ML021710186

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Final - Section C Operating
ML021710186
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom, Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/24/2002
From: Wasong A
Exelon Nuclear
To: Conte R
NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
References
50-277/02301, 50-278/02301, 50-353/02301, 50-352/02301 05-277/02301, 50-278/02301, 50-352/02301, 50-353/02301
Download: ML021710186 (49)
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Appendix D SCENARIO OUTLINE Form ES-D-1 Facility: LGS I and 2 Scenario No.

1 Op-Test Number:.

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: Shuffle Part I is in progress on Unit 1 Turnover. A fuel bundle is in transit from the core to the spent fuel pool Event Malf Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description Minor leakage reported from drywell upper seal plate into the

1.

N/A C

drywell requires temporary suspension of fuel movement to allow access to upper drywell area for inspection.

2.

N/A M

A fuel bundle is dropped onto spent fuel pool with significant fuel damage.

( N )ormal, t I )nswrument, k k, )omponent, SM )ajor Page 1 of 4 t, R )eactlVlty,

Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.

LG IPO Scenario No. I Event No.:

I Page1 of I Event

Description:

Minor leakage reported from drywell upper seal plate into the drywell requires temporary suspension of fuel movement to allow access to upper drywell area for inspection.

Examiner Cue:

With a fuel bundle in transit from the core to the spent fuel pool, the drywell control point contacts you and informs you that a water leak in the vicinity of the drywell upper seal plate has been detected. Access to the drywell is needed to the 313' elevation for inspection and repair in the next 5 minutes.

Time Position j

Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Direct the completion of the current CCTAS step (the bundle is currently in the cattle chute and needs to be moved, as this is one of the least desirable locations to leave the bundle if drywell access is a concern).

FHD

  • Suspend core alterations (The requirement for access controls to the upper elevations of the drywell appears in several places: NOM-L-4.1, FHD Turnover Checklist, FH-1 05, and HP-300. The candidate may reference any or direct the suspension of core alterations from memory)

FHD Post a sign in front of the controls of the grapple controls to remind personnel to verify access controls re-established prior to resuming irradiated core component handling FHD Contact the Health Physics Drywell Control Point and report:

"* irradiated core component transfers have been halted

"* access to the drywell upper elevations may be unrestricted

"* the fuel grapple controls have been posted to re-verify access controls prior to resuming [irradiated core]

component handling Ref: FH-1 05 Step 9.1.2 Examiner Cue:

After about 30 minutes, the Drywell Control Point contacts you and informs you that the water leak was from a demin water hose. Access restrictions to the upper elevation of the drywell have been put back in-place and the area is clear. The control room has made the announcement in the drywell, and irradiated component movements may resume.

You have commenced the next CCTAS step, and have grappled a bundle over the core and are transporting it to the spent fuel pool.

Page 2 of 4

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2.

3/4

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AppendixD OPERATOR ACTIONS -,:-..

', -Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.

LG IPO Scenario No. I Event No.:

2 Page 1 of I Event

Description:

A fuel bundle is dropped onto spent fuel pool with significant fuel damage Examiner Cue:

A bundle is hanging from the main hoist, and the bridge is moving toward the target cell location in front of the North Fuel Prep Machine. Sudden stoppage of the bridge causes the bundle to swing into the prep machine. The bundle caught on the fuel prep machine and as the mast swung away, the bail handle failed and the bundle fell onto the spent fuel below.

The bundle is now lying partly on spent fuel and partly on the fuel pool floor. Bubbles and cloudy water can be seen rising toward the surface.

(Wait about 30 seconds then provide the cue) The PRO has contacted the bridge and reported that the refuel floor has automatically isolated due to high exhaust rad level" The refuel bridge area rad monitor is now alarming.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Enter ON-120, FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS per Symptom 1.3 (Fuel Bundle Dropped or Damaged)

FHD

  • Evacuate the refuel floor per ON-20 FHD Contact SSV and request disposition of damaged bundle CUE: The SSV directs you to leave the bundle in the current location, ensure the refuel floor is evacuated, and come to the main control room FHD Verify normal refuel floor HVAC is isolated and SGTS is started CUE: The PRO reports that the refuel floor has automatically isolated and standby gas treatment is running CUE: You have reached the termination point for the scenario Page 3 of 4
  • Denotes critical task

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LSRO INTEGRATED PLANT SCENARIO TURNOVER CONDITIONS LGS Scenario 1 Fuel Handling Director Unit 1 OPCON 5 Core Shuffle Part I in progress All prerequisites for core alterations are met and a bundle is in-transit from the core to the spent fuel pool. The mast is mid-way through the cattle chute.

Page 4 of 4 CANDIDATE

Appendix D SCENARIO OUTLINE Form ES-D-1 Facility: LGS 1 and 2 Scenario No.

2 Examiners:

Op-Test Number:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: In-vessel maintenance is in progress on Unit 2 Turnover.. The bridge is over the core and moving toward the fuel pool with a double blade guide hanging from the main hoist and a control rod/fuel support piece on the combined grapple hanging from the monorail aux hoist.

Event Malf Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description N/A I

Receipt of unexpected rod block over core due to load cell failure

2.

N/A M

Significant leakage from CRD Mechanism Housing requires installation of the Emergency Guide Tube Seal

( N )ormal,

( R )eactivity,

( I )nstrument,

( C )omponent,

( M )ajor Page 1 of 4

Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.

LG IPO Scenario No.

2 Event No.:

1 Page 1 of I Event

Description:

Receipt of unexpected rod block over core due to load cell failure Examiner Cue:

The NES combined grapple, the fuel support, and the control rod blade are clear of the top guide and coming up per Step 5. 8.19 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Raise NES combined grapple until it stops when the jam block actuates the whisker switch CUE: The aux hoist is full up CUE: The Reactor Operator has just received a ROD OUT BLOCK alarm.

The Refuel Plafform Operator has received ROD BLOCK #1 and ROD BLOCK #2 lamps and has 908 lb indicated on the main hoist Note: The candidate should recognize this as erroneous enforcement of a refueling interlock (hoist loaded over core). A failure of the load cell on the main hoist in the hi direction would cause this (See S97.0.M Attachment 1).

The RPO would also see weight indication jump.

FHD Place the components in a safe location due to equipment exhibiting unexpected behavior Ref: S97.0.M Step 3.1 NOTE: The candidate must address placing the loads in a safe location, keeping in mind that the main grapple will not attempt to release if the load is 908 lb. Examples of ways to meet this step could include (1) CRB in blade rack with FSP seated on rack, (2) hanging from the hoist as low as possible in the fuel pool, or (3) in a location specified by reactor engineers.

