ML030030069
| ML030030069 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/2002 |
| From: | Jury K Exelon Nuclear |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RS-02-207 | |
| Download: ML030030069 (177) | |
Text
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations BYR-01, BYR-1 3, and BYR-1 6 identify the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zones 11.3-0, 11.3G-1 and 11.3-1, respectively) by an unrated wall assembly.
This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.90 Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A Room (Fire Zone 11.3D-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from Division 21 are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The Division 21 charging pump and support components and associated cables are present in this zone. The Division 21 pump is assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 charging pump and support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
2.4-292
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations BYR-23, BYR-24, BYR-25 identify that the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zones 11.3G-2, 11.3-2, 11.3-0) by an unrated wall assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.91 Residual Heat Removal HX 11B Room (Fire Zone 11.3E-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Components from Division 12 are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
2.4-293
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The charging pumps, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The Division 12 RHR heat exchanger and associated valves are present in this zone, and are assumed to be unavailable. The redundant Division 11 RHR train is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and is credited for safe shutdown.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.92 Residual Heat Removal HX 2B Room (Fire Zone 11.3E-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions 2.4-294
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Components from Division 22 are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The charging pumps, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The Division 22 RHR heat exchanger and associated valves are present in this zone, and are assumed to be unavailable. The redundant Division 21 RHR train is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and is credited for safe shutdown.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.93 Safety Iniection Pump 1 B Room (Fire Zone 11.3F-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
2.4-295
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from both divisions are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Includinq Boration)
The charging pumps, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are not directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Valves 1 RH8702A, 1 RH8702B, 1 S18804B and 1S18812B whose spurious operation could affect the RHR system have control cables routed through this zone. However, the RHR shutdown cooling operating procedure requires verification of valve position for RH and connecting system valves whose position could impact the decay heat removal function of the RH system. Therefore, this procedure ensures that if any of these valves spuriously operated, they would be placed in the proper position, if necessary by local manual operation of their handwheels, prior to placing RH in service.
Cables for RHR Train B pump suction valves 1 RH8702A and 1 RH8702B are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the low pressure RHR system. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.1.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions 2.4-296
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 No unit 2 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.94 Safety Injection Pump 2B Room (Fire Zone 11.3F-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from both divisions are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The charging pumps, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are not directly affected by a fire in this zone.
One valve related to the RCS inventory control function is subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. This is discussed below.
The RHR Hx 2A to charging pump suction valve, 2CV8804A, has a cable routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging v-pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect 2.4-297
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are not directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves whose spurious operation could affect the RHR system have control cables routed through this zone. This includes 2CV8804A, 2RH8702A and B, 2SI8804B and 2SI8812B However, the RHR shutdown cooling operating procedure requires verification of valve position for RH and connecting system valves whose position could impact the decay heat removal function of the RH system. Therefore, this procedure ensures that if any of these valves spuriously operated, they would be placed in the proper position, if necessary by local manual operation of their handwheels, prior to placing RH in service.
Cables for RHR Train B pump suction valves 2RH8702A and 2RH8702B are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the low pressure RHR system. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.1.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.95 Centrifugal Charging Pump 11B Room (Fire Zone 11.3G-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
2.4-298
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from Division 12 are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The Division 12 charging pump and support components and associated cables are present in this zone. The Division 12 pump is assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 charging pump and support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-1 3 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zone 11.3D
- 1) by an unrated wall assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4-299
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 2.4.2.96 Centrifugal Charging Pump 2B Room (Fire Zone 11.3G-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone:
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from both divisions are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The Division 22 charging pump and support components and associated cables are present in this zone. The Division 22 pump is assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 charging pump and support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
The RHR Hx 2A to charging pump suction valve, 2CV8804A, has a cable routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to this cable could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support 2.4-300
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are not directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Two valves 2CV8804A and 2SI8804B, whose spurious operation could affect the RHR system have control cables routed through this zone. However, the RHR shutdown cooling operating procedure requires verification of valve position for RH and connecting system valves whose position could impact the decay heat removal function of the RH system. Therefore, this procedure ensures that if either of these valves spuriously operated, they would be placed in the proper position, if necessary by local manual operation of their handwheels, prior to placing RH in service.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-23 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zone 11.3D
- 2) by an unrated wall assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.97 Auxiliary Building General Area, El. 383' (Fire Zone 11.4-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Cables for fans and dampers in both trains of the control room ventilation system are present in this zone. Because both trains of the VC system can be rendered unavailable, all room cooling for the main control room and for both the unit 1 and unit 2 auxiliary electrical equipment rooms (AEERs) can be disabled. Loss of cooling to the AEERs could eventually affect main control room instrumentation, since much of the circuitry for the main control room instrumentation and alarms is dependent on cabinets and equipment in the AEERs. Loss of cooling to the main control room could affect the habitability environment for the control room operator. In the event of the total loss of the VC system, portable fans will be staged and flow paths established to ventilate the AEERs and main control room from the Turbine Building. Station evaluations (reference EC#333738 and Calculation #BRW-97-0339-M/BYR97-210), assuming Turbine Building ambient temperatures associated with peak summer temperatures, have demonstrated that temporary ventilation can maintain the AEER and main control 2.4-301
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 room temperatures within conditions to assure the control room remains habitable and control room instrumentation would not be adversely affected. Additionally, safe shutdown instrumentation at the unit 1 and unit 2 fire hazards panels would not be affected by the loss of the VC system.
The supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cables for dampers 0VA474Y, 0VA475Y, OVA476Y and 0VA477Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause these dampers to fail closed. Closure of these dampers would result in blockage of both flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383' (this fire zone).
The effect of this could be that both units AFW system "A" train pumps may not receive adequate room cooling. However, the "A" AFW pumps are assumed to be damaged, since they are present in this zone. The train "B" AFW components are not affected, and will be credited for safe shutdown for both units.
Control cables for both essential service cooling water tower makeup pumps OSX02PA and OSX02PB are present in the zone. Locally starting and operating one of the makeup pumps at the river screen house will be credited. Makeup to the tower is not immediately required, only after system and evaporation losses result in low tower basin water levels. Adequate time is available to access the river screen house.
Control cables associated with all four essential service water cooling tower hotwater bypass valves are present in the zone. Local manual action will be credited to manually operate the bypass valves using their handwheels. Re-positioning these valves may be necessary to adjust to extreme changes in ambient temperatures at the ESW cooling towers. At the time of the fire, the cooling tower valves will be set up for ambient conditions and several hours would pass before any manipulation would be required if ambient temperatures drastically changed.
The ESW cooling tower hot water bypass valves are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control cables present in the zone. Spurious operation of these valves could, over time, affect the desired ESW tower operating performance. Proper ESW cooling tower operation will be restored by remote manual operation of the hot water bypass valves (if necessary, manually using its handwheel).
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from both ESF divisions are present in this fire zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support Offsite power is assumed to be unavailable for this fire zone. A fire in this zone will affect components from both ESF divisions, but both divisions also remain available.
For Division 11, the emergency diesel generator, the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus and 2.4-302
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 the 480Vac ESF switchgear bus all are unaffected, and remain available. Division 11 ESF MCCs 131X2, 131X4 and 131X5 also are unaffected and remain available.
However, Division 11 ESF MCC 131X3 is located in this zone and MCC 131X1 has power cables routed through this zone, and both are therefore assumed to be unavailable. Power to MCC 131 X3 will be isolated by opening its supply breaker at Bus 131X. This action eliminates the need to open individual MCC 131X3 breakers (the fire may prevent access to the MCC) to isolate power to motor operated valves being manually operated outside of this zone. Power and control cables for four Division 11 416OVac loads are present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually opening the breakers and removing control power fuses from the affected cubicles for the Division 11 AFW, CV, CS and common CC pumps upon the detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the bus.
Control cables for the Division 11 diesel generator room and ESF switchgear room ventilation system dampers are present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the damper control circuits for each affected damper has demonstrated that fire induced faults on the affected cables can prevent the dampers from modulating. However, these postulated faults will only fail the dampers in the safe (once-through cooling) position, and therefore cannot prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment in each of these rooms. Therefore, no action is required to position the dampers as a result of fire damage to their control circuit.
For Division 12, the emergency diesel generator, the 4160Vac ESF switchgear bus and the 48OVac ESF switchgear bus all are unaffected, and remain available. Division 12 ESF MCCs 132X2 and 132X4 also are unaffected and remain available. However, Division 12 ESF MCC 132X3 is located in this zone and MCCs 132X1 and 132X5 have power cables routed through this zone, and both are therefore assumed to be unavailable. Power and control cables for four Division 12 416OVac loads are present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually opening the breakers and removing control power fuses from the affected cubicles for the Division 12 CC, CS, SX, and common CC pumps upon the detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the bus.
Control cables for the Division 12 diesel generator room, ESF switchgear room, and miscellaneous electrical equipment room ventilation system dampers are present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the damper control circuits for each affected damper has demonstrated that fire induced faults on the affected cables can prevent the dampers from modulating. However, these postulated faults will only fail the dampers in the safe (once-through cooling) position, and therefore cannot prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment in each of these rooms. Therefore, no action is required to position the dampers as a result of fire damage to their control circuit.
The DC power and diesel oil systems for both divisions remain available.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
2.4-303
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
A fire in this zone can affect both trains of charging. A power cable for the Division 11 charging pump is present in the zone, this pump is assumed to be unavailable. Control cables for the Division 12 charging pump are present, but the Division 12 charging pump remains available via local manual operation of its breaker at the switchgear bus.
The Division 12 pump will be credited for safe shutdown. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
A Cubicle cooler fan for the Division 12 charging pump may be rendered unavailable by a fire in this zone. As long as auxiliary building ventilation system airflow to the charging pump cubicle remains available, cubicle cooling is not required. This has been demonstrated by calculation. However, the VA system supply path to the Division 12 charging pump room has a damper, 0VA274Y, which fails closed on loss of instrument air. Loss of instrument air is conservatively assumed to occur for a fire in this zone. If instrument air is lost, credit is taken for monitoring the charging pump cubicle temperature per the station fire response procedure, and for operator recognition and diagnosis of the condition should a high temperature be observed.
Credit is taken for re-establishing auxiliary building ventilation flow to the room by opening the cubicle door. Therefore, the loss of the cubicle cooler fans will not preclude safe shutdown of unit 1.
Control cables associated with charging flow indicators 1 FI-01 21 A (1 PM05J) and 1 Fl 0121 B (1 PLO6J) are present in the zone. A fire in this zone can result in the lost of both 1FI-0121A, 1FI-0121B. Fire damage in this zone cannot spuriously fail charging FCV 1 CV1 21 closed, however verification of charging flow may not be available. A manual action to verify at least one charging pump is operating and all reactor coolant pump seal leakoff temperatures are normal is credited upon loss of charging flow indication.
If verifications are not obtained, abnormal operating procedure for loss of RCP seal cooling will be entered to proceed to safe shutdown.
Charging pump suction valves 1 CV1 12B and 1 CV1 12D have cables present in this zone. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, remote manual closure of 1CV1 12C, and remote manual opening of 1CV1 12E from the main control room is credited (these circuits are unaffected).
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in the charging system are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the charging system. These are discussed below.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valve, 1 S18811 A, has cables in this zone.
The effect of the spurious opening of this valve is that RWST inventory would drain to 2.4-304
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication and low level alarms and containment recirculation sump level indication have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 1S18812A via local operation of the handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions.
Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
VCT outlet isolation valve 1 CV1i12B has cables present in this zone. The spurious operation of this valve could isolate the VCT from the charging pump suction. To mitigate this postulated event, the RWST to charging pump suction valve CV1 12E will be opened from the main control room.
RWST to charging pump suction valve 1 CV1i12D has cables present in this zone. The spurious operation of this valve would have no effect other than to align the RWST to the charging pump suction, which is its desired position for most scenarios. If necessary, the valve will be locally manually operated using the handwheel.
The charging pump 1 B mini-flow isolation valves, 1 CV81 10 and 1 CV8116, each have cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of either of these valves would block the minimum recirculation flowpath for charging pump 1B. The RCP seal injection flowpath passes sufficient flow (>60gpm) to prevent charging pump damage (spurious operation position, Section 2.4.1.6.4, applied). Operator response to diagnose and identify the condition is credited. If necessary, the 1CV8116 valve will be failed open by opening its electrical supply breaker and the 1 CV81 10 valve will be locally manually operated using the handwheel.
The charging flow control valve, 1CV121, has cables present in this zone. Postulated fire-induced faults on these cables can cause this valve to fail open. If failed open, credit is taken for manual actions to manually throttle charging flow by implementing use of the flow control valve bypass line.
The RCP seal injection line isolation valves, 1 CV8355A through D, have cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause one of these valves to spuriously close, which would isolate seal injection flow to the affected RCP.
The Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperature greater than 2350F.
Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling or loss of RCP seal injection.
2.4-305
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The RHR Hx 1A to charging pump suction valve, 1CV8804A, has cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Charging pump to cold leg injection isolation valves 1S18801A and 1S18801B each have cables present in this zone. The impact of spuriously opening of one of these valves would be to create an additional flowpath for charging to the RCS. This could result in excessive charging flow. Operator response to locally manually close the affected valve by using its handwheel is credited per existing station procedures.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal A fire in this zone will affect both division 11 and division 12 components and systems used to accomplish this function. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
The control circuits for both auxiliary feedwater pumps are potentially affected. The Division 11 pump is located in this zone and is assumed to be unavailable. This is the subject of unit 1 deviation 1A.7 from BTP CMEB 9.5-1. Credit is taken for operation of the Division 12 pump via the remote start switch located outside of the fire zone on elevation 364 feet.
The AFW pump diesel engine cooling water valve, lSX173, has a cable present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the valves' control circuit has demonstrated that postulated faults on the affected cable can fail the valve open (its desired position), but cannot prevent it from opening or cause it to spuriously close. Therefore, no action is required to reposition this valve as a result of fire damage to its control circuit. The flow control valves, 1 AF005A through H, are all potentially affected. Circuit analysis of these valves' circuits has demonstrated that postulated faults on these cables can disable the controls at both the main control room and remote shutdown panels, or could cause all four valves to fail open. However, the spurious closure of any valve cannot occur. If necessary, valves E through H can be locally manually throttled using their handwheels to control AFW flow. The AFW containment isolation valves, 1 AFO1 3A through H, are also potentially affected. The spurious closure of a single valve would not prevent safe shutdown. When time permits and manpower is available, an affected valve will be manually opened via local operation of its handwheel.
The pump discharge isolation valve, 1 AF004B, has a control cable present in this zone, and is susceptible to spurious operation. The spurious closure of this valve would not damage the pump, since the recirculation line would not be affected (spurious operation position, Section 2.4.1.6.4, applied). Credit is taken for operator response to the situation by failing the air operated valve open by opening its DC control power circuit 2.4-306
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 breaker located outside of the zone (cable damage assumption, Section 2.4.1.5.2c, applied).
The AFW pump 1 B recirculation valve, 1 AF022B, has cables in this zone, and is subject to spurious operation resulting from postulated control circuit faults on these cables. The spurious closure of this valve would not prevent operation of the 1 B AFW pump, since the flowpath from the pump discharge to the steam generators is not simultaneously affected (spurious operation position, Section 2.4.1.6.4, applied). Thus, safe shutdown could not be prevented by this postulated event.
All four steam generator PORVs have control cables present in this zone. Local manual operation of one or more SG PORVs using the hydraulic hand pumps is credited for safe shutdown.
The main steam isolation valves, 1 MS001 A through 1 MS001 D, each have a Division 11 and Division 12 actuation circuit present in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are manually operated.
In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
The main steam isolation bypass valves, 1MS101A through 1MS101 D, each have cables from their Division 11 actuation circuit present in this zone. Each of these valves has two independent actuation circuits which will close the valves on a main steam isolation signal. These valves are normally closed, and it is desired to keep them closed for safe shutdown. A failure of the Division 11 circuit could not prevent them from closing in the event that they are open. With the MS1V bypass valve hand position controllers in their normal position of 0%, postulated circuit faults on an actuation circuit for one of these valves are incapable of causing the spurious opening of the affected valve. No response is required.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited, and the affected steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures.
Essential Support A fire in this zone affects support systems from both divisions. The essential service water pumps, component cooling water pumps, and all four containment ventilation fans can all be affected. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 11 essential service water pump and component cooling water pump via local operation of the breakers at the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 11 RCFC fans via local operation of the breaker at the 480Vac ESF switchgear bus.
2.4-307
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Three of four Division 11 SX pump cubicle cooler fans have cables in this zone, and may be unavailable. In the event of coincident fire damage to the power and/or control circuits of the cubicle cooler fans, credit is taken for auxiliary building ventilation flow to the pump room. Per an existing calculation, adequate room cooling is provided by VA flow if the cubicle coolers are not operating. However, the VA system return path from the Division 11/21 essential service pump room has two fire dampers, 0VA455Y and 0VA456Y, which are conservatively assumed to fail closed for a fire in this zone. Credit is taken for monitoring the essential service water pump cubicle temperature and for operator recognition and diagnosis of the condition should a high temperature be observed. Credit is taken for re-establishing auxiliary building ventilation flow to the room by opening the door, if required. Auxiliary building ventilation supply air to this room is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in these systems are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the affected system. These are discussed below.
The intermediate header crosstie valves, 1 CC9473A and 1 CC9473B, have control cables routed through this zone. Either the unit 1 or unit 2 intermediate crosstie valves have their power locked out during normal operation, therefore the spurious operation of this valve will not affect unit separation of the component cooling system.
Valves 1CC9413A, 1CC9413B, and 1 CC685 each have control cables routed through this zone. These are containment isolation valves for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers and/or oil coolers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F. Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperature greater than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; the operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
The supply header isolation valve, 1 CC9415, has a control cable routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this valve would block the discharge flowpath for the units' component cooling system. Operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the 2.4-308
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
Control cables for both of the RHR heat exchanger outlet valves, 1CC9412A and 1CC9412B, are routed through this zone. The spurious opening of one of these valves would result in excessive flow through the system. If a second pump did not autostart on low discharge pressure, then operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The essential service water discharge header crosstie valves, 1 SX033 and 1 SX034, have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would isolate the train A and train B essential service water supply headers. For this fire zone, components from both divisions may be operating.
The Division 12 charging pump is credited in this zone. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem, temporarily shutdown the Division 12 charging pump, and manually open the affected valve locally with its handwheel to restore essential service water flow to both of the essential service water system supply headers.
The essential service water pump suction valves, 1 SX001 A and 1 SX001 B, have control cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of one of these valves would disable its associated pump. This valve has power locked out during normal operation and is there fore not susceptible to postulated spurious operation.
The unit 1 component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet valve, 1 SX004, has a control cable routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this normally open valve would block essential service water flow to the component cooling heat exchanger, and would result in loss of heat removal by the component cooling system. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and re-establish essential service water flow to the affected component cooling heat exchanger per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The common component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet and outlet valves, OSX146, 0SX147, 1 SX005 and 2SX005 each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious operation of one of these valves would have no impact on normal plant operation, since the common component cooling heat exchanger normally is only aligned to a unit and operated during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The operating procedures for aligning the common component cooling heat exchanger to a given unit require verification of proper valve alignment prior to initiating cooldown with this heat exchanger, and are therefore adequate to deal with postulated spurious operations of these valves.
The unit 1 return header crosstie valves, 1 SX01 0, 1 SX01 1 and 1 SX1 36, each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would have no impact. It would force return flow from some unit 1 2.4-309
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 components to one of the two main return headers, but no flow paths would be blocked.
Thus, no adverse consequences result from the spurious closure of one of these valves.
Cables for the containment chiller condenser bypass valves, 1SX147A and 1SX147B, are located in this zone. This valve normally throttles to divert a portion of the essential service water RCFC return flow through the containment chiller condensers. The spurious closure of one of this valve could block essential service water flow to one train of RCFCs, which would disable containment cooling if the affected train of RCFCs were operating at that time. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and if necessary, manually open the affected valve locally by bleeding air from the valve operator when time permits.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Both trains can be affected by a fire in this zone. Both RHR pumps have power cables present in this zone. Credit is taken for repairing the power cable for one of the RHR pumps per existing station procedures. Power and/or control circuits for three of the four RHR pump room cubicle cooler fans are also present. Credit is taken for repairing the circuit for the chosen RHR pump cubicle cooler fans per existing station procedures. Each train of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8701A and 1 RH8701B for train A. In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for these valves, credit is taken for locally manually opening the valves in order to establish a flowpath to one of the RHR pumps. These pair of valves also forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the low pressure RHR system. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.1.
Several other valves in the RHR system flowpaths have cables present in this zone.
This includes 1CS009A and B, 1CV8804A, 1 RH610, 1RH611, 1RH8716A, 1S18804B, 1S18809A, 1S18811A, 1S18812A and 1S18840. Except as discussed above, the spurious operation of these valves during normal operation or while the unit is in hot standby would not have any adverse consequences. The RHR operating procedure requires verification of proper valve position prior to placing an RH pump in operation.
Therefore, credit is taken for manually verifying and/or repositioning affected valves via local operation with their handwheels prior to initiating cooldown with the RHR system.
Additionally, Division 11 valves 1CC9412A and 1CC9415 and Division 12 valve 1 CC9412B may need to be repositioned (if not previously addressed) to ensure adequate component cooling water flow to the RH heat exchanger. If required, credit is taken for locally manually operating these valves with their handwheels.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from both ESF divisions are present in this fire zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support 2.4-310
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Offsite power is assumed to be unavailable for this fire zone. A fire in this zone will affect components from both ESF divisions, but both divisions also remain available.
For Division 21, the emergency diesel generator, the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus and the 480Vac ESF switchgear bus all are unaffected, and remain available. Division 21 ESF MCC 231X1 has power cables routed through this zone, and is therefore assumed to be unavailable. The other four MCCs are unaffected. Power and control cables for four Division 21 416OVac loads are present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually opening the breakers and removing control power fuses from the affected cubicles for the Division 21 AFW, CS, SX and common CC pumps upon detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the bus. The Division 21 ventilation support systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
For Division 22, the emergency diesel generator, the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus and the 480Vac ESF switchgear bus are unaffected, and remain available. Division 22 ESF MCCs 232X1 and 232X3 are located in this zone and are assumed to be unavailable.
The remaining three Division 22 ESF MCCs are unaffected by a fire in this zone. Power to MCC 232X1 will be isolated by opening its supply breaker at Bus 232X. This action eliminates the need to open individual MCC 232X1 breakers (the fire may prevent access to the MCC) to isolate power to motor operated valves being manually operated outside of this zone. Power and control cables for one Division 22 416OVac load is present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually opening the breaker and removing control power fuses from the affected cubicle for the common CC pump upon detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the bus.
Control cables for the Division 22 diesel generator room, ESF switchgear room, and miscellaneous electrical equipment room ventilation system dampers are present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the damper control circuits for each affected damper has demonstrated that fire induced faults on the affected cables can prevent the dampers from modulating. However, these postulated faults will only fail the dampers in the safe (once-through cooling) position, and therefore cannot prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment in each of these rooms. Therefore, no action is required to position the dampers as a result of fire damage to their control circuit.
The DC power and diesel oil systems for both divisions remain available.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
A fire in this zone can affect both trains of charging. Control cables for the Division 21 charging pump is present in the zone. The Division 22 charging pump is available for safe shutdown of unit 2. The Division 21 charging pump remains available via local manual operation of its breaker at the switchgear bus. Instrumentation in the main 2.4-311
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
Both cubicle cooler fans for the Division 22 charging pump and one fan for the Division 21 charging pump may be rendered unavailable by a fire in this zone. As long as auxiliary building ventilation system airflow to the charging pump cubicle remains available, cubicle cooling is not required. This has been demonstrated by calculation.
However, the VA system supply path to the Division 22 charging pump room has a damper, OVA305Y, which fails closed on loss of instrument air. Loss of air is conservatively assumed to occur for a fire in this zone. Credit is taken for the Division 21 charging pump. Therefore, the loss of the cubicle cooler fans will not preclude safe shutdown of unit 2.
Control cables associated with charging flow indicators 2FI-01 21 A (2PM05J) and 2FI 0121 B (2PL06J) are present in the zone. A fire in this zone can result in the lost of both 2FI-0121A, 2FI-0121B. Fire damage in this zone cannot spuriously fail charging FCV 2CV121 closed, however verification of charging flow may not be available. A manual action to verify at least one charging pump is operating and all reactor coolant pump seal leakoff temperatures are normal is credited upon loss of charging flow indication.
If verifications are not obtained, abnormal operating procedure for loss of RCP seal cooling will be entered to proceed to safe shutdown.
Charging pump suction valves 2CV1 12B and 2CV1 12D have cables present in this zone. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, remote manual closure of 2CV1 12C, and remote manual opening of 2CV1 12E from the main control room is credited (these circuits are unaffected).
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in the charging system are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the charging system. These are discussed below.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valve, 2SI881 1A, has cables in this zone.
The effect of the spurious opening of this valve is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication and low level alarms and containment recirculation sump level indication have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 2S18812A via local operation of the handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions.
Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
2.4-312
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 VCT outlet isolation valve 2CV1 12B has cables present in this zone. The spurious operation of this valve could isolate the VCT from the charging pump suction. To mitigate this postulated event, the RWST to charging pump suction valves 2CV1 12E will be opened from the main control room.
RWST to charging pump suction valve 2CV1 12D has cables present in this zone. The spurious operation of this valve would have no effect other than to align the RWST to the charging pump suction, which is its desired position for most scenarios. If necessary, the valve will be locally manually operated using the handwheel.
The charging pump mini-flow isolation valves 2CV8114 and 2CV8116, each have cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block the minimum recirculation flowpath for the associated charging pump. The RCP seal injection flowpath passes sufficient flow (>60gpm) to prevent charging pump damage (spurious operation position, Section 2.4.1.6.4, applied). Operator response to diagnose and identify the condition is credited. If necessary, the valve associated with the operating charging pump will be failed open by opening its electrical supply breaker.
In addition, the redundant charging pump remains available as described above.
The charging flow control valve, 2CV1 21, has cables present in this zone. Postulated fire-induced faults on these cables can cause this valve to fail open. If failed open, credit is taken for manual actions to manually throttle charging flow by implementing use of the flow control valve bypass line.
The RCP seal injection line isolation valves, 2CV8355A through D, have cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause one of these valves to spuriously close, which would isolate seal injection flow to the affected RCP.
The Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 2350F.
Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection.
The RHR Hx 2A to charging pump suction valve, 2CV8804A, has cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Charging pump to cold leg injection isolation valves 2SI8801 A and 2S18801 B each have cables present in this zone. The impact of spuriously opening of one of these valves would be to create an additional flowpath for charging to the RCS. This could result in 2.4-313
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 excessive charging flow. Operator response to close the affected valve locally manually by using its handwheel is credited per existing station procedures.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal A fire in this zone will affect both division 21 and division 22 components and systems used to accomplish this function. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
The control circuits for both auxiliary feedwater pumps are potentially affected. The Division 21 pump is located in this zone and is assumed to be unavailable. This is the subject of unit 2 deviation 2A.6 from BTP CMEB 9.5-1. Credit is taken for operation of the Division 22 pump via the remote start switch located outside of the fire zone on elevation 364 feet.
The AFW pump diesel engine cooling water valve, 2SX1 73, has a cable present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the valves' control circuit has demonstrated that postulated faults on the affected cable can fail the valve open (its desired position), but cannot prevent it from opening or cause it to spuriously close. Therefore, no action is required to reposition this valve as a result of fire damage to its control circuit. The flow control valves, 2AF005A through H, are all potentially affected. Circuit analysis of the control circuits of these valves has demonstrated that postulated faults on the cables in this zone can disable the controls at both the main control boards and the remote shutdown panels, or can cause all four valves to fail open. The spurious closure of any of these valves cannot occur. If necessary, these valves can be locally manually throttled using their handwheels to control AFW flow. The AFW containment isolation valves, 2AF013A through H, are also potentially affected. The spurious closure of a single valve would not prevent safe shutdown. When time permits and manpower is available, and affected valve will be manually opened via local operation of its handwheel.
The AFW pump 2B recirculation valve, 2AF022B, has a cable in this zone, and is subject to spurious operation resulting from postulated control circuit faults on this cable. The spurious closure of this valve would not prevent operation of the 2B AFW pump, since the flowpath from the pump discharge to the steam generators is not simultaneously affected (spurious operation position, Section 2.4.1.6.4, applied). Thus, safe shutdown could not be prevented by this postulated event.
All four steam generator PORVs have control cables present in this zone. Local manual operation of one or more SG PORVs using the hydraulic hand pumps is credited for safe shutdown.
The main steam isolation valves, 2MS001 A through 1 MS001 D, each have a Division 21 and Division 22 actuation circuit present in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are manually operated.
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
The main steam isolation bypass valves, 2MS101A through 2MS101D, each have cables from their Division 21 actuation circuit present in this zone. Each of these valves has two independent actuation circuits which will close the valves on a main steam isolation signal. These valves are normally closed, and it is desired to keep them closed for safe shutdown. A failure of the Division 21 circuit could not prevent them from closing in the event that they are open. With the MSIV bypass valve hand position controllers in their normal position of 0%, postulated circuit faults on an actuation circuit for one of these valves are incapable of causing the spurious opening of the affected valve. No response is required.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited, and the affected steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures.
Essential Support A fire in this zone affects support systems from both divisions. The essential service water pumps, component cooling water pumps, and both Division 21 containment ventilation fans can all be affected. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 22 essential service water pump and component cooling water pump via local operation of the breakers at the 4160Vac ESF switchgear bus Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 22 RCFC fans from the control room. All four Division 22 SX pump cubicle cooler fans have cables in this zone, and may be unavailable. In the event of coincident fire damage to the power and/or control circuits of the cubicle cooler fans, credit is taken for auxiliary building ventilation flow to the pump room. Per an existing calculation, adequate room cooling is provided by VA flow if the cubicle coolers are not operating.
Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in these systems are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the affected system. These are discussed below.
The intermediate header crosstie valve, 2CC9473B, has control cables routed through this zone. Either the unit 1 or unit 2 intermediate crosstie valves have their power locked out during normal operation, therefore the spurious operation of this valve will not affect unit separation of the component cooling system.
Valves 2CC9413A, 2CC941 3B, 2CC685, and 2CC9414 each have control cables routed through this zone. These are containment isolation valves for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block 2.4-315
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers and/or oil coolers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2351F. Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; the operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
Control cables for both of the RHR heat exchanger outlet valves, 2CC9412A and 2CC9412B, are routed through this zone. The spurious opening of one of these valves would result in excessive flow through the system. If a second pump did not autostart on low discharge pressure, then operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The essential service water discharge header crosstie valves, 2SX033 and 2SX034, have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would isolate the train A and train B essential service water supply headers. For this fire zone, components from both divisions may be operating, although initially only Division 22 components will be used. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and manually open the affected valve locally with its handwheel to restore essential service water flow to both of the essential service water system supply headers.
The Division 22 essential service water pump suction valve, 2SX001 B, has a control cable present in this zone. The spurious closure of this valve would disable its associated pump. This valve has power locked out during normal operation and is therefore not susceptible to postulated spurious operation.
The unit 2 component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet valve, 2SX004, has a control cable routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this normally open valve would block essential service water flow to the component cooling heat exchanger, and would result in loss of heat removal by the component cooling system. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and re-establish essential service water flow to the affected component cooling heat exchanger per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The common component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet and outlet valves, 0SX146, OSX147, 1SX005 and 2SX005 each have control cables routed through this zone. The 2.4-316
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 spurious operation of one of these valves would have no impact on normal plant operation, since the common component cooling heat exchanger normally is only aligned to a unit and operated during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The operating procedures for aligning the common component cooling heat exchanger to a given unit require verification of proper valve alignment prior to initiating cooldown with this heat exchanger, and are therefore adequate to deal with postulated spurious operations of these valves.
The unit 1 return header crosstie valves, 2SX010, 2SX01 1 and 2SX136, each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would have no impact. It would force return flow from some unit 1 components to one of the two main return headers, but no flow paths would be blocked.
Thus, no adverse consequences result from the spurious closure of one of these valves.
Cables for the containment chiller condenser bypass valves, 2SX1 47A and 2SX1 47B, are located in this zone. This valve normally throttles to divert a portion of the essential service water RCFC return flow through the containment chiller condensers. The spurious closure of one of this valve could block essential service water flow to one train of RCFCs, which would disable containment cooling if the affected train of RCFCs were operating at that time. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and if necessary, manually open the affected valve locally by bleeding air from the valve operator when time permits.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. A fire in this zone can affect both trains. The train A RHR pump power cable is present in this zone.
Cubicle cooler fans for both pumps have power and control cables in this zone. Credit is taken for repairing the circuits for one trains' RHR pump and cubicle coolers per existing station procedures. Note that Division 22 MCC 2AP23E is present in this fire zone. This MCC is the power supply for one of the Division 22 RHR pump cubicle cooler fans. If this MCC is damaged by fire, then repair of the Division 21 RHR train per existing station procedures is mandatory, since it is not considered to be feasible to repair an MCC. Division 21 RHR pump suction valve 2RH8701A has control cables in the zone. In the event of fire damage to this control circuit, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the Division 21 RHR pump.
Several other valves in the RHR system flowpaths have cables present in this zone.
