L-96-296, LER 96-S02-00:on 961011,failed to Terminate Access of Temporary Licensee Employee.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Security Unassigned Card Key & Plant Administrative Procedure 0010509 Revised
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L-96-296 l
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory conesission 4 Attn Document Control Desk l Washington, DC 20555 l Re St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 i Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 l Reportable 1Nont: 96-802 Date of Event: October 11, 1996 Failure to Terminata Accaan of Taunoraru Licanmaa
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F=nleyna due to Lack of Notification of Security l
1 i The enclosed Safeguards Event Report is being submitted pursuant to
. the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 to provida notification of the subject event.
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very t ly yours,
. JAS
, . A. stall i Vice President i St. Lucia Plant l
l JAS/WGW/ejb i
j Attachment
'. cca Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC l
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant
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! ttcfNRFF CONTACT FOR THIS LEA f121 j . cme viti o= muwein . A,.. c .
i i W. G. WNte, Plant Security Supervisor (561) 468-4176 I
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EXPECTED j yta submission Ilf yes, complete EXPfCTED sVBMs5SloN DATEl. X NO D ATE (151 1
! AS4 TRACT (Urrut to teoo speces. i.e., approstrnately 15 eingle speced typewntion kneel fiel
! On July 28,1996 a temporary licensee employee completed his work assignment. On September 19,1996, while l comparing a listing of individuals who have not accessed St. Lucie Plant within the last 30 days to a data base listing of
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cctive Florida Power & Ught Company employees, three individuals, including the above temporary amployee, were l found to have been terminated from employment but still retained site access. On discovery, the s.ibiect card keys were 4
d:leted tuneasignod) from the security system. On October 9,1996, while in-processing one of the three individuals
, who had their access unassigned on September 19,1996, for unescorted access as a temporary employee,it was noted j that the individosJ had used Ns card key on three occasions, August 7, 9, and 15,1996, for a total of thirteen hours.
These uses occurred after he ended Ns temporary employment on July 28,1996. Upon discovery, this event ws:
logged in the Safeguards Log on October 11,1996. St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 were operating in mode 1 at 100% power at the time of discovery. Further review and evaluation resulted in a decision to notify the NucIsar Regulatory Commission Operations Center pursuant to 10 CFR Part 73, which occurred on October 16,1996 at 1617 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.152685e-4 months <br />.
The cause of tNs event was cognitive personnel error on the part of licensee department supervisors who failed to follow Administrative Procedure 0010509 whsch requires notification to security upon employee term.aations.
i l Corrective Actions: 1. Security unassigned card keys. 2. All department heads were required to validate the continued plant access for alllicensee and contractor employees under their cogni2ance. 3. Security verified that all Nuclear Division employees released since January 1,1996, did not have site access or were since re-badged. 4. Security
- r; viewed a notwas list to verify the employment status of personnel with 30 day unused key cards. 5. Plant procedure i was revised to reflect new site access requirements. 6. The periodic vital area access review was revised and improved.
- 7. Plant management will be trained in the process for terminating employees' employment. 8. Guidance will be t h
- ':-;+1 on the process for terminating employment.
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Ienc Pdfus SeeA U.S. 880cLEAA/ REGULATORY rmmaam 64- DSI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION sam rry maur m nomrr tra p ara'al PA GF f31 YtM ST, LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 2 OF 4 96 -
SO2 - 00 TEXT IW more space in req &ent. une endtonet copies of NRC Form 36&&l l111 CESCAIFDORLOE.IHE1YENT On July 28,1996 a temporary licensee employee completed his work assignment at the end of a scheduled refueling outage. On September 19,1996, wNie the site's Access Control Specialist was cross referencing a listing of individuals who have not used their site access badges witNo the last 30 days against a personnel data base identifying active Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) employees, three indivaals with active site access no longer employed by FPL were identified. The site access card keys were unassigned from the site security computer. No further actions or notifications were taken.
Subsequent to July 28,1996, one of the above described individuals sought and gained employment at Turkey Point Plant. St. Lucie Plant was requested to process the individual for re-hire on October 7,1996. On October 9,1996, the Security Access Control Specialist noted that the individual had gained access to St. Lucie Plant on J.ugust 7,9, and 15, 1996, although No employment was terminated on July 28,1996. The individual was interviewed concoming Ns entry to the site: he stated that the three events of site access were to interview for possible employment. The interviewers on these three dates were identified. The Access Control Specialist discussed the accesses with the Security l
Operations Supervisor and incorrectly concluded that there was no reportability requirement since access had been terminated by Security once the need for termination was identified and there was no malevolent intent with regard to l the individual's access during the three events in August.
