ML030230274

Response to Request for Additional Information Associated with License Amendment Request to Revise Safety Limits & Instrumentation Setpoints Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation

ML030230274
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	01/10/2003
From:	Mecredy R Rochester Gas & Electric Corp
To:	Clark R Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML030230274 (63)

Text

Rf An Energy East Company ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION - 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, NY 14649-0001

• 585 546-2700 www rge corn ROBERT C MECREDY VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS January 10, 2003 Mr. Robert L. Clark Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Response to Request for Additional Information Associated with the License Amendment Request to Revise the Safety Limits and Instrumentation Setpoints Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

References:

(1) Letter from R.L. Clark, NRC, to R.C. Mecredy, RG&E,

Subject:

Request for Additional Information RegardingR. E. Ginna Nuclear PowerPlant (Ginna) License Amendment Request to Revise the Safety Limits and InstrumentationSetpoints (TAC NO. MB4789), dated September 27, 2002.

(2) Letter from R. Clark, NRC, to file,

Subject:

Summary of Meeting Held on November 20, 2002, With Rochester Gas and Electric CorporationRe:

ProposedLicense Amendment Request to Revise R. E. Ginna Nuclear PowerPlant (Ginna) Safety Limits And InstrumentationSetpoints (TA C NO. MB4789), dated December 12, 2002.

Dear Mr. Clark:

In Reference 1, the NRC provided RG&E with a Request for Additional Information (RAI) related to a proposed license amendmentrequest for Ginna Station concerning the Safety Limits and Instrumentation Setpoints. In response to this RAI, a public meeting was held between RG&E and NRC Staff to discuss the proposed response and schedule (Reference 2). The purpose of this letter is to provide the response to the questions documented in Reference 1 (see enclosure).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that I am authorized by Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation to make this submittal and that the foregoing is true and correct.

Iooo.

If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Tom Harding, 585 771-3384.

Veiy fly yours, Executed on January 10, 2003 (-= aplQ1 Robert C. Mecredy Enclosure - Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Dated 9/27/02 - Revised Bases Page B 2.1.1-3 - DA EE-92-092-21, Revision 3, Instrument Loop Performance Evaluation and Setpoint Verification, Instrument Loop Number RCS T405 / AT - ITS Chapter 3.3 Instrumentation Values xc: Mr. Robert Clark (Mail Stop O-8-C2)

Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Regional Administrator, Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector Mr. William M. Flynn, President New York State Energy, Research, and Development Authority Corporate Plaza West 286 Washington Avenue Extension Albany, NY 12203-6399 Mr. Paul Eddy NYS Department of Public Service 3 Empire Plaza Albany, NY 12223

Enclosure 1 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Dated September 27, 2002 The response to the RAI will be structured as follows. The items in bold below are the questions provided by the NRC in the RAI dated September 27, 2002. A response to each item is then provided by RG&E.

Core Operating Safety Limits

1. In ITS Section B 2.1.1, Reactor Core SLs, (page B 2.1.1-2) the text in the second paragraph beginning with, "The curves of Figure B 2.1.1-1.... Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits" is designated to be removed. However, it seems that the last sentence in this text, i.e., "Normal steady... Boiling (DNB) Limits" should remain, because limiting condition for operation 3.4.1 remains.

Response: RG&E does not agree with the suggestion. The removed sentences are a linked thought, specific to the relocated figure. The last paragraph of the Bases sub section still contains a reference to LCO 3.4.1.

2. In ITS Section 2.1.1, SAFETY LIMITS, (page B 2.1.1-3), the proposed text in the first paragraph reads "The Figure provided in the COLR shows an example of...DNBR correlation" is referring to Figure B 2.1.1-1. Within the same paragraph, the proposed changes to the second sentence reads, "Each of the curves of Figure COLR-5 has three distinct slopes." It appears that both changes are referring to Figure B 2.1.1-1, therefore, to make the first and second sentence consistent, the first sentence should read, "Figure COLR-5 shows an example of...DNBR correlation."

Response: RG&E agrees with the suggestion. The revised markup of the text is provided in Attachment 1.

3. In Table 3.3.1-1, (pages 3.3.1-15, and 16), Note 1 and Note 2, a tolerance of 2.5% and 2.0% of AT span is specified for the OTAT and OPAT nominal trip setpoint, respectively. Please provide the bases for the tolerance given in Note 1 and 2.

Response: The values listed in Table 3.3.1-1 Note 1 and Note 2 for determining the Allowable Value are based on RG&E setpoint analysis DA EE-92-092-21. A copy of this analysis is provided in Attachment 2.

Ginna Setpoint Methodology

1. When was your in-house setpoint methodology reviewed and by whom?

Response: Ginna's in-house setpoint methodology has not been formally reviewed by the NRC. A number of in-house setpoint design analyses were reviewed by the staff during the Technical Specification conversion, as referenced in the SER enclosed with Amendment 61 to the Facility Operating License, dated February 13, 1996.

Since the issue of ANSI/ISA-S67.04-1994 Part I and II, the Ginna setpoint methodology was updated to incorporate the latest industry guidance included in the ISA Standard as well as Branch Technical Position HICB-12 and guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter 91-04. This includes the methodology and process for developing 95/95 plant specific drift analyses described in the Generic Letter.

The Ginna in-house setpoint methodology is similar to the methodology utilized by many other utilities. Specifically, the NRC has previously granted SERs for Technical Specification Amendment requests that included changes based on the similar methodology, including:

San Onofre July 28, 1989 Dresden, LaSalle, Quad Cities March 30, 2001 Prairie Island June 26, 2002

2. How have the changes proposed in this license amendment request affected the lead/lag calculations?

Response: The changes proposed in this license amendment request do not affect the lead/lag calculations. These calculations are part of the safety analysis and included in the Analytical Limit determination for Ginna. An example is the reference to the Overpower DT time constant "3, referred to on page 3.3.1-16 of this amendment request, as

• 10 seconds. The time constant is integral with the Analytical Limit and is included directly in the setpoint calculation as listed in the analysis. The improvements made in updating the instrument uncertainty analysis increase the confidence that the channel will perform it's intended function. An example includes the updated process for instrument drift, which calculates the 95/95 drift allowance using plant specific data and follows the guidelines in Generic Letter 91-04.

3. What is the analytical limit for each of the functions listed in Table 3.3.1-1 and Table 3.3.2-1?

Response: The analytical limit for each of the functions listed in Tables 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-2 is listed in the applicable RG&E setpoint analysis. A table summarizing the analytical limits is included in Attachment 3.

4. What is the calculated trip setpoint for each of the functions listed in Table 3.3.1-1 and Table 3.3.2-1?

Response: The calculated trip setpoint for each of the functions listed in Tables 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-1 is documented in the applicable setpoint analysis and calibration procedure.

A table summarizing the calculated trip setpoints is included in Attachment 3.

5. What is the +/- tolerance band for each of the functions listed in Table 3.3.1-1 and Table 3.3.2-1?

Response: The tolerance band for each of the functions listed in Table 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2 1 is documented in the applicable setpoint analysis and calibration procedure. A table summarizing the tolerance bands is included in Attachment 3.

6. What is the nominal setpoint for each of the functions listed in Table 3.3.1-1 and Table 3.3.2-1?

Response: The nominal setpoints for each of the functions listed in Table 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-1 is documented in the applicable setpoint analysis and calibration procedure. A table summarizing the nominal setpoints is included in Attachment 3.

7. Is the calibration tolerance greater than or equal to the device reference accuracy for each of the functions listed in Table 3.3.1-1 and Table 3.3.2-1?

Response: In most cases the calibration tolerance is 2 the device reference accuracy for each of the functions listed in Tables 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-1. In situations where the tolerance may be < the device reference accuracy, both the tolerance and reference accuracy values are included in the calculation of the instrument uncertainty.

8. Section 6.1 of the American National Standards Institute/Instrument Society of America (ANSI/ISA-S67.04-Part I) requires that a record of the as-found and as-left data be kept for the instances where setpoints are found to be outside the tolerance band. Where have you specified the logging of as-found and as-left data for setpoints needing to be re-adjusted? How is this data being used at Ginna?

Response: As-found and as-left data is recorded within the Ginna calibration and channel operability test procedures, as required by the administrative calibration control program.

Ginna has followed the guidelines of ANSIl/ISA-S67.04 Part I and II as well as Regulatory Guide 1.105 and HICB-12 in calculating the RPS and ESFAS setpoints included in Tables 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-1. For setpoints addressed by the Ginna drift monitoring program, including the RPS and ESFAS setpoints, as-found and as-left data was gathered (going back approximately 10 years) for all setpoints following the drift analysis guidelines in Generic Letter 91-04. Values of drift corresponding to 95/95 confidence and probability were developed and incorporated in the setpoint calculations arriving at the updated values included in Tables 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-1. The program (CRS Engineering Drift Software Package) used to calculate drift for Ginna is the same program used by others in the industry (reference SER for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Conversion to Improved Technical Specifications, dated February 15, 2000).

Ginna Station calibration and channel operability test procedures require a comparison of as-found and as-left values with the procedural required as-left tolerance band. If as found values are outside of the procedural as-left tolerance band, a comparison must be made with the calculated total instrument uncertainty values (which incorporate the most current drift values). An ACTION Report (Ginna corrective action program) is required to be initiated to ensure appropriate corrective actions are implemented for as-found data that is outside of the calculated total instrument uncertainty value, even if the instrument is still be within its Allowable Value limit. The instrument must be adjusted to within its procedural as-left tolerance band to remain bounded by the applicable uncertainty analysis and be declared operable. The drift analysis is periodically reviewed to determine when updates are necessary for specific setpoints or based on make/model drift data. This complies with point 7 of Generic Letter 91-04.

9. Per RG&E Engineering Procedure EP-3-S-0505, Rev. 1, "Instrument Setpoint/Loop Accuracy Calculation Methodology," you indicate that ANSI/ISA-RP67.04-Part II, Figure 6, Method 3 is used to determine the allowable value. The use of Method 3 requires, under certain circumstances, that a check calculation be performed. The check calculation should provide assurance that the purpose of the allowable value is satisfied by providing a large enough margin to account for those uncertainties not measured during the channel operability test as described below.

Check Calculation Methodology In the sample calculation for the safety injection setpoint, (see DA EE-92-041-21),

the required margin between the analytical limit (AL) and the allowable value (AV) is conservatively estimated to be equal to:

2 0.85 psi or 1.42% of scale AVALM1 = TLU 2 -COT =

where: AVALM1 = required margin TLU - total loop uncertainty COT = channel operability uncertainty The available margin (AVALM2) using Method 3 is AVALM2 = TLU - COT = 0.29 psi or 0.48% of scale Because AVALMI > AVALM2, the available margin using Method 3 is insufficient to account for those uncertainties not measured during the COT which include, in part:

Sce2 Deadweight Tester +/- 0.5% Full Scale Sa Sensor Accuracy +/- 0.65% Full Scale Sd Sensor Drift +/- 0.5% Full Scale St Sensor Tolerance +/- 1.0% Full Scale (Note that each of the above uncertainties is greater than the available margin of 0.48%)

To ensure sufficient margin between the analytical limit (AL) and the allowable value (AV), the allowable value and the trip setpoint (TS) should be adjusted as described in ANSIISA-RP67.04-Part II (See Appendix L, Example Calculation Pressure Trip, Section 12.0, "Check Calculation").

Allowable Value Methodology Per RG&E procedure EP-3-S-0505, the allowable value is calculated using the following arithmetic approach:

AV=AL-TLU+COT According to ANS/ISA-RP67.04 - Part II, if the arithmetic approach is used to determine the allowable value versus the square root sum of squares (SRSS) approach, then the check calculation as outlined above should be performed. The only exception to this requirement is if your allowable value was calculated using the SRSS approach, i.e.,

2 AV = AL - TLU 2 -COT which is the setpoint methodology defined by Figure 6, Method 2. These two expressions for the allowable value (AV) are not equivalent and care must be taken whenever terms are removed from the radical sign.

Given the information discussed above, please provide justification as to why the check calculation for the safety injection setpoint using Method 3 was not performed in accordance with ANS/ISA-RP67.04-Part II.