This includes 2CS009A and B, 2CV8804A, 2RH610, 2RH611, 2RH8716A, 2SI8809A, 2SI881 1A, 2S18812A and 2SI8840. Except as discussed above, the spurious operation of these valves during normal operation or while the unit is in hot standby would not have any adverse consequences. The RHR operating procedure requires verification of proper valve position prior to placing an RH pump in operation. Therefore, credit is taken for manually verifying and/or repositioning affected valves via local operation with 2.4-317
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 their handwheels prior to initiating cooldown with the RHR system. Additionally, Division 21 valve 2CC9412A and Division 22 valve 2CC9412B may need to be repositioned (if not previously addressed) to ensure adequate component cooling water flow to the RH heat exchanger. If required, credit is taken for locally manually operating these valves with their handwheels.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-28 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment on the next elevation (fire zone 11.3
- 0) by an unrated floor assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
Also, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations BYR-04 and BYR-19 identify the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zones 11.3-2 and 11.3-1, respectively) by an unrated wall assembly. These evaluations justify the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.98 Control Room Refrigeration Equipment Room (Fire Zone 11.4A-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The safe shutdown components within the control room ventilation system are not affected by a fire in this zone. The auxiliary building ventilation system is also not affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from both divisions are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support Power and control cables for both the Train A and Train B control room refrigeration units are present in this zone. Credit is taken for opening the breaker and removing control power fuses at the Division 11 and 12 switchgear bus cubicles per station procedure upon detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the bus. With these actions, both ESF buses will remain available, and are credited for safe shutdown.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
2.4-318
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The systems and components which perform this function are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The systems and components which perform this function are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The essential support systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system and its required support functions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will not have any impact on unit 2 safe shutdown.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.99 Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 11B Room (Fire Zone 11.4A-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are not affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from Division 12 are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support 2.4-319
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The systems and components which perform this function are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The Division 12 auxiliary feedwater pump and its support components, including oil pumps and coolers, essential service water cooling components, room coolers and associated valves are present in this zone. Cables for each of these active components are also present. Therefore, the Division 12 AFW system is assumed to be unavailable.
The Division 11 AFW system is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and is credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Support The component cooling water and containment ventilation systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone. Two fire dampers 0VA455Y and 0VA456Y in the return ductwork from the Train A essential service water pump room are present in the walls of this zone. A fire in this zone could therefore block the return flowpath for the auxiliary building airflow through this room. The cubicle coolers for the Train A essential service water pump room are not affected, and therefore the operation of the essential service water pumps within this room is also not affected. Thus, both trains of essential service water remain available for safe shutdown.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system and its required support functions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will not have any impact on unit 2 safe shutdown.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations 2.4-320
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone, since the walls, floor and ceiling have a 3-hour fire rating as described in section 2.3.11.31 of the fire hazards analysis.
2.4.2.100 Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Room (Fire Zone 11.4A-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are not affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will not have any impact on unit 1 safe shutdown.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from both divisions are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The systems and components which perform this function are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The Division 22 auxiliary feedwater pump and its support components, including oil pumps and coolers, essential service water cooling components, room coolers and associated valves are present in this zone. Cables for each of these active components are also present. Therefore, the Division 22 AFW system is assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 AFW system is not directly affected by a fire in this zone, and is credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Support 2.4-321
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The essential service water pumps and support components and the containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone. A power cable for the Division 21 component cooling water pump is present in the zone. The Division 22 component cooling water pump is unaffected and is credited in this zone.
The intermediate header crosstie valve, 2CC9473A, has control cables routed through this zone. Either the unit 1 or unit 2 intermediate crosstie valves have their power locked out during normal operation, therefore fire damage to control cables for this valve will not result in a spurious valve operation that will affect unit separation of the component cooling system.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system and its required support functions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone, since the walls, floor and ceiling have a 3-hour fire rating as described in section 2.3.11.32 of the fire hazards analysis.
2.4.2.101 Radwaste / RSP Ventilation Control Room (Fire Zone 11.4B-0)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will not impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.102 Unit 1 Seal Water HX Room (Fire Zone 11.4B-11 The Seal Water Heat Exchanger 1 CV02A is located in this zone, however it is a passive mechanical component not affected by a fire. No safe shutdown electrical components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.103 Unit 2 Seal Water HX Room (Fire Zone 11.4B-2)
The Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2CV02A is located in this zone, however it is a passive mechanical component not affected by a fire. No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will not impact the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.104 Radwaste/Remote Shutdown Control Room (Fire Zone 11.4C-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4 4.
2.4-322
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Common Systems Cables for fans and dampers for train A of the control room ventilation system are present in this zone. Train B is unaffected in this zone.
The auxiliary building ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Control cables for both essential service cooling water tower makeup pumps OSX02PA and OSX02PB are present in the zone. Locally starting and operating one of the makeup pumps at the river screen house will be credited. Makeup to the tower is not immediately required, only after system and evaporation losses result in low tower basin water levels. Adequate time is available to access the river screen house.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from both ESF divisions are present in this fire zone. The remote shutdown panels located in this zone, contain controls and indication for a limited subset of the safe shutdown systems for the unit. See Tables 2.4-5 through 2.4
- 11. For a design basis fire, the controls in both the main control room and at the remote shutdown panels may be rendered unavailable. Safe shutdown instrumentation in the control room will remain available. The safe shutdown instruments in the control room will be credited for safe shutdown. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazards panel remains available (but is not needed). Local manual control of affected safe shutdown components and systems will be credited for safe shutdown of the unit.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The unit 1 ESF AC and DC power sources, including support systems, are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Cables for both charging pumps are present in this zone. Both charging pumps remain available via local manual breaker operation at the ESF switchgear buses. Credit is taken for initial operation of the Division 11 charging pump.
Support systems for the charging pumps are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Control cables associated with charging flow indicators 1FI-0121A (1PM05J) and 1FI 0121B (1PL06J) are present in the zone. A fire in this zone can result in the lost of both 1 FI-0121A, 1 FI-0121B. Fire damage in this zone cannot spuriously fail charging FCV 1 CV1 21 closed, however verification of charging flow may not be available. A manual action to verify at least one charging pump is operating and all reactor coolant pump 2.4-323
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 seal leakoff temperatures are normal is credited upon loss of charging flow indication.
If verifications are not obtained, abnormal operating procedure for loss of RCP seal cooling will be entered to proceed to safe shutdown.
The charging flow control valve, 1 CV1 21, has cables present in this zone. Postulated fire-induced faults on these cables can cause this valve to fail open. If failed open, credit is taken for manual actions to manually throttle charging flow by implementing use of the flow control valve bypass line.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal A fire in this zone can affect both division 11 and division 12 components and systems used to accomplish this function. Instrumentation in the control room will be credited for safe shutdown.
The control circuits for both auxiliary feedwater pumps are potentially affected. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 11 pump via local operation of the breaker at the ESF switchgear bus. Credit is also taken for manual operation of the flow control valves, 1AF005A through D, locally with their handwheels. The AFW containment isolation valves, 1AF013A through D, are also potentially affected. The spurious closure of a single valve would not prevent safe shutdown. When time permits and manpower is available, an affected valve will be manually opened via local operation of its handwheel.
All four steam generator PORVs have control cables present in this zone. Local manual operation of one or more SG PORVs using the hydraulic hand pumps is credited for safe shutdown.
The main steam isolation valves, 1 MS001 A through 1 MS001 D, each have a Division 11 and a Division 12 actuation circuit present in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are manually operated.
In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, manual action will be credited to open the breakers for the affected steam generator PORV.
These valves fail closed on loss of electrical power.
Essential Support A fire in this zone affects support systems from both divisions. The essential service water pumps, component cooling water pumps, and all four containment ventilation fans can all be affected. Each of these components remain available via local operation of their breakers at the switchgear buses. Credit is taken for manual 2.4-324
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 operation of Division 11 essential service water pump, component cooling water pump, and both RCFC fans via local operation of the breakers at the switchgear bus.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from both ESF divisions are present in this fire zone. The remote shutdown panels, located in this zone, contain controls and indication for a limited subset of the safe shutdown systems for the unit. See Tables 2.4-5 through 2.4
- 11. For a design basis fire, the controls in both the main control room and at the remote shutdown panels may be rendered unavailable. Safe shutdown instrumentation in the control room will remain available. In this case, the safe shutdown instruments in the control room will be credited for safe shutdown. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazards panel remains available (but is not needed). Local manual control of affected safe shutdown components and systems will be credited for safe shutdown of the unit.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The unit 2 ESF AC and DC power sources are unaffected by a fire in this zone. Except as noted in the following discussion, support systems are also unaffected by a fire in this zone. Cables for one Division 21 diesel oil transfer pump are routed through this zone. The redundant pump is unaffected; therefore operation of the Division 21 emergency diesel generator will not be adversely affected by fire damage to this component.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Includinq Boration)
Cables for both charging pumps are present in this zone. Both charging pumps remain available via local manual breaker operation at the ESF switchgear buses. Credit is taken for initial operation of the Division 21 charging pump.
Support systems for the charging pumps are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Control cables associated with charging flow indicators 2FI-0121 A (2PM05J) and 2FI 0121B (2PL06J) are present in the zone. A fire in this zone can result in the lost of both 2FI-0121A, 2FI-0121B. Fire damage in this zone cannot spuriously fail charging FCV 2CV121 closed, however verification of charging flow may not be available. A manual action to verify at least one charging pump is operating and all reactor coolant pump seal leakoff temperatures are normal is credited upon loss of charging flow indication.
2.4-325
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 If verifications are not obtained, abnormal operating procedure for loss of RCP seal cooling will be entered to proceed to safe shutdown.
The charging flow control valve, 2CV121, has cables present in this zone. Postulated fire-induced faults on these cables can cause this valve to fail open. If failed open, credit is taken for manual actions to manually throttle charging flow by implementing use of the flow control valve bypass line.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal A fire in this zone can affect both division 21 and division 22 components and systems used to accomplish this function. Instrumentation in the control room will be credited for safe shutdown.
The control circuits for both auxiliary feedwater pumps are potentially affected. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 21 pump via local operation of the breaker at the ESF switchgear bus. Credit is also taken for manual operation of the flow control valves, 2AF005A through D, locally with their handwheels. The AFW containment isolation valves, 2AF013A through D, are also potentially affected. The spurious closure of a single valve would not prevent safe shutdown. When time permits and manpower is available, and affected valve will be manually opened via local operation of its handwheel.
All four steam generator PORVs have control cables present in this zone. Local manual operation of one or more SG PORVs using the hydraulic hand pumps is credited for safe shutdown.
The main steam isolation valves, 2MS001 A through 2MS001 D, each have a Division 21 and a Division 22 actuation circuit present in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are manually operated.
In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, manual action will be credited to open the breakers for the affected steam generator PORV.
These valves fail closed on loss of electrical power.
Essential Support A fire in this zone affects support systems from both divisions. The essential service water pumps, component cooling water pumps, and all four containment ventilation fans can all be affected. Each of these components remain available via local operation of their breakers at the switchgear buses. Credit is taken for manual operation of Division 21 essential service water pump, component cooling water pump, and both RCFC fans via local operation of the breakers at the switchgear bus.
2.4-326
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone, since the walls, floor and ceiling have a 3-hour fire rating as described in section 2.3.11.36 of the fire hazards analysis.
2.4.2.105 Letdown HX 1A Room (Fire Zone 11.4C-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from Division 11 are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The power cable for the Division 11 charging pump and power and control cables for its cubicle cooler fan are routed through this zone. The Division 11 pump is assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 charging pump and support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support 2.4-327
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-20 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zone 11.3-1) by an unrated wall assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.106 Letdown HX 2A Room (Fire Zone 11.4C-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from Division 21 are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Suppor The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
2.4-328
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The power cable for the Division 21 charging pump and power and control cables for its cubicle cooler fan are routed through this zone. The Division 21 pump is assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 charging pump and support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.107 Letdown HX 1B Room (Fire Zone 11.4D-1)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.108 Letdown HX 2B Room (Fire Zone 11.4D-2)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.109 Auxiliary Building General Area, El. 401' (Fire Zone 11.5-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems 2.4-329
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Cables for fans and dampers in both trains of the control room ventilation system are present in this zone. Because both trains of the VC system can be rendered unavailable, all room cooling for the main control room and for both the unit 1 and unit 2 auxiliary electrical equipment rooms (AEERs) can be disabled. Loss of cooling to the AEERs could eventually affect main control room instrumentation, since much of the circuitry for the main control room instrumentation and alarms is dependent on cabinets and equipment in the AEERs. Loss of cooling to the main control room could affect the habitability environment for the control room operator. In the event of the total loss of the VC system, portable fans will be staged and flow paths established to ventilate the AEERs and main control room from the Turbine Building. Station evaluations (reference EC#333738 and Calculation #BRW-97-0339-M/BYR97-210), assuming Turbine Building ambient temperatures associated with peak summer temperatures, have demonstrated that temporary ventilation can maintain the AEER and main control room temperatures within conditions to assure the control room remains habitable and control room instrumentation would not be adversely affected. Additionally, safe shutdown instrumentation at the unit 1 and unit 2 fire hazards panels would not be affected by the loss of the VC system.
The "A" and "C" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system have power cables routed through this zone. The remaining two sets of supply and exhaust fans are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
Cables for dampers 0VA474Y, 0VA475Y, OVA476Y and 0VA477Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause these dampers to fail closed. Closure of these dampers would result in blockage of both flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. The effect of this could be that both units AFW system "A" train pumps may not receive adequate room cooling. The train "B" AFW components are not affected, and will be credited for safe shutdown for both units.
Control cables for both essential service cooling water tower makeup pumps OSX02PA and OSX02PB are present in the zone. Locally starting and operating one of the makeup pumps at the river screen house will be credited. Makeup to the tower is not immediately required, only after system and evaporation losses result in low tower basin water levels. Adequate time is available to access the river screen house.
Control cables associated with all four essential service water cooling tower hotwater bypass valves are present in the zone. Local manual action will be credited to manually operate the bypass valves using their handwheels. Re-positioning these valves may be necessary to adjust to extreme changes in ambient temperatures at the ESW cooling towers. At the time of the fire, the cooling tower valves will be set up for ambient conditions and several hours would pass before any manipulation would be required if ambient temperatures drastically changed.
2.4-330
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The ESW cooling tower hot water bypass valves are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control cables present in the zone. Spurious operation of these valves could, over time, affect the desired ESW tower operating performance. Proper ESW cooling tower operation will be restored by remote manual operation of the hot water bypass valves (if necessary, manually using its handwheel).
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from both ESF divisions are present in this fire zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support Offsite power is assumed to be unavailable for this fire zone. A fire in this zone will affect components from both ESF divisions, but both divisions also remain available.
For Division 11, the emergency diesel generator, the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus and the 48OVac ESF switchgear bus all are unaffected, and remain available. Division 11 ESF MCC 131X5 also is unaffected and remains available. However, the other four Division 11 ESF MCCs all have power cables routed through this zone, and are therefore assumed to be unavailable. Power and control cables for four Division 11 416OVac loads are present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually opening the breakers and removing control power fuses from the affected cubicles for the Division 11 AFW, CV, CS and common CC pumps upon detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the bus.
Control cables for the Division 11 diesel generator room and ESF switchgear room ventilation system dampers are present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the damper control circuits for each affected damper has demonstrated that fire induced faults on the affected cables can prevent the dampers from modulating. However, these postulated faults will only fail the dampers in the safe (once-through cooling) position, and therefore cannot prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment in each of these rooms. Therefore, no action is required to position the dampers as a result of fire damage to their control circuit.
For Division 12, the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus and the 48OVac ESF switchgear bus are unaffected, and remain available. Division 12 ESF MCCs 132X2 and 132X4 also are unaffected and remain available. However, the other three Division 12 ESF MCCs all have power cables routed through this zone, and are therefore assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 emergency diesel generator has control cables present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually starting and controlling the EDG from its local panel. Additionally, control cables associated with the Division 12 emergency diesel generator output breaker are present in the zone. Credit is taken for manually closing the Division 12 EDG output breaker at the Division 12 ESF switchgear bus. Power and control cables for four Division 12 4160Vac loads are present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually opening the breakers and removing control power fuses from the affected cubicles for the Division 12 CC, CS, SX, and common CC pumps upon detection of a design basis fire as a precautionary measure to protect the bus. In 2.4-331
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 addition, a cable for the Division 12 SAT feed breaker is present in this zone.
Postulated faults on this cable could result in its spurious closure, possibly resulting in simultaneously feeding the bus from two energized sources. Therefore, credit is taken for removing the control power fuses and manually placing the Division 12 SAT feed breaker in its desired position.
Control cables for the Division 12 diesel generator room, ESF switchgear room, and miscellaneous electrical equipment room ventilation system dampers are present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the damper control circuits for each affected damper has demonstrated that fire induced faults on the affected cables can prevent the dampers from modulating. However, these postulated faults will only fail the dampers in the safe (once-through cooling) position, and therefore cannot prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment in each of these rooms. Therefore, no action is required to position the dampers as a result of fire damage to their control circuit. The diesel generator cooling water valve, 1 SX1 69B, has a cable present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the valves' control circuit has demonstrated that postulated faults on the affected cable can fail the valve open (its desired position), but cannot prevent it from opening or cause it to spuriously close. Therefore, no action is required to reposition this valve as a result of fire damage to its control circuit.
The DC power and diesel oil systems for both divisions remain available.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
A fire in this zone can affect both trains of charging. The Division 11 pump is assumed to be unavailable, since its power cable is present. Control cables for the Division 12 charging pump are present, but the charging pump remains available via local manual operation of its breaker at the switchgear bus. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
Both cubicle cooler fans for the Division 12 charging pump may be rendered unavailable by a fire in this zone. As long as auxiliary building ventilation system airflow to the charging pump cubicle remains available, cubicle cooling is not required. This has been demonstrated by calculation. However, the VA system supply path to the Division 12 charging pump room has a damper, 0VA274Y, which fails closed on loss of instrument air. Loss of instrument air is conservatively assumed to occur for a fire in this zone. If instrument air is lost, credit is taken for monitoring the charging pump cubicle temperature per the station fire response procedure, and for operator recognition and diagnosis of the condition should a high temperature be observed.
Credit is taken for re-establishing auxiliary building ventilation flow to the room by opening the cubicle door. Therefore, the loss of the cubicle cooler fans will not preclude safe shutdown of unit 1.
2.4-332
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Control cables associated with charging flow indicators 1 FI-01 21 A (1 PM05J) and 1 Fl 0121B (1PLO6J) are present in the zone. A fire in this zone can result in the lost of both 1FI-0121A, 1FI-0121B. Fire damage in this zone cannot spuriously fail charging FCV 1CV121 closed, however verification of charging flow may not be available. A manual action to verify at least one charging pump is operating and all reactor coolant pump seal leakoff temperatures are normal is credited upon loss of charging flow indication.
If verifications are not obtained, abnormal operating procedure for loss of RCP seal cooling will be entered to proceed to safe shutdown.
Charging pump suction valves lCV1 12B, lCV1 12C, lCV1 12D and lCV1 12E have cables present in this zone. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, manual closure of either 1CV1 12B or lCV1 12C, and manual opening of either 1 CV1i12D or 1 CV112E is credited (if necessary, via local operation of the handwheel).
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in the charging system are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the charging system. These are discussed below.
Cables for reactor vessel head vent valves 1 RC014A and 1 RC014C are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the containment atmosphere. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.3.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valves, 1S18811 A and 1S18811 B, both have cables in this zone. The effect of the spurious opening of one of these valves is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication and low level alarms have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 1S18812A or 1 S18812B (depending upon which 1S1881 1A/B valve has spuriously opened) via local operation of the handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
VCT outlet isolation valves 1CV1 12B and lCV1 12C have cables present in this zone.
The spurious closure of these valves could isolate the VCT from the charging pump suction. To mitigate this postulated event, the operating charging pump will be stopped and one of the two RWST to charging pump suction valves lCV1 12D or lCV1 12E will be opened from the main control room, immediately upon determination of a design basis fire. If this cannot be accomplished from the main control room because of fire damage to their control cables, the operating charging pump will be stopped at its 2.4-333
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 switchgear and either valve 1 CV1i12D or 1 CV1i12E manually opened using its handwheel. The charging pump will be re-started after its suction flowpath is aligned to the RWST and control power fuses removed from valves 1CV1 12D and/or 1CV1 12E.
RWST to charging pump suction valves ICV1 12D and 1CV1 12E have cables present in this zone. The spurious operation of one of these valves would have no effect other than to align the RWST to the charging pump suction, which is its desired position for most scenarios. If necessary, the valves will be locally manually operated using the handwheel.
The charging pump mini-flow isolation valves, 1CV81 10, 1 CV81 11 and 1CV8116, each have cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block the minimum recirculation flowpath for the associated charging pump. The RCP seal injection flowpath, which remains available, passes sufficient flow (>60gpm) to prevent charging pump damage (spurious operation position, Section 2.4.1.6.4, applied). Operator response to diagnose and identify the condition is credited.
If necessary, the 1CV8116 solenoid valve will be failed open by opening its electrical supply breaker and the 1 CV81 10 motor operated valve will be locally manually operated using its handwheel to restore a recirculation flowpath for the Division 12 charging pump.
The charging flow control valve, 1CV121, has cables present in this zone. Postulated fire-induced faults on these cables can cause this valve to fail open. If failed open, credit is taken for manual actions to manually throttle charging flow by implementing use of the flow control valve bypass line.
The RCP seal injection line isolation valves, 1 CV8355A through D, have cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause one of these valves to spuriously close, which would isolate seal injection flow to the affected RCP.
The Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperature greater than 2350F.
Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling or loss of RCP seal injection.
The RHR Hx 1 A to charging pump suction valve, 1 CV8804A, has cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Charging pump to cold leg injection isolation valves 1S18801A and 1S18801B each have S..
cables present in this zone. The impact of spuriously opening of one of these valves 2.4-334
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 would be to create an additional flowpath for charging to the RCS. This could result in excessive charging flow. Operator response to locally manually close the affected valve by using its handwheel is credited per existing station procedures. Since an operator must travel through this fire zone, access to valves 1S18801 A and 1S18801 B may not be available until after the fire is extinguished. If necessary, charging can be stopped or delayed during this time.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal A fire in this zone will affect both division 11 and division 12 components and systems used to accomplish this function. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
The control circuits for both auxiliary feedwater pumps are potentially affected. The Division 11 pump is assumed to be unavailable, since both its power and control circuits are present in this zone. Credit is taken for operation of the Division 12 pump via the remote start switch. The AFW pump diesel engine cooling water valve, 1 SX1 73, has a cable present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the valves' control circuit has demonstrated that postulated faults on the affected cable can fail the valve open (its desired position), but cannot prevent it from opening or cause it to spuriously close.
Therefore, no action is required to reposition this valve as a result of fire damage to its control circuit. The flow control valves, 1AF005A through H, are all potentially affected.
Circuit analysis of these valves control circuits has demonstrated that faults on the cables in this zone can disable the controls at both the main control board and the remote shutdown panels, or cause all four valves to fail open. However, the spurious closure of any valve cannot occur. If necessary, these valves can be locally manually throttled using their handwheels to control AFW flow. The AFW containment isolation valves, 1AFO13A through H, are also potentially affected. The spurious closure of a single valve would not prevent safe shutdown. When time permits and manpower is available, an affected valve will be manually opened via local operation of its handwheel.
All four steam generator PORVs have control cables present in this zone. Local manual operation of one or more SG PORVs using the hydraulic hand pumps is credited for safe shutdown.
The main steam isolation valves, 1 MS001 A through 1 MS001 D, each have a Division 11 and a Division 12 actuation circuit present in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are manually operated.
In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
The main steam isolation bypass valves, 1MS101A through 1 MS101 D, each have cables from their Division 11 and Division 12 actuation circuit present in this zone.
These valves are normally closed, and it is desired to keep them closed for safe 2.4-335
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 shutdown. With the MSIV bypass valve hand position controllers in their normal position of 0%, postulated circuit faults on an actuation circuit for one of these valves are incapable of causing the spurious opening of the affected valve. No response is required.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited, and the affected steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using handwheel per existing station procedures.
Essential Support A fire in this zone affects support systems from both divisions. The essential service water pumps, component cooling water pumps, and all four containment ventilation fans can all be affected. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 11 essential service water pump and component cooling water pump via local operation of their breakers at the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 12 RCFC fans via local operation of their breakers at the 48OVac ESF switchgear bus. Two of four Division 11 SX pump cubicle cooler fans have cables in this zone, and may be unavailable. In the event of coincident fire damage to the power and/or control circuits of the cubicle cooler fans, credit is taken for auxiliary building ventilation flow to the pump room. Per an existing calculation, adequate room cooling is provided by VA flow if the cubicle coolers are not operating.
Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in these systems are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the affected system. These are discussed below.
The intermediate header crosstie valves, 1CC9473A and 1CC9473B, have control cables routed through this zone. Either the unit 1 or unit 2 intermediate crosstie valves have their power locked out during normal operation, therefore fire damage to control cables for these valves will not result in a spurious valve operation that will affect unit separation of the component cooling system.
Valves 1 CC9413A, 1CC9413B, 1CC685, 1CC9416 and ICC9438, all have control cables routed through this zone. These are all containment isolation valves for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers and/or oil coolers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F.
Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperature greater 2.4-336
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; the operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
The supply header isolation valve, 1CC9415, has a control cable routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this valve would block the discharge flowpath for the units' component cooling system. Operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
Control cables for both of the RHR heat exchanger outlet valves, 1 CC9412A and 1 CC941 2B, are routed through this zone. The spurious opening of one of these valves would result in excessive flow through the system. If a second pump did not autostart on low discharge pressure, then operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The essential service water discharge header crosstie valves, 1 SX033 and 1 SX034, have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would isolate the train A and train B essential service water supply headers. For this fire zone, components from both divisions may be operating.
If the train B AFW pump must be operated as described above for the hot standby decay heat removal function, the train B AFW pump is capable of supplying its own essential service water flow using its engine driven cooling pump. The Division 12 charging pump is credited in this zone. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem, temporarily shutdown the Division 12 charging pump, and manually open the affected valve locally with its handwheel to restore essential service water flow to both of the essential service water system supply headers.
The essential service water pump suction valves, 1 SX001 A and 1 SX001 B, have control cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of one of these valves would disable its associated pump. This valve has power locked out during normal operation and is therefore not susceptible to postulated spurious operation.
The unit 1 component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet valve, 1 SX004, has control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this normally open valve would block essential service water flow to the component cooling heat exchanger, and would result in loss of heat removal by the component cooling system. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and re-establish essential service water flow to the affected component cooling heat exchanger per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
2.4-337
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The common component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet and outlet valves, OSX1 46, OSX1 47, 1 SX005 and 2SX005 each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious operation of one of these valves would have no impact on normal plant operation, since the common component cooling heat exchanger normally is only aligned to a unit and operated during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The operating procedures for aligning the common component cooling heat exchanger to a given unit require verification of proper valve alignment prior to initiating cooldown with this heat exchanger, and are therefore adequate to deal with postulated spurious operations of these valves.
The unit 1 return header crosstie valves, 1SX010, 1SX01 1 and 1SX136, each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would have no impact. It would force return flow from some unit 1 components to one of the two main return headers, but no flow paths would be blocked.
Thus, no adverse consequences result from the spurious closure of one of these valves.
Cables for the Division 12 essential service water RCFC inlet and outlet containment isolation valves lSX016Band 1SX027B, are present in this zone. The spurious closure of one of these valves could block essential service water flow to the Division 12 RCFCs, which would disable containment cooling. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and manually open the affected valve locally with its handwheel to restore containment cooling.
Cables for the containment chiller condenser bypass valves, 1 SX1 47A and 1 SX1 47B, are located in this zone. These valves normally throttle to divert a portion of the essential service water RCFC return flow through the containment chiller condensers.
The spurious closure of one of these valves could block essential service water flow to one train of RCFCs, which would disable containment cooling if the affected train of RCFCs were operating at that time. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and if necessary, manually open the affected valve locally by bleeding air from the valve operator when time permits.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Both trains can be affected by a fire in this zone. Both RHR pumps have power cables present in this zone. Credit is taken for repairing the power cable for one of the RHR pumps per existing station procedures. Power and/or control circuits for three of the four RHR pump room cubicle cooler fans are also present. Credit is taken for repairing the circuit for the chosen RHR pump cubicle cooler fans per existing station procedures. Each train of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8701 A and 1 RH8701 B for train A and 1 RH8702A and 1 RH8702B for train B. In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for these valves, credit is taken for locally manually opening the valves in order to establish a flowpath to 2.4-338
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 one of the RHR pumps. These pairs of valves each also form a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the low pressure RHR system. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.1.
Cables for both reactor coolant wide range pressure indicators are present in this zone.
Credit is taken for repairing the circuit for one of the indicators per station repair procedures.
Several other valves in the RHR system flowpaths have cables present in this zone.
This includes 1CS009A and B, 1CV8804A, 1RH610, 1RH611, 1RH8716A and B, 1 S18804B, 1 S18809A and B, 1S18811 A and B, 1S18812A and B, and 1 S18840. Except as noted above, the spurious operation of these valves during normal operation or while the unit is in hot standby would not have any adverse consequences. The RHR operating procedure requires verification of proper valve position prior to placing an RH pump in operation. Therefore, credit is taken for manually verifying and/or repositioning affected valves via local operation with their handwheels prior to initiating cooldown with the RHR system. Additionally, Division 11 valves 1 CC9412A and 1 CC9415 and Division 12 valve 1CC9412B may need to be repositioned (if not previously addressed) to ensure adequate component cooling water flow to the RH heat exchanger. If required, credit is taken for locally manually operating these valves with their handwheels.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from both ESF divisions are present in this fire zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support Offsite power is assumed to be unavailable for this fire zone. A fire in this zone will affect components from both ESF divisions, but both divisions also remain available.
For Division 21, the emergency diesel generator, the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus and the 48OVac ESF switchgear bus all are unaffected, and remain available. Four Division 21 ESF MCCs have power cables routed through this zone, and are therefore assumed to be unavailable. Division 21 MCC 231X5 is unaffected in this zone. Power to MCC 231X3 will be isolated by opening its supply breaker at Bus 231X. This action eliminates the need to open individual MCC 231X3 breakers (the fire may prevent access to the MCC) to isolate power to motor operated valves being manually operated outside of this zone. Power and control cables for six Division 21 4160Vac loads are present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually opening the breakers and removing control power fuses from the affected cubicles for the Division 21 AFW, CC, CS, CV, SX and common CC pumps upon detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the bus.
Control cables for the Division 21 diesel generator room and ESF switchgear room ventilation system dampers are present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the damper control circuits for each affected damper has demonstrated that fire induced faults on the affected cables can prevent the dampers from modulating. However, these 2.4-339
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 postulated faults will only fail the dampers in the safe (once-through cooling) position, and therefore cannot prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment in each of these rooms. Therefore, no action is required to position the dampers as a result of fire damage to their control circuit.
For Division 22, the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus and the 48OVac ESF switchgear bus are unaffected, and remain available. Division 22 ESF MCCs 232X2 and 232X4 also are unaffected and remain available. However, the other three Division 22 ESF MCCs all have power cables routed through this zone, and are therefore assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 emergency diesel generator has control cables present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually starting and controlling the EDG from its local panel. Additionally, control cables associated with the Division 22 emergency diesel generator output breaker are present in the zone. Credit is taken for manually closing the Division 22 EDG output breaker at the Division 22 ESF switchgear bus. Power and control cables for one Division 22 416OVac load is present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually opening the breaker and removing control power fuses from the affected cubicle for the common CC pump upon detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the bus. In addition, a cable for the Division 22 SAT feed breaker is present in this zone. Postulated faults on this cable could result in its spurious closure, possibly resulting in simultaneously feeding the bus from two energized sources. Therefore, credit is taken for removing the control power fuses and manually placing the Division 22 SAT feed breaker in its desired position.
A control cable for the Division 22 diesel generator room ventilation fan is present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually operating the fan by local operation of its breaker at the 48OVac ESF switchgear bus. Control cables for the Division 22 diesel generator room, ESF switchgear room, and miscellaneous electrical equipment room ventilation system dampers are present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the damper control circuits for each affected damper has demonstrated that fire induced faults on the affected cables can prevent the dampers from modulating. However, these postulated faults will only fail the dampers in the safe (once-through cooling) position, and therefore cannot prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment in each of these rooms. Therefore, no action is required to position the dampers as a result of fire damage to their control circuit. The diesel generator cooling water valve, 2SX169B, has a cable present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the valves' control circuit has demonstrated that postulated faults on the affected cable can fail the valve open (its desired position), but cannot prevent it from opening or cause it to spuriously close. Therefore, no action is required to reposition this valve as a result of fire damage to its control circuit.
The DC power and diesel oil systems for both divisions remain available.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration) 2.4-340
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 A fire in this zone can affect both trains of charging. The Division 21 pump is assumed to be unavailable, since its power cable is present. Control cables for the Division 22 charging pump are present, but the charging pump remains available via local manual operation of its breaker at the switchgear bus. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
Both cubicle cooler fans for the Division 22 charging pump may be rendered unavailable by a fire in this zone. As long as auxiliary building ventilation system airflow to the charging pump cubicle remains available, cubicle cooling is not required. This has been demonstrated by calculation. However, the VA system supply path to the Division 22 charging pump room has a damper, OVA305Y, which fails closed on loss of instrument air. Loss of instrument air is conservatively assumed to occur for a fire in this zone. If instrument air is lost credit is taken for monitoring the charging pump cubicle temperature per station fire response procedure, and for operator recognition and diagnosis of the condition should a high temperature be observed. Credit is taken for re-establishing auxiliary building ventilation flow to the room by opening the cubicle door. Therefore, the loss of the cubicle cooler fans will not preclude safe shutdown of unit 2.
Control cables associated with charging flow indicators 2FI-0121 A (2PM05J) and 2FI 0121B (2PL06J) are present in the zone. A fire in this zone can result in the lost of both 2FI-0121A, 2FI-0121B. Fire damage in this zone cannot spuriously fail charging FCV 2CV121 closed, however verification of charging flow may not be available. A manual action to verify at least one charging pump is operating and all reactor coolant pump seal leakoff temperatures are normal is credited upon loss of charging flow indication.
If verifications are not obtained, abnormal operating procedure for loss of RCP seal cooling will be entered to proceed to safe shutdown.
Charging pump suction valves 2CV1 12B, 2CV1 12C, and 2CV1 12D have cables present in this zone. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, manual closure of 2CV1 12B or 2CV1 12C using its handwheel and remote manual opening of 2CV1 12E from the main control room is credited.
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in the charging system are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the charging system. These are discussed below.
Cables for reactor vessel head vent valves 2RC01 4A and 2RC01 4C are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the containment atmosphere. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.3.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valves, 2SI8811 A and 2Sl8811 B, both have cables in this zone. The effect of the spurious opening of one of these valves is 2.4-341
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level
\\-~-
indication and low level alarms have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 2SI8812A or 2SI8812B (depending upon which 2SI881 1A/B valve has spuriously opened) via local operation of the handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
VCT outlet isolation valves 2CV1 12B and 2CV1 12C have cables present in this zone.