On October 11,1996, the St. Lucie Plant Security Supervisor became aware of the unauthorized access. The Security Supervisor contacted the FPL personnel who had interviewed the subject to confirm the contacts and the individual's interviews. Further investigation at that time revealed that two other individuals who had been terminated on July 27, 1996 and August 24,1996, respectively, had not had their site access unassigned. Neither of those individuals had cccessed the site between their termination and October 11,1996. On Oe;tober 11,1996, a Safeguards Event Log entry was made based on the fact that, upon discovery, employee site access was revoked. Additionally, it was cencluded that there was no malevolent intent by the individual who had gained site access, that the individual was known to plant personnel, arw' that he had properly completed all necessary screening to allow access previously and had been authorized site access. Through interviews with N: supervisors, it was determined that the employee was d:emed trustworthy and reliable and that Na employment had been terminated'under favorable conditions.
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Subsequent to this event, it was determined that a prompt notification was required which was made to the NRC Operations Center at 1817 hours0.021 days <br />0.505 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.913685e-4 months <br /> on October 16,1996.
CAUSEDE_THEE.VEMT The cause of the event was cognitive personnel error on the part of licensee department supervisors who failed to follow Administrative Procedure (AP) 0010509, Personnel and Material Control, which requires immediate notification to security upon employee termmations.
l ANALY111 OF THF FVFNT l
AP 0010609 requires that site Security be notified when an individual's site access is no longer needed. Additionally, oech individual granted unescorted access to the site is required to read and sign a badge responsibility Weet which instructs them to notify Security when their access to the site is no longer needed. This requirement is also stated in signs posted at all site ingress and ogress card readers. TNs requirement is also reinforced during plant access training. l Contrary to the above requirements and training, Security was not notified of these terminations.
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) . j fencPORM 3eGA U.S. NUcLEAA RESULATORy COMMISSION 64 Del LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION F Are ffY M a us f H DOCKET LER Ninumsaial PACE f 31 W se e vus j ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 3 OF 4 itKT 19 more apare Je retake 4 une eMtmet topies of NMC Fome 366Al (111 l ANALYEAR OF THE EVENTJContinued) l Between October 16,1996 and October 30,1996 a total of 11 individuals were identified where Security was not property informed of termination of employment. None other of the 11 individuals had site access between the time of i
their termination of employment and when Security determined that site access remained in effect. These events were I
logged in the Safeguards Event Log. Safety systems were not affected or threatened by this event nor was there a
! throat to the public health and safety.
l COBRECINF ACTIONS i
j 1. Upon discovery of terminated employment, Security unassigned the card key for the individuals.
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, 2. A letter was sent to all department heads requiring validation of the need for continued plant access for all l licensee and contractor employees under their cognizance. The validation was completed by November 1,1996. i
! 3. The Access Control Specialist used a 30 day access non use list to verify that individuals who had not used their l card key within the last 30 days were e98 employed. This was completed on October 24,1996 and no I I discrepancies were found.
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- 4. Security verified, from a list supplied by FPL Human Resources, that all FPL Nuclear Division employees released since January 1,1996 did not retain site access. This was completed on October 30,1996.
- 5. Plant Administrative Procedure 0010509 was revised to inc[ude a requirement to identify employees as either l full time or temporary. For temporary employees. a date when site access will be terminated is now required.
l This procedure will be further revised by November 22,1996, to include a processing checklist that will specify the required actions which must be completed upon termination of employment.
. 6. The 31 day review for vital area access was revised to require a review by plant departments to ensure that
. listed personnel require ongoing access to the plant. The review is required to be retumed to Security with such an endorsement.
! 7. Security personnel were re-instructed on security reportability requirements and a detailed review of all relevant l regulatory documentation on reportability requirements was conducted. This was completed on November 4 1996.
- 8. Site management and supervisory personnel will be trained on the existing procedures and requirements concoming the necessary interface between site departments and Security for gaining site access and
- termination. This topic will be included in the ' Basics of Supervision
- courss which is scheduled for plant supervisors and managers between November 4,1996 and December 31,1996.
- 9. Nuclear Division guidance will be developed by December 31,1996, to outline the interface requirements j between Human Resources Security, and site departments when terminating an individuals employment with 4 FPL for any rosson.
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aste Fonte astA 64-sol 1
g 4 8 NRC70RM 34GA U.S. NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMIS$50h H est LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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- "mE E ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 4 OF 4 96 - SO2 -
00 TEXT (# mere spees As regahed, we aMabaaf cW of NAC Form Jd&Af (17)
ADOmONALJNFDAMATION F-M e- Idantification No Security System failures existed for tNs event.
Paav6= non., Fwants None with regards to unauthorized access.
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