Response: RG&E performs the calculation as called out in ANSIJSA-S67.04 1994 - Part II, Section 7.3. Specifically, the Standard states the following:

"The third method to calculate the AV illustrated in Figure 6 first calculates the trip setpoint as described in Section 7.2. Then, an allowance for the three categories of instrument uncertainty (drift, calibration uncertainty, and uncertainties during normal operation) is calculated. This allowance is then added to the trip setpoint to establish the AV. If the allowance is not determined in a method that is consistent with the method used for the determination of the trip setpoint, a check calculation should be performed. For example, if an SRSS combination is used for determining the trip setpoint and an algebraic combination is used for the allowance between the trip setpoint and the AV, a check calibration should be performed. The check calibration should provide assurance that the purpose of the AV is still satisfied by providing a large enough allowance to account for those uncertainties not measured during the test. If the check calculation identifies that there is not enough allowance between the AL and AV, the AV must be changed to provide the necessary allowance. In all cases, the difference between the AV and the trip setpoint must be at least as large as the calibration tolerance discussed in 6.2.6.2, and, if it is not, the trip setpoint must be adjusted."

Breaking down this paragraph by sentences, we find:

a. Sentence 1 - RG&E calculates the trip setpoint using the methodology described in Section 7.2. Specifically, the trip setpoint is calculated as AL - TLU where AL is a pre-defined value tied to the Accident Analysis and TLU is calculated using the SRSS approach.

b. Sentence 2 - The "allowance" instrument uncertainties are calculated using the SRSS technique and include drift, accuracy, and setting tolerance as called out in Ginna Engineering Procedure EP-3-S-0505, Rev. 1, "Instrument Setpoint/Loop Accuracy Calculation Methodology." These uncertainties reflect only the boundaries of instrumentation included in the surveillance test credited, in this case the COT, which is performed quarterly and checks the current calibration status of the bistable. Additional allowances may be included as justified. An allowance for M&TE, and or other normal environmental parameters including temperature, is not included in the Allowable Value determination at Ginna, although it is permitted in ANSIIISA-S67.04-1994 (i.e., calibration uncertainties and uncertainties during normal operation). Keeping the COT small by not including these uncertainties is conservative as described in the section below.

c. Sentence 3 - The AV is established by adding the "allowance" (COT) to the trip setpoint (AL - TLU) exactly as specified in the Standard, or:

AV=AL-TLU+ COT This is not an arithmetic approach as called out in the NRC question, as the "allowance" is calculated by SRSS. Also, having a smaller COT than the Standard allows as described under Sentence 2 results in an AV closer to the trip setpoint which is conservative.

d. Sentences 4 through 7 - These do not apply since the "allowance" (COT) is calculated in "a method consistent with the method used for the determination of the trip setpoint" (i.e., SRSS). Consequently, a check calculation is not required.

e. Sentence 8 - The difference between the AV and trip setpoint is at least as large as the calibration tolerance described in Section 6.2.6.2 of the Standard.

Based on the above, RG&E has implemented Method 3 as specified within the Standard.

This implementation is also similar to that'of the other utilities which have received NRC approval, as previously stated in the response to Setpoint Methodology Question 1.

RG&E would also like to note the additional conservatism and plant-specific inputs associated with our implementation of the methodology specified within Ginna Engineering Procedure EP-3-S-0505, Rev. 1, "Instrument Setpoint/Loop Accuracy Calculation Methodology."

a. The use of the minimal COT value in calculating the AV results in an AV closer to the trip setpoint and further from the AL. As such, the channel would be expected to trip sooner than as assumed within the Accident Analysis.

b. The drift values for the bistable have been developed using NRC approved methods for 95/95 statistical analysis of past Ginna specific as-found/as-left data.

This provides a high degree of assurance that the setpoint will remain within the limit of drift, whenever tested. The AV should not be challenged by the COT results, because of the high degree of assurance we now have of channel operation, from the many years of operation at Ginna. This meets the objectives of Regulatory Guide 1.105 and HICB-12 in ensuring that nominal setpoints and Technical Specification AV include allowances to account for normal environmental variations within the boundaries of the credited testing.

c. The actual field setpoints (referred to as "nominal") are even "lower" (i.e., further away from the AL) than the trip setpoint calculated in the subject analyses. That is, Ginna is not operated to the AV, but to the nominal setpoints which have been chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the AL and thus ensuring that the Safety Limit would not be exceeded. As such, the nominal setpoint accounts for uncertainties in setting the device, uncertainties in how the device might actually perform, changes in the point of action of the device over time, and any other factors which may influence its actual performance. In this manner, the nominal setpoint plays an important role in ensuring that Safety Limits are not exceeded. The COT, in conjunction with the more frequently performed Channel Check, is used to periodically determine whether the channel is behaving as predicted. If as-found values are outside of the procedural as-left tolerance band, a comparison must be made with the calculated total instrument uncertainty values. An ACTION Report (Ginna corrective action program) is required to be initiated to ensure appropriate corrective actions are implemented for as-found data that is outside of the calculated total instrument uncertainty value. Operability following the COT is based on the channel being within the required conservative as-left nominal setpoint tolerance. However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This AV is specified in the Technical Specifications in order to define past/as-found operability of the channel.

10. Did the setpoint calculations use ANSI/ISA-RP67.04-Part II, Figure 6, Method 3 for each of the functions listed in Table 3.3.1-1 and Table 3.3.2-1?

Response: The selected method at Ginna is Method 3 and is utilized in all safety related setpoint calculations, as required by EP-3-S-0505, Rev. 1. ANSI/ISA-S67.04 allows the use of multiple methods in calculating setpoints and Allowable Values for safety-related setpoints. Ginna Station methodology incorporated Method 3, which has been used by many licensees in calculating setpoints submitted to the NRC for Technical Specification Amendments including 24 month surveillance extension requests following the guidelines of Generic Letter 91-04. The Ginna method followed is conservative to the method allowed in ANSMISA-S67.04, because the number of allowances included in the Ginna Allowable Value calculation is less than that allowed by the ISA standard. Ginna recognizes that Regulatory Guide 1.105 does not address ANSLI[SA-S67.04 Part II and as discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.105 and HICB-12, it is the responsibility of the licensee to define their own methodology and justify the parameters and method of combination of the parameters for setpoint and loop uncertainty calculations. Ginna has done this in EP-3-S-0505, Rev. 1, previously provided to the NRC. Ginna is currently represented in ISA-$67.04 committee work and has been participating for a number of years. In addition, the enhancement to the calculations, incorporated with this amendment, includes a significant undertaking to develop and implement the statistical analysis of plant specific drift for all setpoints included in this amendment scope as well as other safety related and important to safety setpoints at Ginna. This provides a higher level of assurance that actual plant conditions, not just vendor recommended allowances, are included in the Ginna calculations and brings the Ginna calculations up to the latest industry standards and practices for setpoint methodology.

11. Please confirm that your setpoint calculation methodology meets the 95/95 confidence level requirement.

Response: Ginna setpoint methodology incorporated in EP-3-S-0505, Rev. 1 (section 5.5), meets the 95/95 confidence and probability for safety related setpoints, following the guidelines in ANSMISA-S67.04 Part I and II, HICB-12 and Regulatory Guide 1.105.

The guidance to the setpoint engineers for parameter selection and method of combination matches the recommendations in the ISA standard. In addition, the enhancement includes statistically determined drift values, based on plant-specific drift data, follows an NRC approved method, and uses industry software (provided by CRS).

Ginna completed a major enhancement to gather plant specific instrument calibration history, purchase the software and calculate the 95/95 drift values for the 24 month nominal or 30 month maximum calibration intervals, and develop the calculations to support this amendment. The use of 95/95 drift values, determined in a statistical analysis, provides a high degree of assurance that the channels will be maintained in an operable condition to perform the intended function. This is consistent with the latest industry guidelines, as endorsed by the NRC Branch Technical Position and Reg. Guide.

As per Regulatory Position 1 in Reg. Guide 1.105 Rev. 3, the ISA Standard S67.04 1994, Part 1, provides the methods for combining uncertainties to meet an acceptable criterion of 95% probability and 95% confidence. The Ginna methodology follows this guidance.

Attachment 1 Revised Bases Page B 2.1.1-3

Reactor Core SLs B 2.1.1 Automatic enforcement of these reactor core SLs is provided by the 4 following functions (Ref. 5): .e.fert *

a. High pressurizer pressure trip; _ , , *0" ( ,

b. Low pressurizer pressure trip;

c. Overtemperature AT trip;

d. Overpower AT trip;

e. Power Range Neutron Flux trip; and

f. Steam generator safety valves.

Additional anticipatory trip functions are also provided for specific abnormal conditions.

The SLs represent a design requirement for establishing the RPS trip setpoints identified previously. LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," or the assumed initial conditions of the safety analyses (Ref. Mprovide more restrictive limits to ensure that the SLs are not exceeded.,`,-

SAF

-. SAF ETY LIMITS 2.1J.1o

• Figure Ilai1-1ws an example of the reactor cof THERMAL POWER, RCS pressure, and average temperature for which the minimum DNBR is greater than or equal to the safety analyses limit, that fuel centerline temperature remains below melting, that the average enthalpy in the hot leg is less than or equal to the enthalpy of saturated liquid, or that exit quality hecore type is within of figure, the limits the curves definedB b on Fiue the DNBR 2.1.-oft.,,'*

Jrmtis correlatorn jrm maying specification can be genrtd c fte curves of

---

. Tki,,, 1-1 hs three distinct slopes. Working from left to right, the C2 N-filope ensures that the average enthalpy in the hot leg is less than or equal to the enthalpy of saturated liquid such that overtemperature AT indication remains valid. The second slope ensures that the hot leg steam quality remains _ 15%. The final slope ensures that DNBR is always 1.4. c s TeS is hgher than the limit calculated when the Axial Flux Difference

/ AFD) is within the limits of the F(AI) function of the overtemperature AT (reactor trip. When the AFD is not within the tolerance, the AFD effect on

\the overtemperature AT reactor trips will reduce the setpoints to provide,/

pr._otection consistent with the reactor core SLs.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 2.1.1-3 Revision 21

Attachment 2 DA EE-92-092-21, Revision 3 Instrument Loop Performance Evaluation and Setpoint Verification Instrument Loop Number RCS T405 / AT

Design Analysis Ginna Station Instrument Loop Performance Evaluation and Setpoint Verification Instrument Loop Number RCS T405 / &T Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 DA EE-92-092-21 Revision 3 September 25, 2001 EWR 5126 Prepared by:  ?

D E 91 IDate, Reviewed by:

Reactor Engine ri Reviewed by:

cear Sai& Licensing Date Reviewed by:

n0`dependent Reviewer Date TECHNICAL INPUT FORM E IN TE-401A, TE-401 B. TE-405A. TE-405B, TE-402A, TE-402B, TE-406A, TE-406B, TE-403A, TE-403B, TE-407A, TE-407B, TE-404A, TE-404B, TE-408A, TE-408B, TT-401A, TT-401 B, TT-405A, TT-405B,, TM-40 1AA, TM-405AA, TM-401C, TI 401, TM-401B, TM-4010, TM-401V, Tr402A TT-402B, TT-406A, TT406B, TM-402AA, TM-406AA, TI-402, TM-402C, TM-402B, TM-4020, TM-402V, T-"403A, 1T--403B, TT-407A, TT-407B, TM403AA, TM-407AA, TM-403C, T1I-403, TM 403B, TM-4030, TM-403V, T--404A, "T-404B,TT-408A, TT-408B, TM-404AA, TM-408AA, TM-404C, TI-404, TM 404B, TM-4040, TM-404V KEYWORDS Instrument, Setpoint, Uncertainty, Calibration, Reactor Coolant System, T Hot, T Cold, T Average, Delta T, Overpower Delta T, Overtemperature Delta T CROSS REF CPI-SP1-405 10, CPI-SP2-405.20, CPI-SPI-406 10, CPI-SP2-406.20, CPI-SPI-407.10, CPI-SP2-407.20, CPI SPI-407.10, CPI-SP2-408.20, CPI-DELTA-FLUX-l0, CPI-DELTA-FLUX-20, CPI-DELTA-FLUX-30, CPI DELTA-FLUX-40, CPI-TRIP-TEST-5.10, CPI-TRIP-TEST-5.20, CPI-TRIP-TEST-5 30, CPI-TRIP-TEST 5 40, CPI-DELTA-T-405, CPI-DELTA-T-406, CPI-DELTA-T-407, CPI-DELTA-T.408, PCR-97-026 PSSL 02 EWR/ 5126 PROPRIETARY YES NO X OTHER Projplan 99-0001 COMMENT SUPERSEDES

REVISION STATUS SHEET Revision Number Affected Sections Description of Revision 0 N/A Original 1 Table of Contents, Incorporate modifications 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.0, per PCR 97-026, resolve 4.1.3, 5.1.1, 6.3.1, PCAQs94-065 and 94-066, 9.9, 11.0, Attachment A delete Attachments B and C.

