CW (drawing NA-VPDES-083199-001, Rev.1).

3.32 Nuclear Control Room Operator Development Program Training Modules SW modification performed by this DCP requires a change in the NCRODP-13. Figure 13.3 sh.1 shall be changed and page 6 of the NCRODP will be revised in accordance with Appendix 1-3 to the DCP.

3.34Labeling New valves and a flow indicator will be added to accommodate periodic SW system blowdown.

Component Label Specifications (CLSs) have been prepared and are included in Section 2 Appendix 2-1. Note that Label Type and Facsimile - Noun Name on Component Label Specifications may be changed at discretion of operations.

4.0 REFERENCES

• indicates revision is required 4.1 Calculations

1. ME-0605, Rev.0 Service Water Blowdown

2. CE-1519, Rev.0 Pipe Stress Analysis of Service Water Blowdown Line 6"-WS-114-163-Q3 Located In SW Valve Pit 3 CE-1524. Rev.0 Pipe Supports for Service Water Blowdown Line 4.2 Specifications

1. NAP-0017. Rev.1, Add.11 Specification for Manually Operated Carbon Steel and Stainless Steel Gate, Globe and Check Valves 2 1/2" and Larger. NAPS, Unit 1 & 2.

2 NAP-0097, Rev.0, Add.2 Specification for Flow Orifice Plates. NAPS, Unit 1 & 2.

4.3 Technical Report No. MT-0022, Rev.0. Mock-up Requirements for Evaluating Coating Repairs. Service Water Reservoir Blowdown DCP 00-004, North Anna, Units 1 and 2 (May 97)

0 VIRGINIA POWEJ?

Design Change 1 Design Change Title/Station/Unit 12 Design Change No Loop Isolation Valve - Removal of Disc Pressurization Piping/ NAPS/ Unit 1 100-111 3 Component Mark No. 4 WR.JWO Valves 1 -RC-185, 1-RC-186.1-RC-189, 1 °RC-190,1 .RC-194 &1-RC-195 o,43d!ý7!"7 5 Safety Evaluation 6 Involves An Unreviewed 7. Technical Specification 8 Approval Level 9. Q A Category Required*i Safety Question? Change Required? [ Station [ SR [] NSO E] Yes 0 No [] Yes ED No [3 Yes [D No QMSRC/NRC EJNS 10 Preparing Engineer/Affiliation (Print) 11 nSnature _ i 12. Date W.W. Chaisson/ Virginia Power 4 Z 13 Mechanical Ind Reviewer/Affiliation (Print) 14 Signature 15 Date K.U Avy / Vd}R," . /Z" 0 4-2,7-00 16 Electrical Ind Reviewer/Affiliation (Print) 17 Signature 18 Date 19 Civil Ind Reviewer/Affiliation (Prnt) 20 Signatur 21 Date 22 Other Reviewer/Afliation (Print) 23 Signature 24 Date 25 Other Reviewer/Affilidio (Print) 26. Signature 27. Date 28 Otner Reviewer/Affilation (Print) 31 Other Reviewer/Affiliation (Print) 32. Signature 1/ 33 Date Appendix"R" MA Bourdeau __.,_,,_ _-_-_

_ , 4' I-CG 34 Project Engineer or Supervisor (Print) 35 Signature 36. Date 37 Systems Engineer (Print) 38 Siture a 39 Date W C Harper 40 Supervisor of Testing and Inspection (Print) 42.

D H Smith L2T 43 Design Control Engineer (Print) 44. Sgau45 Date L D Runyon L4 f 5- -o 46 SNSOC Review- V (k

[] SNSOC to review the Operational Readiness Reviews? (Check if yes)

Remarks 47 SNSOC Chair'an (Print) 48 149 Date, UJ Key Ind-independent f Sept 97 0

TABLE OF CONTENTS Loop Isolation Valve - Removal of Disc Pressurization Piping/ NAPS/ Unit 1 DCP 00-111 No of TITLE Pages Section 1 - Design Engineering Review and Design 3 1

Programs Review Checklist 5 Controlled Document Summary 13 Safety Evaluation Appendices 1-1 NCRODP-38 3 1

1-2 VTMCR 2 1-3 Engineering Change Request 1-4 Engineering Evaluation of Vibration Readings Section 2 - Implementing Information Supplemental Implementing Information 1 1

Materials List Drawing Rbvision Record 1

Appendices 2-1 Equipment Added/Removed Drawings

EngineeringReview and Design 0

VIRGINIA POWER I ST -N0 1 I6 1 Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2 Design Change Number Loop Isolation Valve - Removal of Disc Pressurization Piping/ NAPS/ Unit 1 00-111 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM REA 1999-088 requests the elimination of the upper disc pressurization connections on the Reactor Coolant loop stop valves. The upper valve connections (located at the valve body flange) were designed for disc pressurization and for venting the valve body Each valve connection is inspected during refueling outages for indications of high cycle fatigue failure Removal of the disc pressurization connection (valve and flange) will reduce the potential for this type failure 2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION The Reactor Coolant System Loop Stop Valves enable isolation of their respective loops from the reactor vessel and from the other two loops for loop maintenance during plant shutdown The loop stop valves are double disc motor operated gate valves. The valves are only used during refueling outages for maintenance operations The disc pressurization connections were used to pressurize the internal volume between the discs to reduce seat leakage dunng loop maintenance activities The disc pressurization connections are no longer used since makeup to the refueling cavity and the capacity of the PDTT pumps are sufficient to process the volume of leakage (Ref. ET SE-95-025). The lower disc pressurization valves and flanges were removed and the connections capped by DCPs92-299 and 93-243 on Unit I and 2 respectively. The upper disc pressurization valves and flanges will be removed and the lines capped The upper connectton is made of 314 inch diameter pipe and is attached to the loop stop valve on the face of the body flange outside diameter. The pipe branches at a tee for the loop stop valve body vent and disc pressurization connection. The disc pressurization connection includes a root valve and blind flange assembly cantilevered out from the tee. The vent line is upstream of the disc pressurization root valve and is provided for relieving pressure in the loop stop valve bonnet cavity. The body vent lines are tied into the cold leg stop valve bypass lines. Check valves in the vent lines allow bonnet relief and prevents back flow to the valve bonnet.

The North Anna Unit I Loop B cold leg loop stop valve upper disk pressurization line failed in May, 1991 due to high cycle fatigue failure. A subsequent Type 1 Report, NP-2700, provided discussion and recommendations At the time the Type 1 Report was written, the upper disc pressurization connections were still being used, therefore, the report did not recommend the upper disc pressurization valve and flange removal as an option The report did discuss and recommend the removal of the lower disc pressurization valves and flanges As discussed in the Type 1 Report for the lower connections, the removal of the valve and flanges reduces the cantilevered weight thereby reducing the static load on the weld connection. Although the piping configuration for the upper connections include the valve body vent lines, which are not being removed, the removal of the cantilevered weight of the disc pressurization valve and flanges will decrease the potential for fatigue failure The valve and blind flange assembly are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The upper disc pressurization piping will be modified by removing the valve and flanges and capping the line on the run side of the tee after the branch for the body vent line All work will be in accordance with NAS 1009 for pipe class 1502 and B31 7 Class 1 Page 1 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER SDI GN00o01

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2 Design Change Number Loop Isolation Valve - Removal of Disc Pressurization Piping/ NAPS/ Unit 1 00-111 After removal of the disc pressurization valves and flanges and capping of the lines, vibration testing will be performed under flow conditions An engineering evaluation of the vibration results will be used to determine if additional actions are required to further decrease the potential for fatigue failure (See Appendix 1-4) 3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.3 Fire ProtectiontAppendix "R" The reactor coolant piping including the loop stop valve body vent and disc pressurization piping is part of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. The reactor coolant system is an Appendix "R" system. The removal of the disc pressurization valve and flanges and installing pipe caps does not effect the reactor coolant system from achieving the performance goals identified in the Appendix 'R" Report Appendix "R" drawings 11715-DAR-93A Sh 1, 2 & 3 will be updated to show the removal of the disc pressurization piping. This modification does not adversely impact the Station's design basis for compliance with Appendix "R" to 10CFR50 There are no combustibles being added or removed as a result of this modification. In addition, the Reactor Containment is identified as a fire area but is not tracked for combustible loading, therefore, there is no change to the area combustible loading summary.

3.7 Inservice InspectionlInservice Testing The upper disc pressurization connection on each loop stop valve is inspected for cracking due to cyclic fatigue failure The removal of the piping will eliminate the need for future inspections The disc pressurization piping is shown on the ISI Classification Boundary and Pressure Testing drawings. These drawings will be updated to show the removal of the disc pressurization piping.

3.8 Seismic The reactor coolant piping and associated loop stop valve body vent piping is designed and analyzed to seismic class 1 requirements. Seismic class 1 stress report 11715-SSR-15 has been reviewed and there is no reanalysis required as a result of removing the upper disc pressurization connections The existing analysis will envelope the revised configuration.

3.10 In Containment Coating and banned/Restricted Materials Engineering Change Request 1657 has been initiated to identify that valves containing stellite have been removed from the reactor coolant system. Appendix 1-3 3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS)

Electronic EDSCR 14394 has been initiated for components removed by this DCP.

Page 2 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER I ST-G-00B

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2 Design Change Number Loop Isolation Valve - Removal of Disc Pressurization Piping/ NAPS/ Unit 1 00-111 3.23 ALARA The modification is being performed in the Reactor Containment, which is a radiologically controlled area. The work consists of removing 3/4" valves and flanges and capping the lines for upper disc pressurization connections in each of the loop rooms (2 connections per loop room) All work will be performed under an RWP. The exposure estimate for the removal of piping, valves and supports is 400 mRem per loop room and 1200 mRem total 3.26 Impactoflon Other Design Changes DCP-9::FF-has been initiated to im lement a similar type change to Unit 2.

3.27 Summary of Equipment Added or Removed Equipment Added/Removed is identified in Appendix 2-1.

3.32 NCRODP NCRODP-38, Reactor Coolant System will require revision as a result of this DCP. Appendix 1-1 includes mark-ups of the applicable pages. Appendix 1-1 mark-ups assume Unit 2 will be implemented first 3.36 Vendor Technical Manuals (VTMs)

The VTMCR is included in Appendix 1-2

4.0 REFERENCES

NCRODP-38 11715-FP-3T, U, W, X, Y, Z, AA, AB & AC Type 1 Report NP-2700 VTM 59-WB93-00047 Page 3 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER I ST-GS00

1. Design Change Tdie/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number 00-118 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Transmitter Replacement I NAPS I Unit 1 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM many failures The RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet flow transmitter, 1-RH-FT-1605, has experienced is a Foxboro model and is subject to calibration drift due to its age and service. The transmitter and El 3DM that is no longer made and repair parts are no longer available. The transmitter manifold need to be replaced.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION The RHR Flow transmitter has a Kerotest manifold that is directly mounted to the transmitter.

The transmitter is to be replaced with Rosemount transmitter and the Kerotest manifold will be replaced with an Anderson-Greenwood five-valve manifold.

The RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet flow transmitter provides a flow indication function. The transmitter provides RHR flow indication on the control room vertical board. The safety function of the RHR Flow transmitter is as RHR system pressure boundary.

The existing transmitter is a Foxboro model E13DM with a maximum calibration range of 0-800" H20 and static pressure limit of 3000 psi. The replacement Rosemount transmitter model 11 52DP6N92 will also be calibrated for a 0-800" H20 range and is rated for 3000 psig maximum working pressure (@ 681F) which is acceptable for the system design pressure of 600 psig (@ 400DF) per Reference 4.5. The model 11 52DP6 Rosemount transmitter is suitable for calibration within a 0-17 psid to 0-100 psid differential range. The calibration of 0-800" H 20 differential is roughly equivalent to 0-28.9 psid. The replacement flow transmitter will be installed on the same instrument rack that the existing transmitter is currently installed.

The existing Kerotest valve manifold will be replaced with new Anderson-Greenwood 5-valve manifold that cannot be directly mounted to the new transmitter. The manifold will be mounted separately on the same mounting plate as the new transmitter. The new manifold will provide valves for line isolation, equalization, and testing. 1/2" stainless steel welded tubing stubs will be provided at the process connections and 3/8" tubing stubs will be welded to the instrument connections. The 3/8" tubing will be field bent to allow direct connection to the transmitter tubing fitting. Swagelok male connectors will be installed into the manifold test ports to facilitate testing and calibration. The manifold body is suitable for 6000 psig @

100 0 F, but with welded 1/2" 10.065" wall) tube stubs, the pressure rating is reduced to 4500 psig @ 1000F.

The original transmitter and Kerotest manifold weigh approximately 60 pounds. The replacement transmitter and manifold weigh approximately 24 pounds. There will be a net weight decrease of 36 pounds per transmitter in the instrument racks and on the pipe stands because of this modification. These racks were installed in accordance with NAS 90-41 and are qualified to support seismic equipment. The weight change will not adversely affect 1 (a 7 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design WlRGINIJA POWER UI STl[G0III1 I

1. Desllgn Change TitlelStation/Unit Residu al Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet I be mounted in accordance seismic qualifications of the racks. The transmitter and manifold will with NAI-0001 requirements.

The A transmitter mounting bracket will be provided with the Rosemount transmitter.

will be welded to the existing transmitter bracket will be bolted to the mounting plate which instrument rack supports in accordance with drawing N-O01 18-2-M-800.

plate below the The instrument valve manifold will be attached to the same mounting N-O01 18-2-M-800, Sht 4 of 5. The bracket transmitter using a bracket fabricated per drawing to the bracket.

will be bolted to the mounting plate and the manifold will be bolted 3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.3 Appendix R flow The RHR System is an Appendix "R" Safe Shutdown system, however, the of the system transmitter is not a safe shutdown component other than being part no pressure boundary. No additional combustibles are being added by this DCP, changes to the Appendix "R" Report are required and the activity will not adversely impact the design basis for compliance with Appendix "R" to 10CFR5O.

3.4 Equipment Qualification These RHR flow transmitter are located in a potentially harsh environment. This equipment however is safety related only because it provides a system pressure boundary. The transmitter signal is electrically non-safety related since it does not provide any control or protection function. The specifications for the replacement to meet Rosemount transmitter include a stainless steel body and electronics housing EDS classifies the existing Foxboro equipment requirements for containment service.

to be transmitter as non-EQ. There is no requirement for transmitter in this application EQ qualified and thus the new Rosemount transmitter will not be EQ qualified.

3.7 Inservice Inspection The transmitter' high and low side piping and tubing are within the ISI classification However, the boundaries and are, therefore, included in the ASME Section XI program.

tubing is /2/" which is exempt from the ASME Section Xl Repair/Replacement requirements.

Lny~,7 2 "7\

rWay Il

Engineering Review and Design

- VIRGINIA RPdWER STD GN-00 1.Design Change Title/S Residu at Heat Removal 3.8 Seism ic in a 36 lb. net weight The replacement of the transmitter and manifold will result are mounted. The racks reduction per transmitter in each instrument rack in which they and are seismically qualified.

were procured and installed in accordance with NAS 90-41 seismically designed The transmitter and manifold will be rigidly mounted to the The manifold mounting bracket will be mounting plate per drawing N-001 18-2-M-800.

fabricated per drawing N-001 18-2-M-800, Sht 4 of 5.

been seismically The transmitter mounting bracket for Rosemount transmitter has and the mounting plate qualified by the vendor. The valve manifold mounting bracket for seismic adequacy in for the transmitter and valve manifold have been evaluated accordance with Calculation DEO-0359.

3.15 Post-Accident Monitoring (Reg. Guide 1.97) classified in EDS, The RHR Flow Transmitter is a Reg. Guide 1.97 component as harsh environment Variable D-01, Category 3. Although it is located in a potentially and no safety inside the containment, the transmitter is not Environmentally Qualified the RHR system is related electrical circuits are involved. Per UFSAR section 5.5.4.3.3, not required to operate in the post-accident containment atmosphere.

3.18 EPIX transmitters identified Review of EPIX Failure Summary Report for Rosemount 1152 of the identified twelve instances of industry events involving these transmitters. None involved 1-CN-LT-100B failures involved pressure boundary leakage. One of the events Rosemount 1152 at North Anna but the event was not due to transmitter failure.

operation at NAPS and this model is transmitters have a proven history of reliable suitable for this service and environmental conditions.

Uncertainty Calculation 3.19 Setpoints, Station Curves, Instrument Scaling and Instrument opposed to the 0.50%

The accuracy of the Rosemount transmitter is 0.25% of span as for the RHR flow loops, of span for the Foxboro. The instrument uncertainty calculation transmitter. The Calculation EE-0328, will require revision to reflect the new model on 0.75% instrument accuracy and existing instrument calibration procedures are based it is desired to revise the allowable accuracy to 0.50%.

Tolerance Document" Technical Report EE-0099 "North Anna Power Station Instrument number. The will require revision due to the change in manufacturer and model 3

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EngineeringReview and Design

". VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change TitlelStation/Unit 2. Design Change Number Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Transmitter Replacement / NAPS / Unit 1 00-118 necessary updates are attached as Appendix 1-1. The setpoint and PLS documents do not require revision.

The scale on the VX-252 indicators in the control room and simulator will not be affected.

3.21 Radio Frequency Interference Review This design change involves replacement of electronic equipment, however, the electronic signal produced by the transmitter is non-safety related. The signal does not provide any control or protection function and cannot affect other safety related equipment or circuitry. All associated cabling to the transmitter is shielded to mitigate RFI effects.

3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS)

This DCP is modifying existing components in EDS. The transmitter Bill of Materials information is being modified. An electronic EDS change request (EDSCR 0000014679) has been prepared for the transmitter, manifold, and each of the manifold's five valves.

3.23 ALARA This design modification will be performed in the El. 216' Reactor Containment annulus, which is a radiation area. The work shall be performed in accordance with an RWP.

The dose estimate is as follows:

16 Man-Hours x 4 mR/Hour = 64 mR NOTE: Assembly of the new Rosemount level transmitter and associated mounting hardware should be performed outside the RCA area to limit the amount of radiation exposure received by installation personnel.

3.25 Recent NRC and Industry Concerns Plant Issue N-2000-0951 was submitted during the Unit 1 Refueling Outage for difficult operation of the manifold equalizing valve on 1-RH-FT-1605. That manifold will be replaced by this design change.

4 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design V

.VIRTGINIA P0 POWER S.TD-GN0001

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Transmitter Replacement I NAPS / Unit 1 00-118 3.27 Inventory Optimization / Summary of Equipment Added or Removed The following equipment will be added or removed by this design change.

Mark # Add/Rem Mfq Model Location Function 1-RH-FT-1 605 Rem Foxboro E13DM 216' RC Annulus Flow Transmitter Rosemount 1152DP6 216' RC Annulus Flow Transmitter 1-RH-FT-1 605 Add Rem Kerotest 216' RC Annulus 5-Valve Manifold 1-RH-MAN-1 605A AGCO DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus 5-Valve Manifold 1-RH-MAN-1 605A Add Rem Kerotest 216' RC Annulus Isolation Valve (H) 1 -RH-ICV-3012 Add AGCO DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus Isolation Valve (H) 1-RH-ICV-3012 Rem Kerotest 216' RC Annulus Test Valve (H) 1-RH-ICV-3013 Add AGCO DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus Test Valve (H) 1-RH-ICV-3013 Rem Kerotest 216' RC Annulus Equalizing Valve 1-RH-ICV-3014 Add AGCO DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus Equalizing Valve

.- RH-ICV-3014 Rem Kerotest 216' RC Annulus Isolation Valve (L) 1-RH-ICV-3015 Add AGCO DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus Isolation Valve (L) 1-RH-ICV-3015 Rem Kerotest 216' RC Annulus Test Valve (L) 1-RH-ICV-3016 Add AGCO DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus Test Valve (LW 1 -RH-ICV-3016 Inventory optimization review was performed by Joan Purdy, BOM Coordinator, with the determination that there are no items in inventory that will become obsolete by this DCP.

3.34 Labeling Labels that are removed from the existing manifold and transmitter will be reused on the replacement manifold and transmitter. No new labels will be required.

3.37 Reactivity Management Accurate measurement of RHR flow ensures adequate decay heat removal and boron mixing within the RCS. This modification is beneficial to reactivity management.

5 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER I GN-0001JI eSTD

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change TitlelStationlUnit 00-118 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Transmitter Replacement I NAPS ) Unit 1 3.40 Maintenance Rule flow The M-Rule functions that are applicable to these DCPs, which replace the RH and RH0O6. Function RH005 states that the RH transmitters for each unit, are RHOO5 system provides long-term heat removal capability and RC system over-pressure by protection during cold shutdown following a limiting fire or explosion as required Appendix R. This function is not in the scope of M-Rule, and therefore has no adverse that impact. The flow transmitter replacement is also applicable to RH006, which states the RH system provides Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation (SR and NSQ). This function where is in the scope of M-Rule and there are no adverse impacts related to these DCPs, the DCPs will enhance reliability.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 NAI-0001, "Specification for the Installation of Instrumentation", Rev 3.

