ML022810630

Revisions to Event Classification Guide

ML022810630
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	09/26/2002
From:	Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	David Pinckney Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SECG0101
Download: ML022810630 (79)

Text

Document Transmittal Form TO

• NRC C/O PINCKNEY, DAVID ID: SECGO101 DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK WASHINGTON, DC 20555 Date : 09/26/2002 Please update your controlled set of documents with the following documents:

Document ID Revision Status Quantity Fo rmat RecNo 6 A 1 H 146326 PRCISECG-ATT.241000 5 A 1 H 145928 PRCISECG-ATT.041000 8 A 1 H 146285 PRC SECG-ATT.081000 14 A 1 H 146244 PRC SECG-SECG-TOC-BASISI000 4 A 1 H 145969 PRCISECG-ATT.031000 3 A 1 H 146168 PRCISECG-SECT.09.4 (BASIS)l000 2 A 1 H 146206 PRCISECG-SECT.09.5 (BASIS)l000 4 A 1 H 146051 PRCISECG-ATT.011000 4 A 1 H 146130 PRCISECG-SECT.03.3 (BASIS)1000 4 A 1 H 146010 PRCISECG-ATT.021000 I H 146386 PRCISECG-SECT.031000 1 A 38 A 1 H 146092 PRCISECG-SECG-TOCI000 I-

Document Transmittal Form This acknowledgement receipt must be returned to Document Management PSEG Nuclear PO Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 MC N04 Your signature below verifies that:

(1) the above documents have been filed and superseded documents have been removed and destroyed or clearly marked as obsolete.

(2) the mailing address and copyholder information are correct or corrections have been identified on this transmittal.

[I Place checkmark here to be removed from controlled distribution Signature: Date

SALEM GENERATING STATION EVENT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE September 26, 2002 CHANGE PAGES FOR REVISION #38 The Table of Contents forms a general guide to the current revision of each section and attachment of the Salem ECG. The changes that are made in this TOC Revision #38 are shown below.

1. Check that your revision packet is complete.

2. Add the revised documents.

3. Remove and recycle the outdated material listed below.

ADD REMOVE Pages Description Rev. Pages Description Rev.

TOC 38 ALL TOC 37 ALL Section 3 01 ALL Section 3 00 ALL Attachment 1 04 ALL Attachment 1 03 ALL ALL Attachment 2 04 ALL Attachment 2 03 ALL 04 ALL Attachment 3 03 Attachment 3 ALL 05 ALL Attachment 4 04 Attachment 4 ALL 08 ALL Attachment 8 07 Attachment 8 ALL 06 ALL Attachment 24 05 Attachment 24 S-ECG 1 of 1

PSEG Internal Use Only PSE&G CONTROU of5 SALEM EVENT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS/SIGNATURE PAGE COPY #5gr._lol SECTION TITLE REV # PAGES DATE 38 5 09/26/02 T.O.C. Table of Contents/Signature Page 02 11 12/14/00 i Introduction and Usage 00 6 01/21/97 ii Glossary of Acronyms & Abbreviations 21 7 04/16/98 iii Critical Function Status Trees (CFSTs), Unit 1 23 6 08/19/97 Critical Function Status Trees (CFSTs), Unit 2 00 1 01/21/97 1.0 Fuel Clad Challenge 1 00 01/21/97 2.0 RCS Challenge 1 01 09/26/02 3.0 Fission Product Barriers (Table) 1 00 01/21/97 4.0 EC Discretion 1 00 01/21/97 5.0 Failure to TRIP 6.0 Radiological Releases/Occurrences Gaseous Effluent Release 00 4 01/21/97 6.1 1 6.2 Liquid Effluent Release 00 01/21/97 6.3 In Plant Radiation Occurrences 00 1 01/21/97 6.4 Irradiated Fuel Event 00 2 01/21/97 7.0 Electrical Power 2 7.1 Loss of AC Power Capabilities 00 01/21/97 Loss of DC Power Capabilities 00 1 01/21/97 7.2 8.0 System Malfunctions Loss of Heat Removal Capability 00 2 01/21/97 8.1 8.2 Loss of Overhead Annunciators 00 1 01/21/97 00 1 01/21/97 8.3 Loss of Communications Capability 1 Control Room Evacuation 00 01/21/97 8.4 1 8.5 Technical Specifications 00 01/21/97 9.0 Hazards - Internal/External 1 Security Threats 01 02/01/02 9.1 00 1 01/21/97 9.2 Fire 00 1 01/21/97 9.3 Explosion 00 2 01/21/97 9.4 Toxic/Flammable Gases 00 1 01/21/97 9.5 Seismic Event 00 1 01/21/97 9.6 High Winds 00 1 01/21/97 9.7 Flooding 00 1 01/21/97 9.8 Turbine Failure/Vehicle Crash/

Missile Impact 9.9 River Level 00 1 01/21/97 10.0 Reserved for future use N/A WC Salem ECG Charts (Located In ERFs) 01 2 02/01/02 SGS Rev. 38

PSEG Internal Use Only ECG T.O.C.

Pg. 2 of 5 SALEM EVENT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS/SIGNATURE PAGE SECTION TITLE REV # PAGES DATE Licensing is responsible for the Reportable Action Level (Section 11) and associated Attachments (marked by "L")

11.0 Reportable Action Levels (RALs) 11.1 Technical Specifications 01 3 01/23/01 11.2 Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 01 1 01/23/01 11.3 System Actuation 02 1 01/23/01 11.4 Personnel Safety/Overexposure 01 2 01/23/01 11.5 Environmental/State Notifications 01 2 01/23/01 11.6 After-the-Fact 01 1 02/28/02 11.7 Security/Emergency Response 03 1 02/28/02 Capabilities 11.8 Public Interest 01 1 01/23/01 11.9 Accidental Criticality/ 02 2 01/23/01 Special Nuclear Material/

Rad Material Shipments - Releases 11.10 Voluntary Notifications 01 1 01/23/01 SGS Rev. 38

PSEG Internal Use Only ECG T.O.C.

Pg. 3 of 5 SALEM EVENT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS/SIGNATURE PAGE Licensing is responsible for the Reportable Action Level (Section 11) and associated Attachments (marked by "L")

ATTACHMENT TITLE REV # PAGES DATE 1 UNUSUAL EVENT 04 2 09/26/02 2 ALERT 04 2 09/26/02 3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY 04 2 09/26/02 4 GENERAL EMERGENCY 05 5 09/26/02 5 L NRC Data Sheet Completion Reference 02 7 01/23/01 6 Primary Communicator Log 22 8 08/06/02 7 Primary Communicator Log (GE) deleted 02/29/00 8 Secondary Communicator Log 08 9 09/26/02 9 L Non-Emergency Notifications Reference 21 3 08/06/02 10 L 1 Hr Report - NRC Regional Office 01 3 01/23/01 11 L 1 Hr Report (Common Site) Security/Safeguards 01 3 01/23/01 12 L 1 Hr Report - NRC Operations 01 3 01/23/01 13 L 4 Hr Report - Contaminated Events Outside 01 7 01/23/01 Of The RCA 14 L 4 Hr Report - NRC Operations 02 3 01/23/01 15 L Environmental Protection Plan 02 3 01/23/01 16 L Spill / Discharge Reporting 02 12 02/28/02 17 L 4 Hr Report - Fatality or Medical Emergency 02 4 03/15/01 18 L 4 Hr Report - Radiological Transportation Accident 02 4 01/23/01 19 L 24 Hr Report - Fitness For Duty (FFD) 02 3 01/23/01 Program Events 20 L 24 Hr Report - NRC Regional Office 01 3 01/23/01 21 L Reportable Event - LAC/ Memorandum Of 01 2 01/23/01 Understanding (M.O.U.)

22 L T/S Required Engineering Evaluation 01 2 01/23/01 23 Reserved 24 UNUSUAL EVENT (Common Site) 06 3 09/26/02 25 8 Hr Report (Common Site) 02 3 05/02/01 Major Loss of Emergency Assessment, Offsite Response, OR Communications Capability 26 L 8 Hr Report - NRC Operations 00 3 01/23/01 27 L 8 Hr Report - Medical Emergency 01 4 03/15/01 Transport of Contaminated Person 28 L Boiler and Pressure Vessel Reporting 00 3 01/23/01 SGS Rev. 38

PSEG Internal Use Only ECG T.O.C.

Pg. 4 of 5 REVISION

SUMMARY

Biennial Review Performed: Yes X No

- Editorial changes in attachments 1 - 4, & 24 for location of the "Emergency Callout" envelope.

- Editorial change in Attachment 8 foir steps in starting and stopping ERDS, due to SPDS upgrade.

SGS Rev. 38

PSEG Internal Use Only ECG T.O.C.

Pg. 5 of 5 SIGNATURE PAGE Prepared By: William L.Detwiler 08/14/02 (If Editorial Revisions Only, Last Approved Revision) Date Section/Attachments Revised 3.3.3.b 08/14/02 (List Non Editorial Only - Section/Attachments) Date Reviewed By:

eness Reviewer ea 4Effecti Reviewed By:

z-"-/ D(epartment Manager Dte a

Review ed By: N/A N/A Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager Date (Reportable Action evel ection 11) and associated Attachments marked by "L")

Review ed By A EP Manaser rDate Reviewed By N/A Manager - Quality Assessment - NBU Date (IfApplicable)

SORC N/A Mtg. No. Salem Chairman Vice President N/A Date /Da/e Effective Date of this Revision:

t Aate SGS Rev. 38

TABLE, 3.0 FISSIONPOUCT APPLICABLE 11 2s314ONLY",1 If.ir e o sor Potentlal Lo's IsconsIdered llMTNENT IM, POTENTIAL LOSS = 0 PTs

-a - - aa~aaaaaa, LOSS 4 PTs (may occrxWfltn 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), use mud g1 and claiy as ifthe thr-ildd ise'.eeded'a- Not - a-p- a-EAL #3.1.2 a... . --

. - . ReactorCoolantActivity a a* - e 0 gv

> 300 iiCigm Dose Equivalent 1-131 Instruct ons~-a - a-7-.., af~a:"a-f

1. In the table rewiewthe Emergency Acon Levels of all colimns aind identify which',

2. For each of the three barriers, deterrmin'e**'- POTENTIAL LOSS = 3 PTs LOSS =4 PTs "jthe EA, With the highest point value, and EAL # 3.1.3.a EAL # 3.1.3.15

T ,irc the corresponding EAL # arid point 6 or more CETs >700 OF 6 or more CETs >1200 OF J value', No more than one EAL should be-, EAL # 33.3.a EAL # 3.35 selected for each barmer, , CNTMT Sump Level >78"/. UNISOLABLE leakage OLTSIDE (76% adverse) Containment as Indicated by one of the following"

3. Add the point values circled for the three t

'bani-rr id enter the sum below:

• Downstreamopa environment existshway to the

• Radiation monitor, area temperatures, flow or sump level S4.'Clisslifybased on thelpoint'value sum as POTENTIAL LOSS=3 PTs LOSS =z0PTs AMR EAL # 3.1.4.a Not Applicable : , Containment or system Isolation Is folioWS RVLISFuLA Range <39% required due to any one of the following

