Text

Application of the EPRI Risk-Informed ISI Methodology to: VC Summer (Class 1 and 2), Table of Contents - Appendix L
	ML022670317
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Site:	Summer
Issue date:	09/16/2002
From:	; South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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	Download: ML022670317 (146)
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APPLICATION OF THE EPRI RISK-INFORMED ISI METHODOLOGY TO:

VC SUMMER (Class 1 and 2)

Binder 2 of 2

APPLICATION OF THE EPRI RISK INFORMED ISI METHODOLOGY TO VC SUMMER (Class 1 and 2)

INTRODUCTION The enclosed binders contained the evaluations and associated documents that support the application of the EPRI risk-informed inservice inspection (RI-ISI) methodology to the Class 1 and 2 piping at VC Summer. The EPRI RI-ISI methodology was approved for generic use by the USNRC in November 1999. That approval allows licensees to implement the RI-ISI methodology as an alternative to existing ASME Section XI requirements. The implementation process consist of conducting the RI-ISI evaluation consistent with the methodology describe in EPRI TR-l 12657, Rev. B-A and individual licensees submitting a relief request using the RI-ISI template.

As part of implementing the RI-ISI methodology, a number of project specific documents were generated. The purpose of this report is to consolidate these documents into one location for ease of reference. The major components of the RI-ISI project were the degradation mechanism evaluation, consequence evaluation, delta risk evaluation and the template submittal. These documents are described below and included as Appendices to this report.

PROJECT DOCUMENTS The project documents that support the risk-informed selections for Class 1 and 2 piping welds at VC Summer are described below and included in the specified appendices.

CONSEQUENCE EVALUATION An evaluation was prepared which documented the pipe rupture consequence evaluation, and indicated the consequence effect and category assigned to each piping weld, as well as the technical basis for those assignments. The consequence evaluation used insights from the VC Summer PRA and other supporting documents (e.g. Tech Spec). The postulated pipe breaks that could result in an initiating event (e.g. LOCA), disable mitigating equipment or effect containment performance were evaluated. Any combination of the above effects were also considered. In addition, the evaluation considered the potential impact of spatial effects for each postulated break. The resultant consequence rank was based upon each postulated break's impact on core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF). The results of the consequence evaluation were used as input into the risk ranking evaluation. The consequence evaluation is contained in Appendix 1.

DEGRADATION MECHANISM EVALUATION An evaluation was prepared which documented each piping welds' susceptibility io a spectrum of potential degradation mechanisms in accordance with the EPRI RI-ISI

methodology. The degradation mechanism criteria that were evaluated are presented in the form of checklists, which are included in the degradation mechanism evaluation.

These checklists were completed for each system (Class 1 and 2) and the results are documented in the evaluation. As with the consequence evaluation results, the results of the degradation mechanism evaluation were used as input into the risk ranking evaluation. The degradation mechanism evaluation is contained in Appendices 2 (Class

1) and 3 (Class 2).

RISK RANKING Once the consequence and degradation mechanism evaluations were completed, the results were used to perform a risk ranking of in-scope piping. The piping welds are classified in accordance with the EPRI RMSI risk matrix with the highest risk piping welds listed in the upper right hand comer and lowest risk welds in the lower left hand comer. The results of this effort is documented in Appendix 4.

ELEMENT SELECTION Element selection and incorporation of plant specific service history (previous failures, indication, ISI results) were conducted by plant staff. This effort identified the new set of inspection locations that will be used as an alternative to the existing Section XI inspection locations.

DELTA RISK EVALUATION Once the element selection was completed, the new set of locations that will be inspected under the RI-ISI program was compared to the locations that were inspected prior to the implementation of RI-ISI. A risk comparison was performed to ensure that the changes due to implementation of the RI-ISI program result in acceptable risk changes. The evaluation contained in Appendix 5 documents this evaluation and shows that the VC Summer RI-ISI program is in conformance with the acceptance criteria for RI-ISI programs.

RI-ISI Submittal Template Utilizing the results of the RI-ISI process, a plant specific request for acceptable alternative inspections has been developed. This is provided in Appendix 6. This

'template submittal' is based upon the generic 'template submittal' developed by industry, NEI and NRC to streamline the RI-ISI submittal and NRC review process. It has been updated to incorporate lesson learned from previous RI-ISI submittals.

T FILE No.: EPRI-156-330 q2STRUCTURAL CALCULATION INTEGRITY PACKAGE PROJECT No.: EPRI-1 56 Associates, Inc.

PROJECT NAME: Risk Informed ISI Evaluations CLIENT: EPRI CALCULATION TITLE: Degradation Mechanism Evaluation for the Class I (Category B-J/B-F)

Piping at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS)

Project Mgr. Preparer(s) &

Document Affected Revsion Description Approval Checker(s)

Revision Pages Signature & Signatures &

I Date Date 1-35, A0 - A12 BO - B2, CO - C17 DO-D5,EO-E18 FO - F3, GO - G15 HO-H15, 10 -I1l Files on Project CD ROM 1,16-19,26 - 28 Original Issue Incorporati Comments i Scott Chesworth STC 11/8/01 Scott Chesworth STC 11/8/01 Miroslav Trubelj MT 11/8/01 I

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Table of Contents 1.0 INTRODU CTION...........................................................................................................................

4 1.1 Background.................................................................................................................................

4 1.2 Scope...........................................................................................................................................

4 1.3 Assumptions................................................................................................................................

5 2.0 DEGRADATION M ECH ANISM S...........................................................................................

6 3.0 REA CTOR COOLANT SYSTEM...........................................................................................

15 3.1 System D escription.............................................................................................................

15 3.2 Class Boundaries.......................................................................................................................

15 3.3 Piping and M aterials..................................................................................................................

15 3.4 D egradation M echanism Evaluation....................................................................................

16 3.4.1 Thennal Fatigue (TF)..................................................................................................

16 3.4.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)...............................................................................

18 3.4.3 Localized Corrosion (LC).............................................................................................

19 3.4.4 Flow Sensitive (FS)......................................................................................................

19 4.0 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM.............................................................................

20 4.1 System D escription.............................................................................................................

20 4.2 Class Boundaries.......................................................................................................................

20 4.3 Piping and M aterials..................................................................................................................

20 4.4 D egradation M echanism Evaluation...................................................................................

21 4.4:1 Therm al Fatigue (TF)..................................................................................................

21 4.4.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)...............................................................................

22 4.4.3 Localized Corrosion (LC).............................................................................................

22 4.4.4 Flow Sensitive (FS)......................................................................................................

23 5.0 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM............................................................................................

24 5.1 System D escription.............................................................................................................

24 5.2 Class Boundaries.......................................................................................................................

24 5.3 Piping and M aterials..................................................................................................................

24 5.4 D egradation M echanism Evaluation...................................................................................

25 5.4.1 Therm al Fatigue (TF)..................................................................................................

25 5.4.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)...............................................................................

27 5.4.3 Localized Corrosion (LC)............................................................................................

27 5.4.4 Flow Sensitive (FS)......................................................................................................

28 6.0 CHEIUCAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM...................................................................

29 6.1 System D escription...................................................................................................................

29 6.2 Class Boundaries.......................................................................................................................

30 6.3 Piping and M aterials.................................................................................................................

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6.4 D egradation M echanism Evaluation....................................................................................

30 6.4.1 Thermal Fatigue (TF)...................................................................................................

30 6.4.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)................................................................................

32 6.4.3 Localized Corrosion (LC).............................................................................

32 6.4.4 Flow Sensitive (FS)..................................................................

33

7.0 REFERENCES

34 APPENDIX A. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM WELD LIST...................

APPENDIX B.

APPENDIX C.

APPENDIX D.

APPENDIX E.

APPENDIX F.

APPENDIX G.

APPENDIX H.

APPENDIX I.

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM WELD LIST.................

B-0 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM WELD LIST.......................................... C-0 CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM WELD LIST....................... D-0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DEGRADATION MECHANISM EVALUATION CHECKLISTS............................................................ E-0 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM DEGRADATION MECHANJSM EVALUATION CHECKLISTS............................................................ F-0 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM DEGRADATION MECHANISM EVALUATION CHECKLISTS............................................................. G-0 CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM DEGRADATION MECHANISM EVALUATION CHECKLISTS..................................... H-0 THERMAL FATIGUE CALCULATIONS............................................ I-0 S...................... A -0

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

EPRI TR-112657 [2] provides alternative examination requirements for Class I piping welds in lieu of the requirements currently specified in Subsection IWB for such welds in ASME Code Section XI.

This evaluation will be performed according to the EPRI methodology.

The alternative risk-informed methodology calls for the categorization of piping welds into a risk matrix. Welds are categorized based upon two essential elements:

(1) identifying and evaluating the degradation mechanisms associated with the piping system under consideration, and (2) performing a consequence of failure evaluation to determine which portions of the piping system have the highest impact on plant safety.

Once welds are categorized according to these elements, the number of inspection locations shall be at least:

25% of Risk Category 1, 2, and 3 welds 10% of Category 4 and 5 welds No volumetric or surface element examinations of Category 6 and 7 welds are required; however, all elements, regardless of risk category, are to be pressure and leak tested [2].

Only the first element of the risk-informed approach, the evaluation of degradation mechanisms for all piping systems containing Class 1 (Category B-J or B-F) piping welds, will be considered in this calculation for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS).

1.2 Scope The following VCSNS systems, containing all of the Class 1 piping in scope, are evaluated:

Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Safety Injection System (SIS)

Chemical & Volume Control System (CVCS)

The potential degradation mechanisms for these systems are evaluated in Sections 3 through 6.

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1.3 Assumptions

1)

Only normal and upset conditions are evaluated. Degradation mechanisms occurring due to emergency or faulted conditions are excluded from the scope of this calculation.

2)

System and system boundary identification is defined by the current ISI Program for Class 1 (Category B-J and B-F) welds.

3)

Negligible outleakage occurs past containment isolation valves, as they have passed the requirements for containment leak tightness.

4)

If a system and/or section of piping is filled with primary water during startup or shutdown, the water quality will remain constant throughout normal plant operation.

5)

All lines evaluated in this calculation operate under some degree of tensile stress.

6)

For simplification purposes, containment ambient temperature was assumed to be 120TF during normal operations and 100TF during shutdown cooling operations. Ambient temperature outside containment is assumed to be 70TF.

7)

No outside piping surfaces in any piping evaluated are exposed to wetting from concentrated chloride bearing environments (i.e., sea water, brackish water or brine) since all piping is located indoors.

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2.0 DEGRADATION MECHANISMS According to the EPRI methodology [2], all Class 1 (Category B-J and B-F) welds in the assessed systems must be classified by failure potential. This classification is accomplished by determining those degradation mechanisms that might apply to each assessed weld. The degradation mechanisms to be assessed are given below:

TASCS Thermal Stratification, Cycling, Striping TT Thermal Transient IGSCC Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking TGSCC Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking ECSCC External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking PWSCC Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking MIC Microbiologically-Influenced Corrosion PIT Pitting CC Crevice Corrosion E-C Erosion-Cavitation FAC Flow-Accelerated Corrosion For the purposes of this evaluation, any welds susceptible to FAC can be classified as having a high failure potential; welds susceptible to all other mechanisms can be classified as having a medium failure potential. Welds in the medium category must be upgraded to the high category if the associated pipe segment is also susceptible to water hammer.

Specific guidance for determining potential degradation mechanisms based on the EPRI methodology [2] is provided in Table 2-1. In the following sections of this calculation package, the criteria outlined in Table 2-1 are used to assess the potentially active degradation mechanisms for all the Class 1 systems listed in Section 1.2 for VCSNS. Evaluations of the Richardson Number (Ri) and AT allowable for locations potentially susceptible to Thermal Fatigue (see Table 2-1) are performed in Appendix I of this calculation.

A deviation to the EPRI RI-ISI methodology has been implemented in the failure potential assessment for VCSNS. Table 3-16 of EPRI TR-1 12657 [2] limits PWSCC-susceptible materials to Alloy 600 piping material. However, recent service history at VC Summer indicates that Alloy 182 weld metal may also be potentially susceptible to this degradation mechanism. For purposes of conservatism, all Alloy 182 welds at VC Summer that meet the other PWSCC criteria are considered potentially susceptible to PWSCC.

A second deviation to the EPRI RI-ISI methodology has been implemented in the failure potential assessment for VCSNS. Table 3-16 of EPRI TR-1 12657 [2] contains criteria for assessing the Revision 0

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potential for thermal stratification, cycling and striping (TASCS). Key attributes for horizontal or slightly sloped piping greater than 1" nominal pipe size (NPS) include:

> Potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or

> Potential exists for leakage flow past a valve, including in-leakage, out-leakage and cross-leakage allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or

> Potential exists for convective heating in dead-ended pipe sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or

)> Potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or

> Potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with turbulent flow, AND AT > 500F, AND Richardson Number > 4 (this value predicts the potential buoyancy of a stratified flow)

These criteria, based on meeting a high cycle fatigue endurance limit with the actual AT assumed equal to the greatest potential AT for the transient, will identify all locations where stratification is likely to occur, but allows for no assessment of severity. As such, many locations will be identified as subject to TASCS where no significant potential for thermal fatigue exists. The critical attribute missing from the existing methodology that would allow consideration of fatigue severity is a criterion that addresses the potential for fluid cycling. The impact of this additional consideration on the existing TASCS susceptibility criteria is presented below.

Turbulent penetration TASCS Turbulent penetration typically occurs in lines connected to piping containing hot flowing fluid. In the case of downward sloping lines that then turn horizontal, as shown in Figure 2-1, significant top to-bottom cyclic ATs can develop in the horizontal sections if the horizontal section is less than about 25 pipe diameters from the reactor coolant piping. Therefore, TASCS is considered for this configuration.

For upward sloping branch lines connected to the hot fluid source that turn horizontal or in horizontal branch lines as shown in Figures 2-2 and 2-3, respectively, natural convective effects combined with effects of turbulence penetration will keep the line filled with hot water. If there is no potential for in leakage towards the hot fluid source from the outboard end of the line, this will result in a well-mixed IRevision 1

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fluid condition where significant top-to-bottom ATs will not occur. Therefore TASCS is not considered for these configurations. Even in fairly long lines, where some heat loss from the outside of the piping will tend to occur and some fluid stratification may be present, there is no significant potential for cycling as has been observed for the in-leakage case. The effect of TASCS will not be significant under these conditions and can be neglected.

Low flow TASCS In some situations, the transient startup of a system (e.g., RHR suction piping) creates the potential for fluid stratification as flow is established. In cases where no cold fluid source exists, the hot flowing fluid will fairly rapidly displace the cold fluid in stagnant lines, while fluid mixing will occur in the piping further removed from the hot source and stratified conditions will exist only briefly as the line fills with hot fluid. As such, since the situation is transient in nature, it can be assumed that the criteria for thermal transients (TT) will govern.

Valve leakage TASCS Sometimes a very small leakage flow of hot water can occur outward past a valve into a line that is relatively colder, creating a significant temperature difference. However, since this is a generally a "steady-state" phenomenon with no potential for cyclic temperature changes, the effect of TASCS is not significant and can be neglected. In cases where some cyclic component exists, TASCS should be considered (see Section 4.4.1.1.).

Convection heating TASCS Similarly, there sometimes exists the potential for heat transfer across a valve to an isolated section beyond the valve, resulting in fluid stratification due to natural convection. However, since there is no potential for cyclic temperature changes in this case, the effect of TASCS is not significant and can be neglected.

In summary, these additional considerations for determining the potential for thermal fatigue as a result of the effects of TASCS provide an allowance for the consideration of cycle severity in assessing the potential for TASCS effects, and were applied to the failure potential assessment for VCSNS. This constitutes a deviation to the requirements of EPRI TR-112657 [2], since the methodology does not presently provide any allowance for the consideration of cycle severity in assessing the potential for TASCS effects. For the reasons discussed above, this approach is considered technically justifiable. Furthermore, EPRI concurs with this position and has submitted a revision to the methodology to the USN'RC for generic review and approval [16].

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OWO1Ol Figure 2-1, Downward Sloping/Horizontal Line Configuration 0006M4 Figure 2-2. Upward Sloping/Horizontal Line Configuration

Figure 2-3. Horizontal Line Configuration K>

Table 2-1. Degradation Mechanism Criteria and Susceptible Regions [2]

Degradation Criteria Susceptible Regions Mechanism

-NPS > 1 inch, and

-pipe segment has a slope < 450 from horizontal (includes elbow or tee into a vertical pipe), and

-potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e.,

in-leakage, out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or potential exists for convection heating in dead ended pipe sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with turbulent flow, and

-calculated or measured AT > 500F, and

-Richardson number> 4.0

-operating temperature > 270°F for stainless steel, or operating temperature > 220°F for carbon steel, and

-potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and

- IATI > 200°F for stainless steel, or I AT I > 150°F for carbon steel, or I ATI > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)

Nozzles, branch pipe connections, safe ends, welds, heat affected zones (HAZs), base metal, and regions of stress concentration TF TASCS TT I

Table 2-1. (continued)

Degradation Criteria Susceptible Regions Mechanism SCC IGSCC

-evaluated in accordance with existing plant Welds and HAZs (BWR)

IGSCC program per NRC Generic Letter 88-01 IGSCC

- austenitic stainless steel (carbon content >

(PWR) 0.035%), and

-operating temperature > 200TF, and

-tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and

-oxygen or oxidizing species are present OR

-operating temperature < 2000F, the attributes above apply, and

-initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are also required to be present TGSCC

- austenitic stainless steel, and Base metal, welds, and HAZs

-operating temperature > 150 0F, and

-tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and

-halides (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present, and

-oxygen or oxidizing species are present Revision 0

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Table 2-1. (continued)

Degradation Criteria Susceptible Regions Mechanism SCC ECSCC

- austenitic stainless steel, and Base metal, welds, (cont.)

and HAZs

-operating temperature > 1500F, and

-tensile stress is present, and

-an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, OR

-austenitic stainless steel, and

-tensile stress is present, and an'outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from concentrated chloride-bearing environments (i.e., sea water, brackish water, or brine)

PWSCC

-piping material is Inconel (Alloy 600), and Nozzles, welds, and HAZs without stress

-exposed to primary water at T > 5700F, and relief

-the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or cold worked and welded without stress relief LC MIC

-operating temperature < 150°F, and Fittings, welds, HAZs, base metal, dissimilar

-low or intermittent flow, and metal joints (for

-pH < 10, and example, welds and flanges), and regions

-presence/intrusion of organic material (e.g., Raw containing crevices Water System), or

-water source is not treated with biocides, or PIT

-potential exists for low flow, and

-oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and

-initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present File No.

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Degradation Criteria Susceptible Regions Mechanism LC CC

-crevice condition exists (i.e., thermal sleeves),

(cont.)

and

-operating temperature > 150TF, and

-oxygen or oxidizing species are present FS E-C

-cavitation source, and Fittings, welds, HAZs, and base metal

-operating temperature < 2500F, and

-flow present > 100 hrsJyr., and

-velocity > 30 ft.sec., and

-(Pd - P.) / AP < 5 FAC

-evaluated In accordance with existing plant FAC per plant FAC program program

3.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3.1 System Description [1]

The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) consists of 3 similar heat transfer loops connected in parallel to the reactor pressure vessel. Each loop contains a reactor coolant pump, steam generator, and associated piping and valves. In addition, the system includes a pressurizer, a pressurizer relief tank, interconnecting piping, and instrumentation necessary for operational control.

During operation, the RCS transfers the heat generated in the core to the steam generators where steam is produced to drive the turbine generator. Borated demineralized water is circulated in the RCS at a flowrate and temperature consistent with achieving the required reactor core thermal-hydraulic performance. The water also acts as a neutron moderator and reflector, and as a solvent for the neutron absorber (boron) used in chemical shim control.

The RCS pressure boundary provides a barrier against the release of radioactivity generated within the reactor and is designed to ensure a high degree of integrity throughout the life of the plant.

RCS pressure is controlled by the use of the pressurizer where water and steam are maintained in equilibrium by electrical heaters and water sprays. Steam is formed (by the heaters) or condensed (by the pressurizer spray) to minimize pressure variations due to contraction and expansion of the reactor coolant. Spring loaded safety valves and power operated relief valves are mounted on the pressurizer and discharge to the pressurizer relief tank, where the steam is condensed and cooled by mixing with water.

3.2 Class Boundaries The Class 1 RCS piping under consideration consists of the main loop piping (hot leg, cold leg, and crossover leg), the drain lines (including a portion of the excess letdown line from loop C), and the pressurizer surge, spray, safety, and relief valve lines.

3.3 Piping and Materials Table 3-1 lists the Class 1 RCS piping. The line numbers shown in this table are also given with the weld list in Appendix A. Dimensions and material information for all piping were obtained from Reference [3]. Line descriptions were obtained from Reference [4]. Design and operating conditions were obtained from Reference [5].

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Table 3-1. Class 1 RCS Piping DESIGN DESIGN OPER OPER SIZE TIIK PRES TEMP PRES TEMP DRAWING LOOP LINE DESCRIPTION (IN)

(IN)

MATL (PSIG)

(F)

(PSIG)

(F) 1-4308 C

DRAIN LINE (EXCESS LETDOWN) 2.00 0-344 SS 2485 650 2235 557 1-4501 A

PRESSURIZER SAFETY 800/600

.906/.719 SS 2485 680 2235 653 1-4502 A

PRESSURIZER RELIEF 8.00/6 00

.9061.719 SS 2485 680 2235 653

1. 4503 C

PRESSURIZER SPRAY 6 00/4 00

.7191.531 SS 2485 680 2235 653/557 1-4504 A

PRESSURIZER SPRAY 400 0531 SS 2485 650 2235 557 1-4100A A

LOOP "A" R.C. PIPE 31/29127.5 26/2.5/2.4 SS 2485 650 2235 617/557 1-4200A B

LOOP "B" R C. PIPE 31/29/27.5 2.6/2.5/2.4 SS 2485 650 2235 617/557

'I. 4208A B

DRAIN LINE 200 0.344 SS 2485 650 2235 557

.1. 4300A C

LOOP "C" R C. PIPE 31/29/27.5 2.6/2.5/24 SS 2485 650 2235 617/557 1 - 4500A A

PRESSURIZER SURGE 1400 1.406 SS 2485 680 2235 635 I-4505A A

PRESSURIZER RELIEF 300 0438 SS 2485 680 2235 653 3.4 Degradation Mechanism Evaluation Checklists applying the criteria of the EPRI procedure (Table 2-1) to the Class 1 piping runs in the RCS are given in Appendix E. A summary of the evaluation of each degradation mechanism for the conditions existing in the RCS is given below. The information on which all evaluations are based is obtained from References [1, 4, 5 and 9], unless noted otherwise. A complete list Category B-J and B F welds in the RCS Class 1 piping, matched with their potential degradation mechanism(s) based on the EPRI procedure, is provided in Appendix A.

The RCS was evaluated for normal operating conditions as well as conditions of startup/shutdown, RHR initiation, recovery from loss of charging, inadvertent SI actuation, pressurizer auxiliary spray actuation, and pressurizer overpressurization. All other system transients are either mild or slow-acting with respect to RCS temperature (not a TT instigator and no other mechanisms apply) or are emergency/faulted events outside the scope of this evaluation. Transients affecting other systems which impact RCS branch piping welds to those systems will also be evaluated here.

3.4.1 Thermal Fatigue (TF) 3.4.1.1 Thermal Stratification, Cycling and Striping (TASCS)

Main Loop Piping - The branch connection weld from the loop A hot leg to the pressurizer surge line would be affected by TASCS during plant heatup and cooldown, due to hot fluid surges from the pressurizer vessel flowing over the relatively colder fluid from the hot leg. Potential inleakage from the CVCS through the charging and safety injection lines would be well-mixed by the time it reached the branch connection welds, and would not be a TASCS concern at these locations. RHR return flow Revision 0

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through the safety injection lines would not result in a TASCS concern due to the non-cyclic nature of this operation (see Section 2.0).

Pressurizer Piping - The pressurizer surge line would be affected by TASCS during plant heatup and cooldown, due to hot and cold fluid surges from the pressurizer vessel and loop A hot leg, respectively. The pressurizer spray line would also experience TASCS during normal operation due to the 2gpm spray bypass flow from the RCS loop A and C cold legs encountering steam at elevated temperatures near the pressurizer vessel. Potential inleakage from the CVCS auxiliary spray line into the main spray line would not be a TASCS concern due to the mostly steady-state nature of the leakage, which would result in non-cyclic conditions at the interface with the steady-state spray bypass flow. The pressurizer relief valve lines would be convectively heated from the pressurizer vessel, but this would not be a cyclic phenomenon and is hence not a TASCS concern.

Branch Piping - The loop B and C drain lines would experience turbulence penetration from the RCS crossover legs; however, due to the short, insulated run to the first closed valve, temperature differences would be insufficient to result in a TASCS situation in the loop B line; therefote, only loop C is considered potentially TASCS-susceptible.

3.4.1.2 Thermal Transient (TT)

Main Loop Piping - The branch connection weld from the loop A hot leg to the pressurizer surge line would be affected by TT during plant heatup and cooldown, due to hot fluid surges from the pressurizer vessel flowing over the relatively colder fluid from the hot leg. The branch connection welds to the CVCS and SIS are also potentially susceptible to TT under several conditions. If flow is interrupted to either the normal or alternate charging line (whichever is in use), portions of the line remote from the RCS can cool to 120°F (normal operating containment ambient temperature). When flow is restored, this "cold slug" will encounter portions near the RCS, which have been heated to the cold leg temperature of 557°F, and will be followed by the restoration of normal charging flow at 438'F [1], resulting in a double-shock to the portion of the line near the nozzle, including the branch connection weld. Since the normal and alternate charging lines each perform approximately 50% of the duty [12], the branch connection welds to both of these lines are considered potentially susceptible to IT.

The branch connection welds to the 6"' safety injection lines from the RCS cold legs are potentially susceptible to TT during a spurious SI actuation. Under these conditions, 120'F (containment ambient) fluid from the SI lines followed by 70°F fluid from the RWST [8] would enter lines heated to 557°F, including the branch connection weld to each cold leg, at a flowrate of 100gpm (two 150gpm pumps supplying three loops [8]). These branch connection welds would also encounter a TT at the initiation of decay heat removal (DHR) operations. At this time, one RHR train is put into service

[13], and fluid at 350°F from the RCS is drawn into the suction line which is at 100°F (shutdown containment ambient temperature). According to Reference [15], once the RHR pump for this train is Revision 0

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started, theoperator slowly increases the flowrate (through the suction line, discharging through the heat exchanger bypass line and eventually to the three cold legs) slowly until flow is indicated (approximately 1500gpm at 45% demand). Using this value (500gpm per nozzle) as a maximum possible for flow initiation, the double-shock of ambient (100°F) and then 350°F RCS fluid at the nozzles (initially at 350'F) would be sufficient to result in a TT to the branch connection welds.

Pressurizer Piping - The pressurizer surge line would be affected by TT during plant heatup and cooldown, due to hot and cold fluid surges from the pressurizer vessel and loop A hot leg, respectively. The pressurizer spray line would be affected by TT when the pressurizer auxiliary spray is used during heatup and cooldown. At this time, cold CVCS fluid would enter the line formerly heated by pressurizer steam, and then the steam would re-enter the line when spray flow was stopped, resulting in a double-shock. The pressurizer relief valve lines would experience a TT during a pressurizer overpressure transient, when the valves would open and pressurizer steam at an elevated temperature would enter lines formerly containing condensate at a reduced temperature.

Branch Piping - Remote portions of the loop C drain/excess letdown line would encounter a'IT upon flow initiation (either during the latter stages of plant heatup or when normal letdown is unavailable

[6]) when 557°F fluid at 25gpm [1] enters lines formerly at containment ambient temperature (120°F).

3.4.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 3.4.2.1 Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)

The RCS is not susceptible to IGSCC due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled primary water present in all runs [5].

3.4.2.2 Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)

The RCS is not susceptible to TGSCC due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled primary water present in all runs [5].

3.4.2.3 External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC)

The RCS is not affected by this degradation mechanism due to the fact that all insulation is in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no lines are exposed to wetting from concentrated chloride bearing environments [10].

3.4.2.4 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)

As discussed in Section 2.0, Table 3-16 of EPRI TR-112657 [2] limits PWSCC-susceptible materials to Alloy 600 piping material. However, recent service history at VC Summer indicates that Alloy 182 Revision 0

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weld metal may also be potentially susceptible to this degradation mechanism. For purposes of conservatism, all Alloy 182 welds at VC Summer that meet the other PWSCC criteria are considered potentially susceptible to PWSCC. These locations in the RCS include the main loop piping welds from the hot legs to the RPV and steam generators, as well as the nozzle to safe-end welds to the pressurizer surge, spray, safety and relief valve lines [18].

3.4.3 Localized Corrosion 3.4.3.1.Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC)

Only one location, the short run between valves in the loop C drain line, cannot be excluded from the potential for MIC based on the elevated temperatures of the RCS. However, the high-quality reactor grade fluid present, as well as plant service history and industry experience, indicate that this location would not be susceptible to MIC.

3.4.3.2 Pitting (PIT)

The RCS is not susceptible to PIT due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled primary water present in all runs [5].

