ML020350530
| ML020350530 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 01/11/2002 |
| From: | Pastis H NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1 |
| To: | NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1 |
| Pastis H, NRR/DLPM, 415-1261 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML020350586 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML020350530 (30) | |
Text
Americn Crane & Equipment Corp.
ACECO Suppliers of the Single-Failure-Proof Hoist System at Oyster Creek
Oyster Creek Modifications Included 0 New 125/10 SFP Main & Aux. Hoists Trolley 0 1,25% Load 'esting of Trolley at ACECO's Test Facility 0 Functional Testing at ACECO's Test Facility & OCNGS 0 Evaluation of the existing Whiting Bridge 0 Evaluation ol'the existing OCNGS steel superstructure
- Installation compliant with NUREG-0612
"* Trolley end stop modification
"* Special Lifting Devices to Complete Installation
"* Complete Documentation in accordance with QA Plan 10 CFR 50 Appendix B
RECENT HISTORY OF ACECO'S SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE DEVELOPMENT 1994 1995 1995 0
1995 1995 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1997 1997 1998 Completed "Wonder Hloist" ACECO's first nuclear SFP hoist flor re-racking pools Developed a 5 year plan to enter DOE*, aerospace & commercial nuclear markets Updated and implemented ACECO's nuclear QA program Completed upgrade to Reactor Building Crane at OCNGS Seismic specialist is hired ACECO's revised QA program audited by DOE custome: (Hanford)
Received firsi DOE order for 60/10 ton gantry crane for Hanford Site ACEC() engineer joins ASME NOG crane committee Evaluated OCNGS reactor building crane for possible SFP upgrade Received Aerospace order tfor 25-ton crane lor Boeing De& I I I launch complex Received order for 20 ton SIP crane for handling uranium it US Enrichment Received order for 7 SEP cranes & 15 SFP grabs for dismiiitlinm nuclear weapons in Mayak, Russia as part of the Salt II Treaty ASME NOG -1 type I cranes Added 17,000 space square feet to plant to handle additional business Received several orders f'rom I lanford for NQA-I hoists & cranes
RECENT HISTORY OF ACECO'S SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE DEVEVOPMENT 1998 Built S11 dry fuel transfer crane in association with NES for INEEL 1998 Second ma*jor locing order lor S1FP 50-ton Delta IV launch gantry crane 1999 Completed firs"t NRC type licensing review tor a utility SFP crane 0
1999 I fired licensin-g support specialist 0
1999 Received first 125/10 SEP NUREG 0554 replacement trolley 2000 PI3ICO completed NUPIC audit placing ACECO on there ASI, 2000 Received OCNGS 125/10 SIP NUREG 0554 replacement trolley 2001 Received third NUREG 0554 SFP hoist for INEEL project 2001 Received 4th, & 5th NUREG 0554 SIP cranes and hoist Imr utility 2001 Received orders From Boeing for 5th, 6th, & 7th SEP cranes for Vandenberg AFB Since 1996 all Boeing launch support cranes have been built by ACECO
OYSTER CREEK SFP DESIGN BASIS
"* Crane compliant to NUREG-0554
"* Crane Design compliant with CMAA #70
"° Crane compliant to Reg. Guide 1.29 (Seismic)
- Use NUREG-0612 Appendix C when applicable
- ASME NOG-1 supplements above criteria
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE OCNGS SFP DESIGN
- Hook designed with 10:1 safety factor (0612 Appendix C)
- Redundant reeving with 10:1 system safety factor
- Redundant Drum mounted Emergency Disc Caliper Brake a 15% wear factor included for wire rope, hooks, & brakes a Crush pad type equalizer/load transfer system
- Electrical control via variable frequency drives 0 Redundant hoist upper travel limits provided
° Over speed, over travel & rope protection limits provided
- Cab control with radio control back-up 0 Emergency Stop Buttons provided in cab & radio control a Testing & Inspection compliant with NOG-1 Section 7000
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"* Structural Systems
"* Electrical Systems
Mechanical Systems
- l~rovide Ihe caiergy to move and stop the load
- Mechanical components are active and subject to wear
- Design Basis is redundant Except single load path hook per NUREG-0612 Appendix C
- Seismic design is a consideration (normally not controlling)
Upper & Lower Load Blocks 0 Directly supLj; orts the load Single fai wri proof (NUREG-0612 Appendix C) 0 Critical Components including testing requirements:
Hook................. CMTR, UT, MT,& 200% Proof load test Hook Nut............ CMTR, UT, MT,& 200% Proof load test Crosshead............ CMTR, UT, MT Load Block Steel.... CMTR, Impact test Load Block Welds... MT or PT Sheave Pin............ CMTR, UT, MT Sheave................ C of C
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Wire rope
- Directly supp)orts the load