-~OR O EAL # 3.14A.b  : Safely Injection

• Containment pressure greater

- If the Classify as: Refer to RVLIS Dynamic Range Indicates ANY aa .. - .- , " " than4 psig oneodfthe following

• Valid CNMT Vent Isol Signal "sum is: _

4 RCPs I/S <44% "- a- *.- 'a 'j AND Cannot be ISOLATED from the 2 RCPsIIS <20% Main Control Room 1, 2 UNUSUAL EVENT Attachment I 1 RCPU/S <13%

3,4 ALERT Attachment 2 POTENTIAL LOSS =-1 P1 LOSS = 2 PTS 5,6,7,8 SITE AREA Attachment 3 EAL # 3.3A.a EAL #U3.3.4.b

-4 Unisolable, Faulted S/G OUTSIDEof Primary to Secondary Leakage >Tech 9,10 GENERAL Attachment 4 Containment as Indicated by S/G Spec Limits

- - aa S1Y, pressure dropping In an uncontrolled nmnner or completely Prolonged, direct secondary a - a a-a. - -

leakage depressurized to the environment

5. Implement t fheappropriate ECG 'A a -I Affected S/G tubes are Intact OR a a- a a a,-- Attachment per above chart. a a-i, a-a EAL # 3.3.c a A a LOCA conditions a- A-a -

6. Continue to review the EALs on this Table.' AND CNTMT Press OQRSump Level ME for changers that could result In emhergenciy a--s -'----- -5aa---

rising as expected

- escalation oi)rdeescalation.,

LOSS- 4 PTsj a-'

EAL#3,1,6 a~~r a 't ,

IA#.16 a' "'a-av')a-kla- "a '--a-ia-taaaa 'Xa. a> -A--

aa- L a-a- - - 'a-aaaaa-A

- fa-'

A'

a'a'a.f' a Aa.aa- a,.-

POTENTIAL LOSS = 3 PTs LOSS =4 PTs 11 PTENTIIAL LOSS-a 1IPTI LOSS m= s]

EAL # 3.1.6 a EAL # 3.1.6.b SEAL # 3.3*.&a EAL # 3.36.

SANYconditon, In the opinion of the ANY condtion, Inthe opinion of the AN cond'ition, In the opinion or the ANY condition, In the opinion of the

'S's

-EC, that Indicates a Potential Loss of EC, that Indicates a Loss of the Fuel EC, that Indicates a Potential Loss of EC, that indlicates a Loss of the 7 the Fuel Clad Barrier Clad Barrier the Cordalnrnent Barrier Containment Barrier 5083 ECO Rev 01

, , I .Paoelof

ý,-. - I ,I

ECG ATT I Pg. I of 2 ATTACHMENT 1 PSE&G UNUSUAL EVENT  :" L I. EMERGENCY COORDINATOR (EC) LOG SHEET C 0 PY #

Initials A. DECLARE AN UNUSUAL EVENT AT SALEM UNIT EAL # Declared at hrs on time date EC B. NOTIFICATIONS

1. CALL communicators to the Control Room. OS

2. COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF)

(last page of this attachment). EC

3. PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6. EC

4. DIRECT the Secondary Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 8 for an Unusual Event. EC NOTE Activation of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) during an Unusual Event is implemented at the discretion of the Emergency Coordinator (EC). If additional support personnel are needed during an Unusual Event, then limited or full staffing of the TSC may be initiated at the discretion of the EC. Limited staffing may be initiated by contacting selected support personnel on an individual basis in lieu of activating the full ERO.

5. IF desired, ACTIVATE the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) or PERFORM a limited staffing of the Emergency Response Facilities. EC Full Staffing LOCATE the confidential envelope in the front of the Operations Superintendent's (O.S.) copy of the ECG marked "Emergency Callout".

Follow the directions. When complete return to this procedure. OS (EP96-003)

6. IMPLEMENT EPEP 102 for OS. EC Rev. 04 SGS

ECG ATT I Pg. 2 of 2 INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM I. THIS IS , COMMUNICATOR IN THE CONTROL ROOM (NAME)

AT THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO.

II.

El THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT WHICH WAS DECLARED A7T ON (Time - 24 HR CLOCK) (DATE)

EAL # DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

III.

El NO RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS. see NOTE for release El THERE IS A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS. definition IV.

33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): WIND SPEED:

(From MET Computer) (DEGREES) (MPH)

V.NOOTECTEACTE--------------------------------------

ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME V. NO PROTECTIVE EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF)

NOTE:

Radiological Release is defined as: Plant Effluent > Federal Limit of 2.42E+05 pCi/sec Noble Gas or 2.1E+01l'ltCi/sec 1-131.

SGS Rev. 04

ECG ATT 2 Pg. 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 2 ALERT

1. EMERGENCY COORDINATOR (EC) LOG SHEET Initials A. DECLARE AN ALERT AT SALEM UNIT EAL # Declared at hrs on time date EC B. NOTIFICATIONS

1. CALL communicators to the Control Room.

EC

2. COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF)

(last page of this attachment).

BC and DIRECT the

3. PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Communicator Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6.

EC

4. DIRECT the Secondary Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 8 for an ALERT.

EC

5. LOCATE the confidential envelope in the front of the Operations Superintendent's (O.S.) copy of the ECG marked "Emergency Callout".

Follow the directions. When complete return to this procedure.

(EP96-003) OS

6. IMPLEMENT EPEP 102 for OS, EDO or ERM.

EC PSE&G CONTROL COPY #&13Q.\

SGS Rev. 04

ECG ATT 2 Pg. 2 of 2 INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM I. THIS IS COMMUNICATOR IN THE El CONTROL ROOM (NAME) EITSC AT THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO.

II.

o] THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF AN ALERT WHICH WAS DECLARED AT ON (Time - 24 HR CLOCK) (DATE)

EAL # DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

II NO RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS. see NOTE for release El THERE IS A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS. definition IV.

33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): WIND SPEED:

(From MET Computer) (DEGREES) (MPH)

V. NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF)

NOTE:

Radiological Release is defined as: Plant Effluent > Federal Limit of 2.42E+05 pCi/sec Noble Gas or 2.1 E+01I tCi/sec 1-13 1.

I SGS Rev. 04

ECG ATT 3 Pg. 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY I. EMERGENCY COORDINATOR (EC) LOG SHEET Initials A. DECLARE A SITE AREA EMERGENCY AT SALEM UNIT EAL #(s)

Declared at hrson time date EC B. NOTIFICATIONS

1. CALL communicators to the Control Room.

OS

2. COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF)

(last page of this attachment).

EC

3. PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6.

EC

4. DIRECT the Secondary Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 8 for a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

EC

5. IF NOT done previously, LOCATE the confidential envelope in the front of the Operations Superintendent's (O.S.) copy of the ECG marked "Emergency Callout".

Follow the directions. When complete return to this procedure.

(EP96-003) OS

6. IMPLEMENT EPEP 102 for OS, EDO or ERM.

EC PSE&G CONTROL COPY # __,__

SGS Rev. 04

ECG ATT 3 Pg. 2 of 2 INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM

..> I. THIS IS , COMMUNICATOR IN THE El CONTROL ROOM (NAME) O] TSC Q EOF AT THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO.

II. El THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF A SITE AREA EMERGENCY WHICH WAS DECLARED AT ON (TIME - 24 HOUR CLOCK) (DATE)

EAL #(s)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

III. El NO RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS. see NOTE for release El THERE IS A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS. definition IV.

33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): WIND SPEED:

(From MET Computer) (DEGREES) (MPH)

V. NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF)

NOTE:

Radiological Release is defined as: Plant Effluent > Federal Limit of 2.42E+05 pCi/sec Noble Gas or 2.1E+O1 pCi/sec 1-131.

SGS Rev. 04

ECG ATT 4 Pg. 1 of 5 ATTACHMENT 4 GENERAL EMERGENCY PSE&G CONTROL

,. ,EMERGENCY COORDINATOR (EC LOG SHEET CO PY # en-c w t C A. DECLARE A GENERAL EMERGENCY AT SALEM UNIT EAL #(s)

Declared at hrs on time date EC B. NOTIFICATIONS

1. CALL communicators to the Control Room.

OS CAUTION A Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) SHALL be made on the Initial Contact Message Form (ICMF).

2. MAKE A PAR as follows:

a. REFER to Predetermined PAR Flowchart on Pg. 3 and DETERMINE the appropriate PAR.

b. IF a Radiologically Based PAR is IMMEDIATELY available, EC THEN COMPARE the two PARs and choose the most appropriate for inclusion on the ICMF.

EC

3. COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF)

(last page of this attachment).

EC

4. PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6.

EC

5. DIRECT the Secondary Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 8 for a GENERAL EMERGENCY.

EC SGS Rev. 05

ECG ATT 4 Pg. 2 of 5 Initials

6. IF NOT done previously, LOCATE the confidential envelope in the front of the Operations Superintendent's (O.S.) copy of the ECG marked "Emergency Callout".

Follow the directions. When complete return to this procedure.

(EP96-003) OS

7. IMPLEMENT EPEP 102 for OS, EDO or ERM.

EC SGS Rev. 05

ECG ATT 4 Pg. 3 of 5 APPENDIX 1 PREDETERMINED PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS PAR REQUIRED FOR GENERAL EMERGENCY GEBASED> 00E ON 10ON YES BARRIER POINTS EVACUATE ALL SECTORS 0-5 MILES EVACUATE DOWNWIND + 1SECTOR 5-10 MILES SHELTER ALL REMAINING SECTORS 5-10 MILES TABLE (See next page to determine downwind sectors)

NO0 H EVACUATE ALL SECTORS 0-5 MILES DEFAULT PAR (any other GE)

CAUTION:

IF TRAVEL CONDITIONS PRESENT AN EXTREME HAZARD (SEVERE ICE, SNOW, WIND, FLOOD, QUAKE DAMAGE, ETC. ), CONSIDER SHELTER INSTEAD OF EVACUATE IN THE ABOVE SELECTED PAR SGS Rev. 05

ECG ATT 4 Pg. 4 of 5 APPENDIX 1 (continued)

RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTION WORKSHEET WIND DIRECTION PAR AFFECTED SECTORS FROM DEGREES COMPASS DOWNWIND +/-1 SECTORS 349-011 N =_ SSE - S -SSW 011-034 NNE __ S-5SSW-SW 034-056 NE S SSW - SW - WSW 056-079 ENE __ SW-WSW-W 079-101 E WSW-W-WNW 101-124 ESE _ W-WNW-NW 124-146 SE _ _ WNW-NW-NNW 146-169 SSE __ NW-NNW-N 169-191 S __ NNW-N-NNE 191-214 SSW _ _ N-NNE-NE 214-236 SW _ NNE-NE-ENE 236-259 WSW _ NE-ENE-E 259-281 W __ ENE - E - ESE 281-304 WNW _ E - ESE - SE 304-326 NW _ ESE - SE - SSE 326-349 NNW _ SE - SSE - S NOTE CONSIDER ADDING A SECTOR TO THE PAR IF THE WIND DIRECTION (FROM) IS WITHIN +/-'_ OF A SECTOR DIVIDING LINE.