3.4.3.3 Crevice Corrosion (CC)

CC is not a potential mechanism in the RCS due to the fact that, even in locations with thermal sleeves (the pressurizer surge and spray line nozzles) primary water chemistry controls the presence of oxygen to negligible levels [5].

3.4.4 Flow Sensitive (FS) 3.4.4.1 Erosion-Cavitation (E-C)

E-C is not a mechanism in the RCS due to the high operating temperatures and general lack of potential cavitation sources (flow regulating valves and flow orifices). The only in-scope region downstream of a potential cavitation source (the pressurizer spray bypass valves) is at too high a temperature and would encounter too low a flowrate during normal operation to result in a E-C concern.

3.4.4.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)

The RCS is not considered susceptible to FAC since no RCS locations are included in VC Summer's FAC Program [17].

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4.0 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM 4.1 System Description [1]

The Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) transfers heat from the RCS to the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) to reduce the temperature of the reactor coolant to the cold shutdown temperature at a controlled rate during the second part of normal plant cooldown and maintains this temperature until the plant is started up again.

During the first phase of cooldown, the temperature of the RCS is reduced by transferring heat from the RCS to the steam and power conversion system through the steam generators.

Parts of the RHRS also serve as parts of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) during the injection and recirculation phases of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The RHRS is also used to transfer refueling water between the refueling cavity and the refueling water storage tank (RWST) at the beginning and end of refueling operations.

4.2 Class Boundaries The Class 1 RHRS piping under consideration consists of the residual heat removal (RHR) suction line off the loop A hot leg. (NOTE: the RHR suction line off the loop C hot leg is categorized as part of the Safety Injection System in Reference [3], but will also be evaluated in this Section) 4.3 Piping and Materials Table 4-1 lists the Class 1 RHRS piping. The line numbers shown in this table are also given with the weld list in Appendix B. Dimensions and material information were obtained from Reference [3].

Line descriptions were obtained from Reference [4]..Design and operating conditions were obtained from References [5 and 7].

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Table 4-1. Class 1 RHRS Piping DESIGN DESIGN OPER OPER SIZE THK PRES TEMP PRES TEMP DRAINNG LOOP LINE DESCRIPTON (IN)

(MIN MATL (PSIG)

(I)

(PSIG) f1*

1-4102A A

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL 12.00/200 1.125/344 SS 24851600 650(400 2235/425 617/350 4.4 Degradation Mechanism Evaluation Checklists applying the criteria of the EPRI procedure (Table 2-1) to the Class 1 piping runs in the RHRS are given in Appendix F. A summary of the evaluation of each degradation mechanism for the conditions existing in the RHRS is given below. The information on which all evaluations are based is obtained from References [1, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9], unless noted otherwise. A complete list of Category B J welds, matched with their potential degradation mechanism(s) based on the EPRI procedure, is provided in Appendix B.

The RHRS was evaluated for normal operating conditions as well as for conditions of startup/shutdown, RHR initiation and inadvertent SI actuation.

4.4.1 Thermal Fatigue (TF) 4.4.1.1 Thermal Stratification, Cycling and Striping (TASCS)

The RHR suction lines off the RCS loop A and C hot legs are potentially susceptible to turbulence penetration-driven TASCS in horizontal runs between 5 and 25 pipe diameters off the RCS during normal operations. They are also susceptible to TASCS due to leakage through the packing gland of valves XVG-8702A and XVG-8702B into each valve's leak-off line, as described in Reference [19].

This mechanism draws hot water from the RCS into the cool region adjacent to the valve, and is cyclic due to the fact that the valve seat gap expands and contracts on a periodic basis, alternately permitting and prohibiting leakage flow. The TASCS susceptibility of the suction lines is partially mitigated by several factors, including the fact that the run between the hot leg and first closed valve is relatively short and insulated, and that this line is being monitored for thermal fatigue issues in compliance with NRC Bulletin 88-08 [11]. However, the potential for TASCS still exists in this region.

At the initiation of decay heat removal (DHR) operations, one train is put into service [13]. At this time, fluid at 350°F from the RCS is drawn into the suction line, which is at the containment ambient temperature of 100°F. On the condition that this flow was initiated at a low flowrate to minimize thermal shock to the system, it would result in fluid stratification in the horizontal portions of the suction line. However, since DHR operations are not cyclic, this situation would not result in a TASCS concern (see Section 2.0).

I. ___________________________________

4.4.1.2 Thermal Transients (TT)

At the initiation of decay heat removal (DHR) operations, one train is put into service [13]. At this time, fluid at 3501F from the RCS is drawn into the suction line, which is at the containment ambient temperature of 100°F. According to Reference [15], once the RHR pump for this train is started, the operator slowly increases the flowrate (through the suction line, discharging through the heat exchanger bypass line and eventually to the three cold legs) until flow is indicated (approximately 1500gpm at 45% demand). Using this value as a maximum possible for flow initiation, it would still be insufficient to result in a TT to the RHRS suction line.

4.4.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 4.4.2.1 Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)

The RHRS suction lines are not susceptible to IGSCC due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled water present [5].

4.4.2.2 Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)

The RHRS suction lines are not susceptible to TGSCC due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled water present [5].

4.4.2.3 External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC)

The RHRS is not affected by this degradation mechanism due to the fact that all insulation is in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 and the suction line is not exposed to wetting from concentrated chloride bearing environments [10].

4.4.2.4 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)

The RHRS suction line is not susceptible to PWSCC since there are no Inconel components present.

4.4.3 Localized Corrosion (LC) 4.4.3.1 Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC)

The RHLRS suction lines (beyond the first closed valve and remote from the RCS) cannot be excluded from potential MIC susceptibility based on strict application of the EPRI criteria. However, the fact that all lines are filled with high purity, reactor grade water, as well as plant service history and industry experience, indicate that MIC would not be a potential mechanism in this piping.

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4.4.3.2 Pitting (PIT)

The RHRS suction line is not susceptible to PIT due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled water present [5].

4.4.3.3 Crevice Corrosion (CC)

The RHRS is not susceptible to CC since there are no thermal sleeves present in this piping.

4.4.4 Flow Sensitive (FS) 4.4.4.1 Erosion-Cavitation (E-C)

The RHRS is not susceptible to E-C since there are no cavitation sources present in this piping.

4.4.4.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)

The RHRS is not considered susceptible to FAC since no RHRS locations are included in VC Summer's FAC Program [17].

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5.0 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM 5.1 System Description [1]

The Safety Injection System (SIS), also known as the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), is designed to cool the reactor core as well as to provide additional shutdown capability following initiation of the following accident conditions:

1. Pipe breaks in the RCS which cause a discharge larger than that which can be made up by the normal makeup system, up to and including the instantaneous circumferential rupture of the largest pipe in the RCS.

2. Rupture of a control rod drive mechanism causing a rod cluster control assembly ejection accident.

3. Pipe breaks in the steam system, up to and including the instantaneous circumferential rupture of the largest pipe in the steam system.

4. A steam generator tube rupture.

The ECCS components are designed such that a minimum of two accumulators, one charging pump and one residual heat removal pump together with their associated valves and piping will assure adequate core cooling in the event of a Design Basis Accident.

5.2 Class Boundaries The Class 1 SIS piping under consideration consists of the 12" accumulator discharge lines, the 6" safety injection lines to the hot legs and cold legs, and the 2" high head safety injection lines that feed the 6" lines. (NOTE: the RHR suction line off the loop C hot leg is categorized as part of the Safety Injection System in Reference [3], but is evaluated in Section 4.0) 5.3 Piping and Materials Table 5-1 lists the Class 1 SIS piping. The line numbers shown in this table are also given with the weld list in Appendix C. Dimensions and material information for all piping were obtained from Reference [3]. Line descriptions were obtained from Reference [4]. Design and operating conditions were obtained from References [1, 5 and 8].

I

Table 5-1. Class 1 SIS Piping DESIGN DESIGN OPER OPER SIZE THK PRES TEMP PRES TEMP DRAWING LOOP LINE DESCRIPTION (IN)

(IN)

MAT.,

(PSIG)

(F)

(PSIG)

(F) 1-4301 C

ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE 1200 1.125 SS 2485/00 650/300 2235/628 557/120 1-4302 C

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL 12 00/2 00 1.1251.344 SS 2485/600 6501400 2235/425 617/350 1-4303 C

SAFETY INJECTION (COLD LEG) 600 0.719 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 557/120 1-4304 C

SAFETY INJECTION (HOT LEG) 6.00 0.719 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 617/120 1-4309 C

HIGH HEAD S.I. (COLD LEG) 200 0.344 5S 2900 650/300 N/A 5571120

1. 4310 C

HIGH HEAD S 1. (COLD LEG) 200 0.344 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 557/120 1-4311 C

HIGH HEAD S.L (HOTLEG) 2.00 0.344 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 617/120 1-4101A A

ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE 1200 1125 SS 2485f700 650/300 2235/628 557/120 I-4103A A

SAFETY INJECTION (COLD LEG) 600 0719 SS 2900 650/300 NIA 557/120 1-4104A A

SAFETY INJECTION (HOT LEG) 6.00 0.719 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 617/120

1. 411 IA A

HIGH HEAD S.1. (COLD LEG) 2.00 0344 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 557/120 1 4112A A

HIGH HEAD S I (COLD LEG) 2.00 0344 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 5571120 I-4113A A

HIGH HEAD S L (HOT LEG) 2.00 0.344 SS 2900 650/300 NIA 617/120 I-4201A B

ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE 1200 1.125 SS 2485/700 650/300 2235/628 5571120 I-4202A B

SAFETY INJECTION (COLD LEG) 600 0719 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 5571120 1-4203A B

SAFETY INJECTION (HOT LEG) 6.00 0719 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 617/120 I-4209AJB B

HIGH HEAD S I (COLD LEG) 200 0.344 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 617/120 1-421 OA B

HIGH HEAD S 1. (COLD LEG) 2.00 0.344 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 557/120 1-4211A B

HIGH HEAD S L (HOT LEG) 2.00 0.344 SS 2900 650/300 N/A 617/120 N/A = information not available 5.4 Degradation Mechanism Evaluation Checklists applying the criteria of the EPRI procedure (Table 2-1) to the Class 1 piping runs in the SIS are given in Appendix G. A summary of the evaluation of each degradation mechanism for the conditions existing in the SIS is given below. The information on which all evaluations are based is obtained from References [1, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9], unless noted otherwise. A complete list of Category B J welds, matched with their potential degradation mechanism(s) based on the EPRI procedure, is provided in Appendix C.

The SIS was evaluated for normal operating conditions as well as for conditions of startup/shutdown, R-R initiation and inadvertent SI actuation.

5.4.1 Thermal Fatigue (TF) 5.4.1.1 Thermal Stratification, Cycling and Striping (TASCS)

I ___________________________________________

The accumulator lines and the 6" hot leg and cold leg safety injection lines would not experience turbulence penetration-driven TASCS due to the line geometry, as well as the short, insulated run to the first closed (check) valve off the RCS. RHR return flow through the 6" safety injection lines to the cold legs would not result in a TASCS concern due to the non-cyclic nature of this operation (see Section 2.0). Additionally, some fluid stratification may exist beyond the first check valve in the accumulator and 6" hot leg and cold leg safety injection lines due to conductive heating through the valve; however, this would be non-cyclic and hence not a TASCS concern (see Section 2.0).

Inleakage from the higher pressure charging system (CVCS) could potentially result in a TASCS situation to the 6" hot leg and cold leg safety injection lines between the RCS and first check valve.

This susceptibility is partially mitigated by the fact that each line is being monitored for thermal fatigue issues in compliance with NRC Bulletin 88-08 [11]. However, some potential for TASCS still exists in these lines.

5.4.1.2 Thermal Transient (7T)

The 6" cold leg safety injection lines would experience a TT upon a spurious SI actuation, when 120'F (containment ambient) fluid followed by 70'F fluid from the RWST would enter lines previously at the RCS cold leg temperature of 557°F at a flowrate of 100gpm (two 150gpm pumps supplying three loops [8]). The 6" hot leg lines are only used for hot leg recirculation operations [13],

which is an emergency/faulted event outside the scope of this evaluation.

These 6" lines would also encounter a TT at the initiation of decay heat removal (DHR) operations.

At this time, one RHR train is put into service [13], and fluid at 350°F from the RCS is drawn into the suction line, which is at the shutdown containment ambient temperature of 100'F. According to Reference [15], once the RHR pump for this train is started, the operator increases the flowrate (through the suction line, discharging through the heat exchanger bypass line and eventually to the three cold legs) slowly until flow is indicated (approximately 1500gpm at 45% demand). Using this value (500gpm per nozzle) as a maximum possible for flow initiation, the double-shock of ambient (100'F) and then 350'F RCS fluid to the region near the nozzles (initially at 350'F) would be sufficient to result in a TT to these lines. (NOTE: The portions of the 6" lines receiving only the "single-shock" of 350°F into previously 100'F ambient lines would not be subject to a TT', since the flowrate is insufficient.)

The 2" high-head SI lines which feed into the 6" lines would experience a IT at the initiation of DHR operations. At this time, RCS fluid at 350'F flowing in the 6" return lines would contact the branch connection welds to the 2" high-head SI lines (previously at containment ambient temperature),

resulting in a TT to the portions near the tie-in.

5.4.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 5.4.2.1 Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)

The accumulator and 6" hot leg and cold leg safety injection lines (and some 2" HHSI line locations) are potentially susceptible to IGSCC in the region immediately beyond the first check valve off the' RCS. In this region, the temperature is elevated and the accumulator and safety injection piping may be filled by the accumulator tanks or RWST (respectively), which are not controlled for the presence of oxygen [14].

5.4.2.2 Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)

The SIS is not susceptible to TGSCC due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled water present in all runs [14].

5.4.2.3 External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC)

The SIS is not affected by this degradation mechanism due to the fact that all insulation is in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no lines are exposed to wetting from concentrated chloride bearing environmeilts [10].

5.4.2.4 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)

The SIS is not susceptible to PWSCC since there are no Inconel components present.

5.4.3 Localized Corrosion 5.4.3.1 Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC)

A number of locations in the SIS cannot be excluded from potential MIC susceptibility based on strict application of the EPRI criteria. However, the fact that all lines are filled with high purity, reactor grade water, as well as plant service history and industry experience, indicate that MIC would not be a potential mechanism in this piping.

5.4.3.2 Pitting (PIT)

The SIS is not susceptible to PIT due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled water present in all runs [14].

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The SIS is not susceptible to CC since there are no thermal sleeves present in this piping.

5.4.4 Flow Sensitive (FS) 5.4.4.1 Erosion-Cavitation (E-C)

The SIS is not susceptible to E-C since any potential cavitation sources would only encounter flow during surveillance testing, which is of insufficient duration to result in an E-C concern.

5.4.4.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)

The SIS is not considered susceptible to FAC since no SIS locations are included in VC Summer's FAC Program [17].

6.0 CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM 6.1 System Description [6]

The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) is used to establish a programmed water level in the pressurizer to maintain proper reactor coolant inventory. The programmed level is achieved by a continuous feed and bleed operation. Bleed rate is chosen by the selection of the proper combination of letdown orifices. Feed rate is determined by throttling charging pump flow, thereby maintaining the desired pressurizer level.

The Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) shaft seals ensure no loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory from the pumps. The seal design requires a continuous flow of high-pressure water. Part of the discharge of the charging pump is sent to the reactor coolant pumps as seal injection flow. Most of that flow goes directly to the RCS, but some returns to the CVCS through the CVCS seal water heat exchanger to be cooled and reused.

The metals composing the RCS are an important barrier against the release of radioactive fission products. Therefore, the integrity of these metals is very important. This integrity is partly sustained by controlling the chemical condition of the coolant flowing through the RCS. Control of the water chemistry and the activity level of the coolant is performed on a continuous basis as long as the CVCS is in operation.

A sudden loss of reactor coolant, caused by a pipe rupture or similar accident, removes the means to cool the reactor's core. Without cooling, the fuel clad could melt or crack, causing the release of radioactive fission products. The plant's Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) automatically injects thousands of gallons of water onto the core when this accident situation is sensed. The CVCS charging pumps are incorporated into the ECCS because of their high-pressure flow capability.

The RCS coolant inventory is intentionally changed during various plant evolutions. The reduced temperature, pressure, and activity of the reactor coolant in the letdown portion of the CVCS makes it a useful place from which to lower the RCS coolant inventory. The centrifugal charging pumps with their high discharge pressure provide the necessary means to add to the coolant inventory.

In summary, the CVCS functions to:

"* Control reactor coolant inventory through maintenance of programmed water level in the pressurizer

"* Supply seal water injection flow to the reactor coolant pumps

"* Control reactor coolant chemistry conditions and activity levels

"* Supply high pressure water for the ECCS

"* Fill and drain the RCS Revision 0

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EPRI-156-330 Page 30 of 35 6.2 Class Boundaries The Class 1 portion of the CVCS piping under consideration consists of the normal charging, alternate charging, letdown, drain, and pressurizer auxiliary spray lines.

6.3 Piping and Materials Table 6-1 lists the Class 1 CVCS piping. The line numbers shown in this table are also given with the weld lists in Appendix D. Dimensions and material information for all piping were obtained from Reference [3]. Line descriptions were obtained from Reference [4]. Design and operating conditions were obtained from References [5 and 6].

Table 6-1. Class 1 CVCS Piping DESIGN DESIGN OPER OPER SIZE THK PRES TEMP PRES TEMP DRAWING LOOP LLNE DESCRIPTION (I)

IN)

MATL (PSIG)

(F)

(PSIG)

(F) 1-4106A A

ALTERNATE CHARGING 3.00 0438 S5 2485 650 2235 557/438 I-4107A A

LETDOWN 3.00 0438 SS 2485 650 2235 557 1-4110A A

DRAIN LINE 2.00 0.344 S5 2485 650 2235 557 I-4205A B

NORMAL CHARGING 3.00 0.438 SS 2485 650 2235 557/438 I. 4506A A

PRESSURIZERAUX.SPRAY 200 0344 SS 2485 650 2235 120/500 6.4 Degradation Mechanism Evaluation Checklists applying the criteria of the EPRI procedure (Table 2-1) to the Class 1 piping runs in the CVCS are given in Appendix H. A summary of the evaluation of each degradation mechanism for the conditions existing in the CVCS is given below. The information on which all evaluations are based is obtained from References [1, 4, 6 and 9] unless noted otherwise. A complete list of Category B-J welds in the CVCS, matched with their potential degradation mechanism(s) based on the EPRI procedure, is provided in Appendix D.

The CVCS was evaluated for normal operating conditions as well as for conditions of startup/shutdown (including use of the pressurizer auxiliary spray), recovery from a loss-of-charging transient, and re-initiating flow after securing letdown.

6.4.1 Thermal Fatigue (TF) 6.4.1.1 Thermal Stratification, Cycling and Striping (TASCS)

l The CVCS letdown line off the loop A crossover leg would not experience TASCS since it sees a constant, high flowrate during normal operations. The drain line off the letdown line would not experience turbulence pentration or convection-driven TASCS since the in-scope piping would all be at approximately the crossover leg temperature of 557°F. The charging line flow path between normal and alternate charging is swapped every refueling cycle [12], hence each line gets 50% of the duty.

For whichever line is not in duty, the potential exists for inleakage from the CVCS, which can result in a TASCS situation between the RCS and the first closed (check) valve. This susceptibility is partially mitigated by the fact that each line is being monitored for thermal fatigue issues in compliance with NRC Bulletin 88-08 [11]. However, some potential for TASCS still exists in these lines. Line geometry would preclude turbulence-driven TASCS in the inactive line, and any fluid stratification beyond the first valve off the RCS would be non-cyclic, and hence not a TASCS concern (see Section 2.0).

The auxiliary spray line is potentially susceptible to TASCS due to inleakage from the CVCS during normal operations. In this case, ambient fluid would leak past the valve off the main spray line and would mix with the high-temperature pressurizer steam in the line. This susceptibility is Partially mitigated by the fact that the auxiliary spray line is being monitored for thermal fatigue issues in compliance with NRC Bulletin 88-08 [11]. However, some potential for TASCS still exists. This same region of the auxiliary spray line (near the tie-in to the main spray piping) encounters convection heating from the main spray line during normal operations, as well as some turbulence penetration during a main spray event. However, since temperature differences are negligible, neither situation would result in a TASCS concern.

6.4.1.2 Thermal Transient (TT)

The normal or alternate charging line (whichever is in use [12]) would encounter a IT during the recovery from a loss of flow transient. During the time flow is interrupted, portions of the charging line remote from the RCS cool to containment ambient temperature (120°F) while portions near the nozzles would be heated to the cold leg temperature of 557°F. Upon flow restoration, the region near the nozzles would encounter first the cold slug at 120*F, and then restored charging flow at 438°F, resulting in a double-shock and a T"T.

Flow interruptions to the letdown line would primarily occur as a result of letdown being isolated in response to a sufficiently long interruption in charging flow. Such an isolation would result in portions near the RCS remaining at or near the crossover leg temperature, while more remote portions would cool to approximately containment ambient temperature. When letdown flow was re-initiated, hot RCS fluid would enter these cooler lines, resulting in a IT. Alhough such an occurrence is not expected to be a significant thermal fatigue concern due to the low number of cycles involved, the letdown line will be considered potentially TT-susceptible for purposes of this evaluation.

A I

/' P!*

The pressurizer auxiliary spray line would encounter a TT when it is used during plant heatup.

Although temperature differences between the charging system and pressurizer are procedurally limited to 320'F under these conditions [1, 6], this temperature difference would still be sufficient to result in a TT to the portion of the line near the pressurizer vessel.

6.4.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 6.4.2.1 Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)

The CVCS is not susceptible to IGSCC due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled primary water present in all runs [5].

6 4.2.2 Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)

The CVCS is not susceptible to TGSCC due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled primary water present in all runs [5].

6.4.2.3 External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC)

The CVCS is not affected by this degradation mechanism due to the fact that all insulation is in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no lines are exposed to wetting from concentrated chloride bearing environments [10].

6.4.2.4 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)

The CVCS is not susceptible to PWSCC since there are no Inconel components present.

6.4.3 Localized Corrosion (LC) 6.4.3.1 Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC)

The CVCS is generally not susceptible to MIC due to the high operating temperatures. However, in lines partially at containment ambient temperature (such as the auxiliary spray line or the normal or alternate charging line), where the potential for MIC cannot be excluded based upon a strict application of the EPRI criteria, plant service history and industry experience, as well as the high quality reactor grade quality present, indicate that a MIC concern would not exist.

6.4.3.2 Pitting (PIT)

The CVCS is not susceptible to PIT due to the high quality of the chemistry controlled primary water present in all runs [5].

Revision 0

S.

Preparer/Date STC 11/08/01 File No.

EPRI-156-330 I _______________________________________________

I

6.4.3.3 Crevice Corrosion (CC)

The CVCS is not susceptible to CC since there are no thermal sleeves present in this piping.

6.4.4 Flow Sensitive (FS) 6.4.4.1 Erosion-Cavitation (E-C)

The CVCS is not susceptible to E-C since there are no potential cavitation sources present in these lines.

6.4.4.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)

The CVCS is not considered susceptible to FAC since no CVCS locations are included in VC Summer's FAC Program [17].

I

7.0 REFERENCES

1)

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, "Final Safety Analysis Report", SI File No. EPRI-156-701.

2)

EPRI TR-112657, "Revised Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure,"

Revision B-A, December 1999.

3)

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, electronic ISI database, "Risk Informed Inservice Examination Program," SI File No. EPRI-156-702.

4)

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, "ISE Isometric Drawings, Engineering Drawings, and database printouts", SI File No. EPRI-156-703.

5)

Nuclear Operations Training, "Auxiliary Building System AB-2, Reactor Coolant System,"

Revision 9, 10/28/98, SI File No. EPRI-156-704.

6)

Nuclear Operations Training, "Auxiliary Building System AB-3, Chemical and Volume Control System," Revision 8,4/29/99, SI File No. EPRI-156-705.

7)

Nuclear Operations Training, "Auxiliary Building System AB-7,Residual Heat Removal System," Revision 10, 10112/98, SI File No. EPRI-156-706.

8)

Nuclear Operations Training, "Auxiliary Building System AB-10, Emergency Core Cooling System," Revision 8, 9/19/00, SI File No. EPRI-156-707.

9)

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, "FSAR Figures (P&IDs)," SI File No. EPRI-156-708.

10) V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, FSAR Appendix 3A (Reg. Guide 1.36 compliance), "Risk Informed Inservice Examination Program," SI File No. EPRI-156-702.

11)

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, Engineering Services Procedure ES-511, "Collection and Review of Data from the ECCS Temperature Monitoring System for Compliance to NRC Bulletin 88-08," Revision 1, 1/21/00, SI File No. EPRI-156-709.

12) E-mail from Adam R. Caban (V. C. Summer) to Scott Chesworth (SI), "FW:

Charging/Alternate Charging," Wednesday, 7/11/01 7:22AM, SI File No. EPRI-156-710.

13)

E-mail from Adam R. Caban (V. C. Summer) to Scott Chesworth (SI), 'FW: RHR system questions," Wednesday, 7/11/01 10:07AM, SI File No. EPRI-156-710.

Revision 0

S Preparer/Date STC 11/08/01 Checker/Date MT 11/08/01 I1

14) E-mail from Adam R. Caban (V. C. Summer) to Scott Chesworth (SI), "FW: Water Chemistry," Monday, 7/23/01 5:29AM, SI File No. EPRI-156-710.

15) E-mail from Adam R. Caban (V. C. Summer) to Scott Chesworth (SI), "RHR flow @ start up,"

Tuesday, 7/24/01 7:44AM, SI File No. EPRI-156-710.

16) Letter from P. J. O'Regan (EPRI) to Dr. B. Sheron (USNRC), "Extension of Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection (RI-ISI) Methodology," 2/28/01.

17) V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, Engineering Services Procedure ES-421, "Erosion/Corrosion Monitoring Program," Revision 3, 6/11/97, SI File No. EPRI-156-711.

18)

E-mail from Adam R. Caban (V. C. Summer) to Scott Chesworth (SI), "VCS Draft Degradation - Corrections!!," Wednesday, 10/31/01 7:28AM, SI File No. EPRI-156-710.

19) E-mail from Adam R. Caban (V. C. Summer) to Scott Chesworth (SI), "FW: Risk based ISI Question;;FW: VC Summer comments," Thursday, 11/8/01 4:53AM, SI File No. EPRI-156 710.

File No.

EPRI-156-330

APPENDIX A.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM WELD LIST Revision 0

VPreparer/Date STC 11/08/01 Checker/Date MT 11/08/01 File No.

EPRI-156-330 Page A-0 of A-12 OWN

C I

C APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Category Item Component ED Description NPS Wall Thk (In)

(in)

Tli Ino11 1-4100A 3,1 q**

To EL 2 3U0 Material

[

TF scc II TASCS 'T IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC Prr CC EC FAC 304N/351CF 391 1I1A10lfA 8 l I I

TOaM PIPEjru 310U 60UU 304--

NI351CV Inn it tI11 E~f I

-I--1

____I__

ELBOW TO 1113 310A 2 625 i- -

Ing, I

~

l I

IIi_

I-4 I0'A-10 mLouw iU PIPIEL 3100 2.625 B-i 09 11 1-410A. 1 PIPE TO ELBOW 3100 2625 SS B-0 B9 11 1-4100A-12 ELBOW TO PUMP 3100 2625 SS 1.I 13911 1-410OA-13 PIP TO PUMP 27.50 2375 304N/7?

B-1 B9 11 1-4100A-14 PIPE TO ELBOW 27.50 2375 SS B-J B9 11 1-4100A. 15 BINMETAL (INCONEL) 2750 2.375 SSIINCONEL WELD ELBOW TO SAFE END B-F B5 10 1.4100A. 16(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD R.V.