4.2 NCRODP-40, "RHR System" 4.3 UFSAR section 5.5.4 4.4 Tech. Spec. 4.9.8.1.2, 4.9.8.2.2 4.5 NAPS System Design Basis Document, "RHR System" 4.6 DCP 95-223, "Replacement of SI Flow Transmitters", NAPS, Unit 2 4.7 VTM 59-R711-00004, "Rosemount Model 1152 Alphaline Pressure Transmitter for Nuclear Service" 4.8 VTM 59-A062-00001, "Anderson Greenwood Nuclear Instrumentation Manifolds" 4.9 ICP-RH-1-F-1605 4.10 Technical Report EE-0099 "North Anna Power Station Instrument Tolerance Document" 4.11 Calculation DEO-359 4.12 Station Drawings 11715-FM-094A, Sheet 2 11715-FK-094A, Sheet 1 I,=d, .

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0 Engineering Review and Design VIRGINIA POWER IID ]G 000l

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Transmitter Replacement I NAPS / Unit 2 00-119 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet flow transmitter, 2-RH-FT-2605, has experienced many failures and is subject to calibration drift due to its age and service. The transmitter is a Foxboro model El3DM that is no longer made and repair parts are no longer available. The transmitter and manifold need to be replaced.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION The RHR Flow transmitter has a Kerotest manifold that is directly mounted to the transmitter.

The transmitter is to be replaced with Rosemount transmitter and the Kerotest manifold will be replaced with an Anderson-Greenwood five-valve manifold.

The RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet flow transmitter provides a flow indication function. The transmitter provides RHR flow indication on the control room vertical board. The safety function of the RHR Flow transmitter is as RHR system pressure boundary.

The existing transmitter is a Foxboro model El 3DM with a maximum calibration range of 0-800" H 20 and static pressure limit of 3000 psi. The replacement Rosemount transmitter model 11 52DP6N92 will also be calibrated for a 0-800" H 2 0 range and is rated for 3000 psig maximum working pressure (@ 681F) which is acceptable for the system design pressure of 600 psig (@ 400 OF) per Reference 4.5. The model 11 52DP6 Rosemount transmitter is suitable for calibration within a 0-17 psid to 0-100 psid differential range. The calibration of 0-800" H 20 differential is roughly equivalent to 0-28.9 psid. The replacement flow transmitter will be installed on the same instrument rack that the existing transmitter is'currently installed.

The existing Kerotest valve manifold will be replaced with new Anderson-Greenwood 5-valve manifold that cannot be directly mounted to the new transmitter. The manifold will be mounted separately on the same mounting plate as the new transmitter. The new manifpld will provide valves for line isolation, equalization, and testing. %/" stainless steel welded tubing stubs will be provided at the process connections and 3/8" tubing stubs will be welded to the instrument connections. The 3/8" tubing will be field bent to allow direct connection to the transmitter tubing fitting. Swagelok male connectors will be installed into the manifold test ports to facilitate testing and calibration. The manifold body is suitable for 6000 psig @

100 0 F, but with welded 1/2" (0.065" wall) tube stubs, the pressure rating is reduced to 4500 psig @ 1001F.

The original transmitter and Kerotest manifold weigh approximately 60 pounds. The replacement transmitter and manifold weigh approximately 24 pounds. There will be a net weight decrease of 36 pounds per transmitter in the instrument racks and on the pipe stands because of this modification. These racks were installed in accordance with NAS 90-41 and are qualified to support seismic equipment. The weight change will not adversely affect 1 (May 97)

0 EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Transmitter Replacement / NAPS I Unit 2 00-119 seismic qualifications of the racks. The transmitter and manifold will be mounted in accordance with NAI-O001 requirements.

A transmitter mounting bracket will be provided with the Rosemount transmitter. The transmitter bracket will be bolted to the mounting plate which will be welded to the existing instrument rack supports in accordance with drawing N-001 19-2-M-800.

The instrument valve manifold will be attached to the same mounting plate below the transmitter using a bracket fabricated per drawing N-001 1 9-2-M-800, Sht 4 of 5. The bracket will be bolted to the mounting plate and the manifold will be bolted to the bracket.

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.3 Appendix R The RHR System is an Appendix "R" Safe Shutdown system, however, the flow transmitter is not a safe shutdown component other than being part of the system pressure boundary. No additional combustibles are being added by this DCP, no changes to the Appendix "R" Report are required and the activity will not adversely impact the design basis for compliance with Appendix "R" to 10CFR50.

3.4 Equipment Qualification These RHR flow transmitter are located in a potentially harsh'environment. This equipment however is safety related only because it provides a system pressure boundary. The transmitter signal is electrically non-safety related since it does not provide any control or protection function. The specifications for the replacement Rosemount transmitter include a stainless steel body and electronics housing to meet equipment requirements for containment service. EDS classifies the existing Foxboro transmitter as non-EQ. There is no requirement for transmitter in this application to be EQ qualified and thus the new Rosemount transmitter will not be EQ qualified.

3.7 Inservice Inspection The transmitter' high and low side piping and tubing are within the ISI classification boundaries and are, therefore, included in the ASME Section XI program. However, the tubing is 1/2/2 " which is exempt from the ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement requirements.

2 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design 0

VIRGINIA POWER ST-Ge]-001.o1 I

1. Design Change Title/StationrUnit 2. Design Change Number Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Transmitter Replacement / NAPS / Unit 2 00-119 3.8 Seismic The replacement of the transmitter and manifold will result in a 36 lb. net weight reduction per transmitter in each instrument rack in which they are mounted. The racks were procured and installed in accordance with NAS 90-41 and are seismically qualified.

The transmitter and manifold will be rigidly mounted to the seismically designed mounting plate per drawing N-001 19-2-M-800. The manifold mounting bracket will be fabricated per drawing N-001 19-2-M-800, Sht 4 of 5.

The transmitter mounting bracket for Rosemount transmitter has been seismically qualified by the vendor. The valve manifold mounting bracket and the mounting plate for the transmitter and valve manifold have been evaluated for seismic adequacy in accordance with Calculation DEO-0359.

3.10 In Containment Banned/Restricted Materials Unistrut conduit supports attached to the instrument racks in containment may require modification. Unistrut removal may be required to provide space for transmitter installation and the Unistrut support for the local junction box will no longer be needed.

The amount involved is about 1 foot of P-1000 Unistrut. Review of STD-MAT-0006 shows this constitutes a negligible quantity of zinc removal from containment and therefore will not be tracked by this design change.

3.15 Post-Accident Monitoring (Rep. Guide 1.97)

The RHR Flow Transmitter is a Reg. Guide 1.97 component as classified in EDS, Variable D-01, Category 3. Although it is located in a potentially harsh environment inside the containment, the transmitter is not Environmentally Qualified and no safety related electrical circuits are involved. Per UFSAR section 5.5.4.3.3, the RHR system is not required to operate in the post-accident containment atmosphere.

3.18 EPIX Review of EPIX Failure Summary Report for Rosemount 1152 transmitters identified twelve instances of industry events involving these transmitters. None of the identified failures involved pressure boundary leakage. One of the events involved 1-CN-LT-100B at North Anna but the event was not due to transmitter failure. Rosemount 11 52 transmitters have a proven history of reliable operation at NAPS and this model is suitable for this service and environmental conditions.

3 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design 0

VIRGINIA POWER STD-GN-0001

1. Design Change TitlelStation/Urnt 2. Design Change Number Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Transmitter Replacement I NAPS / Unit 2 00-119 3.19 Setpoints, Station Curves, Instrument Scaling, and Instrument Uncertainty Calculations The accuracy of the Rosemount transmitter is 0.25% of span as opposed to the 0.50%

of span for the Foxboro. The instrument uncertainty calculation for the RHR flow loops, Calculation EE-0328, will require revision to reflect the new model transmitter. The existing instrument calibration procedures are based on 0.75% instrument accuracy and it is desired to revise the allowable accuracy to 0.50%.

Technical Report EE-0099 "North Anna Power Station Instrument Tolerance Document" will require revision due to the change in manufacturer and model number. The necessary updates are attached as Appendix 1-1. The setpoint and PLS documents do not require revision.

The scale on the VX-252 indicators in the control room and simulator will not be affected.

3.21 Radio Frequency Interference Review This design change involves replacement of electronic equipment, however, the electronic signal produced by the transmitter is non-safety related. The signal does not provide any control or protection function and cannot affect other safety related equipment or circuitry. All associated cabling to the transmitter is shielded to mitigate RFI effects.

3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS)

This DCP is modifying existing components in EDS. The transmitter Bill of Materials information is being modified. An electronic EDS change request (EDSCR 0000015376) has been prepared for the transmitter, manifold, and each of the manifold's five valves.

3.23 ALARA This design modification will be performed in the El. 216' Reactor Containment annulus, which is a radiation area. The work shall be performed in accordance with an RWP.

The dose estimate is as follows:

16 Man-Hours x 4 mR/Hour = 64 mR NOTE: Assembly of the new Rosemount level transmitter and associated mounting hardware should be performed outside the RCA area to limit the amount of radiation exposure received by installation personnel.

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Engineering Review and Design VIRGINIA POWER I STDGN000

1. Design Change Tile/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Transmitter Replacement / NAPS / Unit 2 00-119 3.25 Recent NRC and Industry Concerns No Plant Issues were found on 2-RH-FT-2605. Plant Issue N-2000-0951 was submitted during the Unit 1 Refueling Outage for difficult operation of the manifold equalizing valve on 1-RH-FT-1605.

3.27 Inventory Optimization / Summary of Equipment Added or Removed The following equipment will be added or removed by this design change.

Mark # Add/Rem Mfgp Model Location Function Rem Foxboro El 3DM 216' RC Annulus Flow Transmitter 2-RH-FT-2605 Flow Transmitter Add Rosemount 1152DP6 216' RC Annulus 2-RH-FT-2605 5-Valve Manifold 2-RH-MAN-2605A Rem Kerotest 216' RC Annulus 216' RC Annulus 5-Valve Manifold 2-RH-MAN-2605A Add AGCO DPMHPS Kerotest 216' RC Annulus Isolation Valve (H) 2-RH-ICV-3019 Rem AGCO DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus Isolation Valve (H) 2-RH-ICV-3019 Add Kerotest 216' RC Annulus Test Valve (H) 2-RH-ICV-3020 Rem AGCO DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus Test Valve (H) 2-RH-ICV-3020 Add Kerotest 216' RC Annulus Equalizing Valve 2-RH-ICV-3021 Rem AGCO DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus Equalizing Valve 2-RH-ICV-3021 Add 216' RC Annulus Isolation Valve (L) 2-RH-ICV-3022 Rem Kerotest AGCO DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus Isolation Valve (L) 2-RH-ICV-3022 Add 216' RC Annulus Test Valve (L) 2-RH-ICV-3023 Rem Kerotest DPMHPS 216' RC Annulus Test Valve -(L) 2-RH-ICV-3023 Add AGCO Inventory optimization review was performed by Joan Purdy, BOM Coordinator, with the determination that there are no items in inventory that will become obsolete by this DCP.

3.34 Labeling Labels that are removed from the existing manifold and transmitter will be reused on the replacement manifold and transmitter. No new labels will be required.

5 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER IE,,D-GNI000

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Transmitter Replacement I NAPS / Unit 2 00-119 3.37 Reactivity Management Accurate measurement of RHR flow ensures adequate decay heat removal and boron mixing within the RCS. This modification is beneficial to reactivity management.

3.40 Maintenance Rule The M-Rule functions that are applicable to these DCPs, which replace the RH flow transmitters for each unit, are RH005 and RHOO6. Function RHOO5 states that the RH system provides long-term heat removal capability and RC system over-pressure protection during cold shutdown following a limiting fire or explosion as required by Appendix R. This function is not in the scope of M-Rule, and therefore has no adverse impact. The flow transmitter replacement is also applicable to RHO06, which states that the RH system provides Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation (SR and NSQ). This function is in the scope of M-Rule and there are no adverse impacts related to these DCPs, where the DCPs will enhance reliability.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 NAI-0001, "Specification for the Installation of Instrumentation", Rev 3.

4.2 NCRODP-40, "RHR System" 4.3 UFSAR section 5.5.4 4.4 Tech. Spec. 4.9.8.1.2, 4.9.8.2.2 4.5 NAPS System Design Basis Document, "RHR System" 4.6 DCP 95-223, "Replacement of SI Flow Transmitters", NAPS, Unit 2 4.7 VTM 59-R711-00004, "Rosemount Model 1152 Alphaline Pressure Transmitter for Nuclear Service" 4.8 VTM 59-A062-00001, "Anderson Greenwood Nuclear Instrumentation Manifolds" 4.9 ICP-RH-2-F-2605 4.10 Technical Report EE-0099 "North Anna Power Station Instrument Tolerance Document" 4.11 Calculation DEO-359 4.12 Station Drawings 12050-FM-094A, Sheet 2 12050-FK-094A, Sheet 1 6

(May 97)

0 Engineering Review and Design VIRGINIA POWER STD-GN1000

1. Design Change TitlelStation/Unit 2. Design Change Number TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE SERVO CARD ADJUSTMENT/NAPS/Unit 1 00-125 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Following the 2000 Unit 1 refueling outage when power level was increased to 100%, main turbine governor valve

1. 1, 01-MS-GOV-IA, which was replaced during the outage exhibited unstable control problems. Power had to be reduced to stabilize governor valve control. Engineering concluded that the flow characteristics of the new valve are slightly different than the previous valve causing the valve to require a greater opening to achieve the same flow. At 100% power 01-MS-GOV-1A reached the knee of the valve characteristic curve which caused the instability problem. REA R 2000-063 was issued to Design Engineering to correct this governor control problem to allow Unit 1 to operate at 100% power.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION Governor valve 01-MS-GOV-1A was placed at the end of the turbine governor valve operating sequence by swapping valve #1 and #4 control cards. This was performed under Temporary Modification No. 1654 and justified by Safety Evaluation 97-SE-TM-17 to reduce high harmonic vibration. This was reviewed and approved by Westinghouse and documented by DCP 97-145. Therefore, returning governor valve #4 to the end of the valve operating sequence is not considered to be an acceptable resolution.

Currently 01-MS-GOV-1A reaches the knee of the control curve at approximately 99.5%, which yields unstable valve operation at 100% power. Power has to be reduced to obtain stable turbine operation and control. Westinghouse has confirmed that the resolution to this problem is to place the valve operating point on a more stable portion of the control curve. Westinghouse indicated that a modification to the control curve would not adversely affect valve operation. Previously (Appendix 2-1) Westinghouse has recommended a governor valve recalibration to place the 100% power operating point of the valve on a less steep sloped portion of the control curve. This change in the lift characteristic of the subject valve can be accomplished through recalibration of its Analog Electro-Hydraulic (AEH) servo card settings.

However, recalibration of the servo card requires removal and reinstallation of the card, which has the potential for a unit trip. Westinghouse has recommended that the servo card recalibration be performed during a unit outage.

Therefore, an interim resolution to correct the governor valve control problem will be utilized. Inaccordance with this DCP the Supplemental Work Instructions, MDAP-19, will instruct I&C to reduce the valve position voltage feedback signal. The governor valve Linear Variable Differential Transmitter (LVDT) gain potentiometer for 01-MS.GOV 1A will be adjusted to provide a lower than actual signal for the valve position. This adjustment can be made without removal of a servo card and will place the valve operation below the knee of the characteristic curve for 100% power. The proposed interim resolution has been reviewed and approved by the turbine-generator manufacturer, Siemens Westinghouse Power Corporation (Ref. Appendix 2-3). Itshould be noted that all turbine trips and runbacks will still remain capable of performing their intended functions.

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EngineeringReview and Design 0

VIRGINIA POWER I SD GN-00

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2 Design Change Number TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE SERVO CARD ADJUSTMENT/NAPS/Unit 1 00-125 The permanent repair will be a 01-MS-GOV-1A control curve servo card calibration in accordance with Westinghouse recommendations (Appendix 2-1 page 6). Please note that governor valve #1 is at the end of the operating sequence. Therefore, the recommended settings for governor valve #4 will be used for governor valve #1 servo card recalibration. This will be performed at the appropriate maintenance opportunity. The permanent repair will include a readjustment of the LVDT gain potentiometer to provide an accurate valve position feedback signal.

The proposed final resolution has been reviewed and approved by the turbine-generator manufacturer, Siemens Westinghouse Power Corporation (Ref. Appendix 2-3). Itshould be noted that all turbine trips and runbacks will still remain capable of performing their intended functions.

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.3 Fire Protection/Appendix "R" The turbine governor valves are part of the Main steam System which is listed as an Appendix Rsafe shutdown system. Areview of the Appendix 'R" Design Summary Checklist has determined that the governor valves are not Appendix 'R"components and recalibration of the governor valve servo card will not adversely impact the Station's design basis compliance with Appendix "R"to 10CFR50. No safe shutdown components are involved in this modification. No combustibles are being added by this modification.

Appendix R flow diagrams are not affected by the change. As a result, the Appendix R program is not affected by this modification.

3.9 Human Factors After implementation of the interim solution of adjusting the LVDT gain for governor valve #1,the control room indication of GV1 position will be inaccurate. The indication will read approximately 25% less than the actual valve position. This will be documented in an Abnormal Status log entry to ensure that the operators are aware of this inaccuracy. This indication has no control functions and does not affect any protective circuitry.

3.17 Simulator The interim repair is to be evaluated for potential simulator software changes. The final resolution changes the control curve for 01-MS-GOV-1A which will require a software change.

2 (May 97)

"0 EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER STD -GN-001

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE SERVO CARD ADJUSTMENT/NAPS/Unit 1 00-125 3.25 Recent NRC and Industry Concerns Plant Issue N-2000-1189 was issued against 01-MS-GOV-1A operation at the knee of its characteristic curve, which limits power operation to approximately 99.5%.

3.36 Vendor Technical Manuals AVTMCR is required to incorporate the appropriate recommendations/documentation for the appropriate servo card adjustments performed under this DCP are included as Appendix 1-1.

3.37 Reactivity Management The main turbine affects reactivity by steam demand and subsequent temperature changes to the primary system.

This activity will not change the steam demand following implementation in any way. The turbine control system will remain in"operator auto." Thus, as turbine load is increased following implementation of this DCP, GV-1 will subsequently open to maintain steam demand per design. However, reactivity will be affected during implementation of the proposed interim solution. Specifically, Unit 1 will be ramped down inload only to a point where GV-1 may be fully opened to allow adjustment of the LVDT gain on the servo amp card to ensure smooth load control during and following DCP implementation. For the permanent solution, if implemented while the unit is on-line, Unit 1will be ramped down in load to a point where governor valve #1 is full closed prior to adjusting the servo amp card to ensure smooth load control during and following DCP implementation. The unit changes down and up in power will be performed in accordance with existing Operating Procedures 1-OP-2.2 and 1-OP-2.1, which provide control for items such as ramp rate limitations and Reactor Engineering activities. Thus, the impact by this activity on reactivity will be performed per existing, approved procedures.

3.40 Maintenance Rule The Maintenance Rule is unaffected since this DCP is not introducing any new components into a Safety Related system or impacting a Non-Safety system that could attribute to the failure of a safety system, component, or structure.

3 (May 97)

Engineering Review and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE SERVO CARD ADJUSTMENT/NAPS/Unit 1 00-125

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Number 4 Governor Valve Evaluation NAPS NP-2364 letter, dated 6113/90.

4.2 NCRODP-24.NA, "Main Turbine System".

4.3 NCRODP-31.NA, "Electro-Hydraulic Fluid Control System".

4.4 NCRODP-75.NA, "Main Turbine Generator Control and Protection System".

4.5 SDBD-NAPS-MS, "System Design Basis Document for Main Steam and Ancillary Systems NAPS".

4.6 Unit 1 Governor Valves and Throttle Valves Calibration Procedure, ICP-P-1-EHC-02.

4.7 Unit Startup From Mode 2 to Mode 1 Operating Procedure, NAPS Unit 1, 1-OP-2.1.

4.8 Unit Startup From Mode 1 to Mode 2 Operating Procedure, NAPS Unit 1, 1-OP-2.2.

4 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement / NAPS / Unit 1 00-129 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The Safeguards Exhaust Fan Discharge Dampers must stay open when the fan is running. These are air-to open dampers that fail close on loss of IA.Since IA can not be relied upon after a DBE (not seismic), SR air flasks (1-IA-TK-5A & B and 2-IA-TK-5A & B) have been installed to supply SR air to the AODs for 30days (reference Plant Issue N-1999-3043). Unfortunately, there has been great difficulty in maintaining this system operable due to numerous small leaks which render the individual AODs (and therefore Safeguards Fans) inoperable (reference Plant Issue N-2000-0870, N-2000-0942, N-2000-1238 and N-2000-1273 for each of the Safeguards Fans). A JCO (C-2000-01) has been prepared since these dampers are so problematic, and can place either unit in an immediate shutdown action statement (3.0.3). Repairs have been made for most of the air leaks, but existing leak rates are such that the air flasks can not hold the damper open for 30 days as required. The required action to clear JCO C-2000-01 is to implement a modification as outlined in REA 2000 043. This REA is also a Licensing Commitment (Plant Issue N-2000-1472, required for LER N-2000-003). The REA recommends replacement of the dampers with a backdraft type. Using backdraft dampers has the added benefit of simplifying maintenance (i.e. elimination of existing quarterly PTs performed on IA check valves and 18 month PTs performed on the flasks and air components).