10 3490 MILES 0110 2810 0790 1010 2590 1910 1690 SGS Rev. 05

ECG ATT 4 Pg. 5 of 5 INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM I. THIS IS , COMMUNICATOR IN THE El CONTROL ROOM (NAME) O TSC O3 EOF AT THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO.

S............................................................................................................................

Ila. El THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF A GENERAL EMERGENCY WHICH WAS DECLARED AT ON v- .

(TIME - 24 HOUR CLOCK) (DATE)

EAL #(s)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

Ilb.

El THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF A PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION UPGRADE WHICH WAS MADE AT HRS ON (24 HOUR CLOCK) (DATE)

Reason for PAR Upgrade:

III. El NO RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS. 1osee NOTE for release El THERE IS A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS. definition IV.

33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): WIND SPEED:

(From MET Computer) (DEGREES) (MPH)

V. Sectors Dist.- Miles El WE RECOMMEND EVACUATION AS FOLLOWS E] WE RECOMMEND SHELTERING AS FOLLOWS EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF)

NOTE:

<-I Radiological Release is defined as: Plant Effluent > Federal Limit of 2.42E+05 pCi/sec Noble Gas or 2.1E+O1 PCi/sec 1-131.

SGS Rev. 05

ECG ATT 8 Pg. 1 of 9 ATTACHMENT 8 SECONDARY COMMUNICATOR LOG Table of Contents Pages 1-2 Notifications & Data Collection/Transmission PSE&G 3-4 Incoming Calls (BNE, DEMA, OEM, AAAG, etc.) Cu NTROL 5 Major Equipment & Electrical Status (MEES) form 6 Operational Status Board (OSB) form CO PY#

7-8 Station Status Checklist (SSCL) form aQ:E2DLJ I 9 Common Site UNUSUAL EVENT - Station Status Checklist form Emergency Classification: (circle) UE ALERT SAE GE Name: Position: CM2 /TS C2/ EOF2 (Print) (circle)

A. NOTIFICATIONS NOTE A new Attachment 8 is required to be implemented if the classification or protective action recommendation (PAR) changes.

Initials

1. OBTAIN a copy of Attachment 6 and ASSIST Primary Communicator with 15-minute notifications, as necessary.

C.M2/TSC2/EOF2

2. DIRECT the Shift Rad Pro Tech (SRPT) (x2644) to implement SC.EP-EP.ZZ 0301(Q), Shift Radiation Protection Technician Response. (N/A for Common Site).

Name: Time:

CM2

3. For an ALERT or higher emergency;

() a. CALLOUT an additional SRO and have him/her report to the OSC.

Name: Time:

CM2

b. ACTIVATE ERDS within 60 minutes from the Affected Unit's SPDS terminal;

1) CLICK <ERDS> button.

2) CLICK <Initiate> button.

3) CHECK for the following status:

ERDS Active LINK Dialing Modem ) Link Active CM2 SGS Rev.08

ECG ATT 8 Pg. 2 of 9 Initials A. NOTIFICATIONS (cont'd)

4. OBTAIN a copy of the ICMF and FAX the ICMF to Group A.

CM2/TSC2/EOF2

5. COMPLETE a Station Status Checklist (SSCL) Form, Pg. 7 or Common Site UNUSUAL EVENT Station Status Checklist (SSCL) Form, Pg. 9;

( ) a. OBTAIN OS (TSS/SSM) assistance, as needed for SSCL Pg. 1.

( ) b. OBTAIN SRPT (RAC/RSM) assistance, as needed for SSCL Pg.2. (N/A for Common Site)

( ) c. FAX to Group B.

( ) d. IF fax transmission of the SSCL is incomplete, THEN CONTACT the State Agencies listed below, READ the data, AND DOCUMENT on SSCL, Pg. 2.

DEMA Delaware Emergency Management Agency 302-659-2290 BNE NJ Bureau of Nuclear Engineering 609-984-7700 CM2/TSC2/EOF2

6. OBTAIN completed NRC Data Sheet from the CM-1, and FAX form to Group B. CM2/TSC2/EOF2

7. REPEAT Step 5 approximately every half hour OR IMMEDIATELY for significant changes in Station status, until either Turnover or relief.

CM2/TSC2/EOF2

8. TURNOVER responsibility for offsite notifications and offsite data updates (SSCLs) to the oncoming facility (TSC or EOF);

( ) a. GIVE names and phone numbers of contacts already made with any Offsite Agencies.

( ) b. GIVE time for next SSCL.

CM2/TSC2

9. IF available for other duties AND TSC turnover is complete, THEN obtain headset, MAN the Ops Data line and CONTACT the TSC ops advisor and establish an open line of communication from the control room to the TSC.

CM-2 B. DATA COLLECTION/TRANSMISSION

1. WHEN in an ALERT or higher emergency OR AFTER significant changes in plant status; THEN COMPLETE the Major Equipment and Electrical Status (MEES) Form.

( ) a. OBTAIN Licensed Operator review.

( ) b. GIVE a copy to the OSC Coordinator.

( ) c. FAX to Group C.

CM2 SGS Rev.08

ECG ATT 8 Pg. 3 of 9 Initials B. DATA COLLECTION/TRANSMISSION (cont'd)

2. IF requested by the TSC, THEN COMPLETE the Operational Status Board (OSB) Form every 15 minutes, (TSS may modify the frequency or data list as appropriate)

( ) a. OBTAIN Licensed Operator review.

( ) b. FAX to Group C.

CM2

3. ENSURE the Facility OSB and MEES Status Boards are updated as follows:

( ) a. OBTAIN OSB Data from SPDS "STATUS BOARD PARAMETERS."

( ) b. IF SPDS is Out of Service, THEN REQUEST CM2 to perform step B.2, above. (data set and frequency of updates may be revised by the TSS based on event circumstances)

( ) c. WHEN significant changes in plant status occur, THEN REQUEST CM2 to perform step B. 1, above.

TSC2/EOF2

4. WHEN the emergency is terminated, THEN FORWARD this document and all completed Forms to the OS (TSS/SSM).

CM2/TSC2/EOF2 C. INCOMING CALLS STATE OFFICIALS

1. IF Notifications authority has transferred, THEN DIRECT the caller to contact the TSC (or EOF if activated).

CM2/TSC2

2. WHEN contacted by any State Agency Officials (listed here),

DEMA - Delaware Emergency Management Agency AAAG - Delaware Accident Assessment Advisory Group BNE - NJ Bureau of Nuclear Engineering DEP - NJ Department of Environmental Protection OEM - NJ Office of Emergency Management PERFORM the following:

( ) a. OBTAIN and RECORD; Agency Caller's Name Phone #

( ) b. READ the latest EC approved SSCL.

SGS Rev.08

ECG ATT 8 Pg. 4 of 9 Initials C. INCOMING CALLS (cont'd)

STATE OFFICIALS

( ) c. IF caller is NJ-BNE, DEMA, or AAAG, THEN also READ the approved NRC Data Sheet Event Description.

CM2/TSC2/EOF2 NEWS MEDIA CAUTION Communicators are NOT authorized to release any information to the News Media.

3. WHEN contacted by any News Media representative, READ the appropriate message below:

a. IF the ENC is not activated (Unusual Event), say; "You are requested to contact the Nuclear Communications Office at the following number: 856-339-1186."

b. IF the ENC is activated (ALERT or higher), say; "You are requested to contact the Media Information Operator at any of the following numbers: 856-273-0188, -0282, -0479, or 0586."311 CM2/TSC2/EOF2 NRC OPERATIONS CENTER

4. WHEN directed by the NRC to TERMINATE ERDS transmission, THEN GO TO any SPDS terminal of the affected Unit AND PROCEED as follows;

a. CLICK <ERDS> button.

b. CLICK <Terminate> button.

c. CHECK for the following status:

ERDS Inactive LINK Not Connected

d. WHEN completed, NOTIFY the OS.

CM2 SGS Rev.08

ECG MEES ATT 8 Pg. 5 of 9 SALEM UNIT DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

UPDATE TIME:

MAJOR EQUIPMENT AND ELECTRICAL STATUS ___

¶1 ELECT. CONTAINMENT ELECT.

SYSTEMS FEED Y/N CONTROL FEED Y/N NOTE: Y = IN SERVICE CHARGING 1 B9D CONT. SPRAY 1 A2D N = OUT OF SERVICE PUMPS 2 C9D PUMPS 2 C2D (CIRCLE ANY UNAVAILABLE EQUIPMENT) 3 A7X CFCU HI LOW SAFETY INJ 1 A5D I A3X A2X A4X PUMPS 2 C5D 2 B3X B2X B4X I I RHR 1 A7D 3 C3X C2X C4X I - i-COOLING ELECT. PUMPS 2 B7D 4 B7X B6X SYSTEMS FEED YIN B8X ELECTRICAL STATUS 5 C7X C6X Y/N c8x AUX FD I AID ELECT.

+ 6- -- L PUMPS 2 BID OFFSITE AC POWER AVAILABLE FEED YIN 3 STM. KUN LOADED FEED Y/N EMEKRiENCY DIESELS IODINE 1 G7X

____________________________________________ ___________ I SERVICE 1 3D EDG A REMOVAL 2 E7X r

WATER 2 8D B U nW 1 A15X PUMPS 3 B3D C RECOM 2 RISX REO 21 B 15 4 1551 #3 GAS TURBINE MISC. EQUIPMENT 5 3D r -

La ELEC DISTRIBUTION

- I-Y/N I.

6 .

8D AVAILABLE? Y/N FIKE PUMPS -

2 COMP. 1 AIOD VITAL BUS A (DIESEL) 2 1

COOLING 2 BIOD B ELECT.

PUMPS 3 CIOD C STATION AIR COMP. FEED Y/N REACTOR 1 H4D GROUP BUS E 1 1H6D COOLANT 2 E4D F 2 2GID PUMPS 3 F4D G 3 IGID 4 G4D H EMERGENCY AIR ELECT.