2 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 2.0, 3.0, Added Sections 9.2 and 10.3.

4.0, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.2, Incorporated Attachment A into analysis.

6.2.1, 6.3.1, 7.3.1, 7.3.3, Incorporated updated drift data from 8.3.1, 8.4.1, 8.5, 8.6*, new drift study performed July 99.

8.8, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, Minor format changes, clarifications 9.5, 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, and corrections of typographical 9.10, 9.11, 10.1, 10.2, errors.

10.3.3, 11.0 Attachment A Added an evaluation of a change in the Delta T Loop configuration per PCR 99-045.

3. 10.3.2 Added Allowable Values for TC-405A/B and TC-405C/D.

[ EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 2 of 47 9/25/2001

INSTRUMENT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND SETPOINT VERIFICATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page Instrument Loop Identification ...................................................... 4 1.0 Purpose .......................................................................... 5 2.0 R eferences ....................................................................... 6 3.0 A ssum ptions ...................................................................... 9 4.0 Block Diagram and Scope of Analysis ................................................ 10 5.0 Instrument Loop Performance Requirements ......................................... 15 6.0 Description of the Existing Instrument Loop Configuration ............................. 18 7.0 Evaluation of Existing Instrument Loop Configuration Against Documented Performance R equirem ents .................................................................... 21 8.0 Documentation of Loop Uncertainties ................................................ 24 9.0 Loop Uncertainty-Evaluation ....................................................... 30 10.0 Setpoint Evaluations .............................................................. 37 11.0 C onclusion ............ ......................................................... 44 ATTACHM ENT A ........................................................................ 45 I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 3 of 47 9/25/2001

INSTRUMENT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND SETPOINT VERIFICATION Instrument Loop Identification Calibration Procedure No. CPI-DELTA-T-405, CPI-SP1-405.10, CPI-SP2-405.20, and CPI-TRIP-TEST-5.10

==

Description:==

Calibration of Delta T Loop 405 Calibration of Delta T Setpoint I Channel 1 Calibration of Delta T Setpoint 2 Channel 1, and Reactor Protection System Trip Test/Calibration for Channel 1 (Red) Bistable Alarms.

The Instrument Performance Evaluation and Setpoint Verification of the following equipment will be performed by this document:

1. TE-401AB and TE-405A,B

2. TT-401A, TT-405A, TT-401B, TT-405B

3. TM-405AA

4. TM-405CC

5. TM-405B

6. TI-405A/B

7. TC-405C/D I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 4 of 47 9/25/2001

1.0 Purpose The purpose of this calculation is to determine the overall loop uncertainty associated with instrument channel RCS T405/AT, which is utilized to monitor the change in reactor coolant temperature for Reactor Coolant System Loop "A". The safety-related portion of this loop to be analyzed consists of the inputs to the Overtemperature and Overpower t&T reactor trips, and the control room AT indication (See Figure 1, Section 4.0). Redundant temperature loops T406, T407 and T408 are equivalent to loop T405; therefore, this analysis is applicable to Channels T406, T407 and T408 also.

1.2 Revision 1 of this document identifies the replacement of several instrument modules at the front end of Channel 2 Tav, and AT signal processing (loop T406). This modification was performed under PCR 97 026 and was addressed in Attachment A to DA-EE-92-091-21. In DA-EE-92-091-21, the Total Loop Uncertainty (TLU) associated with the new configuration was compared to the TLU associated with the existing configuration. Since the TLU of the new instrumentation was less than the TLU of the existing, the new instrumentation does not adversely impact the conclusions of DA-EE-92-091-21 and this analysis, and is therefore acceptable. PCAQs94-065 and 94-066 were also resolved under Revision 1 of this analysis.

1.3 The computer documentation used to perform some of the uncertainty calculations and generate some of the graphics was provided in Attachment C to Revision 0 of this document and will not be reproduced in this and future revisions. See Attachment C to Revision 0 of this analysis for Computer Documentation details.

1.4 Revision 2 of this analysis is for the following purposes:

"* Update of references to procedures, UFSAR, Improved Technical Specifications (ITS), Vendor Technical Documents, etc.

"* Addition of new section 10.3 for discussion of Allowable Values for ITS Tables 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-1.

"* Minor format changes per current Engineering Procedure for preparation of Design Analyses.

• Incorporation of Attachment A into body (section 9) of analysis.

• Incorporation of updated drift values per drift study performed July 1999 (DA-EE-95-109).

"* Deleted figures 5, 6 and 7 from section 10.2 and added Overtemperature Delta T and Overpower Delta T Setpoint Calculation tables and supporting analysis in their place.

"* Revised block diagrams (figures 1,2, & 3) to reflect installation of NUS modules per PCR 97-026 and PCR 99-045.

"* Added Attachment A, which evaluates the impact on this analysis for implementation of PCR 99-045.

I 1.5 Revision 3 of this analysis is for the following purpose:

0 Added ITS Allowable Values in section 10.3.2.

I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 5 of 47 9/25/2001

2.0 References

1. UFSAR Table 7.5-1, "Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3/NUREG-0737 Comparison Table".

2. Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water-Cooled Nuclear Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident", (Rev. 3, Dated May, 1983).

3. Improved Technical Specifications, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.

Table 3.3.1-1 Reactor Trip Instrumentation Table 3.3.2-1 ESF Actuation Instrumentation Table 3.3.3-1 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

4. LTP-LS, Laboratory Inspection Services Test Procedure for Category II Multifunction Meter.

5. Foxboro Drawing No. CD-2, RG&E Ginna Nuclear Station, Interconnection Wiring Diagram Rack No.

R-1 (Top), Sheet 1 of 2.

6. Precalculation Instrument Review Checklist for Instrument Loop T-405/Delta T, Dated 6/13/94.

7.. _ -Instrument Block Diagram Reactor Protection System Loop A-1, Foxboro Diagram No. BD-2, She et 1 of 1.

8. Guidelines for Instrument Loop Performance Evaluation and Setpoint Verification, Rev. 1.

9. Memo from Gary A. Cain to Mr. Baker, "Request for letter stating calibration accuracies of Digital Multifunction Meters", Dated March 29, 1990.

10. Primary Loop RTD Wiring Diagram, Drawing No. 21489-504.

11. RG&E UFSAR Tables:

3.11-1 Environmental Service Conditions for Equipment Designed to Mitigate Design Basis Events 4.4-1 Thermal and Hydraulic Design Parameters.

5.1-2 Reactor Coolant Piping Design Data.

5.2-4 Reactor Coolant Water Chemistry Specifications.

5.4-1 Reactor Coolant Pump Design Data.

15.04 Trip Points And Time Delays To Trip assumed In Accident Analyses

12. EOP Setpoint Database.

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 6 of 47 9/25/2001

13. UFSAR Figures 7.2-5 Reactor Coolant System Trip Signals.

7.2-4 Reactor Trip Signals.

7.2-14 TaVg/AT Control and Protection Systems.

14. Instrument Society of America ISA RP 67.04, "Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation."

15. Reactor Coolant P&ID, Drawing No. 33013-1260.

16. Rosemount Engineering Company, "Certified Configuration Drawing Sensor, Temperature, Platinum Resistance Type (176JA)", Drawing No. H34759-9201.

17. TICP-7, Category II Decade Resistance Boxes.

18. "The Application of Statistical Methods in Evaluation the Accuracy of Analog Instruments and Systems",

The Foxboro Co., by C.S. Zalkind and F.G Shinskey (Systems Engineers).

19. RCS Hot and Cold Leg Temperature Loop TE-401A&B, Instrument Loop Wiring Diagram, Drawing No 11302-0284, Sheets 1-13.

20. RCS Hot and Cold Leg Temperature Loop TE-405A & B, Instrument Loop Wiring Diagram, Drawing No 11302-0288, Sheets 1-10 of 10.

21. Calibration Procedure, CPI-DELTA-T-405, "Calibration of AT Loop 405 Reactor Protection Channel 1".

22. Calibration Procedure, CPI-SP 1-405.1, "Calibration of Delta T S etpoint 1 Channel 1".

23. Calibration Procedure, CPI-SP2-405.2, "Calibration of Delta T Setpoint 2 Channel 1".

24. Deleted

25. Deleted.

26. VTD-F0180-4357 and VTD-F0180-4335: Foxboro Special Instruction G-4025, "Special Model 66 Lead/Lag Unit", The Foxboro Co., Dated 1/69.

27. VTD-F0180-4327: Foxboro Special Instruction G-3581, "Electronic Consotrol Model 66GR-OW Voltage

- to Current Converter", The Foxboro Co.,

S- Dated 1/69.

28. Design Analysis, "Calculation of EOP Footnotes", Page 39, Dated 12/08/88.

29. VTD-F0180-4331: Foxboro Special Instruction G-3603, "Special Model 66 Lead/Lag Unit", The Foxboro Co., Dated 9/68.

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 7 of 47 9/25/2001

30. VTD-W0120-6901: Product Specifications, PSS 2A-3B1 A, The Foxboro Co., 65P Panel-Mounted Indicating Milliammeters and Voltmeters, Dated 82.

31. VTD-F0180-4337: Foxboro Special Instruction G-3645, "Model 63S Rack Mounted Alarms", The Foxboro Co., Dated 4/68.

32. Setpoint Analysis DA EE-92-091-21, "Reactor Coolant System Temperature TAvG T401."

33. RG&E correspondence from D. P. Servatius to R. A. Baker, dated 5/7/97, regarding PCR 97-026.

34. CPI-TRIP-TEST-5.10: Reactor Protection System Trip Test/Calibration for Channel 1 (Red) Bistable Alarms.

35. VTD-N0430-4004: NUS RTD 501 Series Operation and Maintenance Manual

36. VTD-N0430-4401: NUS MBA 500 Master Board Module Operation and Maintenance Manual

37. PCR 97-026,Reactor Protection RTD Input Module Replacement.

38. DA-EE-95-109, Evaluation of 24 Month Surveillance Intervals.

39. RG&E Correspondence from R. W. Eliasz to P. Bamford dated 9/6/95 regarding RCS Flow Uncertainty for an 18 Month Fuel Cycle (including maximum streaming uncertainty).

40. VTD-N0430-4901: NUS DAM 503 Operation and Maintenance Manual.

41. CN-TA-95-67, Westinghouse Calculation Sheet for RG&E OT and OP setpoints Verification, dated May 1995.-

42. Foxboro Drawing No. BD-2, RG&E Ginna Nuclear Station, Instrumentation Block Diagram, Loop Al, Reactor Protection System.

43. VTD-N0430-4601, Operations and Maintenance Manual (EIP-M-FCA502) for FCA502 Special Analog Isolator Module (NUS Instruments).

44. VTD-N0430-4201, Module Specific functions for Delta T (MBA-E062PA) (NUS Instruments).

45. PCR 99-045, Convert Delta T Voltage Loop To a Current Loop.

I 46. COLR Accident Analysis Assumptions Setpoints.

I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 8 of 47 9/25/2001

3.0 Assumptions

1. The following inaccuracies for each component are assumed:

Indicator Readability (TI-405B)

/ subdivision (Ref. No. 8) 1/22(1OF) 0.67% Full Scale Rack Equipment - A drift term of 1.0% for 30 months (Full Scale) will be utilized.

Rack Equipment - Temperature effect is considered negligible.

Test Point Resistors tolerance is +/-1.0%

Basis:

Refer to Reference 8; Section 10.5.2.3; readability has been selected from the guidance provided in this section.