An air-operated damper is located in the discharge duct of each Safeguards Area ventilation exhaust fan. The discharge dampers prevent the back flow of air through a non-operating fan. The operation of the dampers is interlocked with their respective exhaust fans. When the exhaust fan is started, the damper opens; when the fan stops, the damper shuts The air supply to the safeguards exhaust fan discharge damper actuators is from the plant Instrument Air system and provides the motive force to open the damper. The dampers fail shut on loss of operating air. The Instrument Air supply to these dampers is equipped with a backup air bottle (one for each unit's Safeguards Exhaust) On loss of IA pressure, bottled air pressure is designed to maintain the Safeguards Exhaust Fan Discharge dampers open.

The fans are powered from emergency buses Electrical power to the solenoid valve is supplied from its respective safeguards fan circuit. When the fan is running the solenoid valve is open to supply air to the damper actuator. When the fan stops the solenoid valve is de-energized blocking the air supply and bleeding the air from the damper to close. The actuator spring closes the damper on loss of air.

The safeguards exhaust fan air operated discharge dampers will be replaced with backdraft type dampers.

The backdraft damper is a self-closing design that does not require electrical power or instrument air to operate. Installation of limit switches will provide damper position indication, and will meet Reg. Guide 1.97 requirements 2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION The backdraft damper functions in a similar manner to existing dampers but does not require air or electrical power. The backdraft damper opens when a fan is started with air flow across the damper blades and closes by gravity when the fan is stopped.

The air operated dampers are mounted between flanges in the duct with the actuator external. The dampers, actuators, solenoid valves, drain valves, air regulators, instrument air tubing and instrument air accumulators will be removed. The instrument air supply to the instrument air accumulators will be disconnected and the instrument air tubing will be removed and capped locally at the root valve. The electrical cable will be spared in Page 1 of 6 (May 97)

0 Engineering Review and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change Title/StationlUnit 12. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement / NAPS / Unit 1I 00-129 place by de-termination at both the solenoid and fan circuit. Conduit will remain in place but the open end of the rigid conduit will be plugged.

The air operated dampers will be replaced with backdraft type dampers which will be mounted between existing duct flanges. The balance arm, counterweight and blade linkage are external to the damper. As with the air operated dampers, the backdraft dampers will be seismically restrained by the existing supports. The dampers are designed to remain functional during a seismic event.

Two limit switches (proximity switches) will be installed on each damper. One limit switch will provide full open position indication and the other will provide full closed position indication. The limit switches will be inductive non-contact proximity switches to provide damper position indication without physically contacting the damper.

Since the damper performs a safety-related function and must be free to open and close based on duct air flow, the limit switches must be mounted so as to ensure there is no possibility that the switch could physically impede damper movement The non-contact switches can be positioned approximately one inch away from the damper swing arm and still provide reliable damper position indication. The backdraft dampers will be located in the same air flow path as existing dampers, 1-HV-AOD-128-1,2,3 & 4, which require Reg. Guide 1.97 indication. The new damper position indication installed by this modification is electrically non-safety related but will be considered a Reg. Guide 1.97 indication, Category 2, Variable D-34, for emergency ventilation damper position to support existing Reg. Guide 1.97 indication. The position indication for the backdraft dampers will be incorporated into the same ERF indication group as 1-HV-AOD-128-1,2,3 & 4. The Auxiliary Building El 291' area near the Safeguards Area Exhaust Fans is considered a non-harsh post-accident environment and therefore the limit switches will be non-EQ. Each limit switch will be connected to the Validyne Multiplexer system to allow damper position indication via ERF computer point readout in the Control Room 3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.3 Fire ProtectionlAppendix "R" Several areas of the plant require ventilation during safe shutdown in which the ventilation systems (HV) are identified as Appendix "R". The safeguards areas are not identified as requiring ventilation following an Appendix "R" fire scenario The safeguards exhaust fan dampers are part of a safeguards ventilation system. The damper replacement does not alter any Appendix "R" system, system capability or Appendix "R" drawings. This modification does not adversely impact the Station's design basis for compliance with Appendix "R" to 10CFR50.

The backdraft damper materials are non-combustible. All electrical cables will be installed in conduits and cable trays Combustible loading is no longer tracked in the Cable Tray Spreading Room.

Combustibles added to the Auxiliary Building will be tracked by revision to Technical Report EP-0017.

The equivalent fire severity within the Auxiliary Building will remain low; therefore Table 8.1 of the Appendix R Report is not affected.

The installation of conduit and the routing of cable Auxiliary Building and the Cable Spreading Room will require the breaching of multiple fire barriers. Station approved procedures will be used to control these activities.

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0 VIRGINIA POWER EngineeringReview and Design STDGN-00

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement / NAPS / Unit 1 00-129 3.4 Equipment Qualification All equipment installed by this DCP will be non-EQ. The new Reg. Guide 1.97, Category 2, limit switches will be installed in environmental zone AB-291A. Per Revision 19 of the EZD, this zone is identified as a temperature, pressure and humidity harsh zone from a HELB in the Auxiliary Building or a radiation harsh zone from a LOCA inside containment. Detailed examination of post-accident dose rates within the Aux Building by SWEC Calculation 13075-PRB-020 determined that the general area around the Safeguards Area Exhaust Fans is non-harsh Since the new limit switches will be installed in close proximity of the Safeguards Fans (1-HV-F-40A & B), the new limit switches will not be exposed to any harsh environmental conditions when they are required to operate and they are not required to be covered under the 10 CFR 50.49 EQ Program. This has been confirmed with the Corporate EQ Coordinator. (Reference Calculation 13075-PR(B)-020-0, Area "E-E").

3.6 Electrical System Analysis This design change eliminates two solenoid valves that are powered from the 480 VAC Emergency Buses 1H1-2S and 1J1-2S. The electrical load reduction due to the solenoid removal has been evaluated per the attached Electrical System Analysis Checklist (Appendix 1-1). The Station Electrical Load List (SELL) requires revision to reflect the removal of the SOV's. The SELL Change Notification is attached as Appendix 1-6. No update of the VPSLL is necessary.

3.7 Inservice Inspectionlinservice Testing Instrument air check valves 1-IA-925, 1-IA-926, 1-IA-934 and 1-IA-935 provide back flow prevention from air accumulators for the Safeguards exhaust fan dampers. These check valves are included in the IST program for back flow leakage testing. Replacement of the air-operated dampers with backdraft type eliminates the need for these check valves The check valves will be removed from the ISI Program.

3.8 Seismic The Safeguards exhaust fan dampers are required to operate during or after a seismic event. The damper blades are internal to the ventilation duct with the balance arm and counter weight external.

The dampers will be reinstalled within the current location The existing seismic supports will rriaintain the seismic integrity of the ventilation duct and dampers. The dampers are seismically designed and qualified to maintain integrity and operability during a design basis accident. See Appendix 1-3 Replacement of air operated dampers with comparable weight backdraft dampers and removal of associated components (SOVs, tubing, conduit, actuators, etc.) will not adversely affect any seismic analysis The installation of limit switches, conduit and cable for Reg Guide 1.97 indication will be seismically supported 3.9 Human Factors Damper position indication will now provide the operator with indication of either full open or full closed damper position for the safeguards exhaust fan discharge dampers Since this modification is Page 3 of 6 (May 97)

0 VIRGINIA POWER EngineeringReview and Design

1. Design Change Title/StationlUnit 2 Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement ? NAPS / Unit 1 00-129 installing indication via the ERF Computer instead of indicator lights in the Control room, revisions to Control Room panel drawings are not required and no additional Human Factors analysis is needed.

3.11 Station Computer SoftwarelHardware The position indication for the backdraft dampers will be available on both the ERF computer and the Plant Computer System (PCS) since the Validyne multiplexer data is provided to both computer systems The Corporate I&C/Computer group will create the necessary PCS computer points on both Unit I and Unit 2 PCS systems 3.12 Emergency Response Facility System (ERF)

The position indication for the backdraft dampers will be coordinated with existing Safeguards damper position indication. The indication for these dampers will be incorporated into the same ERF indication group as 1-HV-AOD-128-1,2,3 & 4. ERF Design Checklist and ERF Input Data Sheets are attached as Appendix 1-4.

3.15 Post Accident Monitoring (RG 1.97)

The limit switches on the Safeguards exhaust fan dampers will meet Reg. Guide 1.97 requirements for a Category 2 variable per Attachment 6 of STD-GN-0035. The limit switches are a D-34 variable, providing position indication for the Safeguards exhaust fan dampers. In accordance with Attachment 3 of STD-GN-0035, the limit switches must be powered from a highly reliable power source such as the Semi-Vital bus. The existing multiplexer power supply will be used to power the limit switches.

Per section 3.4 above, the new Reg Guide 1.97, Category 2, limit switches will be installed in environmental zone AB-291A near the Safeguards Area Exhaust Fans which has been determined to be a non-harsh radiation zone from a LOCA inside containment.

Engineering Change Request number 1671 has been initiated to request revision of Technical Report PE-0013, EP-0014, and EP-0010 and is attached as Appendix 1-5 ERF Input RG 1.97 Modification Checklist forms are attached as Appendix 1-8.

3.16 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning The Safeguards Area Ventilation ventilates the Engineered Safety Features areas where the primary concern is the potential for airborne contamination. The system supplies 100 percent outside filtered air for fresh air ventilation and heating. Air exhaust can be discharged directly to the environment or filtered prior to discharge, if necessary.

Each exhaust fan is interlocked with an air operated damper. The respective damper opens on fan start and closes when the fan is stopped. The existing damper opening motive force is by air with power to the control solenoid valve from the fan circuit The closed damper prevents air back flow through a non-running fan. The replacement of the air operated dampers with backdraft dampers accomplishes the same function without air or electrical power. The backdraft damper is designed to open with discharge air flow from the running fan and close by gravity when the fan is stopped Page 4 of 6 (May 97)

1 EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change TitlelStation/Unit 2. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement I NAPS / Unit 1 00-129 3.17 Simulator The design change creates new ERF computer points for operator indication of fan damper position.

These computer points are available in the Control Room and this feature is modeled in the Simulator.

There are no hardware modifications required to be made to the simulator.

3.19 Setpoints, Station Curves, instrument Scaling and Instrument Uncertainty Calculations Appendix 2-4 includes a Setpoint Data Sheet and marked up page of the North Anna Unit 1 Setpoint Document for the deletion of 1-HV-PCV-1314A & B.

3.21 Radio Frequency Interference The limit switches are electronic devices that detect movement of the damper. They are powered by the 24 VDC power supply from the Validyne Multiplexer. No RFI influence is expected. Limit switch control circuitry will be appropriately routed in cable trays and conduit to minimize RFI.

3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS)

Electronic EDSCR 14963 and 15194 have been initiated for components added by this DCP.

Electronic EDSCR 15007 has been initiated for components removed by this DCP.

3.23 ALARA The modification is being performed in the Auxiliary Building, which is a radiologically controlled area.

All work will be performed under an RWP. The exposure estimate for the replacement of the safeguards exhaust fan dampers, installation of new conduit and supports is 30 mRem total.

3.25 Recent NRC and Industry Concerns Licensee Event Report N-2000-003-00 identifies multiple surveillance test failures associated with the Safeguards Exhaust Ventilation system The LER documents our commitment to replace the Unit 1 and 2 air operated SAVS fan discharge dampers with backdraft dampers.

3.26 Impact of/on Other Design Changes DCP 00-130 has been initiated to implement a similar type change to Unit 2.

3.27 Inventory Optimization/Summary of Equipment Added or Removed Equipment Added/Removed is identified in Appendix 2-1 3.29 Removable Blocks and Other Barriers Installation of conduit and the routing of cable between the Cable Tray Spreading Room and the Auxiliary Building will involve breaching several wall penetrations. The requirements of VPAP-0305 and Technical Requirements Manual Section 7.0 will be enforced for these activities. The Control Room pressure boundary will be unaffected Page 5 of 6 (May 97)

0 EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change Title/Statior/Unit 2. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement / NAPS / Unit 1 00-129 3.32 NCRODP NCRODP -17, Compressed Air System and NCRODP-47, Primary Ventilation System, will require revision as a result of this DCP. Appendix 1-2 includes mark-ups of the applicable pages.

3.34 Labeling This design change will require that new component labels be installed. The component label specification sheets are included in Appendix 2-2.

3.35 Abandonment of Equipment Conduit and cables to the removed solenoid valves will remain in place as spare. The spared cables will be determinated both from the MCC and from the solenoid valves. Spared cables shall be labeled as "Spare" and identified as being spared per DCP 00-129. The conduit ends will be physically plugged 3.36 Vendor Technical Manuals (VTMs)

The VTMCR is included with DCP 00-130 3.40 Maintenance Rule The Safeguards fans and dampers are within the scope of the Maintenance Rule (Function HV005) since they provide the safety-related functions of post-accident equipment cooling and iodine filtration Replacement of the fan discharge dampers will increase the reliability of the system, thus minimizing the possibility of a maintenance rule functional failure. Damper replacement does not change the Maintenance Rule function of this system and has no other impacts on the Maintenance Rule program.

3.42- Other Concerns Operations Standing Order No. 229 provides instructions in the event of a LOCA on either Unit. The Standing Order provides the "required compensatory actions" for JCO C-2000-01. This statement is applicable prior to implementation of Unit 2 DCP 00-130. The standing Order and JCO will be revised to identify only Unit 1 after the Unit 2 DCP is implemented. After implementation of this DCP (00-129) the Standing Order and JCO will no longer be applicable and can be deleted. Appendix 1-7 includes mark up to delete the Standing Order and JCO

4.0 REFERENCES

NCRO-D-T7 NCRODP-47 NAS-347 NAS-1 045 Page 6 of 6 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER STDGN0001

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement I NAPS / Unit 2 00-130 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The Safeguards Exhaust Fan Discharge Dampers must stay open when the fan is running These are air-to open dampers that fail close on loss of IA Since IA can not be relied upon after a DBE (not seismic), SR air flasks (1-IA-TK-5A & B and 2-IA-TK-5A & B) have been installed to supply SR air to the AODs for 30days (reference Plant Issue N-1999-3043) Unfortunately, there has been great difficulty in maintaining this system operable due to numerous small leaks which render the individual AODs (and therefore Safeguards Fans) inoperable (reference Plant Issue N-2000-0870, N-2000-0942, N-2000-1238 and N-2000-1273 for each of the Safeguards Fans). A JCO (C-2000-01) has been prepared since these dampers are so problematic, and can place either unit in an immediate shutdown action statement (3.0.3). Repairs have been made for most of the air leaks, but existing leak rates are such that the air flasks can not hold the damper open for 30 days as required. The required action to clear JCO C-2000-01 is to implement a modification as outlined in REA 2000 043. This REA is also a Licensing Commitment (Plant Issue N-2000-1472, required for LER N-2000-003). The REA recommends replacement of the dampers with a backdraft type. Using backdraft dampers has the added benefit of simplifying maintenance (i.e. elimination of existing quarterly PTs performed on IA check valves and 18 month PTs performed on the flasks and air components).

An air-operated damper is located in the discharge duct of each Safeguards Area ventilation exhaust fan. The discharge dampers prevent the back flow of air through a non-operating fan. The operation of the dampers is interlocked with their respective exhaust fans. When the exhaust fan is started, the damper opens; when the fan stops, the damper shuts.

The air supply to the safeguards exhaust fan discharge damper actuators is from the plant Instrument Air system and provides the motive force to open the damper. The dampers fail shut on loss of operating air. The Instrument Air supply to these dampers is equipped with a backup air bottle (one for each unit's Safeguards Exhaust) On loss of IA pressure, bottled air pressure is designed to maintain the Safeguards Exhaust Fan Discharge dampers open.

The fans are powered from emergency buses. Electrical power to the solenoid valve is supplied from its respective safeguards fan circuit. When the fan is running the solenoid valve is open to supply air to the damper actuator. When the fan stops the solenoid valve is de-energized blocking the air supply and bleeding the air from the damper to close. The actuator spring closes the damper on loss of air.

The safeguards exhaust fan air operated discharge dampers will be replaced with backdraft type damoers.

The backdraft damper is a self-closing design that does not require electrical power or instrument air to operate Installation of limit switches will provide damper position indication, and will meet Reg. Guide 1.97 requirements 2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION The backdraft damper functions in a similar manner to existing dampers but does not require air or electrical power The backdraft damper opens when a fan is started with air flow across the damper blades and closes by gravity when the fan is stopped.

The air operated dampers are mounted between flanges in the duct with the actuator external. The dampers, actuators, solenoid valves, drain valves, air regulators, instrument air tubing and instrument air accumulators will be removed. The instrument air supply to the instrument air accumulators will be disconnected and the instrument air tubing will be removed and capped locally at the root valve The electrical cable will be spared in Page 1 of 6 (May 97)

Engineering Review and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement !NAPS I Unit 2 0)0-130 space by de-termination at both the solenoid and fan circuit. Conduit will remain in place but the open end of the rigid conduit will be plugged.

The air operated dampers will be replaced with backdraft type dampers which will be mounted between existing duct flanges. The balance arm, counterweight, and blade linkage are external to the damper. As with the air operated dampers, the backdraft dampers will be seismically restrained by the existing supports The dampers are designed to remain functional during a seismic event.

Two limit switches (proximity switches) will be installed on each damper. One limit switch will provide full open position indication and the other will provide full closed position indication. The limit switches will be inductive non-contact proximity switches to provide damper position indication without physically contacting the damper.

Since the damper performs a safety-related function and must be free to open and close based on duct air flow, the limit switches must be mounted so as to ensure there is no possibility that the switch could physically impede damper movement. The non-contact switches can be positioned approximately one inch away from the damper swing arm and still provide reliable damper position indication. The backdraft dampers will be located in the same air flow path as existing dampers, 2-HV-AOD-228-1,2,3 & 4, which require Reg. Guide 1.97 indication The new damper position indication installed by this modification is electrically non-safety related but will be considered a Reg Guide 1.97 indication, Category 2, Variable D-34, for emergency ventilation damper position to support existing Reg. Guide 1.97 indication. The position indication for the backdraft dampers will be incorporated into the same ERF indication group as 2-HV-AOD-228-1,2,3 & 4. The Auxiliary Building El 291' area near the Safeguards Area Exhaust Fans is considered a non-harsh post-accident environment and therefore the limit switches will be non-EQ. Each limit switch will be connected to the Validyne Multiplexer system to allow damper position indication via ERF computer point readout in the Control Room 3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.3 Fire Protection/Appendix "R" Several areas of the plant require ventilation during safe shutdown in which the ventilation systems (HV) are identified as Appendix "R". The safeguards areas are not identified as requiring ventilation following an Appendix "R" fire scenario. The safeguards exhaust fan dampers are part of a safeguards ventilation system The damper replacement does not alter any Appendix "R" system, system capability or Appendix "R" drawings This modification does not adversely impact the Station's design basis for compliance with Appendix "R" to 10CFR50.

The backdraft damper materials are non-combustible. All electrical cables will be installed in conduits and cable trays Combustible loading is no longer tracked in the Cable Tray Spreading Room.

Combustibles added to the Auxiliary Building will be tracked by revision to Technical Report EP-0017.

The equivalent fire severity within the Auxiliary Building will remain low; therefore Table 8.1 of the Appendix R Report is not affected.

The installation of conduit and the routing of cable Auxiliary Building and the Cable Spreading Room will require the breaching of multiple fire barriers. Station approved procedures will be used to control these activities Page 2 of 6 (May 97)

EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER ST-N-016

1. Design Change Title/StationlUnit 12. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement /NAPS /Unit 2I 00-130 3.4 Equipment Qualification All equipment installed by this DCP will be non-EQ. The new Reg. Guide 1.97, Category 2, limit switches will be installed in environmental zone AB-291A. Per Revision 19 of the EZD, this zone is identified as a temperature, pressure and humidity harsh zone from a HELB in the Auxiliary Building or a radiation harsh zone from a LOCA inside containment Detailed examination of post-accident dose rates within the Aux. Building by SWEC Calculation 13075-PRB-020 determined that the general area around the Safeguards Area Exhaust Fans is non-harsh. Since the new limit switches will be installed in close proximity of the Safeguards Fans (1-HV-F-40A & B), the new limit switches will not be exposed to any harsh environmental conditions when they are required to operate and they are not required to be covered under the 10 CFR 50.49 EQ Program This has been confirmed with the Corporate EQ Coordinator. (Reference Calculation 13075-PR(B)-020-0, Area "E-E*)

3.6 Electrical System Analysis This design change eliminates two solenoid valves that are powered from the 480 VAC Emergency Buses 2H1-2S and 2J1-2S. The electrical load reduction due to the solenoid removal has been evaluated per the attached Electrical System Analysis Checklist (Appendix 1-1). The Station Electrical Load List (SELL) requires revision to reflect the removal of the SOV's. The SELL Change Notification is attached as Appendix 1-6. No update of the VPSLL is necessary.