CONDENSATE 1 HID COMP. FEED Y/N PUMPS 2 EID I IC14X 3 FID 2 2C14X Ul / U2 COMMENTS:

CIRC IA 2AD/2AD WATER lB 7BD/7BD PUMPS 2A 3AD/3AD 2B 6BD/6BD 3A 4AD/4AD 3B 5BD/5BD LICENSED OPERATOR REVIEW:

INITIALS SGS Rev.08

( Operational Sta § - Board - Salem UPDATE: I UNIT#

TIME DATE I. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM IV. C.V.C.S Cent. Charg. Pump Flow (BIT flow) GPM Letdown flow GPM SIP flow# _1 GPM Charging flow GPM SlP flow# 2 RHRPflow# _1 GPM V. SECONDARY COOLANT RHRPflow# 2 GPM NO. 1 SG level  % (NR orWR)

RWST LEVEL FT NO. 2 SG level  % (NR orWR)

II. CONTAINMENT NO. 3 SG level  % (NR orWR)

Cont. Pressure PSIG NO. _4 SG level  % (NR or WR)

Cont. Temperature (AVG) F NO. -1 SG pressure PSIG Cont. H2 Concen. NO. -2 SG pressure PSIG Cont. Sump level NO. 3 SG pressure PSIG Cont. Rad (hi range) R44A R/hr NO. _4 SG pressure PSIG Cont. Rad (hi range) R44B R/hr NO. _1 SG feedflow  % or LBS/HR I1l. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NO. _2 SG feedflow  % or LBS/HR

1. of RCPs Running NO. _3 SG feedflow  % or LBS/HR RVLIS (full range) NO. 4 SG feedflow  % or LBS/HR Core Exit Thermocouple (hottest) F AFST level

1. of Thermocouples > 1200 OF VI. MISC. TANKS LEVEL Tc Loop _1 F Waste Hold-Up Tank #__1 Tc Loop 2 F Waste Hold-Up Tank #__2 Tc Loop 3 F Waste Monitor HUT Tc Loop __4 F VII. SSCL INFORMATION NO

• Tave (Autioneered) *If no RCPs running, Tave on F Offsite power available?

PZR/RCS Pressure the ControlConsole is invalid. PSIG Two or more diesels available?

PZR Level (hot) Did ECCS actuate?

Th Loop __ F Is the containment barrier failed?

Th Loop 2 F SIGNIFICANT PLANT EVENTS Th Loop 3 F VIll.

Th Loop 4 F Reactor Power/Neutron flux  %/amps/CPS Subcooling Margin F Licensed Operator Review I I Initials ECG Page 6 of 9 SGS Rev. 08

ECG ISSCL STATION STATUS CHECKLIST ATT 8 (Pg. 1 of 2) Pg. 7 of 9 Operational Information SALEM GENERATING STATION Unit No. Messag e Date Time Transmitted By: Name Position (CR/TSC/EOF)

1. Date and Time Event Declared: Date Time (24 hr clock)

2. Event Classification: 0l Unusual Event 0l Site Ar ea Emergency El Alert 0l Generad Emergency

3. Cause of Event: Primary Initiating Condition used for declaration EAL #(s)

Description of the event

4. Status of Reactor: El Tripped/Time El At Power 0l Startup El Hot Standby 0l Hot Shutdown 0l Cold Shutdown El Refuel

5. RZR/RCS Pressure psig Core Exit TC OF

6. Is offsite power available? 0 YES O NO

7. Are two or more diesel generators available? El YES O NO

8. Did any Emergency Core Cooling Systems actuate? El YES O NO

9. Is the Containment barrier failed? (Loss per EAL section 3.3) El YES 0 NO

10. Other pertinent information Approved:

EC or TSS or SSM SGS Rev. 08

STATION STATUS CHECKLIST (PAGE 2 OF 2) ECG RADIOLOGICAL INFORMATION ATT 8 Pg. 8 of 9 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NUMBER: CALCULATION TIME: DATE:

1. GASEOUS RELEASE>TECH SPEC (T/S) LIMITS:

(T/S LIMITS: 2.42 E+05 gCi/sec NG or 2.1E+01 plCi/sec IODINE)

YES: [ ] RELEASE START TIME: DATE:

NO:[ ]

A. RELEASE TERMINATED: YES [ ]NO [ ] N/A [

B. ANTICIPATED OR KNOWN DURATION OF RELEASE: HOURS C. TYPE OF RELEASE: GROUND [ ] ELEVATED: [ ]N/A [ ]

D. ADJUSTED WIND SPEED: (mph) (m/sec) WIND DIR (deg from)__

E. STABILITY CLASS: (A-G) DELTA T: _ .(deg C)

F. VENT PATHOFRELEASE: R41[ ] R45[ ] R44[ ] R46[ ]

G. NG RELEASE RATE: R41 R45_ R44 R46 (liCi/sec)

H. 1-131 RELEASE RATE: R41 R45 R44 R46 DEFAULT (liCi/sec) (circle if default)

I. TOTAL RELEASE RATE NOBLE GAS: .(pCi/sec)

J. TOTAL RELEASE RATE IODINE-131: (ICi/sec)

2. PROJECTED OFFSITE DOSE RATE CALCULATIONS:

TEDE DISTANCE XU/Q TEDE DOSE THYROID THYROID TIME FOR PLUME FROM VENT RATE (4 DAY) CDE RATE CDE DOSE TO TRAVEL (IN MILES) (l/M2) (MREMIHR) (MREM) (MREM/HR) (MREM) (MIN)

MEA 0.79 2.00 LPZ 5.00 EPZ 10.00

3. OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION:

4. UPDATE TO STATES (IF VERBALLY TRASMITTED):

NAME TIME INITALS STATE OF NEW JERSEY:

STATE OF DELAWARE:

AGENCY:

APPROVED:

EC or RAC or RSM SGS Rev. 08

ECG ATT 8 Pg. 9 of 9 Common Site Unusual Event STATION STATUS CHECKLIST Operational Information Message Date Time Transmitted by: Name Position

1. Date and Time Event Declared: Date Time:

2. Cause of event: Primary Initiating Condition used for declaration EAL#

Description of the event:

33FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): WIND SPEED (From MET Computer) (DEGREES) (MPH)

3. Status of Mode: (Power, Startup, Rx Pressure Hottest Core Exit Rx Water the Reactors Hot Standby, Hot S/D, TC / Rx Temp Level Cold S/D, Refuel)

Salem 1 psig OF %covered Salem 2 psig 0F covered,-:"'--,

Hope Creek psig uF in.

Salem 1 Salem 2 Hope Creek YES NO YES NO YES NO

4. Is offsite power available?

5. Are two or more diesel generators operable?

6. Did any Emergency Core Cooling Systems actuate?

7. Is any Containment Barrier failed? (Loss per EAL section 3.3)

8. Radiological release (> Tech Spec Limit) in progress X X X

9. Other pertinent information EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF)

SGS Rev. 08

ECG ATT 24 ATTACHMENT 24 CONTROL UNUSUAL EVENT (COMMON SITE) COPY #

NOTE ONLY one OS is required to declare this event and assume the responsibilities of Emergency Coordinator (EC). The other OS should perform the duties of the Unaffected Station OS during the implementation of this attachment.

CAUTION IN THE EVENT OF OFFSITE TOXIC GAS RELEASE AFFECTING THE SITE, EVACUATION OF NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER NOTIFICATIONS.

I. COMMON SITE EVENT ASSESSMENT/ EC DETERMINATION Initials SALEM OPERATIONS SUPERINTENDENT (OS) SHOULD:

A. NOTIFICATION OF HOPE CREEK OS I. CONTACT the Hope Creek OS (NETS 5224, DID 3027, or 3059) and brief him/her on the specific circumstances as follows:

( ) a. SHARE information about the externally initiated event in progress.

( ) b. OBTAIN agreement on the Unusual Event classification.

( ) c. DETERMINE which OS will assume EC responsibilities.

Emergency Coordinator:

OS

2. , IF the Hope Creek OS is the EC, THEN.

Contact the Salem Operations Manager and Salem NRC resident and provide them with a briefing on the UE.

Assist the Hope Creek OS as needed.

OS

3. IF the Salem OS is the EC, THEN IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENT this attachment as EC.

OS SGS Rev. 06

ECG ATT 24 Pg. 2 of 3 II. EMERGENCY COORDINATOR (EC) LOG SHEET Initials A. DECLARE AN UNUSUAL EVENT AT SALEM and HOPE CREEK EAL # Declared at hrs on time date EC B. NOTIFICATIONS

1. CALL communicators to the Control Room.

OS

2. COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF)

(last page of this attachment).

EC

3. PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6.

EC

4. DIRECT the Secondary Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 8 for an Unusual Event.

EC NOTE Activation of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) during an Unusual Event is implemented at the discretion of the Emergency Coordinator (EC). If additional support personnel are needed during an Unusual Event, then limited or full staffing of the TSC may be initiated at the discretion of the EC. Limited staffing may be initiated by contacting selected support personnel on an individual basis in lieu of activating the full ERO.

5. IF desired, ACTIVATE the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) or PERFORM a limited staffing of the Emergency Response Facilities.

EC Full Staffing LOCATE the confidential envelope in the front of the Operations Superintendent's (O.S.) copy of the ECG marked "Emergency Callout".

Follow the directions. When complete return to this procedure.

(EP96-003) OS

6. IMPLEMENT EPEP 102 for OS.

EC SGS Rev. 06

ECG ATT 24 Pg. 3 of 3 INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM I. THIS IS COMMUNICATOR IN THE CONTROL ROOM (NAME)

AT THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION.

II.

o3 THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF A COMMON SITE UNUSUAL EVENT AFFECTING BOTH SALEM AND HOPE CREEK WHICH WAS:

DECLARED AT ON (Time - 24 HR CLOCK) (DATE)

EAL # DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

I Ill.

NO RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS 33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): WIND SPEED:

(From MET Computer) (DEGREES) (MPH)

IV. NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF)

SGS Rev. 06

SALEM GENERATING STATION EVENT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TECHNICAL BASIS September,26, 2002 CHANGE PAGES FOR REVISION #14 The Table of Contents forms a general guide to the current revision of each section and attachment of the Salem ECG Technical Basis. The changes that are made in this TOC Revision #14 are shown beloW.

1. Check that your revision packet is complete.

2. Add the revised documents.

3. Remove and recycle the outdated material listed below.

ADD REMOVE Pages Description Rev. Pages Description Rev.

TOC 14 All TOC 13 All 04 All Section 3.3 03 All Section 3.3 03 All Section 9.4 02 All Section 9.4 02 All Section 9.5 01 All Section 9.5 S-ECG 1 of 1

PSEG Internal Use Only SGS EAL Technical Basis T.O.C.