Sensor and rack equipment drift effects are based on sound engineering judgement and previous experience. The drift term of 1.0% for 30 months for each path is conservative based on preliminary drift testing performed by NUS on the various rack modules. An updated drift study was performed in July 99, but insufficient data was available (for the NUS R/I Converters and Math Modules) to perform a statistical drift analysis. At least three calibration intervals are required. After three calibration intervals a statistical drift analysis will be performed on the R/I converters and Math Modules to verify that the 1.0%

path drift value is conservative. The original Foxboro input modules were recently changed to NUS modules as per PCR 97-026.

There was sufficient data to determine drift values per the updated drift study for the NUS DAM 503 and Foxboro 63S-BR bistables. A value of 0.5% is used in this analysis and is bounded by the values determined per the updated drift study.

Temperature effects are considered negligible since the sensor and rack components are located in the control room which is a controlled environment.

Test point resistor tolerance of +/-1.0% for the 10 ohm wire wound test point resistors is conservative.

They have a manufacturers tolerance of +/-0.1%. The computer tap 100 ohm testpoint resistor has a tolerance of +/-1.0%.

2. Assume the power supply effect is negligible.

Basis:

Based on similar equipment specifications and on sound engineering judgement, the power supply effect is considered negligible. For the same reason, resistive elements in modules and conductors have negligible effect on loop accuracy as long as the load is within the range specified for the power supply.

[ EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 9 of 47 9/25/2001

4.0 Block Diagram and Scope of Analysis Block Diagram,Sheet 1 of 3 TR-4W RECORDER LEGEND

"*DEVICE MAYNOT AFFECT LOOP ACCURACY SCOPE BOUNDARY

- DEVICE OUTPUT IS NOT WTHIN THE SCOPE OF ANALYSIS RCS T405/DELTA T BLOCK DIAGRAM RCST4051 DWG Figure 1 EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 10 of 47 9/25/2001

4.0 Block Diagram and Scope of Analysis - (Con't)

Block Diagram, Sheet 2 of 3 (1)

THRMOBULBS DESC 200 OHM,PLAIWOUM. DIRECTlI1ERSION MFO"ROSEMOUNT MOCEL 176JA THOT & Rh MODULES TCOLD RTDs TE40A TT 05ATa TM-401AA &T

-~~ 40SAA TAVO AM~

DELTA T MATH T 0 MODULES TM 00MD 0-750o0. TO REACTOR I AA DELTAT _ T E 401 *-15[E FTO 0000 MATHMOOU.E AA TAV. - TM-,01B T11-4010 MFG.NUS - TI"-401C MODOETMDSW DESO MAIMMODULE MFG. NUS MODEL:11DO00 NOTES

1) FOR RESISTAN;E0TE.PERATURE UNCERTAINTYSEE NOTES 2.7 AND 2 11 OF ROSEMOUNTDWG.H34754"201 RTD Inputs to RPI Converters - SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC SREET2 2

RCST4012.DWG Figure 2 EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 11 of 47 9/25/2001

4.0 Block Diagram and Scope of Analysis - (Con't)

Block Diagram, Sheet 3 of 3 INDICATOR TR-405 RECORDER CT-3 oJ~vo~~r~~SASIPPCS ANALOG r0 MCBINDICATOR 0-75 DEG F TR-405 10-50 WA RECORDER CT-4 SASIPPCS ANALOG 200OHM LEGEND SCOPE BOUNDARY RCS T405IDELTA T BLOCK DIAGRAM SHEET3 RCST4053 DWG Figure 3 I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 12 of 47 9/25/2001

4.1 Description of Functions Making reference to the Block Diagram, describe the instrument loop functions that are within the scope of the analysis using the format below.

4.1.1 Protection Change in reactor coolant temperature as sensed by instrument loop T405 provides input into the reactor protection system as follows:

Overpower Delta T Reactor Trip The Overpower AT reactor trip is provided to protect against excessive power which could result in fuel failure. &Tis used as a measure of reactor power and is continuously compared with an automatically varying setpoint which is dependent on Tvg and axial flux difference. Instrument loops T401 and T405 (TC-405A) provide one of the four inputs to initiate this reactor trip upon the calculated Overpower AT setpoint being exceeded. The remaining three inputs to the two-out-of-four reactor trip coincidence logic are supplied by instrument loops T402 and T406 (TC-406A); T403 and T407 (TC-407A); and T404 and T408 (TC-408A).

OTAT Reactor Trip The Overtemperature ,T reactor trip is provided to protect against departure from nucleate boiling. &Tis used as a measure of reactor power and is continuously compared with an automatically varying setpoint which is dependent on Tavg, pressurizer pressure, and axial flux difference. Instrument loops T401 and T405 (TC-405C) provide one of the four inputs to initiate this reactor trip upon exceeding the Overtemperature AT setpoint. The remaining three signals to the two-out-of-four reactor trip coincidence logic are supplied by instrument loops T402 and T406 (TC-406C); T403 and T407 (TC-407C); and T404 and T408 (TC-408C).

Turbine Runback and Rod Stop Although not safety-related, turbine runback and rod stop signals are generated when measured AT is within 1.71 'F of either the OPAT or the OTAT reactor trip setpoints on two of four channels.

4.1.2 Control This instrument loop does not perform any safety-related control functions.

I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 13 of 47 9/25/2001

4.1.3 Indication This instrument loop provides control room operators with reactor coolant AT indication (0-75 TF). This portion of the loop is safety-related and, hence, included in this analysis.

Non safety related alarms associated with this instrument loop are listed below:

Alarm Conditions for Alarm AT Deviation +/-3 'F Deviation from calculated Average AT.

Reactor Coolant OPAT Channel T401/T405 exceeding the alert calculated OPT setpoint Reactor Coolant OTAT Channel T401/T405 exceeding the alert calculated OTAT setpoint OPA&T Reactor Trip Two-out-of-four AT channels "First Out" Annunciator exceeding calculated OPT channel setpoint.

OTAT Reactor Trip Two-out-of-four AT channels "First Out" Annunciator exceeding calculated OTAT channel setpoint.

The signal generated for ,AT by instrument channels T401 and T405 is combined with AT measurement channels T402 and T406; T403 and T407; and T404 and T408 to produce an Average AT signal. Average AT is compared to individual channel AT to produce a deviation alarm as shown above. This portion of the instrument loop is not safety related, and hence, will not be analyzed by this evaluation.

[ EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 14 of 47 9/25/2001

5.0 Instrument Loop Performance Requirements 5.1 Documenting the Design Requirements for Monitoring the Process Parameter 5.1.1 Identify Performance Related Design Bases Associated With the Instrument Loop:

SR Safety Classification (SR/SS/NS) as documented in the Ginna Q-list.

N/A NUREG 0737/RG 1.97 as documented in Table 7.5-1, of the Ginna UFSAR.

Per a review of UFSAR Table 7.5-1, instrument loop T405 does not provide any required RG 1.97 post-accident monitoring indications.

N/A EQ (per the 10 CFR 50.49 list)

This loop is not identified as requiring Environmental Qualification.

N/A Seismic Category ( Seismic Class I/ Structural Integrity Only / NS)

The RTDs associated with instrument loops T401 and T405 are direct immersion RTDs; therefore, the enclosures to the RTDs are required to meet seismic class 1 qualifications.

However, the instrumentation of this loop does not require seismic qualifications.

Yes Technical Specifications As identified by a review of Tables 3.3.1-1, 3.3.2-1, and 3.3.3-1, of the Improved Technical Specifications, this instrument channel is Technical Specification related.

Temperature monitoring channel T405 provides input to the Overpower and Overtemperature ,T protective trips, and as such, is identified in Table 3.3.1-1 as Reactor Trip System Instrumentation. In Section 10.3, instrument uncertainty limits will be developed to provide operability criteria for channel calibrations.

Yes UFSAR Per a review of Sections 7.2, 7.3 and Tables 7.4-2 and 7.5-1 of the UFSAR, this instrument loop is identified for the the Overtemperature and Overpower JT reactor trip requirements. The logic required for these protective actions is discussed in Section 4.1.1 of this v-eiluation. This instrument loop is not identified as being required for ESF initiation or safe shutdown.

N/A EOP Per a Review of the Emergency Operating Procedures Setpoint Database, there are no EOP setpoints associated with reactor coolant AT.

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 15 of 47 9/25/2001

5.1.2 Description of Process Parameter:

Under normal conditions: (Reference 11)

TE-401A and TE-405A (Hot Leg)

Temperature: 589°F (nominal)

Pressure: 2235 psig Flow: 90,000 gpm (nominal)

Fluid: 0-2600 ppm boric acid TE-401B and TE-405B (Cold Leg)

Temperature: 532 *F (nominal)

Pressure: 2235 psig Flow: 90,000 gpm (nominal)

Fluid: 0-2600 ppm boric acid Under test conditions:

Same as normal conditions.

Under accident conditions, including which accidents:

Loss of heat removal capacity.

TE-401A&B and TE405A&B Temperature: 650'F (design)

Pressure: 2485 psig (design)

Flow: > natural circulation Fluid: approx 2600 ppm boric acid 5.1.3 Description of Limits The process limits associated with Overtemperature and overpressure ,T reactor trips are identified in UFSAR Table 15.0-4, Trip Points And Time Delays To Trip Assumed In Accident Analysis.

5.2 Documenting the Environmental Conditions Associated With the Process Parameter 5.2.1 Identification of the Primary Element / Sensor Location:

Platinum resistance temperature elements TE-401A and TE-405A are installed "direct immersion" in the "Hot Leg" primary coolant piping run between the outlet of the reactor vessel and inlet of Steam Generator "A".

Platinum resistance temperature elements TE-401B and TE-405B are installed "direct immersion" in the "Cold Leg" primary coolant piping run downstream of reactor coolant pump A and prior to the reactor cold leg nozzle.

I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 16 of 47 9/25/2001

5.2.2 Description of Environmental Service Conditions for the Rack Components (Reference 21, 22, 23 Calibration Procedures) 5.2.2.1 Normal 5.2.2.1.1 Normal Operation, Main Control Room, Relay Room Reference 11 UFSAR Table 3.11-1.

Temperature-50 F-to-104 'F (Usually 70 TF to 78 F)--

Pressure: Atmospheric Humidity: 60% Nominal Radiation: Negligible 5.2.2.1.2 During Calibration Same as Normal Operation Above.

5.2.2.2 Accident, Main Control Room (Reference 11 UFSAR Table 3.11-1.)

Temperature: Less than 104'F Pressure: Atmospheric Humidity: 60% Nominal Radiation: Negligible Flooding: N/A I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 17 of 47 9/25/2001

Instrument Location TT-401A, TT-405A, TT-401B,TT Control Room, Reactor Protection Channel 1, Rack 405B (Resistance to Current RI Converters)

TM-405AA Delta T Math Module Control Room, Reactor Protection Channel 1, Rack R1 TM-405CC Voltage to Current Control Room, Reactor Protection Channel 1, Rack Converter R1.

TI-405B Tavg Indicator Control Room, Reactor Protection Channel 1, Rack R1.

TC-405A/B Alarm Bistable Control Room, MCB Front, Center Section.

TM-405C/D Alarm Bistable Control Room, Reactor Protection Channel 1, Rack R1.

6.0 Description of the Existing Instrument Loop Configuration 6.1 Summary of Process Measurement 6.1.1 Primary Element Information TE-401A,B and TE-405A,B Manufacturer/Model No. Rosemount / 176JA Size 2009 Specifications N/A Ref. # 6 Section N/A

-Piping-Configuration/Element Description Platinum resistance temperature elements TE-401A and TE-405A are installed "direct immersion" in tIff"Ho-t-L-g"-p-fiia* co61&at pipiig run between the outlet of the reactor vessel and inlet of Steam Generator "A".

Platinum resistance temperature elements TE-401B and TE-405B are installed "direct immersion" in the "Cold Leg" primary coolant piping run downstream of reactor coolant pump A and prior to the reactor cold leg nozzle.

[ EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 18 of 47 9/25/2001

Ref. # 15 Section N/A 6.1.2 Associated Equipment Environmental Limits:

Reference the Appropriate EQ Block Diagram EQ Block Diagram: N/A 6.2 Summary of Signal Conditioning and Output Devices:

6.2.1 -Signal Conditioning/Output Device Information:

6.2.1.1 Tau #/Type Manuf./ Model Ref.

TM-405AA NUS/TMID-500 CMIS TT-401A NUS/RTD-501 CMIS TT-405A NUS/RTD-501 CMIS TT-401B NUS/RTD-501 CMIS TT-405B NUS/RTD-501 CMIS TM-405CC NUS/FCA-502 CMIS TI-405B Westinghouse / 65-PX-W252 6 TC-405A/B NUS/DAM-503-01 CMIS TC-405C/D NUS/DAM-503-01 CMIS 6.2.1.2 Tae # Input/Output Ref.

TM-405AA (4 signals) 10-50 madc/10-50 madc 22 TT-401A 200 OHM RTD/10-50 madc 22 TT405A 200 OHM RTD/10-50 madc 22 TT-401B 200 OHM RTD/10-50 madc 22 TT-405B 200 OHM RTD/10-50 madc 22 TM-405CC 10 - 50madc/10 - 50madc 21 TI-405B 10 - 50mA / 0 - 75 0 F 21 TC-405A/B 10-50 madc / Digital On-Off 23 TC-405C/D 10-50 made / Digital On-Off 22 6.3 Scaling 6.3.1 Performing the Conversions:

Reactor Coolant System loop "A" reactor coolant temperature is sensed by resistance temperature elements TE-401A & TE-405A, for hot leg temperature measurements; and TE-401B & TE-405B for cold leg temperature measurements. Each of the four resistance temperature elements feeds a resistance to current converter (R/1). The R/I converters in turn feed the TAVG and DELTA T Math Modules. The output (10-50 ma) of the TAVG Math Module represents 540 to 615'F and the output (10-50 madc) of the DELTA T Math Module represents 0 to 75°F. The Math Modules impose a 3 second lag to the input signals. These signals are used to generate the following safety-related signals and indication:

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 19 of 47 9/25/2001

TI-405B Delta T Indication The lagged signal from TM-405AA (10-50madc) is received by TM-405CC, current to current converter. TM-405CC converts the 10-50 madc input signal to a 10-50mA isolated output. TI-405B receives the current signal from TM-405P and converts this to an analog mechanical indication of 0 to 75 OF.

Overtemperature AT SPI Reactor Trip Setpoint Input The lagged signal from TM-405AA (10-50 madc) is sensed by TC-405C/D which produces an output upon exceeding the variable setpoint supplied by instrument loop T401 (Tar,). See Reference 32.

Overpower AT SP2 Reactor Trip Setpoint Input The lagged signal from TM-405AA (10-50 madc) is sensed by TC-405A/B which produces an output upon exceeding the variable setpoint supplied by instrument loop T401 (Tay). See Reference 32.

[ EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 20 of 47 9/25/2001

7.0 Evaluation of Existing Instrument Loop Configuration Against Documented Performance Requirements 7.1 Evaluating the Loop Configuration 7.1.1 Conformance with Design Basis Performance Requirements:

Does the existing design conform to the design basis performance requirements identified in Section Explain: The range, location of readout, and classification of the loop are consistent with the design basis requirements for providing input to the Overtemperature and Overpower AT reactor trips and providing control room ,T indication. The power for this loop comes from MQ-400A, which is power from Class IE Bus 14, and is backed by the battery.

Safety Classification - SR RG 1.97 - N/A EQ - N/A Seismic - N/A Tech. Spec. - Yes UFSAR - Yes EOP - N/A 7.1.2 Performance of Safety Related or Safety Significant Functions:

Can the existing loop adequately perform each of its Safety Related functions (protection, control, and/or indication)?

Explain: This loop is designed to provide Overtemperature and Overpower AT reactor trip input to the reactor protection system and control room AT indication. The design of this loop adequately ensures these safety-related functions can be accomplished.

7.1.3 Evaluating the Consistency of Instrument Loop Documentation Is the loop configuration shown in the calibration procedure(s) consistent with the applicable design drawing(s)? Are component manufacturers and model numbers documented in the calibration procedure consistent with those shown on applicable design drawings? If significant inconsistencies exist, has reaýso*nable assurance of the a-V--6allonfigura-tion been established? Have appropriate notifications been made regarding drawing changes?

Explain: The loop configuration shown in the calibration procedure is consistent with the applicable design drawings. Model numbers are listed in CMIS.

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 21 of 47 9/25/2001

7.2 Evaluating the Loop's Measurement Capability 7.2.1 Evaluating the Range/Span:

Is the calibrated span of the sensor and any indication devices (indicators, recorders, computer output points) broad enough to envelope all of the limits in Section 5.1.3?

Explain: The calibrated range of the loop components is broad enough to envelope the limits stated in

.. Section-5:1 3-of this-evaluation.

7.2.2 Evaluating the Setpoint and Indicated Values vs. the Span:

Explain: See Section 7.2.1 above.

7.2.3 Reviewing the Units of Measure:

Are the units for the indicated values shown within the calibration procedures consistent with the EOPs?

Explain: There are no EOP setpoints associated with this instrument loop.

7.3 Evaluating the Calibration 7.3.1 Reviewing the Calibrated Components:

Is every applicable component and output calibrated?

Explain: Procedures CPI-DELTA-T-405, CPI-SPl-405.10, CPI-SP2-405.20, and CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.10 ensure the calibration of the applicable safety-related components.

7.3.2 Reviewing the Primary Element:

Does the calibration of the sensor properly reflect the sizing of the applicable safety related components.

Explain: The primary elements (RTDs) are sized to ensure a temperature range of 0°F to 75°F can be monitored. The sensors (RRI Converters) are calibrated for this range.

7.3.3 Reviewing the Direction of Interest:

Does the calibration procedure check the components in the direction of interest?

Explain: The calibration procedure ensures the rack equipment is calibrated in the direction of interest and the indicator is calibrated both upscale and downscale.

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 22 of 47 9/25/2001

7.3.4 Evaluating the Scaling:

Are the scaling equations and constants described in Section 6.3 consistent with the existing system performance requirements.

Explain: The scaling equations and factors are consistent with the system performance requirements.

7.3.5 Evaluating Calibration Correction Factors:

Describe any calibration corrections used to account for process, environmental, installation effects or for any special design features employed by the instrument. These include corrections within the calibration process for elevation, static head, density, calibration temperatures, etc. Ensure any effect not accounted for by the calibration process is included within the determination of the total loop uncertainty (See Section 9.10).

Explain: See Section 8.3.

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 23 of 47 9/25/2001

8.0 Documentation of Loop Uncertainties 8.1 Documenting the Components of Sensor Accident Uncertainty (AEUp and AEUs) 8.1.1 Pipe Breaks: N/A This loop is not qualified to operate during harsh environment conditions.

8.1.2 Seismic Event This loop is not required during or after a seismic event.

8.2 Documenting the Components of the Accident Current Leakage Effect (CLU)

This loop is not qualified to operated during harsh environment conditions.

8.3 Determining the Components of Process Measurement Uncertainty (PMU):

8.3.1 Documenting the Components of Process Measurement Uncertainty (PMU)

- -Temperature Streaming:

RG&E correspondence from R.W.Eliasz to P. Bamford, dated 9/6/95, regarding RCS Flow Uncertainty for 18 Month Fuel Cycle (which discusses Hot Leg Temperature Streaming Measurements at R.E.

Ginna Plant), as identified in Reference 39, states the maximum temperature streaming error to be

+/-2.69°F. This produces a full scale equivalent error to the inputs of the TAVG and DELTA T math

-modules of 2.69/75 x 100% = 3.59% Full Scale. .

Pmal = 3.59% Full Scale Note: temperature streaming is considered a dependent error.

Special Module Compensation:

Calculations for special module compensation (process measurement biases (PmaLLB1, PmaLLB2, PmaLLB3) were deleted from this revision of this analysis as they were determined to be zero. The calculations in their entirety may be referenced in revision 1 of this analysis.

[ EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 24 of 47 9/25/2001

PMU Uncertainty Ref/Section Process Measurement Uncertainty +/-3.59% Full Scale Reference 28 (Pmaj) (. 2.69 -F)

Process Measurement Bias (LLB,2.3) +/-0.00% Full Scale This Calc/Sect 8.3.1 Primary Element Accuracy (Pea) +/-1.01% Full Scale Reference 16 8.4 Documenting Measurement and Test Equipment Uncertainty (M&TEU) 8.4.1 Determining Measurement and Test Equipment Uncertainty (M&TEU) 8.4.1.1 Determining the Calibration Uncertainties (M&TEU):

For each component, identify the type of M&TE used for the calibration, the uncertainty attributed to the M&TE, and the associated reference/section numbers that provided the M&TE information.

Tai No Test Equipment/Model No.

TM-405CC 1) Two Hewlett-Packard/3466A Multimeters Calibration of digital voltmeters per the requirements of LTP-LS is +/-.0.18% of input (full scale) plus I count (insignificant)

Accuracy =. 0.18% Full Scale Rce, =.(0.182+ 0. 18 2)1/2 Rcee = - 0.25% Full Scale TM-405CC 2) Computer Tap 4, 10OfL Test Resistor is used as a calibration point to convert the 10 50 mADC signal from the current generator into a 1 - 5VDC test point for monitoring.

Accuracy = - 1.0% Full Scale; Assumption 1 Rce 2 = - 1.0% Full Scale TI-405B 1) One I-ewlett-Packard/3466A Multimeter Calibration of digital voltmeters per the requirements of LTP-LS is +/-0.18% of input (full scale) plus 1 count (insignificant)

Accuracy = - 0.18% Full Scale Rce 3 = - 0.18% Full Scale EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 25 of 47 9/25/2001

TaI- No Test Equipment/Model No.

TI-405B 2) Computer Tap 4, 10092 Test Resistor is used as a calibration point to convert the 10 50 mADC signal from the current generator into a 1 - 5VDC test point for monitoring.

Accuracy = - 1.0% Full Scale; Assumption 1 Rce 4 = 1.0% Full Scale TC-405A/B 1) Two Hewlett-Packard/3466A Multimeters Calibration of digital voltmeters per the requirements of LTP-LS is +0.18% of input (full scale) plus 1 count (insignificant)

Accuracy = 0.18% Full Scale Rce5 =-(0.182+ 0.182)1/2 Rce 5 =-4-0.25% Full Scale TC-405A/B 2) 10) Test Resistor TP/401V is used as a calibration point to convert the 10 - 50 mADC signal from the current generator into a 100 - 500 mVDC test point for monitoring...

--- Accuracy = 1.0% Full Scale; Assumption 1 Rce 6 = 1.0% Full Scale TC-405C/D 1) Two Hewlett-Packard/3466A Multimeters Calibration of digital voltmeters per the requirements of LTP-LS is +/--0.18% of input

- (full scale) plus 1 count (insignificant)

Accuracy = 0.18% Full Scale Rce 7 =+/-(0.182+ 0.182)if2 Rce 7 = -0.25% Full Scale TC-405C/D 2) 1092 Test Resistor TP/401B is used as a calibration point to convert the 10 - 50 mADC signal from the current generator into a 100 - 500 mVDC test point for monitoring.

Accuracy = 1.0% Full Scale; Assumption 1 Rce 8 =+/- 1.0% Full Scale EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 26 of 47 9/25/2001

SM&TEU Uncertainty- .. Ref/Section Rack Equipment Calibration Effect +/-0.25% Full Scale This Calc./8.4 (Rcee) TM-405CC Rack Equipment Calibration Effect +/-1.00% Full Scale This Calc./8.4 (Rce 2) TM-405CC Rack Equipment Calibration Effect +/-0.18% Full Scale This Calc./8.4 (Rce 3) TM-405B Rack Equipment Calibration Effect +/-1.00% Full Scale This Calc./8.4 (Rce 4) TI-405B Rack Equipment Calibration Effect +/-0.25% Full Scale This Calc./8.4 (Rce5) TC-405A/B I Rack Equipment Calibration Effect +/-1.0% Full Scale This Calc./8.4 (Rce 6) TC-405A/B Rack Equipment Calibration Effect +/-0.25% Full Scale This Calc./8.4 (Rce7) TC-405A/B Rack Equipment Calibration Effect +/-1.0% Full Scale This Calc./8.4 (Rce8) TC-405A/B -----_-___1__

8.5 Documenting Rack Equipment Uncertainty (REU)

REU Uncertainty Ref/Section Rack Equipment +/-0.50% Full Scale Reference 27 Accuracy (Real) TM-405CC Rack Equipment +/-1.50% Full Scale Reference 30 Accuracy (Rea2) TI-405B Rack Equipment +/-0.60% Full Scale Reference 31 Accuracy (Rea3) TC-405A1B Rack Equipment +/-0.60% Full Scale Reference 31 Accuracy (Rea 4) TC-405C/D -.......