The load should not normally be left hanging over the core.

FHD

  • Suspend core alterations and CRB exchanges due to inoperable refueling interlocks Ref: LCO 3.9.6 FH-105 Step 4.27 Note: CRB exchanges are done in de-fueled cell. This is not a core alteration; however, the failed load cell will still prevent performing CRB exchanges because the blade guides will not release.

FHD Initiate notifications to troubleshoot and repair the main hoist load cell.

Page 2 of 4

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Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.

LG IPO Scenario No.

2 Event No.:

2 Page 1 of I Event

Description:

Significant leakage from CRD Mechanism Housing requires installation of the emergency guide tube seal Examiner Cue:

While waiting for the system manager to come to the refueling bridge, you hear a report from undervessel that a severe leak occurrred when CRD mechanism 30-39 was lowered using the NES machine. The lift cylinder has jammed and the CRD cannot be raised back into position. All undervessel crews are evacuating the drywell The control room supervisor has directed you to install the emergency guide tube seal to 30-39 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Attach CRB grapple or jet pump grapple as required to frame mounted or monorail aux hoist CUE: The grapple cabinet is currently obstructed by a piece of heavy equipment Ref: M-C-741-301 Section 5.7 FHD Use a rope to handle the guide tube seal as an emergency measure CUE: A 100 foot piece of nylon rope is now attached to the guide tube seal. The seal has been carried to the bridge NOTE. The guide tube seal is stored on a horizontal rack on the Southwest comer of the Refuel Floor. The rope is already staged and attached.

FHD Position the bridge and trolley over 30-39 CUE: The cab is over 30-39 FHD

  • Direct the guide tube seal lowered over the rail into the guide tube for 30-39 CUE: The rope is wrapped around the railing and the seal is in the water. The seal has been lowered through the top guide and has seated in 30-39. Leakage is stopped as verified by undervessel inspection.

CUE: You have reached the termination point for the scenario.

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LSRO INTEGRATED PLANT SCENARIO TURNOVER CONDITIONS LGS Scenario 2 Fuel Handling Director Unit 2 Mode 5 In-vessel maintenance is in progress on Unit 2 per M-C-741-301 All prerequisites for core alterations are met and all rods indicate full in (dummy PIPs are installed on uncoupled rods)

Control rod blade exchange in cell 30-39 is in progress. The double blade guide is hanging from the main hoist with weight indicating 385 lb.

The FSP and CRB are being raised through the top guide on the NES combined grapple on the monorail aux hoist with weight indicating 460 lb and all flags in full-down position (this value agrees with Attachment 12 expected value)

Page 4 of 4 CANDIDATE

Appendix D SCENARIO OUTLINE Form ES-D-1 Facility: PBAPS 2 and 3 Scenario No.

1 Op-Test Number__

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: Core alterations are in progress on Unit 3 Turnover. A bundle is being raised from the core.

Event Malf Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description

1.

N/A C

Hoist jam condition while moving fuel

2.

N/A M

Unexpected fuel floor area radiation monitor alarm (N )ormal,

( R )eactivity,

( I )nstrument,

(

)omponent,

( M )ajor Page 1 of 4

Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D Page 2 of 4

  • Denotes Critical Task Op-Test No.

PB IPO Scenario No.

1 Event No.:

1 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Hoist jam condition while moving fuel Examiner Cue:

Bundle 17-30 is grappled and being raised. The hoist is at 530 inches and is coming up with the bundle oriented Northwest.

The Refuel Platform Operator has just called out a hoist jam condition with about half the bundle above the top guide Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD

  • Direct the RPO to stop hoist operation Ref: S018.1.A-3 FHD Direct the bundle to be lowered until the hoist jam goes out CUE: The RPO has lowered the bundle several inches. The HOIST JAM lamp is out and the grapple controls are released The RPO reports that the bundle channel appears bowed by visual observation.

I FHD The FHD may at this point direct the RPO to attempt to raise the bundle again.

CUE: The RPO has attempted to raise the bundle again using gentle rotation of the mast. The bundle is now clear of the core and is over the spent fuel pool on the way to X-54 i

+

Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS.

Form ES-D-2,w Op-Test No.

PB IPO Scenario No.

1 Event No.:

2 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Unexpected Fuel Floor Area Radiation Alarm Examiner Cue:

The bundle from 17-30 is now about to be lowered into the spent fuel pool. The location and orientation of the bundle has been double-verified and the mast encoder indicates 12 inches Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Direct the RPO to lower the bundle until a slack cable warning is received CUE: The bundle is going down Wait 20 seconds CUE: The fuel storage pool ARM is now alarming FHD

  • Direct the RPO to stop lowering the bundle FHD Enter ON-124, FUEL FLOOR AND FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS -PROCEDURE FHD Recognize that the alarm is not due simply to a bundle positioned near a monitor because the alarm would have been received prior to lowering the bundle Ref: ON-124 Section 2.2 FHD Direct the bundle to be raised until it clears the fuel racks CUE: The RPO has begun to raise the bundle, then reports that the hoist has stopped and a FAULT DETECTED alarm is received for unknown reasons. The bundle is still about halfway into the fuel rack FHD Recognize the bundle will not raise or lower FHD Inform Health Physics of the condition FHD Notify the Main Control Room crew CUE: You can now hear the Fuel Floor Area Rad Monitor alarming FHD
  • Direct the crew to evacuate to the Turbine Building elevation 165' CUE: You have reached the termination point for the scenario.

Page 3 of 4

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LSRO INTEGRATED PLANT SCENARIO TURNOVER CONDITIONS PBAPS Scenario 1 Fuel Handling Director Unit 3 Mode 5 Core Shuffle Part 2 in progress All prerequisites for core alterations are met and a bundle is being raised form the core CANDIDATE Page 4 of 4

.4 Appendix D SCENARIO OUTLINE Form ES-D-1 Facility: PBAPS 2 and 3 Scenario No.

2 Op-Test Number:

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: Core shuffle part 2 is in progress.

Turnover:. A bundle is in transit from the fuel pool to the core.

Event Malf Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description

1.

N/A I

Wide Range Nuclear Monitoring (WRNM) Instrument failure requires suspension of core alterations

2.

N/A M

Loss of cavity level and emergency makeup 11 1

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Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.

PB IPO Scenario No.

