L-MT-18-079, Ninth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions ...

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Ninth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions ...
ML18352A254
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/17/2018
From: Church C
Northern States Power Company, Minnesota, Xcel Energy
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CAC MF4376, EA-13-109, L-MT-18-079
Download: ML18352A254 (17)
v • d • e


Text

2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362 fl Xcel Energy*

RESP ON SI BL E BY NAT U RE 800.895.4999 xcelenergy.com December 17, 2018 L-MT-18-079 10 CFR 2.202 EA-13-109 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No. 50-263 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Ninth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2 (CAC No. MF4376)

References:

1) NRC Order Number EA-13-109, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions," dated June 6, 2013. (ADAMS Accession No. ML13143A334)
2) NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2013-02, "Compliance with Order EA-13-109, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions," Revision 0, dated November 14, 2013.

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13304B836)

3) Letter from D. Skeen (NRC) to J. Pollock (NEI), Endorsement of Hardened Containment Venting System (HCVS) Phase 1 Overall Integrated Plan Template (EA-13-109) Rev 0, dated May 14, 2014.

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14128A219)

4) NEI 13-02, "Industry Guidance for Compliance with Order EA-13-109,"

Revision 0, dated November 2013. (ADAMS Accession No. ML13316A853)

Document Control Desk Page 2

5) Letter from K. Fili (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRG),

"MNGP's Phase 1 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109),"

L-MT-14-052, dated June 30, 2014. (ADAMS Accession No. ML14183A412)

6) Letter from K. Fili (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRG),

"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: First Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109)," L-MT-14-092, dated December 16, 2014. (ADAMS Accession No. ML14353A215)

7) Letter from P. Gardner (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRG),

"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phase 1," L-MT-15-031, dated June 22, 2015.

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15173A176)

8) NEI 13-02, "Industry Guidance for Compliance with Order EA-13-109,"

Revision 1, dated April 2015. (ADAMS Accession No. ML15113B318)

9) NRG Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2015-01, "Compliance with Phase 2 of Order EA-13-109, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions," Revision 0, dated April 2015. (ADAMS Accession No. ML15104A118)
10) Letter from P. Gardner (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRG),

"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's Phase 2 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109) including Phase 1 Status Report," L-MT-15-090, dated December 17, 2015. (ADAMS Accession No. ML15356A120)

Document Control Desk Page 3

11) Letter from P. Gardner (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),

"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Fourth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2," L-MT-16-034, dated June 17, 2016. (ADAMS Accession No. ML16169A309)

12) Letter from M. Halter (NRC) to P. Gardner (NSPM), "Subject Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Phase One of Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) (TAC No. MF4376),"dated April 2, 2015. (ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A167)
13) Letter from J. Quichocho (NRC) to P. Gardner (NSPM), "

Subject:

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Phase 2 of Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents)

(CAC No. MF4376),"dated September 6, 2016. (ADAMS Accession No. ML16244A120)

14) Letter from P. Gardner (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),

"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Fifth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2," L-MT-16-072, dated December 19, 2016. (ADAMS Accession No. ML16354A666)

15) Letter from P. Gardner (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),

"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Sixth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2," L-MT-17-042, dated June 14, 2017.

(ADAMS Accession No. ML17166A051)

16) Letter from C. Church (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),

"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Seventh Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2," L-MT-17-081, dated December 21, 2017. (ADAMS Accession No. ML17355A508)

17) Letter from R. Auluck (NRC) to C. Church (NSPM), "

Subject:

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Report for the Audit of Licensee Responses to Interim Staff Evaluations Open Items Related to NRC Order EA-13-109 to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe

Document Control Desk Page4 Accident Conditions (CAC NO. MF3476; EPID L-2014-JLD-0052),"

dated April 10, 2018. (ADAMS Accession No. ML18094A804)

18) Letter from R. Auluck (NRG) to C. Church (NSPM), "

Subject:

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Correction to the Report for the Audit of Licensee Responses to Interim Staff Evaluations Open Items Related to NRG Order EA-13-109 to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (CAC NO. MF3476; EPID L-2014-JLD-0052)," dated May 14, 2018. (ADAMS Accession No. ML18130A921)

19) Letter from C. Church (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRG),

"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Eighth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2," L-MT-18-035, dated June 26, 2018. (ADAMS Accession No. ML18177A422)

On June 6, 2013, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) issued Order EA-13-109 (Reference 1) to Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation (NSPM),

doing business as Xcel Energy. Reference 1 was effective immediately and directs NSPM to install a reliable hardened venting capability for pre-core damage and under severe accident conditions, including those involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris, for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP). Specific requirements are outlined in Attachment 2 of Reference 1.