27.50 2.375 CSISS I T - F LOOP A INLET NOZZLE TO SAFE B-J 0B931 1 100A-ISBC i2BRANCHCONNECTIONTO 1200 2500 SS 29" PI'PE 1-1 B9 31 1-4100A-19BC 14" BRANCH (CGO1P4500) 1400 2350 304N/SA182 X

X CONNECTION TO 29" PIPE B-J B9.32 1-41UOA-2UUU o

CONNECTIOLAIULN IUTo 06o ppitP 3 *BRANLH ONNECIION TO 31" 3 0 PIPH (CAPPED I

2 500 2400 SAI82.304N B-J B9.32 1-4100A-21BC 3-BRANCH (CGE-1-4107) 300 2400 SA182-304N CONNECTION TO 31" CROSS I_"

B-J B9.32 1-4100A-22BC 2" BRANCH CONNECTION 27.5" 200 2.375 SS PIP (CAPPED)

B-I B9 31 1-4100A.23BC 4"DRANCI[CONNECTIONTO 400 2375 SS 27.5" PIPE B-1 0931 I4100A-24BC 6* BRANCHI CONNECTION TO 600 2-375 SS X

27.5" PIMP

="

B-J B9.31 1-410OA-25BC 12" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 1200 2.375 SS 27.5" PIPE B-1 B9 32 1.410OA-26BC 3" BRANCh (CGOI-4106) 3.00 2.375 SA182-304N X

CONNECHON TO 27.5" PIPE B-J B9 21 1-4100A.27 PIPE CAP TO 3"BRANCl NOZZLE 3.00 0438 SS B-1 B9 21

-410OA-28 PIPECAPTO2"BRANCHNOflLE 200 0 34 ISS B-J 0911 1-4100A-29 SAFE-4D TO ELBOW, HOT LEG 31 25 3I6/CFSA SS EPRI-156.330 Page A-i of A-12

(

EPRI-156-330 Page A-1 of A-12 H

S.

i Oi*I DW 29 00 H

-410OA-SS U*8 111 nj 1t-10lr./-

17BC*

C

(

C APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wail Thk Material TF scc LC FS Category Item ID (In)

(in)

TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-i B9.11 1.4100A-30 SA I-END TO ELBOW, COLD LEG 31 25 316/CFRA B.F B5 70 1.4100A.31(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

31 26 x

NOZZLE TO SA IE END WELD B-F B5.70 1-4100A-32(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

31 26 NOZZLE TO SAFE END WELD B-F B5.10 1-4100A-33(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

29 2.33 CS/INCONEL X

NOZZLE BUTTER WELD B.1 B9 1 I.-4100A-34(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD. PIPE 29 2.33 SS/INCONEL x

=

BUTlER WELD B-I B9.11 1-4100A-35 (INCONEL) WELD. NOZZLE-29 2.33 INCONEL-x

=

BUTrER TO PIPE-BUTLER WELD.

B-i B9 11 1.4100A. 36 PIPETO PIPE WELD 29 2.33 SS 1-F B5.10 1-4200A-I(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD R.V.

2900 2500 CS/SS LOOP B OUTLET NOZZLE TO 13.1 B9 11 2

.4200A. 2 BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

2900 1500 SS x

SAFE END TO PIPS B-J B9 11 1-4200A-3 PIPETOELBOW 2900 2500 SS B-i B9.11 1-42010A-PIPE TO ELBOW 3100 2-625 SS B-J B9139 1-4200A-9 PIPHTO1LBOW 3100 2625 SS B-i B9 12 1.4200A-10 PIPE TO LBOW 3200 2625 SS B-J B9.11 1.4200A-1I PIPETOELBOW 31.00 2625 SS B-1 39.11 1-4200A-12 ELBOW TO PUMP 3100 2625 SS B.j B19.12

.4200A-13 PIII TO PUMP 27.50 2375 SS B-J B9 21

!-4200A-14 PIPE TO ELBOW 27.50 2375 SS B-i B9 11 1-4200A. 15 fBIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

27.50 2375 SS'-,-.....

_ELBOW TO SAFE END B-F B5 10 1-4200A-16(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD. R.V.

27.50 2375 CS/SS LOOP B INLET NOZZLE TO SAFE B-i B9.31 1-4200A-17BC 6" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 29" 600 2.500 SSo o

PIPE 1-3 B9 32 1.4200A-IBBC 3"BRANCI CONNECTION TO 31" 3.00 2.625 SS PIPE (CAPPED)

B-J B9 32 1-4200A-19BC 2" BRANCll CONNECTION TO 31" 2.00 2625 304SS

=

PIPE B-J B9.32 1.4200A-2013C 2" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 200 2.375 304SS I_

27.5" COLD LEG PIP (CAPPED)

I I

EPRI-156-330 Page A-2 of A-12 m

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lPage A-2 of A-12

A EPRI-156-330

c

(

C APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material TF SCC LC FS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS 7T IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-J B9 31 1-4200A-21BC 12"BRANCH CONNECTIONTO 1200 2375 5S 27.5 PIPE.

1143 B9 32 1-4200A-22BC 3" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 3000 2375 304SS X

27.5" PIP B.J B9.31 1-4200A. 23BC 6" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 6.00 2.375 304SS X

27 5" PIP" 3-j E19 21 1-4200A-24 PIPS CAP TO NOZZLI.

2.00 0344 SS R-1 B39 21 1-420OA-25 PIPE CAP TO NOZZL.

300 0.438 SS B-E19 11 1-4200A-26 SAFE-END TO ELBOW, HOT LEG 31 215 316/CFSA B-J B9.11 1-4200A-27 SAFE-END TO ELBOW, COLD LEO 31 2.5 316/CFSA 13-F 13570 1-4200A-28(DM)

BEIMETAL(INCONEL) WELD.

31 26 x

NOZZLE TO SAlM END WELD -X 3-F E15.70 14200A-29(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

31 26 NOZZLE TO SAFE END WELD B.1 B9 40 1-4208A-I SOCKET WELD/BRANCH, 2.00 0 344 SS B-1 B9940 1.4208A. 2 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1.4208A. 3 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-J B9.40 1-4208A-4 SOCKET WELD/XVTS057B, 200 0344 SS B-1 B9 40 1.4208A-5 SOCKET WELD/XVT057B 200 0344 SS B-3 B9 40 1-4208A-6 SOCKET WELD/TEE 200 0344 SS B-J 09.40 1-4208A-7 SOCKET WELDfITE 200 0.344 SS D-J B9.40 1-4208A-8 SOCKET WELD/TEE 2 06 0 344 SS n-J B9.40 1-4208A-9 SOCKET WELD/XVTO058B.

200 0.344 SS B-F B5 10 1-4300A-l(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD. R.V.

2900 2.500 CS/SS X

LOOP C OUTLET NOZZLE TO B-1 B9 11 1-4300A-2 IMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

2900 2500 SS X

SAFE END/PIPE 11-3 B9 11 1-4300A-3 PIPE TO ELBOW 2900 2500 SS 13.1 R9 11 1-4300A-8 PEPE TO ELBOW 31.00 2625 SS B.J B9 11 1-4300A-9 PE'E TO ELBOW 3100 2625 SS EPRI.156-330 Page A-3 of A-12

(

C C

APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material I

T SCC LI Lc

!1 FS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS Tr IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-I B9 11 1-4300A-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 3100 2625 SS n.J B9.11 1-4300A-I I.PEPETOELBOW 3100 2625 SS B-J B9 11 1.4300A. 12 ELBOW TO PUMP 31.00 2625 SS B-i B9 I1 1-4300A-13 PIPE TO PUMP 27.50 2375 SS B.J B9.11 1-4300A-14 PIPE TO ELBOW 27.50 2.375 SS 1-1 B19.11 1-4300A-15 BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

2750 2375 SS ELBOW TO SAM"I END B-F B5.10 1.4300A. 16(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD. R.V.

27.50 2375 CS/SS LOOP C INLET NOZZLE TO SAFfM B-1 B9931 1.4300A-17BC 6BRANCH CONNECTION TO 29" 600 2500 SS PIPE B-j B9.31 1-4300A-18BC 12" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 1200 2.500 SS 29" PIPE I

B-3 B9.32 1-4300A-19BC 3" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 31" 300 2625

SS PIPE (CAPPED)=

1-3 E19.32 l-4300A. 20BC 2" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 31" 200 2625 SS PIPE B-i B9.31 1-4300A. 21BC 4" BRANCII CONNECTION TO 400 2.375 SS 27.5" PIPE 1-i B9 32 1-4300A. 22BC 2" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 200 2375 SS 27.5" PIPE (CAPPED)

B-i B9 31 1-4300A-23BC 12" BRANCH! CONNECTION TO 1200 2375 SS 27.5" PIPE 3.J 19 31 1-4300A-24BC 6" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 6100 2.375 SS X

27 5" PIPE 3-i B9 21 1.4300A-25 PIPE CAP TO 3" NOZZLE 300 0438 SS 1.3 B9121 1.4300A-26 PIPE CAP TO 2"NOZZLE 200 0344 SS B-3 B9.11 1.4300A. 27 SAmE-END TO ELBOW, HOT LEO 29.1 2.5 CF8/316 1-3 B9 I1 1.4300A-28 SAIE-ENDTO.ELBOW. COLDLEa 29.1 2.5 CF8/3l6 13-F B5.70 1-4300A-29(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONIL) WELD 31 26 X

NOZZLE TO SAME END WELD 1-F B570 1-4300A-30(DM) 13IMETAL ONCONEL) WELD.

31 26 NOZZLE TO SAFE END WELD -

I 13-E19 40 1-4308-1 SOCKET WELD/IALF COUPLING 200 0.344 304SS B.3 B9 40 1-4308-2 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS EPRI-156-330 Page A-4 of A-12

C

(

C7 APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material I

T SCC II C

=

FS Category Item ID (In)

(in)

TASCS T'T IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-i B39 40 1-4308-3 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 2.00 0344 SS B.3 H940 1-4308-4 SOCKET WELD/ELJBOW 200 0344 SS X

B-J B9 40 1-4308. 5 SOCKI3TWEID/ELBOW 200 0.344 SS X

B-J B9 40 1.4308. 6 SOCKET WELDMMEE 200 0.344 SS X

0-.

B19.40 1-4308-7 SOCKETE-*w I3fEE 200 0.344 SS X

B-J B9.40 1-4308-8 SOCKET WELDfUI 200 0.344 304SS X

B-J B9 40 1-4308-9 SOCKET WELDIXVT-8057C 200 0.344 304SS x

B.J 09 40 1.4308. 10 SOCKET WELD/XVT-8057C 200 0 344 SS B-0 B9 40 1-4308-I S SOCKE3T WELD/XVT-8058C zoo 0 T44' SS B-F B540 1-4500A-I(DM)

B IMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

1400 1406 SS X

x PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE B-j B9.11 1-4500A-2 BIMETAL(INCONEL) WELD.

1400 1.406 SS X

-x SAFE END TO PIPE I

B-I B9 11 1-4500A-3 PIPE TO ELBOW 14.00 1.406 SS X

X B-1 09.11 1.4500A-4 PIPE TO ELBOW 1400 1.406 SS X

X 0.3 B9 11 1-450OA-5 PIPE TO ELBOW 14.00 1.406 SS X

X B-J B9 11 1-4500A-6 PIPE TO ELBOW 1400 1406 SS X

X

.1 B0911 1-450OA-7 PIPETO ELBOW 1400 1.406 SS X

X B-J B9 11 1-450OA. 8 PIPETO ELBOW 1400 1.406 SS X

X 1-1 B 9.11 1.450OA. 9 PIPE TO ELBOW 1400 1.406 SS X

x B.J B9 11 1-450DA-10 PIPETOELBOW 1400 1.406 SS X

X B-1 B9.11 1.450OA-I1 PIPE TO 1LBOW 1400 1406 SS x

X B-i 09 11 1.450OA-12 PIPETO I3BOW 1400 1406 SS X

X B-J B9 11 1-4500A-13 PIPE TO BRANCIH CONNECTION 1400 1.406 SS x

x B-F B5.40 1-4501-I(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD 800 0.906 SS x

PRESSURIZER SAFETY NOZZLE I

M EPRI-156-330 Page A-5 of A-12

(

C 4u F

C APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Tk Material T

I SCC LC IFS-1 Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS Tr IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-B9 I9 1.4501-2 BIMETAL(INCONEL) WELD 600 0.719 SS x

SAI* END TO pIp1r1 B-J B9.11 1.4501. 3 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J B9.11 1.4501-4 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-.

39 1!

1.4501. 5 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-j B9.11 1-4501. 6 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-i B9.11 1-4501. 7 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-i B911 1-4501. 9 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B.-1 B911 1.4501-9 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J B09.11 1-4501-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J B9.11 1-4501- !1 PIPE TO FLANGB 600 0719 SS B-F7 B540 1-4501-12(DM)

BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD 800 0906 SS X

=

PRESSURIZER SAFETY NOZZLE B-J B9.11 1.4501.13 BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

600 0719 SS X-=-

SAFE END TO PIPE B-I 09.11 1.4501-14 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS I

B-i B9.11 1.4501-15 PIPETOELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J 819 11 1-4501-16 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-i B9.11 1.4501-17 P[In TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B.3 B9 11 1-4501-18 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J 89 1!

1-4501-19 PIPETO ELBOW 6.00 0719 SS B-1 19.11 1-4501-20 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719

$S B.)

B9.11 1-4501-21 PIPIITOELBOW 600 0.719 SS B-J B9.11 1-4501.22 PIPSTORFANGfl 600 0719 SS B.F B15 40 1-4501-23(DM)

BIMETAL ONCONEL) WELD.

8 00 0906 SS X

PRESSURIZER A H

I'AF NOZZLE_.

B-1 89 i!

1-4501-24 BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

600 0719 SS X-X SAFE END TO PIPB Page A-6 of A-12 EPRI-156-330

(

"C

'-C_

APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Tlik Material TF sCC LC FS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS IT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-1 13911 1-4501-25 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS 1-1 B9 11 1.4501-26 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-i B9.11 1.4501-27 PEPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-i B9 11 1.4501-28 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS 1-.

B911 1.4501.29 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS 1-1 B9.11 1.4501-30 PEPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B.3 B911 1-4501-31 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B-J B9 11 1-4501-32 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS 1.3 13911 1-4501-33 PIPE TO FLANGE 600 0719 SS B-F B5 40 1.4502. X(DM)

BIMETAL NCONEL) WELD.

8go 0906 SS X

PR*SSURtZER RELIEF NOZZLE B-1 B9 11 1.4502-2 BIMETAL (INCONEL) WELD.

600 0719 SS X

SAPE END TO PITP 11-J H9.11 1.4502-3 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS 3-J B9 i1 1-4502. 4 PIPE:TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-i B9.11 1-4502-5 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS 1-j 1911 1-4502-6 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B.J B911 1-4502-7 PIPB TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B.J B9.11 1.4502-8 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B-1 B9.11 1.4502-9 PIP TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS 1.1 B9 11 1-4502-10 PIPI TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS 13-j B9.11 1.4502-i1 PIPM TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS 13.J B9.11 1.4502-12 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B-J B3911 1-4502-13 PIPETOTEE 600 0.719 SS X

B-i B19.11 1.4502-14 PIPE TO REDUCER 600 0719 SS X

Page A-7 of A-12 EPRI-156-330

C

)

APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Category Item Component ID Description NPS Wall Thk (in)

(in)

Material TF scc I

LC LIIF TASCS Tr IGSCC TGSCC ECCC Pwrei aLSTO "rV r -u t.9 139 11.4 2PIPBTO.

0.719 S$

X 3-1 Ito Acfl

1.

F7 rMfl IV IEr.

600 X

I.

U I-fl I

I ________ I ________

PIPE TO MEi 600 0719 X

B-J B9.11 1-4502-18 PIPE TO REDUCER 600 0719 SS x

B-1 B9.11 1.4502-19 PIPE TO TEI 600 0.719 SS x

3-i B9 11 1.4502-20 PIPE TO TEB 600 0719 SS X

1-j B9 11 1-4502-21 PIPE.TO ELBoW 600 0.719 SS X

8-1 B9 11 1-4502-22 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS X

13-B911 1-4502-23 PIPE TO REDUCER 600 0.719 SS X

B9.I1 1-4503-I MIE1 TO BRANCH CONNECI ON 4.00 0531 SS 101%.

,.L rAlw%

B-J B911 1-4503-2 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS I

I I

I I3-I B911 1-4503-3 PIPi TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-J B9 11 1-4503-4 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0.531 SS B-i B911 1-4503-5 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-J B9 I1 1-4503-6 PIPETO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 B911 1-4503-7 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-i 09 11 1-4503-8 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B.1 B9 11 1.4503. 9 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-J B9.11 1-4503-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS

° B-J B911 1-4503-11 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-i 119 11 1-4503-12 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 S5 8-3 B9 11 1-4503-13 PIPE TO ELIIOW 400 0531 5S B-J B9 11 1-4503-14 PIPETO PIPE 400 0531 SS C

BJ.J I-.

LJJ I I t -*t,)v&,* Itu 0.7/19 VT*II 1-4.3UZ,= I !

EPRI-156-330 Page A-8 of A-12

(

F

(

C APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material TF SCC LC FS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS Tr IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-139 11 1-4503-15 PIPBTOELBOW 400 0531 SS

13.

B9.11 1-4503-16 PPB TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 B39.11 1-4503-17 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-J 139.11 1-4503-18 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 B39.11 1-4503-19 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 B9.11 1-4503-20 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-.

B9 11 1.4503.21 PIPE TO PIPE 400 0531 SS B-1 1391!

1-4503-22 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS 1.4 19911 1-4503-23 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-i B9.11 1-4503-24

?IPI3 TO ELBOW 400 0.531 SS B-1 19.11 1-4503-25 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0.531 SS B-1 09 11 1-4503-26 PIPI3TO ELBOW 400 0.531 SS B-1 B9.11 1-4503-27 PIPE TO ELBOW 4.00 0531 SS B-J 19 I1 1-4503-28 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 19.11 1.4503-29 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B.1 0911 1-4503-30 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 B9.11 1.4503-31 PIPE TO ELHOW 400 0531 SS B-3 B911 1-4503-32 PIPE TO VALVE (PCV.444C) 400 0531 SS B-1 B9.11 1-4503-33 PIPE TO VALVE (PCV.44C) 400 0531 SS B-1 19 11 1-4503-34 PIPB TO ELBOW 400 0.531 SS B-J B9.11 1.4503-35 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS 1-.

139.11 1.4503-36 PIPE1TO PIPE 400 0.531 SS 13-1 119.11 1-4503-37 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS X

X EPRI156-30 Pge A9 ofA-1 Page A-9 of A-12 EPRI-156-330

(

System: RCS Exam Category Category Item Component ID Description NPS Wall Thk (in)

(in)

Material TF

[i I

LC FS TASCS TT IC.SCC Tr.3*(N 1*e~ro D7p~en*.,,,-

s*,*

-450U3o 41 J-JO8WiI01 1 -4 5 0 3 - 3 8 P I P E T O

' B O W 4i 10 0 5 3 1 X

I [

o rIrli LT IL-..

'Iiw 1 IT *OI 1UW 400 400 0531 x

x 0-5 B9.11 1-450340 P

TO TEE 4

0X 1

0531 x iX L~~

i in

.I4.

L...I.___

1-453Uj-42 PP P7*

0 ELBO1UW 400 0531 x

x B-J B9 II 1-4503-43 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 05 x X

-1 1

.119 11 14 It-IL L

To ELBOW, n-.j 911 1-4503-45 BMEAL(INCONEL) WED. PIPE 4 0 0531 4S00NCONEL 5

TO SAFEET)3

!SI B5 40 400U U

031 x

x BIvMTAL (INCONEL) WELD-600 0719 CS/INCONEL x

B-P B9 11 1-4504-1 rIP TO BRANCH CONNECTION 400 0.531 SS B-J 19.11 1-4504-2 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0.531 SS B-i B9 11 1-4504-3 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS x

x B-J B9.11 1-4504-4 PIF TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-J B9 I1 1.4504-5 PIM TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 B9.11 1-4504-6 PIP TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-j B39.11 1-4504-7 PIPI3TOELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 B9 I1 1-4504-8 PIPETOELBOW 400 0531 SS 11-B9.11 1-4504-9 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 B9 11 1-4504-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-J 19 11 1.4504-11 PIPETO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-3 19.11 1-4504-12 PIPE TO Pri 400 0,531 SS B-j 11912 1-4504-13 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B.j 19 i2 1-4504-14 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS EPRT-156-330 Page A-b of A-12 APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List C

Page A-10 of A-12 CL PVIT CCl ECt F.[AC u-8

J lg n_*

n DB 11 awJS*

111 LI* I AJ *.,I.,D*¢ Wf Il-I 1-4503-46(DM}

EPRI-156-330

C C

C

)

APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wan Thk Material TF SCC LC FS Calegory Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC D-J 1B9.11 1-4504.15 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 B911 1-4504-16 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B.J 139 11 1.4504.17 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 IS 1-J 139 11 1.4504-18 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 IS B.-

B9911 1.4504.19 PTP* TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B.J B9.11 1.4504-20 PrIP TO ELBOW 400 0531 SS B-1 B9 11 1-4504.21 PEPE TO PIP1 400 0531 S

B-i 139.11 1-4504-22 PWH TO ELBOW 400 0531 5S B-3 139.11 1-4504-23 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0.531 IS 13-J B9.11 1.4504-24 PIPE'11TO VALVE (PCV-444D) 400 0.531 IS B.3 B9.11 1-4504-25 P1PH TO VALVE (PCV-444D) 400 0531 IS B-'

B9 11 1.4504.26 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0-531 IS B-B 13913 1.4504-27 PIPB TO ELBOW 400 0531 5S B-3 B9.11 1-4504-28 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 IS X

X B-J 19.11 1-4504-29 PIPE TO ELBOW 400 0531 I

x X

B-J B9.11 1-4504-30 PIPE TO TEE 400 0531 5S X

X B-3 B9 21 1-4505A. I PIPE TO VALVE (PCV.444B) 300 0438 IS X

B-3 B9.21 1-4505A-2 PIPE TO VALVE (XVG-8000B) 300 0438 IS

x.

B-J B9 21 1-4505A-3 PIPH TO VALVE (XVG-8000B) 300 0438 IS x

B-1 B9 21 1-4505A-4 PIPE TO REDUCER 300 0438 IS X

1-J B9.21 1-4505A-5 PIPE TO VALVE (PCV-445A) 300 0438 IS X

1-J E19 21 1.4505A-6 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 5S X

[1.-

13921 1-4505A-7 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS X

EPRI-156-330 Page A-11 of A-12

C I

APPENDIX A Reactor Coolant System Weld List System: RCS Exam Category Category Item Component ID Description NPS Wall Thk (in)

(in)

Material B-i 9 921 1-4505A. 8 PIPE TO VALVE (XVG-8000A) 300 0438 SS B-]

B9 21 1-4505A. 9 PIPE TO VALVE (XVG-8000A) 300 0438 SS B-i B9.21 I-4505A-10 PIPE TO REDUCER 300 0438 SS B-i B9 21 1-4505A-I I PIPE TO REDUCER 3 00 0438 SS B-I B9.21 1-4505A-12 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS f*l

~

flfqlf t A

'~

q*

SS 0-I B9 21 1-4505A-14 PIE TO VALVI (XVG-8000C) 300 0438 SS B-B B9.21 1-4505A-15 PIPE TO VALVE (XVG-8000C) 300 0438 SS B-J B9.2t 1-4505A-16 PIPETO VALVE (PCV.445B) 300 0438 '

SS TF -Thermal Fatigue TASCS - Thermal Stratification, Cycling and Striping TT - Thermal Transients I'II TUOI.LJUW SCC - Stress Corrosion Cracking IGSCC - Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking TGSCC - Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking ECSCC - External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking PWSCC - Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking 300 0438 TF CC LC IFS TASCS Tr IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC X

x w

X X

LC - Localized Co-sion IS - Flow Sensitive MIC - Micxbiologicaly Influenced Corroion EC - Erosion-Cavitation PIC - Mtting FAC - Flow Accelerated Corrosion CC - Crevice Corrosion EPRI-156-330 Page A-12 of A-12 C,

IT,&

I'q*U*

o IJ

APPENDIX B.

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM WELD LIST Revision 0

SPreparer/Date STC 11/08/01 Checker/Date MT 11/08/01 H'fe No.

EPRI-156-330 Page B-0 of B-2

C)

-(

C S)________

APPENDIX B Residual Heat Removal System Weld List System: RHRS Exam Category Category Item T-3 B921 B3-3 B9 11 B-j B3911 B-3 B9 191 B-i B9 11 Component ID 1-4102A-I 1-4102A-2 1-4102A-3 1.4102A-5 1-4102A-6 1-4102A-7 Description PIPE TO BRANCH NOZZU F.

PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO VALVE (XVG-3702A).

NIPS Wall Thk (in)

(in) 2200 1.125 1200 1.125 1200 1.125 1200 1.125 12 1.125 12 1.125 Material T

seeI LC LIF Z Ss SS SS TSS316 SS316 133 19.11 124102A-9 PPT AV (XVG04702A),

112200 1.125 JSS 3.3 j911 1-4102A-9 PIPB TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 "l.j 119 1 1-4102A-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 ss TASCS Tr X

X X

-1

1.

i L.

I I

I1 I

L ____

1-41uuj-A RI 12.00 1.125 B-3 B9.11 1-4102A-12 4PIBTO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9.11 1-4102A-13 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS 0-J 9.11I 1-4102A-14 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9 I1 1-4102A-15 PIPETO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-i B9 11 1-4102A-16 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS lY1 ii 1412UA-17 PIE "TO ULBOW 12.00 1.125 IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC

[1-1g.1 1-4102A. 18 PIPE TO ELBOW 12.00 1.125 SS B-3 139 11 1.4102A. 19 PIPETO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B.j B9.11 1.4102A-20 PIPS TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-.

B9211 1-4102A. 21 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-3 B9 11 1.4102A-22 PIPE TO ELBOW.

12.00 1.125 SS B.J B9 11 1-4102A-23 PIPS TO VALVE (XVO-8701A),

12 00 1.125 SS B-3 B9 32 1-4102A-24BC 2" BRANCI! CONNECTION TO 12" 200 0 344 SS PInM MIC PIT CC EC FAC EPRI-156-330 Page B-1lof B-2 Page o

gt l J, ll PIPE' TO ELBOW I)'J

C Weld List System: RURS Exam Category Component Category Item ID 1-.

B9 40 1.4102A-25SW 2"SoC B-J B9 32 1.4102A. 26BC 2" BRA PIPE.

[I-i B9 40 1.4102A-27SW 2rSCo Degradation Mechanisms TF - Thermal Fatigue TASCS - Thermal Stratification, Cycling and Striping TT - Thermal Transients Description NPS Wall Thk (in)

(in)

Material I TF II I

IrI I

I 0

TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC SCC -Stress Corrosion Cracking LC-Localized Corosion FS-Flow Sensitive IGSCC - Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking MIC - Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion EC - Erosion-Cavitation TGSCC -Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking PIT -Pitting FAC -Flow Accelerated Corrosion ECSCC - External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking CC - Crevice Corrosion PWSCC - Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking EPRI-156-330 Page B-2 of B.2 C )___

APPENDIX B Residual Heat Removal System "I

(

.*CC Page B-2 of B.2 II w

II

-c II EPRI-156-330

APPENDIX C.

SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM WELD LIST Revision 0

VPreparer/Date STC 11/08/01 Checker/Date MT 11/08/01 File No.

EPRI-156-330 Page C-0 of C-17

ý1ý1' omk

C C

C APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material TF I[

SCC LC L

iFS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-1 B9 11 1-4101A-I PEPETO VALVE (XVC-8956A) 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9.11 1-4101A. 2 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-1 13911 1-4101A. 3 PEPETO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS E1.1 1911 1.4101A. 4 PEP TO PEPE (SW8) 1200 1.125 SS B-i B9 11 1-4101A-5 PIPET'OELBOW 1200 1125 316/316 B.J 13911 1-4101A-6 BENT PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1125 SS B.J B9.11 1-4101A-7 PIPE TO BENT PHEP (SWI) 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9 11 1-4101A-8 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B.1 B9191 I-4101A-9 1'IPBTOELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9.11 1.4101A-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.325 SS B-1 B9.11 1.410tA-11 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-1 B9.31 1-4101A-12 PIPH TO PIPE (FW7) 12.00 1.125 SS B-1 B9.13 1.4101A-13 PIP1 TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9.11 1.4101A-14 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 3125 SS x

B-J B9191 1-4101A-15 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8948A) 12.00 1.125 SS X

B-J B9.11 1-4101A-16 PIEMTO VALVI (XVC-8948A) 1200 1325 SS B1.

B911 1-4101A-17 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B1.

B911 1-4101A-18 PIPTOELBOW 1200 1.125 SS 1-J 13911 1.4101A. 19 PIPETO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B.1 B911 1-4101A-20 ELBOWTOBRANCIINO2ZLE 1200 1.125 SS B-J B911 1.4103A-I PIPBTOVALVE(XVC-8973A) 600 0719 SS B1J B9131 1.4103A-2 PiPETO ELBOW 600 0719 SS 1-J B9139 1-4103A-3 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS EPRI-156-330 Page C-1 of C-17

APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Component Category Item ID B.

i9-11 1-4103A-4 B-J 0911 1-4103A-5 8.1 B9 11 1-4103A. 6 1-J B9 11 1-4103A. 7 B-J 19 1!

1-4103A. 8

-I 09 1 1-4103A. 9 B-J 09I1 1-4103A-10 B-J 09.11 1-4103A-II B-J B9.1I 1-4103A. 12 B.1 09.11 1-4103A-13 B-J i9 I9I

-4103A-14 0-J 09.11 1-4103A-15 W-J 89 II 1-4103A-16 B-J i9 I1 1-4104A. I B-iJ 09.11 1-4104A-2 B-I B911 1-4104A-3 0-J 0-1 89 11 B9 if 1-4104A-4 1-4104A. 5 Description PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8998A)

PIPE TO VALVB (XVC-899$A)

PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO BRANClh NOZZI.,

PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8988A).

PIPE TO ELBOW.

PIPE TO ELBOW, PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW NPS Wall Thk Material (In)

(in) 600 0719 SS 600 0.719 iS 600 0719 SS 600 0.719 SS 600 0719 SS 600 0719 SS 600 0719 SS 600 0719 3160304 600 0.719 304SS 600 0719 304SS 6.00 07-19 304SS 600 0.719 304SS 600 0719 304/376N 600 0719 SS 600 0719 SS 6 00 0719 SS 600 600 0719 0719 B-.