- Dual reeving provides a redundant load path
- 5:1 individual rope safety factor
- 10:1 system safety factor o Testing of the wire rope Breaking strength test from sample of the rope installed
- Testing of the wire rope end fittings 200% Proof Test based on wire rope strength
Equalizer /Load Transfer System
"* Equalizes rope tension during normal operation
"* Equalizer is single failure proof connecting the dual ropes
"* Design basis is enhanced safety (10:1 Safety Factor)
"* Absorbs energy during a broken rope event
"* Energy is absorbed via a honeycomb crush pad
"* Crush pad is contained in a double acting steel cylinder
"* The piston cylinder was proof load tested at the maximum load transfer value
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Braking Systems S1Holding
-rake systems are redundant Primary brake located on high speed shaft
-- Emergency brake located on drum providing redundant drive train
"* Holding brakes rated min. 165% torque where acting
"* Control brake is dynamic provided via the freq. drive
"* All brakes were individually tested at 125% of DRL
- Any of thie brakes can stop the DRL load in less than 3" inches
Structural Systems
"* Support the mnechanical & electrical systems
"* Structure provides support during & after the SSE
"* Structural systems are passive & not prone to wear
Trolley Frame
"* Indirectly supports the load
"* Is passive and therefore is not subject to wear
"* Is seismically designed to support the load during & after OBE & SSE
"* Is a welded steel plate structure
"* Critical Components testing requirements include:
Load Girt..... CMTR, C of C, & Impact test Welds.......... MT or PT
Drum Catching Device
"* Structural members located V2" below drums
"* Support the drum in the event of shaft or support failure
"* Drum shell f'ailure is not a credible event
"* Critical Con-ponents testing requirements include:
- Device..........CMTR, C of C, & Impact test
Electrical System
"* Provides control of the mechanical energy to move load
"* Operator at all times has 2 means of stopping system
"* Power is removed from crane on sensing of vibration on the floor
"* Removal of power places crane in safe condition
- Electrical system is not required to function during a seismic event
Flux Vector Variable Frequency Drive
"* Drive is the basis of the electrical system
"* Drive controls the motor & primary brake
"* Provides control braking via dynamic braking
"° Drive provides the following features Torque proving at start Brake checking Load Float (Zero speed)
.- Ability to precisely limit input drive torque
Hoist Upper Travel Limits Redundant limits of differing designs
"* Primary i:,; gýcar type control limit
"* Final is the block actuated (paddle) power !ype limit
"* Final limit removes power from motor
"* Limits are NUREG-0554 alternate design
Over Speed Limits
"* Senses hoist over speed independent of the flux vector drive
"* Limit is electrically isolated from drive
"° Limit provides control redundancy
"* Actuation of limit sets both holding brakes stopping load
Over Weight Limit 0 Limit senses over capacity lifts setting brakes 0 Limit senses load hang-up
- Limit protects crane from over stress
- Limit actuation only permits hoist lowering
Wire Rope Protection Limits
"* Drum mnis-spioling limit protects wire rope from mis spooling onto drum
"* Unbalanced load limit protects wire rope & crane from off center lifts
"* Actuation of either limit stops hoisting motion
Emergency Stop Buttons
"* Remove power from the crane Sets holding brakes Placing crane in a safe condition
"* Button located in the cab
"* Toggle switch located on each radio control
Tests completed to confirm Design Compliant with Section 7000 of NOG-1 Tests at ACI'.tCO's test facility Functioinal & Dimensional tests Mechanical & Electrical Inspection 100% & 125% DRL load tests 125% DRL independent brake tests (Stopped within 3")
- Tests at OCNGS Functional test with load Dimensional inspection Mechanical & Electrical Inspection
- Completed QA documentation package provided
Compliance with NUREG-0554
"* Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA) was performed No single failure points were identified
"* NtJREG-0554/0612 compliance matrix was prepared
- No exceptions noted by licensee
"* Design compliance with NUREG-0554 using 0612 Appendix C
Summary of SFP Crane
- New 125/10 ton SFP trolley
- Crane comnpliant to NUREG-0554/0612
- 10:1 safety factor on rope reeving system
- 15% wear factor included in key mechanical components
- Crush pad type equalizer/load transfer system 0 Two-block protection via redundant limit switches
- Redundant drum brake provides SFP hoisting design
- Operator at all times has 2 means of stopping system 0 Complete functional and load testing
- FMEA identitied no single failure points