The spurious closure of these valves could isolate the VCT from the charging pump suction. To mitigate this postulated event, the RWST to charging pump suction valve 2CV1 12E will be opened from the main control room.
RWST to charging pump suction valve 2CV1 12D has cables present in this zone. The spurious operation of this valve would have no effect other than to align the RWST to the charging pump suction, which is its desired position for most scenarios. If necessary, the valve will be locally manually operated using the handwheel.
The charging pump miniflow isolation valves, 2CV8110, 2CV8114 and 2CV81 16, each have cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block the minimum recirculation flowpath for the associated charging pump. The RCP seal injection flowpath passes sufficient flow (>60gpm) to prevent charging pump damage (spurious operation position, Section 2.4.1.6.4, applied). Operator response to diagnose and identify the condition is credited.
If necessary, the 2CV8116 solenoid valve will be failed open by opening its electrical supply breaker and the 2CV81 10 motor operated valve will be locally manually operated using the handwheel to restore a recirculation flowpath for the Division 22 charging pump.
The charging flow control valve, 2CV1 21, has cables present in this zone. Postulated fire-induced faults on these cables can cause this valve to fail open. If failed open, credit is taken for manual actions to manually throttle charging flow by implementing use of the flow control valve bypass line.
The RCP seal injection line isolation valves, 2CV8355A through D, have cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause one of these valves to spuriously close, which would isolate seal injection flow to the affected RCP.
The Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the seal leakoff temperature exceeds 235°F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 2350F.
Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff 2.4-342
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences a-;
of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection The RHR Hx 2A to charging pump suction valve, 2CV8804A, has cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Charging pump to cold leg injection isolation valves 2SI8801A and 2SI8801B each have cables present in this zone. The impact of spuriously opening of one of these valves would be to create an additional flowpath for charging to the RCS. This could result in excessive charging flow. Operator response to locally manually close the affected valve by using its handwheel is credited per existing station procedures. Since an operator must travel through this fire zone, access to valves 2SI8801A and 2SI8801B may not be available until after the fire is extinguished. If necessary, charging can be stopped or delayed during this time.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal A fire in this zone will affect both division 21 and division 22 components and systems used to accomplish this function. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
The control circuits for both auxiliary feedwater pumps are potentially affected. The Division 21 pump is assumed to be unavailable, since both its power and control circuits are present in this zone. Credit is taken for operation of the Division 22 pump via the remote start switch. The AFW pump diesel engine cooling water valve, 2SX173, has a cable present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the valves' control circuit has demonstrated that postulated faults on the affected cable can fail the valve open (its desired position), but cannot prevent it from opening or cause it to spuriously close.
Therefore, no action is required to reposition this valve as a result of fire damage to its control circuit. The flow control valves, 2AF005A through H, are all potentially affected.
Circuit analysis of the control circuits for these valves has demonstrated that postulated faults on the cables in this zone can disable the controls at both the main control board and the remote shutdown panels, or cause all four valves to fail open. However, the spurious closure of any valve cannot occur. If necessary, these valves can be locally manually throttled using their handwheels to control AFW flow. The AFW containment isolation valves, 2AF01 3A through H, are also potentially affected. The spurious closure of a single valve would not prevent safe shutdown. When time permits and manpower is available, an affected valve will be manually opened via local operation of its handwheel.
2.4-343
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 All four steam generator PORVs have control cables present in this zone. Local manual operation of one or more SG PORVs using the hydraulic hand pumps is credited for safe shutdown.
The main steam isolation valves, 2MS001A through 2MS001D, each have a Division 21 and a Division 22 actuation circuit present in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are manually operated.
In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
The main steam isolation bypass valves, 2MS1 01 A through 2MS1 01 D, each have cables from their Division 21 and Division 22 actuation circuit present in this zone.
These valves are normally closed, and it is desired to keep them closed for safe shutdown. With the MSIV bypass valve hand position controllers in their normal position of 0%, postulated circuit faults on an actuation circuit for one of these valves are incapable of causing the spurious opening of the affected valve. No response is required.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited, and the affected steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures.
Essential Support A fire in this zone affects support systems from both divisions. The essential service water pumps, component cooling water pumps, and all four containment ventilation fans can all be affected. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 22 essential service water pump and component cooling water pump via local operation of the breakers at the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 22 RCFC fans via local operation of the breaker at the 480Vac ESF switchgear bus. Two of four Division 22 SX pump cubicle cooler fans have cables in this zone, and may be unavailable. In the event of coincident fire damage to the power and/or control circuits of the cubicle cooler fans, credit is taken for auxiliary building ventilation flow to the pump room. Per an existing calculation, adequate room cooling is provided by VA flow if the cubicle coolers are not operating.
Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in these systems are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the affected system. These are discussed below.
The intermediate header crosstie valves, 2CC9473A and 2CC9473B, have control cables routed through this zone. Either the unit 1 or unit 2 intermediate crosstie valves 2.4-344
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 have their power locked out during normal operation, therefore fire damage to control cables for these valves will not result in a spurious valve operation that will affect unit separation of the component cooling system.
Valves 2CC9413A, 2CC9413B, 2CC685, 2CC9414, 2CC9416 and 2CC9438, all have control cables routed through this zone. These are all containment isolation valves for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers and/or oil coolers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F.
Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; the operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
The supply header isolation valve, 2CC9415, has control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this valve would block the discharge flowpath for the units' component cooling system. Operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
Control cables for both of the RHR heat exchanger outlet valves, 2CC9412A and 2CC9412B, are routed through this zone. The spurious opening of one of these valves would result in excessive flow through the system. If a second pump did not autostart on low discharge pressure, then operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The essential service water discharge header crosstie valves, 2SX033 and 2SX034, have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would isolate the train A and train B essential service water supply headers. For this fire zone, components from both divisions may be operating, although initially only Division 22 components will be used. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and manually open the affected valve locally with its handwheel to restore essential service water flow to both of the essential service water system supply headers.
2.4-345
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The essential service water pump suction valves, 2SX001 A and 2SX001 B, have control "K>J cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of one of these valves would disable its associated pump. This valve has power locked out during normal operation and is therefore not susceptible to postulated spurious operation.
The unit 2 component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet valve, 2SX004, has a control cable routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this normally open valve would block essential service water flow to the component cooling heat exchanger, and would result in loss of heat removal by the component cooling system. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and re-establish essential service water flow to the affected component cooling heat exchanger per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The common component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet and outlet valves, OSX1 46, 0SX147, 1SX005 and 2SX005 each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious operation of one of these valves would have no impact on normal plant operation, since the common component cooling heat exchanger normally is only aligned to a unit and operated during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The operating procedures for aligning the common component cooling heat exchanger to a given unit require verification of proper valve alignment prior to initiating cooldown with this heat exchanger, and are therefore adequate to deal with postulated spurious operations of these valves.
The unit 2 return header crosstie valves, 2SX01 0, 2SX01 1 and 2SX1 36, each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would have no impact. It would force return flow from some unit 2 components to one of the two main return headers, but no flow paths would be blocked.
Thus, no adverse consequences result from the spurious closure of one of these valves.
Cables for the containment chiller condenser bypass valves, 2SX1 47A and 2SX1 47B, are located in this zone. These valves normally throttle to divert a portion of the essential service water RCFC return flow through the containment chiller condensers.
The spurious closure of one of this valve could block essential service water flow to one train of RCFCs, which would disable containment cooling if the affected train of RCFCs were operating at that time. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and if necessary, manually open the affected valve locally by bleeding air from the valve operator when time permits.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. A fire in this zone can affect both trains. The train A RHR pumps' power cable is present in this zone. Both cubicle cooler fans for this pump also have circuits present in this zone.
The train B RHR pump is unaffected, however one of the cubicle cooler fans for this pump has control cables in this zone. Credit is taken for repairing the circuits for one 2.4-346
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 train of the RHR system per existing station procedures. Each train of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 2RH8701A and 2RH8701 B for train A and 2RH8702A and 2RH8702B for train B.
In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for valves 2RH8701 A and 2RH8702A, credit is taken for locally manually opening the valves in order to establish a flowpath to one of the RHR pumps.
Several other valves in the RHR system flowpaths have cables present in this zone.
This includes 2CS009A and B, 2CV8804A, 2RH610, 2RH611, 2RH8716A, 2S18809A and B, 2SI881 1A and B, 2SI8812A and B, and 2Sl8840. Except as noted above, the spurious operation of these valves during normal operation or while the unit is in hot standby would not have any adverse consequences. The RHR operating procedure requires verification of proper valve position prior to placing an RH pump in operation.
Therefore, credit is taken for manually verifying and/or repositioning affected valves via local operation with their handwheels prior to initiating cooldown with the RHR system.
Additionally, Division 21 valves 2CC9412A and 2CC9415 and Division 22 valve 2CC9412B may need to be repositioned (if not previously addressed) to ensure adequate component cooling water flow to the RH heat exchanger. If required, credit is taken for locally manually operating these valves with their handwheels.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations BYR-05 and BYR-29 identify the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment on the next elevation (fire zones 11.6A-0 and 11.6-0) by an unrated floor assembly. These evaluations justify the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
Also, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations BYR-07, BYR-08, BYR-1 8, and BYR-26 identify the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zones 11.3-2, 11.3-1, 11.5A-1, and 11.5A-2) by an unrated wall assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.110 Unit 1 Containment Refrigeration Equipment Room (Fire Zone 11.5-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
J j Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions 2.4-347
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Cables from both divisions are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The charging pumps, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
However, two essential service water valves 1 SX1 47A, and 1 SX1 47B are located in this zone, along with their cables. These are the containment chiller condenser bypass valves. These valves normally throttle to divert a portion of the essential service water RCFC return flow through the containment chiller condensers. The spurious closure of one of this valve could block essential service water flow to one train of RCFCs, which would disable containment cooling if the affected train of RCFCs were operating at that time. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and if necessary, manually open the affected valve locally by bleeding air from the valve operator when time permits.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system and support components from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations 2.4-348
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.111 Unit 2 Containment Refrigeration Equipment Room (Fire Zone 11.5-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from both divisions are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The charging pumps and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone. Power and control cables for a Division 21 charging pump cubicle cooler fan is present in the zone. Therefore the Division 22 charging pump will be credited in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW pumps and support components from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone. Cables for both Division 22 steam generator PORVs and cables for two Division 21 steam generator pressure indicators are present in this zone. Therefore, the Division 21 steam generator PORVs will be relied upon for safe shutdown. Primary side instrumentation is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and redundant secondary side instrumentation remains available for all four steam generators.
2.4-349
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 In the event of the spurious opening of one of the Division 22 steam generator PORVs, h---'
operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited, and the affected steam generator PORV will be locally manually closed by opening the breaker at its MCC cubicle.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
However, two essential service water valves 2SX1 47A, and 2SX1 47B are located in this zone, along with their cables. These are the containment chiller condenser bypass valves. These valves normally throttle to divert a portion of the essential service water RCFC return flow through the containment chiller condensers. The spurious closure of one of this valve could block essential service water flow to one train of RCFCs, which would disable containment cooling if the affected train of RCFCs were operating at that time. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and if necessary, manually open the affected valve locally by bleeding air from the valve operator when time permits.
I Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system and support components from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.112 Radiological Equipment Calibration Room (Fire Zone 11.5A-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this fire zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from both divisions are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support 2.4-350
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The charging pumps, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW pumps and support components, and associated primary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone. Two Division 11 steam generator pressure indicators have cables routed through this zone.
However, redundant indication remains available.
All four steam generator PORVs have cables routed through this zone. Therefore, one or more steam generator PORVs will be manually operated via local operation with the hydraulic hand pumps per an existing station procedure.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, manual action will be credited to open the breakers for the affected steam generator PORV.
These valves fail closed on loss of electrical power.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4-351
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 2.4.2.113 Division 11 Containment Electrical Penetration Area, El. 414' (Fire Zone 11.5A-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is not directly affected by a fire in this zone. Train B will be credited in this zone.
The "A7 supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system have control cables routed through this zone, and are assumed to be unavailable. The remaining three sets of supply and exhaust fans are unaffected, and are credited for safe shutdown. Cables for damper 0VA474Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause this damper to fail closed. Closure of this damper would result in blockage of one of two flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. A second flowpath is unaffected by a fire in this zone, therefore, the VA system supply flow to this aux building general area is adequate to support safe shutdown of both units.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Most of the cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 11. In general, Division 12 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown. However, Division 11 systems and components may be credited when they are shown to remain available.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The Division 12 ESF bus and its support systems are unaffected, and will be credited for safe shutdown. A control cable for the Division 11 diesel generator room ventilation system and a control cable for the Division 11 ESF switchgear room ventilation system are present in this zone. Fire damage to these cables will cause the modulating supply damper to fail open, and the return damper to fail closed. This will result in full airflow through both the diesel generator room and the ESF switchgear room, with no recirculation. This mode of operation will not prevent operation of the affected components. Additionally, power and control cables for Division 11 essential service water pump 1 A are present in this zone. This non-credited component could adversely affect the operation of the Division 11 bus. Credit is taken for manually opening its breaker and removing the control power fuse upon detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the Division 11 bus. With this action, the Division 11 ESF bus is assumed to remain available, in addition to the credited Division 12 bus.
Division 11 MCCs 131X2 and 131X4 are located in the zone and are not available and not credited.
2.4-352
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Although these valves are Division 11 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 12 components. These are discussed below.
Cables for Division 11 pressurizer PORV 1 RY455A and block valve 1 RY8000A are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the PRT. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.2.
Cables for reactor vessel head vent valves 1 RC01 4A and 1 RC01 4C are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the containment atmosphere. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.3.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valve, 1S18811 A, has cables in this zone.
The effect of the spurious opening of this valve is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication, RSWT level alarms, and containment recirc sump level indication have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by closing valve 1S18812A to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
The RHR Hx 1 A to charging pump suction valve, 1 CV8804A, has cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 AFW and main steam system components and 2.4-353
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
The Division 11 steam generator PORVs, 1 MS01 8A and D, have cables routed through this zone. Credit is taken for the Division 12 steam generator PORVs. In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited. An affected Division 11 steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures.
Essential Support Division 11 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 12 component cooling water pump, and the Division 12 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Although these valves are Division 11 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 12 components. These are discussed below.
Valves 1CC9416 and 1CC9438, each have control cables routed through this zone.
These are each containment isolation valves for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers and/or oil coolers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F. Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperature greater than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; The operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train A is assumed to be unavailable. Train B of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8702A and 1 RH8702B.
Valve 1 RH8702A has cables present in this zone. In the event of fire damage to the 2.4-354
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 control circuit for this valve, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve using its handwheel in order to establish a flowpath to the train B RHR pump.
Cables for both reactor coolant wide range pressure indicators are present in this zone.
Credit is taken for repairing the circuit for the Division 12 indicator per station repair procedures.
Cables for both RHR heat exchanger outlet temperature indicators are present in this zone. Credit is taken for repairing the circuit for the Division 12 indicator per station repair procedures.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-1 2 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment on the next elevation (fire zone 11.6
- 1) by an unrated floor assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
Also, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-18 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zone 11.5-0) by an unrated wall assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so~that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.114 Division 21 Containment Electrical Penetration Area, El. 414' (Fire Zone 11.5A-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The OC" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system have control cables routed through this zone, and are assumed to be unavailable. The remaining three sets of supply and exhaust fans are unaffected, and are credited for safe shutdown. Cables for damper 0VA476Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause this damper to fail closed. Closure of this damper would result in blockage of one of two flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. A second 2.4-355
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 flowpath is unaffected by a fire in this zone, therefore, the VA system supply flow to this aux building general area is adequate to support safe shutdown of both units.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Most of the cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 21. In general, Division 22 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown. However, Division 21 systems and components may be credited when they are shown to remain available.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The Division 21 and 22 ESF buses and their support systems are unaffected, and will be credited for safe shutdown. Control cables for the Division 21 diesel generator room ventilation system (VD) and Division 21 ESF switchgear room ventilation system (VX) dampers are present in the zone. Fire damage to these cables will only cause the modulating supply damper to fail open and the return damper to fail closed, both positions will not prevent the safe shutdown function of the systems from being accomplished. Division 21 MCCs 231 X2 and 231 X4 are located in the zone and are not available and not credited.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Although these valves are Division 21 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 22 components. These are discussed below.
Cables for Division 21 pressurizer PORV 2RY455A and block valve 2RY8000A are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the PRT. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.2.
Cables for reactor vessel head vent valves 2RC01 4A and 2RC01 4C are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the containment atmosphere. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.3.
2.4-356
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valve, 2SI8811 A, has cables in this zone.
The effect of the spurious opening of this valve is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication, RSWT level alarms, and containment recirc sump level indication have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by closing valve 2SI8812A to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
The RHR Hx 2A to charging pump suction valve, 2CV8804A, has cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
All four steam generator PORVs, 2MS018A through D, have cables routed through this zone. Credit is taken for local manual operation of either 2MS018B or 2MS018C using the hydraulic hand pump per existing station procedures to accomplish decay heat removal via steam release to the atmosphere. In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited. An affected Division 21 steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures.
Essential Support Power cables for the Division 22 component cooling water and essential service water pumps are present in the zone and their associated pumps are unavailable. The Division 21 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 21 component cooling water pump, and the Division 22 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
2.4-357
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. These are discussed below.
Valves 2CC9416 and 2CC9438, each have control cables routed through this zone.
These are each containment isolation valves for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers and/or oil coolers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F. Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; the operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event.
Therefore, no adverse consequences result. Credit is taken for operator diagnosis of the problem, and for locally manually re-opening the valve using its handwheel when time permits.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The train B RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train B of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 2RH8702A and 2RH8702B. Valve 2RH8702A has cables present in this zone. In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for this valve, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve using its handwheel in order to establish a flowpath to the train B RHR pump.
Cables for both reactor coolant wide range pressure indicators are present in this zone.
Credit is taken for repairing the circuit for the Division 22 indicator per station repair procedures.
Cables for both RHR heat exchanger outlet temperature indicators are present in this zone. Credit is taken for repairing the circuit for the Division 22 indicator per station repair procedures.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-22 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment on the next elevation (fire zone 11.6
- 2) by an unrated floor assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4-358
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Also, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations BYR-03 and BYR-26 identify the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent areas (fire zone 11.3-2 and 11.5-0, respectively) by an unrated wall assembly. These evaluations justify the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.115 Division 12 Cable Riser Area (Fire Zone 11.5B-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Both the control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Most of the cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 12. In general, Division 11 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown. However, Division 12 systems and components may be credited when they are shown to remain available.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The Division 11 and 12 ESF buses and their support systems are unaffected, and will be credited for safe shutdown.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 12 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 charging pump, sufficient instrumentation, and support components are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Charging pump suction valves 1 CV1 12C and 1 CV1 12E have cables present in this zone. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, remote manual closure of 1CV1 12B, and remote manual opening of 1 CV1 12D from the main control room is credited (these circuits are unaffected).
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
2.4-359
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Although these valves are Division 12 valves, they could potentially impact the "operation of Division 11 components. These are discussed below.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valve, 1 S1881 1 B, has cables in this zone.
The effect of the spurious opening of this valve is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication, RSWT level alarms, and containment recirc sump level indication have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 1S18812B via local operation of its handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
VCT outlet isolation valve 1 CV1i12C has cables present in this zone. The spurious operation of this valve could isolate the VCT from the charging pump suction. To mitigate this postulated event, the RWST to charging pump suction valve 1 CV1i12D will be opened from the main control room.
RWST to charging pump suction valve 1 CV1i12E has cables present in this zone. The spurious opening of this valve would have no effect other than to align the RWST to the charging pump suction, which is its desired position for most scenarios. If necessary, this valve will be locally manually operated using its handwheel.
Charging pump 1 A mini-flow isolation valve, 1 CV8 111, has cables present in this zone.
The spurious closure of this valve would block the minimum recirculation flowpath for charging pump 1 A. The RCP seal injection flowpath, which is unaffected, passes sufficient flow (>60gpm) to prevent charging pump damage. Operator response to diagnose and identify the condition is credited. If necessary, the valve will be locally manually opened using its handwheel.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 12 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 AFW and main steam system components are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function. Division 11 instrumentation associated with RCS loop A and the Fire Hazards panel are present in the zone. Instrumentation on the other three loops are not affected and are credited in the main control room.
Essential Support Division 12 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 11 component cooling 2.4-360
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 water pump, and the Division 11 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
One valve related to these functions is subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Although this valve is a Division 12 valve, it could potentially impact the operation of Division 11 components. It is discussed below.
Valve 1 CC685 has control cables routed through this zone. It is a containment isolation valve for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of this valve would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F. Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 235°F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; the operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train B is assumed to be unavailable. Train A of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8701 A and 1 RH8701 B.
Valve 1 RH8701 B has cables present in this zone. In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for this valve, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve using its handwheel in order to establish a flowpath to the train A RHR pump.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-06 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment on the next elevation (fire zone 11.3
- 1) by an unrated floor assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.116 Division 22 Cable Riser Area (Fire Zone 11.5B-2) 2.4-361
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Both the control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Most of the cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 22. In general, Division 21 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown. However, Division 22 systems and components may be credited when they are shown to remain available.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The Division 21 and 22 ESF buses and their support systems are unaffected, and will "K-.-
be credited for safe shutdown. Power and control cables for the Division 22 feed to the containment spray pump are present in this zone. Therefore, credit is taken for manually opening the breaker and removing control power fuses per station procedure upon detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the Division 22 4 Kv bus.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 22 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Charging pump suction valves 2CV1 12C and 2CV1 12E have cables present in this zone. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, remote manual closure of 2CV1 12B, and remote manual opening of 2CV1 12D from the main control room is credited (these circuits are unaffected).
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
2.4-362
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Although these valves are Division 22 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 21 components. These are discussed below.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valve, 2SI881 1 B, has cables in this zone.
The effect of the spurious opening of this valve is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor building. RWST level indication, RSWT level alarms, and containment recirc sump level indication have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 2SI881 2B via local operation of its handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
VCT outlet isolation valve 2CV1 12C has a cable present in this zone. The spurious operation of this valve could isolate the VCT from the charging pump suction. To mitigate this postulated event, the RWST to charging pump suction valves 2CV1 12D will be opened from the main control room.
RWST to charging pump suction valve 2CV1 12E has cables present in this zone. The spurious opening of this valve would have no effect other than to align the RWST to the charging pump suction, which is its desired position for most scenarios. If necessary, this valve will be locally manually operated using its handwheel.
Charging pump 2A mini-flow isolation valve, 2CV81 11, has a cable present in this zone.
The spurious closure of this valve would block the minimum recirculation flowpath for charging pump 2A. The RCP seal injection flowpath, which is unaffected, passes sufficient flow (>60gpm) to prevent charging pump damage. Operator response to diagnose and identify the condition is credited. If necessary, the valve will be locally manually opened using its handwheel.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 22 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
Essential Support Division 22 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 21 component cooling water pump, and the Division 21 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
2.4-363
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 One valve related to these functions is subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Although this valve is a Division 22 valve, it could potentially impact the operation of Division 21 components. It is discussed below.
Valve 2CC685 has a control cable routed through this zone. It is a containment isolation valve for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of this valve would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers and/or oil coolers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F. Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; The operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train B is assumed to be unavailable. Train A of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 2RH8701A and 2RH8701B.
Valve 2RH8701 B has cables present in this zone. In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for this valve, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve using its handwheel in order to establish a flowpath to the train A RHR pump.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone, since the walls, floor and ceiling have a 3-hour fire rating as described in section 2.3.11.48 of the fire hazards analysis.
2.4.2.117 Auxiliary Building General Area, El. 426' (Fire Zone 11.6-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems 2.4-364
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Cables for fans and dampers in both trains of the control room ventilation system are
- j present in this zone. Because both trains of the VC system can be rendered unavailable, all room cooling for the main control room and for both the unit 1 and unit 2 auxiliary electrical equipment rooms (AEERs) can be disabled. Loss of cooling to the AEERs could eventually affect main control room instrumentation, since much of the circuitry for the main control room instrumentation and alarms is dependent on cabinets and equipment in the AEERs. Loss of cooling to the main control room could affect the habitability environment for the control room operator. In the event of the total loss of the VC system, portable fans will be staged and flow paths established to ventilate the AEERs and main control room from the Turbine Building. Station evaluations (reference EC#333738 and Calculation #BRW-97-0339-M/BYR97-210), assuming Turbine Building ambient temperatures associated with peak summer temperatures, have demonstrated that temporary ventilation can maintain the AEER and main control room temperatures within conditions to assure the control room remains habitable and control room instrumentation would not be adversely affected. Additionally, safe shutdown instrumentation at the unit 1 and unit 2 fire hazards panels would not be affected by the loss of the VC system.
The "A" and "C" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system have control cables routed through this zone. The remaining two sets of supply and exhaust fans are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
Cables for dampers 0VA474Y, 0VA475Y, OVA476Y and 0VA477Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause these dampers to fail closed. Closure of these dampers would result in blockage of both flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. The effect of this could be that both units AFW system "A" train pumps may not receive adequate room cooling. However, since Division 11 and 21 power is not available anyway, there is no impact due to this effect. The train "B" AFW components remain available, and will be credited for safe shutdown for both units.
Fire dampers OVA490Y, 0VA492Y, 0VA495Y, 0VA496Y, and 0VA497Y are present in walls separating this zone from the Division 12 and 22 electrical penetration areas. In addition, flow control damper OVA430Y is present in this zone. A fire in this zone could cause the fire dampers to close and block auxiliary building ventilation to the electrical penetration areas. The postulated closure of these flowpaths have no impact upon VA system operation. Safe shutdown equipment located in the electrical penetration area include Division 12 and 22 motor control centers and the Fire Hazard panel with associated instrumentation. Credit is taken for the operator to monitor area temperatures and open doors to the Division 11/21 electrical penetration area and fuel handling building to restore cooling, if the normal VA supply ducts are isolated.
Control cables for both essential service cooling water tower makeup pumps OSX02PA and OSX02PB are present in the zone. Locally starting and operating one of the makeup pumps at the river screen house will be credited. Makeup to the tower is not 2.4-365
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 immediately required, only after system and evaporation losses result in low tower basin u-water levels. Adequate time is available to access the river screen house.
Control cables associated with all four essential service water cooling tower hotwater bypass valves are present in the zone. Local manual action will be credited to manually operate the bypass valves using their handwheels. Re-positioning these valves may be necessary to adjust to extreme changes in ambient temperatures at the ESW cooling towers. At the time of the fire, the cooling tower valves will be set up for ambient conditions and several hours would pass before any manipulation would be required if ambient temperatures drastically changed.
The ESW cooling tower hot water bypass valves are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control cables present in the zone. Spurious operation of these valves could, over time, affect the desired ESW tower operating performance. Proper ESW cooling tower operation will be restored by remote manual operation of the hot water bypass valves (if necessary, manually using its handwheel).
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from both ESF divisions are present in this fire zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support Offsite power is assumed to be unavailable for this fire zone. A fire in this zone will affect components from both ESF divisions. Division 11 ESF power sources will be unavailable due to the loss of critical support functions.
For Division 12, the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus and the 480Vac ESF switchgear bus are unaffected, and remain available. Division 12 ESF MCC 132X5 is located in this fire zone, and is therefore assumed to be unavailable. MCC 132X3 and all components powered from MCC 132X3 will also be assumed to be unavailable because it is fed from the same 480Vac breaker as MCC 132X5. However, the other three Division 12 ESF MCCs all are unaffected and remain available. Power to MCCs 132X3, 132X5 will be isolated by opening its supply breaker at Bus 132X. This action eliminates the need to open individual MCC 132X5 breakers (the fire may prevent access to the MCC) to isolate power to motor operated valves being manually operated outside of this zone.
The Division 12 emergency diesel generator has control cables present in this zone.
Credit is taken for manually starting and controlling the EDG from its local panel.
Additionally, control cables associated with the Division 12 emergency diesel generator output breaker are present in the zone. Credit is taken for manually closing the Division 12 EDG output breaker at the Division 12 ESF switchgear bus. In addition, a cable for the Division 12 SAT feed breaker is present in this zone. Postulated faults on this cable could result in its spurious closure, possibly resulting in simultaneously feeding the bus from two energized sources. Therefore, credit is taken for removing the control power fuses and manually placing the Division 12 SAT feed breaker in its desired position.
2.4-366
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Control cables for the Division 12 diesel generator room and miscellaneous electrical equipment room ventilation system dampers are present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the damper control circuits for each affected damper has demonstrated that fire induced faults on the affected cables can prevent the dampers from modulating.
However, these postulated faults will only fail the dampers in the safe (once-through cooling) position, and therefore cannot prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment in each of these rooms. Therefore, no action is required to position the dampers as a result of fire damage to their control circuit. The diesel generator cooling water valve, 1 SX1 69B, has a cable present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the valves' control circuit has demonstrated that postulated faults on the affected cable can fail the valve open (its desired position), but cannot prevent it from opening or cause it to spuriously close. Therefore, no action is required to reposition this valve as a result of fire damage to its control circuit.
The DC power and diesel oil systems for Division 12 remain available.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 11 IP buses 1 IP01J and 1 IP03J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 11 power means that Division 11 battery 1 DC01 E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. Control cables for the Division 12 charging pump are present, but the charging pump remains available via local manual operation of its breaker at the switchgear bus. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
Control cables associated with charging flow indicators 1 FI-01 21 A (1 PM05J) and 1 Fl 0121 B (1 PLOJ) are present in the zone. A fire in this zone can result in the lost of both 1FI-0121A, 1 FI-0121B. Fire damage in this zone cannot spuriously fail charging FCV 1 CV1 21 closed, however verification of charging flow may not be available. A manual action to verify at least one charging pump is operating and all reactor coolant pump seal leakoff temperatures are normal is credited upon loss of charging flow indication.
If verifications are not obtained, abnormal operating procedure for loss of RCP seal cooling will be entered to proceed to safe shutdown.
Charging pump suction valves 1CV112B, 1CV112C, 1CV112D and 1CV112E have cables present in this zone. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, manual closure of either 1 CV1 12B or 1 CV1 12C, and manual opening of either 1 CV1 12D or 1 CV1 12E is credited (if necessary, via local operation of the handwheel).
2.4-367
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in the charging system are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the charging system. These are discussed below.
Cables for reactor vessel head vent valves 1 RC01 4A and 1 RC01 4C, and 1 RC01 4B and 1RC014D are present in this zone. These pairs of valves each form a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the containment atmosphere. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.3.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valves, 1S18811 A and 1S18811 B, both have cables in this zone. The effect of the spurious opening of one of these valves is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication and low level alarms have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 1 S18812A or 1S18812B (depending upon which 1S1881 1A/B valve has spuriously opened) via local operation of the handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
VCT outlet isolation valves 1CV1 12B and 1CV1 12C have cables present in this zone.
The spurious closure of these valves could isolate the VCT from the charging pump suction. To mitigate this postulated event, the operating charging pump will be stopped and one of the two RWST to charging pump suction valves 1CV1 12D or 1CV1 12E will be opened from the main control room, immediately upon determination of a design basis fire. If this cannot be accomplished from the main control room because of fire damage to their control cables, the operating charging pump will be stopped at its switchgear and either valve 1 CV1i12D or 1 CV1i12E manually opened using its handwheel. The charging pump will be re-started after its suction flowpath is aligned to the RWST and control power fuses removed from valves 1 CV1i12D and/or 1 CV1 12E.
RWST to charging pump suction valves 1 CV1i12D and 1 CV1i12E have cables present in this zone. The spurious operation of one of these valves would have no effect other than to align the RWST to the charging pump suction, which is its desired position for most scenarios. If necessary, the valves will be locally manually operated using the handwheel.
The charging pump 1 B mini-flow isolation valves, 1CV81 10 and 1 CV8116, each have cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block the minimum recirculation flowpath for its charging pump. However, the RCP seal injection flowpath, which remains available, passes sufficient flow (>60gpm) to prevent 2.4-368
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 charging pump damage (spurious operation position, Section 2.4.1.6.4, applied).
Operator response to diagnose and identify the condition is credited. If necessary, the 1 CV81 16 solenoid valve will be failed open by opening its electrical supply breaker and the 1 CV81 10 motor operated valve will be locally manually operated using the handwheel to restore a recirculation flowpath for the Division 12 charging pump.
The charging flow control valve, lCV1 21, has cables present in this zone. Postulated fire-induced faults on these cables can cause this valve to fail open. If failed open, credit is taken for manual actions to manually throttle charging flow by implementing use of the flow control valve bypass line.
The RCP seal injection line isolation valves, 1 CV8355A through D, have cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause one of these valves to spuriously close, which would isolate seal injection flow to the affected RCP.
The Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperature greater than 235°F after the pumps are tripped. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling or loss of RCP seal injection..
The RHR Hx 1 A to charging pump suction valve, 1 CV8804A, has cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Charging pump to cold leg injection isolation valves 1S18801 A and 1SI8801 B each have cables present in this zone. The impact of spuriously opening of one of these valves would be to create an additional flowpath for charging to the RCS. This could result in excessive charging flow. Operator response to locally manually close the affected valve by using the handwheel is credited per existing station procedures.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
The control circuits for the Division 12 auxiliary feedwater pump and its lube oil pumps are present in this zone. Credit is taken for operation of the Division 12 pump via the remote start switch. The flow control valves, 1AF005A through H, are all potentially affected. If necessary, the Division 12 valves can be locally manually throttled using their handwheels to control AFW flow. The AFW containment isolation valves, 2.4-369
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 1AF013A through H, are also potentially affected. The spurious closure of a single valve would not prevent safe shutdown. When time permits and manpower is available, an affected valve will be manually opened via local operation of its handwheel.
All four steam generator PORVs have control cables present in this zone. Local manual operation of one or more SG PORVs using the hydraulic hand pumps is credited for safe shutdown.
The main steam isolation valves, 1 MS001 A through 1 MS001 D, each have a Division 11 and a Division 12 actuation circuit present in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are manually operated.
In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
The main steam isolation bypass valves, 1 MS1 01 A through 1 MS1 01 D, each have cables from their Division 11 and Division 12 actuation circuit present in this zone.