19.11 1-4104A-6 hPIE TO ELBOW 6 00 0.719 SS 13 91 1-4104A-7 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS FS-1-J B9 I1 1.4104A. 8 PIPETOELBOW T 600 0719 IS IB9 I1 1-4104A-9 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 I0-09!1 i-4104A. 10 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0719 SS TPsc LIIIIzzzz

=y~-

F TASCS 'TT x

x x

H X

X X

X X x IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC prr Ir Page C-2 of C-17 U-i V-J 0719 SS EP1RI-156-330 9I I

EC FAC SS

(

(-

APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall TM Material TF SCC LC IFS Category Item ID (in)

(In)

TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-J B9.11 1-4104A-11 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J B9 11 1-4104A-12 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B-J 19 i1 1-4104A-13 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J B9.11 1.4104A-14 PIPB TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS x

B-i B9 11 1-4104A-15 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS x

B-i B9 11 1-4104A. 16 PIPE TO EL1OW 600 0719 304SS X

B.-

09 11 1.4104A. 17 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8993A) 600 0.719 SS X

BJ-i 0911 1-4104A-18 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8993A).

600 0719 304 X

B-J B9 11 1-4104A-19 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 304 X

1-i B9.11 1-4104A-20 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J 13911 1-4104A. 21 PIPE TO BRANCH NOZZLE 600 0.719 304/376N 134 B9940 1.4111A-I SOCKET WELD ON VALVE XVC-200 0344 304/316 8997A B-J B9.40 1-4111A-2 SOCKET WELD ON TEE, 200 0344 SS B-i B9 40 1-4111A-3 SOCKET WELD ON TEE, 200 0.344 SS B-J B940 1-4111A-4 SOCKET WELD ON TEE, 200 0344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-411!A-5 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 2.00 0344 SS B-1 F9 40 1-4111A-6 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW.

200 0344 SS n-1 B9940 1-41iiA-7 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-i B940 1-41I1A-8 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW.

200 0344 SS B-J B940 1-4111A-9 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0.344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4111 A-10 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW.

200 0344 SS B-i 1B940 1-4111A-I!

SOCKET WELD ON COUPLNG,.

200 0344 SS J-J B9 40 1-4111 A-12 SOCKET WELD ON COUPLING.

200 0344 SS EPIII-156-330 Page C-3 of C-17

C C

)

(

APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Tlik Material TF SCC LC FS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS Tr IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-J B940 1-4111A-13 SOCKET WELD ON ELOW, 200 0344 304 B.1 B9 40 1-411 IA-14 SOCKET WELD ON ELOW.

2.00 0 344 304 13i B9 40 1-4111A-15 SOCKET WEL ON ELBOW, 2.00 0344 304 B-J B9.40 1-4111A. 16 SOCKET WELD ON ELOW.

200 0344 SS B.J B940 1.4111A-17 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 304 B-J B9940 1-4111A. 18 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW.

200 0 344 304 8.1 B9 40 1.4111A. 19 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW.

200 0 344 304 B-J B9940 1.4111A.20 SOCKET WELD ON EI.BOW.

200 0344 304 B-.

B9 40 1-411 A-21 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW.

200 0344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-41IIA-22 SOCKET WE.D ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS 13-i B9.40 1-4111A-23 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-I 1940 1,4111A-24 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0.344 SS B-1 B940 1-4IIA-.25 SOCKET WE.D ON ELBOW.

200 034" SS B-3 B9.40 1-4111A-26 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J B940 1-4111A.27 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW.

200 0344 SS B-J B9.40 i-4111A-28 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-1 B9.40 1-4111A-29 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J B39 40 1-4111A-30 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J 39 40 1-41IIA-31 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-1 B3940 1.4111 A-32 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 2.00 0344 SS B.1 B3940 1-41IlA-33 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0.344 SS B-1 B39.40 1.4111A-34 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-1 D940 1-4111A-35 SOCKET WEI.D ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS EPRI-156-330 Page C-4 of C-17

C APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: S's Deseription NPS Wall Thk (in)

(in)

SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW.

2.00 0344 SS B-1 B9940 1-4IlA-37 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW.

200 0.344 SS 13B-B940 1-4111A.38 SOCKE WPlD ON ELBOW.

200 0.344 SS B-J B9 40 1-41 IA-39 SOCKET WELD ON COUPLING, 200 0.344 SS B-3 B9.32 1-411IA-4011C 2" BRANCH CONNECTION 200 0344 SS (COUPLING) TO6" PIPE,_

B-1 B9940 1-4112A-I SOCKET WELD ON VALVE 200 0344 304S (8995A)

B-I B9140 1.4112A. 2 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0.344 304S

[-J B9140 1-4112A. 3 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 304S D-.

B9 40 I-4112A-4 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS I*qilg IMJ SUOCKET1 WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 B-J B940 1-4112A. 6 SOCKETWELDONTEE, 200 0344 4SS B.1 B9 40 1.4112A-7 SOCKET WELD ON TEK 200 0344 ISs U-J UB940 1-4112A-9 Iý11lfl Y

SOCKET WELD ON TEE, SUOCKETl WEJLDON ELOIUW, 200 200 0.344 0344 SS sS B-J B9940 1-4112A-10 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 2.00 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-411I2A-I I SOCKT~tl WELD ON HIALF 20OO 0 344 S$

jCOUPLING, B-1 11932 1-4112A-12BC 2" BRANCH CONNECTION (HALF 200 0344 SS

_COUPLING) TO 6-PIPE.

B-J v 4U 39 40 I-4113A-I CuuKLEr WELD UN VALVK 200 S9 d

1-4113A-2 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 2oo 0 344 0344 Ss SS B-J 13940 I-4113A-3 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1.4113A-4 SOCKE1T WELD ON ELOW, 200 0344 5S B-J B9140 1-4113A-5 SOCKET WELD ON ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J B9.40 1.4113A-6 SOCKET WELD ON 4 WAY, 200 0344 SS Exam Category Component Category Item ID

".'WU 1-4111 A-36 1*1"(1-10-3u I*lt°i 6

i i

i 1

C

.1 Material TF scc FLCc I

S TASCS IT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC X

SS S$

Page C-5 of C-17 L**J 1*3* q4*

U-J I1 D°J

C

_-I C

APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Description NPS Wall Thk (in)

(in)

B-i B940 1-4113A-7 SOCKET WELD ON 4 WAY, 200 0344 33 B-J 11940 1-4113A-8 SOCKET WELD ON 4 WAY, 200 0344 SS B-J B940 1-4113A-9 SOCKET WELD ON VALVE, 200 0344 SS I1.

B9 40 1-4113A. 10 SOCKET WELD ON 4 WAY, 2.00 0344 SS 114 B9 40 1.4113A-I1 SOCKET WELD ON HALF 200 0344 SS COUPLING.,

B-1 B9.32 1-4113A 12BC 2"BRANCH CONNEC10N (HALF 200 0344 SS COUPLING) TO 6" PIPE, U7J. I U-J tInB 11 1-4.01A-I 1-42U1A-2 PU'BTO VALVE (XVC-9956B) 1200 1.125 Material

[

TF I

sCC LC Q

LSS TASCS IT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC 3S I-I I-

'IPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 Ss B-i B9.11 1-4201A-3 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 5I 1200 1.125 5s B-J B19.11 1-4201A. 5 PIPE TO ELBOW.

1200 1.125 SS B1-B9.11 1-4201A-6 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9.11 1-4201A. 7 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8948B) 12.00 1.125 SS B-i 11911 1-4201A. 8 PEPI TO VALVE (XVC-89481B) 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9 11 1-4201A. 9 PIPT TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 S

B-J B9.11 1-4201A-10 PIP13 TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9.11 1-4201A. 11 PEP13 TO ELBOW 1200 1125 3$

B-i 119 It 1-4201A-12 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-J 119.11 1-4201A-13 PIPE TO BRANCH.

1200 1.125 S$

B.J R9 i9!

1.4202A. I PrirTOXVC8973H 600 0719 S3 B-1 B9.11 1-4202A-2 PIPE TO ELBOW.

600 0.719 SS 13-i B9.11 1-4202A-3 PIPE TO ELBOW.

600 0719 B-I B9 21 1-4202A-4 PIPBTO ELBOW 600 0719 SS Page C-6 of C-17 Exam Category Category Item Component ID EPR'I-156-3*30 C

D'I

7.1l i "q&U 1/*," 4 BUR*NI PEPE'l TO BENT IIPIPE n

K)

C C

APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material eTF CC I

L. c It FS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS IT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-1 139 11 1-4202A. 5 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-i B911 1-4202A-6 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-i B9 11 1-4202A-7 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B-i B9 it 1-4202A-8 PIPETOEIIBOW 600 0719 SS B-i B911 1.4202A-9 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-1 19.11 1-4202A-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B.J B9.11 1-4202A-II PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS 0-i B9.11 1-4202A-12 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J B9.11 1-4202A. 13 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0719 SS x

13-1 B9.11 1.4202A. 14 PIPE TO XVC 8998B 600 0719 SS X

x B-J B9 II 1-4202A-15 PIPIETO VALVE (XVC-8998B),

600 0719 SS X

X B-iJ B9.11 1.4202A-16 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 304/304 x

x B-.1 B9 11 1.4202A. 17 PIPE TO ELBOW 6 00 0.719 SS X

B-i B9.11 1-4202A-18 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS x

B-J B9.11 1-4202A-19 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS x

B-J B9 11 1-4202A-20 PIPiTOBRANCII, 600 0.719 SS X

B-1 B9 It 1.4203A-I pIPETO XVC8988B 600 0719 SS B-1 19 11 1.4203A-4 PIPBTOELBOW 600 0.719 SS B.J B9.11 1.4203A-5 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS 3.J 139.11 1.4203A-6 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B-J B9 11 1-4203A-7 PIPETOELBOW 600 0719 SS 1]-J 3B9 I1 1-4203A-8 PIPETO XVC 8993B 600 0.719 SS x

B-1 B9 11 1-4203A-9 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8993B) 600 0.719 304SS X

Page C-7 of C-17 EPRI-156-330

(

C APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Component Category Item ID Description NPS Wail Thk Material (in)

(in)

TF CC LC IFS TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-J B9.11 1-4203A-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS X

B-J 1B9 11 1-4203A-II PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J B9.11 1-4203A-12 PIPE TO BRANCH 600 0.719 304SS B-1 B9 40 1-4209A-13 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0344 304SS B-1 B9 40 1.4209A-14 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0 344 304SS 1.J 19 40 1.4209A. 15 SOCKET WELD/COUPIJNG, 2.00 0344 SS B-J B9.40 1-4209A-16 SOCKET WELD/COUPLING, 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4209A-17 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 2.00 0.344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-4209A-18 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW.

2.00 0.344 SS 3-J B9 40 1.4209A-19 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0.344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-4209A-20 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 2.00 0344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-4209A-21 SOCKET WEID/ELBOW.

200 0.344 5S 1-J B9 40 1.4209A-22 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0344 SS x

03.J 0940 1-4209A-23 SOCKETTWELD/BRANCIL 200 0344 304SS X

X B-3 B9 32 I-4209A-24BC 2 BRANCi CONNECTION (HALF 200 0 344 SS X

X COUPLING) TO 6-PIPE, B-J 1B940 1-420911. 1 SOCKET WELD/XVC-8997B.

200 0.344 SS 13-1 B9.40 1.4209B-2 SOCKETWEIDITEE.

200 0344 SS 1-J B9940 1-4209B-3 SOCKET WELDfIEEL 200 0344 SS 1-.

B9 40 1.420911. 4 SOCKrETw LDITEE, 200 0344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-4209B-5 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW.

200 0344 SS B1-B9 40 1-4209B-6 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0.344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-420911-7 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-420911-8 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW.

200 0.344 SS

(/

S~(

Page C-8 of C-17 EPRI-156-330

(

APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material

=TF scc LC 1FS Category Item ID (in)

(In)

TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-J B9 40 1.4209B-9 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0.344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4209B-10 SOCKET WELD/EIBOW, 200 0.344 SS B-i B9 40 1-4209B-11 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4209B-12 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0 344 SS B-1 B9940 1-4210A. I SOCKET WELD/XVC-8995B.

200 0344 SS B-J B9.40 1-4210A-2 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0 344 SS B-i B9 40 1-4210A-3 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0.344 SS B-J B940 1-4210A. 4 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4210A-5 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0.344 SS B-J B9940 I-4210A-6 SOCKET WELD/rEE, 200 0344 SS B-J B39.40 1-4210A-7 SOCKETWELD/IEE, 200 0344 SS B-i B19 40 1.4210A-8 SOCKET WELD/EE.

2.00 0344 SS

°

.-J B1940 1.4210A. 9 SOCKETWELDTOI/2COUPLINO, 200 0.344 SS X

B.i R9 32 1-4210A. 10BC r BRANCH CONNECTION(*IALM 200 0344 SS X

COUPUNG) TO 6-PIE,_,

B-J B940 1-4211A-I SOCKET WELD/XVC.8990B, 200 0344 30US B-i B940 1-4211A-2 SOCKET WELD/TEE, 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4211 A-3 SOCK1T WELD/TEE, 200 0344 SS B-J B940 1-4211A-4 SOCKET WE.D/TEE, 200 0344 SS B-J B940 1-4211A-6 SOCKETWELD/ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J B39 40 1-4211A-6 SOCKET WELD/ELmOW, 2 00 0.3"4 S$

B-I B940 1-4211A-7 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 2.00 0344 SS B-J B9.40 1-4211A-8 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0.344 SS B-i 1921 1-4211A-9 PIPE TO TEE, 200 0344 SS Page C-9 of C-17 EPRI-156-330

C APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Tlxk Material TF SCC LC FS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS r1 IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-i B9 40 1.4211A-10 SOCKET WELD/XVC-8992B.

200 0344 304SS B-i B940 1.4211A. I1 SOCKETWELD/ELBOW.

200 0344 SS 13-B0940 1-421[A-12 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J B9921 1-421IA-13 PIPE TO 71M.

200 0344 SS B-J B9.21 1-4211A-14 PIIETO TEB, 200 0.344 SS B-1 B3921 1-4211A-15 PIPETOWOL, 200 0344 SS B.-i 39 32 1-421 IA-16BC 2" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 6" 200 0.344 SS

_PIPE, B-J B9.11 1-4301-1 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-3956C) 1200 1.125 SS B-J B39.11 1-4301-2 PUE TO ELBOW 1200 1,125 SS B-J B39.11 1-4301-3 B3ENT PIPE TO ELBOW,SIH-0 160 1200 1.125 SS REMOVAL REQUIRED.

6-i B9.11 1-4301-4 PIPE TO BENT PIPE (SW I),SIn-1200 1.125 SS 0430 REMOVAL REQUIRED B-i B9 11 1-4301-5 PIPETO PIPE (FW6) 1200 1.125 SS B-i B9.11 1-4301-7 PIPE TO BENT PIPE (FW2) 12.00 1.125 SS X

B-J 13911 1-4301-8 BENT PIPE TO VALVB(XVC-1200 1.125 SS X

8948C)

B-i 1911 1-4301-9 PiPE TO VALVE (XVC.8948C),

1200 1.125 SS B-J B9 11 1-4301-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS.

4-i B9.11 1-4301-11 PIPE TOE*LBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-i B911 1-4301-12 PIPE TO ELBOW 12.00 1.125 SS B-1 19.11 1.4301-13 ELBOW TO BRANCI NOZZL, 1200 1.125 316SS B-i B911 1-4302-1 PIPE TO BRANCH NOZZLE, 1200 1.125 SS B-1 19 11 3-4302-2 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS-.

B-J B9331 1.4302-3 PIPETO ELBOW 12.00 1.125 SS B-B 19 I1 1-4302-4 PB'TOELBOW 1200 1.125 SS

(

(N Page C-10 of C-17 EPRI-156-330

C C

C APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material TF SCC

[ZILCI]

FS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS IT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-1 B9.11 1-4302-5 PIPETOEIBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-1 139 11 1.4302. 6 rPrpTOELBOW 12.00 1.125 SS X

B3-1 B9 11 1.4302-7 PIP'ETO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS X

B.

139 i1 1.4302-8 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS X

B-J B9 11 1-4302-9 PIPETO EL3OW 1200 1125 3165316 X

B-J B911 1.4302-10 PIPE TO VALVE (XVG-8702B).

1200 1125 SS X

B-1 B19.11 1-4302-11 PIPE TO VALVE (XVG-8702B),

1200 1.125 SS B-.

B9 11 1-4302-12 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 5S B-J B9 11 1.4302-13 PIPR TO ELBOW 12.00 1.125 SS B.1 B39 11 1-4302-14 PIPETO ELBOW 12.00 1.125 SS B-1 B39.11 1-4302-I5 PIPE TO ELBOW 12.00 1.125 SS-..

B-J B9 11 1.4302.16 PIPETO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS 13.J B911 1-4302-17 PWP TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-1 B9.11 1.4302-1 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B3-I B9.11 1-4302-19 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1125 SS 1-J B9 11 1.4302-20 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-1 B9 11 1-4302-21 PIPETO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-J 39 i1 1-4302-22 PIPB TO1 ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9.11 1.4302.23 PIPE TO ELBOW 1200 1.125 SS B-J B9 11 1.4302-24 PIPBTO VALVE (XVG-8701B),

1200 112S 5

5 13-J B9.32 1-4302-25BC 2" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 12" Z.00 0 344 SS X

PIPE.

B3-1 B9 40 1-4302-26 SOCKET WELD/HALF COUPLING 200 0 344 SS X

13.1 B9 32 1-4302-27BC 2" BRANCH CONNECTION TO 12" 200 0.344 SS

_PIPE_

EPRI-156-330 Page C-11 of C-17

(

C

)

S(-

APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS STF

[5 CC L1 LC J

FS_

Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-J B9,40 1-4302-28 SOCKII WELD/HALF COUPLING 200 0344 SS B.J B9 32 1.4302. 290C 2r BRANCIH CONNECTION TO 12" 200 0.344 SS PIPE B-J B9 40 1-4302-30 SOCKET WELDAIALF COUPLING 200 0344 SS B-J B9.11 1-4303-1 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8973C) 600 0719 SS 13-3 39.11 1.4303-2 PIPETOELBOW 600 0.719 SS B-J 39.11 1.4303. 3 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS TT3 09.11 1-4303-4 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-D B9 11 1-4303-5 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B.3 B9 11 1-4303-6 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B-1 0911 1-4303-7 PIPE TO EL3BOW 600 0.719 SS B-3 09.11 1-4303-8 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B-3 09.11 1-4303-9 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS B3.

B9 11 1-4303-10 PIPE'TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J B9 I1 1.4303-11 PIPE1TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-J B9 11 1.4303-12 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0719 SS B-i B9.11 1-4303-13 PIPETO ELBOW 600 0719 SS X

B-J B9.11 1-4303-14 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8998C) 600 0.719 SS X

X

.-J 0911 1-4303-15 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8998C) 600 0.719 SS X

X 13-09.11 1.4303-16 PIPE TO lBOW 600 0.719 SS X

X B-J B9.11 1-4303-17 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0719 SS X

B-3 B9.11 1-4303-1S PIPE TO BRANCH NOZZLE 6.00 0719 SS X

B-3 19 It 1.4304. 1 PIPETO BRANCI NOZZLE 600 0719 SS B-J 09 11 1-4304-2 PIPE TO ELBOW 600 0.719 SS EPRI-156-330 r'age u-IZ.1

%--I

C AVI'JIINI.JIA Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS C

)

TTT*TC NPS Wall Thk (in)

(in)

-J ii 1.434. 3 1P1PETO ELBOW 600 0,19 B9.11 Y.11 I 1-43'04-4 1-4304-6 1-4304-7 rwzH Tu VALVrE (XVC-s993C) 600 PIPE Lo VALVE (XVC-8993C)

PIPE TO ELBOW PIPE TO ELBOW 600 600 600 0.719 0719 0719 0.719 S$

SS Material TF scc LC Ps TASCS Tr IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC Xx X

SS Ss B-i 19.11 1-4304-9 jP M TOREDUcR

-0 0719 RESU UB9 4u 1-4J3'0- 1 SOCKET WELD TO VALVE (XVC-200 a99702 0344 304SS 13940 1-4309. 2 SOCKET WELD TO TEB 200 0344 Ss B-1 B940 1-4309-3 SOCKET WELD TO TEE 200 0344 SS n-1 09 40 1-4309. 4 SOCKET WELD TO TEE 200 0.344 SS B-I B9 40 1-4309-5 SOCKeT WELD TO ELBOW 200 0 344 304SS B.1 1B940 1-4309. 6 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 2.00 0.344 304SS B9 4u

'14309.- 7 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS L.

t-

I II L........JI ______

I ______

B9 40 1-4309-8 3OCTr WELD TO ELBOW 2.00 0344 Ss B.3 B9 40 1-4309-9 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-J 89.40 1-4309-10 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-1 B9.40 1-4309.11 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-J B39 40 1.4309-12 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-i B9.40 1-4309-13 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS i-J B9 40 1-4309-14 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-1 B9.40 1-4309-15 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS 13-1 1940 14309-16 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-I 1940 1-4309-17 SOCKETWE* DTOELBOW 200 0344 SS Page C-13 of C-17 Exam Category Component Category Item ID Description B-J B-1 B-J EPRI-156-330 J

B U-S Ll

. l B-j n

1-"4304'- 5 B-3 D

LIoJ

C C

APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS C

)

U'---

Exam Category Category Item Component ID Description SUSfI wr._J, U IU 1.OUW NPS Wall Thk (In)

(in) 20X0 0 344 Material TF Scc LC

_fsi 9S 134 11940 1-4309-19 SOCKET WELD TO COUPLING 200 0.344 SS B-3 B9 40 1-4309.20 SOCKET WELD TO COUPUNG 200 0.344 SS

-4.3w. 21.

SOCKIE WELLD U TOELBOW 200 0344 SS TASCS "Ir IGScC 1B9 40 1-4309-_22 SOCKET WETD TO ELOW 200 0344 1S 1J-J 0ý, qg B9 40 1-4309. 23 1-43U0- 24 SUCKEiT WELD TO ELBOW SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 200 0.344 0344

.1

!D IAfAf 1.in Al-,.

~,

II I_____I CAT JI WIM U 1UA A 200U U 344 X

B-1 B9 32 1-4309-26BC r BRANCH CONNECTION 200 0344 SS X

(SOCKOLET) TO 6-PIPE B.1 B9940 1-4310- I SOCKET WEID/XVC.8995C 200 0344 SS B-3 B9 40 1-4310. 2 SOCKET WELDIIEE 200 0344 SS B-i B9940 1-4310- 3 SOCKET WELD/TEE 200 0.344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4310- 4 SOCKET WELD)T131 200 0344 SS B-i B9940 1-4310- 5 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-J 19 40 1-4310. 6 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B*J B9 40 1-4310- 7 SOCKET WELD/BRANCH 2.00 0344 SS X

CONNECTION B-J 1B9.32 1-4310. 8BC 2"BRANCIICONNECTIJON(IIALF 200 0344 SS X

COUPIJNG) TO 6-PIPE B-i B9140 1-4311. 1 SOCKETWEID1XVCJ08C 200 0344 SS 1.3.

13940 1-4311-2 SOCKET WELDfTEE 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4311-3 SOCKET WELD/XVC 8992C 200 0 344 SS B-1 11940 1-4311-4 SOCKET WELD/TEB 200 0344 SS B-i B9140 1-4311-5 SOCKET WEUD/TEE 200 0344 SS B-1 B940 1-4311-6 SOCKET WELD/TfEE 200 0344 SS-..

EPRI-156-330 Page C-14 of C-17 Ii a-a Il VA%

Page C.14 of C-17 TASCS TT IGSCC

-J BG An

1. "..

I I

TGSCC ECSCC lower" 1-11 AJ 7 L)'J 1 wq4 U-J U7 I "at..3U **

EPRI-156-330

C C

C APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material I

TF SFCi i

i LC II

" FSLE Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS TF IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC 1.1 B9 40 1.4311. 7 SOCKET WEI.DITER 200 0344 SS B-J B940 1.4311-8 SOCKET WEIDITEE 200 0344 SS B.J B9 40 1.4311-9 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-i B9140 1-4311-10 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-I B3940 1-4311-11 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B.-

B9 40 1.4311-12 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 2-00 0344 SS B-3 B9 40 1-4311-13 SOCKET WELD/COUPLING 200 0.344 SS I-.

B9940 1-4311-14 SOCKET WELD/COUPLING 200 0344 SS B.J 19 40 1-4311-15 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-.

B9 40 1-4311-16 SOCKET WELD/EL13OW 200 0344 SS B-i B9.40 1-4311-17 SOCKET WELD/COUPLING 200 0 344 SS B

13940 1-4311-18 SOCKET WELD/COUPLING 200 0344 SS

.3 B9940 1-4311-19 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-.

B9 40 1.4311-20 SOCKETWELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-.

B9940 1-4311-21 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-J B9140 1-4311-22 SOCKETWELD/rLBOW 200 0344 SS B-i 1B940 1-4311-23 SOCKET WELD/COUPLING 200 0344 SS B-3 B9 40 1-4311-24 SOCKET WELD/COUPLING 200 0344 SS B1J 139 40 1-4311-25 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS n-.

B9.40 1-4311-26 SOCKET'WELD/EIEOW 200 0344 SS B-J 1940 1-4311-27 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-3 139 40 1-4311-28 SOCKET WELD/ELIIOW 200 0 344 SS o

B-1 D9 40 1-4311-29 SOCKETWELD/ELBOW 200 0.344 SS Page C-15 of C-17 EPRI-156-330

C

)

(

I APPENDIX C Safety Injection System Weld List System: SIS Exam Category Category Item Component ID Description NPS Wall Thk (in)

(in)

U 344 Material TV SCC LC I s TASCS IT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCer Pw*I'v

%AWilT, prl, -

I..2..0.

1 -

1 a v,,,,,

air,1 2*1 7 1-J B9 40 1-4311-30 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 B-_

B9_40 1.4311-33 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0:344 SS 1-J H9 40 1-4311-34 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 2001 0344 SS 3.J B9 40 1.4311.35 SOCKET WEED/ELBOW 200 0.344 SS rIvnti I i 1

I

-f--f ILl mOAn ILAIIIiI B9 440 U-J 37 44U 1-4.11" io 200 0 344 T

i----I-

-I-

-il J-IL

-L ____

1 ____

1-4311 -31 OUCKET W1IfD/UOUPLING 1.00 z vu 0.344 U 344 200 1-4311-32 SOCKET WELD/FLBOW 200 0344 SS B

AL

]LIiE B-i B940 1.4311-39 SOCKETWELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-1 B9940 1-4311-40 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-I B9 40 1.4311-41 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-I B9 40 1.4311-42 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-1 1B9 40 1-4311-43 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-i B9 40 1-4311-44 SOCKETWELD/IELBOW 200 0344 SS B.J B9940 1-4311.45 SOCKET WELD/EL3BOW 200 0.344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4311-46 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0344 SS 13-1 B39.40 1-4311-47 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-1 D9 40 14311-48 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 2.00 0344 SS B-J R1940 1-4311-49 SOCKET WELD/F.BOW 200 0344 SS B-J 09.40 1-4311-50 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 2.00 0.344 SS B-J 39 40 1-4311-51 SOCKET WELD/ELBOW 2.00 0344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-4311-52 SOCKETWELD/ELBOW 200 0 344 SS EPRI-156-330 Page C-16 of C-17 C

B-1 EPRI-156-330

-1 ing An it Alit 10 it--

i i

i --

H i

i I

-I-1 11 1

1 11

Jt*

Jill

lll

- --"I,.ýUw n

U'J

.Yý SOCKET~ WELD/ M-LIOW I't 4*8 rt IJJ

.Jli

--10 Page C-16 of C-17

(

(_7

.OE:_

APPENDIX C Saiety Injection System Weld List System: SIS sc 1 ý,

sFS I

L Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC IB-i H9 21 11-4311-53 PIBOEJCR2001 0344 ISS F-1 I -

I -

1 7_T F I Degradation Mechanisms TF - Thermal Fatigue SCC - Stress Corrosion Cracking LC - Localized Corosion FS - Flow Sensitive TASCS - Thermal Stratification. Cycling and Striping IGSCC - Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking MIC - Microbiologlcally Influenced Corrosion EC - Erosion-Cavitation TF - Thermal Transients TGSCC - Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking PIT - Pitting FAC - Flow Accelerated Corrosion ECSCC - External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking CC -Crevice Corrosion PWSCC -Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking EPRI-156-330 Page C-17 of C-17

APPENDIX D.

CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM WELD LIST Revision 0

VPreparer/Date STC 11/08/01 Checker/Date MT 11/08/01 File No.

EPRI-156-330 Page D-0 of D-5

C)

APPENDIX D Chemical & Volume Control System Weld List C-System: CYCS Exam Category Category Item Component ID Description MRi 10 VFALNIUAVC-8346),

NPS Wall Thk (in)

(In) 3 00 0 438 Material ITF SCC LC E

FS TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECqCC PuIw~

As' nrr 3041316

1.