Pg. 1 of 4 SALEM ECG TECHNICAL BASIS TABLE OF CONTENTS/SIGNATURE PAGE SECTION TITLE REV # PAGES DATE T.O.C. Table of Contents/Signature Page 14 4 09/26/02 i Introduction and Usage 00 3 01/21/97 ii Glossary of Acronyms & Abbreviations 00 6 01/21/97 1.0 Fuel Clad Challenge 01 4 12/29/99 2.0 RCS Challenge 01 2 07/24/00 3.0 Fission Product Barriers (Table) 3.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 01 20 12/29/99 3.2 RCS Barrier 02 16 01/16/01 3.3 Containment Barrier 04 28 09/26/02 4.0 EC Discretion 00 8 01/21/97 5.0 Failure to Trip 03 9 12/18/01 6.0 Radiological Releases/Occurrences 6.1 Gaseous Effluent Release 00 42 01/21/97 6.2 Liquid Effluent Release 00 4 01/21/97 6.3 In - Plant Radiation Occurrences 00 6 01/21/97 6.4 Irradiated Fuel Event 00 10 01/21/97 7.0 Electrical Power 7.1 Loss of AC Power Capabilities 02 11 01/16/01 7.2 Loss of DC Power Capabilities 00 8 01/21/97 8.0 System Malfunctions 8.1 Loss of Heat Removal Capability 01 10 12/29/99 8.2 Loss of Overhead Annunciators 02 6 07/24/00 8.3 Loss of Communications Capability 00 4 01/21/97 8.4 Control Room Evacuation 01 4 12/18/01 8.5 Technical Specifications 00 2 01/21/97 9.0 Hazards - Internal/External 9.1 Security Threats 02 9 02/01/02 9.2 Fire 02 6 01/16/01 9.3 Explosion 02 5 01/16/01 9.4 Toxic/Flammable Gases 03 12 09/26/02 9.5 Seismic Event 02 4 09/26/02 9.6 High Winds 01 5 01/16/01 9.7 Flooding 02 5 01/16/01 9.8 Turbine Failure/Vehicle Crash/Missile Impact 02 7 01/16/01 9.9 River Level 01 4 01/16/01 PSE&G CONTROL SGS COPY # 14 Rev. 14

PSEG Internal Use Only SGS EAL Technical Basis T.O.C.

Pg. 2 of 4 SALEM ECG TECHNICAL BASIS TABLE OF CONTENTS/SIGNATURE PAGE SECTION TITLE REV # PAGES DATE 10.0 Reserved for future use Licensing is responsible for the Reportable Action Level (Section 11)

Reportable Action Levels (RALs) 11.1 Technical Specifications 01 9 01/23/01 11.2 Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 02 4 01/23/01 11.3 System Actuation 04 7 04/19/02 11.4 Personnel Safety/Overexposure 01 7 01/23/01 11.5 Environmental/State Notifications 01 4 01/23/01 11.6 After-the-Fact 02 1 02/28/02 11.7 Security/Emergency Response 03 5 02/28/02 Capabilities 11.8 Public Interest 01 3 01/23/01 11.9 Accidental Criticality/ 02 8 01/23/01 Special Nuclear Material /

Rad Material Shipments - Releases 11.10 Voluntary Notifications 01 2 01/23/01 SGS Rev. 14

PSEG Internal Use Only SGS EAL Technical Basis T.O.C.

Pg. 3 of 4 REVISION

SUMMARY

Biennial Review Performed: Yes No X Emergency Action Level (EAL) 3.3.3.b wording changed to clarify conditions necessary to consider the containment barrier lost. The intent of the EAL has not been changed.

- 9.4.1 Technical Basis - added statements that clarify uncontrolled toxic gas release.

SGS Rev. 14

PSEG Internal Use Only SGS EAL Technical Basis T.O.C.

Pg. 4 of 4 SIGNATURE PAGE Prepared By: William Detwiler, 08/14/02 (IfEditorial Revisions Only, Last Approved Revision) Date Section/Attachments Revised: 3.3.3.b & 9.4 (List Non Editorial Only - Section/Attachments) Efate Reviewed By:

16 O5(qffectiveesRvee Reviewed By:

Department Manager Date Reviewed By: N/A N/A Manager - Licensing Date (Reportable Action Level (Section 11)

Reviewed By:

EP .Manager Date Reviewed By: NA N/A Manager - Quality Assurance Date (If Applicable)

SORC NA Mtg. No. Salem Chairman Nuclear Operations NA Date 7Dafe Effective Date of this Revision: I?/_ d1sL

- D aiý SGS Rev. 14

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.1 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS 3.3.1.a PSE&G IC Potential Loss of Containment Barrier = 1 POINT CONTROL EAL COPY #5sb MODE - 1, 2, 3, 4 BASIS Containment Environment RED Path, as verified by EOP-CFST-1, results from RCS barrier loss or a faulted S/G inside Containment and signifies that breach of the Primary Containment is imminent. For this condition, all Containment isolations, as well as automatic Containment Spray and CFCU "low speed" operation should be initiated before this threshold is reached.

Barrier Analysis Containment Barrier has been potentially lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the potential loss or loss of additional barriers per EAL Section 3.0.

DISCUSSION Symptom based criteria from the Emergency Operating Procedures Critical Safety Function Tree (CFST) Monitoring are integrated into this EAL. The CFSTs are contained as a tab to the ECG.

The intent of using confirmed CFST status in this'EAL is to simplify the identification of the EAL threshold criteria monitored in the Control Room.

Although the yield strength of the Primary Containment may be much higher that 47 psig, for the purposes of event classification, the barrier is considered potentially lost at that value. Thus, this EAL is primarily a discriminator between a Site Area Emergency and a General Emergency, EAL - 3.3.L.a Rev. 04 Pagel of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis representing a potential loss of the third barrier. CFST status will not be used for event classification until the Control Room Staff has implemented the CFSTs.

DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, PC1 EOP-CFST-1 EOP-TRIP-1 EOP-FRCE-1 EAL - 3.3.1.a Rev. 04 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.1 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS 3.3.1.b IC Potential Loss of Containment Barrier = 1 POINT EAL MODE - 1, 2,3,4 BASIS Core Cooling RED Path, as verified by EOP-CFST-1, represents an imminent melt sequence which if not corrected could lead to Reactor Vessel failure and potential for Containment failure.

The 15 minutes is used as a threshold for indicating that operator actions have not been effective in restoring core cooling.

Barrier Analysis Fuel Clad Barrier has been lost, RCS and the Containment Barriers have been potentially lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the loss of an additional barrier per EAL Section 3.0.

DISCUSSION Symptom based criteria from the Emergency Operating Procedures Critical Safety Function Tree (CFST) Monitoring are integrated into this EAL. The CFSTs are contained as a tab to the ECG.

The intent of using confirmed CFST status in this EAL is to simplify the identification of the EAL threshold criteria monitored in the Control Room.

Severe accident analysis has concluded that functional restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the Reactor Vessel in a significant fraction of the scenarios, and that the EAL - 3.3.1 .b Rev. 04 Page I of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis likelihood of Containment failure in these scenarios is small. It is appropriate, therefore, to allow a reasonable period of time for the functional restoration procedures to arrest the core melt sequence. It should be apparent within 15 minutes if the procedures will be effective. The Emergency Coordinator should make the classification as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be, ineffective. CFST status will not be used for event classification until the Control Room Staff has implemented the CFSTs.

DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, PC6 EOP-CFST-1 EOP-TRIP-1 EAL - 3.3.1 .b Rev. 04 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 3.3.2.a IC Potential Loss of Containment Barrier = 1 POINT EAL MODE - 1, 2, 3, 4 BASIS Hydrogen gas can be present in the Containment at the threshold level only as a result of an inadequate core cooling accident, substantial zire-water reaction, and a breach of the RCS.

Containment H2 level above 4% signifies that an explosive mixture may exist.

Barrier Analysis Containment Barrier has been potentially lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the potential loss or loss of additional barriers per EAL Section 3.0.

DISCUSSION A 4% mixture of H2 with normal Containment atmosphere represents the deflagration lower limit. Any subsequent ignition and bum of this level mixture releases a substantial amount of energy that must be absorbed by the Containment structure, which is already under stress due to the Loss of the RCS Barrier.

DEVIATION None EAL - 3.3.2.a Rev. 04 Page 1 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis REFERENCES NUMARC, NESP-007, PC2 EOP-TRIP-l EOP-FRCE-1 EOP-Setpoint Doc (T.18)

EAL - 3.3.2.a Rev. 04 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 3.3.2.b IC Potential Loss of Containment Barrier =1 POINT EAL CNTMT Press. > 15 psig with EITHER one of the following:

"* No CNTMT Spray AND < 5 CFCUs Running in "Low Speed"

"* One CNTMT Spray Train I/S AND <3 CFCUs Running in "Low Speed" MODE - 1,2, 3, 4 BASIS Containment (CNTMT) pressure increase to >15 psig (the CNTMT Spray initiation setpoint) indicates a major release of energy to the Containment. Failure of ALL Containment Spray with

<5 Containment Fan Coil Units (CFCUs) running in "low speed", or only one train of Containment Spray in service with <3 CFCUs running in "low speed", indicates a condition where systems designed for containment heat removal and depressurization do not have the capacity to maintain Containment pressure below the structural design limit. The threshold value for available Containment Depressurization and Cooling Systems is based upon system design basis for maintaining Containment integrity.

Barrier Analysis Containment Barrier has been potentially lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the potential loss or loss of additional barriers per EAL Section 3.0.

EAL - 3.3.2.b Rev. 04 Page 1 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis DISCUSSION The CFCUs and the Containment Spray system are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the Containment atmosphere. With less than the minimum combination of sub-systems stated in the EAL threshold value, the ability to remove energy from the Containment atmosphere is severely impaired. Containment pressure >15 psig with a loss of Containment Cooling and Depressurization systems represents a potential loss of the Containment barrier.

DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC, NESP-007, PC2 EOP-TRIP-1 EOP-FRCE-1 EOP-Setpoint Doc (T.02)

Technical Specification Section 3.6.2 EAL - 3.3.2.b Rev. 04 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 3.3.2.c IC Loss of Containment Barrier =2 POINTS EAL A Rapid Unexplained Containment Pressure Drop following an initial Rise to

> 4 psig MODE - 1, 2,3,4 BASIS Containment pressure increase to >4 psig (the containment pressure Safety Injection initiation setpoint) indicates a major release of energy to the Containment. These releases can only be provided by a large release of either primary or secondary coolant into the Containment. For the cases that primary coolant provides the source of energy, a loss of the RCS barrier has also occurred. A rapid unexplained loss of Containment pressure following an initial pressure rise indicates a loss of Containment integrity.

Unexplained means that the pressure drop is not as a result of operator actions taken to reduce Containment pressure. The term rapid was added as an attempt to quantify the size of the Containment breach.

Emergency Coordinator judgment should be used to determine if this EAL applies for rapid, unexplained Containment pressure drops following initial rises to less than the 4 psig threshold.

Barrier Analysis Containment Barrier has been lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the potential loss or loss of additional barriers per EAL Section 3.0.

EAL - 3.3.2.c Rev. 04 Page 1 of 2

SGS EALRALTechnical Basis DISCUSSION The threshold value of 4 psig was selected to be consistent with the Safety Injection and Adverse Containment criteria. For those cases where secondary coolant provides the source of energy, a faulted Steam Generator is possible. This requires actions in EOP-LOSC-1 to isolate the Main Steam lines to maintain intact Steam Generators for an RCS Heat Sink, minimize Containment Pressure, and to minimize RCS cooldown.

DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, PC2 EOP-TRIP-1

-EOP-LOSC-1 Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 EAL - 3.3.2.c Rev. 04 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION 3.3.3.a IC Potential Loss of Containment Barrier = 1 POINT EAL MODE - 1, 2,3,4 BASIS The Containment (CNTMT) Sump threshold of 78% (75% adverse) is based upon containment flooding concerns, and is consistent with the CFST level requiring implementation of EOP FRCE-2. An indicated level greater than this value indicates that water has been introduced into the Containment from other sources. Potential flooding of critical system components and instrumentation required for responding to an accident or performing an orderly shutdown may be affected. Thus the Containment and associated systems may not be capable of performing their function as a fission product barrier.

Barrier Analysis Containment Barrier has been potentially lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the potential loss or loss of additional barriers per EAL Section 3.0.

DISCUSSION Symptom based criteria from the Emergency Operating Procedures Critical Safety Function Tree (CFST) Monitoring are integrated into this EAL. The CFSTs are contained as a tab to the ECG.

The intent of using CFST status in this EAL is to simplify the identification of the EAL threshold criteria monitored in the Control Room. The EAL threshold of >78% (75% adverse) CNTMT sump level is consistent with the CFST criteria.

EAL - 3.3.3.a Rev. 04 Page 1 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, PC7 EOP-TRIP-1 EOP-FRCE-1 EOP-FRCE-2 EOP-Setpoint Doe (T.07, T.08)

EAL - 3.3.3.a Rev. 04 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION 3.3.3.b IC Loss of Containment Barrier = 2 POINTS EAL UNISOLABLE leakage OUTSIDE Containment as indicated by one of the following:

"* Downstream pathway to the environment exists

"* Radiation monitor, area temperatures, flow or sump level AND Containment or system isolation is required due to any one of the following:

"* Safety Injection

"* Containment pressure greater than 4 psig

"* Valid CNTMT Vent Isol Signal AND Cannot be ISOLATED from the main Control Room MODE - 1, 2, 3, 4 BASIS A high Containment pressure or a Containment Vent Isolation Signal represents a situation that requires the containment to be isolated from the outside environment. The term "valid" is defined as an actual condition that requires CNTMT Vent isolation due to an instrumentation setpoint being exceeded.

This EAL is intended to cover inability to isolate the containment when containment isolation is required. This EAL addresses conditions where RCS or Containment atmosphere is being transported OUTSIDE the Containment. This EAL is associated with an Isolation signal being generated as the result of an RCS Break with a failure of the isolation valves to close or fully close (downstream pathway to the environment) and any other containment failure that results in EAL - 3.3.3.b Rev. 04 Page 1 of3

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis the containment environment being in direct communications with any areas outside of the containment. Indications (symptoms) of containment failure may be evident without the exact pathway being understood at the time of the failure. If the containment or part of the RCS is required to be isolated and there are valid indications that the containment or system is are not isolated, the containment barrier should be considered lost.

UNISOLABLE means the flowpath through all valves in a penetration cannot be immediately stopped from the Control Room. This EAL ALLOWS for valve closure from the Main Control Room to isolate any systems not completely isolated, prior to event classification. Isolation is defined as the closure of ANY valve from the Main Control Room in the system(s) not completely isolated. For example, if the isolation logic fails to cause valve closure, but operator actions implemented in the Main Control Room successfully isolates the containment breach path, then classification under this EAL is not warranted.

The term "to the environment" is intended to include, ANY UNISOLABLE leakage to the environment either directly or via systems that exhaust to the Plant Vent (e.g.; leakage to the Auxiliary Building ventilation system) or directly to any other area outside the containment.

Radiation monitor indications are those that exceed normal release rate indications without a reason to expect another release source, such as a gas decay tank, spill, or fuel handling problem, and indicate a loss of the containment.

Area temperatures, system flow indications or rising sump level indications outside the containment may also indicate a loss of the containment. If the containment barrier is lost without a loss of the fuel barrier, effluent radiation readings may not increase significantly, however, unexpected area temperatures, flow rates, or sump increases outside of the containment may provide the indications that the containment atmosphere is no longer isolated.

Barrier Analysis Containment Barrier has been lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the potential loss or loss of additional barriers per EAL Section 3.0.

DISCUSSION Technical Specification 3.6.3 "Containment Isolation Valves" was used to determine the signals required for Containment isolation. Any reference to Main Steam Isolation or Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation is covered under the Containment Bypass "potential loss" EAL.

EAL - 3.3.3.b Rev. 04 Page 2 of 3

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis Containment or system isolations are associated with systems that are part of the RCS boundary and penetrate the Containment. Isolation requirements for these lines are covered in 10CFR50, App. A, General Design Criteria 55. These systems form a closed loop outside the Containment, and are not open to the environment (e.g. RHR, SI). They are included in this EAL because they represent an extension of the RCS boundary beyond the Containment, and are a potential release path from the RCS to the environment. Without a completed isolation, continuing leakage represents a Primary System discharging outside the Containment (Containment Bypass),

including areas in the Auxiliary Building.

Systems are lines that either: 1) connect directly to the Containment atmosphere and penetrate the Containment; or 2) penetrate the Containment and are neither part of the RCS boundary nor connected directly to the Containment atmosphere (e.g. Chilled Water). Isolation requirements for these lines are covered in 10CFR50, App. A, General Design Criteria 56 and 57, respectively.

Therefore, this event may potentially connect the RCS or the Containment atmosphere to the environment. Without a completed isolation, continuing flow/leakage represents a release path from the RCS or containment to the environment.

DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, PC3 EOP-TRIP-1 OP-AR.ZZ-0003(Q)

SGS Technical Specifications EAL - 3.3.3.b Rev. 04 Page 3 of 3

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.4 RCS LINE BREAK/CONTAINMENT BYPASS 3.3.4.a IC Potential Loss of Containment Barrier = 1 POINT EAL Unisolable, Faulted Steam Generator OUTSIDE of containment as indicated by S/G pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized AND Affected S/G tubes are intact MODE - 1, 2,3,4 BASIS S/Gs, which have unisolable faults outside of containment, will require feed isolation and secondary side dryout in order to stop the resultant excessive RCS cooldown rate. This subsequent dryout will result in significant thermal stress and differential pressures across the tube sheet and greater risk of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) on an already faulted S/G. As such, this event is considered to be a precursor to a more serious event and will lead to at least an Unusual Event classification.

This EAL excludes S/G depressurization events that are a direct result of EOP directed operator action. The term "dropping in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized" is defined consistent with the EOP definition of a Faulted S/G. "Unisolable" is defined as a condition where isolation is not possible from the Control Room such as a pipe rupture with no accessible isolation valves, a stuck open safety or relief valve, etc. (excluding minor valve leakage).

Barrier Analysis Containment Barrier has been potentially lost.

EAL - 3.3.4.a Rev. 04 Pagel of 3

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the potential loss or loss of additional barriers per EAL Section 3.0.

DISCUSSION This EAL was added to the Fission Product Barrier Table 3.0 as a Containment Bypass "Potential Loss" to ensure that all unisolable steam or feedwater break events, where the fault is outside of the Containment are at least classified as an Unusual Event. The "potential loss" category (1 point) was selected to ensure that further challenges to other Fission Product Barriers result in Emergency Classifications consistent with current philosophy.

The Containment Barrier section was selected since Technical Specifications Section 3.6.3 "Containment Isolation Valves" requires both Main Steam Isolation and Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation. Therefore, failure of any Main Steam Isolation valve to close upon demand and whose flowpath cannot be isolated by the closure of a valve from the Control Room represents a potential loss of containment integrity. Valves specifically included in this EAL as Main Steam Isolation valves are:

1. MS 167, MSIV

2. MS 7, MSIV drain

3. MS 18, MSIV Bypass

4. MS 10, SG PORV

5. GB 4, SG Blowdown The Containment Bypass sub-section was selected based upon the leakage being non-radioactive steam or feedwater with concerns for RCS integrity appropriately classified under the RCS Barrier section.

Steam generator tube ruptures are not considered a potential loss of containment barrier by definition due to the limited radiation releases (below Tech Specs) assumed in the SGTR accident analysis based on plant design. A SGTR would, by itself, be a potential loss of the RCS barrier.

DEVIATION This EAL was added due to a Containment Bypass concern.

REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, PC7 EOP-TRIP-1 EAL - 3.3.4.a Rev. 04 Page2 of 3

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis EOP-LOSC-1 OP-AB.STM-0001 (Q)

EAL - 3.3.4.a Rev. 04 Page 3 of 3

I SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.4 RCS LINE BREAK/CONTAINMENT BYPASS 3.3.4.b IC Loss of Containment Banier =2 POINTS EAL Primary to Secondary Leakage > Tech Spec Limits AND Prolonged, direct secondary leakage to the environment MODE - 1, 2,3,4 BASIS Primary to Secondary leakage greater than Technical Specifications along with indication of prolonged secondary side leakage outside the Containment indicates a Steam Generator (S/G) tube leak that is discharging directly to the environment. "Prolonged" is defined as an unisolable rupture (excluding minor valve leakage) of a steam or feed line outside of Containment, or a stuck open safety or relief valve on a secondary system connected to the steam side of the leaking S/G.

The term "direct secondary leakage to the environment" is intended to include all flow paths of contaminated secondary coolant to the environment either directly or via systems which exhaust to the Plant Vent (e.g.; leakage to the Auxiliary Building ventilation system) with the following exception: If the procedure in effect requires steaming the leaking S/G to the main condenser, the Condenser Air Ejector (R15) pathway is excluded from this EAL provided the release is both controlled and monitored.

For Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), this EAL is used in conjunction with the RCS Barrier SGTR EALs to ensure proper classification if the Ruptured S/G is also faulted outside of Containment.

EAL - 33.4.b Rev. 04 Pagel of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis Barrier Analysis Containment Barrier has been lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the potential loss or loss of additional barriers per EAL Section 3.0.

DISCUSSION The primary intent of this EAL is to ensure, in conjunction with the RCS Barrier "Loss" SGTR EAL, that Ruptured S/Gs that are also faulted outside of Containment are classified as at least a Site Area Emergency. The threshold for establishing the bypass of Containment was intended to be a prolonged release of radioactivity from the Ruptured S/G directly to the environment.

The secondary purpose of this EAL is to classify S/G tube leak events, which exceed Technical Specification limits, but do not exceed the RCS Barrier SGTR thresholds. If a prolonged release occurs from a S/G during a leak, only an Unusual Event would be declared based on the "Loss" of the containment barrier.

DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, PC4 EAL - 3.3.4.b Rev. 04 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.4 RCS LINE BREAK/CONTAINMENT BYPASS 3.3.4.c IC Loss of Containment Barrier =2 POINTS EAL LOCA conditions AND CNTMT Press. OR Sump Level NOT rising as expected MODE - 1, 2,3,4 BASIS The threshold conditions require that a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) is known to be occurring. Such events are accompanied by release of energy and inventory from the RCS to the Containment (CNTMT), and should result in pressure and sump level rise in the Containment.

Failure of CNTMT Pressure or Sump Level indications to rise as expected following a known LOCA is an indication of a Containment Bypass situation.

Barrier Analysis Containment and RCS Barriers have been lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the potential loss or loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier per EAL Section 3.1.