These valves are normally closed, and it is desired to keep them closed for safe shutdown. With the MSIV bypass valve hand position controllers in their normal position of 0%, postulated circuit faults on an actuation circuit for one of these valves are incapable of causing the spurious opening of the affected valve. No response is required.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited. An affected Division 11 steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures. An affected Division 12 steam generator PORV will be locally manually closed by opening the breaker at its MCC cubicle.
Essential Support Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 essential service water pump, component cooling water pump, and containment ventilation fans can each be affected. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 12 essential service water pump and component cooling water pump via local operation of the breakers at the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 12 RCFC fans via local operation of the breaker at the 480Vac ESF switchgear bus.
The unit 1 component cooling water system surge tank is located in this zone. This mechanical component, along with piping, is not susceptible to fire damage.
Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in these systems are such that the spurious 2.4-370
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the affected system. These are
"\\_> discussed below.
The intermediate header crosstie valve, 1CC9473B, has a control cable routed through this zone. Either the unit 1 or unit 2 intermediate crosstie valves have their power locked out during normal operation, therefore fire damage to control cables for this valve will not result in a spurious valve operation that will affect unit separation of the component cooling system.
Valves 1CC9413A, 1CC9413B, 1CC685, 1CC9414, 1CC9416 and 1CC9438, all have control cables routed through this zone. These are all containment isolation valves for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers and/or oil coolers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F.
Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperature greater than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; the operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
Control cables for both of the RHR heat exchanger outlet valves, 1CC9412A and 1CC9412B, are routed through this zone. The spurious opening of one of these valves would result in excessive flow through the system. If a second pump did not autostart on low discharge pressure, then operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The essential service water discharge header crosstie valves, 1 SX033 and 1 SX034, have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would isolate the train A and train B essential service water supply headers. For this fire zone, components from Division 12 only are expected to be operating. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and manually open the affected valve locally with its handwheel to restore essential service water flow to both of the essential service water system supply headers.
The essential service water pump suction valve, 1 SX001 B, has control cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of this valve would disable its associated pump.
This valve has power locked out during normal operation and is therefore not susceptible to postulated spurious operation.
2.4-371
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The unit 1 component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet valve, 1 SX004, has a control cable routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this normally open valve would block essential service water flow to the component cooling heat exchanger, and would result in loss of heat removal by the component cooling system. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and re-establish essential service water flow to the affected component cooling heat exchanger per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The common component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet and outlet valves, OSX1 46, OSX1 47, 1 SX005 and 2SX005 each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious operation of one of these valves would have no impact on normal plant operation, since the common component cooling heat exchanger normally is only aligned to a unit and operated during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The operating procedures for aligning the common component cooling heat exchanger to a given unit require verification of proper valve alignment prior to initiating cooldown with this heat exchanger, and are therefore adequate to deal with postulated spurious operations of these valves.
The unit 1 return header crosstie valves, 1 SX01 0, 1 SX01 1 and 1 SX1 36, each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would have no impact. It would force return flow from some unit 1 components to one of the two main return headers, but no flow paths would be blocked.
Thus, no adverse consequences result from the spurious closure of one of these "valves.
Cables for the Division 12 containment chiller condenser bypass valve, 1 SX1 47B, are located in this zone. This valve normally throttles to divert a portion of the essential service water RCFC return flow through the containment chiller condensers. The spurious closure of this valve could block essential service water flow to one train of RCFCs, which would disable containment cooling if the affected train of RCFCs were operating at that time. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and if necessary, manually open the affected valve locally by bleeding air from the valve operator when time permits.
Cables for the Division 12 essential service water RCFC inlet and outlet containment isolation valves 1 SXO1 6B and 1 SXO27B, are present in this zone. The spurious closure of one of these valves could block essential service water flow to the Division 12 RCFCs, which would disable containment cooling. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and manually open the affected valve locally with its handwheel to restore containment cooling.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Both trains can be affected by a fire in this zone. The Train "A" RHR pumps' power cable is 2.4-372
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 present in this zone. Credit is taken for operation of the "B" RHR pump, which is not affected. Each train of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8702A and 1 RH8702B for train B. In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for these valves, credit is taken for locally manually opening the valves using their handwheels in order to establish a flowpath to the RHR pump. Cables for RHR Train A pump suction valves 1 RH8701 A and 1 RH8701 B, and RHR Train B pump suction valves 1 RH8702A and 1 RH8702B are present in this zone. These pairs of valves each form a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the low pressure RHR system. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.1.
Several other valves in the RHR system flowpaths have cables present in this zone.
This includes valves 1CS009B, 1RH611, 1RH8716B, 1 S18804B, 1 S18809B, 1 SI1881B and 1 S18812B in the Train B flowpath. Except as noted above, the spurious operation of these valves during normal operation or while the unit is in hot standby would not have any adverse consequences. The RHR operating procedure requires verification of proper valve position prior to placing an RH pump in operation. Therefore, credit is taken for manually verifying and/or repositioning affected valves via local operation with their handwheels prior to initiating cooldown with the RHR system. Additionally, Division 11 valve 1CC9412A and Division 12 valve 1CC9412B may need to be repositioned (if not previously addressed) to ensure adequate component cooling water flow to the Train B RH heat exchanger. If required, credit is taken for locally manually operating these valves with their handwheels.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from both ESF divisions are present in this fire zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Suppor Offsite power is assumed to be unavailable for this fire zone. A fire in this zone will affect components from both ESF divisions. Division 21 ESF power sources will be unavailable due to the loss of critical support functions.
For Division 22, the 4160Vac ESF switchgear bus and the 480Vac ESF switchgear bus are unaffected, and remain available. Division 22 ESF MCC 232X5 is located in this fire zone, and is therefore assumed to be unavailable.
However, the other four Division 22 ESF MCCs all are unaffected and remain available. Power to MCC 232X5 will be isolated by opening its supply breaker at Bus 232X. This action eliminates the need to open individual MCC 232X5 breakers (the fire may prevent access to the MCC) to isolate power to motor operated valves being manually operated outside of this zone.
The Division 22 emergency diesel generator has control cables present in this zone.
Credit is taken for manually starting and controlling the EDG from its local panel.
Additionally, control cables associated with the Division 22 emergency diesel generator output breaker are present in the zone. Credit is taken for manually closing the Division 22 EDG output breaker at the Division 22 ESF switchgear bus. In addition, a cable for 2.4-373
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 the Division 22 SAT feed breaker is present in this zone. Postulated faults on this cable could result in its spurious closure, possibly resulting in simultaneously feeding the bus from two energized sources. Therefore, credit is taken for removing the control power fuses and manually placing the Division 22 SAT feed breaker in its desired position.
A control cable for the Division 22 diesel generator room ventilation fan is present in this zone. Credit is taken for manually operating the fan by local operation of its breaker at the 48OVac ESF switchgear bus. Control cables for the Division 22 diesel generator room and miscellaneous electrical equipment room ventilation system dampers are present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the damper control circuits for each affected damper has demonstrated that fire induced faults on the affected cables can prevent the dampers from modulating. However, these postulated faults will only fail the dampers in the safe (once-through cooling) position, and therefore cannot prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment in each of these rooms. Therefore, no action is required to position the dampers as a result of fire damage to their control circuit. The diesel generator cooling water valve, 2SX169B, has a cable present in this zone. Circuit analysis of the valves' control circuit has demonstrated that postulated faults on the affected cable can fail the valve open (its desired position), but cannot prevent it from opening or cause it to spuriously close. Therefore, no action is required to reposition this valve as a result of fire damage to its control circuit.
The DC power and diesel oil systems for Division 22 remain available.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 21 IP buses 21PO1J and 21P03J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 21 power means that Division 21 battery 2DC01 E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
The Division 21 power feed to the unit 2 Fire Hazards panel is present in this zone. The redundant Division 22 power feed is unaffected in this zone and is credited for safe shutdown.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. A control cable for the Division 22 charging pump is present, but the charging pump remains available via local manual operation of its breaker at the switchgear bus. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
Control cables associated with charging flow indicators 2FI-0121A (2PM05J) and 2FI 0121B (2PL06J) are present in the zone. A fire in this zone can result in the lost of both 2FI-0121A, 2FI-0121B. Fire damage in this zone cannot spuriously fail charging FCV 2CV1 21 closed, however verification of charging flow may not be available. A manual action to verify at least one charging pump is operating and all reactor coolant pump 2.4-374
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 seal leakoff temperatures are normal is credited upon loss of charging flow indication.
If verifications are not obtained, abnormal operating procedure for loss of RCP seal cooling will be entered to proceed to safe shutdown.
Charging pump suction valves 2CV1 12B, 2CV1 12C and 2CV1 12D have cables present in this zone. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, manual closure of either 2CV1 12B or 2CV1 12C, and remote manual opening of 2CV1 12E from the main control room is credited.
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in the charging system are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the charging system. These are discussed below.
Cables for reactor vessel head vent valves 2RC014A and 2RC014C are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the containment atmosphere. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.3.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valves, 2SI8811 A and 2SI8811 B, both have cables in this zone. The effect of the spurious opening of one of these valves is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication and low level alarms have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 2SI8812A or 2SI8812B (depending upon which 2SI8811 A/B valve has spuriously opened) via local operation of the handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
VCT outlet isolation valves 2CV1 12B and 2CV1 12C have cables present in this zone.
The spurious operation of these valves could isolate the VCT from the charging pump suction. To mitigate this postulated event, the RWST to charging pump suction valves CV 12E will be opened from the main control room.
RWST to charging pump suction valve 2CV1 12D has cables present in this zone. The spurious operation of this valve would have no effect other than to align the RWST to the charging pump suction, which is its desired position for most scenarios. If necessary, the valve will be locally manually operated using the handwheel.
The charging pump 2B mini-flow isolation valves, 2CV81 10 and 2CV8116, each have cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block the minimum recirculation flowpath for the associated charging pump. However, the 2.4-375
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 RCP seal injection flowpath, which remains available, passes sufficient flow (>60gpm)
.to prevent charging pump damage (spurious operation position, Section 2.4.1.6.4, applied). Operator response to diagnose and identify the condition is credited. If necessary, the 2CV8116 solenoid valve will be failed open by opening its electrical supply breaker and the 2CV81 10 motor operated valve will be locally manually operated using the handwheel to restore a recirculation flowpath for the Division 22 charging pump.
The charging flow control valve, 2CV121, has cables present in this zone. Postulated fire-induced faults on these cables can cause this valve to fail open. If failed open, credit is taken for manual actions to manually throttle charging flow by implementing use of the flow control valve bypass line.
The RCP seal injection line isolation valves, 2CV8355A through D, have cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause one of these valves to spuriously close, which would isolate seal injection flow to the affected RCP.
The Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the seal leakoff temperature exceeds 235°F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 2350F.
Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection.
The RHR Hx 2A to charging pump suction valve, 2CV8804A, has cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Charging pump to cold leg injection isolation valves 2S18801 A and 2S18801 B each have cables present in this zone. The impact of spuriously opening of one of these valves would be to create an additional flowpath for charging to the RCS. This could result in excessive charging flow. Operator response to locally manually close the affected valve by using the handwheel is credited per existing station procedures.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. Instrumentation in the main control room remains available. In addition, instrumentation at the fire hazard panel is also available.
The control circuits for the Division 22 auxiliary feedwater pump and its lube oil pumps are present in this zone. Credit is taken for operation of the Division 22 pump via the remote start switch. The flow control valves, 2AF005A through H, are all potentially 2.4-376 I-
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 affected. If necessary, the Division 22 valves can be locally manually throttled using their handwheels to control AFW flow. The AFW containment isolation valves, 2AF013A through H, are also potentially affected. The spurious closure of a single valve would not prevent safe shutdown. When time permits and manpower is available, an affected valve will be manually opened via local operation of its handwheel.
All four steam generator PORVs have control cables present in this zone. Local manual operation of one or more SG PORVs using the hydraulic hand pumps is credited for safe shutdown.
The main steam isolation valves, 2MS001 A through 2MS001 D, each have a Division 21 and a Division 22 actuation circuit present in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are manually {or remotely as the case may be) operated. In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
The main steam isolation bypass valves, 2MS101A through 2MS101 D, each have cables from their Division 21 and Division 22 actuation circuit present in this zone.
These valves are normally closed, and it is desired to keep them closed for safe shutdown. With the MSIV bypass valve hand position controllers in their normal position of 0%, postulated circuit faults on an actuation circuit for one of these valves are incapable of causing the spurious opening of the affected valve. No response is required.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited. An affected Division 21 steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures. An affected Division 22 steam generator PORV will be locally manually closed by opening the breaker at its MCC cubicle.
Essential Support Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 essential service water pump, component cooling water pump, and containment ventilation fans have control cables present in this fire zone. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 22 essential service water pump and component cooling water pump via local operation of the breakers at the 416OVac ESF switchgear bus. Credit is taken for manual operation of the Division 22 RCFC fans via local operation of the breaker at the 48OVac ESF switchgear bus.
The unit 2 component cooling water system surge tank is located in this zone. This mechanical component, along with piping, is not susceptible to fire damage.
2.4-377
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Valves from both divisions are affected. The valve arrangements in these systems are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the affected system. These are discussed below.
The intermediate header crosstie valves, 2CC9473A and 2CC9473B, have control cables routed through this zone. Either the unit 1 or unit 2 intermediate crosstie valves have their power locked out during normal operation, therefore fire damage to control cables for these valves will not result in a spurious valve operation that will affect unit separation of the component cooling system.
Valves 2CC9413A, 2CC9413B, 2CC685, 2CC9414, 2CC9416 and 2CC9438, all have control cables routed through this zone. These are all containment isolation valves for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers and/or oil coolers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F.
Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 235°F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; the operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
The supply header isolation valve, 2CC9415, has control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this valve would block the discharge flowpath for the units' component cooling system. Operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
Control cables for both of the RHR heat exchanger outlet valves, 2CC9412A and 2CC9412B, are routed through this zone. The spurious opening of one of these valves would result in excessive flow through the system. If a second pump did not autostart on low discharge pressure, then operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The essential service water discharge header crosstie valves, 2SX033 and 2SX034, have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these 2.4-378
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 normally open valves would isolate the train A and train B essential service water
'v supply headers. For this fire zone, only Division 22 components are expected to be used. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and manually open the affected valve locally with its handwheel to restore essential service water flow to both of the essential service water system supply headers.
The essential service water pump suction valve, 2SX001 B, has control cables present in this zone. The spurious closure of this valve would disable its associated pump.
This valve has power locked out during normal operation and is therefore not susceptible to postulated spurious operation.
The unit 2 component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet valve, 2SX004, has control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this normally open valve would block essential service water flow to the component cooling heat exchanger, and would result in loss of heat removal by the component cooling system. Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and re-establish essential service water flow to the affected component cooling heat exchanger per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
The common component cooling heat exchanger ESW inlet and outlet valves, 0SX146, OSX1 47, 1 SX005 and 2SX005 each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious operation of one of these valves would have no impact on normal plant operation, since the common component cooling heat exchanger normally is only aligned to a unit and operated during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The operating procedures for aligning the common component cooling heat exchanger to a given unit require verification of proper valve alignment prior to initiating cooldown with this heat exchanger, and are therefore adequate to deal with postulated spurious operations of these valves.
The unit 1 return header crosstie valves, 2SX01 0, 2SX01 1 and 2SX1 36, each have control cables routed through this zone. The spurious closure of one of these normally open valves would have no impact. It would force return flow from some unit 1 components to one of the two main return headers, but no flow paths would be blocked.
Thus, no adverse consequences result from the spurious closure of one of these valves.
Cables for the containment chiller condenser bypass valve, 2SX1 47B, are located in this zone. This valve normally throttles to divert a portion of the essential service water RCFC return flow through the containment chiller condensers. The spurious closure of this valve could block essential service water flow to one train of RCFCs, which would disable containment cooling if the affected train of RCFCs were operating at that time.
Credit is taken for operator action to diagnose the problem and if necessary, manually open the affected valve locally by bleeding air from the valve operator when time permits.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal 2.4-379
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. A fire in this zone can affect both trains. The train A RHR pumps' power cable is present in this zone. Control and/or power circuits for both cubicle cooler fans are also affected. This pump is therefore assumed to be unavailable. The train B RHR pump is unaffected, and is credited for safe shutdown. Each train of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 2RH8702A and 2RH8702B for train B. In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for valve 2RH8702A, credit is taken for locally manually opening valve 2RH8702A using its handwheel in order to establish a flowpath to the RHR pumps.
Several other valves in the RHR system flowpaths have cables present in this zone.
This includes valves 2CS009B, 2RH611, 2SI8809B, 2SI8811 B and 2SI8812B in the Train B flowpath. The spurious operation of these valves during normal operation or while the unit is in hot standby would not have any adverse consequences. The RHR operating procedure requires verification of proper valve position prior to placing an RH pump in operation. Therefore, credit is taken for manually verifying and/or repositioning affected valves via local operation with their handwheels prior to initiating cooldown with the RHR system. Additionally, Division 21 valves 2CC9412A and 2CC9415 and Division 22 valve 2CC9412B may need to be repositioned (if not previously addressed) to ensure adequate component cooling water flow to the Train B RH heat exchanger. If required, credit is taken for locally manually operating these valves with their handwheels.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-29 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment on the next elevation (fire zone 11.5
- 0) by an unrated floor assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
Also, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations BYR-02 and BYR-1 4 identify the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zones 11.6-2 and 11.6C-0, respectively) by an unrated wall assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.118 Division 12 Containment Electrical Penetration Area, El. 426' (Fire Zone 11.6 Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems 2.4-380
I BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The control room ventilation system is not directly affected by a fire in this zone. Train A is credited in this zone because Division 12 electrical power may not be available.
The "A" and "B" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system have power cables routed through this zone, and are assumed to be unavailable. The remaining two sets of supply and exhaust fans are unaffected, and one of the two trains will be credited for safe shutdown. Although two trains (one on unit 1 and one on unit
- 2) are normally operating, safe shutdown can be achieved with only one operating train for a fire in this zone. Cables for dampers 0VA474Y and 0VA475Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause these dampers to fail closed. Closure of these dampers would result in blockage of one of two flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. A second flowpath is unaffected by a fire in this zone, therefore, the VA system supply flow to this aux building general area is adequate to support safe shutdown of both units.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Most of the cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 12. Division 12 is assumed to be unavailable for this zone; Division 11 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support "The Division 12 ESF bus is assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 ESF bus and its support systems are unaffected, and will be credited for safe shutdown. Power to MCC 132X4 will be isolated by opening its supply breaker at Bus 132X. This action eliminates the need to open individual MCC 132X4 breakers (the fire may prevent access to the MCC) to isolate power to motor operated valves being manually operated outside of this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 12 IP buses 1 IP02J and 1 IP04J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 12 power means that Division 12 battery 1 DC02E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 12 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 charging pump and support components are unaffected by a fire in this zone. Division 11 instrumentation at the Fire Hazards panel and the main control room are affected, but redundant safe shutdown instrumentation remains available. Cables associated with both channels of unit 1 nuclear source range instrumentation are present in this zone. Channel A of the post accident neutron monitor system is not affected and is credited for safe shutdown in this zone.
2.4-381
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Charging pump suction valves 1CV1 12C and 1CV1 12E have cables present in this zone. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, remote manual closure of 1 CV1i12B, and remote manual opening of 1 CV1i12D from the main control room is credited (these circuits are unaffected).
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Although these valves are Division 12 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 11 components. These are discussed below.
Cables for Division 12 pressurizer PORV 1 RY456 and block valve 1 RY8000B are present in this zone. These valves form a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and low pressure systems. A high-low pressure interface evaluation of these valves is provided in subsection 2.4.3.2. The post-fire safe shutdown function of these valves is to depressurize the RCS as required to RHR system entry conditions to allow for cold shutdown decay heat removal. The Division 11 valves are available to perform this function.
Cables for reactor vessel head vent valves 1 RC014B and 1 RC014D are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the containment atmosphere. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.3.
<-J The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valve, 1S188111B, has cables in this zone.
The effect of the spurious opening of this valve is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication, RSWT level alarms, and containment recirc sump level indication have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 1 S18812B via local operation of its handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. Note that MCC 132X4, the power source for 1SI881 2B, is located in this zone and is assumed to be inaccessible. Credit is taken for de-energizing the valve circuit by opening the MCC supply breaker at bus 1AP12E in the ESF switchgear room. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
VCT outlet isolation valve 1 CV1 12C has cables present in this zone. The spurious operation of this valve could isolate the VCT from the charging pump suction. To mitigate this postulated event, the RWST to charging pump suction valve I CV1i12D will be opened from the main control room.
RWST to charging pump suction valve 1CV1i12E has cables present in this zone. The spurious opening of this valve would have no effect other than to align the RWST to the 2.4-382
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 charging pump suction, which is its desired position for most scenarios. If necessary, this valve will be locally manually operated using its handwheel.
Charging pump 1A mini-flow isolation valve 1CV8111 has cables present in this zone.
The spurious closure of this valve would block the minimum recirculation flowpath for charging pump 1A. The RCP seal injection flowpath, which is unaffected, passes sufficient flow (>60gpm) to prevent charging pump damage. Operator response to diagnose and identify the condition is credited. If necessary, the valve will be locally manually opened using its handwheel.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 12 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
Cables for all reactor coolant wide range cold leg temperature indication are present, and therefore, this parameter will be lost. Credit is taken for utilizing the core exit thermocouples and steam generator pressure indication to infer RCS cold leg temperature in accordance with station procedures.
Essential Support Division 12 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 11 component cooling water pump, and the Division II containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
One valve related to these functions is subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Although this valve is a Division 12 valve, it could potentially impact the operation of Division 11 components. It is discussed below.
Valve 1 CC685 has control cables routed through this zone. It is a containment isolation valve for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of this valve would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F. Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 2350F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced "spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection. Component 2.4-383
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow.
The operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train B is assumed to be unavailable. Train A of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8701 A and 1 RH8701 B.
Valve 1 RH8701 B has cables present in this zone. In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for this valve, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the train A RHR pump.
Control cables for the Division 11 pressurizer PORV, 1 RY455A, is present in this zone.
If required to depressurize the RCS, credit is taken for the repair of the affected control cable for the Division 11 PORV per station repair procedures.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-1 2 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment on the next elevation (fire zone 11.5A-1) by an unrated floor assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
Also, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-1 4 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zones 11.6-0 and 11.6C-0, respectively) by an unrated wall assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.119 Division 22 Containment Electrical Penetration Area, El. 426' (Fire Zone 11.6 Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
2.4-384
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The "C" and "D" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system have power cables routed through this zone, and are assumed to be unavailable. The remaining two sets of supply and exhaust fans are unaffected, and one of the trains is credited for safe shutdown. Although two trains (one on unit 1 and one on unit 2) are normally operating, safe shutdown can be achieved with only one operating train for a fire in this zone. Cables for damper 0VA477Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause this damper to fail closed. Closure of this damper would result in blockage of one of two flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. A second flowpath is unaffected by a fire in this zone, therefore, the VA system supply flow to this aux building general area is adequate to support safe shutdown of both units.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Most of the cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 22. Division 22 is assumed to be unavailable for this zone; Division 21 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The Division 22 ESF bus is assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 ESF bus and its support systems are unaffected, and will be credited for safe shutdown. Power to MCC 232X4 will be isolated by opening its supply breaker at Bus 232X. This action eliminates the need to open individual MCC 232X4 breakers (the fire may prevent access to the MCC) to isolate power to motor operated valves being manually operated outside of this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 22 IP buses 21P02J and 21P04J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 22 power means that Division 22 battery 2DC02E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 22 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 charging pump is unaffected by a fire in this zone. A control cable for Division 21 cubicle cooler fan 2VA06CB is present in the zone. The second fan 2VA06CA and normal auxiliary building ventilation is unaffected. The charging pump has been demonstrated by calculation to be capable to operate for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with the loss of this fan. Division 21 instrumentation at the Fire Hazards panel 2.4-385
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 and the main control room are affected, but redundant safe shutdown instrumentation remains available. Cables associated with both channels of unit 2 nuclear source range instrumentation are present in this zone. Channel A of the post accident neutron monitor system is not affected and is credited for safe shutdown in this zone.
Charging pump suction valves 2CV1 12C and 2CV1 12E have cables present in this zone. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, remote manual closure of 2CV1 122B, and remote manual opening of 2CV1 12D from the main control room is credited (these circuits are unaffected).
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Although these valves are Division 22 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 21 components. These are discussed below.
Cables for Division 22 pressurizer PORV 2RY456 and block valve 2RY8000B are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the PRT. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.2.
Cables for reactor vessel head vent valves 2RC01 4B and 2RC01 4D are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the containment atmosphere. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.3.
"The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valve, 2SI8811 B, has cables in this zone.
The effect of the spurious opening of this valve is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication, RSWT level alarms, and containment recirc sump level indication have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 2SI8812B via local operation of its handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. Note that MCC 232X4, the power source for 2SI881 2B, is located in this zone and is assumed to be inaccessible. Credit is taken for de-energizing the valve circuit by opening the MCC supply breaker at bus 2AP1 2E in the ESF switchgear room. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
VCT outlet isolation valve 2CV1 12C has cables present in this zone.. The spurious operation of this valve could isolate the VCT from the charging pump suction. To mitigate this postulated event, the RWST to charging pump suction valve 2CV1 12D will be opened from the main control room.
RWST to charging pump suction valve 2CV1 12E has cables present in this zone. The spurious opening of this valve would have no effect other than to align the RWST to the 2.4-386
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 charging pump suction, which is its desired position for most scenarios. If necessary, this valve will be locally manually operated using its handwheel.
Charging pump 2A mini-flow isolation valve 2CV81 11 has cables present in this zone.
The spurious closure of this valve would block the minimum recirculation flowpath for charging pump 2A. The RCP seal injection flowpath, which is unaffected, passes sufficient flow (>60gpm) to prevent charging pump damage. Operator response to diagnose and identify the condition is credited. If necessary, the valve will be locally manually opened using its handwheel.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 22 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
Cables for all reactor coolant wide range cold leg temperature indication are present, and therefore, this parameter will be lost. Credit is taken for utilizing the core exit thermocouples and steam generator pressure indication to infer RCS cold leg temperature in accordance with station procedures.
Cables for both Division 22 steam generator PORVs are present in this zone. In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited, and the affected steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures.
Essential Support Division 22 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 21 component cooling water pump, and the Division 21 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
One valve related to these functions is subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Although this valve is a Division 22 valve, it could potentially impact the operation of Division 21 components. It is discussed below.
Valve 2CC685 has control cables routed through this zone. It is a containment isolation valve for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of this valve would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F. Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal 2.4-387
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 2350F and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperatures greater than 235°F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation of RCP seal cooling flow or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; The operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train B is assumed to be unavailable. Train A of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 2RH8701A and 2RH8701B.
Valve 2RH8701 B has cables present in this zone. In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for this valve, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the train A RHR pump.
Control cables for Division 21and 22 pressurizer PORVs 2RY455A and 2RY456 are present in the zone. Credit is taken for the repair of control cable 2RY486 for Division 21 pressurizer PORV 2RY455A per station repair procedures.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-22 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment on the next elevation (fire zone 11.5A-2) by an unrated floor assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
Also, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-02 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zone 11.6-0) by an unrated wall assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.120 Laboratory HVAC Equipment Room (Fire Zone 11.6A-09 Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Train A of the control room ventilation system can be affected by a fire in this zone, since numerous dampers have control cables present in this zone. This train is assumed to be unavailable. Train B is unaffected and remains available.
2.4-388
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The auxiliary building ventilation system supply and exhaust fans are not directly affected by a fire in this zone. However, the resulting unavailability of the Division 11 electrical power sources will render the A supply and exhaust fans unavailable.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions The cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 11. Division 11 systems and components are assumed to be unavailable for this zone. Division 12 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DCY Support The Division 11 ESF bus is assumed to be unavailable for this zone. The Division 12 ESF bus and its support systems are unaffected, and will be credited for safe shutdown.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 11 IP buses 1 IP01J and 1 IP03J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 11 power means that Division 11 battery 1 DC01 E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
"RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
Essential Support Division 11 support systems are assumed to be unavailable due to postulated damage to the ESF bus (but they are otherwise unaffected by the fire). The Division 12 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 12 component cooling water pump, and the Division 12 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Although these valves are 2.4-389
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Division 11 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 12
\\'*-
components. These are discussed below.
The intermediate header crosstie valve, 1 CC9473A, has a control cable routed through this zone. Either the unit 1 or unit 2 intermediate crosstie valves have their power locked out during normal operation, therefore fire damage to control cables for this valve will not result in a spurious valve operation that will affect unit separation of the component cooling system.
The supply header isolation valve, 1 CC9415, has a control cable routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this valve would block the discharge flowpath for the units' component cooling system. Operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train A is assumed to be unavailable. Train B of the RHR system is unaffected by a fire in this zone. Train B of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8702A and 1 RH8702B for train B. In the event of the loss of power to valve 1 RH8702A, credit is taken for locally manually opening the valve using its handwheel in order to establish a flowpath to the RHR pump. Additionally, Division 11 valve 1 CC9415 may need to be re-positioned to assure adequate component cooling water flow to the Train B RH heat exchanger. For these events, credit is taken for locally operating the valves with their handwheels.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown cables or components are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-05 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment on the next elevation (fire zone 11.5
- 0) by an unrated floor assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.121 Unit 1 Volume Control Tank Room (Fire Zone 11.6A-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems 2.4-390
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The "B" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system have control cables routed through this zone, and are assumed to be unavailable. The remaining three sets of supply and exhaust fans are unaffected, and are credited for safe shutdown. Cables for damper 0VA475Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause this damper to fail closed. Closure of this damper would result in blockage of one of two flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. A second flowpath is unaffected by a fire in this zone, therefore, the VA system supply flow to this aux building general area is adequate to support safe shutdown of both units.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Most of the cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 12.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The charging pumps and their support components from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone. The volume control tank is located in this room. Because of the tank construction and the low combustible loading in this zone, the VCT is assumed to be unaffected by a fire in this zone. The two VCT isolation valves, 1CV1 12B and 1CV1 12C, are both present in this zone, along with associated cables. Following a fire in this zone, the valves will be unavailable for remote operation, and access for local manual action will not be available until the fire is extinguished and temperatures return to near ambient. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, remote manual opening of either 1CV1 12D or 1 CV1 12E from the main control room is credited. This will ensure adequate flow and NPSH to the charging pumps, ensuring the capability to provide makeup to the RCS. Credit is also taken for manually closing either 1 CV1i12B or 1 CV1 12C when time permits (after access is established and manpower is available).
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support 2.4-391
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.122 Unit 2 Volume Control Tank Room (Fire Zone 11.6A-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cables for damper OVA477Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause this damper to fail closed.
Closure of this damper would result in blockage of one of two flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. A second flowpath is unaffected by a fire in this zone, therefore, the VA system supply flow to this aux building general area is adequate to support safe shutdown of both units.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Most of the cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 22.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
2.4-392
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The charging pumps and their support components from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone. The volume control tank is located in this room. Because of the tank construction and the low combustible loading in this zone, the VCT is assumed to be unaffected by a fire in this zone. The two VCT isolation valves, 2CV1 12B and 2CV1 12C, are both present in this zone, along with associated cables. Following a fire in this zone, the valves will be unavailable for remote operation, and access for local manual action will not be available until the fire is extinguished and temperatures return to near ambient. In order to establish a charging pump suction flowpath to the refueling water storage tank, remote manual opening of either 2CV1 12D or 2CV1 12E from the main control room is credited. This will ensure adequate flow and NPSH to the charging pumps, ensuring the capability to provide makeup to the RCS. Credit is also taken for manually closing either 2CV1 12B or 2CV1 12C when time permits (after access is established and manpower is available).
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary "side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The essential service water pumps and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.123 Auxiliary Building Offices, El. 426' (Fire Zone 11.6B-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4 4.
2.4-393
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The "C" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system have control cables routed through this zone, and are assumed to be unavailable. The remaining three sets of supply and exhaust fans are unaffected, and are credited for safe shutdown.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Most of the cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 21. Division 21 systems and components are assumed to be unavailable for this zone. Division 22 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The Division 21 ESF bus is assumed to be unavailable for this zone. The Division 22 ESF bus and its support systems are unaffected, and will be credited for safe shutdown.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 21 IP buses 21P01J and 21P03J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 21 power means that Division 21 battery 2DC01 E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Although these valves are Division 21 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 22 components. These are discussed below.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valve, 2SI881 1A, has a cable in this zone.
The effect of the spurious opening of this valve is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication and RSWT level alarms have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this 2.4-394
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 2SI8812A to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions.
Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
The main steam isolation valves 2MS001 A through 2MS001C have a Division 21 actuation circuit cable present in the zone. Valve 2MS001 D has a Division 22 actuation circuit cable present in this zone. Each of these valves has two independent actuation circuits, either one of which can actuate the valves. Thus these valves remain available since one Division 11 or 12 actuation circuit is unaffected by a fire in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves and the steam generator PORVs will remove decay heat. In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
Essential Support Division 21 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 22 component cooling water pump, and the Division 22 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Although these valves are Division 21 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 22 components. These are discussed below.
The intermediate header crosstie valve, 2CC9473A, has a control cable routed through this zone. Either the unit 1 or unit 2 intermediate crosstie valves have their power locked out during normal operation, therefore fire damage to control cables for this valve will not result in a spurious valve operation that will affect unit separation of the component cooling system.
The supply header isolation valve, 2CC9415, has a control cable routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this valve would block the discharge flowpath for the 2.4-395
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 units' component cooling system. Operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train A is assumed to be unavailable. Train B of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 2RH8702A and 2RH8702B.
Although valve 2RH8702A has no cables present in this zone, its power supply may not be available. In the event of fire damage to the power supply for this valve, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the train B RHR pump. Additionally, Division 21 valve 2CC9415 may need to be re-positioned to assure adequate component cooling water flow to the Train B RH heat exchanger. For these events, credit is taken for locally operating the valves with their handwheels.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to this fire zone.