Rack Equipment Negligible Assumption 1

-Temperature Effect (Rte)

Rack Equipment Negligible Assumption 2 Power Supply Effect (Rpse)

Rack Miscellaneous Effect (Rme) +/-0.67% Full Scale Assumption 1 Readability I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 27 of 47 9/25/2001

8.6 Documenting Sensor Uncertainty (SU)

SU Uncertainty Ref/Section Sensor Accuracy (Sa), TT-401A, Accounted for in Math 9.2 TT-405A, TT-401B, TT-405B Module Uncertainty Table Sensor Static Pressure Effect (Sspe) N/A N/A Sensor Temperature Effect (Ste) Negligible Assumption 1 Sensor Power Supply Effect (Spse) Negligible Assumption 2 Sensor Miscellaneous Effect (Sme) Negligible N/A 8.7 Documenting Drift Uncertainty (DU)

DU Uncertainty Ref/Section Rack Equipment Drift Red, Path 1 +/--1.00% Full Scale Assumption 1 Rack Equipment Drift Red 2-P'h2 +/-1.00% Full Scale- Assumption 1 Rack Equipment Drift Red 3 Path 3 +/-1.00% Full Scale Assumption 1 8.8 Documenting Tolerance Uncertainty (TU)

TU Uncertainty Ref/Section Rack Equipment Tolerance (Retl) +/-1.00% Full Scale Reference 21 TM-405CC Rack Equipment Tolerance (Ret2) TI- +/-2.00% Full Scale Reference 21 405B Rack Equipment Tolerance (Ret3) +/-1.00% Full Scale Reference 23 TC-405A/B Rack Equipment Tolerance (Ret 4) +/-1.00% Full Scale Reference 22 TC-405C/D EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 28 of 47 9/25/2001

9.0 Loop Uncertainty Evaluation The following analysis is broken down into 3 flow paths for the temperature loop T405. The following is a description of the different flow paths.

Path I TI-405 output uncertainty.

Path 2 TC-405A/B Bistable output to Overpower ,T Reactor Trip uncertainty.

Path 3 TC-405C/D Bistable output to Overtemperature eT Reactor Trip uncertainty.

9.1 Process Measurement Uncertainty (PMU)

Biases will be accounted for in Section 9.9.

Path 1-3 2

PMU = -[(Pea) 2 + (Pma1 ) ]112 PMU is accounted for in the Uncertainty Table below.

9.2 Uncertainty Table (Math Module output TP/TM-405AA)

RTD'S RI'S TESTPOINTS MATH MODULES Pma, 3.59 (hot legs) N/A N/A N/A Pea 1.01 N/A N/A N/A M&TE N/A 0.25 1.0 0.40 Temp Effect N/A 0.45 N/A 0.42 Accuracy N/A 0.5 N/A 1.0+0.2 Drift

• 1% FOR ENTIRE PATH -- -

Tolerance N/A 1.0 N/A 1.0

• The 1% drift term (for entire path) is accounted for in section 9.8 The M&TE uncertainty for each R/I and the Math module is calculated as follows:

Each RPI is calibrated utilizing a Decade Box (accuracy = +/-0.15%) and a digital multifunction meter (accuracy = +/-0. 18%).

MTEm = (0.152 + 0. 1 8 2)11 = 0.23% (round to 0.25%)

I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 29 of 47 9/25/2001

Each Math Module is calibrated utilizing five (four inputs and one output) digital multifunction

-- meters(accuracy-= -0+/-A 8%).--- -.

MTEM, = (0.18 2 + 0.18 2+0.182 + 0.182++ 0.18')"= 0.40%

Determination of total uncertainty up to TPITM-405AA Uncertainty to Math Module Inputs 2 2 2 Hot Legs: [((MTEp1 2 + (TempRa) 2 + (Accm) + (TolR4) ) + (Pma) 2 + (Pea) + (Testpoint )2]112 Hot Legs: [(0.252 + 0.452 + 0.52 + 12) + 3.592 + 1.012 + 1 .0 2]f = 4.05 Cold Legs: [((MTERt)2 + (TempRn) 2+ (AccRA) 2 + (Tolp) 2) + (Pea)2 + (Testpoint )2'1]

Cold Legs: [(0.252 + 0.452 + 0.52 + 12) + 1.012 + 1. 0 2]112 = 1.88 Total Delta T Uncertainty:

2 2

[2(Gain x hot leg uncertainty) + 2( Gain x cold leg uncertainty)

+ (MTEMM) 2 + (TempMM) 2 + (ACCMM) 2 + (TMolM]

[2(0.5x4.05) 2 + 2(0.5xl.88) 2 + (0.402 + 0.422 + 1.02 + 0.22 + 12)]Y. +/- 3.51%

The uncertainties for the remainder of the individual paths (downstream of testpoint TP/TM-405AA) will now be calculated and then combined with the uncertainty at the output of the Math Modules to determine the Total Loop Uncertainty for each path.

9.3 --- Measurement and Test Equipment Uncertainty (M&TEU)

Path 1 2 2 2 M&TEU = +/-[(Rcel)2 + (RCe 2 ) + (Rce 3) + (Rce4) ] 11 M&TEU = +/-[(0.25)2 + (1.00)2 + (0.10)2 + (1.00)2]1/2 M&TEU = +/-L1.45 Path 2 2

M&TEU = 4-[(Rce 5 ) + (Roe6)2]1r2 M&TEU = +/-[(0.25)2 + (1.0)2]1/2 M&TEU = +/-1.03 I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 30 of 47 9/25/2001

Path 3 M&TEU = "[(Rce 7)2 + (Rce8 )2 ] ` 2 M&TEU = 4[(0.25) 2 + (1.0)2] 1/2 M&TEU = "1.03 9.4 Determining the Accident Environmental Uncertainties (AEU)

For Pipe Breaks: This loop is not qualified to operated during harsh environmental conditions.

For Seismic Events: This loop is not required during or after a seismic event.

9.5 Accident Current Leakage Effect (CLU)

This loop is not qualified to operate during harsh environmental qualifications.

9.6 Rack Equipment Uncertainty (REU)

Path 1 2 2 12 REU = "[(Rea1 )2 + (Rea 2) + (Rme) ]'

REU = 4[(0.50)2 + (1.50)2 + (0.67)2]1/2 REU = +/- 1.72 Path 2 REU = +/-[(Rea3)2]'1 2 REU = [(0.60)2]112 REU = +/- 0.60 Path 3 REU =+/-[(Rea4 )211 ]2 REU = +/-[(0.60)2]/a REU = +/- 0.60

[ EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 31 of 47 9/25/2001

9.7 Sensor Uncertainty (SU)

Path 1 - 4 Sensor accuracy term (R/I accuracy) is accounted for in the Math Module Uncertainty Table (Section 9.1).

9.8 Drift Uncertainty (DU)

Path 1-3 DU =-[(Red l3)]2 DU = -( 1 .00)2]If2 DU =+/-1.00 The drift term for each path is + 1.0%. This includes the entire path from the sensor (in this analysis the R/I converter is considered the sensor) to the final output device.

9.9 Tolerance Uncertainty (TU)

Path 1 2 + (Ret2) 2]1/2 TU = +[(Ret)

TU = +/-[(1.00)2 + ( 2 .00)2]f2 TU-=+2.24 Path 2 TU = +/-[(Ret3 )2 ]'2 TU =-[(1.00)21]V2 TU =+/-1.00 Path 3 TU = +/-[(Ret4)21lf2 TU = +/-[(1.00)21/2 TU = +/-1.00 EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 32 of 47 9/25/2001

9.10 Calculating the Total Loop Uncertainties Provide the total loop uncertainty (TLU) for each end device for normal, seismic and accident conditions as applicable.

TLU Normal Path 1 (Indication)

Output of Delta T Math Module (MMOUDELTAT)

TLU MMOUDELTAT = + 3.5 1%

Remainder of Rack Path (RROUDELTAT)

TLU RROUDELTAT (M&TEU2 + REU2 + SU2 + DU 2 + TU2 + PMLU 2)12

-+ (1.452 + 1.722 + N/A + 1.002 + 2.24 2 + N/A) 1/2 TLU RROUDELTAT = 3.33%

2 2 112 TLU Total = + [(TLU MMOUDELTAT) + ( TLU RROUDELTAT) ]

TLU Total = + [(3.51)2 + (3.33)2]112 = + 4.84%

Path 2 (Overpower Reactor Trip - Input Uncertainty)

Output of Delta T Math Module (MMOUDELTAT)

TLU MMOUDELTAT = +/- 3.5 1%

Remainder of Rack Path (RROUDELTAT)

TLU RROUDELTAT 2 2

- +/- (M&TEU 2 + REU 2 +SU 2 + DU2 + TU + PMU )1/2

= +/- (1.032 + 0.60 + N/A + 1.002 + 1.002 + N/A)1/2 TLU RROUDELTAT=+/- 1.85%

I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 33 of 47 9/25/2001

2 2 TLU Total = + [(TLU MMOUDELTAT) 2 + (TLU RROUDELTAT) ]"

TLU Total = + [(3.51)2 + ( 1 . 8 5 )2]12 = + 3.97%

Path 3 (Overtemperature Reactor Trip - Input Uncertainty)

Output of Delta T Math Module (MMOUDELTAT)

TLU MMOUDELTAT = + 3.51%

Remainder of Rack Path (RROUDELTAT)

TLU RROUDELTAT

- (M&TEU2 + REU 2 + SU 2 + DU2 + TUi +PMLU 2 )1

- (1.032 + 0.60 + N/A + 1.002 + 1.002 +N/A)'!2 TLU RROUDELTAT = +1.85%

2 2 2 TLU Total = + [(TLU MMOUDELTAT) + (TLU RROUDELTAT) ]1 TLU Total = + [(3.5 1)2 + (1.85)211/2 = + 3.97%

Path 2 (Overpower Reactor Trip Uncertainty)

This uncertainty combines the delta T input uncertainty with the Overpower setpoint uncertainty. (Ref.

32).

The TLUo*Sp value below is calculated in DA-EE-92-091-21.

TLU = [(TLU TOTAL) 2 + (TLU. +)2]1/2 TLU = [(3.97)2 + (5.52)2)]1/2 TLU = - 6.80% Full Scale or 5.10°F EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 34 of 47 9/25/2001

Path 3 (Overtemperature Reactor Trip Uncertainty)

This uncertainty combines the delta T input uncertainty with the Overtemperature setpoint uncertainty.

(Ref. 32).

The TLUots value below is calculated in DA-EE-92-091-21.

2 TLU = +/- [(TLU TOTAL) + (TLUoU +)2]112 TLU = * [(3.97)2 + (6.97)2)]1/2 TLU =

• 8.02% Full Scale or 6.02°F t

Where: TLUs The Total Loop Uncertainty Seismic TLUa The Total Loop Uncertainty Accident CLU Current Leakage Uncertainty AEUs Accident Environmental Uncertainty (Seismic)

AEUp Accident Environmental Uncertainty (Pipe Break)

PMU Process Measurement Uncertainty REU Rack Equipment Uncertainty SU Sensor Uncertainty DU Drift Uncertainty TU Tolerance Uncertainty M&TEU Measurement and Test Equipment Uncertainty MMOUDELTAT Math Module Output Uncertainty Delta T RROUDELTAT Remaining Rack Output Uncertainty Delta T TLU TOTAL Total Delta T input uncertainty Path 1-(Indic-ation)

End Device Normal TI-405A +/-4.84% Full Scale or 3.63°F Path 2 (Overpower Reactor Trip)

TC-405A/B +/-6.80% Full Scale or 5.10°F Path 3 (Overtemperature Reactor Trip)

TC-405C/D -+/-8.02%Full Scale or 6.02°F

[ EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 35 of 47 9/25/2001

9.11 Comparing the Reference Accuracy vs. the Calibration Tolerance From the calibration procedure(s), identify the calibration tolerance associated with each component.