II 4-41--------1 I _______

1-"4106uA, 3 P

, IP U TIELBOUW PIPEJ TO UELf*UW 300 300 0438 0.438 SS I

II 4-4f I ____

I ____

ss B-J B9121 1-4106A-4 PIPE TO ELBOW 3.00 0438 SS B-J R9.21 1-4106A. 5 PEPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS B-1 B9 21 1.4106A-6 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8379),

300 0438 SS X

B-J B9 21 1.4106A-7 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8379).

300 0438 SS X

X B-i B9 21 1-4106A-8 PiPe TO ELBOW 3f00 0438 SS X

X 1-4106A-9 PIPE1 TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS x

=. l at.U r

[.

B-i B9 21 1.4106A-10 PIPE TO BRANCII NOZZLE.

300 0.438 304M376N X

B.i B9 21 1-4107A-I PIPE TO BRANCH NOMALB 300 0438 SS B-B9921 1-4107A-2 P'IE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS B-i B9 21 1.4107A-3 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS B-J B9921 1-4107A-4 PIPE TO ELBOW 3.00 0438 SS B-i E19 21 1-4107A-5 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS D-1 B9 21 1-4107A-6 PIPB TO ELBOW 300 0.438 SS B-J B921 1-4107A-7 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS B-1 B3921 1-4107A-8 PW 1TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS X

B.1 B921 1-4107A-9 PIPIITO ELBOW 300 0438 SS x

B.1 139 21 1.4107A-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS X

B-i B1921 1-4107A-11 PIPETO ELBOW 300 0438 SS X

l-j B9921 1.4107A. 12 PIPE TO 7EE 300 0438 SS x

B-J 1B921 1-4107A-13 REDUCER TO TEE 300 0.438 SSX U

B-J A.

Inaw7 q, I

IAJ I

I nm*

J U7 J.l I'*IUU/41.

i U*J rl VT.&l l "q I UUPI*- *;

U°J 1['1 03' LI B9.21 EPRI-156-330 Page D-1 of D-5

C C

C

_)

APPENDIX D Chemical & Volume Control System Weld List System: CVCS TF E: Lc 1i7 Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material sec LC

=FS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-i B9 21 1.4107A. 14 PIPE TO TEE 300 0438 sS x

B-i B9 21 1-4107A-15 PIPB TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS X

B-1 B3921 1-4107A-16 PIPB TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS X

n-J B9 21 1.4107A. 17 PIPE TO VALVE (XVG-8085A).

300 0438 SS X

B-j B9 21 1.4107A-18 PIPE TO VALVE (XVG-8085A).

300 0438 SS X

B-J B9.21 1-4107A-19 PIPE TO VALVE (LCV-460).

300 0438 SS X

B-J B9 21 1-4107A-20 PIPE TO VALVB (LCV-460).

300 0438 SS x

B-1 B9 21 1-4107A-21 PIPE TO VALVE (LCV-459).

300 0438 SS x

B-1 B9.21 1-4110A-1 PIPE TO REDUCER, 200 0344 S5 B-i B940 1-4110A-2 SOCKET WELD - PIPE TO ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-i B940 1-4110A-3 SOCKET WELD - PIPE TO ELBOW, 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-41i0A-4 SOCKET WELD - PIPS TO VALVE 200 0 344 SS (XV -.8057A),

B-1 1940 1.4110A-5 SOCKET WELD -PIPE TO VALVE 200 0344 SS (XVO-8057A)

B-J B9340 1-4110A-6 SOCKET WELD - PIPE TO VALVE 200 0.344 SS (XVG-8058A)

B-1 B9921 1-4205A-I PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8347),

300 0438 304/316 B-B921 1.4205A-2 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS B-J 89 21 1-4205A. 3 PIPBTOELBOW 3.00 0438 SS B-i B9.21 1-4205A-4 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS B-i B9 21 1.4205A-5 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0.438 SS B-i B9 21 1.4205A-6 PIPE TO VALVE (XVC-8378).

300 0438 3041316 x

B-1 B9921 1-4205A-7 PIPETO VALVE (XVC-8378).

300 0438 304/316 X

X B-J B9 21 1-4205A-8 rim TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS x

X 1-1 j921 1-4205A-9 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS x

rag 1)-

01 ll -3 EPRI-156-330 r'age i -Z. 01 i0-3

(

C C

APPENDIX D Chemical'& Volume Control System Weld List System: CVCS TF SCC LC I

FS I

Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS Tr IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-0 B9 21 1-4205A-10 PIPE TO ELBOW 300 0438 SS X

B-i B921 1-4205A. 11 PIPETOELBOW 300 0438 SS X

B-1 B9 21 1-4205A. 12 PIPE TO BRANCH,UNDER BOOT 300 0438 304/376N X

AT WALL B-1 B9 40 1-4506A-1 SOCKET WELD TO VALVE (XVT-2.00 0.344 SS 8145) n.1 B940 1-4506A-2 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-B9940 1.4506A. 3 SOCKET WELD TOELBOW 200 0 344 SS B-i B9 40 1-4506A-4 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-j B9 40 1-4506A-5 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS U.1 B940 1-4506A-6 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 2.00 0344 SS B-1 B9.40 1-4506A-7 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-J B9,40 1-4506A-8 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B.1 B940 1-4506A-9 SOCKET WFLD TO ELBOW 200 0 344 SS B-I B940 1.4506A-10 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-i B940 1-4506A-1I SOCKET WELD TO EL13OW 200 0.344 SS B-j B9.40 1-4506A-12 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-J B940 1-4506A-13 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 2.00 0344 SS B-J B940 1.4506A-14 SOCKIT WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-1 B940 1-4506A-15 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-J B940 1-4506A-16 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-i B940 1-4506A-17 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-i B9 40 1-4506A-18 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4506A-19 SOCKET WpLD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS 0-J B9.40 1-4506A-20 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 5S EPRI-156-330 P'age D-3 or D-5

C APPENDIX D Chemical & Volume Control System Weld List System: CVCS Exam Category Category Item Component ID Description NPS Wall Thk Material (in)

(in) l TF II scc II LC IFS I TASCS Tr IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC 1.1 B9940 1-4506A-21 SOCKET WELD TO 1LM3OW 200 0344 SS 13.-

1B940 1.4506A. 22 SOCKET WELD TO COUPLING 200 0344 SS B-i B9 40 1-4506A-23 SOCKET WELD TO COUPLING 200 0344 Ss1 B-i B9.40 1-4506A-24 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-I B9.40 1-4506A. 25 SOCKEIT WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4506A-26 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0 344 SS B-I B9 40 1-4506A-27 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B.j B9 490

-4506A. 2S SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 2.00 0.344 SS B-1 B39 40 1-4506A-29 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 2.00 0344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-4506A-30 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 2.00 0344 SS B-J B39.40 1.4506A-31 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0 344 SS 13.1 B9 40 1-4506A-32 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0 344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4506A-33 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-1 B9 40 1.4506A-34 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 2.00 0344 SS-.

B-1 13940 1-4506A-35 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-1 B9940 1-4506A-36 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS 1-J D9.40 1-4506A-37 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4506A-38 SOCKETWELDTOELBOW 200 0344 SS-B-1 B9940 1.4506A. 39 SOCKETWELDTO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-4506A-40 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-1 1B9 40 1-4506A-41 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-1 139 40 1-4506A-42 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0 344 SS B-1 B9 40 1-4506A-43 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0 344 SS C

7)

C...

Page D-4 of D-5 EPRI-156-330

(

C C

APPENDIX D Chemical & Volume Control System Weld List System: CVCS Exam Category Component Description NPS Wall Thk Material TF SCC LC FS Category Item ID (in)

(in)

TASCS Tr IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC B-I 39 40 1-4506A-44 SOCKET WE.D TO ELMOW 200 0.344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4506A-45 SOCK*I'TWELD TO ELBOW 200 0.344 SS B-1 B1940 1-4506A-46 SOCKET WELD TO COUPLING 200 0344 SS B-3 11940 1-4506A-47 SOCKET WEED TO COUPLING 200 0344 SS B-J B9.40 1-4506A-48 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B.J B9 40 1-4506A-49 SOCKET WEL TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-J B9 40 1-4506A-50 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-i B9140 1-4506A-51 SOCKET WELD TO ELBOW 200 0344 SS B-J B9.4O0