2.4.2.124 Auxiliary Building Laundry Room, El. 426' (Fire Zone 11.6C-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Train A of the control room ventilation system has cables for the supply and return fans and dampers present in this zone. Train B of the control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The "A" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system have control cables routed through this zone, and are assumed to be unavailable. The remaining three sets of supply and exhaust fans are unaffected, and are credited for safe shutdown. Cables for damper 0VA474Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause this damper to fail closed. Closure of this damper would result in blockage of one of two flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. A second flowpath is unaffected by a fire in this zone, therefore, the VA system supply flow to this aux building general area is adequate to support safe shutdown of both units.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions 2.4-396
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The cables in this zone are mostly associated with ESF Division 11. Division 11 systems and components are assumed to be unavailable for this zone. Division 12 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The Division 11 ESF bus is assumed to be unavailable for this zone. The Division 12 ESF bus and its support systems are unaffected, and will be credited for safe shutdown.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 11 IP buses 1 IP01J and 1 IP03J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 11 power means that Division 11 battery 1 DC01 E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves related to the RCS inventory control function are subject to spurious "operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone.
Although these valves are Division 11 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 12 components. These are discussed below.
The LPSI containment sump supply isolation valve, 1SI8811 A, has cables in this zone.
The effect of the spurious opening of this valve is that RWST inventory would drain to the reactor containment sump. RWST level indication, RSWT level alarms, and containment recirc sump level indication have been verified to remain available in the control room to provide indication of this postulated event. With the RWST at the Tech Spec low level setpoint, the estimated drawdown time to a minimum credited inventory is approximately 36 minutes. For this event, credit is taken for operator identification and diagnosis of this condition, and for mitigating the event by manually closing valve 1S18812A via local operation of its handwheel to prevent completely emptying the RWST. This action will occur quickly enough to preserve sufficient inventory in the RWST to borate the primary system to cold shutdown conditions. Thus, the RCS inventory control function would not be prevented by this postulated spurious operation.
The RHR Hx 1A to charging pump suction valve, 1 CV8804A, has cables routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to these cables could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
2.4-397
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
The main steam isolation valves, 1 MS001A through 1 MS001 D, each have a Division 11 actuation circuit present in this zone. Each of these valves has two independent actuation circuits, either one of which can actuate the valves. Thus these valves remain available since the Division 12 actuation circuits are unaffected by a fire in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are operated. In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the Division 11 steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited, and the affected steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures.
Essential Support Division 11 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 12 component cooling water pump, and the Division 12 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Although these valves are Division 11 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 12 components. These are discussed below.
Valves 1CC9416 and 1CC9438, each have control cables routed through this zone.
These are each containment isolation valves for component cooling service to the RCPs. The spurious closure of one of these valves would block component cooling flow to the RCP thermal barriers and/or oil coolers. For spurious valve closure that causes loss of CC flow to the thermal barrier with the RCPs running, the seal leakoff temperature would not be expected to exceed 2350F. Additionally, the Byron reactor coolant pump seals are designed to withstand a complete loss of seal cooling at RCS pressure and temperature with the limitation that the RCPs are tripped if the RCP seal leakoff temperature exceeds 235OF and that seal cooling or injection flow should not be restored with seal leakoff temperature greater than 2351F. Procedures for restoring seal injection or seal cooling account for seal leakoff temperatures. Credit is taken for operators to diagnose and mitigate the consequences of fire induced spurious isolation 2.4-398
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 of RCP seal cooling or loss of RCP seal injection. Component cooling flow through this flowpath is a small fraction of total component cooling flow; The operating component cooling pump will not be significantly affected by this postulated event. Therefore, no adverse consequences result.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train A is assumed to be unavailable. Train B of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8702A and 1 RH8702B.
Valve 1 RH8702A has cables present in this zone. In the event of fire damage to the control circuit for this valve, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the train B RHR pump.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions A cable for the Division 21 SAT feed breaker is present in this zone. Postulated faults on this cable could result in a spurious breaker closure signal. This breaker is normally closed and not otherwise affected by the fire. Therefore, fire damage to this cable will not impact operation of the Division 21 buses..
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
However, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation BYR-14 identifies the equipment within this room that is separated from redundant equipment in an adjacent area (fire zone 11.6-1) by an unrated wall assembly. This evaluation justifies the existing separation, so that a credible fire will not adversely affect the redundant components.
2.4.2.125 Auxiliary Building Showers/Decon/Change Area. El. 426' (Fire Zone 11.6D-0)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.126 Auxiliary Building Decon/Storage Area, El. 426' (Fire Zone 11.6E-01 Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Damper 0VA489Y is located in the zone. Fire actuation of this fire damper would isolate one of two auxiliary building ventilation paths to the electrical penetration area.
Closure of this fire damper has no impact on the operation of the VA system.
2.4-399
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from Division 21 are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The Division 22 charging pump, support components and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown. The Division 21 charging pump cubicle cooler fan has a control cable present in the zone, therefore Division 21 is not credited.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support The Division 22 essential service water pump and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone. The Division 21 essential service water pump has control cables present in the zone, therefore Division 21 is not credited.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to this fire zone.
2.4.2.127 Auxiliary Building HVAC Exhaust Complex (Fire Zone 11.7-0) 2.4-400
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002
"~-*_
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Cables for several dampers in train B of the control room ventilation system are present in this zone. Train A of the VC is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and will be credited for safe shutdown.
All four auxiliary building ventilation system supply fans and all four exhaust fans are present in this zone. Power and control cables for each of these auxiliary building supply and exhaust fans are also present in this zone. Upon determination of a design basis fire in this zone, credit is taken for opening the breakers and removing control power fuses for each of these fans as a precautionary measure to protect their respective ESF power buses. The presence of each of these fans and their associated cables in the same fire zone is the subject of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviation OA.2 This BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviation concludes that adequate protection is provided for these fans and cables by the existing physical configuration in this fire zone. Therefore, at least one supply and exhaust fan will remain available following a fire in this zone.
Safe shutdown of both units can be accomplished following a fire in this zone with no auxiliary building ventilation available. However, after the fire is extinguished and fire damage is assessed, the undamaged supply and exhaust fans of the VA system could be restored to service.
Cables for dampers 0VA474Y, 0VA475Y, 0VA476Y and 0VA477Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause these dampers to fail closed. Closure of these dampers would result in blockage of both flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. The effect of this could be that both units AFW system "A" train pumps may not receive adequate room cooling. The train "B" AFW components are not affected, and will be credited for safe shutdown for both units.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone. As described above, ventilation for the train A auxiliary feedwater pump may be affected. Therefore, the Division 12 AFW system will be credited for safe shutdown.
The Division 11 ESF essential power buses are credited to supply power to the Train A control room ventilation system.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions 2.4-401
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 No unit 2 systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone. As described above, ventilation for the train A auxiliary feedwater pump may be affected. Therefore, the Division 22 AFW system will be credited for safe shutdown.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.128 Unit I Purge Room (Fire Zone 11.7-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cables for the "A" and "B" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this zone. The other two sets of supply and exhaust fans of the VA system are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and one of the sets is credited for safe shutdown. Although two sets of supply and exhaust fans (one on unit 1 and one on unit
- 2) are normally operating, safe shutdown can be achieved with only one operating set for a fire in this zone.
Cables for dampers 0VA474Y and 0VA475Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause these dampers to fail closed. Closure of these dampers would result in blockage of one of the flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. The redundant flowpath is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and therefore, the VA system supply flow to this aux building general area is adequate to support safe shutdown of both units.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit I safe shutdown systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4-402
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 2.4.2.129 Unit 2 Purge Room (Fire Zone 11.7-2 Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cables for the "C" and "D" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this zone. The other two sets of supply and exhaust fans of the VA system are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and one of the sets is credited for safe shutdown. Although two sets of supply and exhaust fans (one on unit 1 and one on unit
- 2) are normally operating, safe shutdown can be achieved with only one operating set for a fire in this zone.
Cables for damper 0VA477Y of the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this fire zone. Fire damage to these cables may cause this damper to fail closed.
Closure of this damper would result in blockage of one of the flowpaths of the auxiliary building supply to the aux building general area at elevation 383'. The redundant flowpath is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and therefore, the VA system supply flow to this aux building general area is adequate to support safe shutdown of both units.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Power and control cables for the Division 21 and 22 feeds to the "C" and "D" supply and exhaust fans for the auxiliary building ventilation system are present in this zone.
Therefore, credit is taken for manually opening the breakers and removing control power fuses per station procedure upon detection of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the Division 21 and 22 4 Kv buses.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.130 Fuel Handling Building (Fire Zone 12.1-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4 4.
2.4-403
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables from Division 21 are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The Division 21 and 22 charging pumps, support components and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone. Division 21 pressurizer PORV block valve 2RY8000A has a control cable present in the zone. Division 22 is credited for safe shutdown.
One valve related to the RCS inventory control function is subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. The valve arrangements in the charging system are such that the spurious operation of a single valve could affect both trains of the charging system. This is discussed below.
The RHR Hx 2A to charging pump suction valve, 2CV8804A, has a cable routed through this zone. Postulated fire damage to this cable could cause this valve to spuriously open. The effect would be to open a path from the RWST to the charging pump suction via the RHR pump and heat exchanger. This would not adversely affect charging in any way, since establishment of such a flowpath is a desired safe shutdown function. Therefore, there is no adverse impact due to this postulated event.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support 2.4-404
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The Division 22 essential service water pump and support components, the component cooling water pumps, and the containment ventilation system are all unaffected by a fire in this zone. The Division 21 essential service water pump has control cables present in the zone, therefore Division 21 is not credited.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system, support components, and instrumentation from both divisions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.131 QA Vault (Fire Zone 13)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.132 Radwaste Drumming Station and Tunnel (Fire Zone 14.1-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
-~4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are both unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Division 21 instrument cables are routed through this zone. These are instrument cables for steam generator level and pressure indicators located at the remote shutdown panel. Indication in the main control room for all four steam generators is unaffected and remains available to support safe shutdown.
One Division 22 instrument cable is routed through this zone.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration) 2.4-405
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The Division 21 and 22 charging pumps, support components and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The charging flow control valve, 2CV1 21, has a cable present in this zone. Postulated fire-induced faults on these cables can cause this valve to fail open. If failed open, credit is taken for manual actions to manually throttle charging flow by implementing use of the flow control valve bypass line.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.133 Radwaste Evaporator Tank/Spent Resin Pump Room (Fire Zone 14.2-0)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.134 Surface Condenser Room (Fire Zone 14.3-0)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.135 Spent Resin Tank/Waste Gas Compressor Room (Fire Zone 14.4-0)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.136 Radwaste Evaporator Room (Fire Zone 14.5-0)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.137 Radwaste Building Ground Floor (Fire Zone 14.6-0)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.138 Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (Fire Zone 16.1-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems 2.4-406
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions One unit 1 safe shutdown component is present in this zone. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) is a steel lined concrete tank which is not susceptible to fire damage. Therefore, a fire in this zone will not have any effect on safe shutdown of unit
- 1.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.139 Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (Fire Zone 16.1-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions One unit 2 safe shutdown component is present in this zone. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) is a steel lined concrete tank which is not susceptible to fire damage. Therefore, a fire in this zone will not have any effect on safe shutdown of unit
- 2.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.140 Cooling Tower Unit 1 (Fire Zone 17.1-1) 2.4-407
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 S.
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.141 Cooling Tower Unit 2 (Fire Zone 17.1-2)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.142 Unit 1 Essential Service Water Cooling Tower (Fire Zone 17.2-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The auxiliary building ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
All essential service water (SX) cooling "B" tower makeup inlet valves, hot water bypass valves, and riser valves are present in the zone. Additionally, control cables associated with the "B" SX makeup pump are present in the zone. The train "A" tower valves and "A" SX makeup pump are unaffected and credited for safe shutdown.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.143 Unit 2 Essential Service Water Cooling Tower (Fire Zone 17.2-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
2.4-408
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The auxiliary building ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
All essential service water (SX) cooling WA" tower makeup inlet valves, hot water bypass valves, and riser valves are present in the zone. The train "B" tower valves are unaffected and credited for safe shutdown. Additionally, control cables associated with both SX makeup pumps are present in the zone. Locally starting and operating one of the makeup pumps at the river screen house will be credited. Makeup to the tower is not immediately required, only after system and evaporation losses result in low tower basin water levels. Adequate time is available to access the river screen house.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.144 Diesel Generator 1B/Switchqear Room Air Shaft (Fire Zone 18.1-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are not directly affected by a fire in this fire zone. However, the resulting unavailability of Division 12 electrical power sources will render Train B of the control room ventilation system unavailable and 0B supply and exhaust fans of the auxiliary building ventilation system unavailable.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions The components and cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 12. Division 12 is assumed to be unavailable for this zone; Division 11 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support 2.4-409
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 All of the components and cables in this zone are associated with the Division 12 emergency diesel generator room ventilation system, the ESF switchgear room ventilation system, and the miscellaneous electrical equipment room ventilation system.
Therefore, the Division 12 ESF AC power sources are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 ESF bus is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and is credited for safe shutdown.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 12 IP buses 1IP02J and 1IP04J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 12 power means that Division 12 battery 1 DC02E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 12 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 12 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
Essential Support Division 12 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 11 component cooling water pump, and the Division 11 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train B is assumed to be unavailable. Train A of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8701 A and 1 RH8701 B.
Although valve 1 RH8701 B has no cables present in this zone, its power source may be unavailable. In the event the power supply is not available, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the train A RHR pump.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone. Therefore, safe shutdown of unit 2 will be unaffected by a fire in this zone.
2.4-410
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone, since the walls, floor and ceiling have a 3-hour fire rating as described in section 2.3.18.1 of the fire hazards analysis.
2.4.2.145 Diesel Generator 2B/Switchqear Room Air Shaft (Fire Zone 18.1-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone. The auxiliary building ventilation system is not directly affected by a fire in this fire zone. However, the resulting unavailability of Division 22 electrical power sources will render the OD supply and exhaust fans of the auxiliary building ventilation system unavailable.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone. Therefore, safe shutdown of unit 1 will be unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions The components and cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 22. Division 22 is assumed to be unavailable for this zone; Division 21 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Supoort All of the components and cables in this zone are associated with the Division 22 emergency diesel generator room ventilation system, the ESF switchgear room ventilation system, and the miscellaneous electrical equipment room ventilation system.
Therefore, the Division 22 ESF AC power sources are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 ESF bus is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and is credited for safe shutdown.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 22 IP buses 21P02J and 21P04J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 22 power means that Division 22 battery 2DC02E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration) 2.4-411
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Division 22 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 22 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
Essential Support Division 22 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 21 component cooling water pump, and the Division 21 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train B is assumed to be unavailable. Train A of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 2RH8701 A and 2RH8701 B.
Although valve 2RH8701 B has no cables present in this zone, its power source may be unavailable. In the event the power supply is not available, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the train A RHR pump.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone, since the walls, floor and ceiling have a 3-hour fire rating as described in section 2.3.18.2 of the fire hazards analysis.
2.4.2.146 Diesel Generator 1lASwitchoear Room Air Shaft (Fire Zone 18.2-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are not directly affected by a fire in this fire zone. However, the resulting unavailability of Division 11 electrical power sources will render Train A of the control room ventilation system unavailable and the OA supply and exhaust fans of the auxiliary building ventilation system unavailable.
2.4-412
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 "Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions The cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 11. Division 11 is assumed to be unavailable for this zone; Division 12 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The components and cables in this zone are associated with the Division 11 emergency diesel generator room ventilation system, the ESF switchgear room ventilation system, and the miscellaneous electrical equipment room ventilation system. Therefore, the Division 11 ESF AC power sources are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 ESF bus is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and is credited for safe shutdown.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 11 IP buses 1 IP01J and 1 IP03J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 11 power means that Division 11 battery 1 DC01 E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
RCS Inventory Control (Includinq Boration)
Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
Essential Support Division 11 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 12 component cooling water pump, and the Division 12 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train A is assumed to be unavailable. Train B of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8702A and 1 RH8702B.
2.4-413
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Although valve 1 RH8702A has no cables present in this zone, its power source may be unavailable. In the event the power supply is not available, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the train B RHR pump.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone. Therefore, safe shutdown of unit 2 will be unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone, since the walls, floor and ceiling have a 3-hour fire rating as described in section 2.3.18.3 of the fire hazards analysis.
2.4.2.147 Diesel Generator 2A/Switchcqear Room Air Shaft (Fire Zone 18.2-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system is unaffected by a fire in this zone. The auxiliary building ventilation system is not directly affected by a fire in this fire zone. However, the resulting unavailability of Division 21 electrical power sources will render the OC supply and exhaust fans of the auxiliary building ventilation system unavailable.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone. Therefore, safe shutdown of unit I will be unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions The cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 21. Division 21 is assumed to be unavailable for this zone; Division 22 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support All of the components and cables in this zone are associated with the Division 21 emergency diesel generator room ventilation system, the ESF switchgear room ventilation system, and the miscellaneous electrical equipment room ventilation system.
Therefore, the Division 21 ESF AC power sources are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 ESF bus is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and is credited for safe shutdown.
2.4-414
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. However, Division 21 IP buses 21P01J and 21P03J should be relied upon only in the short term. The assumed loss of Division 21 power means that Division 21 battery 2DC01 E is the only power source for these buses. When the battery becomes depleted, these buses and their instruments will also fail.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
Essential Support Division 21 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 22 component cooling water pump, and the Division 22 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train A is assumed to be unavailable. Train B of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 2RH8702A and 2RH8702B.
Although valve 2RH8702A has no cables present in this zone, its power source may be unavailable. In the event the power supply is not available, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the train B RHR pump.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone, since the walls, floor and ceiling have a 3-hour fire rating as described in section 2.3.18.4 of the fire hazards analysis.
2.4.2.148 Unit 1 Main Steam/AFW Pipe Tunnel (Fire Zone 18.3-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4. Several cables present in this zone are also routed in conduit through the unit 1 2.4-415
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 tendon tunnel area and through the buttress #2 area of unit 1 and enter the auxiliary
\\-'
building near grade level. The tendon tunnel and buttress areas have not been assigned fire zone designations as these areas have very little in them except for lights, sump pumps, and cables in conduit.. The cables are all associated with the steam generator PORVs. The consequence of damage to these cables are bounded by the analysis for this fire zone.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are not affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from both divisions are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are not directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Power and control cables for one Division 12 416OVac load is present in this zone.
Credit is taken for manually opening the breaker and removing the control power fuse from the affected cubicle for the Division 12 control room chiller as a precautionary measure to protect the Division 12 bus.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The systems and components which perform this function are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal This fire zone includes the main steam and feedwater pipe tunnels and the two valve houses located approximately 120 degrees apart at the containment wall. Components present in this fire zone include the auxiliary feedwater containment isolation valves, the steam generator safety valves, the steam generator PORVs, the main steam isolation valves, and the main steam isolation bypass valves. Cables for these components are also present, as are cables for all of the steam generator pressure instruments. Byron BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviation 1A.1 identifies that these components are located in the same fire zone, and concludes that adequate protection is provided for these components and cables by the existing physical configuration in this fire zone.
Therefore, at least one train of components and instruments will remain available to safely shut down unit 1 following a fire in this fire zone.
2.4-416
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The main steam isolation valves, 1 MS001 A through 1 MS001 D, each have a Division 11 and a Division 12 actuation circuit present in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are manually operated.
In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
The main steam isolation bypass valves, 1MS101A through 1MS101 D, each have cables from their Division 11 and Division 12 actuation circuit present in this zone.
These valves are normally closed, and it is desired to keep them closed for safe shutdown. With the MSIV bypass valve hand position controllers in their normal position of 0%, postulated circuit faults on an actuation circuit for one of these valves are incapable of causing the spurious opening of the affected valve. No response is required.
All four steam generator PORVs have control cables present in this zone. Local manual operation of one or more SG PORVs using the hydraulic hand pumps is credited for safe shutdown. If necessary, credit is taken for operation of the safety valves to remove decay heat until the fire is extinguished and access to the area is re established.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited, and the affected steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures. If necessary, this action will be delayed until the fire is extinguished and access to the area is re-established.
Essential Support The essential service water, component cooling water and containment ventilation systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system and its required support functions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will not have any impact on unit 2 safe shutdown.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations 2.4-417
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.149 Unit 2 Main Steam/AFW Pipe Tunnel (Fire Zone 18.3-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4. Several cables present in this zone are also routed in conduit through the unit 2 tendon tunnel area and through the buttress #4 area of unit 2 and enter the auxiliary building at various elevations. The tendon tunnel and buttress areas have not been assigned fire zone designations as these areas have very little in them except for lights, sump pumps, and cables in conduit.. The cables are all associated with the steam generator PORVs. The consequence of damage to these cables are bounded by the analysis for this fire zone.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are not affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components or cables are present in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will not have any impact on unit 1 safe shutdown.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from both divisions are present in this zone.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The essential power systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The four instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The systems and components which perform this function are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal This fire zone includes the main steam and feedwater pipe tunnels and the two valve houses located approximately 120 degrees apart at the containment wall. Components present in this fire zone include the auxiliary feedwater containment isolation valves, the steam generator safety valves, the steam generator PORVs, the main steam isolation 2.4-418
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 valves, and the main steam isolation bypass valves. Cables for these components are
- .j also present, as are cables for all of the steam generator pressure instruments. Byron BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviation 2A.1 identifies that these components are located in the same fire zone, and concludes that adequate protection is provided for these components and cables by the existing physical configuration in this fire zone.
Therefore, at least one train of components and instruments will remain available to safely shut down unit 2 following a fire in this fire zone.
The main steam isolation valves, 2MS001A through 2MS001 D, each have a Division 21 and a Division 22 actuation circuit present in this zone. In the event of the spurious closure of one or all MSIVs due to actuator circuit damage, the main steam safety valves will remove decay heat until the steam generator PORVs are manually operated.
In the event of the spurious opening of any MSIV, actions will be taken per station procedures to prevent overcooling of the RCS.
The main steam isolation bypass valves, 2MS101A through 2MS101 D, each have cables from their Division 21 and Division 22 actuation circuit present in this zone.
These valves are normally closed, and it is desired to keep them closed for safe shutdown. With the MSIV bypass valve hand position controllers in their normal position of 0%, postulated circuit faults on an actuation circuit for one of these valves are incapable of causing the spurious opening of the affected valve. No response is required.
All four steam generator PORVs have control cables present in this zone. Local manual operation of one or more SG PORVs using the hydraulic hand pumps is credited for safe shutdown. If necessary, credit is taken for operation of the safety valves to remove decay heat until the fire is extinguished and access to the area is re established.
In the event of the spurious opening of one of the steam generator PORVs, operator diagnosis and response per the faulted steam generator procedure is credited, and the affected steam generator PORV isolation valve will be locally manually closed using its handwheel per existing station procedures. If necessary, this action will be delayed until the fire is extinguished and access to the area is re-established.
Essential Support The essential service water, component cooling water and containment ventilation systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The residual heat removal system and its required support functions are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations 2.4-419
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone.
2.4.2.150 Train A Control Room HVAC Equipment Room (Fire Zone 18.4-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Components and cables for train A of the control room ventilation system are present in this zone. Train A of the VC system is assumed to be unavailable. Train B of the VC system is unaffected by a fire in this zone and is credited for safe shutdown. Outlet control dampers to the unit 1 side of the main control room and inlet and outlet control dampers to the unit 1 auxiliary electrical equipment room (AEER) have cables routed through this zone. These are two position dampers which are used to balance flows for the train of VC which is in operation. Fire-induced faults on these cables could cause the dampers to move to the opposite train position. The effect would be to reduce flow to the main control room. The main control room has two supply and return flowpaths, and only one of these is potentially affected. No adverse consequences are expected.
The single supply and return flowpath (dampers OVC094Y and OVC095Y) to the unit 1 AEER is potentially affected. However, the flow reduction would not reduce room cooling enough to cause equipment high temperature limits to be reached or exceeded.
No adverse consequences are expected.
The auxiliary building ventilation system is not directly affected by a fire in this fire zone.
The OA supply and exhaust fans are not credited in this zone because Division 11 electrical power may not be available.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions The cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 11. Division 11 is assumed to be unavailable for this zone; Division 12 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support Cables in this zone are associated with the Division 11 emergency diesel generator and ESF switchgear bus. Therefore, the Division 11 ESF AC power sources are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 ESF bus is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and is credited for safe shutdown.
The Division 12 instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. Division 11 buses 1 IP01 J and 1 IP03J could be disabled by faults on cables in this zone.
2.4-420
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002
""-J' RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cables for Division 11 pressurizer PORV 1 RY455A and block valve 1 RY8000A are present in this zone. This pair of valves forms a high-low pressure interface between the RCS and the PRT. This condition is discussed in Section 2.4.3.2. The post-fire safe shutdown function of these valves is to depressurize the RCS as required to RHR system entry conditions to allow for cold shutdown decay heat removal. The Division 12 valves are available to perform this function.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 11 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
Essential Support "Division 11 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 12 component cooling water pump, and the Division 12 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Several valves related to these functions are subject to spurious operation as a result of having control circuit cables routed through this fire zone. Although these valves are Division 11 valves, they could potentially impact the operation of Division 12 components. These are discussed below.
The intermediate header crosstie valve, 1 CC9473A, has a control cable routed through this zone. Either the unit 1 or unit 2 intermediate crosstie valves have their power locked out during normal operation, therefore fire damage to control cables for this valve will not result in a spurious valve operation that will affect unit separation of the component cooling system.
The supply header isolation valve, 1 CC9415, has a control cable routed through this zone. The spurious closure of this valve would block the discharge flowpath for the units' component cooling system. Operator action to stop the running pump is required.
Loss of component cooling is assumed to result. Credit is taken for diagnosis of the problem and for re-establishing component cooling system flow per the loss of component cooling station procedure.
2.4-421
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train A is assumed to be unavailable. Train B of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 1 RH8702A and 1 RH8702B.
Valve 1 RH8702A has cables present in this zone, and is therefore assumed to be unavailable for remote operation. In this event, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the train B RHR pump.
Additionally, Division 11 valve 1 CC9415 may need to be re-positioned to assure adequate component cooling water flow to the Train B RH heat exchanger. For these events, credit is taken for locally operating the valves with their handwheels.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone. However, power and control cables associated with the Division 11 to Division 21 ESF bus crosstie are routed through this zone. Postulated faults on these cables could adversely affect the operation of the Division 21 ESF bus. Therefore, credit is taken for manually opening the crosstie feed breaker per station procedures after determination of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure. Additionally, power and control cables associated with the Division 21 essential service water cooling tower unit substation 231Z are routed through the zone. Postulated faults on these cables could adversely affect the operation of the Division 21 ESF bus. Therefore, credit is taken for manually opening the unit substation feed breaker per station procedures after determination of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone, since the walls, floor and ceiling have a 3-hour fire rating as described in section 2.3.18.7 of the fire hazards analysis.
2.4.2.151 Train B Control Room HVAC EquiDment Room (Fire Zone 18.4-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Components and cables for train B of the control room ventilation system are present in this zone. Train B of the VC system is assumed to be unavailable. Train A of the VC system is unaffected by a fire in this zone and is credited for safe shutdown. Outlet control dampers to the unit 2 side of the main control room and inlet and outlet control dampers to the unit 2 auxiliary electrical equipment room (AEER) have cables routed through this zone. These are two position dampers which are used to balance flows for the train of VC which is in operation. Fire-induced faults on these cables could cause 2.4-422
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 the dampers to move to the opposite train position. The effect would be to reduce flow to the main control room. The main control room has two supply and return flowpaths, and only one of these is potentially affected. No adverse consequences are expected.
The single supply and return flowpath (dampers OVC175Y and 0VC182Y) to the unit 2 AEER is potentially affected. However, the flow reduction would not reduce room cooling enough to cause equipment high temperature limits to be reached or exceeded.
No adverse consequences are expected.
The auxiliary building ventilation system is not directly affected by a fire in this fire zone.
The OC supply and exhaust fans are not credited in this zone because Division 21 electrical power may not be available.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown components are present in this fire zone. However, train B of the VC system is powered from unit 1 power sources. The impact of a fire in this zone on the VC system is discussed above. Safe shutdown of unit 1 will not be affected by a fire in this zone. Power and control cables associated with the Division 11 to Division 21 4 Kv ESF bus crosstie are routed through this zone. Postulated faults on these cables could adversely affect the operation of the Division 11 ESF bus. Therefore, credit is taken for manually opening this breaker per station procedure after determination of a design basis fire, as a precautionary measure to protect the bus.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions With the exception of cables for train B of the VC system, the cables in this zone are associated with ESF Division 21. Division 21 is assumed to be unavailable for this zone; Division 22 systems and components are credited for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) SuDDort Cables in this zone are associated with the Division 21 emergency diesel generator and ESF switchgear bus. Therefore, the Division 21 ESF AC power sources are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 ESF bus is unaffected by a fire in this zone, and is credited for safe shutdown.
The two Division 22 instrument power buses are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and remain available. Both Division 21 IP buses 21PO1J and 21P03J could be disabled by faults on load cables in this zone, and are assumed to be unavailable.
RCS Inventory Control (Includinq Boration)
Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 charging pump, support components, and instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
2.4-423
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal Division 21 components and systems used to accomplish this function are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 AFW and main steam system components and associated primary and secondary side instrumentation are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited with accomplishing this safe shutdown function.
Essential Support Division 21 support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 essential service water pump and its support components, the Division 22 component cooling water pump, and the Division 22 containment ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The RHR system is credited with decay heat removal for cold shutdown. Train A is assumed to be unavailable. Train B of the RHR system has two reactor coolant system to RHR pump suction isolation valves in series. These are 2RH8702A and 2RH8702B.
Although valve 2RH8702A has no cables present in this zone, its power source may not be available. In this event, credit is taken for locally manually opening this valve in order to establish a flowpath to the train B RHR pump.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundary of this fire zone, since the walls, floor and ceiling have a 3-hour fire rating as described in section 2.3.18.8 of the fire hazards analysis.
2.4.2.152 Kitchen/Locker Area El. 451' (Fire Zone 18.5-1)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.153 Security Control Center El. 451' (Fire Zone 18.5-2)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.154 Main Power Transformer 1E (Fire Zone 18.1OA-1)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.155 Main Power Transformer 2E (Fire Zone 18.1OA-2) 2.4-424
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.156 Main Power Transformer 1W (Fire Zone 18.10B-1)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.157 Main Power Transformer 2W (Fire Zone 18.101B-2)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.158 Unit Auxiliary Transformer 141-1 (Fire Zone 18.1OC-1 )
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.159 Unit Auxiliary Transformer 241-1 (Fire Zone 18.1OC-2)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.160 Unit Auxiliary Transformer 141-2 (Fire Zone 18.10D-1)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.161 Unit Auxiliary Transformer 241-2 (Fire Zone 18.10D-2)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.162 System Auxiliary Transformers 142-1/142-2 (Fire Zone 18.10E-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are both unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions 2.4-425
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 The offsite power feeds to both ESF buses are present in this fire zone. Therefore, offsite power will be lost. However, the ESF buses and their support systems are unaffected. Therefore, safe shutdown components and systems from both ESF divisions remain available for safe shutdown of unit 1.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.163 System Auxiliary Transformers 242-1/242-2 (Fire Zone 18.1 0E-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are both unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown systems are directly affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions The offsite power feeds to both ESF buses are present in this fire zone. Therefore, offsite power will be lost. However, the ESF buses and their support systems are unaffected. Therefore, safe shutdown components and systems from both ESF divisions remain available for safe shutdown of unit 2.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.164 Byron River Screen House (Fire Zone 18.11-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems 2.4-426
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Both of the essential service water cooling tower makeup pumps, their diesel engines, and their various coolers are present in the zone. The makeup pumps are separated horizontally by approximately 40 feet, each pump is surrounded by a 48 inch high 12 inch thick concrete barrier, and there are automatic C02 suppression systems in place for each pump. As a result a single fire is not likely to affect both components.
Two deep well pumps located near the SX cooling tower are capable of making up to the tower using station operating procedures when the safe shutdown makeup pumps at the river screen house are not available. Although the deep well pumps are not listed as safe shutdown components, they are powered off the ESF buses and are not impacted by any fire damage effects at the river screen house.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.165 Byron River Screen House DO Tank Room 1 (Fire Zone 18.11-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The OB essential service water cooling tower makeup pump diesel oil storage tank is present in the zone. The redundant OA essential service water cooling tower makeup pump is unaffected by a fire in this zone and is credited for safe shutdown.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations 2.4-427
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.166 Byron River Screen House DO Tank Room 2 (Fire Zone 18.11-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The OA essential service water cooling tower makeup pump diesel oil storage tank is present in the zone. The redundant OB essential service water cooling tower makeup pump is unaffected by a fire in this zone and is credited for safe shutdown.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.167 ESW Cooling Tower Electrical Substation, Division 12 (Fire Zone 18.14A-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Control cables for the OB essential service water cooling tower makeup pump OSX02PB are present in the zone. The redundant OA essential service water cooling tower makeup pump is unaffected by a fire in this zone and is credited for safe shutdown.