3.7 Inservice InspectionlInservice Testing Instrument air check valves 2-IA-396, 2-IA-397, 2-IA-405 and 2-IA-406 provide back flow prevention from air accumulators for the Safeguards exhaust fan dampers. These check valves are included in the IST program for back flow leakage testing. Replacement of the air-operated dampers with backdraft type eliminates the need for these check valves. The check valves will be removed from the ISI Program.

3.8 Seismic The Safeguards exhaust fan dampers are required to operate during or after a seismic event. The damper blades are internal to the ventilation duct with the balance arm and counter weight external.

The dampers will be reinstalled within the current location. The existing seismic supports will maintain the seismic integrity of the ventilation duct and dampers The dampers are seismically designed and qualified to maintain integrity and operability during a design basis accident. See Appendix 1-8.

Replacement of air operated dampers with comparable weight backdraft dampers and removal of associated components (SOVs, tubing, conduit, actuators, etc.) will not adversely affect any seismic analysis The installation of limit switches, conduit and cable for Reg. Guide 1.97 indication will be seismically supported.

3.9 Human Factors Damper position indication will now provide the operator with indication of either full open or full closed damper position for the safeguards exhaust fan discharge dampers. Since this modification is Page 3 of 6 (May 97)

0 Engineering Review and Design VIRGINIA POWER STDGN-00

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement I NAPS / Unit 2 00-130 installing indication via the ERF Computer instead of indicator lights in the Control room, revisions to Control Room panel drawings are not required and no additional Human Factors analysis is needed.

3.11 Station Computer Software/Hardware The position indication for the backdraft dampers will be available on both the ERF computer and the Plant Computer System (PCS) since the Validyne multiplexer data is provided to both computer systems. The Corporate I&C/Computer group will create the necessary PCS computer points on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 PCS systems 3.12 Emergency Response Facility System (ERF)

The position indication for the backdraft dampers will be coordinated with existing Safeguards damper position indication. The indication for these dampers will be incorporated into the same ERF indication group as 2-HV-AOD-228-1,2,3 & 4. ERF Design Checklist and ERF Input Data Sheets are attached as Appendix 1-4 3.15 Post Accident Monitoring (RG 1.97)

The limit switches on the Safeguards exhaust fan dampers will meet Reg. Guide 1.97 requirements for a Category 2 variable per Attachment 6 of STD-GN-0035. The limit switches are a D-34 variable, providing position indication for the Safeguards exhaust fan dampers. In accordance with Attachment 3 of STD-GN-0035, the limit switches must be powered from a highly reliable power source such as the Semi-Vital bus. The existing multiplexer power supply will be used to power the limit switches.

Per section 3 4 above, the new Reg. Guide 1.97, Category 2, limit switches will be installed in environmental zone AB-291A near the Safeguards Area Exhaust Fans which has been determined to be a non-harsh radiation zone from a LOCA inside containment.

Engineering Change Request number 1672 has been initiated to request revision of Technical Report PE-0013, EP-0014, and EP-0010 and is attached as Appendix 1-5. ERF Input RG 1.97 Modification Checklist forms are attached as Appendix 1-9.

3.16 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning The Safeguards Area Ventilation ventilates the Engineered Safety Features areas where the primary concern is the potential for airborne contamination The system supplies 100 percent outside filtered air for fresh air ventilation and heating Air exhaust can be discharged directly to the environment or filtered prior to discharge, if necessary.

Each exhaust fan is interlocked with an air operated damper. The respective damper opens on fan start and closes when the fan is stopped. The existing damper opening motive force is by air with power to the control solenoid valve from the fan circuit. The closed damper prevents air back flow through a non-running fan. The replacement of the air operated dampers with backdraft dampers accomplishes the same function without air or electrical power. The backdraft damper is designed to open with discharge air flow from the running fan and close by gravity when the fan is stopped.

Page 4 of 6 (May 97)

0 EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 12. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement / NAPS / Unit 2J 00-130 3.17 Simulator The design change creates new ERF computer points for operator indication of fan damper position.

These computer points are available in the Control Room and this feature is modeled in the Simulator.

There are no hardware modifications required to be made to the simulator.

3.19 Setpoints, Station Curves, instrument Scaling and Instrument Uncertainty Calculations Appendix 2-4 includes a Setpoint Data Sheet and marked up page of the North Anna Unit 2 Setpoint Document for the deletion of 2-HV-PCV-2314A & B.

3.21 Radio Frequency Interference The limit switches are electronic devices that detect movement of the damper. They are powered by the 24 VDC power supply from the Validyne Multiplexer. No RFI influence is expected Limit switch control circuitry will be appropriately routed in cable trays and conduit to minimize RFI.

3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS)

Electronic EDSCR 14964 and 15194 have been initiated for components added by this DCP.

Electronic EDSCR 15008 has been initiated for components removed by this DCP.

3.23 ALARA The modification is being performed in the Auxiliary Building, which is a radiologically controlled area.

All work will be performed under an RWP. The exposure estimate for the replacement of the safeguards exhaust fan dampers, installation of new conduit and supports is 30 mRem total.

3.25 Recent NRC and Industry Concerns Licensee Event Report N-2000-003-00 identifies multiple surveillance test failures associated with the Safeguards Exhaust Ventilation system The LER documents our commitment to replace the Unit 1 and 2 air operated SAVS fan discharge dampers with backdraft dampers.

3.26 Impact ofion Other Design Changes DCP 00-129 has been initiated to implement a similar type change to Unit 1.

3.27 Inventory OptimizationlSummary of Equipment Added or Removed Equipment Added/Removed is identified in Appendix 2-1 3.29 Removable Blocks and Other Barriers Installation of conduit and the routing of cable between the Cable Tray Spreading Room and the Auxiliary Building will involve breaching several wall penetrations The requirements of VPAP-0305 and Technical Requirements Manual Section 7.0 will be enforced for these activities The Control Room pressure boundary will be unaffected Page 5 of 6 (May 97)

0 EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Safeguards Exhaust Fan Damper Replacement / NAPS / Unit 2 00-130 3.32 NCRODP NCRODP -17, Compressed Air System and NCRODP-47, Primary Ventilation System, will require revision as a result of this DCP. Appendix 1-2 includes mark-ups of the applicable pages 3.34 Labeling This design change will require that new component labels be installed. The component label specification sheets are included in Appendix 2-2.

3.35 Abandonment of Equipment Conduit and cables to the removed solenoid valves will remain in place as spare. The spared cables will be determinated both from the MCC and from the solenoid valves. Spared cables shall be labeled as "Spare" and identified as being spared per DCP 00-130. The conduit ends will be physically plugged.

3.36 Vendor Technical Manuals (VTMs)

The VTMCR is included in Appendix 1-3 3.40 Maintenance Rule The Safeguards fans and dampers are within the scope of the Maintenance Rule (Function HV005) since they provide the safety related functions of post-accident equipment cooling and iodine filtration Replacement of the fan discharge dampers will increase the reliability of the system, thus minimizing the possibility of a maintenance rule functional failure Damper replacement does not change the Maintenance Rule function of this system and has no other impacts on the Maintenance Rule program 3.42 Other Concerns Operations Standing Order No 229 provides instructions in the event of a LOCA on either Unit. The Standing Order provides the "required compensatory actions" for JCO C-2000-01. After implementation of this DCP (00-130) the Standing Order and JCO will no longer be applicable to Unit 2 The Standing Order and JCO will be revised to identify only Unit 1. Appendix 1-7 includes changes to the Standing Order and JCO

4.0 REFERENCES

NCRODP-17 NCRODP-47 NAS-347 NAS-1 045 Page 6 of 6 (May 97)

0 EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER 1 . D e._

2. D esign C -ha-nge ber

ýNum MFRV ACTUATOR AIR SUPPLY MODIFICATION

/ NAPS / UNIT 1 00-147 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM It has been determined that some components associated with the Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (MFRV) actuator can be removed from the system without creating any adverse system operation. The air lock-up valve, affect on 1-FW-AOV-1478,88,98-1, is installed to to close on a loss of Instrument Air (IA). allow the MFRV The air filter regulator is installed to regulate IA supply for each actuator to 100 psig. the 105 psig Both of these components have exhibited problems in the past, necessitating frequent air leakage replacement. It would be beneficial to two components because it would enhance remove these system reliability and maintainability without system operation. (REAs 1999-081 & sacrificing 2000-115).

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION The MFRVs were modified in 1993 which replaced the Copes-Vulcan valve trim diaphragm type actuator with the current and spring CCI Drag trim and pneumatic piston actuator.

included the installation of the Conoflow This retrofit VB-11 air lock-up valve (1-FW-AOV-1478,88,98-1) actuator assembly. The air lock-up valve to each was decreased to 65 psig or lower. The previous added to allow the MFRV to fail close when IA failure mechanism was provided by the spring, which overcame the force exerted actuator on the diaphragm by a decreasing IA supply valve. Recent studies have concluded to shut the that the air lock-up valve can be removed affect to system operation. Consultations without adverse with the actuator manufacturer (CCI) and (Reference Appendix 1-1) have confirmed actual testing that the MFRVs will fail close on a local, loss of IA On a gradual loss of IA header catastrophic pressure, the MFRVs will no longer trip However, 1-AP-28 requires the reactor close at 65 psig.

be tripped and the MFRVs be closed in pressure decreases to less than 70 psig. the event that IA Even without operator action, the MFRVs fail close on a gradual loss of IA when will eventually the weight of the valve plug and stem acting on the pneumatic piston. Therefore, overcome the forces the air lock-up valve can be removed from without adversely affecting system operation. each MFRV The MFRV actuators are currently supplied with IA regulated to 100 psig. IA system typically runs at approximately 105 psig pressure upstream of the filter regulator. The filter removed without any adverse affects to regulator can be actuator components or the MFRVs themselves.

MFRV actuator and sub-components (i.e. The SOVs, AOVs, positioner, and valves) have pressure of 150 psig or greater. Removing a design the air regulator from each valve will subject actuator assembly to 105 psig unregulated the instrument air instead of the current 100 air. This change will not adversely impact psig, regulated operation of the MFRV since the modest pressure is still well within design parameters. increase in air actuation signal will not change since the Fail-safe valve closure time following an ESF volume tank is currently supplied with unregulated instrument air. An air filter with the same micron rating will be installed such that components receive a filtered air supply. all MFRV actuator temperature rating of 9000 F. The flow The filter assembly has a pressure rating of 6000 psig a capacity of the filter (Cv = 0.73) is greater filter regulator (Cv =0.28). The air lock-up than sensing pilot and volume tank are currently the existing supplied with 1

(May 97)

• EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA POWER 1 ~llttolm

~~~~ST-N00 MeinCag ei sn/ i nd2 n h a n e i t l / S a t D e i n C a ng e Nu m b e r MFRV ACTUATOR AIR SUPPLY MODIFICATION / NAPS / UNIT 1 00-147 unfiltered air. Eliminating the air regulator will remove a component that has exhibited air leakage problems without impacting system operation.

The design change will also install tubing couplings (AOVs) and the actuator housing. This will help between the actuator air operated valves facilitate future removal of the AOVs from the actuator housing and eliminate the galling potential that currently exists between the components.

The MFRVs will continue to perform as designed.

The valves will continue to close on a loss of Instrument Air and fail close on an ESF signal during a design basis accident. The MFRVs safely operate as designed without these actuator can components. Failure of these components in their current configuration could lead to a loss of MFRV control, which could jeopardize Unit operation. Removal of these components will improve system reliability and maintainability.

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.2 Technical Specifications The MFRVs will continue to fail-safe close on an ESF actuation signal and meet the response for isolation as stated in Tech Spec 3.3.2.1 time 3.8 Seismic Removal of the air regulator and air lock-up valve will not adversely impact the seismic qualification of the MFRV or the FW piping.

3.17 Simulator Removal of the air lock-up valves, 1-FW-AOV-1478,88,98-1, the simulator software since the MFRVs are currently will require a corresponding change to modeled on the simulator to fail close once IA pressure decreases to 65 psig.

3.19 Setpoints. Station Curves, Instrument Scaling & Instrument Uncertainity Calculations The North Anna Setpoint Document will be revised to reflect the removal of the air lock-up valves (1-FW-AOV-1478,88,98-1). A setpoint change request is included in Appendix 2-2.

2 (May 97)

Engineering Review and Design VIRGINIA POWEiR I

STDGN

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit2.D sg Ch n e N m r MFRV ACTUATOR AIR SUPPLY MODIFICATION / NAPS / UNIT1 00-147 3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS)

Removal of the air lock-up valves, air regulators, and installation of the in-line air filters will require a revision to the EDS database. Reference EDSCR # 0000015529.

3.27 Summary of Equipment Added or Removed MARK # ADD/REMOVE FUNCTION 1-FW-AOV-1478-1 REM 1-FW-FCV-1478 Actuator Air Supply Lock-Up Valve 1-FW-AOV-1488-1 REM 1-FW-FCV-1488 Actuator Air Supply Lock-Up Valve 1-FW-AOV-1498-1 REM 1-FW-FCV-1498 Actuator Air Supply Lock-Up Valve 1-FW-I/P-1478 REM 1-FW-I/P-1478 Air Regulator 1-FW-I/P-1488 REM 1-FW-I/P-1488 Air Regulator 1-FW-I/P-1498 REM 1-FW-I/P-1498 Air Regulator 1-FW-FL-1478 ADD 1-FW-FCV-1478 Actuator Air Supply Filter 1-FW-FL-1488 ADD 1-FW-FCV-1488 Actuator Air Supply Filter 1-FW-FL-1498 ADD 1-FW-FCV-1498 Actuator Air Supply Filter 3.32 NCRODP NCRODP-26-NA, Feedwater System will require revision as a result of this modification.

A change request is included in Appendix 1-2.

3.34 Labeling New component labels are required for the new in-line air filters. Component Label Specifications are included in Appendix 2-1.

3.36 Vendor Technical Manuals (VTMs)

A VTM change is not required for VTM 59-366-00005 since the existing manual includes additional Conoflow valves not affected by the removal of the VB-1 1 model valve.

3 (May 97)

0 EngineeringReview and Design VIRGINIA PoWE!?

1. Des5ign Change TitlelStationlUnit 2 Design Change Number MFRV ACTUATOR AIR SUPPLY MODIFICATION / NAPS / UNIT 1 00-147 3.38 Equipment/System ResDonse Times This modification will not affect the existing MFRV closure time for isolating Main Feedwater upon receipt of an ESF actuation signal The volume tank is currently supplied with unregulated IA and will remain in that configuration following implementation of this design change

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 DCPs92-171 & 92-263, "Feedwater Regulating Valves Internals Replacement" 4

(May 97)

O Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design I ST-Go00 Atahmn 4

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Control Room Emergency Air Filters 1-HV-FL-1 8 & 19 Delta P Indication I NAPS / Unit 1 I 00-171 1.0 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM The Control Room and Emergency Switchgear Room moisture separators (or demister filters) 1-HV-FL-18 & 19 lack differential pressure indication. These moisture separators are located on the inlet of the suction duct to the Control Room and Switchgear Room Emergency Pressurization fans 1-HV-F-41 & 42. Also located in the suction duct to these fans are HEPA and charcoal filters; which have differential pressure gauges.

Technical Specification Change Request No. 378 has been submitted to the NRC. The current wording of the Technical Specification ( Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.1.d.1) requires that at least once per 18 months that the plant : 'Verify the pressure drop across the HEPA filter and Charcoal adsorber assembly is < 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the filter train at a flow rate of 1000 cfm + 10%". However, since the maximum static pressure that the fan can produce is - 5.2 inches of water gauge, the existing 6" limit is not meaningful. The new technical specification will require that the sum of the differential pressure drops across the HEPA, Charcoal, and Demister filters be less than 4 inches of water gauge. This DCP will provide the means in which to monitor the pressure drop across the demister filters. ( Ref. REA 2000-114 and ET N 00-057 Rev. 2) 2.0 PROPOSED SOLUTION Install differential pressure gauges across demister filters 1-HV-FL-18 & 19.

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.3 Fire Protection/Appendix "R" Both the Control Room and the Emergency Switchgear Rooms are identified in the Appendix "R" Report as requiring ventilation during safe shutdown operations. The wall between the control room and the turbine building and the walls between the mechanical chiller rooms and air conditioning rooms are fire area boundary walls. The installation of tubing through these walls will be controlled by station approved procedures.

3.8 Seismic The differential pressure indicator and tubing that connects to it will be seismically mounted.

(June 01)

Do.

PDominion-EngineeringReview and Design ST-N00 Attchen 4

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change TitlelStation/Unit 00-171 Control Room Emergency Air Filters 1-HV-FL-18 & 19 Delta P Indication I NAPS / Unit I 3.9 Human Factors New pressure differential gauges will be installed on the north wall of the Unit 1 Control Room and the north wall of Emergency Switchgear Room. These gauges are just a short distance from the respective fan's HEPA and Charcoal filter PDI's.

3.16 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Penetration of the pressure envelope, between the Unit 1 control room and turbine building and between the Mechanical Chiller room and the AC room will be required for the tubing run. This penetration will be made and sealed lAW approved station procedures.

3.22 Equipment Data System The addition of the two pressure differential gauges and their isolation valves will require.a change to the Equipment Data System. EDSCR # 16838 and 16846 have been initiated for this change.

3.26 Impact onlof Other Design Changes ET N 00-057 Rev. 2 " CR and ESWGR Emergency Ventilation Filter DIP Limit" provides the technical bases for the new differential pressure limit supporting Technical Specification Change Request No. 378.

ET N 01-121 " Demister Filter Bell-Mouth Modifications" document the required demister filter material and the corresponding Bell-Mouth housing change.

3.27 Inventory Optimization/Summary of Equipment Added or Removed The following PDI's and isolation valves are being added by this DCP:

M~lrk" NIt irmh*r Add/Remn Function hAnrk- N"mhpr dd/Rem 1-HV-PDI-1008-3 Add Pressure Differential Across Filter 1-HV-FL-18 1-HV-ICV-3179 Add Isolation Valve to 1-HV-PDI-1008-3 LP Side 1-HV-ICV-3180 Add Isolation Valve to 1-HV-PDI-1008-3 HP Side 1-HV-PDI-1009-3 Add Pressure Differential Across Filter 1-HV-FL-19 1-HV-ICV-3181 Add Isolation Valve to 1-HV-PDI-1 009-3 LP Side 1-HV-ICV-3182 Add Isolation Valve to 1-HV-PDI-1009-3 HP Side 2

(June 01)

S D ominion- EngineeringReview and Design ISD 01 Attachment 4ee 11

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 12. Design Change Number Control Room Emergency Air Filters 1-HV-FL-18 & 19 Delta P Indication / NAPS / Unit I1 00-171 No inventoried materials will be made obsolete by this DCP.

3.28 System and Plant Design Basis Documents Technical Specification Change Request No. 378 has been submitted to the NRC. The current wording of the Technical Specification ( Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.1.d.1) requires that at least once per 18 months that the plant : 'Verify the pressure drop across the HEPA filter and Charcoal adsorber assembly is < 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the filter train at a flow rate of 1000 cfm + 10%". However, since the maximum static pressure that the fan can produce is - 5.2 inches of water gauge, the existing 6" limit is not meaningful. The new technical specification will require that the sum of the differential pressure drops across the HEPA, Charcoal, and Demister filters be less than 4 inches of water gauge. This DCP provides the means in which to monitor the pressure drop across the demister filters. See Appendix 1.2 for the SDBD Change Request.

3.29 Removable Blocks and Other Barriers Drilling 1" diameter holes through the concrete wall between the Chiller Room and the Air Conditioning room and between the Control Room and Turbine Building will be controlled by station approved procedures.

3.32 NCRODP See Appendix 1.1 for the mark up of NCRODP-36 which shows the changes required as a result of this DCP.

3.34 Labeling This design change will require that new component labels be installed. The component labels will be generated from the EDSCRs identified in Section 3.22.

3.40 Maintenance Rule This equipment is not risk-significant per the Maintenance Rule scoping matrix. Therefore, unavailability hours are not required to be monitored or tracked for this equipment. Good work planning to return equipment to operational status is to be exercised. The installation 3

(June 01)

S D ominion- EngineeringReview and Design I SD GNee0 Atahmn 4

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 12. Design Change Number Control Room Emergency Air Filters 1-HV-FL-18 & 19 Delta P Indication / NAPS / Unit 1 I 00-171 of these differential pressure gauges will allow operators to detect filter fouling, which will help prevent MPFFs due to low system flow.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 REA 2000-114 4.2 ET N 00-057 Rev. 2 4.3 NCRODP -36 4.4 11715-FB-24C & D 4.5 11715-FC-8AJ 4.6

• 11715-FB-44E 4.7 11715-HV-LIL Sht. 7 4

(June 01)

S Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design SD- GN-gg0. Athe 4-

1. Design Change TitlelStation/Unt 12 Design Change Number Control Room Emergency Air Filters 2-HV-FL-1 8 & 19 Delta P Indication / NAPS / Unit 2 I 00-172 1.0 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM The Control Room and Emergency Switchgear Room moisture separators (or demister filters) 2-HV-FL-18 & 19 lack differential pressure indication. These moisture separators are located on the inlet of the suction duct to the Control Room and Switchgear Room Emergency Pressurization fans 2-HV-F-41 & 42. Also located in the suction duct to these fans are HEPA and charcoal filters; which have differential pressure gauges.

Technical Specification Change Request No. 378 has been submitted to the NRC. The current wording of the Technical Specification ( Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.1 .d.1) requires that at least once per 18 months that the plant : "Verify the pressure drop across the HEPA filter and Charcoal adsorber assembly is < 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the filter train at a flow rate of 1000 cfm + 10%". However, since the maximum static pressure that the fan can produce is - 5.2 inches of wa;ter gauge, the existing 6" limit is-not meaningful. The new technical specification will require that the sum of the differential pressure drops across the HEPA, Charcoal, and Demister filters be less than 4 inches of water gauge. This DCP will provide the means in which to monitor the pressure drop across the demister filters. ( Ref. REA 2000-114 and ET N 00-057 Rev. 2) 2.0 PROPOSED SOLUTION Install differential pressure gauges across demister filters 2-HV-FL-18 & 19.

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.3 Fire Protection/Appendix "R" Both the Control Room and the Emergency Switchgear Rooms are identified in the Appendix "R" Report as requiring ventilation during safe shutdown operations. The wall between the control room and the turbine building and the walls between the mechanical chiller rooms and air conditioning rooms are fire area boundary walls. The installation of tubing through these walls will be controlled by station approved procedures.

3.8 Seismic The differential pressure indicator and tubing that connects to it will be seismically mounted.

(June 01)

% Dominion- Engineering Review and Design I ST-N-01 Atahenl

.nnye iurnier

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit .. L'esign 7

Design Ch0ange umber Control Room Emergency Air Filters 2-HV-FL-18 & 19 Delta P Indication / NAPS / Unit 2 I0O -1 72 3.9 Human Factors New pressure differential gauges will be installed on the north wall of the Unit 2 Control Room and the north wall of Emergency Switchgear Room. These gauges are just a short distance from the respective fan's HEPA and Charcoal filter PDI's.

3.16 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Penetration of the pressure envelope, between the Unit 2 control room and turbine building and between the Mechanical Chiller room and the AC room will be required for the tubing run. This penetration will be made and sealed lAW approved station procedures.

3.22 Equipment Data System The addition of the two pressure differential gauges and their isolation valves will require.a change to the Equipment Data System. EDSCR # 16839 and 16847 have been initiated for this change.

3.26 Impact on/of Other Design Changes ET N 00-057 Rev. 2 " CR and ESWGR Emergency Ventilation Filter DIP Limit" provides the technical bases for the new differential pressure limit supporting Technical Specification Change Request No. 378.

ET N 01-121 " Demister Filter Bell-Mouth Modifications" document the required demister filter material and the corresponding Bell-Mouth housing change.

3.27 Inventory OptimizationlSummary of Equipment Added or Removed The following PDI's and isolation valves are being added by this DCP:

Mnirk Nniinhpr Add/Rem Function "nrk Nlumber Function 2-HV-PDI-2008-3 Add Pressure Differential Across Filter 2-HV-FL-18 2-HV-ICV-3057 Add Isolation Valve to 2-HV-PDI-2008-3 LP Side 2-HV-ICV-3058 Add Isolation Valve to 2-HV-PDI-2008-3 HP Side 2-HV-PDI-2009-3 Add Pressure Differential Across Filter 2-HV-FL-19 2-HV-ICV-3059 Add Isolation Valve to 2-HV-PDI-2009-3 LP Side 2-HV-ICV-3060 Add Isolation Valve to 2-HV-PDI-2009-3 HP Side 2

(June 01)

S D ominion- EngineeringReview and Design I ST-G 00 Atahmn 4

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Control Room Emergency Air Filters 2-HV-FL-1 8 & 19 Delta P Indication / NAPS / Unit 2 I 00-172 No inventoried materials will be made obsolete by this DCP.

3.28 System and Plant Design Basis Documents Technical Specification Change Request No. 378 has been submitted to the NRC The current wording of the Technical Specification ( Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.1.d.1) requires that at least once per 18 months that the plant : "Verify the pressure drop across the HEPA filter and Charcoal adsorber assembly is < 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the filter train at a flow rate of 1000 cfm + 10%". However, since the maximum static pressure that the fan can produce is - 5.2 inches of w;ter gauge, the existing 6" limit is not meaningful. The new technical specification will require that the sum of the differential pressure drops across the HEPA, Charcoal, and Demister filters be less than 4 inches of water gauge. This DCP provides the means in which to monitor the pressure drop across the demister filters. See Appendix 1.1 for the SDBD Change Request.

3.29 Removable Blocks and Other Barriers Drilling 1" diameter holes through the concrete wall between the Chiller Room and the Air Conditioning room and between the Control Room and Turbine Building will be controlled by station approved procedures.

3.32 NCRODP This DCP will have no impact on the training module; the update of NCRODP-36 is being handled by DCP 00-171. There is no difference between Unit 2 and Unit 1 NCRODP details.

3.34 Labeling This design change will require that new component labels be installed. The component labels will be generated from the EDSCRs identified in Section 3.22.

3.40 Maintenance Rule This equipment is not risk-significant per the Maintenance Rule scoping matrix. Therefore, unavailability hours are not required to be monitored or tracked for this equipment. Good work planning to return equipment to operational status is to be exercised. The installation 3

(June 01)

SDominion- EngineeringReview and Design IST -N00 AtSS. -t

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change Title/StationlUnit 00-172 Control Room Emergency Air Filters 2-HV-FL-18 &19 Delta P Indication I NAPS / Unit 2 of these differential pressure gauges will allow operators to detect filter fouling, which will help prevent MPFFs due to low system flow.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 REA 2000-114 4.2 ET N 00-057 Rev. 2 4.3 NCRODP -36 4.4 11715-FB-24C &E 4.5 11715-FC-8AJ 4.6

• 11715-FB-44E 4.7

• 12050-HV-LIL Sht. 9 4

(June 01)

S Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design

[,M-SDre *eol

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 01-128 Revise Setpoint for 1-CH-RV-1 322 / North Anna / Units 1 & 2 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM a Design and Licensing Bases Integration As part of the Integrated Configuration Management Project, System. It was noted that the UFSAR Review was performed for the Chemical and Volume Control consistent with the set pressure listed in the description for the boric acid batch tank relief valve was not Section 9.3.4.2.4.21 states that:

North Anna Setpoint and PLS documents. Specifically UFSAR low-pressure piping and batching tank "The relief valve on the steam line to the batching tank protects the return line is isolated. The capacity of the heating jacket and coil from overpressure when the condensate The set pressure equals the design pressure relief valve equals the maximum expected steam inlet flow.

of the heating jacket.'

valve set pressure. Per vendor drawing The inconsistency concerns the last sentence regarding the relief 150 psig. A review of the North Anna is 11715/12050-3.20-2B, the design pressure of the heating jacket to be 160 psig. This is the relief valve's setpoint (1-CH-RV-1322)

Setpoint and PLS documents shows inconsistent with the UFSAR statement.

that the piping design pressure for Other inconsistencies were also noted. The EDS database indicates psig. Engineering Work Request is 20 the piping downstream of steam pressure regulator, 1-AS-PIC-107, 120 psig. Also, the Unit 2 Setpoint 92-100 changed the steam supply pressure regulator setpoint to tank and steam supply is a common document provides a setpoint for 2-CH-RV-2322. The Unit 1 batch system for both units. This is no Unit 2 relief valve.

N-1999-1948-R2

Reference:

Request for Engineering Assistance # 1999-103, Plant Issue 2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION of the inconsistencies noted by This design change will serve as the controlling document for resolution the Configuration Management Project.

set pressure for relief valve In order to resolve the relief valve set pressure inconsistency, the A setpoint change request will be prepared to 1-CH-RV-1322 will be revised from 160 psig to 150 psig. distributor, Sam Lovelace Per the local Crosby Valve revise the North Anna Setpoint and PLS documents. or X36018 (chrome relief valve (Crosby Part Nos. X06018 of Hamilton Hawkins Co., Inc., the spring in the may be reset from 160 psig. Therefore, the relief valve plated)) has a working range between 149-169 washers.

psig to 150 psig without changing the existing relief valve spring or spring been reviewed for the design To resolve the EDS database, the piping arrangement and supports have setting and the 120 psig steam supply and operating conditions consistent with the 150 psig relief valve STD-CEN-0016 and pressure regulator setpoint. Pipe stress analyses per Engineering Standard results of the analyses determined that a piping thermal Calculation No. CE-1530 were performed. The This pipe support will overstress condition exists in line 2.00"-CH-160-151 at pipe support FPH-CH-160-1.

data in the EDS parameter be modified to eliminate the thermal overstress condition. Also, the design acid batch tank will be boric sets for the auxiliary steam lines and condensate return lines to and from the condition was thermal overstress revised to correct their design and operating conditions. The piping documented in Plant Issue N-2000-0391.

from the North Anna A setpoint change request will be prepared to delete the setpoint for 2-CH-RV-2322 Setpoint document.

1 (June 01)

W Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design

• ' *I IIIi*r.5iT*'

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit

&2 01-128 Revise Setpoint for 1-CH-RV-1 322 / North Anna / Units 1 3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW are impacted by this design change.

The completed Programs Review Checklist indicates that programs A further review is provided for the following programs:

3.3 Fire Protection / Appendix "R" The boric acid batch tank This design change affects the chemical and volume control system. on the Appendix "R" Safe required to be shown heating coil steam piping is not shown on, nor not discussed in Appendix Shutdown Flow Diagrams, 11715-DAR-095 series drawings. It is also Tables 3-1, 3-3, or 3-5. Thus the revision of the setpoint for "R" Report Section 3.5.2 or listed in do not adversely impact relief valve 1-CH-RV-1322 and FPH-CH-160-1 pipe support modification the Station's design basis for compliance with Appendix "R" to 10CFR50.

3.7 Inservice Inspection / Inservice Testing The boric acid batch tank This design change affects the chemical and volume control system. ISI Classification drawings Pressure Testing and heating coil steam piping is shown on ISI System of 4, but is not included in the 11715-CBM-095A-3, Sheet 2 of 4 and 11715-SPM-095A-3, Sheet 2 impact the Station's ASME ISI program boundaries. Thus this design change does not adversely Section Xl Inservice Inspection (ISI) / Inservice Testing (IST) programs.

Calculations 3.19 Setpoints. Station Curves, Instrument Scaling and Instrument Uncertainty relief valve, 1-CH-RV-1322, The setpoint for the boric acid batch tank auxiliary steam supply The batch tank and steam supply is a common requires revision from 160 psig to 150 psig.

does not exist and the reference setpoint for system for both units. Relief valve 2-CH-RV-2322 Setpoint Data Sheets this valve needs to be deleted from the Setpoint document. The associated are attached as Appendix 2-1 to the design change package.

3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS) been prepared to reflect In accordance with VPAP-0310, Electronic EDSCR No. 0000016455 has changes made by this design change package.

3.23 ALARA is located in the This design change involves work in a radiation area. Relief valve 1-CH-RV-1322 FPH-160-1 is acid batch tank. Pipe support auxiliary building on El. 274'- 0" adjacent to the boric drops down to the lower located at the El. 274'-0" floor opening where line 2"-CH-160-151 elevation. Pipe support FPH-1 60-1 is accessible from El. 259'-6".

An RWP will provide all of the radiological controls for this task.

3.32 NCRODP Training Modules are included as an Changes to NCRODP-41 "Chemical Volume & Volume Control System" appendix to Section 1 of this design change package.

2 (June 01)

WT Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design

2. Design Change Number 1 Design Change Title/Station/Unit Revise Setpoint for I-CH-RV-1 322 / North Anna I Units 1 & 2 01-128 3.40 Maintenance Rule The The chemical and volume control (CH) system is identified as a Maintenance Rule system.

for 1-CH-RV-1322 and modification to pipe support FPH-CH-160-1 does revision of the setpoint as described not alter the description, scope or functions (CH001 through CH022) of the system will result from this design change in the Maintenance Rule database. No effect on the PSA package.

As noted above, the Maintenance Rule Program is not affected.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 EWR 86-410 "Crosby Replacement for Valve 1-CH-RV-1 322" Acid 4.2 11715-3.20-2A, Westinghouse Drawing 113E262 Sheet 1 of 2, "800 Gallon Tank - Boric Batching" Boric Acid 4.3 11715-3.20-3A, Westinghouse Drawing 113E262 Sheet 2 of 2, "800 Gallon Tank -

Batching" 4.4 11715-3.20-4A, Westinghouse Drawing 1188F09 "Aux Steam Coil for 800 Gallon Boric Acid Batching Tank" 4.5 11715-7.63-2A, Fisher Controls Co. Drawing AU6184 "Air Operated Control Valves" 4.6 11715-SPH-CH-160, Pipe Support Location isometric 4.7 11715-SPH-PHLD-224, Pipe Support Location Isometric 4.8 11715-SPH-SA-32, Pipe Support Location Isometric 4.9 11715-MSK-139A3, Piping Flexibility Analysis Summary Sheet 4.10 11715-MSK-121Fl-1, Piping Flexibility Analysis Summary Sheet 4.11 11715-MSK-121F2-1, Piping Flexibility Analysis Summary Sheet 4.12 11715-FP-1 1T, Chemical Volume Control and Safety Injection System - Aux. Bldg. Sheet 8 4.13 11715-FP-11U, Chemical Volume Control and Safety Injection System - Aux. Bldg. Sheet 9 4.14 11715-FP-21T, Chemical Volume Control and Safety Injection System - Aux. Bldg. Sheet 18 4.15 11715-FP-21AD, Chemical Volume Control and Safety Injection System - Aux. Bldg. Sheet 27 4.16 11715-CH-036, Chemical & Volume Control System, Boric Acid Batching Tank (1-CH-TK-5)