-4506A-52 SOCKET WELD TO VALVE (XVC-200 0344 SS 377-B-i 1B9 40 1-4506A-53 SOCKET WEE TO VALVE(XVC-200 0344 SS X

X

~~~~~8377)

B-i 1B9.40 1-4506A-54 SOCKET WELD TO BRANCII 200 0344 304/304 X

X

_CONNETION B-. -

B9.32 1-4506A-55BC 2 BRANCII CONNECTION TO 4" 200 0.344 304/304 X

X PIPE Deeradation Mechanisms "TF - Thermal Fatigue SCC - Stress Corrosion Cracking LC - Localized Corosion PS - Flow Sensitive TASCS - Thermal Stratification, Cycling and Striping IGSCC - Intcrgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking MIC - Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion EC - Erosion-Cavitation TI-Thernal Transients TGSCC - Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking PIT - Pitting FAC - Flow Accelerated Corrosion ECSCC - External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking CC - Crevice Corrosion PWSCC - Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking Page D-5 of D-5 EPRI-156-330

APPENDIX E.

REACTOR COOLANT SYTEM DEGRADATION MECHANISM EVALUATION CHECKLISTS

Table E-1. RCS, Main Loop Piping Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

~Attributes to be Considered Jj-5][E ' J-Jf ]

Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and 0

3 1 3 31',29-and 27.5i lines TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <45o from horizontal (includes elbow 0

03 03 03 Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists forlow flow in a pipe section connected to a E l []

0 Fluid surges from pressunzer into loop A hot component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or leg; RHR return flow (non-cyclic, see Section 2)

TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flowpast a valve (i.e, in-leakage, 13 X]

n3 13 Potential irleakage from CVCS through various out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold S1 and CVCS lines into RCS, but would not fluids, or affect branch piping welds to main loop piping TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead.-ended pipe

[3 El

[]

13 sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam /water) flow, or

[3 El

[3

[]

TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder 03 0

03 0

branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with turbulent flow, and I

TASCS-4 calculated ormeasuredATT> 50°F, and 0

03 03

[] 1 Pzr line surges during normal ops and HU/CD TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 10 0

]0 10 1 For flows <332.Bgpm (HU/CD)

In conclusion, the branch connection from the loop A hot leg to the pressurizer surge line is potentially susceptible to low-flow TASCS during heatup and cooldown due to hot fluid surges from the pressurizer vessel.

TT-1-I1 operating temperature.> 270OFforstainless steel, or 0

01 []

03 617F hot legs, 557F cold and crossover legs TT-1-2 operating temperature > 22 0 °F for carbon-steel, and 03 E3 0

El potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including 77-2-1 cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or E]

03 03 03 SI actuation; RHR return; charging cold-slug TT-2-2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment and 0

0

[0 10 Restoration of charging (dbl-shock); pzr surges TT-3-1

/,dT/ > 200°F for stainless steel, or 0l 0

0 0

557F vs. 70F (SI); 350F vs. 100F (RHR); 557F vs. 120F (chg); 435F vs. 190F (Pzr surge)

TT-3-2 ldT!.> 1500F for carbon steel, or 03 0]

0 0

TT-3-3 fAT! > ATallowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)

E0 03 0

13 For flows > 58.3gpm (SI); > 62.Sgpm (RHR); >

I 15.6gpm (chg); > 1685.3gpm (Pzr surge)

In conclusion, the branch connection from the loop A hot leg to the pressurizer surge line Is potentially susceptible to TT during HU/CD. Also, the welds to the safety injection lines are susceptible to TT dunng DHR initiation and SI actuation, as are those to the charging line(s) upon flow recovery.

IGSCC-B-1 I ~~~~evaluated in accordance with existing pla nt IGSCC program per 01011 Wsol IGSCCB-1 INRC Generic Letter 88-01 ol In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

IGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon contentŽZ 0.035%6), and 0l E3 0

0 IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature.> 2000F, and 0 J3 03 0

617F hot legs. 557F cold and crossover legs IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 0 J3 13 0

Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O

10 0]

10 Primary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature s t200F, te attrbutes above apply, and o3IE 1II11 617F hot legs, 557F cold and crossover legs IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are E3E 313Primary water chemistry control

\\,ý 11 In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

E-1

~ Table E-1. RCS, Main Loop Piping (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered I

S F1 F

I Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and M

3 10 0E[

TGSCC-2 operating temperature > 150F, and 0I

[0 0 0

617F hot legs, 557F cold and crossover legs TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 0

03 03 03 Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g., fluoride orchlonde) are present, and 0[

13 10 3

Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oygen or oxidizing species are present 0

0 0

0 Primary water chem atry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

0 00 E 10 ECSCC-2 operating temperature> 150°T, and 0

0 0

03 617F hot legs, 557F cold and crossover legs ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present, and E0 03 03 03 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is within live diameters of a probable 03 0

03 03 In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that Is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenibc stainless steel, and 00 00

[]

13 ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present and 0

03 03 03 Assumption 01,ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from 03 M0 0 03 Assumption concentrated chloride beanng environments (i.e., sea water, brackish water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping material is Inconel (Afloy 600), and 0

0 10 0]

1 Alloy 182 weld metal in welds to RV and SGs PWSCC-2 exposed to pnrnmay waterat T> 570°F, and 10

[]

[0 Hot legs at 617F PWSCC-3-1 the materials mill-annealed and cold worked, or 13 1 03 Possible PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 0

C 10 03 3

Possible In conclusion, the Alloy 182 welds to the steam generators and reactor vessel In the RCS hot legs of all three loops are potentially susceptible to PWSCC, due to the fact that plant service history indicates that this material may also be affected by this degradation mechanism.

MIC-1 operating temperature <150°F, and 01 0 03 03 617F hot legs, 557F cold and crossover legs MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 03 E0 03 03 Constant high flow MIC-3 pH < 10, and 0

0]

E3 03 Possible MIC-4-1 presenceintrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water0system),

[3 El 3

[0 Primary water system or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated wilh buocides or c e

s 0

1 0]

[]

No biocides present In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

PIT-1 potentialexists forlow flow, and

[3 0 10 1E Constant high flow Pn'.2 oxygen or oxidizfng species are present, and

[3

[] 10 1[]

Primary water chemistry control PIT-3 initiating contaminants Ile g., fluoride or chloride) are present E3

[] 10 1]

Primary water chemistry control k'n conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

E-2

Table E-1. RCS, Main Loop Piping (concluded)

E-3 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered yIv No 1

/AII Remarks CCo1 crevice condition exists (CIe., thermal sleeves), and 03 Ei 03 0]

No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operabing temperature > 150 0F, and El 03 03 03 617F hot legs, 557F cold and crossover legs CC-3 oxygen or oxid"zIng species are present 03 E0 03 0]

Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0

0 10 03 I No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <250*t, and 03 0

0 03 617F hot legs, 557F cold and crossover legs E-C-3 flow present.> 100 hrs./r., and

0) 03 03 03 Constant high flow E-C_

I velocy > 30 ft.sec., and 0]

03 E0 0

E-C-5 (P,.P,) /4p <'5 0

00 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

FAC-1 evaluated in accordance wIh existrig plant FACprogram 0

0 0

0 In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.

Table E-2. RCS. Loon B and C Drain Lines (and Excess Letdown)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet N.Attributes to be Considered N /]CR F/

Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and 0

El 10

[]

2-lines TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <450 from honzontal (includes elbow 0

0 0

0l Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and I

TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a n3 0

0l 0l Loop B drain only encounters flow when RCS component allowing midng of hot and cold fluids, or Is drained during an outage; loop C drain also encounters high flow when excess letdown is used near the end of plant heatup TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (l.e., in-leakage, El 0 El El out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe El 0

0 El sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or n

0

[]

0 TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration Into a relatively colder 0

0 El El Turbulence penetration active In region branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with between 5 and 25 pipe diameters off RCS turbulent flow, and III TASCS-4 calculated or measured AT.> 50°F, and 3

El El El Unlikely for loop B (shor, Insulated run to first closed valve); possible for loop C (longer runs)

TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 El El 0 El Not relevant for TASCS-3-5 In conclusion, the excess letdown line Is potentially susceptible to turbulence penetration-driven TASCS In all horizontal piping between 5 and 25 pipe diameters from the loop C crossover leg during normal operations.

7-1-1 operating temperature > 270°F for stainless steel, or 0

El El El 557F near RCS crossover legs TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220°F for carbon steel, and El El El 0

potential for relatively rapid temperature changes Including TT-2-1 cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or El 0

El El TT-2-2 hot fluid injection Into cold pipe segment, and I[]

13 El El Initiation of excess letdown In loop C drain line TT-3-1

/T1T/> 200°F forstainless steel, or 0El El E3 l

557F RCS fluid into lines at 120F (ambient)

TT-3-2

/4T/ > 150°F for carbon steel, or E3 [3 E3 El TT-3-3 fAT!.>,Tallowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon) 0] 1]

El El Forflows > 15.3gpm In conclusion, the excess letdown line is potentially susceptible to TT when excess flow is Initiated (near the end of plant heatup or when normal letdown is unavailable) due to hot RCS fluid entering remote portions of the fine previously ait containment ambient temperature.

IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant lGSCC program per l El I Jl I

El 1[]IBWRs only NRC Generic Letter 88-01I I I I In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

IGSCC-P-1 austenidc stainless steel (carbon content Ž 0.035%), and M

El El El IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature> 200°F, and El El El E3 557F near RCS crossover legs IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and

[]0 El El Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present E0 El j E Primary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <2000F, the attributes above apply, and 13 r

13

[3 No oxygen present IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluonde or chloride) are 13 EM E3 1[]

Primary water chemistry control also required to be present t IIn conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping E-4

Table E-2. RCS, Loop B and C Drain Lines (and Excess Letdown) (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered U

rU" II ii Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0l 0

0 0

TGSCC-2 operating temperature> 1500F, and El 0 13 0

3 557F near RCS crossover legs TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 0l 0

0 0

Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present, and 03 0I 0

[0 Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 03 0

3 0

03 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

13 0

10 ECSCC-2 operating temperature> 150F, and 0]

03 0

0 557F near RCS crossover legs ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present, and

[ X El 0 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is w7thin five diameters of a probable 0

0l 0

0 In compliance leak path (e.g, valve stems) and Is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not In compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenitic stainless steel, and

[]

03 0

E3 ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present, and 0

0 03 03 Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from 0

[]

n 03 Assumption concentrated chlonde beanng environments (Le., sea water, brackish water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping material is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 0

0l 0

0 No Inconel present PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary water at T> 570°F, and 13 0l 0

03 557F near RCS crossover legs (max.)

PWSCC-3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or

[]

3 E

01 PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 1

-0

[] 10 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 150TF, and 0

0 0

03 Possible between valves MIC-2 low orinternmttent flow, and 0

03 0

03 Used Intermittently MIC-3 pH< 10, and M0 0

0 03 Possible MIC-4-1 presenceAntrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

0 E0 03 03 Prinmary water system or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated with biocides El 3

0 0 0 0 No biocides present In conclusion, while the potential for MIC cannot be precluded in the drain lines based upon a strict application of the EPRI criteria, plant service history and industry expenence indicates that it would not be a potential degradation mechanism in this piping.

PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and 0

0 0

01 Typically stagnant PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and

!0 M 0

13 1l Primary water chemistry control PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

o 0 1 1 Primary water chemistry control

<2 E-5 m

Table E-2. RCS, Loop B and C Drain Lines (and Excess Letdown) (concluded)

E-6 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered

"- IC NIA Remarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (Ie., thermal sleeves), and 13 11 J3 13 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature.> 150*"F, and 1N]

3 3 E3 557F near RCS crossover legs CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present E1 El 0 El Pnmary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping E-C-1 cavitation source, and

[3El 3

03 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <2500F, and El El E3

[]

Possible between valves E-C-3 flow present.> 100 hrs4r., and E3 l

3 El 0 3

E-C-4 velocity > 30 ftJsec., and El

[ 0 0

El E-C-5 (P, - P') /,P <5 1-10 E

0 13 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping FAC-1 evaluated in accordance with existingplant FAC program El3 1 W 10 E* -

I In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

Table E-3. RCS, Pressurizer Safety Valve Lines Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered 1 NO 1N/C M/A Remarks TASCS-1 nps.> 1 inch, and 0

rl 03 1E 6-lines TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <450 from honzontal (includes elbow 10 0 1l 0l Honzontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a

]El 0 E E3 No 'low flow, conditions encountered component allowing mixng of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, n0 IM 3

E3 out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe 03 0]

3 3

sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or 3El 0 3

E E3 Steam/condensate interface, but no flow TASCS-3-5 poteuitial exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder

[3El E3 0

3 branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with turbulent flow, and TASCS-4 calculated or measureddT> 50T, and E3

[]

0 0

TASCS-5 Richardson number>4.0 El El 0

0 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

TT-I-1 operating temperature > 270°F for stainless steel, or El El I

C3 653F steam near pressurizer TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220F for carbon steel, and E3 03 3 El0 potental for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold flud injection into hot pipe segment, or El 3

I 0

TT-2-2 hot fluid injecton into cold pipe segment, and E3 0 El Only in very unlikely case of significant overpressure event, in region beyond vertical drop TT-3-1

/[TI,> 200OFforstainless steel, or 0

El 0

TT-3-2 16T/ > 150-F for carbon steel, or 0"

0 0

I TT-3-3

,dT/>,T allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon) 0 E0 0

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

IGSCC-B-1 Ievaluatedin accordance with existing plant IGSC.Cprogram iper 10 10 10 10 1IBWRs only NRC Generic Letter 8-0 I I In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

IGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon contentZO.035%), and 0

0 0 10 1 IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature

-200F, and El 0

0 653F steam near pressurizer IGSCC-P-3 jtensile stress (icluding residual stress) is present~ and 0

0l 0l 11 Assumption IGSCC-P-4, oxygen or oxidling species are present D

0 0 E 10 Primary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <2000F. the attnbutes above apply, and EI 0 1 653F steam near pressurizer, no oxygen IGSCC-P-6 initatng contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride or chlotide) are 0

1 0j Primary water chemistry control 41 also required to be present In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-7

Table E-3. RCS, Pressurizer Safety Valve Lines (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No Attributes to be Considered M/ A Remarks TGSCC-1 austendic stainless steel, and E0

]

[] 0

]

TGSCC-2 operating temperature > 1500F, and 0

0 0]

C]

653F steam near pressurizer TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 0

C]

0

]

[]

Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present, and 0] 1 E

]

C]

Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxicizing species are present

[] 10 1] 1]

Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping ECSCC-1 austenitc stainless steel, and 0

13 1] 10 ECSCC-2 operating temperature > 1500F, and E0 C]

E]

C]

653F steam near pressurizer ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present and E

[]

C]

I" Assumptbon ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable 3] 0 0]

0]

In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenitic stainless steel, and E0

[]

3] 1]

ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present and 0

0 3]

C]

Assumption lECSCC-7 an outside piping surface Is exposed to wetting from

]

El

[]

E3 Assumption concentrated chloride beanng environments (I.A, sea water, brackish water or bnne)

In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping material is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 10 1C] 1o 113 Alloy 182 weld metal (nozzle-to-SE welds)

PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary waterat T> 570TF, and m I r-3]

j3E 653F steam near pressurizer PWSCC-3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or 0

[]

C]

[3 Possible PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 1l 0 13

[3 Possible In conclusion, the Alloy 182 nozzle to safe-end welds In the pressurizer safety valve lines are potentially susceptible to PWSCC, due to the fact that plant service history indicates that this material may also be affected by this degradation mechanism.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 150"T, and C

[]

- []

C]

653F steam near pressurizer MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and E0 C]

[]

3] Intermittent flow MIC-3 pH <10, and l

E]

D]

C]

Possible MIC-4-1 presencefntrus/on of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

3] 0 03 C]

Primary water system or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated with biocides 10 C13] []

[]

No blocides present In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and 0

3] [] 1]

Used Intermittently Pn'-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and C

[]

C]

Primary water chemistry control PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e.g, fluoride or chloride) are present C]3 1

[] 1]

Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-8

Table E-3. RCS, Pressurizer Safety Valve Lines (concluded)

,iw%

E-9 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Consdered 1

1emarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (i.e., thermal sleeves), and 0

El 03 03 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature > 1500F, and 0

03 13 03 653F steam near pressurizer CC-3 oxygen or oxidinng species are present 0

E] [0 0

Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0

0M 03 0

No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <250*F, and 3

El E3 00 653F steam near pressurizer E-C-3 flow present > 100 hi.sy*., and 0

03 E0 0

E-C-4 velocay > 30 ft/sec., and 00 00 El 1

E-C-5 (PMd-P) lAP <5 03 03

[]

03 In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.

nFAC-1 I evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program 0

0 0

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

ý'ý I

Table E-4. RCS, Pressurizer Relief Valve Lines Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered Ye t II N, I*C N IA Remarks TASCS-1 nps >1 inch, and 0

03 03 03 6" and 3" lines TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <450 from horizontal (includes elbow E0 03 0

0 Horizontal runs or tee Into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a 0

0E 0 03 Some condensate will form, but will not be at component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or significantly different temperature than steam TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flowpast a valve (i.e., in-leakage, 03 E0 0

03 Condensate past down vertical drop should out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold prevent steam leakage through PORVs fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-endedpipe 03 El 0

0[

Run to vertical drop will be convectively heated sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or from pressunzer, but non-cyclic (see Section 2)

TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or 0

El 03 03 Steam/condensate Interface, but minimal flow TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder 03 E0 03 0

branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with turbulent flow, and TASCS-4 calculated or measured4T> 50-F, and 03 13 0

0 0

TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 03

[3 0] 1 E In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

TT-1-1 operating temperature > 2700F for stainless steel, or 01 0 0

0]

653F from pressurizer to first vertical drop T77-1-2 operating temperature > 22O 0 F forcarbon steel, and 0

0 0 i potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or 03 I0 0

0 TT-2-2 hot fluid injection Into cold pipe segment, and 0l 0 0

03 Overpressure event, beyond drop (condensate)

TT-3-1

,AT/ > 200F forstainless steel, or 0]

E0 0 0

Possible TT-3-2

/MT/ > 150F for carbon steel, or 03 0

03 0l TT-3-3

/AT />4T allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon) 0I 0l

[]0 03 For flows> 47.7gpm (6");> 19.1gpm (3")

In conclusion, the pressurizer relief valve lines are potentially susceptible to TT during an overpressure event, when pressurizer steam enters the lines beyond the first vertical drop, which are filled with condensate at a significantly lower temperature.

lGSCC-B-1I evaluatedin accordance with existing plant IGSCCprogram per 1* 10 0

0 BWRs only NRC Generic Letter 88-01 I

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

IGSCC-P-1 austeritfic stainless steel (carbon content-> 0.035%.), and 0l1 [3 10 03 IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature.> 2000F, and 0l 0

0o 0

653F from pressurizer to first vertical drop IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and E

0 0

Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0 I 0

1 0

Pnmary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200F, the attributes above apply, and 0

El 0 3n 653F near pressurizer, no oxygen present IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are also required to be present

,i conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping 1

1 00 Primary water chemistry control E-1O m

Table E-4. RCS, Pressurizer Relief Valve Lines (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

I Attributes to be Considered IF Fvc[JA/11 Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and El E3 E3 E3 TGSCC-2 operating temperature > 1500F, and 0

E3 E3 E3 653F from pressurizer to first vertical drop TGSCC-3 tensile stress (includng residual stress) is present, and El [3 E3 E3 Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g., fluoride or chlonde) are present, and E3 El E3E i Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0

0 El 0

Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0l 0 03 El ECSCC-2 operating temperature > 1500F, and 0I 03 0

0 653F from pressurizer to first vertical drop ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present and El D 03 13 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable 03 0

03 03 In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not In compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 L!

OR ECSCC-5 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

03 03 E3 ECSCC-6 tensile stress Is present, and EM 03 0

13 Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from E

E 0

1 Assumption concentrated chloride beanng environments (i.e., sea water, brackish water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.

PWSCC-2 exposed toprimaq waterat T> 570°F, and El 130 El 653F from pressurizer to first vertical drop PWSCC-3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or I 0[] 0 I

I PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 0

El 13 0 0 In conclusion, the Alloy 182 nozzle to safe-end weld in the pressurizer relief valve line is potentially susceptible to PWSCC, due to the fact that plant service history indicates that this material may also be affected by this degradation mechanism.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 150 0F, and 0 10 E

0 Unlikely even beyond first vertical drop MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 0 0 0

El Intermittent flow MIC-3 pH < 10, and 0rl El E l Possible MIC-4-1 presence/intrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

3E '1 0 E

Primary water system or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated with biocides 0

0

[

3 E

E No biocides present In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.

PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and 0El El ElC Used Intermittently PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and E

El 0 1 El Pnmary water chemistry control PIT-3 inttiating contaminants (e.g, fluoride or chloride) are present E3 0 El El Pnmary water chemistry control "In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping E-11 a

Table E-4. RCS, Pressurizer Relief Valve Lines (concluded)

E-12 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Attributes to be Considered

,es NO t/c Remarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (i.e., them7al sleeves), and 3

010 10 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature.> 1500F, and 0

0 0

0 653F from pressurizer to first vertical drop CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0

0 0

[

Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0

0l 3

01 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <2500F, and 3El 0 3 I El Unlikely even beyond first vertical drop ElC-3 flow present.> 100 hrslyr., and 0

0 0 0l E.C-_

velocity > 30 ft/sec., and 0

n lElO E-C-5 (Pd - Pd) AP <5 1

03 03 0 0

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

nAC-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant FACgprogram 0 1 0

0 In conclusion, this mechanism is riot active In this piping.

Table E-5. RCS, Pressurizer Spray Lines Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered

-I rs N

iJ AJ Remarks TASCS-1 nps > l inch, and.l 1l 13 1n 4"lines TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <45° from honzontal (includes elbow El 1l 13 1l Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a El 13 13

[]

2gpm total spray bypass flow during normal component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or operations TASCS-3-2 lotentral exists for leakage flow past a valve (1 e., in-leakage, 0l E-E3

[3 Potential inleakage from aux spray line during out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold normal ops; however, since normal spray fluids, or bypass flow is at a low flowrate, their Interaction would be non-cyclic and not a TASCS concern TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe

[]

El

[]

sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or El E3 rl E3 Steam/condensate mixing to first vertical drop TASCS-3-5 potential exists forturbulent penetration into a relatively colder El El 13 13 branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with turbulent flow, and TASCS-4 calculated ormeasuredAT> 50F, and El 13 E3 [3 557F spray bypass flow vs. 653F pzr steam TASCS-5 Richardson number>4.0 0

3 1 1 E[] VFor flows < 109gpm In conclusion, the pressurizer spray line is potentially susceptible to low-flow driven TASCS during normal operation due to the 2gpm spray bypass flow from the cop A and C RCS cold legs mixing with steam in the region near the pressurzer vessel.

O 7TT-1.1 operating temperature.>270°F for stainless steel, or El 3

1 0 0 653F near pressurizer;, 557F remote from pzr TT-1-2 operating temperature > 2207F for carbon steel, and 0l 13 0

El potential for relatively rapid temperature changes Including TT-2-1 cold fluid Injection Into hot pipe segment, or El 0l E3

[

3 Aux spray actuation during cooldown 77"-2,2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and El E3 I3 E3 Steam recovery following an auxiliary spray I event (double-shock)

TT-3-1

/AT/ >200°Fforstainless steel, or El 0l E3 E3 Procedurally limited to 320F TT-3-2

/,dT/ >150OF for carbon steel, or 13 E3 13 El TT-3-3 IATI > ATallowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)

I l E3 0 1 For flows > 23.6gpm In conclusion, the pressurizer spray line Is potentially susceptible to TT during heatup and cooldown, when auxiliary spray flowing through the spray lines encounters steam near the pressurizer vessel.

IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per 1 13 03 El BWRs only INRC Generic Letter 88-0 1 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piplig.

IGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon content Z0.035%), and rlEl 0 J3 E IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature > 2000F, and El E3 0 El 653F near pressurizer; 557F remote from pzr IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and El 0

E3 13 Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizng species are present

[3 El El ID Primary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <2000F, the attnbutes above apply, and 3

Elevated temperatures; no oxygen present IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are

[3 El 3

[]

Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

E-13

Table E-5. RCS, Pressurizer Spray Lines (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered IFT..[ iL'

]f¢ Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

"1 0" 0

TGSCC-2 operating temperature > 1500F, and El 1 E3 E3 653F near pressurizer, 557F remote from pzr TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 0

E3 E3 E3 Assumption..

TGSCC-4 halides (e g., fluoride or chloride) are present, and E3 0 El En Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidizing species are present E3 0 El E3 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

13 El 13 ECSCC-2 operating temperature> 1500F, and 0 El E3

[]

653F near pressunzer, 557F remote from pzr ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present, and 0 El 0 0

E Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is "Athin five diameters of a probable E3 El El In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

El 13 13 ECSCC-6 tensile stress Is present, and 0El 13 El1 Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from El0 El E3 Assumption concentrated chloride beanng environments (i.e., sea water, brackish water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

PWSCC-i piping material is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 0

13 El 13 Alloy 182 weld metal (nozzle-to-SE welds)

PWSCC-2 exposed to primary waterat T.> 5706F, and 0I 0 El E

653F near pressurizer PWSCC-3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or 0

El El

[]

PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief

[0 El El El In conclusion, the Alloy 182 nozzle to safe-end weld in the pressurizer spray line Is potentially susceptible to PWSCC, due to the fact that plant service history indicates that this material may also be affected by this degradabon mechanism.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 1500F, and 3E 0

[3 El 653F near pressunzer, 557F remote from pzr MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 0

13 El El Constant 2gpm (total) spray bypass flow MIC-3 pH <'10, and 0

El E3

[3 Possible MIC-4-1 presenceintrusion of organic matenal (e.g., raw water system),

El 0

El El Pnrmary water system or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated with biocides I

El E3 El No biocides present In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping PIT-3 potential exists for low flow, and 0

El El El Constant 2gpm (total) spray bypass flow LPIT.-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and E 0 E

l El0 Primary water chemistry control PIT_3 initiating contaminants (e g., fluoride or chloride) are present E 0 El El0 Primary water chemistry control P6n conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-14 m

Table E-5. RCS, Pressurizer Spray Lines (concluded)

E-15 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet NO.

Attributes to be Considered S

H E

[

N/

Remarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (Le., thermal sleeves), and El 03 3

E3 Thermal sleeve on pressunzer spray nozzle CC-2 operating temperature.> 150°F, and El E3 0l 03 653F near pressuntzer;, 557F remote from pzr CC-3 oxygen or oxidi.ng species are present 03 0

0 13 Pnrmary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0

03 0

013 Pressurizer spray bypss valves (downstream)

E-C-2 operating temperature <250°, and 0

El 0

03 653F near pressurizer;, 557F remote from pzr E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs./yr., and 0

03 0

03 E-C-4 Inlocty> 30 ftsec., and co nl l us igpm flow per line dunong normal operations E-C-5 (P, - P,) /,dP < 5 13

[]

[3

[,]3 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

In conclusion. this mechanism Is not actie In this piping.

Table E-6. RCS, Pressurizer Surge Line to Loop A Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet NO.

Attributes to be Considered Remarks TASCS-1 nps> 1 inch, and 111 13 3

14"lne TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <45° from horizontal (includes elbow E

]

] 0 0

Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a El 3

3 0 Surges between loop A RCS hot leg and pzr component allowing mixng of hot and cold fluids, or vessel during normal ops and HU/CD TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flowpast a valve (ie., In-leakage, 03 l 0 3

out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe 0

E 0

03 sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or 03 0

3 0

TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder 0

0 0

0 branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with turbulent flow, and TASCS-4 calculated or measuredAT.> 500F, and E0 3

[ 0 Pzr line surges during normal ops and HU/CD TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4 0 0

0 0

For flows < 332.agpm (HU/CD)

In conclusion, the pressurizer surge line is potentially susceptible to low-flow TASCS dunng heatup and cooldown due to hot fluid surges from the pressunzer vessel and cold fluid surges from the hot leg.

7--1-1 operating temperature > 270F for stainless steel, or El 03 0

E]

Average line temperature of 635F TT-1-2 operating temperature > 2207F for carbon steel, and E3

[]

0 0

potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold fluid Injection Into hot pipe segment or 0

3 0

0 Surges from hot leg to pressurizer vessel TT-2-2 hot fluid Injection into cold pipe segment, and 0

3 I 0

Surges from pressurizer vessel to hot leg TT-3-1 IATI > 200°F for stainless steel, or E

0 0

E Dunng heatup/cooldown only (435F vs. 190F) 77-3-2

/,T/ > 150-F for carbon steel, or 0

0 E

0 TT-3-3

/4T1>,dT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)

E

]

0 0

For flows > 1685.3gpm In conclusion, the pressurizer surge line Is potentially susceptible to TT during heatup and cooldown due to hot fluid surges from the pressurizer vessel and cold fluid surges from the hot leg.

ISCB1Ievaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per 0

13NR Genr3 Lete 88-01M I BWRS only In conclusion, this mGeneitctLeiserpi8-01 In conclusion, this mechanism Is riot active In this piping.

IGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon contentŽ0.035%),and M 0 T l

0 IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature>200,F, and 0 J3 E

03 Average line temperature of 635F IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (incluLing residual stress) Is present, and El 3o E3 03 Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O

El m 0.13 Primary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200°F, the attributes above apply, and 3

El 13 1 E3 Average line temperature of 635F; no oxygen IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are 0

IM 1 0 1]

Primary water chemistry control I

L also required to be present n conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

E-16

Table E-6. RCS, Pressurizer Surge Line to Loop A (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered V- ] E MI"A[l*

Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitc stainless steel, and El o

0 10 TGSCC-2 operating temperature > 150/F. and 0

13 13 E3 Average line temperature of 635F TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) Is present, and El E3 0

0 Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e g., fluoride orchlonde) are present, and 0]

E0 13

[3 Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 7

t 0 E[ [

l Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0El 13

[]

ECSCC-2 operating temperature.> 150TF, and 0

0 0

El Average line temperature of 635F ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present and El 0

E 3 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable 00 El E l In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 Jaustenitic stainless steel, and 0 J3 El 3 0 ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present, and 0

El ID E

Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from 13 10 13 13 Assumption concentrated chloride bearing environments (i.e, sea water, brackish water or bfine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping ma terial is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 0

El El E

Alloy 182 weld metal (nozzle-to-SE welds)

PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary waterat T> 5700F, and 0 El El El Average line temperature of 635F PWSCC-3-1 the material is mitl-annealed and cold worked, or 0

E3 E3 El PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 171 E3 El

[

In conclusion, the Alloy 182 nozzle to safe-end weld In the pressurizer surge line Is potentially susceptible to PWSCC, due to the fact that plant service history indicates that this material may also be affected by this degradaton mechanism.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 1504F, and El 0

El 0

Average line temperature of 635F MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 0l 0

El El Possibility of low flow MIC-3 pH <10, and 0 E El 0

Possible MIC-4-1 presence/intrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

3El 0 El E

Primary water system or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated with biocides El El E]

l]

No biocides present In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

PIT-2 potential exists for low flow, and 0El E3 l

El Possibilrty of low flow PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and 13El 0 ElE Primary water chemistry control PIT-Iinitiating contaminants (e g., fluoride or chloride) are present 3 El 0

0 Primary water chemistry control I In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-17 m

Table E-6. RCS, Pressurizer Surge Line to Loop A (concluded)

K>

E-18 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet o.Attributes to be Considered YtS RCNARemarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (iLe., thermal sleeves). and 0

03 03 10 1Thermal sleeves on both ends of surge line CC-2 operating temperature > 150TF, and El 03 03 13 Average temperature of 635F CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present E3 E0 E3 1 03 Prmary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 03 - 0 0

03 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <250TF, and 0

0 03 03 Average temperature of 635F E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs.yr., and 03 0

E1 0

E-C-4 velocity > 30 fl/sec., and 0

0 0

El 1 0 E-C-5 (Pd-P,)/4P<5 03 0 01 0 1

1 In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

FAG-i evaluated in accordance th existing plant FAC program 01l 10 0 1 0 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

APPENDIX F.

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYTEM DEGRADATION MECHANISM EVALUATION CHECKLIST Revision 0

VPreparer/Date STC 11/08/01 ChezkerlDate MT 11/08/01 File No.

EPRI-156-330 Page F-0 of F-3

\\K2?0%

Table F-1. RHRS, Residual Heat Removal Lines (Loops A and C)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered Y

ijo j c N/A Remarks TASCS-1 nps >linch, and I

0 ID El 12'lInes TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <45° from honzontal (includes elbow 0

n3 0 -1 Horizontal runs or tee Into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a E

1 0 I El Possible at the onset of DHR operations; not component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or considered a cyclic condition (see Section 2.0)

TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (C.e., In-leakage,

[]0 El I E

Potential for leakage through the packing gland out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold of valves XVG-8702A/B into leak-off lines; fluids, or cyclic due to valve seat expansion/contraction TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-endedpipe El 0I l

13 NOTE: Locations In the RHR suction lines are sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or currently being monitored for thermal fatigue concerns in response to bulletin 88-08 TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or

] 0 El E 3 TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration Into a relatively colder 0 El []

0 Potential for turbulence penetration from loop A branch pipe connected to headerpiping containing hot fluid with and loop C hot legs to horizontal runs between turbulent flow, and 5 and 25 pipe diameters off the RCS TASCS-4 calculated or measuredaT> 500F, and 0

[3 In E3 Possible TASCS-5 Richardson number.> 4.0 D

E3 [3 I 3

For flows < 2145.1gpm (rASCS-3-2)

In conclusion, the RHRS residual heat removal lines are potentially susceptible to turbulence penetration-drnven TASCS In the horizontal runs between 5 and 25 pipe diameters off the loop A and loop C hot legs during normal operabons. They are also susceptible to valve-leakage TASCS.

7"-1-I

-operating temperature >270°F forstainless steel, or 0 El El 10 1

617F normally; 350F at the onset of DHR ops.

TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220°F for carbon steel, and

[3

[]

El I

potential for relatively rapid temperature changes includng TT-2-1 cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or

[E 0

E El TT-2-2 hot flud injection Into cold pipe segment, and 0]El l

E l At the onset of DHR operations TT-3-1

/AT/1>200Fforstainless steel, or 0

[]

El El 350F RCS fluid into ambient lines at 10OF TT-3-2 IATI > 150°F tor carbon steel, or

[]

El E

[ 0 7T-3-3 IAT! > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)

El

[El. E l Only for flows > 1776.3gpm In conclusion, the RHRS residual heat removal lines are not potentially susceptible to TT at the onset of DHR operations since the initial flowrate Is 1500gpm (max), which is insufficient to result In a TT to these lines.

IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per I1E l

1 l0 l 0 BWRsonly INRC Genenic Letter 88-01 I I I I,.....,...,,.j..,,,n

i nnt

.th, In thk nininri HI W I.4UOIfl

I,

rr U-IGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon contentŽ 0.035%), and 0

El El El IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature >200OF, and 0

E El El 617F near RCS; 12OF remote from RCS IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and r0El El3 E l Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present El]i 0 El E l3 Primary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thlosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are

[3 0

[] 13 Primary water chemistry control n

also required to be presen t in conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

F-1

Table F-1. RHRS, Residual Heat Removal Lines (Loops A and C) (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

][

Attributes to be Considered

-1[AV~N/]

Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

0 0

[]

TGSCC-2 operating temperature> 150OF, and 0

E3 3 10 617F near RCS; 120F remote from RCS TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present and 0

0l 1

03 Assumption..

TGSCC-4 hahdes (e.g, fluonde or chloride) are present, and 03

[] '3 0[

Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidczing species are present

[]

M

[1 n Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

30 Dl ECSCC-2 operating temperature > 1500F, and 0

03 3

E 3

617F near RCS; 120F remote from RCS ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present, and 01 03

[3 E3 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable 03 0l 03 03 In compliance leak path (e.g., valve sterns) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenittic stainless steel, and 0]

0 03 0

ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present, and 0

El E3 [3 Assumptbon ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from 13 El 0 3

0 3

Assumption concentrated chlonde bearing environments (i.e., sea water, braclksh water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping matenal is Inconel (Alloy 600), and E3 0 El El No Inconel present PWSCC-2 exposedto primary water at T7> 570*F, and El []

0 E

617F near RCS; 120F remote from RCS PWSCC-3-1 the material is mil-annealed and cold worked, or E3 0 0

El PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief E3 0

El

_3 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 150°F, and 0M 03 0

El 617F near RCS; 120F remote from RCS MIC-2 low or Intermittent flow, and E

0 El 0

Used Intermittently MIC-3 pH <10, and 1@

0 03 El Possible MIC-4-1 presenceintrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

03 0M El El Primary water system or MIC-4-2 water source Is not treated with biocides 0I I

0 0], No biocides present In conclusion, while the potential for MIC cannot be excluded in the residual heat removal lines based upon a strict application of the EPR! crftena, plant service history and Industry expenence indicates that it would not be a potential degradation mechanism in this piping.

PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and 0

El 0 El Low flow at onset of DHR operations PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and 0

0 0 El Pnmary water chemistry control PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chlonde) are present l

0 E El Primary water chemistry control kIn conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

F-2 00%

A

Table F-1. RHRS, Residual Heat Removal Lines (Loops A and C) (concluded)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered I

Yes IN NC0 4/C A

Remarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (i.e., thermal sleeves), and 03 El 03 03 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature> 1500F, and 0

03 0l r3 617F near RCS; 120F remote from RCS CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0

0 03

[]

Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0

0l 0 03 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <2500F, and 0I 03 0

03 617F near RCS; 120F remote from RCS E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs./yr., and 0'13 E0 0 E-C-4 velocify > 30 ft/sec., and 03 13 E0 00 E-C-5 (Pd - P,) /,P < 5 10 00 0 13 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active lb this piping.

AC-1 evalua ted In accordanc with existng plant FAg C progr0 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

F-3

APPENDIX G.

SAFETY INJECTION SYTEM DEGRADATION MECHANISM EVALUATION CHECKLISTS File No.

EPRI-156-330 I

Table G-1. SIS, Accumulator Discharge Lines to Cold Legs Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered I Y o

N/CUd/A*

Remarks TASCS-1 rnps > 1 inch, and 0

03 3

E3 120 lines TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <450 from horizontal (includes elbow 0

03 03 03 Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow In a pipe section connected to a 03 0]

03 03 component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, 01 M]

0 03 out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists forconvection heating in dead-endedpipe 0

0]

03 03 Some fluid stratification may occur beyond first sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or valve due to conduction through the valve, but this would be non-cyclic (see Section 2.0)

TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or 0

El 0

03 TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulentikenetratron into a relatively colder 03 El E3 0

3 Angled upwards off cold lbgs and short branch pipe connected to header piping contaning hot fluid with distance to first closed valve; therefore, RCS turbulent flow, and temperature to first closed valve TASCS-4 calculated or measured AT.> 500F, and 10 10 10 1

TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 3

0 1 []0 1

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

TT-1-1 operating temperature >270OFforstainless steel, or 0

E3 0

0 557F near RCS; 120F remote from RCS TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220°F for carbon steel, and 0

03 0

0 potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or 0

0 03 03 Only in severe RCS depressurization event (very unlikely)

TT-2-2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and 0

0 10

[0 TT-3-1 fAT/ > 2000F for stainless steel, or

[0 0

0 0

TT-3-2 IATI > 150°F for carbon steel, or 03 0

0 EM TT-3-3 IATI > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon) 3

[3 0 0

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordanc with existing plant IGSCC program per 10 11 10 1 IM0 I BWRs only NRC Generic Letter88-O1 I I I I In conclusion, this mechanism would not be active In this piping.

IGSCC-P-1_

austenitic stainless steel (carbon content a a03596), and 0 13 0

0 IGSCC-P-2_

operating temperature.> 200*F, and 0 J3 0 0

557F near RCS to just beyond first valve IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) Is present, and 0l 13 03 0

Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidbing species are present 0

0 10 013 Accumulator fill beyond first valve (possible 02)

OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200*F, the attnibutes above apply and l 0 03 03 120F remote from RCS; past valve, line filled from accumulator (oxygen not controlled)

IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e g., thiosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are 0

0 0

0 G-1 In conclusion, the SIS accumulator lines are potentially susceptible to IGSCC just beyond the first closed check valve off the RCS cold legs, where j temperatures are elevated and the lines are filled from the accumulator tanks, which are not controlled for oxygen.

Table G-1. SIS, Accumulator Discharge Lines to Cold Legs (continued)

In conclusion, while the potential for MiC cannot be precluded in the SIS accumulator lines based upon a strict application of the EPRi criteria, plant service history and industry experience indicates that it would not be a potential degradation mechanism In this piping.

PIT-I potential exists for low flow, and 0

03 1 103 Used lntermittently PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and

]

0 0

0 Accumulator fluid not controlled for oxygen PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride orchlonde) are present 3

l

[

0 Accumulator fluid controlled for contaminants In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

G-2 "I

I, "Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered I

9 FNI-c N/] F Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0i 0

0 r0 TGSCC-2 operating temperature > 1500/F, and 0l []

0 0

557F near RCS to just beyond first valve TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 0 ]

0 0

Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g., fluonde or ch/ionde) are present, and 0

l 0 3 Accumulator fluid controlled for halides TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidzng species are present E]

[]

0 0

Accumulator fill beyond first valve (possible 02)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

0 0

[0 ECSCC-2 operating temperature> 1500F, and 0M 0

0 0

557F near RCS to just beyond first valve ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present, and 0

03 0

0 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface i within five diameters of a probable 03 El 0

0 In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenitic stainless steel, and 1@ 0 J 3 10 ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present, and 0

0 J] Jo Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from 0

[]0 0 10 Assumption concentrated chloride bearing environments CL e., sea water, brackish water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping material is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 03 0

03 03 No Inconel present PWSCC-2 exposed toprimary water at T.> 5700F, and 3

0 03

[]

1 557F (max.) near RCS to just beyond first valve PWSCC-3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or 03

[]

M 3

PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief

[]

0 0

[

In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 1504F, and 0l 0.

0 03 120F (ambient) remote from RCS MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and M 0 0 0 0

Used Intermittently MIC-3 pH < 10, and E]

0 0

0 Possible MIC-4-1 presencelntrusion of organic rnatenal (e g., raw water system),

0 El 0

0 Filled from accumulator tanks or MIC-4-2 watersource is not treated with biocides 10 10 10 13 No biocides present

Table G-1. SIS, Accumulator Discharge Lines to Cold Legs (concluded)

C-G-3 K-'>

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No iAttributes to be Considered Ve Fi1 No C

~JVI Remarks CC-1 crevice condtlion exsts (i.e., thermal sleeves), and 03 0

03 03 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature> 150°F. and 0l 0

01 E3 557F near RCS to just beyond first valve CC-3 oxygen or oxiaizing species are present 0

03 03 03 Accumulator fluid not controlled for oxygen In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0

0l 10 10 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <250°F, and 0]

0 01 0

12OF (ambient) remote from RCS E-C-3 flow present.> 100 hrs4.r., and E3 0

E0 0

E-C-4 velocity> 30 UtJsec., and 03 0

0l 0 E-C-5 (Pd-P,)f

/4P <5 0

0

[

0 0

[]

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping FAC-l evaluated in accordance with existing plant FACgprogram 0

0 0

1 In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.I

Table G-2. SIS, Safety Injection Lines to Cold Legs Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered j

Ne-Ao

JiPUF/I Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and 0 1 n E3 03 6-lines TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope < 45= from horizontal (includes elbow 0

03

-1

[3 Honzontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a 03 0

03 0

Only at the onset of RHR operations; not component allowing mixng of hot and cold fluids, or considered a cyclic condition (see Section 2.0)

TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, El 03 03 03 Potential inleakage from the CVCS would result out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold in a TASCS concem between the RCS and the fluids, or first check valve; NOTE: monitored under 88-08 TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe

[]

El 03 0

Some fluid stratification may occur beyond first sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or valve due to conduction through the valve, but this would be non-cyclic (see Section 2.0)

TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or 0

0]

0 0

TASCS-3-5 potential exists forturbulent penetration into a relativelycolder 0

El 0

0 Angled upwards off cold legs and short branch pipe connected to header piplng containing hot fluid with distance to first closed valve, therefore, RCS turbulent flow, and I

temperature to first closed valve TASCS-4 calculated ormeasured4T> 50F, and 0

03 10 03 120F ambient fluid Into 557F lines TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 0

0 0 0]

13 For flows - 73.4gpm In conclusion, the cold leg safety injection lines are potentially susceptible to TASCS due to Inleakage from the CVCS, which would result in 120F containment ambient fluid entering the portion of the line adjacent to the ROS which would be at the cold leg temperature of 557F.

7"-1-1 operating temperature > 270°F for stainless steel, or 0

03 0] 10 557F near RCS; 120F remote from RCS TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220°F for carbon steel, and 03 03 03 0M potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or E0 E3 0

3 0

3 SI actuation/ RHR initiation (both near nozzles)

TT-2-2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment and E0 E3 0

3 0

3 RHR Initiation (after cold slug; double-shock)

TT-3-1

/1AT/> 200OF for stainless steel, or E0 03 03 03 350F vs100F(RHR);557Fvs.70F(SI) 7T-3-2

/4T/> 150° for carbon steel, or 0

03 03 0l TT-3-3

/ATI >,dTallowable (applicable to both stainless and ca rbon) 0M 0D 03 03 For flows > 62.5gpm (RHR); > 58.3gpm (SI)

In conclusion, the cold leg safety injection lines are potentially susceptible to Tr under two conditions: an SI actuation at power or during the Initiation of DHR operations. Both of these TTs would be due to double-shocks to the elevated-temperature regions near the nozzles.

IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per 10 E

01 0 r BWRsonly NRC Generic Letter 88-01

,5, we,.,ons,,,

u so, C

£05 £50151 50 I IIJL W.,UVU SI I II lb jJSjJII I¶J.

IGSCC-P-1 austenific stainless steel (carbon content Z 0.035%), and 0l 0

0 0

IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature >2000F, and rl 03 03 J3 557F near RCS to just beyond first valve IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and M0 03 0]

0 Assumption IGSCC-P-4 _ oxygen or oxidzing species are present El 03 0] 0]

Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200TF, the attributes above apply, and E0 03 03 03 120F remote from RCS IGSCC-P-6 Inibating contaminants (e.g, thiosultate, fluonde or chloride) are 03 E0 0]

0]

RWSTipnmary water controlled for initiating also required to be present IIcontaminants G-4 In conclusion, the SIS cold leg injection lines are potentially susceptible to IGSCC In the region just beyond the first closed valve off the RCS, where the temperature is sufficiently elevated and the lines may be filled from the RWST. which is not controlled for oxygen.

Table G-2. SIS, Safety Injection Lines to Cold Legs (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered IF Ie;]

_][l/]c

_/_]J Remarks TGSCC-1 austentic stainless steel, and El 0

0

[

0 1 TGSCC-2 operating temperature> 150TF, and 0

0 0

03 557F near RCS to just beyond first valve TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 0

03 0

03 Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g., fluoride or chloride) am present, and 03 l

0 0l RWST/pdmary water controlled for halides TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0]

0 0l 03 Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and M0 03 0

03 ECSCC-2 operating temperature.> 1500F, and 0M 03 0

0 557F near RCS to just beyond first valve ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present, and 0

0 03 03 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is Mthin five diameters of a probable 03 El 03 0

In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that Is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austentic stainless steel, and 0

03 0

03 ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present and 0l 03 0

D Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface Is exposed to wetting from 0

0l 0

0 Assumption concentrated chloride bearing environments (i.e., sea water, braclash water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping PWSCC-2 exposed to primary water at T.> 570°T, and 03 0l 03 03 557F (max.) near RCS to just beyond first valve PWSCC-3-1 the material Is mdl-annea/ed and cold worked, or 00 E 0

E0 E PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief O

03 0

03 In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping MIC-1 operating temperature < 1500F, and 0M 03 03 01 120F (ambient) remote from RCS MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 0

0 0

0 Used Intermittently MIC-3 pH < 10, and 0

03 03 0

Possible MIC-4-1 presenceTntrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

0 0l 0

0 Filled from RCS or RWST (high-purity reactor or quality fluid)

MIC-4-2 water source is not treated with biocides

]0 10 10 No biocides present In conclusion, while the potential for MIC cannot be precluded In the SIS cold leg Injection lines based upon a strict application of the EPRI criteria, plant service history and industry experience indicates that it would not be a potential degradation mechanism In this piping.

PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and 0

03 03 0

Used intermittently PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and 0

0 0

03 Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

PIT-3 Iniia ting contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present 03 10 03 03 RWST/primary fluid controlled for contaminants In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

G-5

Table G-2. SIS, Safety Injection Lines to Cold Legs (concluded)

G-6 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

I Attributes to be Considered FRIi oII cJI/ II Remarks CC-I crevice condition exists (i.e., thermal sleeves), and E 0 El 13 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature> 1500F, and 0

0l 0l l 557F near RCS to just beyond first valve CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0

El El 0l Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and El 0

0 0 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <250°F, and El 0

03 0

120F (ambient) remote from RCS E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs./., and 0

0 0l 0

E.C-4 velocity> 30 Utlsec., and 0

0 0

0 E-C-5 (Pd - P,) AP <'5 0

0 0 0

10 1 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

SFAC-o I evaluated in accordance with existrng plant FAC program l J0 El 0

In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

Table G-3. SIS, Safety Injection Lines to Hot Legs Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

I Attributes to be Considered Remarks TASCS-1 rnps > 1 inch, and 0

0 03 03 6"lines TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <450 from horizontal (includes elbow El

[0 03 03 Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow In a pipe section connected to a 03 El 03 0

Only used for hot leg recirculation (beyond component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or scope of evaluation)

TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, E0 03 0]

0]

Potential inleakage from the CVCS would result out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold in a TASCS concern between the RCS and the fluids, or first check valve; NOTE. monitored under 88-08 TASCS-3-3

,otenttal exists for convection heating in dead-endedpipe 03 El 03 0

Some fluid stratification may occur beyond first sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or valve due to conduction through the valve, but this would be non-cyclic (see Section 2.0)

TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or 03 0l 03 03 TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder El []

0 Angled upwards off cold legs and short branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with distance to first closed valve; therefore, RCS turbulent flow, and I

temperature to first closed valve TASCS-4 calculated ormeasured`4T>50TF, and 0 10 1 11 1

0 20Fambientfluid into 617F lines TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 0 1 13

]0 0

For flows < 87.9gpm In conclusion, the hot leg safety injection lines are potentially susceptible to TASCS due to inleakage from the CVCS, which would result in 120F containment ambient fluid entenng the portion of the line adjacent to the RCS which would be at the hot leg temperature of 617F.

7TT-1-1 operating temperature >270TF forstainless steel, or 0

[0 0 1 0 617F near RCS; 120F remote from RCS STT-1-2 operating temperature > 2207F for carbon steel, and 03 0

03 0

potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold fluid Injectron into hot pipe segment, or 03 0

03 0

Only used for hot leg recirt (outside scope)

TT-2-2 hot fluid injection into coldpipe segment, and 03 0

El 0

0 Only used for hot leg reciro (outside scope)

TT-3-1

/`4T/ > 200°F for stainless steel, or 03 03 03 0

TT-3-2

/AT/> 150°F for carbon steel, or 0

0 03 0

TT-3-3

/ATI > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon) 0 03 03 01 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

ISCS1I evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per 11 0 Mo 01 10M I BWRs only NRC Generic Letter

-I I

I I

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

IGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon contentZ 0.0 35%), and 0

EJ 0 3 0

IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature> 200F, and 0

13 10 10 617F near RCS to just beyond first valve IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (includng residual stress) Is present, and El J0 D

10 Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0 JD

[ J Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200TF, the attributes above apply, and E

120F remote from RCS IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are Dololo 1 0 1RWST/pnmary water controlled for initiating 0also required to be present contaminants

.n conclusion, the SIS hot leg injection lines are potentially susceptible to IGSCC in the region just beyond the first closed valve off the RCS, where the

. temperature Is sufficiently elevated and the lines may be filled from the RWST, which is not controlled for oxygen.

G-7

Table G-3. SIS, Safety Injection Lines to Hot Legs (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

I Attributes to be Considered II r

I N/s j N/Al Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

0l 1l 1l TGSCC-2 operating temperature> 150 0F, and E0 0

3 1 El 617F near RCS to just beyond first valve TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is presen4 and 0

E3 []

0 Assumption TGSCC-4 hahdes (e.g, fluoride or chloride) are present, and 0

E 0

El RWST/primary water controlled for halides TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 10 0 13 E3 Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ECSCC-7 austenitic stainless steel, and 01 1

0 1 0 ECSCC-2 operating temperature.> 150TF, and 0 1 E3 1]

1] 3 617F near RCS to just beyond first valve ECSCC-3 tensile stress Is present, and.

0l 0 10 103 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable

]

E 0

[

In compliance leak path (e.g, valve stems) and Is covered with non-metalhc insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

M 0 JEl ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present, and 0

E 1 0 103 Assumption CS -7 an outside piping surface is exposed to Wetting from 0El0 0 0

Assumption concentrated chlonde bearing environments (i.e., sea water, brackish water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping material Is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 0

El 0 1-1 No Inconel present PWSCC-2 exposed topnmar wateratT> 570T, and I0 El E

0 617F near RCS to just beyond first valve PWSCC-3-1 the material Is mill-annealed and cold worked, or 0l 0

0 0O PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 0 E3 0 El In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 150TF, and 0

0

[]

1 1 120F (ambient) remote from RCS MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 0

0 1 El Used Intermittently MIC-3 pH < 10, and 0]

E3 El 1E Possible MIC-4-1 presence, ntrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

01 0

0 E

Filled from RCS or RWST (high-purity reactor or quality fluid)

MIC-4-2 water source Is not treated vth biocides El 0 El 03 No biocides present In conclusion, while the potental for MIC cannot be precluded in the SIS hot leg injection lines based upon a strict application of the EPRI criteria, plant service history and industry experience indicates that It would not be a potential degradation mechanism In this piping PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and El 0

0 1 1 Used intermittently PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and 0

03 03 El Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

PIT-3 Initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present E3 El E l0 1 RWST/primary fluid controlled for contaminants In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping ii G-8 r-I A

I I

I

Table G-3. SIS, Safety Injection Lines to Hot Legs (concluded)

G-9 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet o.Attributes to be Considered fYes jJ F

Remarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (i.e., thermal sleeves), and

]El 0 1

E E3 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature > 150°F, and 0

[

0 []

617F near RCS to just beyond first valve CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0

[30 E3 Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping E-C-1 cavitation source, and El 0 El 0

No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <250TF, and 0

03 13

[]

120F (ambient) remote from RCS E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs./yr., and 0

1] 0 0

EoC-4 velocity.> 30 ftUseca, and

[]

0 El 0 0

E-C-5 (Pd - P,) /AP <-5 0000

[

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

FAC-1 evaluated in accordance with existfng plant FACgprogram

.0 El 11 In conclusion, this mechanisi, Is not active In this piping.

Table G-4. SIS, High Head S.I. Lines to Cold Legs Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered rE] Ala N/C [N/A][

Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and 0

0 03 10 2-lines TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <45* from horizontal (includes elbow 0l 03 03 03 Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow In a pipe section connected to a 03 0 03 03 Only used dunng an SI actuation (high flow) component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (f.e., in-leakage, 0

0 03 03 Potential Inleakage from CVCS; however, this out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mbdng of hot and cold would not be a cyclic concern in these lines fluids, or (see Section 2.0)

TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe 03 0

0 0

Lines are remote from RCS at ambient sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or temperature TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or 03 0l 03 03 TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder 0

0M 13 0

3 2" lines tie in between check valves on 6" lines, branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with and are therefore prevented from encountering turbulent flow, and turbulence penetration from RCS cold legs TASCS-4 calculated or measured zdT.> 500F, and 0

0 0]

0M TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 0 3 0

1 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

7TT-1-1 operating temperature> 270°F forstainless steel, or El 03 03 0]

Branch welds to 6" lines would encounter elevated temperatures dunng DHR ops (350F)

TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220°F for carbon steel, and 0

0 03 0

potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including "77-2-1 cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or 0

0 03 03 7T-2-2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and 0l 0

03 0 1 Near branch connection at onset of DHR ops TT-3-1

/,4T/,>200F for stainless steel, or E0 03 0 03 350F vs. 1OOF (ambient)

TT-3-2

/,IT/> 150°F for carbon steel, or 03 0

0 091 T-3-3

/AJT/.>ATaflowable (applicable to both stainless andcarbon) 09 01 03 03 For flows> 128.Ogpm In conclusion, the 2" high-head safety injection lines would be potentially susceptible to 17 during the initiation of DHR operations. At this time, 350F RCS fluid would encounter previously ambient lines at IOOF. This 1r would only impact the branch connection welds to the 6" SI lines.

IGSCC-B-1 Ievaluated in accordance with existing plant lGSCC program per I0* I0 1D JI 0 BWRsonly NRC Generic Letter 88-01 thi piing In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.

iGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon contentZ 0.035%6), and 0l 0

0 0

IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature > 2000F, and 0

0 0

0 Only line 4209 near 6" (other lnes at 120F)

IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) Is presen4 and 0

0 0

0 Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidinng species are present 0.0 0E 1

0 Possble (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200F, the attributes above apply, and

[] I0 1 I0 120F (ambient) dunng normal operations IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluonde or chloride) are also required to be present 0I10 10 RWST controlled for the presence of Initiating contaminants G-10 In conclusion, this mechanism is not generally active In this piping. The only exceptions to this are the welds on line 4209 near the 6" cold leg SI piping to loop B. These welds would be potentially susceptible to IGSCC due to the elevated temperature present in this region.

Table G-4. SIS, High Head S.I. Lines to Cold Legs (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered Y

-I 1C M lIA Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and E1 0

0 03 TGSCC-2 operating temperature> 150F, and 0

0 E3

[]

120F (ambient) during normal operations TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) Is present, and 0

0 03 03 Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present, and 0]

0l 03 0

RWST controlled for the presence of halides TGSCC-5 o;ygen or oxidizing species are present El 310 10 0 Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenifc stainless steel, and 0

0 0

[

0 ECSCC-2 operating temperature > 150°F, and 01 El 03 03 120F (ambient) during normal operations ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present; and 0

0 0

03 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is "'thin five diameters of a probable 03 0

03 03 In compliance leak path (e g., valve stems) and Is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not In compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

a 0 00 ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present, and El 0

0 0

Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface Is exposed to wetting from 03 El 03 03 Assumption concentrated chloride bearing environments (i.e., sea water, brackish water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping material is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 94 0

03 13 No Inconel present PWSCC-2 exposed to primary water at T.> 570TF, and 0

E 13 0[]

120F (ambient) during normal operations PWSCC-3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or 01 0

IS) E3 PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief

.0 10 0 Jo In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping MIC-1 operating temperature < 1500F, and 0ZI 03 03 0

120F (ambient) during normal operations MIC-2 low or Intermittent flow, and M

0 03 0

Used intermittently MIC-3 pH <10, and 0

0 0

03 Possible MIC-4-1 presenceintrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

0 0

0 03 Filled from RCS or RWST or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated wIth biocides 0

0 0 0

E1 No biocides present In conclusion, while the potential for MIC cannot be precluded in the SIS high-head cold leg Injection lines based upon a strict application of the EPRI criteria, plant service history and Industry experience indicates that it would not be a potential degradation mechanism In this piping.

PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and 0

0 0

03 Used intermittently PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and E0 0

0 0

Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

PIT-3 Initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present

]0 0l 0

0 RWST controlled for the presence of initiating I

Icontaminants In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

G-11 A.

Table G-4. SIS, High Head S.I. Lines to Cold Legs (concluded)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered Yt No

)VIC N/

I Remarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (i.e., thermal sleeves), and El 0

l

[0 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operatbng temperature > 1504F, and l 0 ED 1 3E 120F (ambient) during normal operations CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0

El El 0

Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0 M

[]

0 No sources present E-C-2 operabng temperature <250'F, and 0

[]

0 013 120F (ambient) during normal operations E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs.4'r., and E3 El W 1 n E-C-4 velocity> 30 fl/sec., and El El 0

El E-C-5 (Pd-P,) /4P <5 E l0l 0

1l In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

FA.C-1 evaluated maccordance with existing plant FAC program I

El 10 El 1I In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

G-12

Table G-5. SIS, High Head S.I. Lines to Hot Legs Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet

~IAA;~:

IIAtteibzut:;

to be Considered II itv

]

?le Remarks TASCS-1 rips >lIinch, and Erl 101 Jrl 2-I 2lines TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <45° from honzontal (includes elbow E

0 1 03 113 Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a 0

0 0

0 Only used for hot leg recirculation (outside component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or scope of evaluation)

TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, 0

I0 0 0

Potential inleakage from CVCS; however, this out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold would not be a cyclic concern in these lines fluids, or (see Section 2.0)

TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-endedpipe 0

0l 0

0 Lines are remote from RCS at ambient sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or temperature TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or 03

[]

03 0

TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder 0]

0l 0

0 2" lines be in beyond first valve on 6" lines, and branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with are therefore prevented from encountering turbulent flow, and turbulence penetrabon from RCS cold legs TASCS-4 calculated or measured dT> 500F, and 0

0 I [

TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 0

0 0

03 In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

TT-1-1 operating temperature > 270°F for stainless steel, or 03 IM 03 0

120F (ambient) dunng normal operations TT-1-2 operating temperature.> 220'F for carbon steel, and D_

_3 0 []_

potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or 0

0m 0 03 Only used for hot leg recirc (outside scope)

TT-2-2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and 13 10 0 0 0 Only used for hot leg recirc (outside scope)

TT-3-1 IATI >200F for stainless steel, or 03 03 03 0

T1-3-2 IMT/ > 150°F for carbon steel, or 03 03 03 0

TT-3-3 IdT/ > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)

E3 0

0 0

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping IGSCC-B-1 i

mevaated in accordance with existingplat IGSCCprgra per 0

0 I

I NRC Generic Letter 88-01 ol In conclusion, this mechanism is niot active In this piping IGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon ccntenta 0.035%"), and 0l 10 0 10 IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature> 200F, and 03 l

03 03 120F (ambient) during normal operations IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and W

03 03 Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizng species are present W

0 [

3]

0 0

Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200*F, the attributes above apply, and El1 013120F (ambient) duning normal operations IGSCC-P-6 Initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are E3 0 100 13 RWST controlled for the presence cf initiating also required to be present contaminants In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping II G-13

?0-ý J

Table G-5. SIS, High Head S.I. Lines to Hot Legs (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered NI IA, o

j l I Remarks TGSCC-1 austenrtic stainless steel, and 0

l 0l 0

1 TGSCC-2 operating temperature> 150TF, and E3 0 3 10 I

120F (ambient) during normal operations TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 0

n3 El I3 Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present, and El 0

0 E WST controlled for the presence of halides TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidizmng species are present 10 E3.0 0

Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

El 10 1 ECSCC-2 operating temperature.> 1500F, and 0

0 El El 120F (ambient) during normal operations ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present, and VI El El E

Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable I0 El l

D In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance wfth Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

El 0o J3 ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present; and 0

E 0]

El Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface Is exposed to wetting from El0 IM 0 El Assumption concentrated chloride bearing environments (i.e, sea water,

.II brackish water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping materialis Inconel (Alloy 600), and E 0 JEl 0

El No Inconel present PWSCC-2 exposed to primary water at T.> 570*F, and E 0 El 0 El 120F (ambient) during normal operations PWSCC-3-1 the material Is mill-annealed and Cold worked, or 0El El 101 PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 0

El El 11 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 150TF, and 0

El 0 ElE 120F (ambient) dunng normal operations MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 0

El El El Used Intermittently MIC-3 pH <10, and 0

El El El Possible MIC-4-1 presencerintrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

El 0

E*

El Filled from RCS or RWST or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated with biocides 10 El El

[3 No biocides present In cnclsio, w~e he otenialforMICcanot e prclued n te SS hgh-had ot eg nletio lins bsedupo a trit aplictio oftheEPR In conclusion, while the potential for MIC cannot be precluded in the SIS high-head hot log Injection lines based upon a strict application of the EPRI criteria, plant service history and industry experience Indicates that It would not be a potential degradation mechanism in this piping.

PIT-i potential exists for low flow, and0 El El El 3 Used Intermittently PIT-2 oxygen or oxifdzing species are present, and 0

El E3 El Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present El 12

[3 0

RWST controlled for the presence of initiating nncontaminants I*In conclusion. this mechanism is not active in this piping.

G-14

Table G-5. SIS, High Head S.I. Lines to Hot Legs (concluded)

<-I G-15 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet NAttributes to be Considered

[FII

)VIIA Remarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (i.e., thermalsleeves), and 0 Jo 0 J"1 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature > 150 0F, and 13 0 0 0 j j 120F (ambient) dunng normal operations CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 10 0o 0 0o Possible (RWST not controlled for oxygen)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0

I0I 0

0 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <250°F, and IM 0 0 []

120F (ambient) during normal operations E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs.lyr., and 03 0

X 0[

E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/sec., and 0

0 00 E

3 E-C-5 (Pd-PI) /AP <5 10 1

[]0 0 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

FA -1 valuated in accordance with existing plant FACIprogram 0

I 0 0

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping

APPENDIX H.

CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYTEM DEGRADATION MECHANISM EVALUATION CHECKLISTS

Table H-1. CVCS, Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Line Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered ye ]j i

7'Aj Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and 0 1 0 E

-1 20 line TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <.450 from honzontal (includes elbow El 03 13 0

Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a 0

E0 0

0 Only used dunng final stages of cooldown, at component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or high flowrate TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flowpast a valve (Ie., In-leakage, IM 3]

0 0

Potential inleakage from CVCS during normal out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold operations; NOTE: 88-08 monitonng is being fluids, or performed TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating In dead-ended pipe 0

0l 0 0

Line convectively heated from main spray line, sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or but would be at spray line temp. to first valve TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or 0l 03 D

03 Leakage flow and pressurizer steam would mix TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder 03 0

0 03 Turbulence penetration from main spray during branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with a spray event, but only negligible differences in turbulent flow, and line temperatures (line already heated to valve)

TASCS-4 calculated or measured 4T.> 500F, and 0

03 0

0] 1 653F steam vs. 120F (ambient) leakage flow TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 0 1 0 10 10 1 For flows < 22.0gpm In conclusion, the pressurizer auxiliary spray line is potentially susceptible to TASCS due to potential inleakage from the CVCS mixing with pressurizer steam at an elevated temperature.

, TT-1-1 operating temperature> 27O0Fforstainless steel, or 10 0

0]

557F/653F near main spray; 120F past valve TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220°F for carbon steel, and[3 0

3 00 potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold fluid injection Into hot pipe segment, or El 0

0 01 Auxiliary spray actuation during plant cooldown TT-2-2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and M

1 0 0 0 Pzr steam returns to line (double-shock)

TT-3-1 fAT!.> 200OF forstainless steel, or 0l 03 0

03 Procedurally limited to 320F 77-3-2

/AT/I> 1500Fforcarbon steel, or 03 0

0 El TT-3-3

/,4T/>,ATaflowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon) 10 03 03 03 For flows> 8.2gpm In conclusion, the pressuzier aux spray line is potentially susceptible to TT when aux spray Is used during plant heatup and cooldown.

IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per 1 10 ll3 JM IBWRsnonly NRC Generic Letter 88-01 I I I I In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

IGSCC-P-1 austeniticstainless steel (carbon contentŽ 0.0355,), and 0

0 00 IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature.> 200*F, and M 03 03 10 557F/653F near main spray;, 12OF past vaalve IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 0

E3 0

03 Assurrption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen oroxidlang species are present 03 0

03 0] 3 Primary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200°F, the attributes above apply, and

[]

E3 13 i 120F in remote sections, but no oxygen present IGSCC-P-6 I initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are also required to be present 0110 10 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

.4 Bi H-1 Iv I

r i

Table H-1. CVCS, Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Line (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.Attributes to be Considered Ne o

I[

NIA[

Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 10 0 1 0 TGSCC-2 operating temperature > 150°F, and E0

[30 13 557FI653F near main spray; 120F past valve TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present and

@ 0

[3 0

Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e g., fluoride or chloride) are present, and 0