Division 12 OB essential service water cooling tower makeup inlet, tower riser, and hot water bypass valves have cables present in the zone. The redundant Division 11 CA essential service water cooling tower valves are unaffected and credited for safe shutdown.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions 2.4-428
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Cables and components from Division 12 are present in this fire zone. Therefore Division 11 equipment will be relied upon for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Supoort The Division 11 and 12 4KV ESF buses are available for safe shutdown. Power and control cables for Unit 1 ESW Cooling Tower unit substation 132Z is located in this zone. Postulated faults on these cables could adversely affect the operation of the Division 12 4KV ESF bus. Therefore, after determination of a design basis fire, credit is taken for manually opening and pulling the control power fuses for the Division 12 unit substation feed breaker per station procedure as a precautionary measure to protect the Division 12 4KV ESF bus. Additionally, components and cables associated with the Division 12 essential service water cooling tower ESF unit substation 132Z, MCC 132Z1, and room ventilation fans are present in this zone. Therefore, the Division 12 ESW AC power sources at the cooling tower are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 ESW AC power sources at the cooling tower are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The RCS inventory control systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The hot standby decay heat removal systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support Division 12 essential service water cooling tower support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 11 essential service water cooling tower support system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The remaining essential support systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The cold shutdown decay heat removal systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4-429
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002
<-J 2.4.2.168 ESW Cooling Tower Electrical Substation, Division 22 (Fire Zone 18.14A-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Division 22 OB essential service water cooling tower makeup inlet, tower riser, and hot water bypass valves have cables present in the zone. The redundant Division 21 OA essential service water cooling tower valves are unaffected and credited for safe shutdown.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from Division 22 are present in this fire zone. Therefore Division 21 equipment will be relied upon for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The Division 21 and 22 4KV ESF buses are available for safe shutdown. Power and control cables for Unit 2 ESW Cooling Tower unit substation 232Z is located in this zone. Postulated faults on these cables could adversely affect the operation of the Division 22 4KV ESF bus. Therefore, after determination of a design basis fire, credit is taken for manually opening and pulling the control power fuses for the Division 22 unit substation feed breaker per station procedure as a precautionary measure to protect the Division 22 4KV ESF bus. Additionally, components and cables associated with the Division 22 essential service water cooling tower ESF unit substation 232Z, MCC 232Z1, and room ventilation fans are present in this zone. Therefore, the Division 22 ESW AC power sources at the cooling tower are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 ESW AC power sources at the cooling tower are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The RCS inventory control systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The hot standby decay heat removal systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support 2.4-430
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Division 22 essential service water cooling tower support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 21 essential service water cooling tower support system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The remaining essential support systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The cold shutdown decay heat removal systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.169 ESW Cooling Tower Electrical Substation, Division 11 (Fire Zone 18.14B-1)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Control cables for the OA essential service water cooling tower makeup pump OSX02PA are present in the zone. The redundant OB essential service water cooling tower makeup pump is unaffected by a fire in this zone and is credited for safe shutdown.
Division 11 OA essential service water cooling tower makeup inlet, tower riser, and hot water bypass valves have cables present in the zone. The redundant Division 12 OB essential service water cooling tower valves are unaffected and credited for safe shutdown.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from Division 11 are present in this fire zone. Therefore Division 12 equipment will be relied upon for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) Support The Division 11 and 12 4KV ESF buses are available for safe shutdown. Power and control cables for Unit 1 ESW Cooling Tower unit substation 131Z is located in this zone. Postulated faults on these cables could adversely affect the operation of the Division 11 4KV ESF bus. Therefore, after determination of a design basis fire, credit is taken for manually opening and pulling the control power fuses for the Division 11 unit substation feed breaker per station procedure as a precautionary measure to protect the Division 11 4KV ESF bus. Additionally, components and cables associated with the Division 11 essential service water cooling tower ESF unit substation 131 Z, MCC 2.4-431
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 131Z1, and room ventilation fans are present in this zone. Therefore, the Division 11 ESW AC power sources at the cooling tower are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 ESW AC power sources at the cooling tower are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
RCS Inventory Control (Includinq Boration)
The RCS inventory control systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The hot standby decay heat removal systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support Division 11 essential service water cooling tower support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 12 essential service water cooling tower support system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The remaining essential support systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The cold shutdown decay heat removal systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 2 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.170 ESW Cooling Tower Electrical Substation, Division 21 (Fire Zone 18.14B-2)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems Division 21 OA essential service water cooling tower makeup inlet, tower riser, and hot water bypass valves have cables present in the zone. The redundant Division 22 OB essential service water cooling tower valves are unaffected and credited for safe shutdown.
2.4-432
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions No unit 1 safe shutdown systems are affected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions Cables and components from Division 21 are present in this fire zone. Therefore Division 22 equipment will be relied upon for safe shutdown.
Essential Electric Power (AC/DC) SuD*ort The Division 21 and 22 4KV ESF buses are available for safe shutdown. Power and control cables for Unit 2 ESW Cooling Tower unit substation 231 Z is located in this zone. Postulated faults on these cables could adversely affect the operation of the Division 21 4KV ESF bus. Therefore, after determination of a design basis fire, credit is taken for manually opening and pulling the control power fuses for the Division 21 unit substation feed breaker per station procedure as a precautionary measure to protect the Division 21 4KV ESF bus. Additionally, components and cables associated with the Division 21 essential service water cooling tower ESF unit substation 231Z, MCC 231Z1, and room ventilation fans are present in this zone. Therefore, the Division 21 ESW AC power sources at the cooling tower are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 ESW AC power sources at the cooling tower are unaffected by a fire in this zone, and are credited for safe shutdown.
RCS Inventory Control (Including Boration)
The RCS inventory control systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Hot Standby Decay Heat Removal The hot standby decay heat removal systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Essential Support Division 21 essential service water cooling tower support systems are assumed to be unavailable. The Division 22 essential service water cooling tower support system is unaffected by a fire in this zone.
The remaining essential support systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Cold Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The cold shutdown decay heat removal systems are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations 2.4-433
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.171 Condensate Storage Tank Area (Fire Zone 18.23-0)
Safe shutdown components and cables located in this fire zone are listed in Table 2.4
- 4.
Common Systems The control room ventilation system and the auxiliary building ventilation system are unaffected by a fire in this zone.
Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Functions One unit 1 safe shutdown component is present in this zone. The condensate storage tank (CST) is an aluminum tank which is not susceptible to fire damage. Therefore, a fire in this zone will not have any effect on safe shutdown of unit 1.
Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Functions One unit 2 safe shutdown component is present in this zone. The condensate storage tank (CST) is an aluminum tank which is not susceptible to fire damage. Therefore, a
~->_
fire in this zone will not have any effect on safe shutdown of unit 2.
Fire Zone Boundary BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations and Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations No BTP CMEB 9.5-1 deviations or Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations are applicable to the boundaries of this fire zone.
2.4.2.172 Security Diesel Motor Control Center Elev. 426'-0" (Fire Zone 18.35-
- 0)
No safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.173 Relay House (Fire Zone 18.36-0)
Offsite power is assumed to be lost for a fire in this zone, however, no safe shutdown components or cables are located in this fire zone. Therefore, a fire in this zone will have no impact on the safe shutdown of either unit.
2.4.2.174 ESW Retum Valve Pit @ Braidwood Cooling Lake (Fire Zone 18.39-0)
This is a Braidwood only fire zone which does not exist at the Byron station.
2.4-434
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 2.4.3 Identification and Analysis of High-Low Pressure Interfaces A number of interfaces between the RCS and lower pressure systems were reviewed as potential high-low pressure interfaces. The following interfaces were so evaluated:
RCS to RHR pump suction lines Pressurizer PORVs/Block valves Reactor vessel head vent valves Normal letdown line Excess letdown line Each of these potential high-low pressure interfaces is discussed below.
2.4.3.1 RHR Pump Suction Lines The power and control cables for each of the RHR pump suction valves are listed in Table 2.4-4. The routings of each cable can be determined from this table.
Each of the four RHR pump suction lines is isolated from the RCS by two motor operated valves in series. The valves are located as near to the RCS hot leg nozzle as practicable. Each valve and the intermediate piping is rated for full RCS pressure, but the downstream piping is designed for a lower pressure. The RHR pump suction valves are manually controlled valves which can be opened only by manual operation of their control switches in the main control room or locally using their handwheels.
Each pump suction line has an isolation valve powered from both ESF divisions. For unit 1(2) train A, the two isolation valves are 1 (2)RH8701A and 1 (2)RH8701B. For unit 1(2) train B, the two isolation valves are 1(2)RH8702A and 1 (2)RH8702B. Valves 1(2)RH8701A and 1 (2)RH8702A are powered from ESF division 11 (21). Valves 1 (2)RH8701 B and 1(2)RH8702B are powered from ESF division 12(22).
During normal operation, plant procedures require that power be locked out to at least one of the two valves in each RHR pump suction line. The result is that postulated faults on control circuit cables could cause one of the valves to open, but not the valve with power locked out. Therefore, it is not necessary to evaluate the control circuits of these valves for potential spurious operation. Postulated faults on the power cables are assumed to be capable of causing a valve to spuriously open.
For each suction line, a review of the power cable routing for each of the isolation valves reveals that the power cable for both valves in the line are present only in one fire zone. That is the containment itself. Outside of containment, the power cables for both valves in a suction line are never together in the same fire zone. Also, a combination of one power cable and a control cable for the other valve are not found in the same fire zone. Therefore, fires outside of the containment are not capable of causing both valves in a line to spuriously open.
2.4-435
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 For these valves, the licensing basis of the plant, as documented in the original Fire
~-*--
Protection Report/SSA and subsequently issued SERs, is that simultaneous three phase hot shorts of the proper polarity on the power cables of both of these valves is not credible. Therefore, the spurious operation of these valves is not postulated to occur inside the containments. This position supercedes the cable damage criteria as stated in introductory subsection 2.4.1.5.2 (which is therefore not applied to these valves). Therefore, the spurious opening of these valves due to a fire in the containment is not postulated to occur.
2.4.3.2 Pressurizer PORVs and Block Valves The power and control cables for each of the pressurizer PORVs and their associated block valves are listed in Table 2.4-4. The routings of each cable can be determined from this table.
The pressurizer PORVs are DC solenoid controlled air operated valves. These valves provide the primary overpressure protection of the RCS during most modes of operation. Each PORV discharge line has a normally open motor operated block valve immediately upstream of the PORV itself. Both PORV discharge lines are routed to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). The PRT is sized to accept and quench the PORV discharge only for a limited time. Certain post-fire scenarios may require or result in discharge for a longer time. If a PORV were to discharge to the PRT for a sufficiently long time, the PRT pressure would rise to the rupture disc relief pressure, and the PRT contents would be released to the containment atmosphere. The postulated release of reactor coolant to the containment atmosphere would not adversely affect any safe shutdown components located inside containment, since these components are qualified for a post-LOCA environment. However, containment habitability would be affected. Local manual operation of safe shutdown motor operated valves inside containment is credited for some postulated fires.
Postulated hot shorts on any PORV control cables except 1 (2)DC100 for PORV 1(2)RY455A and 1 (2)DC102 for PORV 1 (2)RY456 are assumed to be capable of causing the spurious opening of the valve. Cables 1 (2)DC1 00 and 1 (2)DC1 02 are the cables which provide 125Vdc power to the circuit. Postulated faults on these cables can de-energize (or re-energize) the circuit, but cannot cause a spurious operation of the affected PORV.
The Division 11(21) PORV and block valve both have control cables in the main control room and in two of the upper cable spreading rooms. Should a fire in any of these zones cause the spurious opening of the PORV, coincident with control circuit damage to the block valve, the block valve could still be closed. A "remote/local" isolation switch and control switch are provided for the block valve at its motor control center, located in the Division 11 (21) electrical penetration area. The block valve can be closed by placing the =remote/local" isolation switch in "Local" and then closing the valve with the control switch provided. A control cable for the PORV is also present in the Division 11 (21) electrical penetration area, along with control and power cables for the block 2.4-436
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 valve. The PORV control cable is located in conduit without any other cables.
-v-Therefore, a fire in this zone may disable both the PORV and its block valve, but fire induced faults cannot cause the PORV to spuriously open.
The Division 12(22) PORV and block valve both have control cables in the main control room and in two of the lower cable spreading rooms. Should a fire in any of these zones cause the spurious opening of the PORV, coincident with control circuit damage to the block valve, the block valve could still be closed. A "remote/local" isolation switch and control switch are provided for the block valve at its motor control center, located in the Division 12(22) electrical penetration area. The block valve can be closed by placing the "remote/local" isolation switch in "Local" and then closing the valve with the control switch provided. A control cable for the PORV is also present in the Division 12(22) electrical penetration area, along with control and power cables for the block valve. The PORV control cable is located in conduit without any other cables.
Therefore, a fire in this zone may disable both the PORV and its block valve, but fire induced faults cannot cause the PORV to spuriously open.
In fire zones where one of the PORVs has a control cable present in the zone that can spuriously open the PORV and its associated block valve does not have AC power available, the PORV will be failed closed by pulling its control power fuse at its DC distribution panel.
The Division 11 and Division 12 PORVs and block valves both have cables present inside containment. In some locations, these cables are close together. This is the subject of Appendix R Deviation 2C.1. Inside the pressurizer cubicle, all cables are routed in conduit. Outside the pressurizer cubicle, Division 11 cable 1 RY246 and Division 12 cable 1 RY252 are routed wholly in conduit from the penetration over to the junction box in the pressurizer cubicle. Since the cables are routed in conduit, spurious operation of the PORV due to fire-induced faults on the cable is not possible.
Therefore, a fire in this zone may disable both the PORV and its block valve, but fire induced faults cannot cause the PORV to spuriously open.
The Division 21 and Division 22 PORVs and block valves both have cables present inside containment. In some locations, these cables are close together. This is the subject of Appendix R Deviation 2C.1. Inside the pressurizer cubicle, all cables are routed in conduit. Outside the pressurizer cubicle, Division 21 cable 2RY246 and Division 22 cable 2RY252 are routed wholly in conduit from the penetration over to the junction box in the pressurizer cubicle. Since the cables are routed in conduit, spurious operation of the PORV due to fire-induced faults on the cable is not possible.
Therefore, a fire in this zone may disable both the PORV and its block valve, but fire induced faults cannot cause the PORV to spuriously open.
2.4.3.3 Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves The cables for each of the reactor vessel head vent valves are listed in Table 2.4-4.
The routings of each cable can be determined from this table.
2.4-437
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Each reactor vessel head vent has two parallel flowpaths, each of which has two valves in series. These are 1(2)RC014A and 1(2)RC014C in one path and 1(2)RC014B and 1(2)RC014D in the other path. The arrangement of these valves is shown in UFSAR figure 5.1-1, sheet 1.
All four valves are dc solenoid operated valves. They are normally closed during power operation, and they fail closed. Each valve is controlled through a separate circuit from a two position (OPEN and CLOSE) control switch at main control room panel 1(2)PM1 1J. Power is supplied to each solenoid directly through the control cabling.
Division 11 valves 1 RC014A and 1 RC014C have control cables present together in the following fire zones: 2.1-0, 3.3C-1, 3.3D-1, 3.4A-1, 3.2E-1, 11.6-0, 11.5-0, 11.5A-1, and the containment (1-1).
Division 12 valves 1 RC01 4B and 1 RC01 4D have control cables present together in the following fire zones: 2.1-0, 3.2B-1, 3.2C-1, 11.6-0, 11.6-1 and the containment (1-1).
Division 21 valves 2RC014A and 2RC014C have control cables present together in the following fire zones: 2.1-0, 3.3C-2, 3.3D-2, 3.4A-2, 3.2E-2, 11.6-0, 11.5-0, 11.5B-2, and the containment (1-2).
Division 22 valves 2RC01 4B and 2RC01 4D have control cables present together in the following fire zones: 2.1-0, 3.2A-2, 3.2B-2, 3.2C-2,11.6-2 and the containment (1-2).
In order to preclude a control room fire from causing the spurious opening of any of these valves, the control room evacuation procedure requires the circuits for these valves be de-energized upon leaving the control room.
For these valves, the licensing basis of the plant, as documented in the original Fire Protection Report/SSA and subsequently issued SERs, is that simultaneous two wire hot shorts on the DC control cables of both valves in series is not credible, and therefore is not postulated to occur. This position supercedes the cable damage criteria as stated in introductory subsection 2.4.1.5.2 (which is therefore not applied to these valves). Therefore, the spurious opening of these valves due to a fire in any of the zones where control cables from both valves in a flowpath are present is not postulated to occur.
2.4.3.4 Normal Letdown Line Normal letdown is taken from the reactor coolant system loop 3 cold leg. Two flow control valves are provided in this line, one inside and one outside the missile barrier.
These are valves 1 (2)CVLCV459 and 1 (2)CVLCV460. Both of these valves are air operated valves which fail closed on loss of air or loss of electric power. Downstream of these valves, the letdown line splits into two lines prior to entering the regenerative heat exchangers. Isolation valves 1(2)CV8389A and B are provided in the lines 2.4-438
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 upstream of each regenerative heat exchanger. Each of these valves are air operated valves which fail closed on loss of air or loss of electric power. Downstream of the "regenerative heat exchangers, the letdown lines join together prior to passing through one or more of three parallel letdown orifices and the letdown orifice isolation valves, 1(2)CV8149A, B and C. Each of the letdown orifice isolation valves is an air operated valve which fails closed on either loss of air or loss of electric power. Piping downstream of the letdown orifice isolation valves has a lower design pressure than upstream piping, which is designed for the RCS normal operating pressure. Therefore, these valves form the high-low pressure boundary on the letdown line. The letdown line therefore has at least four valves in series, each of which fails to the closed position.
The simultaneous hot shorts on the control circuits of four valves, which is required to cause all four valves to spuriously open, is not considered to be credible. Therefore, this flowpath does not need to be evaluated as a high-low pressure interface. The valves in this flowpath are not listed on the safe shutdown equipment list and are not evaluated further.
2.4.3.5 Excess Letdown Line Excess letdown can be taken from each of the four reactor coolant system cold leg loop drain headers. These lines are each isolated by normally closed air operated isolation valves, 1(2)RC8037A through D. These valves fail closed on loss of air or loss of electric power. Flowpaths from the reactor coolant system hot leg loop drain headers are also provided, but these are isolated by manual valves which are not susceptible to spurious operation. All eight of these lines combine into a single line prior to splitting into two lines, one for each excess letdown heat exchanger. An isolation valve, 1 (2)CV8153A and B, is provided upstream of each excess letdown heat exchanger.
These are normally closed air operated valves, which fail closed on loss of air or loss of electric power. The excess letdown lines then rejoin prior to passing through a flow control valve, 1 CVHCV1 23. This normally closed valve also fails closed on loss of air or loss of electric power. The excess letdown line has three normally closed, fail closed valves in series. The simultaneous hot shorts on the control circuits of three valves, which is required to cause all three valves to spuriously open, is not considered to be credible. Therefore, this flowpath does not need to be evaluated as a high-low pressure interface. The valves in this flowpath are not listed on the safe shutdown equipment list and are not evaluated further.
2.4-439
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-1 SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO PERFORM SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTION Reactivity control Reactor Coolant System inventory and pressure control Decay heat removal Process monitoring SYSTEMS FOR HOT STANDBY Reactor Trip CVCS (charging pumps)
Pressurizer PORVs Boric Acid (BATs and transfer pumps)
Condensate (CST)
Main Steam (S/G atmospheric relief valves; safety valves)
Neutron Monitoring (NR)
Pressurizer Level (RY) &
Pressure (RY)
RCS Hot & Cold Leg Temperature (RC)
Incore Thermocouples (IT)
S/G Pressure (MS)
S/G Level (FW)
Containment sump Level (SI) and Flow (RF)
(Diagnostic)
SYSTEMS FOR COLD SHUTDOWN CVCS & SI (Borated water from RWST)
Same as for hot standby Same as for hot standby N/A Residual Heat Removal (includes SI flowpaths)
N/A Same as for hot standby RCS WR Pressure (RC)
RHR HX Outlet Temperature (RH)
N/A N/A N/A Same as for hot standby N/A (Sheet 1 of 2)
BYRON - FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-1 SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO PERFORM SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTION Essential mechanical support Essential HVAC support Essential electrical support SYSTEMS FOR HOT STANDBY Essential Service Water Component Cooling Water Auxiliary Building HVAC Control Room HVAC Diesel Generator HVAC Switchgear Room and MEER HVAC Containment Cooling (RCFCs)
Essential & Limited Non Essential AC Power Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries Essential DC Power Instrument Power SYSTEMS FOR COLD SHUTDOWN Same as for hot standby Same as for hot standby Same as for hot standby Same as for hot standby Same as for hot standby Same as for hot standby Same as for hot standby Essential AC Power Same as for hot standby Same as for hot standby Same as for hot standby (Sheet 2 of 2)
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 0AB03P(1)
OAB03P(2)
OCCOIA OCC01 E-A OCC01 E-B 0CCO1E-C OCC01 E-D OCC01P ODO08TA ODO08TB OFI-SX044 0SX007 OSX02AA OSX02AB 0SX02PA OSX02PA-K OSX02PB OSX02PB-K OSX03AA OSX03AB OSX04AA OSX04AB 0SX146 0SX147 0SX157A OSX157B 0SX158A 0SX158B 0SX162A OSX162B 0SX162C OSX162D 0SX163A OSX163B 0SX163C 0SX163D OSX163E OSX163F OSX163G 0SX163H OVA005Y OVA010Y OVA011Y OVA01CA OVA01CB OVA01CC "0VAO1CD (Sheet 1 of 27)
Equipment Description Boric Acid Transfer Pump Boric Acid Transfer Pump 0 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Switchgear Bus for "0" CC Pump Powered from 4160Vac Bus 141 Swttchgear Bus for "0" CC Pump Powered from 416OVac Bus 241 Switchgear Bus for "0" CC Pump Powered from 416OVac Bus 142 Switchgear Bus for "0" CC Pump Powered from 416OVac Bus 242 0 Component Cooling Pump SX Makeup Pump Diesel ON Storage Tank OA SX Makeup Pump Diesel Oil Storage Tank OA Component Cooling HX "0" Flow Indicator (OFT-SX044)
Component Cooling HX '0" ESW Outlet Valve (MO)
Essential Service Water Cooling Tower OA Essential Service Water Cooling Tower 0B Essential Service Water Makeup Pump OA Diesel Engine for Essential Service Water Makeup Pump OA Essential Service Water Makeup Pump 0B Diesel Engine for Essential Service Water Makeup Pump 0B ESW Makeup Pump OA Diesel Jacket Water Heat Exchanger ESW Makeup Pump 0B Diesel Jacket Water Heat Exchanger ESW Makeup Pump OA Diesel Gear Oil Cooler ESW Makeup Pump 0B Diesel Gear ONl Cooler Component Cooling HX "0' ESW Outlet Isolation Valve (MO)
Component Cooling HX "0" ESW Outlet Isolation Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower OA Makeup Inlet Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower 0B Makeup Inlet Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower OA Makeup Inlet Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower 0B Makeup Inlet Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower OA Hot Water Bypass to Basin Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower OB Hot Water Bypass to Basin Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower OA Hot Water Bypass to Basin Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower 0B Hot Water Bypass to Basin Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower OA Riser Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower OA Riser Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower OA Riser Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower OA Riser Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower 0B Riser Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower 0B Riser Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower 0B Riser Valve (MO)
ESW Cooling Tower 0B Riser Valve (MO)
Aux Bldg HVAC Fan OA & 0B Supply Air Control Damper (AO)
Aux Bldg HVAC Fan 0C & OD Supply Air Control Damper (AO)
Aux Bldg HVAC Supply Crosstie Isolation Damper (AO)
Auxiliary Building HVAC Supply Fan OA Auxiliary Building HVAC Supply Fan 0B Auxiliary Building HVAC Supply Fan OC Auxiliary Building HVAC Supply Fan OD Equipment Zone 11.5-0 11.5-0 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.4-0 11.4-0 11.4-0 11.3-0 18.11-2 18.11-1 11.2-0 11.2-0 17.2-2 17.2-1 18.11-0 18.11-0 18.11-0 18.11-0 18.11-0 18.11-0 18.11-0 18.11-0 11.2-0 11.2-0 17.2-2 17.2-1 17.2-2 17.2-1 17.2-2 17.2-1 17.2-2 17.2-1 17.2-2 17.2-2 17.2-2 17.2-2 17.2-1 17.2-1 17.2-1 17.2-1 3.2-0 3.2-0 3.2-0 11.7-0 11.7-0 11.7-0 11.7-0
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Conrd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number OVA02CA OVA02CB OVA02CC OVA02CD 0VA274Y OVA305Y OVA430Y OVA448Y 0VA455Y 0VA455Y 0VA456Y OVA456Y OVA474Y 0VA475Y 0VA476Y 0VA477Y 0VA489Y OVA489Y OVA490Y OVA490Y 0VA492Y 0VA492Y 0VA495Y 0VA495Y 0VA496Y 0VA496Y 0VA497Y 0VA497Y OVA514Y OVA515Y 0VA515Y OVA516Y 0VA516Y OVC01CA OVC01CB 0VC01Y OVC02CA OVC02CB OVC02Y OVC032Y OVC033Y OVC034Y OVC034Y OVC03Y OVC043Y 0VC044Y OVC04Y (Sheet 2 of 27)
Equipment Description Auxiliary Building HVAC Exhaust Fan OA Auxiliary Building HVAC Exhaust Fan OB Auxiliary Building HVAC Exhaust Fan OC Auxiliary Building HVAC Exhaust Fan OD Charging Pump 1 B Room Inlet Isolation Damper (AO)
Charging Pump 2B Room Inlet Isolation Damper (AO)
Aux Bldg HVAC Fan OC & OD Supply Air Control Damper (AO)
Aux Bldg HVAC Supply Crosstie Isolation Damper (AO)
Train A SX Pump Room Return Duct Fire Damper Train A SX Pump Room Return Duct Fire Damper Train A SX Pump Room Return Duct Fire Damper Train A SX Pump Room Return Duct Fire Damper Aux Bldg HVAC El. 383' Supply Isolation Damper (MO)
Aux Bldg HVAC El. 383' Supply Isolation Damper (MO)
Aux Bldg HVAC El. 383' Supply Isolation Damper (MO)
Aux Bldg HVAC El. 383' Supply Isolation Damper (MO)
Unit 2 Division 22 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit 2 Division 22 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit 2 Division 22 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit 2 Division 22 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit 2 Division 22 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit 2 Division 22 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit 1 Division 12 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit I Division 12 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit 1 Division 12 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit 1 Division 12 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit I Division 12 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit I Division 12 Electrical Penetration Area Fire Damper Unit 1 Division 12 Elect. Penet. Area Flow Control Damper (AO)
Unit 1 RHR Pump 1B Room Exhaust Fire Damper Unit 1 RHR Pump lB Room Exhaust Fire Damper Unit 2 RHR Pump 2B Room Exhaust Fire Damper Unit 2 RHR Pump 2B Room Exhaust Fire Damper Control Room HVAC Supply Fan OA Control Room HVAC Supply Fan OB Train B Return Air Fan OB Inlet Damper Control Room HVAC Return Fan OA Control Room HVAC Return Fan OB Train B Purge Exaust Damper to Turbine Bldg Train A Outside Air Damper Train A Supply Fan OA Outlet Damper MCR HVAC Main Supply Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Supply Duct Fire Damper Train B Return Air Fan OB Outlet Damper Train A Recirculation Charcoal Absorber Bypass Damper Train B Recirculatlon Charcoal Absorber Bypass Damper Train B Maximum Outside Air (Purge Line) Inlet Damper Equipment Zone 11.7-0 11.7-0 11.7-0 11.7-0 11.3G-1 11.3G-2 11.6-0 3.2-0 11.4-0 11.4A-1 11.4-0 11.4A-1 11.4-0 11.4-0 11.4-0 11.4-0 11.6-2 11.6E-0 11.6-0 11.6-2 11.6-0 11.6-2 11.6-0 11.6-1 11.6-0 11.6-1 11.6-0 11.6-1 11.6-0 11.2B-1 11.2C-1 11.2B-2 11.2C-2 18.4-1 18.4-2 18.4-2 18.4-1 18.4-2 18.4-2 18.4-1 18.4-1 18.4-1 3.3A-1 18.4-2 18.4-1 18.4-2 18.4-2