2 Event No.:

1 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Wide Range Nuclear Monitoring instrument failure requires suspension of core alterations Examiner Cue:

With the refuel platform entering the refuel slot, the Reactor Operator contacts the bridge crew and reports the "2B" Wide Range NI just failed because the cable was accidentally un-plugged from under the vessel Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Direct the RPO to stop auto motion due to failure to meet required operable nuclear instruments Ref: T.S. Surv. Req. 3.3.1.2.2 NOM-L-4.1 FH-6C Step 5.6 Examiner Note: The candidate need only simulate that the bundle is not inserted into the core. He or she may elect to complete the transit of the refuel slot to r'ninimize dose rate in the drywell The candidate may either direct the RPO to stop the bridge, or he or she may simulate supervisory action from the FHD console by stopping the move. The move may be terminated by performing any of the following:

  • Touching AUTO STOP Deflecting a manual motion joystick Depressing STOP pushbutton Depressing TRAVEL OVERRIDE CUE: The RPO has stopped the bridge (You have stopped the bridge)

FHD Notify Reactor Engineering that core alterations have been suspended Ref: FH-6C Step 10.2.4 CUE: Reactor engineering directs you to return the bundle to the "safe setdown" location until the WRNM is restored FHD Return the bundle to the safe setdown location in the fuel pool in semi-auto or manual mode CUE: The bundle is in-transit to the location you selected Page 2 of 5

  • Denotes Critical Task

Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.

PB IPO Scenario No.

2 Event

Description:

Loss of reactor cavity level and emergency makeup CUE:

Event No.:

2 Page 1 of 2 While waiting in a low dose area for the WRNM to be restored, you hear the drywell control point reporting that everyone just came running out of the drywell because there is a huge leak coming from some big pipe. You can also see cavity level dropping.rapidly, and the fuel pool cooling weirs just became uncovered. You have been directed to respond to the cavity level drop from the fuel floor because the only available ECCS has failed to inject from the control room.

Time I

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Enter ON-124, FUEL FLOOR AND FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS - PROCEDURE FHD

  • Ensure all irradiated components are lowered to a safe location Complete the fuel move in progress, either to the original location or to the nearest fuel pool location (the rapid level drop given in the cue may cause the candidate to abandon the move to-the original location and simply get the bundle down immediately. This is also an acceptable response per the procedure)

Ensure the fuel prep machines are fully lowered if fuel loaded All other irradiated components hanging from any hoist or cable is lowered CUE: All fuel and irradiated materials are fully lowered Ref: ON-124 Section 2.6 FHD Notify Health Physics to continue to evaluate fuel floor conditions CUE: HP is on the fuel floor and providing continuous coverage FHD Evaluate whether the fuel is uncovered in the fuel pool for the purpose of EP classification CUE: The fuel is still covered by approximately 20 feet of water FHD Evacuate non-essential personnel to the Turbine Building CUE: The Shift manager has directed you to remain on the fuel floor and direct the response until Health Physics directs you to evacuate.

Page 3 of 5

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Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ESD-2 Op-Test No.

PB IPO Event

Description:

Scenario No.

2 Event No.:

2 Page 2 of 2 Loss of reactor cavity level and emergency makeup CUE:

While waiting in a low dose area for the WRNM to be restored, you hear the drywell control point reporting that everyone just came running out of the drywell because there is a huge leak coming from some big pipe. You can also see cavity level dropping rapidly, and the fuel pool cooling weirs just became uncovered. You have been directed to respond to the cavity level drop from the fuel floor because the only available ECCS has failed to inject from the control room.

FHD Enter FH-74, "Actions in Response to an Unexpected Loss of Fuel Pool, Reactor Cavity, or Equipment Storage Pool Water Inventory" FHD Inspect the fuel pool rails, racks, fuel prep machines, and cask laydown area for any irradiated material above the top of the fuel storage racks CUE: All materials are below the top of the racks Ref: FH-74 Step 8.4.2 (Note-There are several steps in FH-74 thathave already been taken in ON-124. The candidate may spend a few moments locating the next step that needs to be performed)

FHD Turn off power to the refueling platform FHD Exit the area using proper HP procedures CUE: While exiting, the control room supervisor calls and directs you to add water to the cavity per FH-74. Health Physics is present and states that radiological conditions permit the performance of the steps on the refuel floor FHD

  • Attach hoses to any condensate and demin water connections and route to the cavity and add water FHD
  • Roll out any fire hose attached to a water supply and route to the cavity and add water CUE: You have reached the termination point for the scenario Page 4 of 5
  • Denotes Critical Task I

I

LSRO INTEGRATED PLANT SCENARIO TURNOVER CONDITIONS PBAPS Scenario 2 Fuel Handling Director Unit 2 Mode 5 Core Shuffle Part 2 in progress Unit 2 Refuel Platform is in full automatic X, Y, Z mode "A", "B", "G", and "H" WRNMs are the only operable Nuclear Instruments The CCTAS step in progress is bundle PYN463 from P2SPENT CC-18 (NW) to 51-34 (SW)

The CCTAS lists P2SPENT YY39 as the safe setdown location All prerequisites for core alterations are met and the bridge is in motion toward the refueling slot CAN DI DATE Page 5 of 5

Effective Date:

ERP-101, Rev.

23 Page 1 of 32 RES/res PECO NUCLEAR PEACH BOTTOM UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE ERP-101 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES 1.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 1.1 Shift Management:

1.1.1 Recognize and classify an event or condition.

1.1.2 Assume duties of Emergency Director (ED).

1.2 Plant Manager or designated alternate:

1.2.1 Relieve acting ED.

1.2.2 Assume duties of ED.

2.0 INITIAL ACTIONS NOTE THE JUDGMENT OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER GUIDANCE IN THE PROCEDURE.

NOTE IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN 15 MINUTES AFTER THE APPLICABLE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)

ARE MET.

2.1 Emergency Director shall:

2.1.1 Select categories appropriate for station events or conditions.

2.1.2 Review Emergency Action Level (EALs) for categories selected.

2.1.3 IF the event trigger is known to be spurious, THEN do not classify the event (i.e.,

false high reading, false radiation monitor readings, etc.)

2.1.4 Classify the event based on selected categories and most severe EALs.

2.1.5 IF the event or condition classifies as an emergency, THEN assume duties of ED and implement ERP-200.

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 2 of 32 RES/res 3.0 CONTINUING ACTIONS NOTE IT IS PREFERABLE TO OBTAIN EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGER (ERM)

CONCURRENCE PRIOR TO DE-ESCALATION.

3.1 IF emergency conditions dictate, THEN escalate or de escalate emergency classification.

4.0 FINAL CONDITIONS 4.1 Emergency conditions have been terminated, or ERP-C 1900, Recovery Phase Implementation has been implemented.