Reference 1 required submission of a Phase 1 Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) pursuant to Section IV, Condition D. References 2 and 3 endorse industry guidance document, NEI 13-02, Revision O (Reference 4) with clarifications and exceptions. Reference 5 provided the MNGP Phase 1 OIP.

Reference 1 requires submission of a status report at six-month intervals following submittal of the Phase 1 OIP. References 2 and 4 provide direction regarding the content of the status reports. References 6 and 7 provided the first and second six-month status reports for Phase 1 of the order.

In Reference 9, the NRG endorsed industry guidance document NEI 13-02, Revision 1 (Reference 8) with clarifications and exceptions identified in Reference 9. NEI 13-02, Revision 1 provides guidance for implementing Phase 2 of Order EA-13-109.

Reference 10 provided a combined Phase 1 and 2 OIP and provided an updated status of Phase 1 of the order. Reference 11 provided the fourth status report which included both Phase 1 and Phase 2 status updates. In References 12 and 13, the NRG provided interim staff evaluations (ISEs) for HCVS Order Phase 1 and 2 OIPs, respectively. In References 14, 15, 16, and 19 NSPM provided the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth HCVS Order status reports.

Document Control Desk Page 5 The purpose of this letter is to provide the ninth six-month status report pursuant to Section IV, Condition D, of Reference 1, that delineates progress made in implementing the requirements of Reference 1. Enclosure 1 provides the status report, which includes an update of Phase 1 and 2 milestone accomplishments, including any changes to the compliance method, schedule, or need for relief and the basis, if any.

Please contact Stephen Sollom, Senior Regulatory Affairs Engineer, at 612-342-8982, if additional information or clarification is required.

Summary of Commitments This letter makes no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December J.1:., 2018.

ristopher R. Church Site Vice President, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosure (1) cc: Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC Resident Inspector, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC

L-MT-18-079 ENCLOSURE 1 MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT NINTH SIX-MONTH STATUS REPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NRC ORDER EA-13-109, "ORDER MODIFYING LICENSES WITH REGARD TO RELIABLE HARDENED CONTAINMENT VENTS CAPABLE OF OPERATION UNDER SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, PHASES 1 AND 2" 1.0 Introduction Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, developed a Phase 1 Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) (Reference 1) for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), in response to Reference 2. The Phase 1 OIP documents the installation of a Hardened Containment Vent System (HCVS) that provides a reliable wetwell hardened venting capability for pre-core damage and under severe accident conditions, including those involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris. Starting with the fourth six-month status report (Reference 12),

updates of milestone accomplishments were based on the combined Phase 1 and 2 OIP, (Reference 9). The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth six-month status reports were provided in References 14, 15, 16, and 19. Previous status reports for Phase 1 only were provided to the NRG in References 6 and 8.

NSPM developed an updated and combined Phase 1 and 2 OIP (Reference 9),

documenting:

1. The installation of a HCVS that provides a reliable hardened venting capability for pre-core damage and under severe accident conditions, including those involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris, in response to Reference 2.
2. An alternative venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a drywell vent is needed to protect the containment from overpressure related failure under severe accident conditions, including those that involve a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris, in response to Reference 2.

This enclosure provides an update of milestone accomplishments since submittal of the combined Phase 1 and 2 OIP, including any changes to the compliance method, schedule, or need for relief/relaxation and the basis, if any.

2.0 Milestone Accomplishments The original milestone schedule with target dates was provided in Part 5 of the combined Phase 1 and Phase 2 OIP (Reference 9). The milestone dates are updated, if necessary, in the six-month status reports. One milestone was completed since the Page 1 of 12

L-MT-18-079 last six-month status report and prior to November 30, 2018. The milestone is related to Phase 2 of the HCVS Order. The milestone completed was:

  • Phase 2 Walk Through Demonstration/Functional Test 3.0 Milestone Schedule Status The following provides an update to Part 5 of the combined Phase 1 and 2 OIP (Reference 9). It provides the activity status of each item, and whether the expected completion date has changed. The dates are planning dates subject to change as design and implementation details are developed (i.e., not considered formal regulatory commitments). This schedule is current as of November 30, 2018.