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number OVCO60Y OVC060Y 0VC094Y 0VC095Y 0VC096Y OVC096Y OVC097Y 0VC097Y OVC099Y 0VC099Y OVC100Y 0VC100Y 0VC102Y OVC102Y OVC103Y OVC103Y OVC104Y OVC105Y OVC105Y OVC106Y OVC106Y OVC107Y OVC107Y OVC108Y OVC108Y 0vC109Y OVC109Y 0v C110Y oVC 110Y 0VClllY OvC111Y 0VCl 12Y 0VCl 12Y OVC1 13Y OVC1 13Y OVCl 14Y 0VCl 14Y OVCll5Y OVC1 15Y OVC116Y 0VCl 16Y 0VC1 17Y 0VCl 17Y OVC1 18Y 0VCll8Y 0VC119Y OVC11o9Y (Sheet 3 of 27)
Equipment Description Unit I AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit I AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 AEER Return Flow Control Damper Unit 1 AEER Supply Flow Control Damper Unit 1 AEER Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 AEER Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I AEER Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 AEER Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit I AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit I AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Return Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Return Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Supply Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Flow Control Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Equipment Zone 3.3B-1 5.5-1 3.3B-1 3.3B-1 3.3B-1 5.5-1 3.3B-1 5.5-1 3.3B-1 5.5-1 3.3B-1 5.5-1 18.4-1 3.3B-1 3.3A-1 3.3C-1 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (ConVd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number OVC120Y OVC120Y OVC121Y OVC121Y OVC122Y 0VC122Y OVC123Y 0VC123Y OVC124Y OVC124Y OVC125Y 0VC125Y OVC126Y OVC126Y OVC127Y OVC127Y OVC128Y OVC12BY OVC133Y OVC140Y OVC141Y OVC141Y OVC142Y OVC142Y OVC1 43Y OVC143Y OVC144Y OVC144Y OVC145Y OVC145Y OVC146Y OVC146Y OVC147Y OVC147Y OVC14BY 0VC148Y OVC149Y OVC149Y OVC 150Y OVC150Y OVC151Y OVC151Y OVC152Y OVC152Y OVC153Y OVC153Y OVC154Y (Sheet 4 of 27)
Equipment Description Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit I Main Control Room Return Row Control Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Flow Control Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Equipment Zone 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 2.1-0 3.3C-1 3.3C-1 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Confd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number OVC154Y OVC155Y OVC155Y OVC161Y OVC161Y OVC162Y OVC162Y OVC163Y OVC163Y OVC164Y OVC164Y OVC165Y OVC165Y OVC166Y OVC166Y OVC167Y OVC167Y OVC168Y OVC168Y OVC169Y OVC169Y OVC16Y OVC170Y OVC170Y OVC171Y OVC171Y 0VC172Y OVC173Y 0VC173Y OVC174Y OVC174Y OVC175Y 0VC176Y OVC176Y 0VC177Y OVC177Y OVC178Y OVC178Y 0VC179Y 0VC179Y OVC17Y 0VC180Y oVC180Y 0VCl81Y OVC181Y OVC182Y OVClBY (Sheet 5 of 27)
Equipment Description Unit 2 Main Control Room Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Train B Outside Air Damper MCR HVAC Main Supply Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Supply Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Return Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Return Duct Fire Damper Train B Supply Fan 0B Outlet Damper MCR HVAC Main Supply Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Supply Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Return Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Return Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Supply Flow Control Damper Unit 2 AEER Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Train A Return Air Fan OA Inlet Damper Unit 2 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER Return Flow Control Damper Train A Purge Exaust Damper to Turbine Bldg Equipment Zone 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 2.1-0 3.3C-2 18.4-2 3.3C-1 3.3C-2 3.3C-1 3.3C-2 18.4-2 18.4-2 3.3A-2 18.4-2 3.3B-2 3.3B-2 3.33-2 5.5-2 3.3B-2 5.5-2 3.3B-2 5.5-2 3.3B-2 5.5-2 18.4-1 3.3B-2 5.5-2 3.3B-2 5.5-2 3.3B-2 18.4-1
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number OVC19Y OVC20Y OVC217Y OVC240Y OVC240Y OVC241Y 0VC242Y 0VC242Y 0VC248Y 0VC248Y 0VC249Y 0VC249Y 0VC252Y 0VC252Y 0VC268Y 0VC268Y OVC281Y 0VC282Y 1AB03P 1AB03T 1AB8465 1AB8468 1AF004A 1AF004B 1AF005A IAF005B 1AF005C 1AF005D 1AF005E 1AF005F 1AFO05G 1AF005H 1AF006A 1AF006B 1AF013A 1AF013B 1AF013C IAF013D 1AF013E 1AF013F 1AF013G 1AF013H 1AF017A 1AF017B 1AF01AA IAF01AB 1 AF01 EA-A (Sheet 6 of 27)
Equipment Description Train A Return Air Fan OA Outlet Damper Train A Maximum Outside Air (Purge Line) Inlet Damper Unit 2 Main Control Room Return Flow Control Damper MCR HVAC Main Supply Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Supply Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Return Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Return Duct Fire Damper MCR HVAC Main Return Duct Fire Damper Unit I AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit 1 AEER Exhaust Duct Fire Damper Unit I AEER and Misc Area Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit I AEER and Misc Area Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER and Misc Area Supply Duct Fire Damper Unit 2 AEER and Misc Area Supply Duct Fire Damper Train A Outside Air Damper Train B Outside Air Damper Boric Acid Transfer Pump Boric Acid Tank BA Pump Suction Crosstie Isolation Valve (MV)
BA Pump Discharge Crosstle Isolation Valve (MV)
AFW Pump IA Discharge Isolation Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 1B Discharge Isolation Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 1A to SG 1A Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 1A to SG 1B Flow Control Valve(AO)
AFW Pump 1A to SG 1C Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 1A to SG ID Flow Control Valve(AO)
AFW Pump 1B to SG 1A Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 1 B to SG 1 B Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 1 B to SG IC Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump lB to SG 1D Flow Control Valve (AO)
Essl Service Water to AFW Pump 1A Suction Valve (MO)
Essl Service Water to AFW Pump 1B Suction Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 1A to SG 1A Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 1A to SG 1B Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 1A to SG IC Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump IA to SG ID Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 1 B to SG IA Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 1 B to SG 1 B Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 1B to SG 1C Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 1 B to SG 1D Stop Valve (MO)
Essl Service Water to AFW Pump 1A Suction Valve (MO)
Ess'l Service Water to AFW Pump 1 B Suction Valve (MO)
Oil Cooler for AFW Pump 1A Oil Cooler for AFW Pump lB Battery 1 for AFW Pump 1 B Diesel Engine Equipment Zone 18.4-1 18.4-1 3.3C-2 3.3A-2 3.3C-2 3.3B-1 3.3B-2 3.3C-2 3.3B-1 5.5-1 3.3B-1 5.5-1 3.3A-1 3.3B-1 3.3A-2 3.31-2 18.4-1 18.4-2 11.5-0 11.5-0 11.5-0 11.5-0 11.4-0 11.4A-1 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.4A-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 11.4-0 11.4A-1 11.4-0 11.4A-1 11.4A-1
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont d)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 1AF01EA-B 1AF01EB-A 1AF01EB-B 1AF01PA 1AF01 PA-A 1AF01PB 1AF01PB-A 1AF01PB-C 1AF01PB-K IAF022A 1AF022B IAF02A 1AP05EA IAP05EC 1AP05EE IAP05EF IAPO5EG 1AP05EJ IAP05EK IAP05EP 1AP05ER 1AP05EU 1AP06EC 1AP06EE 1AP06EF 1AP06EG 1AP06EH 1AP06EL 1AP06EN 1AP06EP 1AP06EQ 1AP06ES 1AP07E IAP07EK 1AP07EL 1AP10E 1AP12E 1AP14E 1AP21E 1AP21EA 1AP22E 1AP23E 1AP24E 1AP25E 1AP26E 1AP27E 1AP28E (Sheet 7 of 27)
Equipment Description Battery 1A for AFW Pump lB Diesel Engine Battery 2 for AFW Pump 1 B Diesel Engine Battery 2A for AFW Pump IB Diesel Engine Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 A (Motor Driven)
Lube Oil Pump for AFW Pump 1 A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 B (Diesel Driven)
Lube Oil Pump for AFW Pump 1 B Gear Box Lube Oil Pump for AFW Pump 1 B Diesel Engine for AFW Pump 1 B AFW Pump 1A Recirculation Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 1B Recirculation Valve (AO)
Gear Oil Cooler for AFW Pump 1 B Division 11 ACB 1415Z (4160-480V ESW Cig Twr Transformer 131Z)
Division 11 ACB (for Safety Injection Pump ISI01 PA)
Division 11 4160V ESF Switchgear Bus 141 Undervoltage Cubicle Division 11 ACB 1413 (Feed from Diesel Generator 1 A)
Division 11 ACB 1411 (Bus Tie to 4160V Swgr Bus 143)
Division 11 ACB (for Containment Spray Pump 1CS01 PA)
Division 11 ACB (for Control Room Refrign Unit 0WOO1 CA)
Division 11 ACB 1414 (Reserve Feed from 4160V Swgr Bus 241)
Division 11 ACB 1412 (SAT Feed from Transformer 142-1)
Division 11 ACB 1415X (4160-480V ESF Transformer 1AP1IE)
DMslon 12 ACB (for Safety Injection Pump 1S01 PB)
Division 12 4160V ESF Switchgear Bus 142 Undervoltage Cubicle Division 12 ACB 1423 (Feed from Diesel Generator IB)
Division 12 ACB 1421 (Bus Tie to 4160V Swgr Bus 144)
Division 12 ACB (for Containment Spray Pump 1CS01 PB)
Division 12 ACB (for Control Room Refrign Unit 0WO01CB)
Division 12 ACB 1425Z (4160-480V ESW Cig Twr Transformer 132Z)
DMsion 12 ACB 1425X (4160-480V ESF Transformer 1AP13E)
Division 12 ACB 1424 (Reserve Feed from 4160V Swgr Bus 242)
DMsion 12 ACB1 422 (SAT Feed from Transformer 142-2)
Division 11 4160 Non-ESF Switchgear Bus 143 4160V Bus 143 Feed From Bus 141 Transformers 133X and 133Y Feed Division 11 480V ESF Switchgear Bus 131X Division 12 480V ESF Switchgear Bus 132X Division 11 480V Non-ESF Aux Bldg Unit Substation 133X Division 11 480V ESF MCC 131X1 Division 11 480V ESF MCC 131XIA DMsion 11 480V ESF MCC 131X3 Division 12 480V ESF MCC 132X1 Division 12 480V ESF MCC 132X3 Division 11 480V ESF MCC 131X2 Division 11 480V ESF MCC 131X4 Division 12 480V ESF MCC 132X2 Division 12 480V ESF MCC 132X4 Equipment Zone 11.4A-1 11.4A-1 11.4A-1 11.4-0 11.4-0 11.4A-1 11.4A-1 11.4A-1 11.4A-1 11.4-0 11.4-0 11.4A-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.1-1 5.1-1 5.1-1 5.1-1 5.1-1 5.1-1 5.1-1 5.1-1 5.1-1 5.1-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.2-1 5.1-1 11.5-0 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.4-0 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.5A-1 11.5A-1 11.6-1 11.6-1
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 1AP30E 1AP32E 1AP36E 1AP38E 1AP42E 1AP92E 1AP93E 1AP98E 1AP99E ICC01A ICC01PA 1CCOIPB ICCO0T 1 CC685 1CC9412A 1CC9412B 1CC9413A 1CC9413B 1CC9414 1 CC9415 1CC9416 1 CC9438 1CC9459B 1CC9467B ICC9473A 1CC9473B ICDO1T 1CS009A 1CS009B 1CV01PA 1CV01PB 1CV02A 1CV02SA 1CV02SB ICV03SA 1CV03SB 1CV112B ICV112C 1CV112D 1CV112E 1CV121 1CV8104 1CV8110 1CV8111 1CV8114 1CV8116 1CV8355A (Sheet 8 of 27)
Equipment Description Division 11 480V ESF MCC 131X5 Division 12 480V ESF MCC 132X5 Division 11 480V Non-ESF MCC 133X1B Division 11 480V Non-ESF MCC 133X1A Division 11 480V Non-ESF MCC 133X3 Division 12 480V ESW Cooling Tower MCC 132Z1 Division 11 480V ESW Cooling Tower MCC 131ZI Division 12 480V ESF Unit Substation 132Z Division 11 480V ESF Unit Substation 131Z Unit 1 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 1A Component Cooling Pump 1B Component Cooling Pump Component Cooling Surge Tank CCW Return Containment Isolation Valve (MO) 1A RHR Hx Outlet Valve (MO) 1 B RHR Hx Outlet Valve (MO)
CCW Supply Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
CCW Supply Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
CCW Return Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
Supply Header Isolation Valve (MO)
CCW Return Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
CCW Return Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
Manual Header Crosstie Valve (Manual)
Manual Header Crosstie Valve (Manual)
Intermediate Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
Intermediate Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
Unit 1 Condensate Storage Tank Containment Spray Pump 1 A Sump Suction Valve (MO)
Containment Spray Pump 1 B Sump Suction Valve (MO)
Charging Pump IA Charging Pump 1 B CV Seal Water Heat Exchanger Charging Pump 1A Gear Cooler Charging Pump 1B Gear Cooler Charging Pump 1 A Lube Oil Cooler Charging Pump 1 B Lube Oil Cooler VCT Outlet Isolation Valve (MO)
VCT Outlet Isolation Valve (MO)
RWST to Charging Pumps Suction Valve (MO)
RWST to Charging Pumps Suction Valve (MO)
Centrifugal Charging Pumps Flow Control Valve (AO)
Emergency Boration Valve (MO)
Charging Pump IB Miniflow Isolation Valve (MO)
Charging Pump 1A Miniflow Isolation Valve (MO)
Charging Pump 1A Miniflow Isolation Valve (SO)
Charging Pump 1B Miniflow Isolation Valve (SO)
RCP 1A Seal Injection Isolation Valve (MO)
Equipment Zone 11.6-0 11.6-0 11.2-0 11.2-0 11.5-0 18.14A-1 18.14B-1 18.14A-1 18.14B-1 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.6-0 11.3-1 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3-0 1-1 1-1 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 18.23-0 111.2B-1 11.2C-1 11.3D-1 11.3G-1 11.4B-1 11.3D-1 11.3G-1 11.3D-1 11.3G-1 11.6A-1 1 1.6A-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.6A-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3-1
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 1CV8355B 1CV8355C 1CV8355D 1CV8387A 1CV8387B 1CV8483A 1CV8483B 1CV8804A 1DC01E IDC02E 1DC03E 1DC04E 1DC05E 1DC06E 1DC10J 1DC11J IDG01KA 1DG01KB 1DO01PA 1DO01PB 1DO01PC "1DOO1PD 1DO01TA 1DO01TB 1DO01TC 1DO01TD 1DO02TA 1DO02TB 1DO10T 1ESFCompl 1 1ESFComp12 1FI-0121A 1FI-0121B 1FI-SX031 1IPOlE 1IP01J 1IP02E IIP02J 1IP03E 1IP03J lIP04E 1IP04J IIP05E 1IP06E IlP07E lIP08E 1U-0459A (Sheet 9 of 27)
Equipment Description RCP 1 B Seal Injection Isolation Valve (MO)
RCP 1C Seal Injection Isolation Valve (MO)
RCP ID Seal Injection Isolation Valve (MO)
Charging Pump 1A Discharge Header FCV Bypass Valve Charging Pump 1 B Discharge Header FCV Bypass Valve (MV)
Charging Header FCV Upsteam Isolation Valve (MV)
Charging Header FCV Downsteam Isolation Valve (MV)
RHR HX 1 A to Charging Pump Suction Isolation Valve (MO)
Division 11 125V Battery 111 Division 12 125V Battery 112 Division 11 Battery Charger 111 Division 12 Battery Charger 112 Division 11 125Vdc Distribution Center 111 Division 12 125Vdc Distribution Center 112 Division 11 125Vdc Fuse Panel Division 12 125Vdc Fuse Panel Diesel Generator IA Diesel Generator 1B 1A Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1 B Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1C Fuel Oil Transfer Pump ID Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Diesel Oil Storage Tank IA Diesel Oil Storage Tank 1B Diesel Oil Storage Tank 1C Diesel Oil Storage Tank 1 D Diesel Generator Day Tank 1A Diesel Generator Day Tank 1 B AFW Diesel Day Tank Ficticous placeholder for all components receiving manual ESF signal Ficticous placeholder for all components receiving manual ESF signal Charging Header Flow Indicator 0 1PM05J (1FT-0121)
Charging Header Flow Indicator 0 1PL06J (1 FT-0121)
Component Cooling HX "1" Flow Indicator (1 FT-SX031)
Division 11 Instrument Bus 111 Transformer Division 11 120Vac Instrument Bus Distribution Panel 111 Division 12 Instrument Bus 112 Transformer Division 12 12OVac Instrument Bus Distribution Panel 112 DMsion 11 Instrument Bus 113 Transformer Division 11 120Vac Instrument Bus Distribution Panel 113 Division 12 Instrument Bus 114 Transformer Division 12 120Vac Instrument Bus Distribution Panel 114 Division 11 Instrument Bus 111 Inverter Division 12 Instrument Bus 112 Inverter Division 11 Instrument Bus 113 Inverter Division 12 Instrument Bus 114 Inverter Pressurizer Level Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1 LT-459)
Equipment Zone 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3D-1 11.3G-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 5.6-1 5.4-1 5.6-1 5.4-1 5.6-1 5.4-1 5.6-1 5.4-1 9.2-1 9.1-1 10.2-1 10.1-1 10.2-1 10.1-1 10.2-1 10.1-1 10.2-1 10.1-1 9.3-1 9.4-1 11.4A-1 NIA N/A 2.1-0 11.4C-0 11.2-0 5.6-1 5.5-1 5.4-1 5.5-1 5.6-1 5.5-1 5.4-1 5.5-1 5.6-1 5.4-1 5.6-1 5.4-1 2.1-0
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Equipment Number Description 1LI-0459B Pressurizer Level Indicator @ 1 PL06J (1LT-459) 1LI-0460A Pressurizer Level Indicator 0 1PM05J (1LT-460) 1 LI-0460B Pressurizer Level Indicator 0 1 PL06J (1 LT-460) 1 LI-0461 Pressurizer Level Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1 LT-461) 1LI-0501 Loop 1A SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 1PL04J (1LT-501) 1LI-0501A Loop 1A SG Wide Range Level Indicator @ 1PM06J (1LT-501) 1LI-0502 Loop 1B SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 1PL04J (1LT-502) 1LI-0502A Loop 1 B SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 1PM06J (1LT-502) 1LI-0503 Loop 1C SG Wide Range Level Indicator @ 1PL04J (1 LT-503) 1LI-0503A Loop IC SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 1 PM06J (1 LT-503) 1 LI-0504 Loop 1 D SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 1 PL04J (1 LT-504) 1LI-0504A Loop 1 D SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 1 PM06J (1 LT-504) 1LI-0930 RWST Level Indicator 0 1 PM06J (1LT-0930) 1 LI-0931 RWST Level Indicator 0 1 PM06J (1 LT-0931) 1LI-0932 RWST Level Indicator 0 1 PM06J (1 LT-0932) 1LI-0933 RWST Level Indicator 0 1PM06J (1LT-0933) 1U-FW309 Loop 1A SG Wide Range Level Indicator @ 1PL10J (1LT-501)
ILI-FW310 Loop 1 B SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 1PL10J (11LT-502) 1LI-RY034 Pressurizer Level Indicator 0 1 PL10J (1 LT-459) 1LL-SI075A Containment Recirc Sump Level Indicating Lights @ 1 PM06J (1 LS-0940A) 1LL-SI075B Containment Recirc Sump Level Indicating Ughts @ 1PM06J (1LS-0941A) 1MS001A Loop 1A Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO) 1MS001A-DIV11 Loop 1 A Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 11 Actuation Circuit IMS001A-DIV12 Loop 1A Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 12 Actuation Circuit 1MS001B Loop 1 B Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO) 1MS001B-DIV11 Loop lB Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 11 Actuation Circuit 1MS001B-DIV12 Loop 1B Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 12 Actuation Circuit 1MS001C Loop 1C Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO) 1MS001C-DIV11 Loop IC Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 11 Actuation Circuit 1MS001C-DIV12 Loop 1C Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 12 Actuation Circuit 1MS001D Loop 1D Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO) 1MS001D-DIV11 Loop ID Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 11 Actuation Circuit 1MS001D-DIV12 Loop 1D Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 12 Actuation Circuit 1MS013A Main Steam Relief Valve IMS013B Main Steam Relief Valve 1MS013C Main Steam Relief Valve 1MS013D Main Steam Relief Valve 1 MS014A Main Steam Relief Valve 1MS014B Main Steam Relief Valve 1MS014C Main Steam Relief Valve lMS014D Main Steam Relief Valve 1IMS015A Main Steam Relief Valve 1MS015B Main Steam Relief Valve 1MS015C Main Steam Relief Valve 1MS015D Main Steam Relief Valve 1MS016A Main Steam Relief Valve 1 MS016B Main Steam Relief Valve (Sheet 10 of 27)
Equipment Zone 11.4C-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.6-1 11.6-1 11.6-1 2.1-0 2.1-0 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Contfd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 1MS016C 1MS016D IMS017A 1MS017B 1MS017C 1MS017D 1MS018A 1MS018B 1MS018C IMS018D 1MS019A 1MSO19B 1MS019C 1MS019D 1MS101A IMS101B IMS101C 1MS101D 1MS185A IMS185B 1MS185C 1MS185D 1MS186A 1MS186B 1MS186C 1MS186D 1MS187A 1MS187B 1MS187C 1MS187D 1NI-0031B INI-0032B 1NI-NRO05B 1NI-NRO05D 1NI-NRO06B 1NI-NRO06D 1PI-0402 1PI-0403A 1 PI-0404 1 PI-0405 IPI-0455A 1 PI-0455B 1 PI-0456 1PI-0457 1 PI-0458 1PI-0514A 1PI-0514B (Sheet 11 of 27)
Equipment Description Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Steam Generator 1A Power Operated Relief Valve (HO)
Steam Generator 1 B Power Operated Relief Valve (HO)
Steam Generator 1 C Power Operated Relief Valve (HO)
Steam Generator 1 D Power Operated Relief Valve (HO)
Steam Generator 1A Atmospheric Relief Isolation Valve (MV)
Steam Generator 1 B Atmospheric Relief Isolation Valve (MV)
Steam Generator 1C Atmospheric Relief Isolation Valve (MV)
Steam Generator 1D Atmospheric Relief Isolation Valve (MV)
Loop 1A MSIV Bypass Valve (AO)
Loop lB MSIV Bypass Valve (AO)
Loop 1C MSIV Bypass Valve (AO)
Loop ID MSIV Bypass Valve (AO)
SG IA PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 1B PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 1C PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 1D PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 1A PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 1B PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG IC PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG ID PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 1A PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 1 B PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG IC PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 1D PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
Ch A Source Range Neutron Flux Indicator 0 1 PM05J (NE-31)
Ch B Source Range Neutron Flux Indicator 0 1PM05J (NE-32)
Ch A Post Accident Neutron Flux Indicator 0 OPM02J (INRi 1 E)
Ch A Post Accident Neutron Flux Indicator 0 1 PL10J (1 NR1 1 E)
Ch B Post Accident Neutron Flux Indicator 0 OPM02J (1 NR1 3E)
Ch B Post Accident Neutron Flux Indicator 0 1PL1OJ (1NR13E)
Hot Leg local Pressure Indicator - Loop C RCS Wide Range Pressure Indicator 0 1 PM06J (1 PT-403)
Hot Leg local Pressure Indicator - Loop A RCS Wide Range Pressure Indicator 0 1 PM06J (1 PT-405)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1 PT-455)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 1 PL06J (1 PT-455)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1 PT-456)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1 PT-457)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1 PT-458)
Loop 1A SG Pressure Indicator 0 1PM04J (1PT-0514)
Loop 1A SG Pressure Indicator 0 1PL04J (1PT-0514)
Equipment Zone 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 18.3-1 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.6-1 2.1-0 11.6-1 1-1 2.1-0 1-1 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 Equipment Number 1PI-0515A 1PI-0516A 1 PI-0524A 1PI-0524B 1PI-0525A 1PI-0526A 1PI-0534A 1 PI-0534B 1PI-0535A 1 PI-0536A 1PI-0544A 1PI-0544B 1PI-0545A 1PI-0546A 1PI-CC107 IPI-MS193 1 PI-MS1 94 1PI-RY033 1R0014A 1RC014B 1RRC014C IRC014D 1RC01BA 1RC01BB 1RC01BC 1RC01BD 1RCO1R 1RH01PA IRH01PB 1RH02AA 1RH02AB 1RH606 1RH607 1RH610 1 RH61 1 1RH618 1RH619 1RH8701A 1RH8701B 1RH8702A I RH8702B 1RH8716A 1RH8716B 1RY01S 1RY32MA 1RY32MB 1RY455A (Sheet 12 of 27)
TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Equipment Zone Description Zone Loop 1A SG Pressure Indicator @ 1PM04J (1PT-0515) 2.1-0 Loop 1A SG Pressure Indicator @ 1PM04J (1PT-0516) 2.1-0 Loop 1B SG Pressure Indicator 0 1 PM04J (1 PT-0524) 2.1-0 Loop 1 B SG Pressure Indicator @ 1 PL05J (1 PT-0524) 11.4C-0 Loop 1B SG Pressure Indicator 0 1PM04J (IPT-0525) 2.1-0 Loop 1B SG Pressure Indicator 0 1PM04J (1PT-0526) 2.1-0 Loop 1C SG Pressure Indicator 0 1 PM04J (1 PT-0534) 2.1-0 Loop 1C SG Pressure Indicator 0 1PL05J (1PT-0534) 11.4C-0 Loop 1C SG Pressure Indicator 0 1PM04J (1PT-0535) 2.1-0 Loop 1C SG Pressure Indicator 0 1PM04J (IPT-0536) 2.1-0 Loop ID SG Pressure Indicator 0 1PM04J (1PT-0544) 2.1-0 Loop ID SG Pressure Indicator 0 1 PL04J (1 PT-0544) 11.4C-0 Loop 1D SG Pressure Indicator 0 1PM04J (1PT-0545) 2.1-0 Loop 1D SG Pressure Indicator C 1PM04J (1PT-0546) 2.1-0 Component Cooling Pump Common Discharge Header Pressure Indicator 0 1 PM06J (1 P 2.1-0 Loop 1A SG Pressure Indicator 0 1 PL1OJ (1PT-0514) 11.6-1 Loop lB SG Pressure Indicator 0 1PL10J (IPT-0525) 11.6-1 Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 1PL10J (1PT-455) 11.6-1 Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve - Train A (SO) (High-Low Pressure, HLP, interface 1-1 Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve - Train B (SO) (HLP) 1-1 Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve - Train A (SO) (HLP) 1-1 Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve - Train B (SO) (HLP) 1-1 Steam Generator 1A 1-1 Steam Generator 1B 1-1 Steam Generator IC 1-1 Steam Generator ID 1-1 Reactor Vessel 1-1 Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A 11.2A-1 Residual Heat Removal Pump 1 B 11.2D-1 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 1A 11.313-1 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 1 B 11.3E-1 RHR HX IA Discharge Valve (AO) 11.3B-1 RHR HX 1B Discharge Valve (AO) 11.3E-1 RHR Pump 1A Minlflow Valve (MO) 11.3B-1 RHR Pump 1 B Miniflow Valve (MO) 11.2-0 RHR HX 1A Bypass Valve (AO) 111.3B-1 RHR HX 1 B Bypass Valve (AO) 11.3E-1 RHR Pump 1A Isolation Valve (MO) (High-Low Pressure, HLP, Interlace) 1-1 RHR Pump 1A Isolation Valve (MO) (HLP) 1-1 RHR Pump 1 B Isolation Valve (MO) (HLP) 1-1 RHR Pump 1 B Isolation Valve (MO) (HLP) 1-1 RHR HX 1A Discharge Crosstie Valve (MO) 11.3-1 RHR HX 1B Discharge Crosstle Valve (MO) 11.3-1 Pressurizer 1-1 PORV Accumulator Tank 1A 1-1 PORV Accumulator Tank 1 B 1-1 Pressurizer PORV (AO) (High-Low Pressure. HLP, Interface) 1-1
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 1RY456 1RY8000A 1RY8000B 1SIOIT IS18801A 1SI8801B 1S18804B 1S18806 1SI8807A 1SI8807B 1S18808A 1SI8808B 1 SI8808C 1SI8808D 1 SI8809A 1S18809B 1SI8811A 1S18811B 1SI8812A 1S18812B 1SI8840 1SI8923A 1S18924 1SX001A 1SX001B 1SX004 1SX005 1SX007 1SX010 1SX011 ISX016A 1SX016B JSX01AA 1SX01AB 1SX01K ISX01PA 1SX01 PA-C 1SXO1PB 1SX01 PB-C 1SX027A 1SX027B 1SX02K 1 SX033 1SX034 1SX04P 1SX1O1A "1SX136 (Sheet 13 of 27)
Equipment Description Pressurizer PORV (AO) (HLP)
PORV Block Valve (MO) (HLP)
PORV Block Valve (MO) (HLP)
Refueling Water Storage Tank Charging Pump to Cold Leg Injection Isol'n Valve (MO)
Charging Pump to Cold Leg Injection Isoln Valve (MO)
RHR HX 1B to SI Pump Isolation Valve (MO)
SI Pump Suction RWST Isolation Valve (MO)
SIICV Pump Suction Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
SIICV Pump Suction Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
SI Accumulator 1A Discharge Isolation Valve SI Accumulator 1 B Discharge Isolation Valve SI Accumulator IC Discharge Isolation Valve SI Accumulator ID Discharge Isolation Valve RHR HX 1A to RC Cold Leg Isolation Valve (MO)
RHR HX 1B to RC Cold Leg Isolation Valve (MO)
LPSI Containment Sump Supply Isolation Valve (MO)
LPSI Containment Sump Supply Isolation Valve (MO)
LPSI RWST Supply Isolation Valve (MO)
LPSI RWST Supply Isolation Valve (MO)
RHR HX to RC Hot Leg Isolation Valve (MO)
SI Pump 1A Suction Valve (MO)
SI/CV Pump Suction Header Crosstie Isolation Valve (MO)
Essential Service Water Pump IA Suction Valve (MO)
Essential Service Water Pump 1 B Suction Valve (MO)
Unit 1 Component Cooling HX ESW Inlet Valve (MO)
Component Cooling HX '0" ESW Inlet Valve (MO)
Unit 1 Component Cooling HX ESW Outlet Valve (MO)
Unit 1 Return Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
Unit I Return Header Crosstle Valve (MO)
RCFC IA/IC Inlet Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
RCFC 1311 D Inlet Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
Essential Service Water Pump IA Oil Cooler Essential Service Water Pump 1B Oil Cooler AFW Pump 15 Engine Closed Cycle Heat Exchanger Essential Service Water Pump 1A Essential Service Water Pump 1 A Lube Oil Pump Essential Service Water Pump 1 B Essential Service Water Pump 1B Lube Oil Pump RCFC 1AJ1C Outlet Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
RCFC 1 B/I D Outlet Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 1 B Right Angle Gear Oil Cooler ESW Pump 1A Discharge Crosstie Isolation Valve (MO)
ESW Pump 1 B Discharge Crosstle Isolation Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 1B Cooling Water Pump (Engine Driven)
AFW Pump 1A Oil Cooler Outlet Valve (SO)
Unit I Return Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
Equipment Zone 1-1 1-1 1-1 16.1-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3F-1 11.3F-1 11.3A-1 11.3A-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.23-1 11.2D-1 11.3-1 11.3A-1 1 1.3A-1 11.1A-0 11.1B-0 11.1A-0 11.12-0 112*-0 11.2-0 11.2-0 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.1A-0 11.1B-0 11.4A-1 11.1A-0 11.1A-0 11.11B-0 11.1B-0 11.3-1 11.3-1 11.4A-1 11.1A-0 11.11B-0 11.4A-1 11.4-0 11.2-0
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Con Vd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 1SX147A 1SX147B 1SX169A 1SX169B 1SX173 1SX178 1TI-0413A 1TI-0413B 1TI-0423A 1TI-0423B 1TI-0433A 1TI-0433B 1TI-0443A 11T-0443B 1TI-0604 1T"-0605 1TI-0608 1TI-0609 1TI-IT001 1TI-IT002 1TI-RC005A 1TI-RC005B 1TI-RC006A 1TI-RC006B 1TI-RC007A 1TI-RC007B 1TI-RC008A 1TI-RCO08B 1TI-RC022A 1TI-RC022B 1TI-RC023A 1TI-RC023B 1TI-RC024A 1TI-RCO24B 1TI-RC025A 1TI-RC025B IUL-AN012-A7 1UL-AN012-B7 1UL-AN012-C7 1VA01CA 1VAO1CB 1VA01CC 1VA01CD IVA0ICE 1VA01CF 1VAO1CG "IVA0ICH Equipment Description Containment Chiller Condenser Bypass Valve (AO)
Containment Chiller Condenser Bypass Valve (AO)
Diesel Generator 1 A Service Water Isolation Valve (AO)
Diesel Generator 1 B Service Water Isolation Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 1 B SX Supply Isolation Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 1B SX Return Isolation Valve (AO)
Loop 1A Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1TE-RC022A)
Loop IA Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1TE-RC022B)
Loop lB Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1PM05J (1TE-RC023A)
Loop 1B Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1PM05J (1TE-RC023B)
Loop IC Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1TE-RC024A)
Loop 1C Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1TE-RC024B)
Loop 1 D Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1TE-RC025A)
Loop ID Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PM05J (1TE-RC025B)
RHR Hx IA Outlet Temperature Indicator 0 1PM06J (1TE-604)
RHR Hx 1B Outlet Temperature Indicator 0 1 PM06J (1TE-605)
RHR Hx 1 RH02AA Outlet Temperature Indicator RHR Hx 1 RH02AB Outlet Temperature Indicator Division 11 Incore Thermocouple Display Insert 0 1 PM05J Division 12 Incore Thermocouple Display Insert 0 1PM05J Loop 1A Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PL05J (1TE-RC022A)
Loop 1A Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PL05J (ITE-RC022B)
Loop 1B Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PLO5J (1TE-RC023A)
Loop IB Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PL05J (1TE-RC023B)
Loop 1C Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1PLO5J (1TE-RCO24A)
Loop IC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1PL05J (1TE-RC024B)
Loop 1D Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1PL05J (1TE-RC025A)
Loop 1D Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1PL05J (1TE-RCO25B)
Loop IA Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1PLIOJ (1TE-RC022A)
Loop 1A Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PL1OJ (1TE-RC022B)
Loop IB Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator @ IPL1OJ (1TE-RC023A)
Loop 18 Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PL1OJ (1TE-RC023B)
Loop IC Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PL10J (1TE-RC024A)
Loop 1 C Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PL1OJ (1TE-RC024B)
Loop 1 D Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PL10J (ITE-RC025A)
Loop 1 D Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 1 PL10J (1TE-RC025B)
RWST LEVEL LO-3 Annunciator Alarm RWST LEVEL LO-2 Annunciator Alarm RWST LEVEL LOW Annunciator Alarm SX Pump 1A Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump IA Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 1A Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump IA Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 1B Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 1B Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 1 B Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 18 Cubicle Cooler Fan (Sheet 14 of 27)
Equipment Zone 11.5-1 11.5-1 9.2-1 9.1-1 11.4A-1 11.4A-1 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.3B-1 11.3E-1 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.6-1 11.6-1 11.6-1 11.6-1 11.6-1 11.6-1 11.6-1 11.6-1 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.1A-0 11.1A-0 11.1A-0 11.1A-0 11.1B-0 11.1B-0 11.1B-0 11.1B-0
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Contd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 1VA01SA 1VA01SB 1VA02CA IVA02CB 1VA02CC 1VA02CD IVA02SA 1VA02SB IVA06CA 1VA06CB 1VA06CC 1VA06CD 1VA06SA 1VA06SB 1VA08CB 1VA08S IVD01CA 1VD01CB 1VD01YA 1VD01YB 1VD02YA "IVD02YB 1VD09YA 1VD09YB 1VD1OYA 1VD10YB 1VD16YA 1VD16YA 1VD16YB 1VD16YB 1VD17YA 1VD17YA 1VD17YB 1VD17YB 1VD23YA 1VD23YA 1VD23YB 1VD23YB 1VD24YA 1VD24YA 1VD24YB 1VD24YB 1VE01C 1VE01Y IVE02Y 1VE04Y 1VE04Y (Sheet 15 of 27)
Equipment Description SX Pump 1A Cubicle Cooler SX Pump 1B Cubicle Cooler RHR Pump 1A Cubicle Cooler Fan RHR Pump IA Cubicle Cooler Fan RHR Pump 1 B Cubicle Cooler Fan RHR Pump 1B Cubicle Cooler Fan RHR Pump 1A Cubicle Cooler RHR Pump 1 B Cubicle Cooler Charging Pump 1A Cubicle Cooler Fan Charging Pump 1A Cubicle Cooler Fan Charging Pump 1B Cubicle Cooler Fan Charging Pump lB Cubicle Cooler Fan Charging Pump 1A Cubicle Cooler Charging Pump 1B Cubicle Cooler Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cubicle Cooler Fan (Engine-driven)
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cubicle Cooler Diesel Generator Room 1A Supply Fan Diesel Generator Room 1 B Supply Fan Diesel Generator Room 1 B Outside Air Intake Damper Diesel Generator Room 1B Outside Air Intake Damper Diesel Generator Room 1 B Return Air Damper Diesel Generator Room 1 B Return Air Damper Diesel Generator Room 1A Outside Air Intake Damper Diesel Generator Room 1A Outside Air Intake Damper Diesel Generator Room 1A Return Air Damper Diesel Generator Room 1A Return Air Damper Diesel Generator Room 1B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1 B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1 B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1 B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1 B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1 B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room lB Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room IA Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room IA Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 1A Fire Damper Division 12 MEER Supply Fan Division 12 MEER Outside Air Intake Damper Division 12 MEER Return Air Damper Division 12 MEER Fire Damper Division 12 MEER Fire Damper Equipment Zone 11.11A-0 11.1B-0 11.2A-1 11.2A-1 11.2D-1 11.2D-1 11.2A-1 111.2D-1 11.3D-1 11.3D-1 11.3G-1 11.3G-1 11.3D-1 11.3G-1 11.4A-1 11.4A-1 18.2-1 18.1-1 18.1-1 18.1-1 9.1-1 9.1-1 18.2-1 18.2-1 9.2-1 9.2-1 18.1-1 9.1-1 18.1-1 9.1-1 8.3-1 9.1-1 8.3-1 9.1-1 18.2-1 9.2-1 18.2-1 9.2-1 8.3-1 9.2-1 8.3-1 9.2-1 5.4-1 18.1-1 5.4-1 18.1-1 5.3-1