DISCUSSION EAL - 3.3.4.c Rev. 04 Pagel of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis A LOCA is expected to result in CNTMT pressure rise to >4 psig. This leak rate should result in the accumulation of RCS inventory in the CNTMT Sump as well as a CNTMT SUMP PMP START OHA as the level rises. A lack of expected CNTMT Sump level response or CNTMT pressure not rising indicates that the Containment Barrier has been bypassed.

DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, PC2 EOP-TRIP-1 EOP-LOCA-6, LOCA Outside Containment OP-AR.ZZ-0003(Q)

EAL - 3.3.4.c Rev. 04 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 310 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.5 CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVELS IC Potential Loss of Containment Barrier = 1 POINT EAL MODE - 1, 2,3,4 BASIS A Containment High Range Monitor (R44) reading in excess of 2000 R/hr indicates significant Fuel Clad damage, well in excess of that corresponding to a loss of the RCS and Fuel Clad barriers. The value corresponds to a release of approximately 20% of the gap region. Regardless of whether Containment is challenged, this amount of activity in Containment, if released, could have severe consequences and it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of the Containment Barrier.

Barrier Analysis Containment Barrier has been potentially lost, the Fuel Clad and RCS Barriers have been lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA N/A DISCUSSION This calculation is based upon a calculation of 20% Clad Damage as it relates to R44 measured Dose Rate values. This calculation was prepared by the Nuclear Fuels Group and is on file with Emergency Preparedness under file title DS 1.6-OOXX "Verification of Emergency Action Levels for Event Classification" date 1/26/95.

DEVIATION None EAL - 3.3.5 Rev. 04 Page 1 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, PC5 NUREG-1228 - Source Term Estimation During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents Calculation by Nuclear Fuels file title DS 1.6-OOXX "Verification of Emergency Action Levels for Event Classification EAL - 3.3.5 Rev. 04 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 3.0 Fission Product Barriers 3.3 Containment Barrier 3.3.6 EMERGENCY COORDINATOR JUDGMENT 3.3.6.a/ 3.3.6.b IC Potential Loss ( 1 POINT) or Loss of Containment Barrier (= 2 POINTS)

EAL ANY condition, in the opinion of the EC, that indicates EITHER a Potential Loss OR Loss of the Containment Barrier MODE - 1, 2,3,4 BASIS This EAL allows the Emergency Coordinator (EC) to address any factor not otherwise covered in the Fission Product Barrier Table to determine that the Containment barrier has been lost or potentially lost. A complete loss in the ability to monitor the Containment barrier should be considered a "Potential Loss" of that barrier Barrier Analysis Containment Barrier has been lost or potentially lost.

ESCALATION CRITERIA This event will be classified and/or escalated based on the loss or potential loss of additional barriers per EAL Section 3.0.

DISCUSSION None DEVIATION None EAL - 3.3.6.a/ 3.3.6.b Rev. 04 Page 1 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, PC8 EAL - 3.3.6.a/I3.3.6.b Rev. 04 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 9.0 Hazards - Internal/External 9.4 Toxic/ Flammable Gases UNUSUAL EVENT - 9.4.1.a IC Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant EAL Notification by Local, County, or State Officials for the potential need to EVACUATE non-essential personnel due to an Offsite Toxic Gas release AND SNSS deems evacuation of non-essential personnel is required MODE - All BASIS Notification by Local, County, or State Officials for the potential need to EVACUATE non essential personnel due to an Offsite Toxic Gas release, along with OS concurrence that such action is appropriate warrants declaration of an Unusual Event, since a release that has occurred offsite, may have an impact on routine plant operations. An offsite event (such as a tanker accident or a barge accident) may place the Protected Area within the evacuation area. The evacuation is determined from the Department of Transportation (DOT) Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials.

The DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials may be obtained from fire department. Salem County Office of Emergency Management will notify the fire departments of offsite release concerns from both sides of the river.

A Toxic Gas is considered to be any substance that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact. A Toxic Gas release is considered to be a threat to plant personnel if concentrations are high enough to endanger the health of those personnel.

Barrier Analysis N/A PSE&G CONTROL COPY # \&OVA EAL - 9.4.l.a Rev. 03 Page i of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis ESCALATION CRITERIA Emergency Classification will escalate to an Alert if the Toxic Gas enters either a Plant Vital Area or an area contiguous to a Plant Vital Area.

DISCUSSION None DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, HU3.2 SC.OP-AB.CR-0003(Q)

DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials EAL - 9.4.1.a Rev. 03 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/IALTechnical Basis 9.0 Hazards - Internal/External 9.4 Toxic/ Flammable Gases UNUSUAL EVENT - 9.4.1.b IC Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant EAL Uncontrolled Toxic Gas release within the Protected Area in ANY area which does not normally require an atmospheric survey or Respiratory Protection for entry AND Routine Plant Operations are IMPEDED based on EITHER one of the following:

"* Access restrictions caused by the uncontrolled release

"* Personnel injuries have occurred as a result of the release MODE - All BASIS An uncontrolled Toxic Gas release within the Protected Area, in high enough concentrations ,will adversely affect the health and safety of plant personnel, along with the safe operation of the plant. This EAL specifically addresses those areas within the Protected Area that do not normally require an atmospheric survey or Respiratory Protection for entry, since the atmosphere in an area that does require an atmospheric survey or Respiratory Protection does not meet the intent of this EAL.

Releases classified under this EAL include those that originate both onsite and offsite.

Classification under this EAL is not warranted for small or incidental releases. This EAL assumes an uncontrolled process that has the potential to affect plant operations or personnel safety.

A Toxic Gas is considered to be any substance that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact. Uncontrolled Toxic Gas releases are considered to be those releases that cannot be isolated and/or confined to a single compartment or area, or are not as the result of a designed plant safety feature. For example, an uncontrolled release of chlorine/ammonia into I

the Turbine Building that requires evacuation warrants declaration of an Unusual Event.

EAL - 9.4.1.b Rev. 03 Page I of 3

SGS EALIRALTechnical Basis A Cardox discharge inside aný aiea that contains this safety feaiure (i.e. Diesel Room) does not warrant Unusual Event declaration since this does not meet the definition of an Uncontrolled Toxic Gas release. Regardless of resulting personnel injury or access restrictions, a Cardox discharge, operating as designed, as this condition is not a precursor for an uncontrolled gas release should not be classified under this EAL.

An Uncontrolled Toxic Gas release is considered to be IMPEDING normal plant operations if the release results in Access Restrictions or Personnel Injuries.

Access Restrictions are those actions that are put-in-place or left-in-place (evacuation of an area, no entry into an area, SCBA required for entry into an area), after an initial assessment of the release conditions is performed by the fire department. Access restrictions do not include short term precautionary actions put in place prior to or during the initial assessment by the fire department.

"* If the fire department's initial assessement results in implementation of or continuation of access restrictions, then the UE should be declared.

"* If the fire department's initial assessement results in no access restrictions then the event does not warrant UE declaration.

This EAL does not require a detailed assessment or quantification. If the initial assessment is delayed, cannot be completed or is inconclusive, and access restrictions are in place then classification of this event should be promptly made.

Personnel Injuries are considered any conditions that resulted for the uncontrolled toxic gas release that require transport of an individual(s) to the hospital for further evaluation or treatment. Injury to an individual for a small or incidental gas release (not an uncontrolled toxic gas release) is not included under this EAL. For example, an inhalation injury from a small or incidental release (small amount of localized fuming when a system is opened for maintenance) does not warrant classification under this EAL, however, an injury sustained when a leaking chemical pipe fills an area with hazardous fumes and a worker(s) is overcome and requires hospital evaluation/treatment, would warrant classification under this EAL.

Barrier Analysis N/A ESCALATION CRITERIA Emergency Classification will escalate to an Alert if the Toxic Gas enters either a Plant Vital Area or an area adjoining to a Plant Vital Area and safe shutdown could be impeded.

EAL - 9.4.L.b Rev. 03 Page 2 of 3

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis DISCUSSION This EAL should not be construed to include confined spaces that must be ventilated prior to entry or situations involving The fire department personnel who are using respiratory equipment during the performance of their duties unless it also affects personnel not involved with The fire department activities. These areas include ALL Confined Spaces. In addition, those situations that require personnel to wear respiratory protection equipment as the result of airborne contamination as required by Radiation Protection personnel do not meet the intent of this EAL.

An offsite event (such as a tanker accident or a barge accident) may place the Protected Area within the evacuation area. The evacuation is determined from the Department of Transportation (DOT) Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials. The DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials may be obtained from the fire department. Salem County Office of Emergency Management will notify the fire departments of offsite release concerns from both sides of the river.

DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, HU3.1 NEI 99-01, HU3 - Draft SC.OP-AB .CR-0003(Q)

DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials EAL - 9.4.1.b Rev. 03 Page 3 of 3

SGS EAI/RALTechnical Basis 9.0 Hazards - Internal/External 9.4 Toxic/ Flammable Gases UNUSUAL EVENT - 9.4.1.c IC Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant EAL Uncontrolled Flammable Gas release within the Protected Area that RESULTS in Flammable Gas concentrations EXCEEDING 25% of the LEL AND Routine Plant Operations are IMPEDED based on EITHER one of the following:

"* Access restrictions caused by the uncontrolled release

"* Personnel injuries have occurred as a result of the release MODE - All BASIS An uncontrolled Flammable Gas release within the Protected Area, in high enough concentrations, will adversely affect the health and safety of plant personnel, along with the safe operation of the plant. This EAL specifically addresses those conditions where a Flammable Gas concentration EXCEEDING 25% of the LEL (Lower Explosive Limit) exists anywhere within the Protected Area. Releases classified under this EAL include those that originate both onsite and offsite.

A Flammable Gas is considered to be any substance that can result in an ignition, sustained bum or detonation. Uncontrolled Flammable Gas releases are considered to be those releases that can not be isolated / confined to a single compartment or area.

For example, an uncontrolled release of hydrogen into the Turbine Building in concentration exceeding 25 % of the LEL warrants declaration of an Unusual Event. In comparison, a controlled release of Hydrogen during Generator purging or Hydrogen Tank trailer purging does not warrant event declaration, as these evolutions are controlled.

Flammable Gas release is considered to be IMPEDING normal plant operations if concentrations are high enough to restrict routine operator movements resulting in Access Restrictions. Access Restrictions are those actions that are put-in-place or left-in-place (evacuation of an area, no entry into an area, SCBA required for entry into an area), after an EAL - 9.4.1.c Rev. 03 Pagel of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis initial assessment of the release conditions is performed by the fire department. Access restrictions do not include short-term precautionary actions put in place prior to or during the initial assessment by the fire department.

"* If fire department's initial assessement results in implementation or continuation of access restrictions, then the UE should be declared.

"* If fire department's initial assessement results in no access restrictions required, then the event does not warrant UE declaration.

This EAL does not require a detailed assessment or quantification. If the initial assessment is delayed, cannot be completed or is inconclusive, and access restrictions are in place then classification of this event should be promptly made.