Submit 6 Month Updates:

December Update 1 Complete 2014 Update 2 June 2015 Complete Update 3 (with Phase 2 December Complete OIP) 2015 Update 4 June 2016 Complete December Update 5 Complete 2016 Update 6 June 2017 Complete December Update 7 Complete 2017 Update 8 June 2018 Complete December Complete with Update 9 2018 this Submittal Page 2 of 12

L-MT-18-079 Phase 1 Modifications:

Hold preliminary/conceptual June 2014 Complete design meeting Design Engineering November Complete On-site/Complete 2016 Implementation Outage May 2017 Complete Walk Through Demonstration/Fun ctiona I May 2017 Complete Test Phase 1 Procedure Changes Active:

Operations Procedure May 2017 Complete Changes Developed Site Specific Maintenance May 2017 Complete Procedure Developed Procedure Changes Active May 2017 Complete Phase 1 Training:

Training Complete May 2017 Complete Phase 1 Completion:

HCVS Implementation May 2017 Complete Milestone is not Submit Completion Report July 2017 Not Required required per NRC direction.

Phase 2 Modifications:

Page 3 of 12

L-MT-18-079 Hold preliminary/conceptual October 2015 Complete design meeting Design Engineering June 2018 Complete On-site/Complete Implementation Outage May 2019 Not Started Walk Through Demonstration/Functional May 2019 Complete Test Phase 2 Procedure Changes Active:

Operations Procedure December Complete Changes Developed 2018 Site Specific Maintenance December Started Procedure Developed 2018 Procedure Changes Active May 2019 Started Phase 2 Training:

Training Complete May 2019 Complete Phase 2 Completion:

HCVS Implementation May 2019 Started Submit Completion Report July 2019 Not Started 4.0 Proposed Changes to Compliance Method There are no changes to the compliance methods as documented in the combined Phase 1 and 2 OIP (Reference 9). Updates to information in the OIP are discussed below.

OIP Update - Electrical Component Qualification Page 4 of 12

L-MT-18-079 Enclosure 1 In Reference 9, Part 2, NSPM stated that any HCVS order electrical components that interface with Class 1E power sources would be considered safety related and that the remaining components would be considered augmented quality components.

As described in the response to ISE Open Item 10 in Reference 15, not all electrical components installed for the HCVS Order Phase 1 compliance are safety related or augmented quality. However, all components are qualified for the expected conditions that may occur should an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) with core damage occur.

OIP Update - Electrical Conduit Seismic Classification In Reference 9, Part 2, NSPM stated that conduit designs will be installed to Seismic Class 1 Criteria.

The conduit work in support of the HCVS modifications to complete Phase 1 of the order were considered non-safety related installations. The conduit that was installed was required to be Underwriters Laboratory (UL) listed. The conduit was installed to Seismic 11/1 criteria, which ensures the conduit will not collapse in a design basis seismic event.

OIP Update - Backup Operating Station Valve Controls In Reference 9, Part 2, NSPM stated that controls required to open the HCVS at the backup operating station Remote Operating Station (ROS) will be secured.

A key-lock switch is provided for the HCVS Primary Containment Isolation Valve controls at the Alternate Shutdown System Panel where the Primary Operating Station is provided. However, at the nitrogen bottles, manual isolation valves were installed, and these valves are normally closed but are not secured. Multiple actions (i.e. at the nitrogen bottles and at the ROS) are required to open an HCVS containment isolation valve or to rupture the rupture disk, therefore, inadvertent operation is not credible.

OIP Update - Drill/Exercise Performance In Reference 9, Part 4, NSPM stated that the site will utilize the guidance provided in NEI 13-06 and 14-01 for guidance related to drills, tabletops, or exercises for HCVS operation. In addition, the site will integrate these requirements with compliance to any rulemaking resulting from the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendations 8 and 9.

It is NSPM's intention to comply with drill/exercise performance requirements consistent with the final 10 CFR 50.155 language. NSPM will continue to utilize the guidance of NEI 13-06 and NEI 14-01 insofar as it is consistent with the regulatory requirements promulgated in the final rulemaking.

OIP Update - SAWA and SAWM Flowrates Page 5 of 12

L-MT-18-079 In Reference 9, Part 3, NSPM stated that the Severe Accident Water Addition (SAWA) flowrate for MNGP is 305 gpm and the Severe Accident Water Management (SAWM) flowrate is 61 gpm.

A refined evaluation of the required SAWA and SAWM flowrates has been completed for MNGP. As a result, SAWA flow is now 285 gpm and SAWM flow is now 57 gpm.

5.0 Need and Basis for Relief/Relaxation from the Requirements of the Order NSPM expects to comply with the order implementation date and no relief/relaxation is required at this time.

6.0 Open Items from Combined Overall Integrated Plan and Interim Staff Evaluation The following tables provide a summary of the open items documented in the combined Phase 1 and 2 OIP (Reference 9) and the Interim Staff Evaluations (ISE) (References 7 and 13) and the status of each item.