5.0 ATTACHMENTS AND APPENDICES 5.1 -

EAL Table of Contents and Tables 1 through 9.

CM-i, CM-2, CM-3, CM-5 5.2 - Terms and Definitions 6.0 SUPPORTING INFORMATION 6.1 Purpose 6.1.1 To provide the method for classifying an event or condition into one of four (4) emergency classifications described in the Nuclear Emergency Plan.

6.1.2 To provide pre-determined Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for specific plant conditions whenever a General Emergency is declared.

6.2 Criteria For Use 6.2.1 Implement whenever conditions meet or exceed EALs listed in the Tables.

NOTE ISSUANCE OF A PAR REQUIRES A GENERAL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND CONVERSELY A GENERAL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION REQUIRES THE ISSUANCE OF A PAR.

6.2.2 PAR information in the tables, is expected to be used when an event rapidly progresses to a General Emergency or when the PAR is based only on plant conditions.

Dose Assessment based PAR information may be obtained from the Dose Assessment Coordinator or the Dose Assessment Team Leader.

In either case, the most conservative PAR available is to be used.

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 3 of 32 RES/res 6.2.3 Whenever the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is activated, then all PAR information from the ED should be submitted to the ERM.

CM-4 6.3 Special Equipment None 6.4 References 6.4.1 EPA-400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents ERP-200, Emergency Director (ED)

ERP-C-1900, Recovery Phase Implementation Nuclear Emergency Plan NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-l, Criteria for Preparations and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Nuclear Power Plants PBAPS Technical Specifications PBAPS Offsite Dose Calculation Manual PBAPS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Reference Manual:

Identification and Evaluation of Potentially Reportable Items SE-i, Plant Shutdown from the Remote Shutdown Panel SE-5, Earthquake SE-10, Plant Shutdown from the Alternative Shutdown Panels T-101, Reactor Pressure Vessel Control T-102, Primary Containment Control T-103, Secondary Containment Control T-104, Radioactivity Release Control T-116, RPV Flooding 6.4.2 6.4.3 6.4.4 6.4.5 6.4.6 6.4.7 6.4.8 6.4.9 6.4.10 6.4.11 6.4.12 6.4.13 6.4.14 6.4.15 6.4.16 6.4.17 6.4.18

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 4 of 32 RES/res 6.4.19 T-200, Primary Containment Venting 6.4.20 SO 67.7A, Verification of Suspected Earthquake or Seismic System Activation 6.4.21 US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors 6.4.22 US NRC Response Technical Manual 6.5 Commitment Annotation 6.5.1 CM-i, NRC Inspection Report 50-277, 278/

88 12/12 (T00349),

(see Attachment 1, tables 1 through 9) 6.5.2 CM-2, Event INV Report 3-90-031, corrective action #7, (T00826),

(see Attachment 1, table 1 for Reactor Fuel and table 3 for Fission Product Barrier) 6.5.3 CM-3, NRC URI 85-17-03, IN Inspection Report 86-06/06, (T01934),

(see Attachment 1, table

9) 6.5.4 CM-4, Peach Bottom Inspection Report 92-19/19 (T02540),

(see section 6.2.3) 6.5.5 CM-5, NRC Inspection 92-03/03, (T02541),

(see, table 3 for Fission Product Barrier)

ERP-101, Rev. 23 Page 5 of 32 RES/res Attachment I EAL Table of Contents 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.1 C oo lant A ctivity..............................................................................................

.. 6 1.2 Irradiated Fuel or New Fuel............................................................................

7 2.0 Reactor Pressure Vessel 2.1 Reactor W ater Level........................................................................................

8 2.2 Reactor Power................................................................................................

9 3.0 Fission Product Barrier CM-2, CM-5 3.1 Initiating Condition Matrix.............................................................................

10 3.2 Fission Product Barrier Table........................................................................

11 4.0 Secondary Containment Bypass 4.1 Main Steam Line............................................................................................

13 5.0 Radioactivity Release 5.1 Effluent Release and Dose...........................................................................

14 5.2 In-Plant Radiation..........................................................................................

16 6.0 Loss of Power 6.1 Loss of AC or DC Power.................................................................................

18 7.0 Internal Events 7.1 Technical Specifications & Control Room Evacuation.................................

20 7.2 Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capabililty......................................................

21 7.3 Loss of Assessment/Communications Capabililty.........................................

22 8.0 External Events 8.1 Security Events.............................................................................................

24 8.2 Fire/Explosion and Toxic/Flammable Gases.................................................

26 8.3 Man-Made Events.........................................................................................

28 8.4 Natural Events..............................................................................................

29 9.0 Other CM-3 9.1 G e n e ra l..............................................................................................................

3 1 MODE 11 Run 22 Startup 33 Shutdown (hot) 44 Shutdown (cold) 55 Refueling D6 Defueled CM-1, All Tables

ERP-101, Rev. 23 Page 6 of 32 RES/res 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.1 Coolant Activity CLASSIFICATION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL UNUSUAL IC Fuel Clad Degradation EVENT 1.1.1.a Applicable Modes: ALL Reactor Coolant activity >4,uCi/gm Dose Equivalent Iodine 131 1.1.1.b Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 SJAE Discharge Radiation > 2.5x10 mR/hr ALERT None SITE AREA None EMERGENCY GENERAL None EMERGENCY

ERP-101, Rev. 23 Page 7 of 32 R ES/res 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.2 Irradiated Fuel or New Fuel 1

ULASSIFICATION UNUSUAL EVENT

'NLERT Ii EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL IC Unexpected Rise in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration.