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 1VE05Y 1VE05Y IVE06Y 1VE06Y IVE07Y 1VEO7Y 1VE12Y 1VE12Y 1VE17Y 1VE17Y 1VP01AA 1VP01AB 1VP01AC 1VP01AD 1VP01CA 1VP01CB 1VP01CC 1VP01CD 1VXO1C 1VX01Y 1VX02Y 1VX04C 1VX04Y 1VX05C 1VX05Y 1VX06C IVX16Y 1VX16Y 1VX17Y 1VX17Y 1VX20Y 1VX20Y 1VX22Y 1VX22Y 1VX30Y IVX32Y 1VX33Y 1VX35Y 2AB03P 2ABO3T 2AB8465 2AB8468 2AF004A 2AF004B 2AF005A 2AF005B "2AF005C (Sheet 16 of 27)
Equipment Description Division 12 MEER Fire Damper Division 12 MEER Fire Damper Division 11 MEER Fire Damper Division 11 MEER Fire Damper Division 11 MEER Fire Damper Division 11 MEER Fire Damper Division 11 MEER Fire Damper Division 11 MEER Fire Damper Division 12 MEER Fire Damper Division 12 MEER Fire Damper Essential Service Water Coil Essential Service Water Coil Essential Service Water Coil Essential Service Water Coil RCFC Fan A RCFC Fan B RCFC Fan C RCFC Fan D Division 12 ESF Switchhear Room Supply Fan Division 12 ESF Swgr Room Outside Air Intake Damper Division 12 ESF Swgr Room Return Air Damper Division 11 ESF Switchgear Room/MEER Supply Fan Division 11 ESF Swgr Room Outside Air Intake Damper ESW Cooling Tower OA Division 11 Electric Substation Bus 131Z Supply Fan Division 11 ESF Swgr Room Return Air Damper ESW Cooling Tower OB Division 12 Electric Substation Bus 132Z Supply Fan Division 12 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 12 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 12 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 12 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 11 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 11 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 11 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 11 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper ESW Cooling Tower OA Division 11 Electric Substation Bus 131Z Outside Air Intake ESW Cooling Tower OA Division 11 Electric Substation Bus 131Z Return Air Damper ESW Cooling Tower OB Division 12 Electric Substation Bus 132Z Outside Air Intake ESW Cooling Tower OB Division 12 Electric Substation Bus 132Z Return Air Damper Boric Acid Transfer Pump Boric Acid Tank BA Pump Suction Crosstie Isolation Valve (MV)
BA Pump Discharge Crosstie Isolation Valve (MV)
AFW Pump 2A Discharge Isolation Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 2B Discharge Isolation Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 2A to SG 2A Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 2A to SG 2B Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 2A to SG 2C Row Control Valve (AO)
Equipment Zone 5.6-1 8.6-0 18.2-1 5.4-1 5.6-1 8.6-0 5.4-1 5.6-1 5.3-1 5.4-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 18.1-1 18.1-1 5.1-1 18.2-1 18.2-1 18.14B-1 5.2-1 18.14A-1 18.1-1 5.1-1 5.1-1 8.5-1 5.2-1 8.5-1 18.2-1 5.2-1 18.14B-1 18.14B-1 18.14A-1 18.14A-1 11.5-0 11.5-0 11.5-0 11.5-0 11.4-0 11.4A-2 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Contd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 2AF005D 2AF005E 2AF005F 2AF005G 2AF005H 2AF006A 2AF006B 2AF013A 2AFO13B 2AF013C 2AF013D 2AF013E 2AF013F 2AF013G 2AF013H 2AF017A 2AF017B 2AF01AA 2AFO1AB 2AF01EA-A 2AF01EA-B 2AF01 EB-A 2AF01E'-B 2AF01PA 2AF01PA-A 2AF01PB 2AF01PB-A 2AF01PB-C 2AF01PB-K 2AF022A 2AF022B 2AF02A 2AP05ED 2AP05EE 2AP05EG 2AP05EJ 2AP05EP 2AP05ER 2AP05ES 2AP05ET 2AP05EV 2AP06ED 2AP06EF 2AP06EH 2AP06EP 2AP06EQ 2AP06ER (Sheet 17 of 27)
Equipment Description AFW Pump 2A to SG 2D Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 2B to SG 2A Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 2B to SG 2B Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 2B to SG 2C Flow Control Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 2B to SG 2D Flow Control Valve (AO)
Essl Service Water to AFW Pump 2A Suction Valve (MO)
Ess'l Service Water to AFW Pump 2B Suction Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 2A to SG 2A Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 2A to SG 2B Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 2A to SG 2C Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 2A to SG 2D Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 2B to SG 2A Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 2B to SG 2B Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 2B to SG 2C Stop Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 2B to SG 2D Stop Valve (MO)
Ess'l Service Water to AFW Pump 2A Suction Valve (MO)
Ess'l Service Water to AFW Pump 2B Suction Valve (MO)
Oil Cooler for AFW Pump 2A Oil Cooler for AFW Pump 2B Battery I for AFW Pump 2B Diesel Engine Battery IA for AFW Pump 25 Diesel Engine Battery 2 for AFW Pump 2B Diesel Engine Battery 2A for AFW Pump 2B Diesel Engine Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A (Motor Driven)
Lube Oil Pump for AFW Pump 2A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B (Diesel Driven)
Lube Oil Pump for AFW Pump 2B Gear Box Lube 00 Pump for AFW Pump 25 Diesel Engine for AFW Pump 2B AFW Pump 2A Recirculation Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 25 Recirculatlon Valve (AO)
Gear Oil Cooler for AFW Pump 2B Division 21 ACB 2415X (4160-480V ESF Transformer 2AP1 E)
Division 21 ACB 2415Z (4160-480V ESW CIg Twr Transformer 231Z)
Division 21 ACB 2412 (SAT Feed from Transformer 242-1)
Division 21 ACB 2414 (Reserve Feed from 4160V Swgr Bus 141)
Division 21 ACB (for Containment Spray Pump 2CS01 PA)
Division 21 ACB 2411 (Bus Tie to 41 60V Swgr Bus 243)
Division 21 ACB 2413 (Feed from Diesel Generator 2A)
Division 21 4160V ESF Switchgear Bus 241 Undervoltage Cubicle Division 21 ACB (for Safety Injection Pump 2SI01 PA)
Division 22 ACB 2424 (Reserve Feed from 4160V Swgr Bus 142)
Division 22 ACB 2422 (SAT Feed from Transformer 242-2)
Division 22 ACB 2425X (4160-480V ESF Transformer 2AP13E)
Division 22 ACB (for Containment Spray Pump 2CS01 PB)
Division 22 ACB 2421 (Bus Tie to 4160V Swgr Bus 244)
Division 22 ACB 2423 (Feed from Diesel Generator 25)
Equipment Zone 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.4A-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 11.4-0 11.4A-2 11.4-0 11.4A-2 11.4A-2 11.4A-2 11.4A-2 11.4A-2 11.4-0 11.4-0 11.4A-2 11.4A-2 11.4A-2 11A4A-2 11.4-0 11.4A-2 11.4A-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.1-2 5.1-2 5.1-2 5.1-2 5.1-2 5.1-2
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 2AP06ES 2AP06EU 2AP06EV 2AP07E 2AP07EE 2AP07EF 2AP10E 2AP12E 2AP14E 2AP21E 2AP21EA 2AP22E 2AP23E 2AP24E 2AP25E 2AP26E 2AP27E 2AP28E 2AP30E 2AP32E 2AP38E 2AP42E 2AP92E 2AP93E 2AP98E 2AP99E 2CC01A 2CC01PA 2CC01PB 2CC01T 2CC685 2CC9412A 2CC9412B 2CC9413A 2CC9413B 2CC9414 2CC9415 2CC9416 2CC9438 2CC9459B 2CC9467B 2CC9473A 2CC9473B 2CD01T 2CS009A 2CS009B 2CV01PA Equipment Description Division 22 4160V ESF Switchgear Bus 242 Undervoltage Cubicle Division 22 ACB (for Safety Injection Pump 2SI01 PB)
Division 22 ACB 2425Z (4160-480V ESW Cig Twr Transformer 232Z)
Division 21 4160 Non-ESF Switchgear Bus 243 Transformers 233X and 233Y Feed 4160V Bus 243 Feed From Bus 241 Division 21 480V ESF Switchgear Bus 231X Division 22 480V ESF Switchgear Bus 232X Division 21 480V Non-ESF Aux Bldg Unit Substation 233X Division 21 480V ESF MCC 231X1 Division 21 480V ESF MCC 231X1A Division 21 480V ESF MCC 231X3 Division 22 480V ESF MCC 232X1 Division 22 480V ESF MCC 232X3 Division 21 480V ESF MCC 231X2 Division 21 480V ESF MCC 231X4 Division 22 480V ESF MCC 232X2 Division 22 480V ESF MCC 232X4 Division 21 480V ESF MCC 231X5 Division 22 480V ESF MCC 232X5 Division 21 480V Non-ESF MCC 233X1 Division 21 480V Non-ESF MCC 233X3 Division 22 480V ESW Cooling Tower MCC 232Z1 Division 11 480V ESW Cooling Tower MCC 231Zl Division 22 480V ESF Unit Substation 232Z Division 21 480V ESF Unit Substation 231Z Unit 2 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 2A Component Cooling Pump 2B Component Cooling Pump Component Cooling Surge Tank CCW Return Containment Isolation Valve (MO) 2A RHR Hx Outlet Valve (MO) 2B RHR Hx Outlet Valve (MO)
CCW Supply Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
CCW Supply Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
CCW Return Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
Supply Header Isolation Valve (MO)
CCW Return Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
CCW Return Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
Manual Header Crosstie Valve (Manual)
Manual Header Crosstie Valve (Manual)
Intermediate Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
Intermediate Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank Containment Spray Pump 2A Sump Suction Valve (MO)
Containment Spray Pump 2B Sump Suction Valve (MO)
Charging Pump 2A (Sheet 18 of 27)
Equipment Zone 5.1-2 5.1-2 5.1-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.2-2 5.1-2 11.5-0 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.5-0 11.4-0 11.4-0 11.5A-2 11.5A-2 11.6-2 11.6-2 11.6-0 11.6-0 11.2-0 11.5-0 18.14A-2 18.14B-2 18.14A-2 18.14B-2 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.6-0 11.3-2 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-0 1-2 1-2 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 11.3-0 18.23-0 11.2B-2 11.2C-2 11.3D-2
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Contd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 2CV01PB 2CV02A 2CV02SA 2CV02SB 2CV03SA 2CV03SB 2CV112B 2CV112C 2CV112D 2CV112E 2CV121 2CV8104 2CV81 10 2CV8111 2CV8114 2CV8116 2CV8355A 2CV8355B 2CV8355C 2CV8355D 2CV8387A "2CV8387B 2CV8483A 2CV8483B 2CV8804A 2DC01E 2DC02E 2DC03E 2DC04E 2DC05E 2DC06E 2DC10J 2DC11J 2DG01KA 2DG01KB 2DO01PA 2DO01PB 2DO01PC 2DO01PD 2DO01TA 2DO01TB 2DO02TA 2DOO2TB 2DO10T 2ESFComp2l 2ESFComp22 "2FI-0121A (Sheet 19 of 27)
Equipment Description Charging Pump 2B CV Seal Water Heat Exchanger Charging Pump 2A Gear Cooler Charging Pump 2B Gear Cooler Charging Pump 2A Lube Oil Cooler Charging Pump 2B Lube Oil Cooler VCT Outlet Isolation Valve (MO)
VCT Outlet Isolation Valve (MO)
RWST to Charging Pumps Suction Valve (MO)
RWST to Charging Pumps Suction Valve (MO)
Centrifugal Charging Pumps Flow Control Valve (AO)
Emergency Boration Valve (MO)
Charging Pump 2B Miniflow Isolation Valve (MO)
Charging Pump 2A Miniflow Isolation Valve (MO)
Charging Pump 2A Miniflow Isolation Valve (SO)
Charging Pump 28 Miniflow Isolation Valve (SO)
RCP 2A Seal Injection Isolation Valve (MO)
RCP 2B Seal Injection Isolation Valve (MO)
RCP 2C Seal Injection Isolation Valve (MO)
RCP 2D Seal Injection Isolation Valve (MO)
Charging Pump 2A Discharge Header FCV Bypass Valve Charging Pump 2B Discharge Header FCV Bypass Valve Charging Header FCV Upsteam Isolation Valve (MV)
Charging Header FCV Downsteam Isolation Valve (MV)
RHR HX 2A to Charging Pump Suction Isolation Valve (MO)
Division 21 125V Battery 211 Division 22 125V Battery 212 Division 21 Battery Charger 211 Division 22 Battery Charger 212 Division 21 125Vdc Distribution Center 211 Division 22 125Vdc Distribution Center 212 Division 21 125Vdc Fuse Panel Division 22 125Vdc Fuse Panel Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator 2B 2A Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 28 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2C Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2D Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2A Diesel Oil Storage Tank 2B Diesel Generator Day Tank 2A Diesel Generator Day Tank 2B AFW Diesel Day Tank Fictioous placeholder for all components receiving manual ESF signal Ficticous placeholder for all components receiving manual ESF signal Charging Header Row Indicator @ 2PM05J (2FT-0121)
Equipment Zone 11.3G-2 11.41-2 11.3D-2 11.3G-2 11.3D-2 11.3G-2 11.6A-2 11.6A-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.6A-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2.
11.3D-2 11.3G-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 5.6-2 5.4-2 5.6-2 5.4-2 5.6-2 5.4-2 5.6-2 5.4-2 9.2-2 9.1-2 10.2-2 10.1-2 10.2-2 10.1-2 10.2-2 10.1-2 9.3-2 9.4-2 11.4A-2 N/A N/A 2.1-0
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 2FI-0121B 2FI-SX031 21PO1E 21PO1J 21P02E 21P02J 21P03E 21P03J 21P04E 21P04J 21P05E 21P06E 21P07E 21P08E 2LI-0459A 2LI-0459B 2LI-0460A 2U-0460B 2LI-0461 2LI-0501 2U-0501A 2LI-0502 2LI-0502A 2L1-0503 2LI-0503A 2LI-0504 2LI-0504A 2U1-0930 2LI-0931 2LI-0932 2L1-0933 2LI-FW309 2LI-FW310 2U-RY034 2LL-SI075A 2LL-SI075B 2MS001A 2MS001A-DIV21 2MSOO1A-DIV22 2MS001B 2MS001B-DIV21 2MSOO1B-DIV22 2MS001C 2MS001C-DIV21 2MS001C-DIV22 2MS001D 2MS001D-DIV21 Equipment Description Charging Header Flow Indicator @ 2PL06J (2FT-0121)
Component Cooling HX "2" Flow Indicator (2FT-SX031)
Division 21 Instrument Bus 211 Transformer Division 21 12OVac Instrument Bus Distribution Panel 211 Division 22 Instrument Bus 212 Transformer Division 22 12OVac Instrument Bus Distribution Panel 212 Division 21 Instrument Bus 213 Transformer DMsion 21 120Vac Instrument Bus Distribution Panel 213 Division 22 Instrument Bus 214 Transformer Division 22 120Vac Instrument Bus Distribution Panel 214 Division 21 Instrument Bus 211 Inverter Division 22 Instrument Bus 212 Inverter Division 21 Instrument Bus 213 Inverter Division 22 Instrument Bus 214 Inverter Pressurizer Level Indicator @ 2PM05J (2LT-459)
Pressurizer Level Indicator @ 2PL06J (2LT-459)
Pressurizer Level Indicator @ 2PM05J (2LT-460)
Pressurizer Level Indicator @ 2PL06J (2LT-460)
Pressurizer Level Indicator 0 2PM05J (2LT-461)
Loop 2A SG Wide Range Level Indicator C 2PL04J (2LT-501)
Loop 2A SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 2PM06J (2LT-501)
Loop 2B SG Wide Range Level Indicator @ 2PL04J (2LT-502)
Loop 2B SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 2PM06J (2LT-502)
Loop 2C SG Wide Range Level Indicator @ 2PL04J (2LT-503)
Loop 2C SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 2PM06J (2LT-503)
Loop 2D SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 2PLO4J (2LT-504)
Loop 2D SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 2PM06J (2LT-504)
RWST Level Indicator @ 2PM06J (2LT-0930)
RWST Level Indicator 0 2PM06J (2LT-0931)
RWST Level Indicator 0 2PM06J (2LT-0932)
RWST Level Indicator @ 2PM06J (2LT-0933)
Loop 2A SG Wide Range Level Indicator @ 2PL10J (2LT-501)
Loop 2B SG Wide Range Level Indicator 0 2PL10J (2LT-502)
Pressurizer Level Indicator 0 2PL10J (2LT-459)
Containment Recirc Sump Level Indicating Ughts @2PM06J (2LS-0940A)
Containment Recirc Sump Level Indicating Ughts 02PM06J (2LS-0941A)
Loop 2A Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO)
Loop 2A Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 21 Actuation Circuit Loop 2A Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 22 Actuation Circuit Loop 2B Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO)
Loop 2B Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 21 Actuation Circuit Loop 2B Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 22 Actuation Circuit Loop 2C Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO)
Loop 2C Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 21 Actuation Circuit Loop 2C Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 22 Actuation Circuit Loop 2D Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO)
Loop 2D Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 21 Actuation Circuit (Sheet 20 Of 27)
Equipment Description Equipment Zone 11.4C-0 11.2-0 5.6-2 5.5-2 5.4-2 5.5-2 5.6-2 5.5-2 5.4-2 5.5-2 5.6-2 5.4-2 5.6-2 5.4-2 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.6-2 11.6-2 11.6-2 2.1-0 2.1-0 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Conrd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 2MS001D-DIV22 2MS013A 2MS013B 2MS013C 2MS013D 2MS014A 2MS014B 2MS014C 2MS014D 2MS015A 2MS015B 2MS015C 2MS015D 2MS016A 2MS016B 2MS016C 2MS016D 2MS017A 2MS017B 2MS017C 2MS017D 2MS018A 2MS018B 2MS018C 2MS018D 2MS019A 2MS019B 2MS019C 2MS019D 2MS101A 2MS101B 2MS101C 2MS101D 2MS185A 2MS185B 2MS185C 2MS185D 2MS186A 2MS186B 2MS186C 2MS186D 2MS187A 2MS187B 2MS187C 2MS187D 2NI-0031B "2NI-0032B Equipment Description Loop 2D Main Steam Isolation Valve (HO); Division 22 Actuation Circuit Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Main Steam Relief Valve Steam Generator 2A Power Operated Relief Valve (HO)
Steam Generator 2B Power Operated Relief Valve (HO)
Steam Generator 2C Power Operated Relief Valve (HO)
Steam Generator 2D Power Operated Relief Valve (HO)
Steam Generator 2A Atmospheric Relief Isolation Valve (MV)
Steam Generator 2B Atmospheric Relief Isolation Valve (MV)
Steam Generator 2C Atmospheric Relief Isolation Valve (MV)
Steam Generator 2D Atmospheric Relief Isolation Valve (MV)
Loop 2A MSIV Bypass Valve (AO)
Loop 2B MSIV Bypass Valve (AO)
Loop 2C MSIV Bypass Valve (AO)
Loop 2D MSIV Bypass Valve (AO)
SG 2A PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 2B PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 2C PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 2D PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 2A PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 2B PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 2C PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 20 PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 2A PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 2B PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 2C PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
SG 20 PORV Hand Pump Isolation Valve (MV)
Ch A Source Range Neutron Flux Indicator @ 2PM05J (NE-31)
Ch B Source Range Neutron Flux Indicator 0 2PM05J (NE-32)
(Sheet 21 of 27)
Equipment Zone 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 18.3-2 2.1-0 2.1-0
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Description Equipment Number 2NI-NRO05B 2NI-NRO05D 2NI-NRO06B 2NI-NRO06D 2PI-0402 2PI-0403A 2PI-0404 2PI-0405 2PI-0455A 2PI-0455B 2P1-0456 2P1-0457 2PI-0458 2PI-0514A 2PI-0514B 2PI-0515A 2PI-0516A 2PI-0524A 2PI-0524B 2PI-0525A 2PI-0526A "2PI-0534A 2PI-0534B 2PI-0535A 2PI-0536A 2PI-0544A 2PI-0544B 2PI-0545A 2PI-0546A 2PI-CC107 2PI-MS193 2PI-MS194 2PI-RY033 2RC014A 2RC014B 2RC014C 2RC014D 2RC01BA 2RCO1BB 2RC01BC 2RC01BD 2RC01R 2RH01PA 2RH01PB 2RH02AA 2RH02AB 2RH606 Ch A Post Accident Neutron Flux Indicator 0 OPM02J (2NR1 1 E)
Ch A Post Accident Neutron Flux Indicator 0 2PL10J (2NR1 1 E)
Ch B Post Accident Neutron Flux Indicator 0 OPM02J (2NR13E)
Ch B Post Accident Neutron Flux Indicator 0 2PL10J (2NR13E)
Hot Leg local Pressure Indicator - Loop C RCS Wide Range Pressure Indicator 0 2PM06J (2PT-403)
Hot Leg local Pressure Indicator - Loop A RCS Wide Range Pressure Indicator 0 2PM06J (2PT-405)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 2PM05J (2PT-455)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 2PL06J (2PT-455)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator @ 2PM05J (2PT-456)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 2PM05J (2PT-457)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 2PM05J (2PT-458)
Loop 2A SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0514)
Loop 2A SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PL04J (2PT-0514)
Loop 2A SG Pressure Indicator @ 2PM04J (2PT-0515)
Loop 2A SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0516)
Loop 2B SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0524)
Loop 2B SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PL05J (2PT-0524)
Loop 2B SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0525)
Loop 2B SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0526)
Loop 2C SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0534)
Loop 2C SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PL05J (2PT-0534)
Loop 2C SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0535)
Loop 2C SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0536)
Loop 2D SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0544)
Loop 2D SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PL04J (2PT-0544)
Loop 2D SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0545)
Loop 2D SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PM04J (2PT-0546)
Component Cooling Pump Common Discharge Header Pressur Loop 2A SG Pressure Indicator 0 2PL10J (2PT-0514)
Loop 2B SG Pressure Indicator @ 2PL1OJ (2PT-0525)
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 0 2PL10J (2PT-455)
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve - Train A (SO) (HLP)
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve - Train B (SO) (HLP)
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve - Train A (SO) (HLP)
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve - Train B (SO) (HLP)
Steam Generator 2A Steam Generator 2B Steam Generator 2C Steam Generator 2D Reactor Vessel Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Residual Heat Removal Pump 2B Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 2A Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 2B RHR HX 2A Discharge Valve (AO)
(Sheet 22 of 27) e indicator 0 2PMO6J (2 Equipment Zone 2.1-0 11.6-2 2.1-0 11.6-2 1-2 2.1-0 1-2 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 P 2.1-0 11.6-2 11.6-2 11.6-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 11.2A-2 11.2D-2 11.3B-2 11.3E-2 11.3B-2
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 2RH607 2RH610 2RH611 2RH618 2RH619 2RH8701A 2RH8701B 2RH8702A 2RH8702B 2RH8716A 2RH8716B 2RY01S 2RY32MA 2RY32MB 2RY455A 2RY456 2RY8000A 2RY8000B 2SI01T 2SI8801A 2SI8801B "2SI8804B 2SI8806 2SI8807A 2SI8807B 2SI8808A 2SI8808B 2SI8808C 2SI8808D 2SI8809A 2SI8809B 2S18811A 2SI8811B 2SI8812A 2SI8812B 2SI8840 2SI8923A 2SI8924 2SX001A 2SX001B 2SX004 2SX005 2SX007 2SX010 2SX011 2SX016A 2SX016B (Sheet 23 of 27)
Equipment Description RHR HX 2B Discharge Valve (AO)
RHR Pump 2A Miniflow Valve (MO)
RHR Pump 2B Miniflow Valve (MO)
RHR Pump 2A Isolation Valve (MO) (HLP)
RHR Pump 2A Isolation Valve (MO) (HLP)
RHR Pump 2B Isolation Valve (MO) (HLP)
RHR Pump 2B Isolation Valve (MO) (HLP)
RHR HX 2A Discharge Crosstle Valve (MO)
RHR HX 2B Discharge Crosstle Valve (MO)
Pressurizer PORV Accumulator Tank 2A PORV Accumulator Tank 2B Pressurizer PORV (AO) (HLP)
PORV Block Valve (MO) (HLP)
PORV Block Valve (MO) (HLP)
Refueling Water Storage Tank Charging Pump to Cold Leg Injection lsoln Valve (MO)
Charging Pump to Cold Leg Injection lsol'n Valve (MO)
RHR HX 2B to SI Pump Isolation Valve (MO)
SI Pump Suction RWST Isolation Valve (MO)
SI/CV Pump Suction Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
SIICV Pump Suction Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
SI Accumulator 2A Discharge Isolation Valve SI Accumulator 2B Discharge Isolation Valve SI Accumulator 2C Discharge Isolation Valve SI Accumulator 2D Discharge Isolation Valve RHR HX 2A to RC Cold Leg Isolation Valve (MO)
RHR HX 2B to RC Cold Leg Isolation Valve (MO)
LPSI Containment Sump Supply Isolation Valve (MO)
LPSI Containment Sump Supply Isolation Valve (MO)
LPSI RWST Supply Isolation Valve (MO)
LPSI RWST Supply Isolation Valve (MO)
RHR HX to RC Hot Leg Isolation Valve (MO)
SI Pump 2A Suction Valve (MO)
SI/CV Pump Suction Header Crosstie Isolation Valve (MO)
Essential Service Water Pump 2A Suction Valve (MO)
Essential Service Water Pump 2B Suction Valve (MO)
Unit 2 Component Cooling HX ESW Inlet Valve (MO)
Component Cooling H-X 0" ESW Inlet Valve (MO)
Unit 2 Component Cooling HX ESW Outlet Valve (MO)
Unit 2 Return Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
Unit 2 Return Header Crosstie Valve (MO)
RCFC 2A/2C Inlet Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
RCFC 2B/2D Inlet Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
Equipment Zone 11.3E-2 11.3B-2 11.2-0 11.3B-2 11.3E-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 16.1-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3F-2 11.3F-2 11.3A-2 11.3A-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.2B-2 11.2D-2 11.3-2 11.3A-2 11.3A-2 11.1A-0 11.11B-0 11.1A-0 11.11B-0 11.2-0 11.2-0 11.2-0 11.3-2 11.3-2
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Contd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 2SX01AA 2SX01AB 2SX01K 2SX01 PA 2SX01PA-C 2SX01PB 2SX01PB-C 2SX027A 2SX027B 2SX02K 2SX033 2SX034 2SX04P 2SX101A 2SX136 2SX147A 2SX147B 2SX169A 2SX169B 2SX173 2SX178 2TI-0413A 2TI-0413B 2T1-0423A 2TI-0423B 2TI-0433A 2TI-04338 2TI-0443A 2T1-0443B 2TI-0604 2T1-0605 2TI-0608 2T1-0609 2TI-IT001 2TI-IT002 2TI-RC005A 2TI-ROO05B 2TI-RC006A 2TI-RC006B 2TI-RC007A 2TI-RO007B 2TI-RC008A 2TI-RC008B 2TI-RC022A 2TI-RC022B 2T1I-RC023A "2TI-RC023B (Sheet 24 of 27)
Equipment Description Essential Service Water Pump 2A Oil Cooler Essential Service Water Pump 2B ail Cooler AFW Pump 2B Engine Closed Cycle Heat Exchanger Essential Service Water Pump 2A Essential Service Water Pump 2A Lube Oil Pump Essential Service Water Pump 2B Essential Service Water Pump 2B Lube Oil Pump RCFC 2A/2C Outlet Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
RCFC 2B12D Outlet Containment Isolation Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 2B Right Angle Gear Oil Cooler ESW Pump 2A Discharge Crosstie Isolation Valve (MO)
ESW Pump 2B Discharge Crosstle Isolation Valve (MO)
AFW Pump 2B Cooling Water Pump (Engine Driven)
AFW Pump 2A ON Cooler Outlet Valve (SO)
Unit 2 Return Header Crosstle Valve (MO)
Containment Chiller Condenser Bypass Valve (AO)
Containment Chiller Condenser Bypass Valve (AO)
Diesel Generator 2A Service Water Isolation Valve (AO)
Diesel Generator 2B Service Water Isolation Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 2B SX Supply Isolation Valve (AO)
AFW Pump 2B SX Return Isolation Valve (AO)
Loop 2A Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PM05J (2TE-RC022A)
Loop 2A Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PM05J (2TE-RC022B)
Loop 2B Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PM05J (2TE-RC023A)
Loop 2B Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator @ 2PM05J (2TE-RC023B)
Loop 2C Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PM05J (2TE-RC024A)
Loop 2C Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PM05J (2TE-RC024B)
Loop 2D Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PM05J (2TE-RC025A)
Loop 2D Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PM05J (2TE-RC025B)
RHR Hx 2A Outlet Temperature Indicator 0 2PM06J (2TE-604)
RHR Hx 2B Outlet Temperature Indicator 0 2PM06J (2TE-605)
RHR Hx 2RH02AA Outlet Temperature Indicator RHR Hx 2RH02AB Outlet Temperature Indicator Division 21 Incore Thermocouple Display Insert 0 2PM05J Division 22 Incore Thermocouple Display Insert 0 2PM05J Loop 2A Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL05J (2TE-RC022A)
Loop 2A Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL05J (2TE-RC022B)
Loop 2B Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL05J (2TE-RC023A)
Loop 2B Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL05J (2TE-RC023B)
Loop 2C Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL05J (2TE-RC024A)
Loop 2C Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL05J (2TE-RC024B)
Loop 2D Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL05J (2TE-RC025A)
Loop 2D Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL05J (2TE-RC025B)
Loop 2A Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL10J (2TE-RC022A)
Loop 2A Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PLI1J (2TE-RC022B)
Loop 2B Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL10 J (2TE-RC023A)
Loop 2B Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL10J (2TE-RC023B)
Equipment Zone 11.1A-0 11.1B-0 11.4A-2 11.1A-0 11.1A-0 11.11-0 11.16-0 11.3-2 11.3-2 11.4A-2 11.1A-0 11.1B-0 11.4A-2 11.4-0 11.2-0 11.5-2 11.5-2 9.2-2 9.1-2 11.4A-2 11.4A-2 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.3B-2 11.3E-2 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.4C-0 11.6-2 11.6-2 11.6-2 11.6-2
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Contd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 2TI-RC024A 2TI-RC024B 2TI-RC025A 2TI-RC025B 2UL-AN012-A7 2UL-AN012-B7 2UL-AN012-C7 2VAO1 CA 2VA01CB 2VA01CC 2VA01CD 2VAO1CE 2VAO1CF 2VA01CG 2VA01CH 2VA01SA 2VA01SB 2VA02CA 2VA02CB 2VA02CC 2VA02CD "2VA02SA 2VA02SB 2VA06CA 2VA06CB 2VA06CC 2VA06CD 2VA06SA 2VA06SB 2VA08CB 2VA08S 2VD01CA 2VD01CB 2VD01YA 2VD01YB 2VD02YA 2VD02YB 2VD09YA 2VD09YB 2VD10YA 2VD10YB 2VD16YA 2VD16YA 2VD16YB 2VD16YB 2VD17YA "2VD17YA Equipment Description Loop 2C Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL10J (2TE-RC024A)
Loop 2C Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL10J (2TE-RCO24B)
Loop 2D Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature Indicator @ 2PL10J (2TE-RC025A)
Loop 2D Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Indicator 0 2PL1 J (2TE-RC025B)
RWST LEVEL LO-3 Annunciator Alarm RWST LEVEL LO-2 Annunciator Alarm RWST LEVEL LOW Annunciator Alarm SX Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler Fan SX Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler SX Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler RHR Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler Fan RHR Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler Fan RHR Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler Fan RHR Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler Fan RHR Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler RHR Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler Charging Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler Fan Charging Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler Fan Charging Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler Fan Charging Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler Fan Charging Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler Charging Pump 2B Cubicle Cooler Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cubicle Cooler Fan (Engine-driven)
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cubicle Cooler Diesel Generator Room 2A Supply Fan Diesel Generator Room 2B Supply Fan Diesel Generator Room 2B Outside Air Intake Damper Diesel Generator Room 2B Outside Air Intake Damper Diesel Generator Room 2B Return Air Damper Diesel Generator Room 2B Return Air Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Outside Air Intake Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Outside Air Intake Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Return Air Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Return Air Damper Diesel Generator Room 2B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 26 Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2B Fire Damper (Sheet 25 of 27)
Equipment Zone 11.6-2 11.6-2 11.6-2 11.6-2 2.1-0 2.1-0 2.1-0 11.1A-0 11.1A-0 11.1A-0 11.1A-0 11.1B-0 11.163-0 11.1"-0 11.1 B-0 11.1A-0 11.1B-0 11.2A-2 11.2A-2 11.2D-2 11.2D-2 11.2A-2 11.2D-2 11.3D-2 11.3D-2 11.3G-2 11.3G-2 11.3D-2 11.3G-2 11.4A-2 11.4A-2 18.2-2 18.1-2 18.1-2 18.1-2 9.1-2 9.1-2 182-2 18.2-2 9.2-2 9.2-2 18.1-2 9.1-2 18.1-2 9.1-2 8.3-2 9.1-2
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Contrd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Number 2VD17YB 2VD17YB 2VD23YA 2VD23YA 2VD23YB 2VD23YB 2VD24YA 2VD24YA 2VD24YB 2VD24YB 2VE01C 2VE01Y 2VE02Y 2VE04Y 2VE04Y 2VE05Y 2VE05Y 2VE06Y 2VE06Y 2VE07Y 2VE07Y 2VE12Y 2VE12Y 2VE17Y 2VE17Y 2VP01AA 2VP01AB 2VP01AC 2VP01AD 2VPO1CA 2VP01CB 2VP01CC 2VP01CD 2VX01C 2VX01Y 2VX02Y 2VX04C 2VX04Y 2VX05C 2VX05Y 2VX06C 2VX16Y 2VX16Y 2VX17Y 2VX17Y 2VX20Y 2VX20Y (Sheet 26 of 27)
Equipment Description Diesel Generator Room 2B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2B Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Fire Damper Diesel Generator Room 2A Fire Damper Division 22 MEER Supply Fan Division 22 MEER Outside Air Intake Damper Division 22 MEER Return Air Damper Division 22 MEER Fire Damper Division 22 MEER Fire Damper Division 22 MEER Fire Damper Division 22 MEER Fire Damper Division 21 MEER Fire Damper Division 21 MEER Fire Damper Division 21 MEER Fire Damper Division 21 MEER Fire Damper Division 21 MEER Fire Damper Division 21 MEER Fire Damper Division 22 MEER Fire Damper Division 22 MEER Fire Damper Essential Service Water Coil Essential Service Water Coil Essential Service Water Coil Essential Service Water Coil RCFC Fan A RCFC Fan B RCFC Fan C RCFC Fan D Division 22 ESF Switchhear Room Supply Fan Division 22 ESF Swgr Room Outside Air Intake Damper Division 22 ESF Swgr Room Return Air Damper Division 21 ESF Swltchgear Room/MEER Supply Fan Division 21 ESF Swgr Room Outside Air Intake Damper ESW Cooling Tower OA Division 21 Electric Substation Bus 231Z Supply Fan DIvision 21 ESF Swgr Room Return Air Damper ESW Cooling Tower OB Division 22 Electric Substation Bus 232Z Supply Fan Division 22 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 22 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 22 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 22 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 21 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 21 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Equipment Zone 8.3-2 9.1-2 18.2-2 9.2-2 18.2-2 92-2 8.3-2 9.2-2 8.3-2 9.2-2 5.4-2 18.1-2 5.4-2 18.1-2 5.3-2 5.6-2 8.6-0 18.2-2 5.4-2 5.6-2 8.6-0 5.4-2 5.6-2 5.3-2 5.4-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 18.1-2 18.1-2 5.1-2 18.2-2 18.2-2 18.14B-2 5.2-2 18.14A-2 18.1-2 5.1-2 5.1-2 8.5-2 5.2-2 8.5-2
BYRON-FPR AMENDMENT 20 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd)
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Equipment Description Division 21 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper Division 21 ESF Swgr Room Fire Damper ESW Cooling Tower OA Division 21 Electric Substation Bus 231Z Outside Air Intake ESW Cooling Tower OA Division 21 Electric Substation Bus 231Z Return Air Damper ESW Cooling Tower 0B Division 22 Electric Substation Bus 232Z Outside Air Intake ESW Cooling Tower 0B Division 22 Electric Substation Bus 232Z Return Air Damper Equipment Zone 18.2-2 5.2-2 18.14B-2 18.14B-2 18.14A-2 18.14A-2 (Sheet 27 of 27)
Equipment Number 2VX22Y 2VX22Y 2VX30Y 2VX32Y 2VX33Y 2VX35Y