1. Follow industry guidance on missile protection for HCVS. Closed - see ISE Phase 1 Open Item 5
2. Identify the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> power supply for the HCVS. Closed - see ISE Phase 1 Open Item 1
3. Determine radiological conditions for the FLEX portable equipment Closed - see staging areas. ISE Phase 1 Open Item 3
4. Evaluate the Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS) panel and Closed - see Backup HCVS Operation Station locations for accessibility, ISE Phase 1 habitability, staffing sufficiency, associated pathways from the Open Items 3 control room and communication capability with vent-use decision and 7 makers.
5. Determine approach or combination of approaches to control Closed-see hydrogen. ISE Phase 1 Open Items 8 and 9 Page 6 of 12

L-MT-18-079

6. Determine the Qualification Method for HCVS instrumentation. Closed - see ISE Phase 1 Open Item 10
7. Evaluate the effects of radiological and temperature constraints on Closed - see the deployment of nitrogen bottles after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ISE Phase 1 Open Item 3
8. Evaluate HCVS battery charger location for accessibility, Closed-see habitability, staffing sufficiency, associated pathways from control ISE Phase 1 room and communication capability with vent-use decision Open Items 3 makers. and 7
1. Determine approach to repower Low Pressure Coolant Injection Complete (LPCI) swing bus from FLEX PDG. See Reference 16
1. Make available for NRG staff audit the final sizing evaluation for Closed See HCVS batteries/battery charger including incorporation into FLEX Reference 18 Diesel Generator (DG) loading calculation.

Closed See

2. Make available for NRG staff audit documentation of the HCVS Reference 18 nitrogen pneumatic system design including sizing and location.

Closed See

3. Make available for NRG staff audit an evaluation of temperature Reference 18 and radiological conditions to ensure that operating personnel can safely access and operate controls and support equipment.
4. Make available for NRG staff audit analyses demonstrating that Closed See HCVS has the capacity to vent the steam/energy equivalent of one Reference 18 percent of licensed/rated thermal power (unless a lower value is justified), and that the suppression pool and the HCVS together are able to absorb and reject decay heat, such that following a reactor shutdown from full power containment pressure is restored and then maintained below the primary containment design pressure and the primary containment pressure limit.

Page 7 of 12

L-MT-18-079

5. Make available for NRG staff audit the seismic and tornado missile Closed See final design criteria for the HCVS stack. Reference 18 and Additional Information in Enclosure 2 of Reference 19
6. Make available for NRG staff audit the descriptions of local Closed See conditions (temperature, radiation and humidity) anticipated during Reference 18 Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) and severe accident for the components (valves, instrumentation, sensors, transmitters, indicators, electronics, control devices, etc.) required for HCVS venting including confirmation that the components are capable of performing their functions during ELAP and severe accident conditions.
7. Make available for NRG staff audit documentation that Closed See demonstrates adequate communication between the remote Reference 18 HCVS operation locations and HCVS decision makers during ELAP and severe accident conditions.
8. Provide a description of the final design of the HCVS to address Closed See hydrogen detonation and deflagration. Reference 18
9. Provide a description of the strategies for hydrogen control that Closed See minimizes the potential for hydrogen gas migration and ingress Reference 18 into the reactor building or other buildings.
10. Make available for NRG staff audit descriptions of all Closed See instrumentation and controls (existing and planned) necessary to Reference 18 implement this order including qualification methods.
11. Make available for NRG staff audit documentation of an evaluation Closed See verifying the existing containment isolation valves, relied upon for Reference 18 the HCVS, will open under the maximum expected differential pressure during Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE) and severe accident wetwell venting.

Page 8 of 12

L-MT-18-079

1. Licensee to provide the plant specific justification for SAWA Closed See

[Severe Accident Water Addition] flow capacity less than specified Reference in the guidance in NEI 13-02, Section 4.1.1.2. 18

2. Licensee to evaluate the SAWA equipment and controls, as well as Closed See the ingress and egress paths for the expected severe accident Reference conditions (temperature, humidity, radiation) for the sustained 18 operating period.
3. Licensee to demonstrate how instrumentation and equipment being Closed See used for SAWA and supporting equipment is capable to perform for Reference the sustained operating period under the expected temperature 18 and radiological conditions.
4. Licensee to demonstrate that containment failure as a result of Closed See overpressure can be prevented without a drywell vent during Reference severe accident conditions. 18
5. Licensee to demonstrate how the plant is bounded by the reference Closed See plant analysis that shows the SAWM [Severe Accident Water Reference Management] strategy is successful in making it unlikely that a 18 drywell vent is needed.
6. Licensee to demonstrate that there is adequate communication Closed See between the MGR [Main Control Room] and the Intake Structure Reference operator at the FLEX manual valve during severe accident 18 conditions.
7. Licensee to demonstrate the SAWM flow instrumentation Closed See qualification for the expected environmental conditions. Reference 18 7.0 Interim Staff Evaluation Impacts There are no potential impacts to the Phase 1 or 2 ISE identified at this time.