1.2.1.a Applicable Modes: ALL Uncontrolled water level drop in the spent fuel pool with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water 1.2.1.b Applicable Modes: ALL Unexpected Skimmer Surge Tank low level alarm AND Visual observation of an uncontrolled water level drop below the fuel pool skimmer surge tank inlet IC Unexpected Rise in Plant Radiation 1.2.1.c Applicable Modes: ALL Radiological readings exceed 600 mR/hr one foot away OR 1200 mR/hr at the external surface of any dry storage system IC Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel 1.2.2.a Applicable Modes: ALL Unplanned general area radiation > 500 mR/hr on the refuel floor (Table 1-1) 1.2.2.b Applicable Modes: ALL Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered 1.2.2.c Applicable Modes: 5 (With Reactor Refueling Cavity Flooded)

Water Level < 458" above RPV instrument zero for the Reactor Refueling Cavity that will result in Irradiated Fuel uncovering 1.2.2.d Applicable Modes: ALL Water Level < 232ft 3 inches plant elevation for the Spent Fuel Pool that will result in Irradiated Fuel uncovering L

SITIE AREA None EMERGENCY GENERAL None EMERGENCY Table 1-1 Refuel Floor ARMs 3-7 (7-9)

Steam Separator Pool 3-8 (7-10)

Refuel Slot 3-9(7-11)

Fuel Pool 3-10(7-12)

Refueling Bridge

=

I

2.0 Reactor Pressure Vessel 2.1 Reactor Water Level ERP-101, Rev. 23 Page 8 of 32 RES/res CLASSIFICATION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY IC Reactor Coolant System Leakage 2.1.1 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4 The following conditions exist:

Unidentified Primary System Leakage > 10 gpm into the Drywell OR Identified Primary System Leakage > 25 gpm into the Drywell None IC Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover fuel in the Reactor Vessel 2.1.3 Applicable Modes: 4, 5 RPV level < -172 "

'ENERAL 11EMERGENCY None p

None

2.0 Reactor Pressure Vessel ERP-101, Rev. 23 Page 9 of 32 RES/res 2.2 Reactor Power CLASSIFICATION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL None IC Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Scram Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Scram Was Successful 2.2.2 Applicable Modes: 1, 2 Automatic RPS SCRAM should occur due to RPS Setpoint being exceeded AND Failure of Automatic RPS SCRAM to make Reactor shutdown IC Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Scram Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Scram Was NOT Successful 2.2.3 Applicable Modes: 1, 2 RPS SCRAM should occur due to RPS Setpoint being exceeded AND Failure of Automatic RPS, ARI AND Manual SCRAM to reduce reactor power < 4%

i IC Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Scram and Manual Scram was NOT Successful and There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core 2.2.4 Applicable Modes: 1, 2 RPS SCRAM should occur due to RPS Setpoint being exceeded AND Failure of Automatic RPS, ARI AND Manual SCRAM to reduce reactor power < 4%

AND Torus Temperature is on the "UNSAFE" side of the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) curve (T-1 02, T/T-1) OR RPV level <-200"

      • PAR***

Evacuate 2 mile radius, evacuate affected sector(s) plus 1 sector on each side of affected sector(s) for 2-5 miles.

1 i

i

3.0 Fission Product Barrier Table ERP-101, Rev. 23 Page 10 of 32 R ES/res 3.1 Initiating Condition Matrix USE TABLE 3.2, "FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER STATUS TABLE" FOR CLASSIFYING EVENT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL 3.1.1 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 ANY Loss OR ANY Potential Loss of Primary Containment ALERT 13.1.2 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY

.3ENERAL EMERGENCY ANY Loss OR ANY Potential Loss of EITHER Fuel Clad OR RCS 3.1.3 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Loss of BOTH Fuel Clad AND RCS OR Potential Loss of BOTH Fuel Clad AND RCS OR Potential Loss of EITHER Fuel Clad OR RCS, AND Loss of ANY Additional Barrier 3.1.4 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND Potential Loss of Third Barrier

      • PAR***

Evacuate 2 mile radius, evacuate affected sector(s) plus 1 sector on each side of affected sector(s) for 2-5 miles. (See Fission Product Barrier Table 3.2 for exception based on extremely Hi Containment Radiation Levels.)

NOTES:

1.

If a "Loss" condition is satisfied, the "Potential Loss" category can be considered satisfied. This is accounted for in the matrix contained in the Fission Product Barrier Table 3.2 used to determine the proper classification based on Fission Product Barrier status.

2.

For all conditions listed in Fission Product Barrier Table 3.2, the barrier failure column is only satisfied if it fails when called upon to mitigate an accident. For example, failure of both containment isolation valves to isolate with a downstream pathway to the environment is only a concern during an accident.

If this condition exists during normal power operations, it will be an active Technical Specification Action Statement. However, during accident conditions, this will represent a breach of containment.

CLASSIFICATION UNUSUAL EVENT

3.2 Fission Product-iarrier Status Table Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Barrier Parameter Reactor Coolant Activity Fuel Clad Loss Pot(

Reactor Coolant activity >

"/A.

300 pCigm Dose Equivalent Iodine 131

.101, Rev. 23 Page 11 of32 RES/res RES/res Primary Containment RPV Level IRPV level < -200 "

RPV Level Unknown RCS Leak Rate Drywell Pressure Drywell Radiation V level < -172 "

eIUV I ý -

RPV level cannot be restored above -200" within the time limit of the "SAFE" region of the Maximum Core Uncovery Time Limit Curve (T-1 16, RE-l)

RPV level cannot be determined AND RPV Flooding cannot be established as indicated by inability to maintain 5 ADS/SRVs open with RPV pressure at least 60 psig above Torus pressure per T-116 rv-v mV*l uannot De determined RCS leakage

>50 gpm Drywell Pressure

> 49 psig and rising

> 2.0 psig AND Indication of a leak inside drywell Drywell Rad Monitor reading

> 8x104 R/hr Drywell Hydrogen > 6%

AN.__D Drywell Oxygen >.5%

Drywell Rad Monitor reading

> 6x105R/hr Drywell Rad Monitor reading

> 15 R/hr Evacuate 5 mile radius, evacuate affected sector(s) plus 1 sector on each side of affected sector(s) for 5-10 miles.

Reacutor Coolant system Drywell Pressure ORR

luuuon in me Judgment of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the FUEL CLAD barrier In the table below, circle all of the appropriate X's in each applicable row for e 3.2 Fission Product Barrier Status Table

-101, Rev. 23 Aplicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Page 12 of 32 RES/res Reactor Coolant System Primary Containment Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss SUnisolable primary system leakage outside drywell as Failure of both valves in any indicated by T-1 03, one line to close AND Temperature Action Level downstream pathway to the is exceeded in ONE area environment exists requiring a SCRAM OR OR Unisolable primary system Intentional venting per leakage outside drywell as T-200 is required indicated by T-103, Radiation Action Level is OR exceeded in ONE area Unisolable primary system requiring a SCRAM leakage outside drywell as indicated by T-1 03, Temperature Action Level is exceeded in ONE area requiring a SCRAM OR Unisolable primary system leakage outside drywell as indicated by a T-1 03, Radiation Action Level is exceeded in ONE area requiring a SCRAM Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Director Any condition in the judgment of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS barrier that indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Primary Containment barrier Classify the event as identifie.in

  • ,k1.

, o.r-otenal Loss of Fission Product Barrier as determined by the table above.

1 I

    • ...PAR-...