Temperature Control, Indication and High/Low Alarm 3

(June 01)

u0Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design ST -N00 S ta ch et .- 1 1 Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Revise Setpoint for 1-CH-RV-1 322 / North Anna / Units 1 & 2 01-128 4.17 11715-AS-003, Auxiliary Steam System, Auxiliary Steam System Header Pressure Indication &

Control 4.18 11715-AS-004, Auxiliary Steam System, Boric Acid Batch Tank Inlet Pressure Control 4.19 11715-FM-072A, FlowNalve Operating Numbers Diagram, Auxiliary Steam & Air Removal System 4.20 11715-FM-72B, Valve Operating Numbers, Aux Steam - Primary Plant 4.21 11715-CBM-095A, Sheet 2 of 4, ISI Classification Boundary Dwg. Interval-3, Chemical and Volume Control System 4.22 11715-SPM-095A, Sheet 2 of 4. System Pressure Testing Dwg. Interval-3, Chemical and Volume Control System 4

(June 01)

SDominion- Engineering Review and Design ST-N00 Attacment

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Replace QS, and RS RTD's Associated with Containment Integrity Reanalysis/NAPS/Unit 2 01-132 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Nuclear Analysis and Fuels has completed a revised containment integrity analysis. The revised analysis requires several Resistance Temperature Devices (RTD's) to be changed out and routinely recertified or replaced in order to assure they meet instrument uncertainty requirements that were assumed in the integrity analysis. Twenty-eight RTD's require replacement, twenty-four of which are located in-containment which will require an outage to access and will be replaced via DCP 01-130. The remaining RTD's, listed below which can be replaced at any time are being replaced by this Design Change.

Mark # Location Function 2-QS-TE-200A Yard RWST Temperature 2-QS-TE-200B Yard RWST Temperature 2-RS-TE-200A Yard Casing Cooling Tank Temperature 2-RS-TE-200B Yard Casing Cooling Tank Temperature 2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION The existing RTD's are 100 ohm platinum with an instrument accuracy tolerance of .5% at operating temperature (1150 F). The vendors of the existing QS RTD's is Electric Thermometer (E.T.T.) and the RS RTD's is Rosemount.

The replacements are Weed, field "cuttable", 100 ohm platinum model RTD's in compliance to the International Standard IEC-751 through amendment 2 dated 1995-07, resistance curve with a Class A tolerance. There is only one resistance curve in this standard and it is for platinum 100 ohm RTD's with a temperature coefficient (alpha) of 0.00385 per degree C. The Class A tolerance is defined for degrees C as plus or minus 0.15 +(0.002 x the absolute temperature in degrees C). The temperature ranges for each RTD remains the same.

Therefore, these RTD's are a similar and acceptable model for installation. Periodic replacements will be necessary prior to the expiration of the "drift term", which could possibly put the RTD's in excess of the allowable accuracy. The acceptable "drift term limit" as conservatively determined by Project Engineering, is three (3) years. This is based in reference to an Engineering Transmittal previously developed for a similar application, the Spent Fuel Pool Analysis, CEE 01-0011, Channel Statistical Allowance for the CC Heat Exchangers Outlet Temperature Channels, which was performed for the same model Weed RTD. An Engineering Transmittal will be developed later as part of the larger Containment Integrity Reanalysis, which will confirm or revise this PM replacement timetable.

1 of 5 (June 01)

S Dominion- Engineering Review and Design ISDGN00 A ttcmn 4

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Replace OS, and RS RTD's Associated with Containment Integrity Reanalysis/NAPS/Unit 2 01-132 The Quality Classifications of 2-QS-TE-200A, 200B, are incorrectly identified in EDS as Safety Related. These classification changes are discussed in ER&D Section 3.22. As a result of the downgrade some additional physical changes are required. Cable identifications associated with these RTD's are color coded and must be changed to Neutral (NS). RTD's 2 RS-TE-200A & B although classified as NS in EDS have color coded cable identifications and require a change to Neutral as well. Only the color coding of the cables are being changed.

This will involve changing the cable identification tags at all termination locations as well as revising the Cable & Raceway Database. All cabling and cable routing remains the same.

These RTD's are currently color coded as follows:

Mark # Cable Color Code 2-QS-TE-200A Red 2-QS-TE-200B Blue 2-RS-TE-200A White 2-RS-TE-200B Yellow 3.0 Programs Review 3.3 Fire Protection I Appendix "R" The Quench Spray System is an Appendix "R" Safe Shutdown System however, RTD's 2 QS-TE-200A, 2-QS-TE-200B, are not safe shutdown components. In addition, their operation has no impact on the credited Appendix R flow path. As a result, the Appendix R Program is not affected by the modification.

3.8 Seismic RTD's 2-QS-TE-200A, 2-QS-TE-200B, are identified in EDS as being seismic. However, there is no requirement for these to be either seismically qualified or installed. The new RTD's will still be installed into threaded thermowells. The thermowells are the safety related pressure boundary and are seismically installed. The replacement RTD's will not affect the seismic integrity of the thermowells. The weight of the RTD's is approximately the same as the existing and due to the insignificant weight will not present a threat to safety significant equipment as a falling object. There are no seismic requirements imposed on the new RTD's.

2 of 5 (June 01)

SDominnion Engineering Review and Design STD-GNI00 A. 4

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Replace QS, and RS RTD's Associated with Containment Integrity Reanalysis/NAPS/Unit 2 01-132 3.18 EPIX A review of EPIX and NPRDS found 61 failures of RTDs. 74% of the failures were in the reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature monitoring systems of various plants. 52% of the failures were of Weed manufactured RTDs and 33% were of Rosemount manufactured RTDs. These failures indicate the sensitivity of the RTDs installed in the RCS loops and the environment that they are in. The two manufacturers are well known for their quality products thus the percentage of failures attributed to them is probably an indication of market share in the nuclear industry rather than as outliers among peers.

The RTDs that are being replaced by this DCP are in much more benign areas with respect to temperature, pressure, and radiation than the RCS loops. The failures that were unrelated to the RCS appeared to be random in nature. This information should not, therefore, be used to exclude these two vendors as potential sources of RTD for this DCP.

3.19 Setpoints, Station Curves, Instrument Scaling and Instrument Uncertainty Calculations Instrument scaling changes are required and are included as Appendix 2-1. Instrument uncertainty calculations will eventually require revision as a result of these replacements to satisfy the Containment Integrity Re-Analysis. These calculations will be documented via the CDR&R of the Engineering Transmittal which institutes the new analysis.

3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS)

The Quality Classifications of 2-QS-TE-200A, 200B are incorrectly identified in EDS as Safety Related. The Quality Classification definitions for 2-QS-TE-200A & 200B are 5.1.10 and 5.2.30, which are non-safety classifications. The primary reason for not reclassifying these RTD's was cost effectiveness. To comply with the UFSAR the down grade would have to involve physically changing the cable identifications and Cable and Raceway Database to change the Color coding of the cable to Neutral (NS).

EDSCR 0000016882 has been submitted to update EDS to reflect the new vendor and model in addition to the changes to design of these circuits as noted. Based on the current classifications of the temperature elements in EDS, additional documentation (SREDC) is not required. RWST temperature elements are currently identified as potentially downgradeable based on the QCRC approval of PEC 00024 on 7119/00. The temperature elements for Casing Cooling Tank Temperature are currently classified NS 3 of 5 (June 01)

WADominion- EngineeringReview and Design 3-T-N00 Atacmet6

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Replace QS, and RS RTD's Associated with Containment Integrity Reanalysis/NAPS/Unit 2 01-132 and this DCP reconciles the existing differences between the colored cable designations and EDS classifications.

3.26 Impact On I Of Other Design Changes This modification is one of two Unit 2 RTD replacement Design Changes required for the revised containment integrity analysis. DCP 01-130 will be issued and implemented (teantatively planned for the 2002 RO) to replace the CV and LM system RTD's located in the containment.

3.27 Inventory OptimizationlSummary of Equipment Added or Removed Weed field "cuttable" RTD's model 310-01BH-A-6-C-24, have been selected to replace the existing model RTD's. It is intended that this new model RTD be used generically as the standard replacement for RTD's throughout the plant in the future.

Supply Chain Management (Bryan Nevius) has researched inventory and to the best of their ability were not able to find any equipment that will be made obsolete as a result of this modification.

Mark # Add/Rem/Modify Function 2-QS-TE-200A Remove Temperature Element 2-QS-TE-200A Add Temperature Element 2-QS-TE-200B Remove Temperature Element 2-QS-TE-200B Add Temperature Element 2-RS-TE-200A Remove Temperature Element 2-RS-TE-200A Add Temperature Element 2-RS-TE-200B Remove Temperature Element 2-RS-TE-200B Add Temperature Element 3.40 Maintenance Rule The replacement of the RTD's in the RWST (QS) and Casing Cooling Tank (RS) will have no effect on either M-Rule scope or performance as monitored under the rule.

4 of 5 (June 01)

SDominion EngineeringReview and Design ISTD 6N060 Atahet

1. Design Change TitlelStation/Unit 2. Design Change Number 01-132 Replace OS, and RS RTD's Associated with Containment Integrity ReanalysislNAPS/Unit 2 I

4.0 References REA R2000-171 NAS 90-23 NAS 90-14 DCP 01-125 DCP 01-131 5 of 5 (June 01)

7/D ominion- EngineeringReview and Design I ST-G -00 Atacmet

1. Design Change Title/StabonfUnit 2. Design Change 01-136 Number Replace Existing Barton Flow Switches Model 288A with Model 288C / NAPS / Unit 1 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The Main Feed Pump recirculation flow control indicating switches 01- FW-FS-150 NB/C do not indicate or actuate correctly for present plant design. Feed Water pump suction should indicate approximately 15,000 GPM. However, the pump suction indicators normally indicate around 12,000 - 13,000 GPM. This has a direct impact on recirc. valve operation since these switches control the recirc. valve open/close setpoints. The review of vendor information for the installed orifice plates shows that they were sized to produce a maximum differential pressure of 478.85" WC at a flow of 17,000 GPM. The flow indicator differential pressure unit (DPU) is designed for a maximum d/p of 700" WC at 17,000 GPM. Therefore, at the normal expected flow of just under 15,000 GPM, the orifice was producing around 350" d/p which was seen by the indicator as approximately 12,000 GPM.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION The flow orifices and the flow indicating switches are obviously mismatched. The installed switch, which is a Barton Instrument Systems 288A does not have enough adjustment to be calibrated down to match the flow element, so it has been determined that new flow switches with the correct range DPU will be installed to match the presently installed flow elements.

The type flow switch to be used will be a Barton Instrument Systems 288C, with a maximum d/p range of 478.85 " WC scaled 0-17,000 GPM. The Barton Model 288C quoted is equivalent to the 288A and is the same fit, form and function. The design improvement includes an upgraded linkage system. The DCP will update all DWG's, procedures and scaling documents required to incorporate these switches into the plant and the installation will be lAW the Implementing Information Section, which is section 2 of this package.

1 (June 01)

SDominion- EngineeringReview and Design I ST

-G -00 Atacnn-t I ,s. rL... hi. ..

1. Design Change Tite/Stabon/Unit 01-136 Replace Existing Barton Flow Switches Model 288A with Model 288C / NAPS / Unit 1 3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.18 EPIX The EPIX web page has been searched and no information pertaining to the Barton Instrument Model 288C Flow Switch was found.

3.19 SETPOINTS, STATION CURVES, INSTRUMENT SCALING and INSTRUMENT UNCERTAINTY CALCULATIONS See Scaling Data Sheet attached. Appendix 2-1 3.22 EQUIPMENT DATA SYSTEMS Electronic EDSCR created and sent to approvers for the change from a Barton Model 288A to a Barton Model 288C. Edscr No. 0000016618.

3.27 INVENTORY OPTIMIZATION I

SUMMARY

OF EQUIPMENT ADDED OR REMOVED Table 3.27-1 Equipment ADDEDIREMOVED Mark # Add IRem I Modify Function 01-FW-FS-150A ADD Recirc Flow Control 01-FW-FS-150B ADD for Main Feed Pumps 01-FW-FS-150C ADD 01-FW-FS-150A REM 01-FW-FS-150B REM 01-FW-FS-150C REM No inventoried items will become obsolete as a result of this DCP, lAW the Materials Coordinator.

2 (June 01)

S Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design I ST

-G S00 *tahet

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Replace Existing Barton Flow Switches Model 288A with Model 288C I NAPS I Unit I 01-136 3.36 VENDOR TECHNICAL MANUALS (VTMs)

Barton Instrument Systems Model 288C Instruction Manual will be added to the system lAW VTMCR, Appendix 1-1.

3.40 MAINTENANCE RULE Maintenance Rule function FW 011 states that, " The FW System delivers feed water to the Steam Generators at the required flow rate and temperature to support normal operation (includes FW recirc and feed reg/bypass control)." Flow switches 01-FVW-FS-150A/B/C are integral to the control function for FW recirc valves. Therefore, the Maintenance Rule is applicable to the proposed modifications to these flow switches.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 REA R1999-019 4.2 11715-FM-074A 4.3 DCP 00-806 4.4 DCP 00-807 4.5 DCP 01-137 3

(June 01)

S Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design I I

12. Design Change Number

1. Design Change "dl'taStaborVUnit 01-137 Replace Existing Barton Flow Switches Model 288A with Model 288C I NAPS / Unit 2 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The Main Feed Pump recirculation flow control indicating switches 02- FW-FS-250 NB/C do not indicate or actuate correctly for present plant design. Feed Water pump suction should indicate approximately 15,000 GPM. However, the pump suction indicators normally indicate around 12,000- 13,000 GPM. This has a direct impact on recirc. valve operation since these switches control the recirc. valve open/close setpoints. The review of vendor information for the installed orifice plates shows that they were sized to produce a maximum differential pressure of 478.85" a

WC at a flow of 17,000 GPM. The flow indicator differential pressure unit (DPU) is designed for maximum dip of 700" WC at 17,000 GPM. Therefore, at the normal expected flow of just under 15,000 GPM, the orifice was producing around 350" d/p which was seen by the indicator as approximately 12,000 GPM.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION The flow orifices and the flow indicating switches are obviously mismatched. The installed switch, which is a Barton Instrument Systems 288A does not have enough adjustment to be calibrated down to match the flow element, so it has been determined that new flow switches with the correct range DPU will be installed to match the presently installed flow elements.

The type flow switch to be used will be a Barton Instrument Systems 288C, with a maximum d/p range of 478.85 " WC scaled 0-17,000 GPM. The Barton Model 288C quoted is equivalent to the 288A and is the same fit, form and function. The design improvement includes an upgraded to linkage system. The DCP will update all DWG's, procedures and scaling documents required incorporate these switches into the plant and the installation will be lAW the Implementing Information Section, which is section 2 of this package.

1 (June 01)

' Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design I ST-NOD ~As mn f, ki 1-

1. Design Change Title/StatiorlUnft 01-137 Model 288C I NAPS / Unit 2 Replace Existing Barton Flow Switches Model 288A with 3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.18 EPIX Instrument The EPIX web page has been searched and no information pertaining to the Barton Model 288C Flow Switch was found.

3.19 SETPOINTS, STATION CURVES , INSTRUMENT SCALING and INSTRUMENT UNCERTAINTY CALCULATIONS See Scaling Data Sheet attached. Appendix 2-1 3.22 EQUIPMENT DATA SYSTEMS 288A to a Electronic EDSCR created and sent to approvers for the change from a Barton Model Barton Model 288C. Edscr No. 0000016819.

3.26 IMPACT of/on OTHER DESIGN CHANGES DCP 00-806, " Feedwater Recirculation Flow Setpoint Change "was implemented during the low March, 2001 refueling outage. The purpose of DCP was to lower the recirc. flow control valve of flow opening setpoint from 6,800 GPM to 6,400 GPM. This was done to reduce the possibility inadvertent opening. This DCP will enhance that design change by increasing the accuracy and response of the flow switch that controls the recirculation valves.

2 (June 01)

~Dominion EngineeringReview and Design I -GST -00 Atah enS

1. Design Change Ttle/Station/Unit Replace Existing Barton Flow Switches Model 288A with Model 288C / NAPS I Unit 2 4. Design 1 01-137 Ch ange rNumbe, 3.27 INVENTORY OPTIMIZATION I

SUMMARY

OF EQUIPMENT ADDED OR REMOVED Table 3.27-1 Equipment ADDEDIREMOVED Add IRem I Modify Function Mark #

02-FW-FS-250A ADD Recirc Flow Control ADD for Main Feed Pumps 02-FW-FS-250B 02-FW-FS-250C ADD 02-FW-FS-250A REM 02-FW-FS-250B REM 02-FW-FS-250C REM No inventoried items will become obsolete as a result of this DCP, lAW the Materials Coordinator.

3.40 MAINTENANCE RULE Maintenance Rule function FW 011 states that, "The FW System delivers feed water to the Steam Generators at the required flow rate and temperature to support normal operation (includes FW recirc and feed reg/bypass control)." Flow switches 02-FW-FS-25QAJBIC are integral to the control function for FW recirc valves. Therefore, the Maintenance Rule is applicable to the proposed modifications to these flow switches.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 REA R1999-019 4.2 12050-FM-074A 4.3 DCP 00-806 4.4 DCP 00-807 4.5 DCP 01-136 3

(June 01)

' Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design

1. Design Change Title/Statior/Uni t 2. Design Change Number Remove RCP Thermal Barrier CC Pressure indicators / North Anna / Unit 1 01-141 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Component cooling water piping to the reactor coolant pump thermal barriers from the inlet check valves to the containment isolation trip valves located outside the containment is designed against overpressurization in the event of a failure of the thermal barrier. The piping is Pipe Class 1501 and is protected by relief valves 1-CC-RV-125A, B, & C which are set at 1500 psig. However, existing pressure indicators, 1-CC-PI-147A, B, & C and 1-CC-PI-155A, B, & C are only 0-160 psig gauges. As documented in Plant Issue N-2001-0417-R3, discussions with the pressure gauge manufacturer indicates that the pressure gauges typically have a rated pressure of one and one half the maximum pressure range of the gauge. The 0-160 psig gauges can not be expected to hold at pressures greater than 240 psig.

Therefore, the 0-160 psig gauges are not suitable for the component cooling water piping design conditions around the reactor coolant pump thermal barriers.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION As recommended in Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) No. R2001-035, pressure indicators 1-CC-PI-147A, B, & C and 1-CC-PI-155A, B, & C will be removed and the connections on the associated instrument lines will be capped and isolated. As indicated in the REA, based on discussions with Operations and I&C personnel, the gauges are not used. The capped connections will be identified as PI test connections. A test pressure gauge can be connected at these locations, if required at some later date.

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW The completed Programs' Review Checklist indicates that programs are impacted by this design change.

A further review is provided for the following programs:

3.3 Fire Protection / Appendix "R" The component cooling water system is an Appendix bRWsafe shutdown system. The component cooling water piping to the reactor coolant pump thermal barriers is not shown on, nor required to be shown on the Appendix "R" Safe Shutdown Flow Diagrams, 11715-DAR-79A & B drawings. It is also not discussed in Appendix R" Report Section 3.5.6 or listed in Tables 3-1, 3-3, or 3-5.

Thus the removal of the local pressure gauges on the component cooling water system piping does not adversely impact the Station's design basis for compliance with Appendix "R" to 10CFR50.

3.7 Inservice Inspection /Inservice Testin This design change affects the component cooling water system. The affected pressure gauges are shown on ISI System Pressure Testing and ISI Classification drawings 11715-CBM-079B-3, Sheets 2, 3, & 4 of 5 and 11715-SPM-079B-3, Sheets 2, 3, & 4 of 5. These drawings will be revised to reflect the change in the Station's ASME Section Xl Inservice Inspection (ISI) / Inservice Testing (IST) program boundaries.

1 (June 01)

.ODominion- EngineeringReview and Design

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number 01-141 Remove RCP Thermal Barrier CC Pressure Indicators / North Anna / Unit 1 3.8 Seismic Pressure indicators 1-CC-PI-147A, B, & C and 1-CC-PI-155A, B, & C are seismically mounted.

Removal of the pressure indicators will not affect the seismic qualifications of the remaining capped tubing. Included in the Supplemental Implementing Information are instructions to verify that the remaining tubing is adequately supported after the associated pressure gauge has been removed.

3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS)

In accordance with VPAP-0310, Electronic EDSCR No. 0000016749 has been prepared to reflect changes made by this design change package.

3.23 ALARA This design change involves work in a radiation area. Pressure indicators 1-CC-PI-1 47A, B, & C and 1-CC-PI-155A, B, & C are located at various locations on El. 216'-11" in the reactor containment building.

An RWP will provide all of the radiological controls for this task.

3.27 Inventory Optimization/Summary of Equipment Added or Removed The following equipment will be affected by this design change:

Mark # Add/RemiModify Function 1-CC-PI-147A Remove Local Pressure Indicator 1-CC-PI-147B Remove Local Pressure Indicator 1-CC-PI-147C Remove Local Pressure Indicator 1-CC-PI-155A Remove Local Pressure Indicator 1-CC-PI-155B Remove Local Pressure Indicator 1-CC-PI-155C Remove Local Pressure Indicator Per the Bill of Materials Coordinator in Supply Chain Management, no stocked material will become obsolete as a result of this design change package. In addition, there will be no impact on the current stocking levels. See e-mail included as an appendix to Section 1 of this design change package.

3.28 System and Plant Design Basis Documents Changes to SDBD-NAPS-CC "Component Cooling Water System" are included as an appendix to Section 1 of this design change package.

3.32 NCRODP Training Modules Changes to NCRODP-51 "Component Cooling Water System" are included as an appendix to Section 1 of this design change package.

2 (June 01)

S UDominion- EngineeringReview and Design STDGN0001Atcmn4

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 1 01-141 Remove RCP Thermal Barrier CC Pressure Indicators / North Anna / Unit 3.34 Labeli Labeling changes made by this design change are identified in Electronic EDSCR No.

0000016749.

4.0 REFERENCES

- 3, Component

• 4.1 11715-CBM-079B-3, Sheet 2 of 5, ISI Classification Boundary Drawing Interval Cooling Water System

• 4.2 11715-CBM-079B-3, Sheet 3 of 5, ISI Classification Boundary Drawing Interval - 3, Component Cooling Water System

• 4.3 11715-CBM-079B-3, Sheet 4 of 5, ISI Classification Boundary Drawing Interval - 3, Component Cooling Water System 4.4 11715-SPM-079B-3, Sheet 2 of 5, System Pressure Testing Drawing Interval - 3, Component Cooling Water System

- 3, Component

• 4.5 11715-SPM-079B-3, Sheet 3 of 5, System Pressure Testing Drawing Interval Cooling Water System Component

• 4.6 11715-SPM-079B-3, Sheet 4 of 5, System Pressure Testing Drawing Interval - 3, Cooling Water System

• 4.7 11715-FP-3E, Reactor Containment Annulus Piping Sheet 5

• 4.8 11715-FP-3G, Reactor Containment Annulus Piping Sheet 7

• 4.9 11715-FP-3H, Reactor Containment Annulus Piping Sheet 8

• 4.10 11715-FP-3Q, Reactor Containment Annulus Piping Sheet 15

• 4.11 11715-CC-LIL, Local Instrument List - Component Cooling System 3

(June 01)

/ D ominion- EngineeringReview and Design I STDG-00 Atahmn

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 12. Design Change Number 01-143 Generator Breaker G12 Pressure Switch Test and Isolation Valves / NAPS / Unit I1 1.0 Statement of the Problem REA 2000-083 was issued to evaluate the installation of isolation and test valves on the Generator Breaker control cabinet air lines to the generator breaker pressure switches. The installation of isolation and test valves on the air supply tubing to the pressure switches will facilitate the calibration and maintenance of the pressure switches.