Personnel Injuries are considered any conditions that resulted for the Uncontrolled Flammable Gas release that require transport of an individual(s) to the hospital for further evaluation or treatment.

Barrier Analysis N/A ESCALATION CRITERIA Emergency Classification will escalate to an Alert if the Flammable Gas enter either a Plant Vital Area or an area adjoining to a Plant Vital Area.

DISCUSSION For Hydrogen Gas, the explosive limit is 4%. Hence, a threshold of 25% of the LEL equates to 1% Hydrogen. This EAL should not be construed to include those controlled evolutions that may discharge a Flammable Gas within the Protected Area, but present no danger to plant safety, since the evolution is planned and controlled.

An offsite event (such as a tanker accident or a barge accident) may place the Protected Area within the evacuation area. The evacuation is determined from the Department of Transportation (DOT) Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials. The DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials may be obtained from fire department. Salem County Office of Emergency Management will notify the fire department of offsite release concerns from both sides of the river.

DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, HU3.1 SC.OP-AB.CR-0003(Q)

DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials EAL - 9.4.l.c Rev. 03 Page 2 of 2

-SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 9.0 Hazards - Internal/External 9.4 Toxic/ Flammable Gases ALERT - 9.4.2.a IC Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown Conditions EAL Uncontrolled Toxic Gas release within ANY one of the following Plant Vital Structures

"* Auxiliary Building

"* Service Water Intake Structure

"* Control Point Area

"* Inner/Outer Penetration Area

"* Containment

"* Fuel Handling Building

"* Service Building

"* RWST, PWST, and AFWST Area AND Toxic Gas concentrations result in ANY one of the following:

"* An IDLH atmosphere

"* Plant personnel report severe adverse health reactions, including burning eyes, nose, throat, or dizziness 0 The Threshold Limit Value (TLV) being EXCEEDED AND Plant personnel are unable to perform actions necessary to complete a Safe Shutdown of the plant without appropriate personnel protection equipment MODE - All BASIS EAL - 9.4.2.a Rev. 03 Page 1 of 3

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis An uncontrolled Toxic Gas release entering any of the plant structures listed in the EAL, that threatens the ability of plant personnel to perform actions required for safe shutdown of the plant, warrants declaration of an Alert. The EAL threshold includes those conditions that present a significant challenge to plant personnel. This EAL specifically addresses only those plant structures that either contain safe shutdown equipment or are contiguous to those areas. Release classified under this EAL include those that originate both onsite and offsite. A Toxic Gas is considered to be any substance that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact. Uncontrolled Toxic Gas releases are considered to be those releases that can not be isolated I confined to a single compartment or area, or are not as the result of a designed plant safety feature.

Barrier Analysis N/A ESCALATION CRITERIA Emergency Classification will be escalated based on further damage to plant safety systems, loss of fission product barriers, or abnormal radiological releases. The EC may use Emergency Coordinator Discretion and escalate the classification to SAE based on the nature of the toxic gas release.

DISCUSSION Access is considered impeded if the Toxic Gas concentrations are life threatening, i.e. require the use of personnel protective equipment. Use of protective equipment also limits the mobility and vision. The cause or magnitude of the gas concentration is not the major concern in this EAL, but rather that access required to an area that may be impeded. An IDLH atmosphere is any atmosphere that is determined to be Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health.

This EAL should not be construed to include confined spaces that must be ventilated prior to entry or situations involving Site Protection personnel who are using respiratory equipment during the performance of their duties unless it also affects personnel not involved with Site Protection activates. In addition, those situations that require personnel to wear respiratory protection equipment as the result of airborne contamination as required by Radiation Protection personnel do not meet the intent of this EAL.

An offsite event (such as a tanker accident or a barge accident) may place the Protected Area within the evacuation area. The need for the evacuation is determined from the DOT Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials and may be obtained from the fire department.

DEVIATION None EAL - 9.4.2.a Rev. 03 Page 2 of 3

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, HA3.1 SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0003(Q)

DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials EAL - 9.4.2.a Rev. 03 Page 3 of 3

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 9.0 Hazards - Internal/External 9.4 Toxic/ Flammable Gases ALERT - 9.4.2.b IC Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown Conditions EAL Uncontrolled Flammable Gas release within ANY one of the following Plant Vital Structures

"* Auxiliary Building

"* Service Water Intake Structure

"* Control Point Area

"* Inner/Outer Penetration Area

"* Containment

"* Fuel Handling Building

"* Service Building

"* RWST, PWST, and AFWST Area AND Flammable Gas concentrations EXCEED 50% of the LEL AND Plant personnel are unable to perform actions necessary to complete a Safe Shutdown of the plant without appropriate personnel protection equipment MODE - All BASIS An uncontrolled Flammable Gas release entering any of the Plant Structures listed in the EAL, that threatens the ability of plant personnel to perform actions required for safe shutdown of the plant, warrants declaration of an Alert. The EAL threshold includes those conditions that present a significant challenge to plant personnel. This EAL specifically addresses only those Plant EAL - 9.4.2.b Rev. 03 Pagel of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis Structures that either contain safe shutdown equipment or are contiguous to those areas.

Releases classified under this EAL include those that originate both onsite and offsite.

A Flammable Gas is considered to be any substance that is capable of being easily ignited or burning quickly. Uncontrolled Flammable Gas releases are considered to be those releases that can not be isolated / confined to a single compartment or area, or are not as the result of a designed plant safety feature. For example, an uncontrolled release of hydrogen into the Auxiliary Building in concentration exceeding 50 % of the LEL (Lower Explosive Limit) warrants declaration of an Alert. In comparison, a controlled release of Hydrogen during Generator purging does not warrant event declaration, as this evolution is controlled.

Barrier Analysis N/A ESCALATION CRITERIA Emergency Classification will be escalated based on subsequent damage to plant safety systems, loss of fission product barriers, or abnormal radiological releases. The EC may use discretion and escalate the classification to SAE based on the nature of the flammable gas release.

DISCUSSION For Hydrogen Gas, the explosive limit is 4 %. Hence, a threshold of 50 % of the LEL equates to 2 % Hydrogen. This EAL should not be construed to include those controlled evolutions that may discharge a Flammable Gas within the Protected Area, but present no danger to plant safety, since the evolution is planned and controlled.

An offsite event (such as a tanker accident or a barge accident) may place the Protected Area within the evacuation area. The need for an evacuation is determined from the DOT Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials and may be obtained from the fire department.

DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, HA3.2 SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0003(Q)

DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials EAL - 9.42.b Rev. 03 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 9.0 Hazards - Internal/External 9.5 Seismic Events PSE&G UNUSUAL EVENT - 9.5.1.a/9.5.1.b CONTROL IC Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area COPY #

EAL EITHER one of the following conditions:

"* Seismic Event felt by personnel within the Protected Area

"* Valid actuation of the Seismic Trigger (>0.01g) has occurred as verified by the SMA-3 Event Indicator (flag) being White on the Seismic Monitor System cabinet in the # 1 CR Equipment Room MODE - All BASIS An earthquake of this magnitude is not expected to affect the capability of plant safety functions.

A seismic event recording a magnitude of>0.01g is the threshold level at which the Seismic Monitoring System would monitor the event. The actual value can be determined by engineering evaluation of the acceleration of gravity as read on the seismic recorder, information provided by Hope Creek station, or confirmation by the National Earthquake Center.

The Overhead Annunciator, "SEIS RCDR SYS ACT" will alert operators to this event and the seismic monitoring instrumentation would begin to monitor the event. This value is well below the Operating Basis Earthquake of 0.1g.

A seismic event felt within the protected area is defined as an earthquake of sufficient intensity such that the ground motion is felt onsite and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators/supervisors on duty at the time of the event.

Additional information can be obtained by contacting the National Earthquake Center in Denver, Colorado at (303) 273-8500.

However, it is important to realize that it will take the Earthquake Center approximately 30 minutes to provide the requested information. The time required to obtain this additional information should not result in a delay of event classification for a valid actuation.

EAL - 9.5.1.a/9.5.1.b Rev. 02 Pagel of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis Barrier Analysis None ESCALATION CRITERIA Escalation of this event would occur if actuation of the Hope Creek Seismic Switch (Q:O.lg) has occurred. Call the Hope Creek SNSS to request this information.

DISCUSSION An earthquake of this magnitude is not expected to affect the capability of plant safety functions.

For further information, the National Earthquake Center can be contacted at (303) 273-8500. An approximate relationship between acceleration of gravity and magnitude is as follows:

An Acceleration of: is approx. equal to a Richter Scale Magnitude of:

0.01g 4.0 0.02g 4.5 0.1g 5.5 02g 6.5 DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, HUM.1 UFSAR, Section 7.7 2.12, Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation NEI 99-01, Rev. 4, HUI - Earthquake Basis EAL - 9.5.1.a/9.5.1.b Rev. 02 Page 2 of 2

SGS EAfRALTechnical Basis 9.0 Hazards - Internal/External 9.5 Seismic Events ALERT - 9.5.2 IC Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area EAL Valid Actuation of the Hope Creek Seismic Switch (> 0.1g) has occurred as verified by the Hope Creek SNSS MODE - All BASIS The Operating Basis Earthquake of 0.1g has been exceeded for both Salem and Hope Creek.

At this level, plant safety systems are designed to remain functional and within design stress and deformation limits. Thus, an earthquake of this magnitude is not expected to affect the capability of plant safety functions required to shut down the plant and place it in a cold shutdown condition.

The actual value can be determine by engineering evaluation of the acceleration of gravity as read on the seismic recorder, information provided by Hope Creek station, or confirmation by the National Earthquake Center. The Overhead Annunciator, "SEIS RCDR SYS ACT" will alert operators to this event and the seismic monitoring instrumentation would begin to monitor the event.

Barrier Analysis N/A ESCALATION CRITERIA Escalation of this event would occur if the seismic event caused additional damage to plant safety systems, loss of fission product barriers, or abnormal radiological releases. The EC may use discretion and escalate the classification to SAE based on the nature of the event.

EAL - 9.5.2 Rev. 02 Pagel of 2

SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis DISCUSSION The Overhead Annunciator, "SEIS RCDR SYS ACT" will alert operators to this event and the seismic monitoring instrumentatiin would begin to monitor the eveht. If analysis of the event indicates that the threshold value has been exceeded, immediate plant shutdown is required to evaluated possible equipment damage. This threshold value is well below the Design Basis Earthquake of 0.2g that is the maximum seismic event that is expected to occur based on local geological and seismological factors.

For further information, the National Earthquake Center can be contacted at (303) 273-8500. An approximate relationship between acceleration of gravity and magnitude is as follows:

An Acceleration of: is approx. equal to a Richter Scale Magnitude of:

0.01g 4.0 0.02g 4.5 O.lg 5.5 0.2g 6.5 DEVIATION None REFERENCES NUMARC NESP-007, HA1.1 UFSAR, Section 7.7.2.12, Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation EAL - 9.5.2 Rev. 02 Page 2 of 2