Next, obtain the reference accuracy associated with each component. Translate both effects into the equivalent units. Ensure that the calibration tolerance is greater than or equal to the reference accuracy for each component.

Tag No. Reference Accuracy Calibration Tolerance TT-401A, TT-405A 0.50% 1.00%

TT-401B, TT-405B 0.50% 1.00%

TM-405AA 1.0 + 0.2%* 1.00%

TM-405CC 0.50% 1.00%

TI-405B 1.50% 2.00%

TC-405A/B 0.60% 1.00%

TC-405C/D 0.60% 1.00%

• The accuracy and calibration tolerance for the the math modules is used in the determination of the loop TLU, therefore the calibration is acceptable.

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 36 of 47 9/25/2001

10.0 Setpoint Evaluations 10.1 Assigning the Limits For each instrument function, identify the associated limits and limit type.

Output Device Limit Value Type of Limit TC-405A/B UFSAR Table 15.0-4 Analytical TC-405C/D UFSAR Table 15.0-4 Analytical 10.2 Evaluating the Setpoint(s):

Compare the existing setpoint, reset point, or indicated value within the calibration procedure with the maximum or minimum acceptable setpoint.

UFSAR Table 15.0 Overpower Reactor Trip and Overtemperature Reactor Trip In order to evaluate the Overpower and Overtemperature core protection setpoints documented in UFSAR Table 15.0-4, the uncertainties associated with the Overpower reactor trip setpoint input and the AT input to bistable TC-405A/B are combined. These uncertainties can be considered independent, and therefore can be combined using the SRSS methodology. Reference section 9.9 The Overtemperature Delta T and Overpower Delta T Reactor Trip Setpoints are variable (depending on plant conditions) and defined by their respective setpoint equations. The following equations from ITS Table 3.3.1-1 are used to determine the nominal setpoints used to calculate the OTAT and OPAT reactor trip setpoints. The nominal ATo used in the ITS equations is 57°F.

Overtemperature Delta T (OTAT)

AT< AT 0[1.2 + 0.00090(P-2250) - 0.0209(T-T')(l+25s/l+5s) - f(AI)]

Overpower Delta T (OPAT)

-- ATp< AT 0 [1.077 - K5(T-T) -K 6 (l0sT/+10s) - f(AI)]

K5 = 0.001 1/*F for T>T'

= 0.0/°F for T<T' K6 = 0.0262/°F for increasing T

= 0.0/°F for decreasing T f(AI) = 0 when the flux tilt between the top and bottom of the core is

• 13%.

I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 37 of 47 9/25/2001

The following equations from UFSAR Table 15-0.4 are used to determine the maximum calculated

-setpoints-for OTA-T-and OPAT... . . . .

The nominal ATo used in the accident analysis is 58.62'F (reference 41), which is based on the assumption that 15% of the steam generator tubes are plugged. f(AI) is assumed to be equal to zero.

Overtemperature Delta T (OTAT)

ATP< AT 0[1.32073 + 0.00090(P-2250) - 0.0209(T-T,,)(l+25s/l+5s)]

Overpower Delta T (OPAT)

ATop <AT0 [1.14877 - K5(T-T,) - K6 (lOsT/1+l0s)]

K5 = 0.001l/°F for T>Tref

= 0.0/°F for T<Tref K6 = 0.0262/°F for increasing T

= 0.0/°F for decreasing T Per Westinghouse Calculation Sheet CN-TA-95-67, revision 0, the maximum OPAT setpoint including uncertainties is 67.34°F for TAVG less than 573.5°F The following differences exist between the ITS OPAT and OTAT and the UFSAR OPAT and OTAT equations (the UFSAR equations are used in the accident analysis and are considered the analytical limits):

"* value of AT (57 OF vs 58.62 OF)

"* overpower reactor trip setpoint (1.077 vs 1.14877)

"* overtemperature reactor trip setpoint (1.2 vs 1.32073)

OPAT Setpoint Calculation Table TAVG Calculated ITS OPAT Analysis OPAT Setpoint Margin Margin including OF Setpoint OF OF OF uncertainty °F 561.0 61.39 67.34 5.95 0.85 565.0 61.14 67.08 5.94 0.84 573.5 60.61 66.53 5.92 0.82 630.0 57.06 62.89 5.83 0.73 EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 38 of 47 9/25/2001

A review of the above Table shows that for all values of temperature (TAvG) there is adequate margin between the ITS calculated nominal setpoint and the accident analysis maximum setpoint (including instrument uncertainty). It should be noted that there are differences in terminology between UFSAR Table 15.0-4 and ITS Table 3.3.1-1 and that [TREF *F] and [TAVG 'F Nominal] represent the same parameter for the purposes of this calculation.

The following table was generated using the equations from ITS Table 3.3.1-1 to determine the nominal calculated setpoints for OTAT.

OTAT Nominal Setpoint Calculation Table PSIA TAVG ('F) TAVG (-F) ATsp Measured Nominal 1775 565 573.5 54.15 1775 565 561.0 39.26 1775 592 573.5 21.99 1775 592 561.0 7.10 2000 572 573.5 57.36 2000 572 561.0 42.47 2000 602 573.5 21.62 2000 602 561.0 6.73 2250 582 573.5 58.27 2250 582 561.0 43.38 2250 612 573.5 22.53 2250 612- 561.0 7.64 2400 588 573.5 58.82 2400 588 561.0 43.93 2400 618 573.5 23.08 2400 618 561.0 8.19 I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 39 of 47 9/25/2001

The following table was generated using the equations from UFSAR Table 15-0.4 to determine the

-maximum accident analysis calculated setpoints for OTAT. The margin is the difference between the ITS nominal calculated setpoint and the maximum calculated setpoint using UFSAR Table 15.0-4. The accident analysis uses a TREF value of 573.5 'F.

OTAT Accident Analysis Setpoint Calculation Table PSIA TAVG °F TREF °F ATsp MARGIN OF MARGIN OF (TO NOMINAL SETPOINT @ (TO NOMINAL SETPOINT @

573 5F mnd @ 561 'F) 573 537ad@ 5617)

INCLUDING UNCERTAINTY 1775 565 573.5 62.77 8.62 2.60 1775 565 573.5 62.77 23.51 17.49 1775 592 573.5 29.69 7.10 1.08 1775 592 573.5 29.69 22.59 16.57 2000 572 573.5 66.07 8.71 2.69 2000 572 573.5 66.07 23.60 17.58 2000 -602 573.5 29.31 7.69 1.67 2000 602 573.5 29.31 22.58 16.56 2250 582 573.5 67.00 8.73 2.71 2250 582 573.5 67.00 23.62 17.60 2250 612 573.5 30.25 7.72 1.70 2250 612 573.5 30.25 22.61 16.59 2400 588 573.5 67.57 8.75 2.73 2400 588 573.5 67.57 23.65 17.63 2400 618 573.5 30.81 7.72 1.70 2400 618 573.5 30.81 22.61 16.59 A review of the above Tables shows that for all combinations of temperature and pressure there is adequate margin between the ITS calculated nominal setpoint and the accident analysis maximum setpoint (including instrument uncertainty). It should be noted that there are differences in terminology between UFSAR Table 15.0-4 and ITS Table 3.3.1-1 and that [TREF 'F] and [TAVG (OF)

Nominal] represent the same parameter for the purposes of this calculation.

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 40 of 47 9/25/2001

The worst case margin is 7.10 'F (not including setpoint uncertainty) for TREF at 573.5 'F (accident analysis), which.is greater ihan the overall setpoint uncertainty of 6.02'F. The available margin taking instrument uncertainty into account is 1.08 'F. Therefore, the uncertainty associated with the Overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip will not prevent it from achieving its protective function. It should be noted that under normal operating conditions TREF is nominally at 561 'F and the worst case margin increases to 22.58 'F. Therefore, using 7.10 *F as the worst case margin is conservative.

10.3 Operability Determination of RTS and ESFAS Functions for ITS Tables 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-1 10.3.1 Discussion of Instrument Allowable Values and TIU:

In the foregoing sections of this Setpoint Analysis, the ability of the instrument channel to perform its required protective function(s) is verified: the total instrument loop uncertainty (TI;U) is determined by identifying and accounting for all uncertainties and effects, starting with an evaluation of the measured process, continuing with the process sensor and signal conditioning and ending at the final output device. The TLU includes process measurement effects, instrument accuracies, drift, tolerances, environmental effects etc. The Nominal Trip Setpoint is the bistable setting at which actuation of a protective device is desired to occur. The Analytical Limit is the maximum (or minimum) trip setpoint assumed in the Ginna Station Accident Analysis. The Analytical Limit plus (or minus) the TLU (depending on the direction of interest) is the-Calculated Setpoint. The Calculated Setpoint is the maximum (or minimum) value at which the Nominal Trip Setpoint would normally be allowed to be set. The Allowable Value is determined by subtracting (or adding depending on the direction of interest) the COT uncertainty to the Calculated Setpoint. This methodology for determining the Allowable Value is consistent with ISA-67.04-Part H1-1994, Fig 6, method 3. The channel must be considered inoperable if the As Found bistable trip setpoint is not within its Allowable Value.

Reference procedure EP-3-S-0505 Ginna Station Setpoint Methodology for a description of the setpoint methodology and definitions of terms.

10.3.2 Determination of Allowable Values:

Allowable Values will be based on combined instrument uncertainties associated with the quarterly channel operability test (COT). The COT for this channel is performed under CPI-TRIP-TEST-5.10 (Reference 34). The COT involves the following instrument loop components:

TC-4)5A/B: Bistable; Overpower Delta T Reactor Trip TP/401V: Test Point Resistor TC-405C/D: Bistable; Overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip TP/4(1B: Test Point Resistor Protective Functions: Overpower Delta T Reactor Trip Overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 41 of 47 9/25/2001

The following evaluation is applicable to both above functions:

Component Uncertainties From Section 8.0:

TC-405A/B and TC-405C/D Component Uncertainty Type Uncertainty Value Test Point Test Point Resistor +/- 1.0% Full Scale Bistable Accuracy -0.6% Full Scale Bistable Drift - 0.5% Full Scale Bistable Calibration Tolerance - 1.0% Full Scale Bistable *M&TE: DVM Accuracy -0.2% Full Scale

• COT Uncertainty does not include M&TE Uncertainty.

COT Uncertainty = (12 +0.62 + 0.52 + 12 )1 = +/- 1.62% Full Scale TIU = (12 +0.62 + 0.52 + 12 + 0. 2 2)1'. =+/- 1.63% Full Scale Allowable Values For ITS Table 3.3.1-1:

For the Overpower and Overtemperature Delta T reactor trips, the existing ITS COLR Accident Analysis Assumptions Setpoints and ITS Table 3.3.1-1 specify the trip setpoints as "variable" and as "defined by" their respective setpoint equations. This existing format will not be changed. The Allowable Values for the OPDT and OTDT reactor trips are calculated below and will be added to ITS Table 3.3.1-1 as a result of this analysis. The above calculated TIU will be input to the CMIS Equipment Database TIU field for each of the bistables evaluated in this section.

OPAT Allowable Value (TC-405A/B)

From the OPAT Setpoint Calculation Table in section 10.2, the case with the minimum margin excluding instrument uncertainty 5.83 'F (7.77% Full Scale) will be used to determine the Allowable Value.

-Bistable TC-405A/B TLU =--=6:80%-Full Scale.

COT Uncertainty = +/-1.62% Full Scale.

TLU - COT = +/-(6.80% - 1.62%) = 5.18% Full Scale Margin including uncertainty = 7.77% - 5.18% = 2.59%

I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 42 of 47 9/25/2001

The Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following nominal trip setpoint by more than 2.0% of AT span.-(This value will-maintain:a margin-of 0.59% tolthe Analytical Limit).-._

ATP< AT0 [1.077 - K5(T-I") - K6 (lOsT/l+10s) - f(AI)]

K5 = 0.001 1/1F for TkT'

= 0.0/°F for T<T' K6 = 0.0262/'F for increasing T

= 0.0/°F for decreasing T f(AI) = 0 when the flux tilt between the top and bottom of the core is ,*13%.