2.0 Proposed Resolution The Generator Breaker pressure switches periodically require calibration and preventative maintenance. This is difficult to perform in its present form of installation since the pressure switches can't be isolated from the air supply tubing and removed from service. The installation of isolation valves and test valves on the 1/4" O.D. stainless steel tubing will permit the pressure switches to be calibrated and maintained without removing equipment from operation and draining the air storage tanks. The installation of the isolation and test valves will be performed skill of the craft in accordance with drawing N-01 143-1-1 FM1 11 B, sheet 2.

The work is non safety related, non seismic and non EQ. The Generator Breaker control cabinet is located in the Unit 1 Turbine Building at elevation 303 ft. east of the generator breakers.

3.0 Programs Review 3.22 Equipment Data System The installation of the isolation and test valves will affect components in the Equipment Data System. Electronic EDSCR No. 0000016772 has been established to update the EDS Program.

"(June01)

7 Dominion EngineeringReview and Design

1. Design Change Title/Station/Uni: 2. Design Change Number 01-143 Generator Breaker G12 Pressure Switch Test and isolation Valves / NAPS / Unit 1I 3.27 Inventory Optimization/Summary of Equipment Added or Removed Table 3.27-1 Equipment Added/Removed/Modified Mark # Add/Rem/Modify Function 1-PH-12 Add Isolation valve 1 -PH-13 Add Test valve 1-PH-14 Add Isolation valve 1-PH-15 Add Test valve "3.34 Labelingq The modification will add new mark numbered components. EDSCR No. 0000016772 contains the mark number descriptions for the new labels for the new valves.

4.0 References REA 2000-083 NCRODP-32, Main Generator and Exciter System NCRODP-76, Main Generator Control and Protection System 2

(June 01)

S Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design ST-N00 Attachment 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The Feedwater Hydrazine Analyzer for the Chemistry Monitoring System, which at the present time is an Orion Model 151801, is obsolete and in need of replacement. The analyzer was removed from service in July 1999, resulting in a yellow on-line monitoring window. REA R2000 018 was submitted to install a new type analyzer.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION Since the existing analyzer is obsolete and beyond reasonable repair, a new type analyzer has been selected to take it's place. The new analyzer will be a Hydrastat Model 9186-3000 from Astro Polymetron. The new analyzer has dimensions slightly smaller and weighs less than the existing one. It should be installed in the same location and configuration as the existing analyzer and the sample and drain lines will be reused. The power requirements for the new analyzer are 120 VAC, 60 Hz, and 5 watts, which is the same for the existing analyzer. See Supplemental Implementing Instructions for installation and wiring specifications.

The range of the new analyzer is the same as the existing analyzer (0-.5 ppm hydrazine). The existing analyzer has two outputs one 0-5vdc and one 4-2OmA.The data controller for the Chemistry monitoring panel requires a 0-5vdc input. The new analyzer has two 4-2OmA outputs and does not have a 0-5vdc output, therefore a DC input field configurable isolator will be added in the circuit for the data controller to convert it to 0-5vdc. At the present time the data controller is scaled for a range of 0-10000 ppb. The range of the data controller will require changing by the Information Technology Group to reflect the actual range of the sample loop, which is 0 - .5ppm.

The isolator will be given a new mark number (01-SS-ISC-1 04), it will be installed and wired lAW drawing N-01 146-E-1400 and instructions in the SII section of this DCP.

The loop presently utilizes an L&N Speedomax 100 recorder that is also obsolete and in need of replacement. The recorder will be replaced with a Yokogawa Model DX106-1-2. The new recorder will be mounted in the same location and have the same power requirements as the existing model.

1 (June 01)

' Dominion" EngineeringReview and Design I ST-N001 Atahet The procedure that presently performs the preventive maintenance for the hydrazine analyzer

( IMP-P-1-SS-04 ) can be deleted. The preventive maintenance for the new analyzer will be performed by the Chemistry department lAW the VTM.

The recorder ( 01-SS-TR-101 ) will be calibrated using 0-ICP-MIS-G-001, by the Maintenance department.

The disposal of the existing analyzer shall be coordinated with the Chemistry department in order to safely dispose of any chemical reagents that could be inside or connected to the analyzer.

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.18 EPIX The EPIX web page has been searched and no information pertaining to the Hydrastat 9186 analyzer was found.

3.21 RADIO FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE REVIEW The new analyzer is non-safety related and RFI would not cause the equipment to adversely impact safety related equipment or result in challenges to safety related equipment. The analyzer will be shielded and properly grounded in accordance with STD-EEN-0225.

2 (June 01)

SDominion- EngineeringReview and Design I STDGN-00 'tahet4-3.22 EQUIPMENT DATA SYSTEMS Electronic EDSCRS created and sent to approvers for the analyzer replacement, recorder replacement and the installation of the Isolator/Converter.

Analyzer EDSCR - 0000017050 Isolator/Converter EDSCR - 0000017051 Recorder EDSCR - 0000017052 3.27 INVENTORY OPTIMIZATION I

SUMMARY

OF EQUIPMENT ADDED OR REMOVED Table 3.27-1 Equipment ADDEDIREMOVED Mark # Add/RemlModify Function 01-SS-HZA-102 ADD Feedwater Hydrazine REM "Analyzer 01-SS-HZA-102 ADD Signal Converter 01-SS-ISC-104 ADD Secondary Sample Bath 01-SS-TR-101 REM 22 Temp. Recorder 01-SS-TR-101 No inventoried items will become obsolete as a result of this DCP, lAW the Materials Coordinator.

3.34 LABELING A new mark number will be added to the Equipment Data Systems (01-SS-ISC-104 ) as a result of this DCP. A configurable isolator will be added to the to the loop to interface with the data logger. See section 3.22 for EDSCR submitted.

3 (June 01)

' Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design ST-N00 Attahrnnt-3.36 VENDOR TECHNICAL MANUALS (VTMs)

VTM A522-00001 added to system for the Hydrastat 9186 Hydrazine Analyzer. See Appendix 1-1.

Action Pak Model AP4380, DC, Input Field Configurable Isolator V'TM 59-A054-00002 revised lAW VTMCR Appendix 1-2. VTMCR Appendix 1-3 submitted for the new Yokogawa Model DX1 06-1-2 recorder.

4.0 REFERENCES

REA R2000-018 4

(June 01)

S Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design SDG-01 Atacmet SUCTION HEADER 12. Design Change Number

1. Design Change TitleJStaton/Unit 1B/WC MAIN FIEEDWATER PUMP 01-148 PRESS XMTR Replacement/NAPS/Unit 1 1.0 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM Pump Suction REA 2001-176 was approved for replacement of the Unit 1 Main Feedwater Header Pressure Transmitter 1-CN-PT-150C. Transmitter 1-CN-PT-150C has been is no longer performing erratically. The existing transmitter is a Foxboro model EIIGM that is being made and repair parts are no longer available. This design change, DCP 01-148, of all issued as the response to REA 2001-176. This design change includes replacement Unit I Main Feedwater Pump Suction Header pressure transmitters I-CN-PT-15OAIBIC.

with the Transmitters 150AIB are currently functioning properly, but will require replacement same model as 150C when they fail. To maintain consistency among the suction header pressure transmitters and also because plant conditions allow, all transmitters will be replaced.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION Foxboro transmitters 1-CN-PT-150NAB/C will be replaced with new model Foxboro transmitters.

Gauge pressure transmitters 1-CN-PT-150NB/C provide indication of main feedwater pump suction header pressure. The output of each transmitter drives a pressure indicator and low pressure annunciator in the Main Control Room. The output also feeds into the Feedwater pump start permissive and trip circuitry. The pressure transmitter is classified as Non Safety (NS).

of 0 The existing pressure transmitters are Foxboro Model El 1GM with a calibration range to 700 psig and a maximum pressure limit of 1500 psi. The replacement Foxboro is rated transmitter model IGP20 can provide a calibration range of -14.7 to 3000 psig and pressure of the for 3625 psi maximum working pressure which exceeds the 1200 psi design pressure Feedwater pumps. For hydrostatic testing purposes, the transmitter has a proof damage to rating of 14500 psig; a maximum of 3625 psi may be applied without physical the transmitter.

Transmitter accuracy is +/-0.10% of calibrated span (including combined effects of linearity, hysteresis, and repeatability) compared to the original transmitter accuracy of +/-0.50%.

Since the new Foxboro transmitter and the existing Foxboro transmitter both provide on effect 4-2OmA output and will be replaced on a one for one basis, there will be no net electrical bus loading. The leads will be reworked as necessary between the the new Page I of 4 (June 01)

' - Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design HEADER 2. Design Change Numbewr

1. Be-sign Change Tdle/StationtUnit 1A/BIG MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION 1 01-148 PRESS XM'rR Replacement/NAPS/Unit to the new transmitter and junction box. The flex conduit will be reworked as necessary Foxboro transmitter.

The new transmitter is being ordered with a local LCD readout with on-board pushbuttons on the electronics housing of the transmitter. The pushbuttons allow zero and span of adjustments, as well as local configuration. The LCD readout provides a local display pressure reading.

original The new Foxboro IGP20 transmitter weighs approximately 9.6 pounds while the Foxboro El 1GM weighs approximately 20 pounds. The new Foxboro transmitter comes 2" pipe with a mounting bracket, which will be used to mount the transmitter on the existing stand.

1 This The new Foxboro IGP20 transmitter has /" NPT threaded pipe process connections.

is the same process connection used by the existing transmitter(s). The %" process tubing will be reworked to fit to the new transmitter(s).

steel Both the original Foxboro E11GM and the replacement IGP20 have 316SS stainless sensor material and process covers.

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.3 FIRE PROTECTION/APPENDIX "R" The condensate system is an Appendix "RWsystem, however transmitters 01-CN-PT 150AIB/C are not safe shutdown components. In addition, their operation has no impact on the credited Appendix "R" flow path. As a result, this program is not affected by the design change.

3.18 EPIX A search of EPIX database located no references to Foxboro transmitter IGP20. The transmitter will be added to the site EPIX database.

Page 2 of 4 (June 01)

2;) Dominion" EngineeringReview and Design PUMP SUCTION HEADER 12. Design Change Number

1. Des gn Change TittelStation/Unit 1AIBIC MAIN FEEDWATER 01-148 PRESS XMTR Replacement/NAPS/Unit 1 Uncertainty 3.19 Setpoints, Station Curves, Instrument Scaling and Instrument Calculations No Channel Statistical Analysis calculation exists for this transmitter application.

Basic Foxboro IGP20 transmitter accuracy is +/- 0.10% of calibrated span. For the purpose of NAPS Instrument Calibration Procedures, an accuracy of +/-1.00% of calibrated span may be used. Technical Report EE-0099 will not require update since this instrument loop is not addressed.

3.21 Radio Frequency Interference Review This design change involves replacement of electronic equipment. The electronic signal produced by the transmitter is non-safety related. The signal provides for indication and alarm of Feedwater pump suction pressures and controls signals Feedwater pump operating logic. All associated cabling to the transmitter is shielded with the shield properly grounded to mitigate RFI effects.

3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS)

This DCP is modifying an existing component in EDS. The transmitter Bill of Materials information requires update. EDSCR number 16918 has been prepared for the change in model number.

3.27 Inventory Optimization/Summary of Equipment Added or Removed The following equipment will be added or removed by this design change.

Mark # Add/Rem Mfg Model Function 1-CN-PT-150A Rem Foxboro E11GM FW Pump Suction Press 1-CN-PT-150A Add Foxboro IGP20 FW Pump Suction Press 1-CN-PT-150B Rem Foxboro E11GM FW Pump Suction Press I-CN-PT-150B Add Foxboro IGP20 FW Pump Suction Press 1-CN-PT-150C Rem Foxboro E11GM FW Pump Suction Press 1-CN-PT-150C Add Foxboro IGP20 FW Pump Suction Press No items in inventory that will become obsolete by this DCP.

Page 3 of 4 (June 01)

S Dominion- Engineering Review and Design HEADER 12. Design Change Number

1. De-sngn Change Tae/-StatiorVUnit 1A/BIC MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION 01-148 PRESS XMTR Replacemnent/NAPS/Unit 1 3.34 Labeling Labels that are removed from the existing transmitter(s) are to be reused on the replacement transmitter(s). No new labels are required.

3.36 Vendor Technical Manuals (VTMs)

A new VTM 59-F367-00027, Rev. 0 has been created for these transmitters.

3.40 Maintenance Rule The Maintenance Rule Program is unaffected by this modification.

3.46 Protection and Control Analysis This design change installs new Feedwater Pump Suction Header Pressure transmitters. The transmitters provide a control function to the Feedwater pump in the form of a Feedwater pump start permissive and a low suction pressure trip.

Failure of the transmitters could effect plant operation by causing a feed water pump to trip or fail to start. The transmitters are being replaced because they are becoming obsolete and spare parts are no longer available. The replacement transmitters are equivalent and meet or exceed the ratings for the existing transmitters. The new transmitters should help minimize any potential transient that could occur due to the failure of the existing transmitters.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 REA 2001-176 4.2 Test Loop Diagram 11715-CN-035 4.3 Test Loop Diagram 11715-CN-037 4.4 Test Loop Diagram 11715-CN-039 4.5 Instrument Transmitter Racks Sheet 4 11715-FK-6D 4.6 Foxboro Product Specifications for I/A Series Electronic Pressure Transmitters 4.7 VTM 59-F367-00009 Foxboro Composite Manual Page 4 of 4 (June 01)

p Dominion" EngineeringReview and Design I

SD,, At*nt 4-1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The Feedwater Hydrazine Analyzer for the Chemistry Monitoring System, which at the present time is an Orion Model 151801, is obsolete and in need of replacement. The analyzer was removed from service in July 1999, resulting in a yellow on-line monitoring window. REA R2000 018 was submitted to install a new type analyzer.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION Since the existing analyzer is obsolete and beyond reasonable repair, a new type analyzer has been selected to take it's place. The new analyzer will be a Hydrastat Model 9186-3000 from Astro Polymetron. The new analyzer has dimensions slightly smaller and weighs less than the existing one. It should be installed in the same location and configuration as the existing analyzer and the sample and drain lines will be reused. The power requirements for the new analyzer are 120 VAC, 60 Hz, and 5 watts, which is the same for the existing analyzer. See Supplemental Implementing Instructions for installation and wiring specifications.

The range of the new analyzer is the same as the existing analyzer (0-.5 ppm hydrazine). The existing analyzer has two outputs one 0-5vdc and one 4-2OmA.The data controller for the Chemistry monitoring panel requires a 0-5vdc input. The new analyzer has two 4-2OmA outputs and does not have a 0-5vdc output, therefore a DC input field configurable isolator will be. added in the circuit for the data controller to convert it to 0-5vdc. At the present time the data controller is scaled for a range of 0-10000 ppb. The range of the data controller will require changing by the Information Technology Group to reflect the actual range of the sample loop, which is 0 - *5ppm.

The isolator will be given a new mark number (02-SS-ISC-202), it will be installed and wired lAW drawing N-01149-E-1400 and instructions in the SI1 section of this DCP.

The loop presently utilizes an L&N Speedomax 100 recorder that is also obsolete and in need of replacement. The recorder will be replaced with a Yokogawa Model DX106-1-2. The new recorder will be mounted in the same location and have the same power requirements as the existing model.

1 (June 01)

SDominion- EngineeringReview and Design ST-N00 Attachment The procedure that presently performs the preventive maintenance for the hydrazine analyzer

( IMP-P-1-SS-04 ) can be deleted. The preventive maintenance for the new analyzer will be performed by the Chemistry department lAW the VTM.

The recorder ( 02-SS-TR-202 ) will be calibrated using 0-lCP-MIS-G-001, by the Maintenance department.

The disposal of the existing analyzer shall be coordinated with the Chemistry department in order to safely dispose of any chemical reagents that could be inside or connected to the analyzer.

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.18 EPIX The EPIX web page has been searched and no information pertaining to the Hydrastat 9186 analyzer was found.

3.21 RADIO FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE REVIEW The new analyzer is non-safety related and RFI would not cause the equipment to adversely impact safety related equipment or result in challenges to safety related equipment. The analyzer will be shielded and properly grounded in accordance with STD-EEN-0225.

2 (June 01)

PDominion" EngineeringReview and Design I SD GN-00 Atahmn 4 3.22 EQUIPMENT DATA SYSTEMS Electronic EDSCRS created and sent to approvers for the analyzer replacement, recorder replacement and the installation of the Isolator/Converter.

Analyzer EDSCR - 0000017116 Isolator/Converter EDSCR -0000017118 Recorder EDSCR- 0000017119 3.27 INVENTORY OPTIMIZATION I

SUMMARY

OF EQUIPMENT ADDED OR REMOVED Table 3.27-1 Equipment ADDEDIREMOVED Mark # Add/RemlModify Function 02-SS-HZA-207 ADD Feedwater Hydrazine REM Analyzer 02-SS-HZA-207 ADD Signal Converter 02-SS-ISC-202 ADD Secondary Sample Bath 02-SS-TR-202 REM 24 Temp. Recorder 02-SS-TR-202 No inventoried items will become obsolete as a result of this DCP, lAW the Materials Coordinator.

3.34 LABELING A new mark number will be added to the Equipment Data Systems ( 02-SS-ISC-202 ) as a result of this DCP. A configurable isolator will be added to the to the loop to interface with the data logger. See section 3.22 for EDSCR submitted.

3 (June 01)

2 Dominion" EngineeringReview and Design I ST-G S00 Atahmn 4

4.0 REFERENCES

REA R2000-018 4

(June 01)

SDominion- EngineeringReview and Design

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unitt 2. Design Change Number Remove RCP Thermal Barrier CC Pressure indicators / North Anna / Unit 2 I 01-152 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Component cooling water piping to the reactor coolant pump thermal barriers from the inlet check valves against to the containment isolation trip valves located outside the containment is designed The piping is Pipe Class 1501 and is overpressurization in the event of a failure of the thermal barrier.

are set at 1500 psig. However, existing pressure protected by relief valves 2-CC-RV-225A, B, & C which indicators, 2-CC-PI-247A, B, & C and 2-CC-PI-255A, B, & C are only 0-160 psig gauges. As documented the in Plant Issue N-2001-0417-R3, discussions with the pressure gauge manufacturer indicates that have a rated pressure of one and one half the maximum pressure range of the pressure gauges typically gauge. The 0-160 psig gauges can not be expected to hold at pressures greater than 240 psig.

Therefore, the 0-160 psig gauges are not suitable for the component cooling water piping design conditions around the reactor coolant pump thermal barriers.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION As recommended in Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) No. R2001-035, pressure indicators 2-CC-PI-247A, B, & C and 2-CC-PI-255A, B, & C will be removed and the connections on the associated instrument lines will be capped and isolated. As indicated in the REA, based on discussions with Operations and I&C personnel, the gauges are not used. The capped connections will be identified as PI test connections. A test pressure gauge can be connected at these locations, if required at some later date.

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW The completed Programs Review Checklist indicates that programs are impacted by this design change.

A further review is provided for the following programs:

3.3 Fire Protection / Appendix "R" The component cooling water system is an Appendix "R" safe shutdown system. The component cooling water piping to the reactor coolant pump thermal barriers is not shown on, nor required to be shown on the Appendix "R" Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram 12050-DAR-79A. It is also not discussed in Appendix "R" Report Section 3.5.6 or listed in Tables 3-1, 3-3, or 3-5. Thus the removal of the local pressure gauges on the component cooling water system piping does not adversely impact the Station's design basis for compliance with Appendix OR" to 10CFR50.

3.7 Inservice Inspection / Inservice Testino This design change affects the component cooling water system. The affected pressure gauges are shown on ISI System Pressure Testing and ISI Classification drawings 12050-CBM-079B-3, Sheets 2, 3, & 4 of 5 and 12050-SPM-079B-3, Sheets 2, 3, & 4 of 5. These drawings will be revised to reflect the change in the Station's ASME Section Xl Inservice Inspection (ISI) / Inservice Testing (IST) program boundaries.

1 (June 01)

S Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit

/ Unit 2  !01-152 Remove RCP Thermal Barrier CC Pressure Indicators / North Anna 3.8 Seismic

& C are seismically mounted.

Pressure indicators 2-CC-PI-247A, B, & C and 2-CC-PI-255A, B, qualifications of the remaining Removal of the pressure indicators will not affect the seismic are instructions to verify capped tubing. Included in the Supplemental Implementing Information gauge has been pressure that the remaining tubing is adequately supported after the associated removed.

3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS) has been prepared to reflect In accordance with VPAP-0310, Electronic EDSCR No. 0000017049 changes made by this design change package.

3.23 ALARA 2-CC-PI-247A, B, & C This design change involves work in a radiation area. Pressure indicators216-11" in the reactor various locations on El.

and 2-CC-PI-255A, B, & C are located at containment building.

An RWP will provide all of the radiological controls for this task.

3.27 Inventory Optimization/Summary of Equipment Added or Removed The following equipment will be affected by this design change:

Mark # Add/Rem/Modify Function 2-CC-PI-247A Remove Local Pressure Indicator Remove Local Pressure Indicator 2-CC-PI-247B 2-CC-PI-247C Remove Local Pressure Indicator Remove Local Pressure Indicator 2-CC-PI-255A 2-CC-PI-255B Remove Local Pressure Indicator 2-CC-PI-255C Remove Local Pressure Indicator material will be Per the Bill of Materials Coordinator in Supply Chain Management, no stocked appendix to as an affected as a result of this design change package. See e-mail included Section 1 of this design change package.

3.34 Labeling No.

Labeling changes made by this design change are identified in Electronic EDSCR 0000017049.

2 (June 01)

SDominion- EngineeringReview and Design i2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change "ritlelStation/Unit Unit 2 I 01-152 Remove RCP Thermal Barrier CC Pressure Indicators / North Anna /

4.0 REFERENCES

Drawing Interval - 3, Component

• 4.1 12050-CBM-079B-3, Sheet 2 of 5, ISI Classification Boundary Cooling Water System Interval - 3, Component

• 4.2 12050-CBM-079B-3, Sheet 3 of 5, ISI Classification Boundary Drawing Cooling Water System Drawing Interval - 3, Component

• 4.3 12050-CBM-079B-3, Sheet 4 of 5, ISI Classification Boundary Cooling Water System Interval - 3, Component 4.4 12050-SPM-079B-3, Sheet 2 of 5, System Pressure Testing Drawing Cooling Water System

- 3, Component

• 4.5 12050-SPM-079B-3, Sheet 3 of 5, System Pressure Testing Drawing Interval Cooling Water System Drawing Interval - 3, Component

• 4.6 12050-SPM-079B-3, Sheet 4 of 5, System Pressure Testing Cooling Water System

• 4.7 12050-FP-3L, Reactor Containment Annulus Piping Sheet 11 4.8 12050-FP-3N, Reactor Containment Annulus Piping Sheet 13 4.9 12050-FP-3P, Reactor Containment Annulus Piping Sheet 14

• 4.10 12050-FP-3P, Reactor Containment Annulus Piping Sheet 15

• 4.11 12050-CC-LIL, Local Instrument List - Component Cooling System Note:

change.

Drawings marked with an asterisk require drawing updates as a result of this design 3

(June 01)

Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit

/ UNIT 2 01-155 02-CC-MAN-216BC TEST MANIFOLD REMOVAL /NAPS 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 2-CC-ICV-3050 and 3051 (2-CC-FT-216B low side inlet line blowdown valves) are leaking through.

The valve seats are damaged and parts are no longer available for these Hoke valves. In addition, required for the test tap manifold located between the two valves, 2-CC-MAN-216BC, is no longer service. It is requested that the valves be replaced and the test manifold permanently removed.