Evacuate 2 mile radius, evacuate affected sector(s) plus 1 sector on each side of affected sector(s) for 2-5 miles. (Upgrade PAR for D/W Rad > 6x10° R/hr)

~~~~~~~-

e........

he; al* lding if all X's in a column under that heading are circled.

ERP-1 01, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 13 of 32 RES/res 4.0 Secondary Containment Bypass 4.1 Main Steam Line CLASSIFICATION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT

--jTE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL IC Fuel Ciad Degradation 4.1.1 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Main Steam Line HiHi Radiation (10xNFPB)

IC RCS Leak Rate 4.1.2 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Indication of a Main Steam Line Break:

Hi Steam Flow Annunciator AND Hi Steam Tunnel Temperature Annunciator OR Direct report of steam release None None I

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 14 of 32 RES/res 5.0 Radioactivity Release 5.1 Effluent Release and Dose LLAbF1ICATION UNUSUAL EVENT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL IC Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the Radiological Technical Specifications for 60 Minutes or Longer 5.1.1.a Applicable Modes: ALL A valid reading on one or more of the following radiation monitors that exceeds TWO TIMES the HiHi alarm setpoint value for > 60 minutes:

Main Stack, Vent Stack, Radwaste Discharge, Service Water Discharge AND Calculated maximum offsite dose rate using computer dose model exceeds 0.114 mRem/hr TPARD OR 0.342 mRem/hr child thyroid CDE based on a 60 minute average Note:

If the required dose projections cannot be completed within the 60 minute period, then the declaration must be made based on the valid sustained monitor reading.

5.1.1.b Applicable Modes: ALL Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concentrations or release rates exceeclinri TWC3 TIM*IIQ T,*-.k o..

......u....

..v,t,

%.)j p e c s k L i q U l a R e l e a s e O D C M 3.

and Gaseous Release ODCM 3.8.C.1.b) for

> 60 minutes ALERT IC Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 200 Times Radiological Technical Specificati for 15 Minutes or Longer 5.1.2.a Applicable Modes: ALL A valid reading on one or more of the following radiation monitors that exceeds TWO HUNDRED TIMES the HiHi alarm setpoint value for > 15 minutes:

Main Stack, Vent Stack, Radwaste Discharge, Service Water Discharge AND Calculated maximum offsite dose rate exceeds 11.4 mRem/hr TPARD OR 34.2 mRem/hr child thyroid CDE based on a 15 minute average Note:

If the required dose projections cannot be completed within the 15 minut4 eriod then the utrijlr!sie o, tne+ vaid*sustained

,eriu h

h made based on te valid sustained monitor reading.

8. B. 1 ons 5.1.2.b Applicable Modes: ALL Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concentrations or release rates exceeding TWO HUNDRED TIMES Tech Specs (Liquid Release ODCM 3.8.B.1 and Gaseous Release ODCM 3.8.C.l.b) for

> 15 minutes e

I

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 15 of 32 RES/res rE AREA IC Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous EMERGENCY Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mR Whole Body or 500 mR Child Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release 5.1.3 Applicable Modes: ALL A valid reading on one or more of the following radiation monitors that exceeds or is expected to exceed the value shown for > 15 minutes AND Dose Projections are not available:

Main Stack 5.84 pVCi/cc Vent Stack 2.08E-3 ýiCi/cc Torus Vent 203 cpm Note:

If the required dose projections cannot be completed within the 15 minute period, then the declaration must be made based on the valid sustained monitor reading.

OR Projected offsite dose using computer dose model exceeds 100 mRem TPARD OR 500 mRem child thyroid CDE OR Analysis of Field Survey results indicate site boundary whole body dose rate exceeds 100 mRem/hr expected to continue for more than one hour, OR Analysis of Field Survey results indicate child thyroid dose commitment of 500 mRem for one hour of inhalation "ENERAL IC Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous

.MERGENCY Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 mR Whole Body or 5000 mR Child Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release Using Actual Meteorology 5.1.4 Applicable Modes: ALL A valid reading on one or more of the following radiation monitors that exceeds or is expected to exceed the value shown for > 15 minutes AND Dose Projections are not available:

Main Stack 58.4 pCi/cc Vent Stack 2.08E-2 pCi/cc Torus Vent 2000 cpm Note:

If the required dose projections cannot be completed within the 15 minute period, then the declaration must be made based on the valid sustained monitor reading.

OR Projected offsite dose using computer dose model exceeds 1000 mRem TPARD OR 5000 mRem child thyroid CDE OR Analysis of Field Survey results indicate site boundary whole body dose rate exceeds 1000 mRem/hr expected to continue for more than one hour, OR Analysis of Field Survey results indicate child thyroid dose commitment of 5000 mRem for one hour of inhalation

      • PAR***

Evacuate 2 mile radius, evacuate affected sector(s) plus 1 sector on each side of affected sector(s) for 2-5 miles.

CDE = Committed Dose Equivalent, TPARD = Total Protective Action Recommendation Dose NTE:

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 16 of 32 RES/res 5.0 Radioactivity Release 5.2 In-Plant Radiation CLASSIFICATION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL UNUSUAL IC Unexpected Rise in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 5.2.1 Applicable Modes: ALL Valid Direct Area Radiation Monitor readings rise by a factor of 1000 over normal*

levels Normal levels can be considered as the highest reading in the past twenty four hours excluding the current peak value.

IC Release of Radioactive Material or Rises in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown 5.2.2.a Applicable Modes: ALL Valid radiation level readings > 5000 mR/hr in areas requiring infrequent access to maintain plant safety functions as identified in procedure SE-1, SE-10 AND Access is required for safe plant operation, but is impeded, due to radiation dose rates 5.2.2.b Applicable Modes: ALL Valid Control Room OR Central Alarm Station radiation reading > 15 mR/hr None None

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 17 of 32 RES/res This Intentionally Left Blank

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 18 of 32 RES/res 6.0 Loss of Power 6.1 Loss of AC or DC Power CLASSIFICATION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL UNUSUAL IC Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes EVENT 6.1.1.a Applicable Modes: ALL The following conditions exist:

Loss of Power to 2 and 3 Startup and Emergency Aux. Transformers and 343 Startup Transformer for >15 minutes AND At least Two Diesel Generators are supplying power to their respective 4 KV emergency busses IC Unplanned Loss of Required DC Power During Cold Shutdown or Refueling Mode for Greater than 15 Minutes 6.1.1.b Applicable Modes: 4, 5 Unplanned Loss of ALL safety related DC Power indicated by

< 107.5 VDC on DC Panels 2(3)0D21, 22, 23, 2 4 for >15 minutes ALERT IC AC power capability to essential busses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that any additional single failure would result in station blackout 6.1.2.a Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 The following conditions exist:

Loss of Power to 2 and 3 Startup and Emergency Aux. Transformers and 343 Startup Transformer for >15 minutes AND Only One 4 KV emergency bus powered from a Single Onsite Power Source due to the Loss of: Three of Four Division Diesel Generators, D/G Output Breakers, or 4 KV Emergency Busses as indicated by bus voltage IC Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses During Cold Shutdown Or Refueling Mode 6.1.2.b Applicable Modes: 4, 5, D The following conditions exist:

Loss of Power to 2 and 3 Startup and Emergency Aux. Transformers and 343 Startup Transformer AND Failure to restore power to at least One 4 KV emergency bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power K

ERP-1 01, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 19 of 32 R ES/res TE AREA IC Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential EMERGENCY Busses 6.1.3.a Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 The following conditions exist:

Loss of Power to 2 and 3 Startup and Emergency Aux. Transformers and 343 Startup Transformer RINIU Failure to restore power to at least One 4 KV emergency bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC IC Loss of All Vital DC Power 6.1.3.b Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Loss of ALL Safety Related DC Power indicated by < 107.5 VDC on DC Panels 2(3)0D21, 22, 23, 24 for > 15 minutes IC Prolonged Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power 6.1.4 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Prolonged loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

Loss of Power to 2 and 3 Startup and Emergency Aux. Transformers and 343 Startup Transformer AND Failure of ALL Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to 4 KV emergency busses AND At least one of the following conditions exist:

"* Restoration of at least One emergency bus within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is NOT likely OR

"* Reactor Water Level cannot be maintained > -172 OR

"* Torus temperature is on the "UNSAFE" side of the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) curve (T-102, T/T-l)

      • PAR***

Evacuate 2 mile radius, evacuate affected sector(s) for 2-5 miles.

affected sector(s) plus 1 sector on each side of I GENERAL EMERGENCY

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 20 of 32 R ES/res 7.0 Internal Events 7.1 Technical Specification & Control Room Evacuation CLASSIFICATION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL IC Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Mode Within Technical Specification Limits 7.1.1 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Inability to reach required shutdown mode within Tech. Spec. LCO required action completion time.

IC Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated 7.1.2 i1 Applicable Modes: ALL Entry into SE-1 or SE-I 0 procedure for Control Room evacuation IC Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Established 7.1.3 Applicable Modes: ALL The following conditions exist:

Control room evacuation has been initiated AND Control of the plant cannot be established per SE-1 or SE-1 0 within 15 minutes None I

ERP-1 01, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 21 of 32 R ES/res 7.0 Internal Events 7.2 Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability CLASSIFICATION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL UNUSUAL None EVENT ALERT IC Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown 7.2.2 Applicable Modes: 4, 5 The foilowing conditions exist:

Unplanned Loss of ALL Tech Spec required systems available to provide Decay Heat Removal functions AND Uncontrolled Temperature rise that either:

Exceeds 212 OF (Excluding a <15 minute rise >2120 F with a heat removal function restored)

OR Results in temperature rise approaching 212 OF (with NO heat removal function restored)

SITE AREA IC Complete Loss of Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown EMERGENCY 7.2.3 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Loss of TORUS heat sink capabilities as evidenced by T-1 02 T/T legs directing a T 112 Emergency Blowdown GENERAL None EMERGENCY

ERP-1 01, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 22 of 32 RES/res 7.0 Internal Events 7.3 Loss of Assessment / Communication Capability CLASSIFICATION UNUSUAL EVENT mLERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

-NERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL IC Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in The Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes 7.3.1.a Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciators (Table 7-1) OR indicators (Table 7-2) for > 15 minutes requiring increased surveillance to safely operate the unit(s).

IC Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications Capabilities 7.3.1.b Applicable Modes: ALL Loss of ALL Onsite communications (Table 7-3) affecting the ability to perform routine operations OR Loss of ALL Offsite communications (Table 7-3)

IC Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication In Control Room With Either (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators are Unavailable 7.3.2 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciators (Table 7-1) OR indicators (Table 7-2) for > 15 minutes requiring increased surveillance to safely operate the unit(s)

AND EITHER A significant plant transient is in progress (Table 7-4) OR the plant monitoring system (PMS) is unavailable.

IC Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress 7.3.3 Applicable Modes: 1, 2, 3 Loss of safety system annunciators (Table 7-1)

AND indicators (Table 7-2)

AND PMS AND a significant plant transient is in progress. (Table 7-4)

None

ERP-1 01, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 23 of 32 RES/res Table 7-1 Safety System Annunciators ECCS Containment Isolation Reactor Trip Process Radiation Monitoring Table 7-2 Safety Function Indicators Reactor Power Decay Heat Removal Containment Safety Functions Table 7-3 Communications Onsite Offsite Site Phones (GTE System) x x

OMNI System X

X Plant Public Address X

Station Radio X

NRC (FTS-2000)

X PA State Police Radio X

Load Dispatcher Radio X

PECO Dial Network X

Table 7-4 Siqnificant Plant Transients SCRAM Recirc Runbacks > 25% thermal power Sustained power oscillations 25% peak to peak Stuck open relief valve(s)

ECCS injection

ERP-101, Rev. 23Errorl Main Document Only.

Page 24 of 32 RES/res 8.0 External Events 8.1 Security Threats CLASSIFICATION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL IC Confirmed Security Event Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant 8.1.1 Applicable Modes: ALL A credible threat to the station reported by the NRC.

OR An actual threat that meets ALL of the following criteria:

"* A credible threat reported by any other outside agency or determined per SY-AA-101-132; AND

"° Is specifically directed towards the station; AND

"* Is imminent (within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />).

OR Attempted intrusion and attack to the Protected Areas OR Attempted sabotage discovered within the Protected Areas OR Hostage/Extortion situation that threatens normal plant operations IC Security Event in a Plant Protected Area 8.1.2 Applicable Modes: ALL Intrusion into plant protected areas by a hostile force OR Confirmed bomb, sabotage or sabotage device discovered in the Protected Areas IC Security Event in a Plant Vital Area 8.1.3 Applicable Modes: ALL Intrusion into plant Vital area by a hostile force OR Confirmed bomb, sabotage or sabotage device discovered in a Vital Area IC Security Event Resulting in Loss of Ability to Reach and Maintain Cold Shutdown 8.1.4 Applicable Modes: ALL Loss of physical control of the control room due to security event OR Loss of physical control of all remote shutdown capability due to security event

      • PAR***

Evacuate 2 mile radius, evacuate affected sector(s) plus 1 sector on each side of affected sector(s) for 2-5 miles.

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 25 of 32 R ES/res This Page Intentionally Left Blank