E lO 0

Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidizing Species are present 0 3 1

El0 0

Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

1 3 3

0 ECSCC-2 operating temperature > 1500F, and E0 10 0 10 557F/653F near main spray;, 120F past valve ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present, and 0M 0 0

013 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable 0

0l 0 0l In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenittic stainless steel, and 0M 0

03 011E ECSCC-6 tensile stress Is present, and El 0 10 0

1 Assumption ECSCC-7

.an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from 0

E 0

Assumption concentrated chloride bearing environments (i.e., sea water, brackish wateror brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

PWSCC-l piping material is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 0

0 10 10 No Inconel present PWSCC-2 exposed to primary water at T.> 570*F, and 0l 0 01_

El Une encounters some Pzr steam at 653F PWSCC-3-1 the material Is mill-annealed and cold worked, or 0

0 1 0

1 PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 0

[0 0l 0 In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.

M/C-1 operating temperature < 1500F, and 0l 1 - 3 13 557F/653F near main spray; 120F past valve MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and W 10 0

0 0

Used intermittently MIC-3 pH < 10, and 0

0 0

0]

Possible MIC-4-1 presencefintrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

0 0

Pnmary water system or MIC-4-2 water source Is not treated with bictdes E0 0

0 No biocides present In conclusion, while the potential for MIC cannot be precluded in the CVCS audliary spray line based upon a strict application of the EPRI criteria, aint service histnrv and indtstrV experience Indicates that It would not be a potential degradation mechanism In this piping.

PIT-i potential exists for low flow, and El 0

0 0

Used intermittently PIT-2 oxygen or oxdlzng species are present, and 0

l 0 0

Primary water chemistry control S PIT-3 Initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present 0

0 0

0 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

H-2

Table H-1. CVCS, Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Line (concluded)

K/

H-3 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered NO

_I C

Remarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (i.e., thermal sleeves), and T o 1

310 T3 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature > 150TF, and 1l E3 0

3

-13 557F/653F near main spray;, 120F past valve CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present

[o 10 o 13 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0

M0 0 3

0 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <250°F, and El 03 03 0

557F/653F near main spray;, 120F past valve E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs.yr., and 0

0 0

0 E-C-4 velocity> 30 ft/sec., and 0

0 0*0 E-C-5 (P,. P,1)/6P < 5 00 003 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

nFAC-1 I

valuated In accordance with existing plant FACgprogram 0

0 0

0 In conclusion, this mechanism is niot active In this piping.

Table H-2. CVCS, Letdown Line from Loop A Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered J Y l J{

N/CO Ft/Ah Remarks TASCS-1 nps> linch, and 0

0 0-0 3"line TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <45* from horizontal (includes elbow 0

03 03 0

Honzontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow In a pipe section connected to a 03 E0 03 03 Constant, high flow at 60 - 120gpm (max.) from component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or loop A RCS crossover leg TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (7i.e., in-leakage, 03 0l 03 0

out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convect on heabng in dead-ended pipe 0

E0 03 0

sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or D0 0l 03 1

TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder 0

El 0

0 branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with turbulent flow, and TASCS-4 calculated ormeasured,dT.> 50 0F, and 00 03 E3 IM0 TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 03 0]

0 1 0I In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

TT-1-1 operating temperature > 270°Ffor stainless steel, or 0

0 0

0[3 120gpm flow (max.) at 557F dunng normal ops TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220T for carbon steel, and 0

0 03 potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold fluid injection Into hot pipe segment, or 0

0 0 0

TT-2-2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and E0 03 03 03 Re-iniation after securing (infrequent)

TT-3-1

/dT/ > 200-F for stainless steel, or E'

0 03 03 557F RCS fluid into 120F (ambient) lines TT-3-2

/,dTI/> 150-F for carbon steel, or 03 0

0 El TT-3-3

/,T/ >AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)

I 0]

[]0 0 For flows> 30.6gpm In conclusion, remote portions of the letdown line are potentially susceptible to a TT during the infrequent occurrence of flow Initiation after secunng (such as dunng a loss of charging transient). In this instance, hot RCS fluid would enter piping that has cooled to containment ambient temperature.

IGSCC-B-1 I evaluated In accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per 13 0 E3 Io E3 0

BWRs only NRC Genenic Letter 88-01I I I I In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

IGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon content Z 0.035%), and MI 0 03 0

,GSCC-P-2 operating temperature.> 200F, and M

03 03 E3 120gpm flow (max.) at 557F during normal ops IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stres) is present and 0 I 0

0 Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0].0 03

[

3 Primary water chemistry control IGSCC-P-5 erating temperature <o200F, the attributes above apply, and present]3 557F dunng normal operations; no oxygen IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosutfate, fluonde or chloride) are 13 jjl Prnmary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ii H4

Table H-2. CVCS, Letdown Line from Loop A (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to begr C

aonsiee MechanismNI Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitc stainless steel, and 0

0 0

0 TGSCC-2 operating temperature.> 150F, and 0l 0 3 0 120gpm flow (max.) at 557F dunng normal ops TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and E0 0

0 03 Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present, and E0 1@ 0 E0 Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxid*izng species are present 0 10 0 03 Pnmary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

'l

]0 0

ECSCC-2 operating temperature> 1500F, and E

0 13 0 D 3

120gpm flow (max.) -at 557F during normal ops ECSCC-3 tensile stress Is present, and E0 03 0

0 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface Is within five diameters ofa probable 03 El 0 0

In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenitc stainless steel, and 103 0 1 ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present, and El 3

03 0

Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from 03 El 3

03 Assumption concentrated chloride bearing environments (i.e., sea water, brackish water or brine)

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping material is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 03 0

3*

3 0

No Inconel present exposed to primary water at T.> 570T. and E3j 0 10 03 1 20gpm flow (max.) at 557F during normal ops PWSCC-3-1 the material Is rmll-annealed and cold worked, or 03 0

n 1 103 PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 0

0 10 0

In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 150"F, and 03 0

0*

3l 120gpm flow (max.) at 557F during normal ops MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 0

0 El E

Constant, high flow dunng normal operation MIC-3 pH < 10, and 0 []

0 El Possible MIC-4-1 presenceaintrusion ot organic material (e.g., raw water system),

0]

0 El I3 Pnmary water system or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated with biocides 10 0 1]0 0

13 No biocides present In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

PIT-i potena exsts for low flow, and 3

MI 0

0 D

Constant, high flow during normal operation PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and 0

0 0

03 Primary water chemistry control PIT-3 initiatingconta*mnants (e.g.. fluorlde or chloride) are present 3

1@l I

0 Pnmary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

11-5 KJ

m

Table H-2. CVCS, Letdown Line from Loop A (concluded)

H-6 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered No Remarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (i.e., thermal sleeves), and E3 O El Jo0 No th~ermial sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature.> 1500F, and Jl 0 n

r0 120gpm flow (max.) at 557F during normal ops CC-3 oxygen oroxidizng species are present 0

1X 0 0 Pnmary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0l 0

0 10 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature<250TF, and El 0

03 I El 120gpm flow (max.) at 557F during normal ops E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs.y., and 0

El 0

0 E-C-4 velocity.> 30 f/sec., and 0

0 0

0' E-C-5 (P,-Po)/eiP <5 10 El 0

El In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.

FAC-1 evaluated In accordance with existing plant FAC program El 0 El E13 l13 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

Table H-3. CVCS, Drain Line (off Loop A Letdown)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

E Attributes to be Considered i-i II, Remarks TASCS-1 rips >1linch, and 0

C n

03 2"line TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <45* from horizontal Cincludes elbow 0

03 13 03 Honzontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a

[0 0

E3 03 Only used to drain loop A RCS crossover leg component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or dunng an outage TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, 03 0

0 03 out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe 03 E0 03 0

Entire line will run at approximately RCS sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or crossover leg (letdown) temperature of 557F TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or 0

[]

0 03 TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder 0

0 0

03 Entire line will be at approximately loop A RCS branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with crossover leg (letdown) temperature of 557F turbulent flow, and due to turbulent mixing and convection TASCS-4 calculated or measured dT.> 50'F, and 0

0 I0 0

I TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 03 03 1"10 1

In conclusion, this piping Is not affected by this mechanism.

TT-1-1 operating temperature >270°Ffor stainless steel, or El 3 10 0 0

Line at approximately 557F to first valve Tr-1-2 operating temperature > 22 0 °F for carbon steel, and 0

0 0

0 potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold fluid injection Into hot plpe segment, or 0

E 03 0

TT-2-2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and 0 I0 a 0 1

TT-3-1

/d T/ > 200F for staliless steel, or 03 0

13 0Ml TT-3-2

/d T / > 150°F for carbon steel, or 03 0

03 0M TT-3-3

/AdT/ >,dT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)

[3 0 10 1 El In conclusion, this piping is not affected by this mechanism.

IGSCC-B-1 Ievaluated In accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per 10 10 10 1o ED IBWRs only NRC Generic Letter 88-01 In conclusion, this piping is not affected by this mechanism.

IGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon contentZ 0.035%), and 0l E3 0

0 IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature> 200°F, and 0M 10 0

0 iUne at approximately 557F to first valve IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and I0 E3 0

3 Assumption IGSCC-P-4, oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0 JI 0

03 Primary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200F, the attributes above apply, and 13 1 Temperature too high; no oxygen present IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g, thiosulfate, fluonde or chloride) are

[]3 1 IM 1 13 Primary water chemistry control

~also required to be present I

In conclusion, this piping Is not affected by this mechanism.

H-7

\\Ký Iw

Table H-3. CVCS, Drain Line (off Loop A Letdown) (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered IjYesSI C

U 11 Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and M

0 03 10 TGSCC-2 operating temperature> 150°F, and El 03 J] 10 Une at approximately 557F to first valve TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and E0 0

03 0

[

3 Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g., fluoride orchlonde) are present, and 0

0l E3 0

3 Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxiaizing species are present 0

0 0_

03 Pnmary water chemistry control In conclusion, this piping is not affected by this mechanism.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0

0 0

10 ECSCC-2 operating temperature > 150/0F, and E0 0

03 013 Une at approximately 557F to first valve ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present, and M

03] 0 10 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable 0

EM 0 0

In compliance leak path (e.g., valve sterns) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that Is not In compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenitic stainless steel, and 00 10 1 01 ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present, and E0 0

0 0

Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface Is exposed to wetting from 0

0l 0

0 Assumption concentrated ch~londe beatring environments (iLe., sea water, braclksh water or brine)

In conclusion, this piping Is not affected by this mechanism.

PWSCC-1 piping material is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 03 0

0 1 0 No Inconel present PWSCC-2 exposed topmary water at T> 570OF, and 0

E 0 1+/-

1 557F max PWSCC-3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or 0

0 E0 10 PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 0

0 CM 10 In conclusion, this piping is not affected by this mechanism.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 1500F, and 0

[0.

0 10 Unlikely even between valves MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 0

0 0

0 E3 Used Intermittently MIC-3 pH<10, and 0

03 0

03 Possible MIC-4-1 presencerintrusion of organic matenal (e.g., raw water system),

0 0

0 0 Primary water system or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated with blocides 3

0 0

0 No biocides present In conclusion, this piping is not affected by this mechanism.

PI--

potential exists for low flow, and 0]

0 0

0 E3 Used Intermittently PIT-2 oxygen or oxidktng species are present, and 0

0 0

0 Primary water chemistry control PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chlonde) are present 0]

0 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this piping is not affected by this mechanism.

H-8 7"q Im

Table H-3. CVCS, Drain Line (off Loop A Letdown) (concluded)

H-9 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered i

-/.t I Remarks CC-1 crevice condition exists (i.e.. therrna/ sleeves), and 0

E E]

0 No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature> 1500F, and 10 j3 E3 E3 Line at approximately 557F to first valve CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 13 120 ID E3 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this piping is not affected by this mechanism.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 0

E0 03 10 No sources present E-C-2 operatng temperature <250°F, and 03 0

El 1E Unlikely even between valves E-C-3 flow present> 100 hislyr., and 0

0 0

Ml E-C-4 velocity> 30 ftlsec., and 0

03 0 0 13 E-C-5 (Pd-P,) 1P<5 03 i0 0 01 In conclusion, this piping is not affected by this mechanism.

FAC-1 I evauated in accordance byth existing plant FACipm gram 0

0 0

1 In conclusion, this piping is not affected by thiis mechanism.

Table H-4. CVCS, Normal Charging Line to Loop B Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered II,W ii

-1

_I Remarks TASCS-1 nps> I inch, and 0 1 03 0

13 3-line TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <45° from horizontal (includes elbow 0

03 E3 03 Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a 03 El 03 03 Constant, high flow at 45 - 105gpm (max.)

component allowing mibdng of hot and cold fluids, or when in use (shares 50% of duty with alt chg}

TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., In-leakage, 0

03 03 0

Potential Inleakage from CVCS when the line is out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold not in use would result in a TASCS concern fluids, or between the RCS and the first check valve; NOTE: 88-08 monitoring is being performed TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-endedpipe 03 0

0 E3 Some fluid stratification between first valve and sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or down elbow beyond when line not In use, but would be non-cyclic in nature (see Section 2.0)

TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or 0

0 03 03 TASCS-3-5 potential exists forturbulent penetration into a relatively colder 0

0l I3 13 Une is vertically upward off loop B cold leg; branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with hence, temperature would be uniform with RCS turbulent flow, and to first closed valve when line not in use TASCS-4 calculated ormeasuredAT> 50TF, and 3

0 0

0 120F fluid Into 557F line TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 0

0 0

3 For flowrates < 13 3gpm In conclusion, the normal charging line is potentially susceptible to TASCS when not in use due to Inleakage from the CVCS, which would result In 120F containment ambient fluid entering the portion of the charging line adjacent to the RCS which would be at the cold leg temperature of 557F.

TT-1-1 operating temperature >270F for stainless steel, or E0 0

0 0

438F If used for charging; 557F if stagnant 7T-1-2 operating temperature > 220OF for carbon steel, and 03 0

0 El potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including 7T-2-1 cold fluid injection Into hot ptpe segment, or 0

0 0

0 Recovery from flow interruption (cold slug)

TT-2-2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and 0

[0 03.0 Restoration of flow (after cold slug)

TT-3-1

/AT/>200Fforstainless steel, or

[]

03 03 0

120F vs. 557F; 438F vs. 120F (double-shock)

TT-3-2

/AT/ > 150-F for carbon steel, or 03 0

0 0l 3-3

/,T/ >,dT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon) 0l 03 03 03 For flows >15.6gpm In conclusion, the normal charging line Is potentially susceptible to Tr (when it is being used) following an interruption In charging flow. Under these conditions, when flow Is restored, a cold slug at ambient temperature would enter warm lines, followed by warm charging flow from the CVCS.

IGSCC-B-1 evaluatedin accordance with existing plant lGSCCprogram per D I0 l3 I

10 BWRs only NRC Generic Letter 88-01 I I I In,-,-,r,,,l.,oi,n $hk mohnkm k rint active In this oioina.

r IGSCC-P-1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon content Z 0.035%4), and 010 0

10 IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature > 2001F, and 0

0 1 10E 438F H used for charging; 557F f stagnant IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and o

3 r-1 Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present M

0 Pnrmary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200F, the attributes above apply, and 0

1olE 120Fremote from RCS If not in use, but no 02 IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluonde or chloride) are j3 0jol Primary water chemistry control Icalso required to be present In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

H-10

Table H-4. CVCS, Normal Charging Line to Loop B (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet NO.

Attributes to be Considered Yf]' NoNC I

Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitc stainless steel, and IM 10 j

10

[

TGSCC-2 operatrng temperature.> 150 oF, and 0 J3l E3 0l 438F if used for charging; 557F if stagnant TGSCC-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 0

0 0

0]

E Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e g., fluoride or chloride) are present, and

]0 El 0 0 Primary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 40 Mo [0 10 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenibc stainless steel, and 0l E3 0 E

ECSCC-2 operating temperature.> 150°F, and 0l 0

[3 0

438F if used for charging; 557F If stagnant ECSCC-3 tensile stress is present, and 0El 0

0 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is w'ithin five dameters of a probable 0]El 0 []

In compliance leak path (e.g, valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenifc stainless steel, and 0

0 El El ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present and 0

En l 0

0 Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from 0

0l 0

0l Assumption Sbrackish water or bn~ne)I In conclusion, this mechanism is not act"e In this piping.

PWSC--

p iping material is, Ioe, (Alloy 600),and 0 10 0 10 No Inoone, rsn PWSCC-2 exposed to primaq' water at T.> 570-F, and E 0 El E3 0

438F if used for charging; 557F If stagnant PWSCC-3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or El E

0 El PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief E l El 0 E In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 150F, and 0

El E3l El 120F remote from RCS when line not In use MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and M0 0 El E

Une used intermittently (50% duty with alt chg)

MIC-3 pH <10, and 0 El l

E l Possible MIC-4-1 presencelintrusion of organic matenal (e.g., raw water system),

0 IM 0 E

]

Pnmary water system or MIC-4-2 watersource is not treated wmth biocides El El El n

No biocides present In conclusion, while the potential for MIC cannot be precluded In the CVCS normal charging line based upon a Strict application of the EPRI criteria, plant service history and industry experience indicates that it would not be a potential degradation mechanism In this piping.

PIT-1 potential exists forlowflow, and 0I E

E El I Une used intermittently (50% duty with alt chg)

PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and El 0

El El Primary water chemistry control initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present I

I

I 0o I0 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

H-II It

_j PrT-3 W"pq

Table H-4. CVCS, Normal Charging Line to Loop B (concluded)

H-12 KJý A Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered YIe SOII OI[ NI Remarks CC-i crevice condition exists (iLe., thermal sleeves), and 13 E

0 ID No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature.> 150T, and Ej 13 E3 438F If used for charging, 557F If stagnant CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present I

Ei

.3 I

3 Pnmary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and

[]

0 0 10 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <250°F, and 0l E3 03 03 120F remote from RCS when line not in use E-C-3 flow present> lOO hrs4yr., and 3

0

[0 ]

E-C-4 velocity.> 30 ft/sec., and 01 [

0 0

E-C-5 (P,-F,) /,AP <05 010 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

FAC-1 Ievaluatedin accordance with existingplant FACprogram 013 1 ED 0 10 In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

Table H-5. CVCS, Alternate Charging Line to Loop A Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered YB 11 c

Remarks TASCS-1 nps.> 1 inch, and El

-1 0 0

3'line TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope <45° from honzontal (includes elbow 0

03 13 10 Horizontal runs or tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a 03 0

0]

[

3 Constant, high flow at 45 -1 05gpm (max.)

component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or when In use (shares 50% duty with normal chg)

TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage,

[]

03 03 03 Potential Inleakage from CVCS when the line is out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold not in use would result In a TASCS concern fluids, or between the RCS and the first check valve; NOTE: 88-08 monitoring Is being performed TASCS-3-3 potential exists forconvection heabngin dead-endedpipe 0

0 E3 0

Some fluid stratfication between first valve and sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or down elbow beyond when line not In use, but would be non-cyclic in nature (see Section 2.0)

TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam/water) flow, or 3El 0 3 0rl TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration into a relatively colder

[3 l 0 0

Line is vertically upward off loop A cold leg; branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid wdh hence, temperature would be essentially turbulent flow, and uniform with RCS to first closed valve TASCS-4 calculated ormeasuredAT>50*F, and El 10 3 10 0

120F fluid into 557F line TASCS-5 Richardson number> 4.0 M

0 0] 10 1 For flowrates < 13.3gpm In conclusion, the alternate charging line is potentially susceptible to TASCS when not in use due to inleakage from the CVCS, which would result in 120F containment ambient fluid entering the portion of the charging line adjacent to the RCS which would be at the cold leg temperature of 557F.

77-1-1 operating temperature > 270°F for stainless steel, or

[]

03 0

0 438F if used for charging; 557F if stagnant T77-1-2 operatrng temperature> 220'F for carbon steel, and

[]

0 3 00 potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including T7-2-1 cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or 0]

03 03 0 Recovery from flow Interruption (cold slug)

TT-2-2 hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and

[I El 0

]0 Restoration of flow (after cold slug)

TT-3-1

/ilT/ > 200F for stainless steel, or 3

El 0

El 120Fvs.557F;438Fvs. 120F (double-shock)

TT-3-2

/iT"/> 150°F for carbon steel, or 0

E 0

El TT-3-3

/,dT/ >T allowable (applcable to both stainless and carbon)

[

E 0 El For flows >15.6gpm In conclusion, the alternate charging line is potentially susceptible to 17 (when It is being used) following an Interruption In charging flow. Under these conditions, when flow Is restored, a cold slug at ambient temperature would enter warm lines, followed by warm charging flow from the CVCS.

IGSCC-B-1 I evaluated in accordance with exisng plant IGSCCprogram per 1 1 0 1o 1 1BWRs only NRC Generic Letter 88-01 I I I I In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

IGSCC-P.1 austenitic stainless steel (carbon content a 0.035%9), and 0

[]

0 0

IGSCC-P-2 operating temperature > 2007F, and 0 10 0

0 438F if used for charging; 557F if stagnant IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present and 0 10 0

0 Assumption IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present J El 0

0 Pnmary water chemistry control OR IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature <200*F, the attributes above apply, and

[]

El 0

0 120F remote from RCS if not in use, but no 02 IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g, thiosulfate, fluoride or chloride) are 0

El 0 10 Primary water chemistry control also required to be present I

I In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

H-13 K-J OI

Table H-5. CVCS, Alternate Charging Line to Loop A (continued)

Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.Attributes to be Considered H~[ NIA[~

Remarks TGSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and M

0 J 01 TGSCC-2 operating temperature.> 150T, and 0 J 03 10 438F If used for charging; 557F if stagnant TGSCC-3 tensile stress (inciuding residual stress) is present, and 0

0 0

0 13 Assumption TGSCC-4 halides (e.g, fluonde or chlonde) are present, and 03 U

3 0

0 Pnmary water chemistry control TGSCC-5 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 03 0

10 013 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active in this piping.

ECSCC-1 austenitic stainless steel, and 0l 03 03 0

ECSCC-2 operating temperature.> 1500F, and 0l 0

03 03 438F if used for charging; 557F if stagnant ECSCC-3 tensile stress Is present, and E0 0

0 03 Assumption ECSCC-4 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable 0

0 03 03 In compliance leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not In compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36 OR ECSCC-5 austenitc stainless steel, and E0000E E

ECSCC-6 tensile stress is present, and E

0 U

0 Assumption ECSCC-7 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from 0

0 0

0 Assumption concentrated chloride beaiing envronments si.e.,

sea water, brackish waterorbrine)

In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.

PWSCC-1 piping material is Inconel (Alloy 600), and 03 0

0 0

No Inconel present PWSCC-2_ exposed to purmar, water at T.> 570T, and 03 0l 03 101 438F If used for charging; 557F if stagnant PWSC the materialIs mill-annealed and cold wIr*ecý or 00 a 0 1 PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief 0

0 0

In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active In this piping.

MIC-1 operating temperature < 1500F, and E0 0

03 0

120F remote from RCS when line not In use MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and l0 3

0 0

Une used intermittently (50% duty with normal charging)

MIC-3 pH < 10, and 0l 0

03 03 Possible MIC-4-1 presenceintrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system),

0 El 03 0

Pnmary water system or MIC-4-2 water source is not treated with biocides I

0 0]

0 E I No biocides present In conclusion, while the potential for MIC cannot be precluded In the CVCS alternate charging line based upon a strict application of the EPRI criteria, plant service history and industry experience Indicates that it would not be a potential degradation mechanism In this piping.

PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and 0l 0

03 0

Une used intermittently (50% duty with normal charging)

PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and 0

E0 03 0

Primary water chemistry control P['t'-3 initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride or chloride) are present 0

El 0

03 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

or H-14 Ký 0%

a I

v

Table H-5. CVCS, Alternate Charging Line to Loop A (concluded)

[

H-15 Kuý 9 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet No.

Attributes to be Considered Yaj No IC JVI Remarks CC-l crevice condition exists (i.e., thernal sleeves), and 0l 1 1B 0

]

No thermal sleeves present CC-2 operating temperature> 150°F, and 0E E3 13

[]

438F if used for charging; 557F if stagnant CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 0

0

[3 03 Primary water chemistry control In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

E-C-1 cavitation source, and 13 0

03 13 No sources present E-C-2 operating temperature <250'F, and 0 El l

[

E 120F remote from RCS when line not in use E-C-3 flow present.> 100 hrs./y., and E3 03 El 0 E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/sec., and 10 0

El 0 E-C-5 (Pd - P,) /l P <.5 0

o 3

0

[

In conclusion, this mechanism is not active In this piping.

[

AC-1 evaluated in accordance with exisng plant FAC program 0

0.El El Incocuion, this mechanism Is not active in this piping.

APPENDIX I.

THERMAL FATIGUE CALCULATIONS Revision 0

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The criteria of the EPRI Risk-Informed Procedure for thermal fatigue evaluation (as given in Table 2

1) includes the determination of certain key values: the Richardson Number (Ri) in the case of TASCS, and the allowable AT in the case of IT. For some operating conditions, sufficient information is available to determine the desired parameter directly, while for others, a "cut-off' (threshold) value can be established for purposes of evaluating the criteria. The methodology for determining Ri and the allowable AT is given below.

RICHARDSON NUMBER Methodology Richaýdson Number values were only calculated for elements potentially susceptible to TASCS-3-1 (low flow), which is sometimes combined with TASCS-3-4 (two-phase flow), as well as TASCS-3-2 (valve leakage). For TASCS-3-3 (convection heating) or TASCS-3-5 (turbulent penetration) the Richarson Number is not a meaningful value. The methodology for the evaluation of the Richardson Number is given in Reference [I-1]. The value of the Richardson number is calculated using Equation 1:

Ri = (g/p) * (Ap

d)/u 2 (1) where:

d = inner pipe diameter (ft) g = acceleration due to gravity (32.2 ft/sec)

Ap = absolute value of difference in density abm/ft3) p = density of the stratified flowing fluid (brm/ft 3) u = velocity of the fluid in the stratified portion of the pipe cross section (ft/sec)

Density values are obtained from Reference [1-2] at the hot/cold fluid temperatures. In performing the evaluations, p is taken as that of the warmer fluid, even when the colder fluid is actually flowing. This assumption incorporates conservatism, in that it renders the evaluated piping more, rather than less, susceptible to TASCS.

As actual flowrates are often uncertain, the value of Ri was set equal to 4 (the critical value) in all evaluations, and the corresponding value of u was then determined and converted to a "threshold" flowrate. In converting between u (ft/sec) and flow rate (gpm) for comparison with actual operating conditions, the cross-sectional area used was that of the entire pipe and not merely the stratified portion. This assumption also incorporates conservatism, in that it renders the evaluated piping more, rather than less, susceptible to TASCS. This calculated flow rate was then used as a "cut-off' for evaluation purposes. If the actual flow rate was expected to be significantly lower, the piping would be considered susceptible to TASCS under the given conditions; if the actual flow rate was expected to

be significantly higher, the piping would not be considered susceptible. In cases where the actual flowrate was a known value, this conclusion could be made with even more certainty.

One further criterion was applied following the determination of the Richardson Number, and that was whether the conditions encountered were cyclic (frequently encountered, or high-frequency in nature),

as opposed to steady-state or infrequent. This criterion was used in the final determination regarding element TASCS susceptibility, and is discussed at some length in Section 2.0 of this calculation.

Calculated threshold flowrate values for all cases evaluated are given in Table I-M, and are compared to actual flowrates where available. Values for temperatures, flowrates, etc. for each system are taken from the References cited in the relevant Section. Conclusions regarding potential susceptibility to the TASCS degradation mechanism are given for all cases.

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Table I-1. Richardson Number Calculations ystem Line Description Drawing(s)

Operating Condition Hot Fluid Source Cold Fluid Source Hot Fluid Temp.(F)

Cold Fluid Temp.(F)

Hot Fluid Density (binm/3)

Cold Fluid Density (lbm/ft3)

Density Difference (lbnmft3)

in) Cm)

ID ('m)

ID (ft) g (ft/sec2) u (ft/sec)

Ri Q threshold (gpm)

Q actual (gpm)

TASCS due to Ri Cyclic Condition TASCS Concern System Line Description rawing(s)

Operating Condition Hot Fluid Source Cold Fluid Source iot Fluid Temp.(F)

Cold Fluid Temp.(F)

Hot Fluid Density (Ibm/ft3)

Cold Fluid Density (lbmlft3)

Density Difference (lbm/ft3) fPS (in)

ID (in)

ID (ft) g (ft/sec2) u (ft/sec)

RI Q threshold (gpm)

Q actual (gpm)

TASCS due to Ri Cyclic Condition TASCS Concern

+

RCS Pzr Surge Line 1-4500 Heatup Pressurizer fluid RCS Hot Leg 435 190 52.15 60.35 8.2 14 11.188 0.932 32.2 1.09 4

332.8 Unknown Possible Yes YES SIS Hot Leg SI Lines 1-410411-4203/1-4304 Inleakage (normal ops.)

RCS fluid Stagnant fluid 617 120 40.82 61.69 20.87 6

5.189 0.432 32.2 1.33 4

87.9 Unknown Possible Yes YES RCS Pzr Spray Line 1-4503/1-4504 Spray bypass flow Pressurizer steam RCS Cold Leg 653 557 6.36 45.5 39.14 4

3.438 0.287 32.2 3.77 4

109.0 2

Yes Yes YFSq CVCS Normal/Alt. Charging 1-4105/1-4205 Inleakage (normal ops.)

RCS fluid Stagnant fluid 557 120 45.5 61.69 16.19 3

2.624 0.219 32.2 0.79 4

13.3 Unknown Possible Yes YES SIS Cold Leg SI Lines 1-4103/1-420211-4303 Inleakage (normal ops.)

RCS fluid Stagnant fluid 557 120 45.5 61.69 16.19 6

5.189 0.432 32.2 1.11 4

Intentionally Blank 734 Unknown Possible Yes YES CVCS Pzr Aux. Spray Line 1-4506 Inleakage (normal ops.)

Pressurizer steam Stagnant fluid 653 120 6.36 61.69 55.33 2

1.69 0.141 32.2 3.14 4

22no Unknown Possible Yes YES RHRS RHR Suction Lines 1-4102A/1-4302 Leakage (normal ops.)

RCS fluid Stangnant fluid 653 120 6.36 61.69 55.33 12 10.5 0.875 33.2 7.95 4

2145.1 Unknown Possible Yes YFSq Revision 0

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KJ'

AT ALLOWABLE Methodology The methodology for the evaluation of AT allowable is given in Reference [I-1], with additional information provided in Reference [1-3]. In cases where the transient flow rate is known, the value of AT allowable can be directly evaluated using the following method:

Firstly, the mean fluid temperature of the potential thermal transient is determined. Then, the heat transfer coefficient (h) is calculated using Equation 2:

h= Q 0 °8ID 18 (2) where:

(= determined from Figure I-1 at the mean fluid temperature [I-1]

Q = transient flow rate (gpm)

D = pipe ID (in)

Next, the value T is determined using Equation 3:

TI=k/ht (3) where:

k = thermal conductivity of the material (BTU/hr-ft-T) at the mean fluid temperature, taken from [1-4]

t = pipe thickness (ft)

Once T has been calculated, AT allowable for the transient can be determined from Figure 1-2

[Reference 1-3] for the appropriate material. If the maximum transient AT is greater than this allowable value, a T" will occur. If not, the piping is not susceptible under the stated conditions.

As actual flowrates are often uncertain, an alternate methodology was employed for the Tr evaluations performed in this Appendix. First, AT allowable was set equal to the maximum transient AT. T was then determined at this AT from Figure 1-2, and, with knowledge of k, the value of the heat transfer coefficient (h) was then calculated using Equation 3. Next, (D was determined from Figure I 1, and a flow rate value (Q) was determined using Equation 2. This calculated flow rate was then used as a "cut-off" (threshold) for evaluation purposes. If the actual flow rate was expected to be significantly higher, AT allowable would be lower than the maximum transient AT and the piping would be considered susceptible to 'IT under the given conditions. If the actual flow rate was Revision 0

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expected to be significantly lower, the piping would not be considered susceptible. In cases where the actual flowrate was a known value, this conclusion could be made with even more certainty.

In some cases, a particular region of piping encounters two or more significant thermal shocks during a brief time period. When this is the case, the maximum AT used for evaluation purposes is taken as the superposition of the various ATs experienced. When an allowable AT value resulted in a corresponding T value beyond the range shown in Figure 1-2, one of the methodologies below was employed:

1) The formula accompanying the figure in Reference [1-3] was used to calculate T directly

2) The flowrate at the maximum value of T shown on Figure 1-2 (0.5) was used as a cut-off to establish TT susceptibility

3) The value of TI' was linearly extrapolated from the values shown in Figure 1-2 (only used for allowable AT values up to approximately 600TF)

Calculated threshold flowrate values for all cases evaluated are given in Table 1-2, and are compared to actual flowrates (where available). Values for temperatures, flowrates, etc. for each system are taken from the References cited in the relevant Section. Conclusions regarding potential susceptibility to the IT degradation mechanism are given for all cases.

File No.

EPRI-156-330

ystem Line Description Drawing(s)

Operating Condition Hot Fluid Source Cold Fluid Source ot Fluid Temp. (F) old Fluid Temp. (F) vg. Fluid Temp. (F)

Ielta T Max. (F) elta T Allowable (F)

Psi

< (BTU/hr.ft-F) t (n)

(ft)

Phi (in)

(in)

Q allowble (gpm)

Q actual (gpm)

TT Concern System Lie Description Drawing(s)

Operating Condition Hot Fluid Source Cold Fluid Source Hot Fluid Temp. (F)

Cold Fluid Temp. (F)

Avg. Fluid Temp. (F)

Delta T Max. (F)

Delta T Allowable (F)

Psi k (BTU/hr-ft.F) t (m) t (ft) h Phi NPS C(i)

D (in)

Q allowble (gpm)

Q actual (gpm)

IT Concern Table 1-2. AT Allowable Calculations RCS Pzr Surge Line

(+ Branch Conn.)

1-4500 Heatup Pressurizer RCS Hot Leg 435 190 312.5 245 245 0.065 9.88 1.406 0.117 1297.8 262.79 14 11.188 16853 Unknown YES RHRS RHRS Suction Line 1-4102 RHR initiation RCS fluid Stagnant fluid 350 100 225 250 250 0.075 9.43 1.125 0.094 1341.0 232.24 12 10.50 1776.3 1500 (max)

WAN RCS Pzr Spray Line 1-4503 Aux spray during CD Pzr steam Aux spray flow 420 100 260 640 640.0 0.65 9.61 0531 0.044 334.1 246.13 4

3.44 23.6 45 (min)

YES SIS Cold Leg SI Lines

(+ Branch Conn.)

1.4103/1.420211-4303 RHR initiation RCS fluid Stagnant fluid 350 100 225 500 5oo 048 9.43 0.719 0.060 327.8 232.24 6

5.19 62.5 500 (max)

V"WC NO_

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)

RCS Pzr Relief Valve Lines 14502 Valve actuation Pressuzier steam Condensate 653 120 386.5 533 533 0.54 10.27 0.719 0.060 317.4 279.02 6

5.189 47.7

> 47.7 YES RCS Pzr Relief Valve Lines 1-4505 Valve actuation Pressuzier steam Condensate 653 120 386.5 533 533 0.54 10.27 0.438 0.037 521.0 279.02 3

2.624 19.1

> 19.1 YES I

Table 1-2. AT Allowable Calculations (continued) ystem Line Description Drawing(s) perating Condition ot Fluid Source Cold Fluid Source tt Fluid Temp. (F) old Fluid Temp. (F) vg. Fluid Temp. (F)

Delta T Max. (F)

Delta T Allowable (F)

Psi k (BTU/hr-ft-F)

(ft)

Phi S(in) n) (in)

Sallowbie (gpm)

Q actual (gpm)

TT Concern System Line Description Drawing(s)

Operating Condition Hot Fluid Source Cold Fluid Source Hot Fluid Temp. (F)

Cold Fluid Temp. (F)

&vg. Fluid Temp. (F)

Delta T Max. (F)

Delta T Allowable (F)

Psi k (BTU/hr-ft.F) t (ft)

Phi

.PS (in)

ID (in)

ý allowble (gpm)

ý actual (gpm) rT Concern SIS Cold Leg SI Lines

(+ Branch Conn.)

1-4103/1-4202/1-4303 SI actuation RCS fluid Cold slug 557 70 313.5 487 487 0.47 9.89 0.719 0.060 351.2 263.06 6

5.19 58.3 100.0 YFS CVCS Pzr Aux. Spray Line 1-4506 Aux spray during CD Pzr steam Aux spray flow 420 100 260 640 640.0 0.65 9.61 0.344 0.029 515.8 246.13 2

1.69 8.2 45 (min)

YES CVCS Normal/Alt. Charging

(+ Branch Conn.)

1-410511-4205 Flow recovery RCS fluid/CVCS fluid Stagnant fluid 557/438 120 308.75 755 755 0.65 9.86 0.438 0.037 415.8 261.75 3

2.62 15.6 45 (rain)

YES SIS Cold Leg SI Lines 1-4103/1-4202/1-4303 RHR initiation RCS fluid Stagnant fluid 350 100 225 250 250 0.075 9.43 0.719 0.060 20982 232.24 6

5.19 636.5 500 (max)

NO SIS High-Head 2" Lines to Cold Leg SI Lines 1-4111/1-4112/1-4209 1-4210W1-430911-4310 RHR initiation RCS fluid Stagnant fluid 350 100 225 250 250 0.075 9.43 0.344 0.029 4385.4 232.24 2

1.69 128.0 500 (max)

YES RCS Drain (Excess Letdown) 1-4308 Flow initiation RCS fluid Stagnant fluid 557 120 338.5 437 437 0.375 10.02 0.344 0.029 932.0 269.41 2

1.69 15.3 25.0 YFS Revision 0

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Table 1-2. AT Allowable Calculations (concluded)

System Line Description Drawing(s)

Operating Condition Hot Fluid Source Cold Fluid Source Hot Fluid Temp. (F)

Cold Fluid Temp. (F)

Avg. Fluid Temp. (F)

Delta T Max. (F)

Delta T Allowable (F)

Psi k (BTU/hr-ft-F) t(in) t(ft) h Phi NPs (in)

ED (in)

Q allowble (gpm)

Q actual (gpm) rr Concern RCS Letdown 1-4107 Flow recovery RCS fluid Stagnant fluid 557 120 338.5 437 437 0.375 10.02 0.438 0.037 732.0 269.41 3

2.62 30.6 60.0 YESq

~~_.1 Revision 0

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M~

0 100 200 300 400 Soo Temperaiure, F Fit Dedved 600 Figure I-1. (D vs. Temperature for Water [I-1]

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ý,ý 04

500 410 2L iz: 320

_ 230 140 0

0.1

.0.2 0.3 0.4 k/(ht) - dimensionless Figure 1-2. '1 vs. Allowable AT for Commonly Used Materials [1-3]

0.5 Revision 0

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EPRI-156-330 Page I-11 of I-11 REFERENCES (for Appendix I only)

I-1. EPRI TR-104534-V2, "EPRI Fatigue Management Handbook, Volume 2-Screening Criteria,"

December 1994.

1-2. Moran, Michael J. and Shapiro, Howard N. "Fundamentals of Engineering Thermodynamics,"

John Wiley & Sons, 1988.

1-3.

SI Calculation, "Enhanced Fatigue Management Handbook Screening Criteria," Revision 0, 3110/97, SI File No. EPRI-1 1OQ-302.

1-4. XSME Code Section IZ 1992 Edition.

ML022670317

Text

7.0 REFERENCES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

7.0 REFERENCES

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