(REA R2001-203) 2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION B's 2-CC-FT-216B provides for indication of component cooling outlet header flow from 2-RC-P-1 and thermal barrier. Low side blowdown isolation valves from the transmitter, 2-CC-ICV-3050 To 3051, have damaged seats. Exact replacement Hoke valves and repair parts are not available.

resolve this problem, the valves will be replaced with a Whitey instrument isolation valve. The severe service, union bonnet needle valves are rated for 6000 psig at 100"F, which exceed CC design conditions. The valves are supplied with 'k"diameter, 0.065 wall thickness, 6" long tube stubs. These valves are an acceptable replacement for the existing Hoke union bonnet needle valves.

Manifold 2-CC-MAN-216BC was installed to provide a test connection between the two blowdown isolation valves. The test manifold will be removed from the system since the test connection is not used and the threaded plug connection provides a potential leakage source 3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.3 Fire Protection/Appendix "R" The component cooling water system is an Appendix "R" safe shutdown system. The component cooling water flow transmitter and tubing is not shown on the Appendix "R" Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram 12050-DAR-079A. This modification does not affect any fire protection systems or equipment. No combustibles are being added or removed. The modification does not adversely impact the Station's design basis for compliance with Appendix "R" to 10CFR50 or Appendix OR" shutdown procedures.

3.7 Inservice Inspectionflnservice Testinq 2-CC-FT-216B process tubing is within the ISI classification boundary and is therefore, included in the ASME Section Xl program. However, the affected tubing is 1h" which is exempt from the ASME Section Xl Repair/ Replacement requirements.

1 (June 01)

' Dominion- EngineeringReview and Design I ST-N-01 Atahmn

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change Title/StationlUnit 01-155 02-CC-MAN-216BC TEST MANIFOLD REMOVAL / NAPS / UNIT 2 3.8 Seismic Flow transmitter 2-CC-FT-216B is seismically mounted. The replacement valves will be installed within the existing tubing configuration, utilizing the existing support structure arrangement.

Removal of the test manifold between the two valves will not adversely impact the seismic integrity of the associated tubing or supports.

3.18 EPIX The Equipment Performance Information Exchange database was reviewed for the replacement valves. No failures or reliability issues were found for such component.

3.22 Equipment Data System (EDS)

EDSCR #0000017120 has been initiated to reflect the removal of the test manifold.

3.23 ALARA The modification will involve work inside containment, which is an RCA. The materials of construction for the new valves is stainless steel, which match that of the existing valves. All radiological concerns will be addressed and controlled through the RWP for this work.

3.27 Inventory Optimization/Summary of Equipment Added or Removed MARK # ADD/REMOVE FUNCTION 2-CC-MAN-216BC REMOVE 2-CC-FT-216B Blowdown Test Connection.

Supply Chain Management Bill of Materials Coordinator has determined that no stocked material will be affected as a result of this design change package.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Request for Engineering Assistance, REA 2001-203 4.2 NCRODP-51-NA, Component Cooling Water System 4.3 Station drawing 12050-FM-079A and Test Loop Diagram 12050-CC-106 4.4 Instrument Piping and Transmitter Rack Drawing 12050-FK-iC and 12050-FK-6C.

2 (June 01)

EngineeringReview and Design S Dominion- ST-G-00 AftacInein 4 is Design Change Tdle/Stabon/Und 2. Design Change Number REACTOR HEAD INSULATION SPLATTER SHIELD / NORTH ANNA / 2: 01-156

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Boric acid leakage from 2-RC-36 or the Target Rock head vent tailpipe can cause difficulty in performing VT-2 inspection of head penetrations. This boric acid pools on the head insulation where it can be pulled back under the insulation, resulting in the possibility of false indications of problems during inspection of the head. This potentially contributed to rejectable indications on penetrations 62, 63 and 51 in 2001.

This has been an ongoing problem, but recent head inspection activities have elevated the importance of removing the boric acid accumulation from the insulation.

2. PROPOSED SOLUTION It is proposed to install a sloped tray below each of the two locations discussed above to serve as a splatter shield for the Reactor head insulation, routing any boric acid away from the area where it now pools.

These trays will be fabricated of Stainless Steel sheet and attached to the Reactor head insulation using quick release buckles, similar to those used to hold insulation panels together. Each tray will extend over the edge of the Reactor head insulation to direct any boric acid to fall into the cavity. This will keep the insulation clean, while making iteasier to identify any leakage that is of concern.

The shields are not atached to the Reactor head shroud to prevent any problems with thermal growth between the head insulation and shroud that would be resisted by the new shields. Also there is a small gap between each shield and the head shroud to prevent rattling.

All materials for this Design Change may be non-safety related.

3. PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.8 SEISMIC Each tray will be made of 16 gage Stainless Steel sheet and weighs less than 25 pounds. The quick release buckles to be used will easily restrain this weight from moving in the event of an earthquake. Calculation CE 1531 is being addended to reflect the weight of the shields on the seismic analysis of the Reactor Head insulation.

23. ALARA The trays will be installed under the same work order that reinstalls the head insulation. This work is performed by an RWP. In addition, by directing the boron away from the insulation and Reactor head the dose accumulated will be reduced by elimination of boric acid accumulation on the head.

Page 1 of 2 (June 01)

. 116 EngineeringReview and Design SWDominion- ST-N00 Atacimnt

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change Tdie/StationlUnit 01-156 REACTOR HEAD INSULATION SPLATTER SHIELD / NORTH ANNA /2

25. Recent NRC and Industry Concerns industry Preventing boric acid accumulations on the Reactor head has become more important as NRC and nozzles has grown. Boric acid accumulation on the head is used as a primary concerns of cracking of Reactor head as that indicator of leakage, perhaps due to a crack. Conversely, boric acid accumulations from other sources such in man-hours, pulled onto the head from normal runoff, gives a false indication of a potential problem. These costs of boric acid dose and outage time as evaluations are required to dismiss these indications. Preventing the pooling tangible benefits. The trays on the horizontal section of the Reactor head insulation, as the trays will help do, has will divert this boric acid to the cavity.

4. REFERENCES none Page 2 of 2 (June 01)

SDominion- EngineeringReview and Design ST iJl il *-i00. -l@ .

1. Design Change TitlelStationlUnit 01-157 Removal of 2-CN-83 Flash Evaporator Bypass Valve I NAPS / Unit 2

2. Design Change Number 1.0 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM The flash evaporator condensate bypass valve, 2-CN-83, developed a valve body leak. Instead of repairing or replacing the valve, REA 2001-206 was submitted to replace the valve with a section of pipe.

2.0 PROPOSED SOLUTION Remove 2-CN-83 and replace it with a section of 24" Schedule 40 ASTM Al 06 Grade B pipe; this is lAW with NAS-1 009 Class 301. The welding in of this section of pipe is to be done lAW the Corporate Weld Manual -Technique Sheet 103.

The flash evaporator has not been in service for years and will not be put back into service. 2-CN-83 is a normally open valve; without a plant coi idition or mode that would require it to be closed.

.3.0 PROGARISR:,'riVIEW 3.3 Fire Protection I Appehdix "-"

The Condei sate system is a system listed as being required for Appendix" R ".The replacement of the flash evaporator condensate byp-ass valve 2-CN-83 with a section of striaght pipe will not hinder the operation of this system; and does not impact the Appendix " R " analysis.

3.20 Secondary Piping F'nd Components Inspertil'sn Program 2-CN-83 has developed a valve body leak. The SII of this DCP requires that the bypass piping be inspected for FAC prior to weldiiig in the section of 24" schedule 40 pipe en lieu of the valve.

12050-UTI-WCPD-2414A and 2414B are being updated by this DCP.

3.22 Equipment Data System The removal of 2-CN-83 will require a change to the Equipment Data System. EDSCR # 17145 has been initiated for this change and will be sent to the reviewers upon-implementation of this DCP.

1 (June 01)

,2 Donminion- EngineeringReview and Design STDG *00S .. Atahet

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unit 2. Design Change Number Removal of 2-CN-83 Flash Evaporator Bypass Valve / NAPS / Unit 2 01-157 3.27 Inventory OptimizationlSummary of Equipment Added or Removed The elimination of this 24" isolation valve will not have an affect on inventory.

M~rk Niimbrhr Add/Rem Function Mark Number dd/Rem 2-CN-83 Rem Flash Evaporator Condensate Bypass Valve 3.32 Nuclear Control Room Operator Development Program Training Modules The flash evaporator condensate bypass valve is shown on Figure 25-1-NA. See Appendix 1-1 for the mark-up of this drawing.

3.50 Other Concerns Existing pipe supports-near 2-CN-83 (immediately east and west of the valve) wcre originally sized to support the weight of piping, the valve and contents. Thesc pipe supports use rod hangers to carry vertical (down) loads only. After the valve is replaced by.piping, the line will see a net dead weight reduction of about 4,000 lb. The existing supports will be structurally adequate for the reduced loads, by inspection.

Based on the original support loads given on station drawing 12050-FP-40J, neither support is expected to experience load reversal (uplift). A walkdown by DEO Civil is required by Appendix 2-1 to confirm the hangers are properly adjusted upon completion.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 REA 2001-206 4.2

• 12050-FM-73A 2

(June 01)

EngineeringReview and Design

' Dominion STD-GN-000* .Attachmn

1. Design Change TdtlelStationJUnit Replace High Pressure Switch on Containment Air Particulate Unit I I,

I, 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The High Pressure Switch For the Containment Air Particulate Radiation Monitor 01-RM-RMS 159 is obsolete and in need of replacement. The manufacture of the existing switch is Cook Electric and they are no longer in business. The type switch presently used is a Model 714-3111 and there are none in stock and one cannot be procured from other sources.

REA R2000-068 was submitted to install a replacement switch.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION The type switch selected as a replacement is a Pressure Controls, Inc. Model P-10. This switch is presently being used in Unit 2 for the same application for 02-RM-RMS-259 and has been proven to be a reliable replacement for several years. Both switches have the same calibration range of 0-10 PSIG and have sufficient electrical ratings for the applied circuit (110/250 VAC, 5 Amperes Resistive).

The new switch will use the existing tubing and be wired lAW NA-DW-1056E03 Wiring Diagram.

The mounting of the switch will require modification to add a bracket to support the new switches cylindrical shape. See Supplemental Implementing Instructions for bracket installation.

The Equipment Data System (EDS) specifies the switches application as seismic, due to it being a part of a Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection System, as stated in UFSAR section 5.2.4.

The switch functions to de-energize the main sample pump and to disable the main sample inlet/outlet solenoid valves due to an over pressure condition at the sample point.

Page 1 of 4

1 1 -Engineering Review and Design ow- Dominion- STD-GN-0001______________

1. Design Change Title/Station/Unzt 2. Design Change Number Replace High Pressure Switch on Containment Air Particulate Radiation Monitor I NAPS I 02-101 Unit 1 3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW 3.8 SEISMIC Mark number 01-RM-PS-159 is classified Seismic lAW UFSAR Section 5.2.4.1.1, due to it being part of the Containment Particulate Radiation Monitor. The Radiation Monitor is one of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) Detection Systems.

The recommended replacement switch utilizes a Subminiature Micro Switch, which is the only relevant component with moving parts. The manufacture of the micro switch is Honeywell and they tested the switch at both free position and full overtravel from 50 to 3,000 CPS and 30 G's.

At these levels, which were limited by the maximum output of the test equipment rather than the switch capabilities, the switches did not exhibit any resonance, contact separation, or contact disturbance.

The new switch will be seismically mounted in the same location, as the existing switch and the installation will be verified satisfactory by Civil Engineering prior to work order closeout.

See supporting Appendix 1-2 for vendor specifications.

3.18 EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EXCHANGE (EPIX)

The EPIX web page has been searched and no information pertaining to the Model P-10 pressure switch was found.

3.22 EQUIPMENT DATA SYSTEMS (EDS)

Electronic EDSCRS 0000017405 created and sent to approvers to revise the EDS to reflect the new manufacture and model for 01-RMS-RM-159.

Page 2 of 4

EngineeringReview and Design S Dominion- I ST-N-01 Atahen,

1. Design Change "dtelStation/Unti 2. Design Change Number Replace High Pressure Switch on Containment Air Particulate Radiation Monitor / NAPS 1 02-101 Unit I 3.23 ALARA Analysis The pressure switch is located on the 4th floor of the Auxiliary Building in a low radiation area. The replacement of this switch should be performed as routine maintenance lAW a RWP issued by Health Physics for Radiation Monitors. The expected dose received completing this task should be zero.

3.27 INVENTORY OPTIMAZATION /

SUMMARY

OF EQUIPMENT ADDED OR REMOVED Table 3.27-1 Equipment ADDEDIREMOVED lm-=.. J A rlrlfI~mIMneltf'jt Funtction Iviarrk F .

Function..,,=

01-RM-PS-159 ADD High Pressure Cutout 01-RM-PS-159 REM High Pressure Cutout No inventoried items will become obsolete as a result of this DCP, lAW the Materials Coordinator.

3.34 LABELING Existing labeling should be reused, if not, label new switch lAW VPAP-1409.

3.36 VENDOR TECHNICAL MANUALS (VTMs)

VTMCR submitted for VTM W893-00078 to show switch replacement and add new switch technical specifications. See Appendix 1-1.

Page 3 of 4

EngineeringReview and Design O'Dominion- ST-N00 ttcmn II

1. Design Change TitlelStationlUnit 2. Design Change Number Replace High Pressure Switch on Containment Air Particulate Radiation Monitor / NAPS / 02-101 Unit 1

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 REA R2000-068 4.2 VTM W893-00078 4.3 ICP-RMS-1-RM-159 Page 4 of 4

EngineeringReview and Design wF. Dominion- ST-N00 SPI -Atcmn 2 Design Change Number

1. Design Change TitlelStation/Ufit.

PERMANENT SCAFFOLD SUPPORTS INSIDE CONDENSER / NORTH ANNA / UNIT 2 02-108 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Each refueling outage, scaffolding must be placed inside the condenser steam space above the tube bundle to support performance of inspections on "dogbone" expansion joints and other components Placing and removing this large quantity of scaffolding is time and labor intensive, resulting in cost and outage schedule concerns. In addition, there are challenges with personnel safety due to the requirements of working in the confined space and moving all of the scaffold material.

Request for Engineering Assistance R2000-087 proposed that permanent scaffold supports be installed in selected areas inside the condenser steam space. These would permit the placement of scaffold boards without the necessity of erecting the scaffold framework approximately 20 feet tall. Cost savings would include those associated with using a smaller amount of scaffolding material in the condensers and in allowing future scheduling flexibility due to reducing the magnitude of this labor intensive activity.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION Discussions with the Nuclear Site Support personnel involved in erecting the scaffolding, coupled with field walks, has resulted in a proposed resolution that will provide permanent brackets on the East, West-and South condenser walls. Due to the number of interferences, it is not expected that brackets can be erected on the North wall. Removable frames would be inserted into these brackets and standard aluminum scaffolding boards placed across the frames to provide a walkway at a convenient elevation below the expansion joint elevation. These frames will be removed from the brackets prior to condenser closeout and unit startup.

Brackets will be made of short sections of heavy wall tube steel welded to small baseplates that are then welded to the wall of the condenser. These will be small and made of steel thick enough to mitigate erosion due to turbine exhaust impingement. Carbon steel is being used because this is the material of the condenser walls. (While it is possible to weld stainless steel to the carbon steel walls, the dissimilar materials can result in the condenser wall being corroded.) The design provides a convenient interface for handrails built with standard scaffold materials. Walkboards and scaffold materials are not included in this Design Change Package.

The removable frames will be made of structural angle, sections of pipe and plate steel, with an approximate weight of 40 pounds per frame. The support frames are designed for a loading of 75 pounds per square foot on the walk boards, using a factor of safety of four as specified by OSHA regulation 1926.451 (a)(1).

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW The condenser steam space is non-safety related. A review of the Programs Review Checklist did not identify any programs that are affected or potentially affected by this design change.

4.0 REFERENCES

41 Station Drawings 12050-FM-4A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H 4.2 Vendor Drawings N4-201-DRET-501X1 (Stone and Webster Number 11715-4.23-34A) and N4-201-DRET-535X1 (Stone and Webster Number 11715-4.23-25A)

(June 01)

Egineerng Review and Design D om in io n - ST D-G N _0001_Attach ment_4 i2 Design Change Numbter 1 Design Change Title/Station/Unit PERMANENT SCAFFOLD SUPPORTS INSIDE CONDENSER / NORTH ANNA / UNIT 2!02-108 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM tube Each refueling outage, scaffolding must be placed inside the condenser steam space above the other components bundle to support performance of inspections on "dogbone" expansion joints and Placing and removing this large quantity of scaffolding is time and labor intensive, resulting in cost and outage schedule concerns. In addition, there are challenges with personnel safety due to the requirements of working in the confined space and moving all of the scaffold material.

be installed in Request for Engineering Assistance R2000-087 proposed that permanent scaffold supports scaffold boards selected areas inside the condenser steam space. These would permit the placement of 20 feet tall Cost savings would without the necessity of erecting the scaffold framework approximately in the condensers and in include those associated with using a smaller amount of scaffolding material allowing future scheduling flexibility due to reducing the magnitude of this labor intensive activity.

2.0 PROPOSED RESOLUTION Discussions with the Nuclear Site Support personnel involved in erecting the scaffolding, coupled with field walks, has resulted in a proposed resolution that will provide permanent brackets on the East, West and South condenser walls. Due to the number of interferences, it is not expected that brackets can be erected on the North wall. Removable frames would be inserted into these brackets and standard aluminum scaffolding boards placed across the frames to provide a walkway at a convenient elevation below the expansion joint elevation. These frames will be removed from the brackets prior to condenser closeout and unit startup.

Brackets will be made of short sections of heavy wall tube steel welded to small baseplates that are then welded to the wall of the condenser. These will be small and made of steel thick enough to mitigate erosion due to turbine exhaust impingement. Carbon steel is being used because this is the material of the condenser walls. (While it is possible to weld stainless steel to the carbon steel walls, the dissimilar materials can result in the condenser wall being corroded.) The design provides a convenient interface for handrails built with standard scaffold materials. Walkboards and scaffold materials are not included in this Design Change Package.

The removable frames will be made of structural angle, sections of pipe and plate steel, with an approximate weight of 40 pounds per frame. The support frames are designed for a loading of 75 pounds per square foot on the walk boards, using a factor of safety of four as specified by OSHA regulation 1926.451 (a)(1).

3.0 PROGRAMS REVIEW The condenser steam space is non-safety related. A review of the Programs Review Checklist did not identify any programs that are affected or potentially affected by this design change.

4.0 REFERENCES

41 Station Drawings 12050-FM-4A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H 4.2 Vendor Drawings N4-201-DRET-501X1 (Stone and Webster Number 11715-4.23-34A) and N4-201-DRET-535X1 (Stone and Webster Number 11715-4.23-25A)

(June 01)

Engineering Review and Design 2"lDominion" STDGN001 - tahmnS

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change TitlelStabon/Unit Replace Terry Turbine Pump 1-FW-P-2 Restricting Orifice / NAPS / Unit 1 02-133 1.0 Statement of the Problem REA 1996-503 was issued to evaluate the suitability of a replacement isolation valve for the steam driven auxiliary steam generator feedpump 1-FW-P-2 full flow recirculation line. During surveillance testing, the isolation valve is throttled to provide the proper flow rate through the recirculation line.

The valve is not designed to serve this application, and a valve to fulfill this function has not been found. It was decided by System Engineering to utilize a different restricting orifice to control the flow for the surveillance testing and not throttle the isolation valve.

Temporary Modification N-1695 was issued to change restricting orifice 1-FW-RO-102A from a 1.161" bore orifice plate to a 0.746" bore orifice plate. The surveillance test was performed, and the flow rate was acceptable with the 0.746" orifice plate installed. The acceptability of the new orifice plate needs to be documented by a Design Change Package and the Temporary Modification can be closed.

2.0 Proposed Resolution The new restricting orifice plate for 1-FW-RO-102A with a 0.746" bore that was installed by Temporary Modification N-1695 and proven by surveillance testing is an acceptable substitute for the original 1.161" bore orifice plate. The design flow rate for the new 0.746" orifice plate is approximately 345 GPM. The new orifice was sized and procured from U S Filter based upon flow information provided by System Engineering. The new orifice plate is similar to the existing orifice plate except for the bore size and will not have any affect on the piping seismic installation. During the surveillance testing, the actual flow rate stabilized at 360 GPM. The 360 GPM flow rate is acceptable since the flow rate needs to be at least 340 GPM for routine surveillance testing, and less than 400 GPM for pump response time testing. Therefore, the currently installed orifice plate with a bore of 0.746" is an acceptable replacement for the 1.161" bore orifice for surveillance testing with an unthrottled isolation valve on the full flow recirculation line. The appropriate procedures as noted in Engineering Transmittal N 02-055, Rev. 0, should be revised to document the new orifice plate installation.

The original 1.161" orifice plate needs to be retained for use during future full flow and pump head versus flow verification testing. The appropriate procedures should be revised to documentthat the orifice plate will need to be changed to the 1.161" orifice plate for full flow or pump head versus flow verification testing. The 1.161" orifice plate should be secured near the pipe orifice installation point with a label stating that it is the 1.161" orifice plate to be installed for 1-FW-P-2 full flow and pump head versus flow verification testing.

3.0 Programs Review 3.3 Fire Protection / Appendix "R" The Auxiliary Feedwater system is an Appendix "R" system required for the safe shutdown of the unit. The replacement of the orifice plate in the recirculation line does not affect the Auxiliary Feedwater System from achieving the performance goals identified in the Appendix "R" Report.

There are no Appendix "R" drawings that require updating. This modification does not adversely impact the station's design basis for compliance with Appendix "R" to 10 CFR 50. Combustible loading will also not be affected by this change.

1 (June 01)

Engineering Review and Design

, Dominion- ST-N-01 Atahmn

2. Design Change Number

1. Design Change TitlelStatonrUnft 02-133 Replace Terry Turbine Pump 1-FW-P-2 Restricting Orifice / NAPS / Unit 1 3.27 Inventory OptimizationlSummary of Equipment Added or Removed Mark # Add/Remove/Modify Function 1-FW-RO-102A Remove 1.161" Bore Orifice Plate 1-FW-RO-102A Add 0.746" Bore Orifice Plate No stock items will become obsolete as a result of the implementation of this DCP per telecon with Bryan Jacobs, Supply Chain Management.

4.0 References REA 1996-503 ET N 02-055, Rev. 0 Temporary Modification N-1695 PI N-2002-0591 UFSAR 10.4 TS %.7.1 11715-FM-074A SH 3 of 4 P. 0. No. 45095518 (Orifice Plate from U S Filter) 2 (June 01)