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 26 of 32 RES/res 8.0 External Events 8.2 Fire / Explosion and Toxic / Flammable Gases CLASSIFICATION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL UNUSUAL IC Fire Within Protected Area Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of EVENT Detection 8.2.1.a Applicable Modes: ALL Fire within ON-1 14 Plant Vital Structures (Table 8-1) which is not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room alarm IC Release of Toxic or Flammable Gasses Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant 8.2.1.b Applicable Modes: ALL Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant OR Report by Local, County or State Officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event IC Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area 8.2.1.c Applicable Modes: ALL Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated explosion within protected area boundary resulting in visible damage to permanent structure or equipment ALERT IC Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown 8.2.2.a Applicable Modes: ALL The following conditions exist:

Fire or explosion which potentially makes inoperable:

Two or More subsystems of a Safe Shutdown System (Table 8-2) OR Two or More Safe Shutdown Systems OR Plant Vital Structures containing Safe Shutdown Equipment AND Safe Shutdown System or Plant Vital Structure is required for the present Operational Mode

ERP-1 01, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 27 of 32 RES/res IC Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown Applicable Modes: ALL Report or detection of toxic gases within Plant Vital Structures (Table 8-1) in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel OR Report or detection of flammable gases within Plant Vital Structures (Table 8-1) in concentrations affecting the safe operation of the plant SITE AREA None EMERGENCY GENERAL None EMERGENCY Table 8-1 Plant Vital Structures Power Block Diesel Generator Building Emergency Pump Structure Inner Screen Structure Emergency Cooling Tower Table 8-2 Safe Shutdown Systems Diesel Generators HPCI Core Spray SBGTS PCIS 4KV Safeguard Buses RCIC HPSW ECW Control Room Ventilation ADS RHR (All Modes)

ESW CAC/CAD II T

.ERT 8.2.2.b

ERP-1 01, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 28 of 32 RES/res 8.0 External Events 8.3 Man-Made Events CLASSIFICATION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL UNUSUAL IC Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area EVENT 8.3.1.a Applicable Modes: ALL Vehicle crash within protected area boundary that may potentially damage plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

8.3.1.b Applicable Modes: ALL Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.

ALERT IC Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area 8.3.2 Applicable Modes: ALL Vehicle crash affecting Plant Vital Structures (Table 8-1)

OR Turbine failure generated missiles result in any visible structural damage to or penetration of any Plant Vital Structures (Table 8-1)

SITE AREA None EMERGENCY GENERAL None EMERGENCY Table 8-1 Plant Vital Structures Power Block Diesel Generator Building Emergency Pump Structure Inner Screen Structure Emergency Cooling Tower

ERP-101, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 29 of 32 RES/res 8.0 External Events 8.4 Natural Events CLASSIFICATION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL IC Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area 8.4.1.a Applicable Modes: ALL Earthquake >.01 g as determined by procedure SO 67.7.A 8.4.1.b Applicable Modes: ALL Report by plant personnel of tornado striking within protected areas OR Wind speeds > 75 mph as indicated on site Meteorological data for > 15 minutes 8.4.1.c Applicable Modes: ALL Assessment by the control room that an event has occurred. (Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Areas) 8.4.1.d Applicable Modes: All High River level > 112' OR Low River level < 98.5' IC Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area 8.4.2.a Applicable Modes: ALL Earthquake >.05 g (Operating Basis Earthquake OBE) as determined by procedure SO 67.7.A 8.4.2.b Applicable Modes: ALL Tornado or wind speeds > 75 mph causing damage to Plant Vital Structures (Table 8-1) 8.4.2.c Applicable Modes: ALL Report of any visible structural damage to any Plant Vital Structure (Table 8-1) 8.4.2.d Applicable Modes: All High River level > 116' OR Low River level < 92.5' SITE AREA None EMERGENCY

-- iENERAL None EMERGENCY I

I

ERP-1 01, Rev. 23Errorl Main Document Only.

Page 30 of 32 RES/res

,le 8-1 Plant Vital Structures Power Block Diesel Generator Building Emergency Pump Structure Inner Screen Structure Emergency Cooling Tower

ERP-1 01, Rev. 23Error! Main Document Only.

Page 31 of 32 RES/res 9.0 Other 9.1 General CLASSIFICATION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT STE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL IC Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event 9.1.1 Applicable Modes: ALL Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant IC Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert 9.1.2 Applicable Modes: ALL Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted IC Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency 9.1.3 Applicable Modes: ALL Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public IC Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency 9.1.4 Applicable Modes: ALL Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director indicate:

(1) actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment, or (2) potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases. These releases can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA PAG plume exposure levels outside the site boundary

      • PAR***

Evacuate 2 mile radius, evacuate affected sector(s) I affected sector(s) for 2-5 miles.

plus 1 sector on each side of I

I

ERP-1O1, Rev.

23

'age 32 of 32 RES/res TERMS AND DEFINITIO Plant parameters or other condition which if met or exceeded the emergency classification level and requires a declaration of emergency.

System, subsystem, train, component, or
device, and all auxiliaries required for their operation, is capable of performing its specified function in the intended manner.

made to the state action avoid or reduce to the public.

An estimate of radiation dose which affected individuals could potentially receive if protective actions are not taken.

Total Protective Action Recommendation Dose.

(TPARD = External Dose & Inter nal Dose & Dose Due to 4-Day Shine)

Committed Dose Equivalent.

(CDE

= in ternal Organ Dose from Ingestion)

Committed Effective Dose Equivalent.

(CEDE = Internal Whole Body Dose from Ingestion)

Total Effective Dose Equivalent.

(TEDE

= Deep Dose Equivalent & CEDE Dose)

Action guidelines based on projections for the total integrated dose a member of the public would receive for the duration of the emergency.

An act conducted by a person or persons with the intent of damaging or impairing the operation of the plant.

Events in progress or have occurred, that indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

Events in progress or have occurred that involve actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Any releases of radioactive material are expected to be limited to small fractions of the Environmental Protective Agency (EPA)

Protective Action Guidelines (PAG) exposure levels.

Events in progress or which have occurred that involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public-Any releases of radioactive material are not expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels except near site boundary.

Events in progress or which have occurred that involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

Releases of radioactive material can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAC exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.

.11 _______

A security threat as illustrated by attempted entry or sabotage with the intent to gain physical control of the plant.

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