OTAT Allowable Value (TC-405C/D)

From the OTAT Accident Analysis Setpoint Calculation Table in section 10.2, the case with the minimum margin excluding instrument uncertainty 7.10 0 F (9.47% Full Scale) will be used to determine the Allowable Value.

Bistable TC-405C/D TLU = +/-8.02% Full Scale.

COT Uncertainty = +/--1.62% Full Scale.

TLU - COT = =L(8.02% - 1.62%) = 6.4% Full Scale Margin including uncertainty = 9.47% - 6.4% = 3.07%

The Overtemperaure AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following nominal trip setpoint by more than 2.5% of AT span. (This value will maintain a margin of 0.57% to the Analytical Limit).

AT-< AT 0[1.2 + 0.00090(P-2250) - 0.0209(T-T)(l+25s/l+5s) - f(AI)]

f(AI) = 0 when the flux tilt between the top and bottom of the core is

• 13%.

I EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 43 of 47 9/25/2001

10.3.3 Determination of Total Instrument Uncertainties (TIUs):

TRIUs will be based on combined individual instrument uncertainties associated with the Channel Calibration Tests. The Channel Calibration Tests for this channel are performed under CPI DELTA-T-405, CPI-SP1-405.10, and CPI-SP2-405.20 (References 21, 22, and 23). The Channel Calibration Tests involve the following protective function instruments upstream of the components evaluated in Section 10.3.2:

TM-405AA TAVG Math Module Protective Functions: Overpower and Overtemperature Delta T Rx Trips TIUs for Components Upstream of TC-405A/B and TC-405C/D Per Data From Section 8.0:

__Component Uncertainties in Percent Full Scale Component M&TEI Accuracy] Drift Tolerance] SRSS (TIU)

TM-405AA 0.40 1.0 + 0.2 0.5 1.0 4.1.57%

TT-401A, TT-401B, 0.25 0.5 0.5 1.0 +/-1.25 TT-405A, TT-405B From Section 10.2.2: TIU for TC-405A/B = +/- 1.63% full scale.

TIU for TC-405C/D = +/- 1.63% full scale.

Component TIU (% Full Scale)

TC-405A/B -- 1.63% F.S.

TC-405C/D - 1.63% F.S.

TM-405AA -1.57% F.S.

TT-401A, TT-401B . 1.25% F.S.

TT-405A, TT-405B

[ EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 44 of 47 9/25/2001

JAN-21-2003 10:55 RG&E GINNR ENGINEERING 716 ?71 3904 P.02 11.0 Conclusion A review of the instrument loop performance requirements against the existing loop configuration for loop T405 was conducted by this evaluation. The results of this review determined that the safety related delta T channel T405 will provide satisfactory input to the reactor protection system as well as providing control room operators satisfactory delta T indication.

A review of the adequacy of the calibration activities and calibration procedures CPI-DELTA-T-405, "Calibration of the Tavg Loop 405",CPI-SPI-405.10, "Calibration of Delta-T Setpoint I Channel I",

CPI-SP2-405.20, "Calibration of Delta-T Setpoint 2 Channel I", and CPI-TRIP-TEST-5. 10, "Reactor Protection Trip Test/Calibration for Channel I (Red) Bistable Alarms" was also conducted under this Instrument Loop Performance Evaluation. All applicable safety related components are adequately calibrated using correct calibration techniques.

Parameter limits associated with this instrument loop were analyzed in Section 10.2 of this evaluation. The Overtemperature and Overpower delta-T reactor trip input and setpoint uncertainties will not prevent the Overtemperature reactor trip circuitry from protecting the core against exceeding limits associated with this parameter.

PCAQ Resolution PCAQ 94-065 PCAQ 94-065 was previously initiated (10/4/94) to address a concern regarding the interpretation of UFSAR Figure 7.2-13. It was concluded in revision I of this analysis that no discrepancy existed and that UFSAR Figure 7.2-13 was acceptable. UFSAR Figure 7.2-13 has been deleted from the current revision of the UPSAR.

PCAQ 94-066 The dynamic compensation used by this instrument loop has no design basis document related to tolerances. PCAQ 94-066 was initiated to address this concern. The dynamic time constan were specified by Westinghouse per letter SI-FA-=I-1037 dated 3/17/75. These are the values used in the accident analysis: Westinghouse calculation CA-TA-94-22 dated 11/3/94. The time constant values as calibrated to 4O.2 seconds tolerance are considered to be adequate to perform the intended safety function.

Allowable Setpoint values for ITS Setpoint Tables 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-1 and Total Instrument Uncertainties (THUs) for instrunents performing protective functions are determined in Section 10.3.

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 45 of 47 9/25/2001 TOTAL. P.02

ATTACHMENT A Evaluation of PCR 99-045 Modification (Sheet 1 of 2)

References:

1) PCR 99-045

2) VTD-N0430-4601, Operations and Maintenance Manual (EIP-M-FCA502) for FCA502 Special Analog Isolator Module (NUS Instruments)

3) VTD-N0430-4901, Operation and Maintenance Manual (EIP-M-DAM503) for DAM503 Alarm Module (NUS Instruments)

4) VTD-N0430-4401, Operation and Maintenance Manual (MBA500) for MBA500 Master Board Module (NUS Instruments)

5) VTD-N0430-4201, Module Specific Functions for Delta T (MBA-E062PA)

6) BD-2, Instrumentation Block Diagram Loop A-i, Reactor Protection System Implementation of PCR 99-045 has resulted in the following changes to the configuration of the Delta T Loop.

"* Math Module TM-405AA has been reconfigured such that it has a 10-50 madc current output as opposed to the original 0-8 vdc output.

"* Voltage to current isolator modules TM-405P and TM-405C (Foxboro model 66GR-OW), which each converted a 0-8 vdc input to a 10-50 madc output have been removed ancd replaced with one NUS FCA502 Special Analog Isolator Module. The new NUS isolator has a 10-50 madc input and four 10-50 madc outputs (only two output channels will be utilized).

"* Delta T Alarm Modules TC-405A/B and TC-405C/D have been reconfigured such that they require two 10-50 madc inputs as opposed to their previous configuration where they each had one 0-8 vdc input and one 10-50 madc input.

References 4 and 5 above were reviewed and it has been determined that the change in configuration of Math Module TM-405AA will have no effect on its uncertainty or on the uncertainty of any of the modules downstream of it.

Reference 2 above was reviewed and it has been determined that the installation of an NUS Special Analog Isolator Module in place of the two existing Foxboro voltage to current isolator modules will not increase the loop uncertainty. The specific uncertainties associated with the existing Foxboro modules and included in this analysis bound those uncertainties associated with the NUS modules.

EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 46 of 47 9/25/2001

ATTACHMENT A Evaluation of PCR 99-045 Modification (Sheet 2 of 2)

Reference 3 above was reviewed and it has been determined that changing the input configuration of the Delta T alarm modules will have no effect on their uncertainty or on the uncertainty of the any modules downstream of them.

[ EWR 5126 Revision 3 DA-EE-92-092-21 Page 47 of 47 9/25/2001

Attachment 3 ITS Chapter 3.3 Instrumentation Values

ITS Item Analytical Limi Allowable Value Calculated Setpoint Nominal Setpoint Tolerance Section ISA-RP67 04 PART II, method 3I 33 1 Function #2 a 118% `1134% 1123% 108% 107 46 to 108 54%

Function #2 b 35% *30 4% 2928% 24% 23 88 to 24 12%

Function #5 UFSAR Table 15 0-4, shall not exceed UFSAR Table 15 0- ITS Table 3.3 3-1, +/-I 0%

variable a nominal setpoint 4, variable a, Note 1 (57 O°F for (56 25 to by Ž 2 0% minus 8 02% surveillance) 57.75-F)

Function #6 UFSAR Table 15 0-4, shall not exceed UFSAR Table 15 0- ITS Table 3 3 3-1, +/-1 0%

variable c nominal setpont 4, variable c, Note 2 (57 O°F for (56 25 to by > 2 5% minus 6 8% surveillance) 57 75-F)

Function #7 a 1760 psig >1777 psig 17912 psig 1873 psig 1865 0 to 1881 0 psig Function #7 b 2410 psig  !:2406 psig 2396 2 psig 2377 psig 2369 0 to 2385 0 psig Function #8 100% <98 3% 9647% 87% 86 0 to 88 0%

Function #9 a 87% Ž88 7% 8986% 91% 90 32 to 9165%

Function #9 b 87% k88.7% 8986% 91% 90 32 to 91 65%

Function #12 57.0 Hz ;57.2 Hz 57 50 Hz 57.7 Hz 57 55 to 57 85 hz Function #13 0% >12 4% 13 88% 17% 16 0 to 18 0%

Function #16 a Not Modeled 24 CE-I IA Not Modeled 5 0E-1 IA 4 3E-1 I to 5 3E-11 A Function #16 b Not Modeled *9 3% Not Modeled 8% 7.94 to 8 06%

Function #16 c Not Modeled t50 3% Not Modeled 49% 48 76 to 49 24%

Function #16 d Not Modeled g513% Not Modeled 50% 49 76 to 50 24%

Function #16 e Not Modeled k4 7% Not Modeled 6% 5 94 to 6 06%

332 Function #1 c 6 0 psig ,05 71 psig 4 61 psig 4 psig 3 40 to 4 60 psig Function# Id 1715 psig >1731 psig 1744 8 psig 1750 psig 1742 0 to 1758 0 psig Function #1 e 358 psig 2385 4 psig 393 8 psig 514 psig 500 0 to 528 0 psig Function #2 e 32 5 psig :32 21 psig 31 11 psig 28 psig 27.4 to 28 6 psig 32 5 psig 631 06 psig 28 6psig 28 psig 26.1 to 29.9 psig Function #4 c Not Modeled *:20 46 psig Not Modeled 18 psig 16 1 to19.9 psig Function #4 d 0 66E6 Ibm/phb0.56E6 Ibm/hr 0 42E6 Ibm/hr 0 4E6 Ibm/hr 0 25E6 to 051E6 (high steam) Ibm/hr Function #4 d 543"F 2!544 0°F 544 98°F 545"F 544 25 to (low T. 5 ) 545 75°F Function #4 e 3 7E6 ibm/hr !3 64E6 Ibm/br 3 630E6 Ibm/hr 3 6E6 Ibm/hr 3 57E6 to 3 62E6 (high-high Ibm/hr steam)

Function #5 b 1000% 92 7 % 91 15% 85% 84 0 to 86 0%

Function #6 c 00% Ž12 4% 13 88% 17% 16 0 to 18 0%

Function #6e 2450V z2454V 2597V 2870V 2795 2 to 2944 8V

ITS Item Analytical Linut Allowable Value Calculated Setpoint Nominal Setpoint Tolerance Section ISA-RP67 04 PART 1I,method 1 ~ 31 3 34 SR 3342 LOSS OF VOLTAGE LOSS OF LOSS OF LOSS OF LOSS OF a368V and *384V with VOLTAGE VOLTAGE a371.6V VOLTAGE VOLTAGE time delay of 2150 2369 2V and and -378V with time 372 8V, time delay +2 0, -0 0V, seconds and s 2.75 ,382 4V with delay of 2!164 2 4 seconds seconds time delay of seconds and s 2 61 +/-0 12 second

>1 50 seconds seconds and r 2 75 seconds DEGRADED VOLTAGE DEGRADED DEGRADED DEGRADED DEGRADED a414V and <432V VOLTAGE VOLTAGE VOLTAGE VOLTAGE mm time delay of 20 a414 8V and a419 6V and 420 8V, time delay +2 0, -0 0 V, seconds at 4432V, g431 2V with s424 4V 40 seconds @ +/-1 0 second max 1600 seconds @ time delay of time delay of >307 368V

• 414V and 500 seconds >307 seconds seconds and g1589

@368V and *1520 seconds @416 8V seconds and >25 I seconds

(@416 8V) and and g494 9 seconds 225 I seconds @368V and *475 seconds

@368V I I I _ __