8.0 References

1. Letter from K. Fili (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRG), "MNGP's Phase 1 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number Page 9 of 12

L-MT-18-079 EA-13-109)," L-MT-14-052, dated June 30, 2014. (ADAMS Accession No. ML14183A412)

2. NRC Order Number EA-13-109, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions," dated June 6, 2013. (ADAMS Accession No. ML13143A334)
3. NEI 13-02, "Industry Guidance for Compliance with Order EA-13-109," Revision 0, dated November 2013. (ADAMS Accession No. ML13316A853)
4. NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2013-02, "Compliance with Order EA-13-109, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions,"

Revision 0, dated November 14, 2013. (ADAMS Accession No. ML13304B836)

5. Letter from D. Skeen (NRC) to J. Pollock (NEI), Endorsement of Hardened Containment Venting System (HCVS) Phase 1 Overall Integrated Plan Template (EA-13-109) Rev 0, dated May 14, 2014. (ADAMS Accession No. ML14128A219)
6. Letter from K. Fili (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: First Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109)," L-MT-14-092, dated December 16, 2014. (ADAMS Accession No. ML14353A215)
7. Letter from M. Halter (NRC) to P. Gardner (NSPM). "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Interim Staff Evaluation Relating To Overall Integrated Plan In Response To Phase One Of Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) (TAC No. MF4376)," dated April 2, 2015. (ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A167)
8. Letter from P. Gardner (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phase 1," L-MT-15-031, dated June 22, 2015.

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15173A176)

9. Letter from P. Gardner (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's Phase 2 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109) including Phase 1 Status Report,"

L-MT-15-090, dated December 17, 2015. (ADAMS Accession No. ML15356A120)

10. NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2015-01, "Compliance with Phase 2 of Order EA-13-109, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions,"

Revision 0, dated April 2015. (ADAMS Accession No. ML15104A118)

Page 10 of 12

L-MT-18-079

11. NEI 13-02, "Industry Guidance for Compliance with Order EA-13-109," Revision 1, dated April 2015. (ADAMS Accession No. ML151138318)
12. Letter from P. Gardner (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Fourth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2," L-MT-16-034, dated June 17, 2016.

(ADAMS Accession No. ML16169A309)

13. Letter from J. Quichocho (NRC) to P. Gardner (NSPM), "

Subject:

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Phase 2 of Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) (CAC No. MF4376),"dated September 6, 2016.

(ADAMS Accession No. ML16244A120)

14. Letter from P. Gardner (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Fifth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2," L-MT-16-072, dated December 19, 2016. (ADAMS Accession No. ML16354A666)
15. Letter from P. Gardner (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Sixth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2," L-MT-17-042, dated June 14, 2017.

(ADAMS Accession No. ML17166A051)

16. Letter from C. Church (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Seventh Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2," L-MT-17-081, dated December 21, 2017. (ADAMS Accession No. ML17355A508)
17. Letter from R. Auluck (NRC) to C. Church (NSPM), "

Subject:

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Report for the Audit of Licensee Responses to Interim Staff Evaluations Open Items Related to NRC Order EA-13-109 to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (CAC NO. MF3476; EPID L-2014-JLD-0052)," dated April 10, 2018. (ADAMS Accession No. ML18094A804)

18. Letter from R. Au luck (NRC) to C. Church (NSPM), "

Subject:

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant- Correction to the Report for the Audit of Licensee Responses to Interim Staff Evaluations Open Items Related to NRC Order EA-13-109 to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (CAC NO.

Page 11 of 12

L-MT-18-079 MF3476; EPID L-2014-JLD-0052)," dated May 14, 2018. (ADAMS Accession No. ML18130A921)

19. Letter from C. Church (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC), "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant: Eighth Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109), Phases 1 and 2," L-MT-18-035, dated June 26, 2018. (ADAMS Accession No. ML18177A422)

Page 12 of 12

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=L-MT-18-079,_Ninth_Six-Month_Status_Report_in_Response_to_June_6,_2013_Commission_Order_Modifying_Licenses_with_Regard_to_Reliable_Hardened_Containment_Vents_Capable_of_Operation_Under_Severe_Accident_Conditions_...&oldid=2397357"